This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Ongoing labors and watermills
- The difficulty of learning from baking to every labor and setting up the basic dispute
- Bava Kamma: winnowing and the assisting wind, and “the Torah prohibited planned labor”
- Comparing the medieval authorities (Rishonim) to the dispute between Magen Avraham and Even HaOzer
- “We do not tell a person: sin” and Tosafot in Eruvin
- The Riva: the forbidden act has already been done and will therefore finish on its own
- Defining the labor of baking: a condition for liability or part of the act itself
- The Rashash and the Minchat Chinukh: baking close to nightfall and the practical difference
- The implication for the discussion of “it finishes on its own” and a proposed answer for Magen Avraham
Summary
General Overview
The lecture examines the parameters of ongoing Sabbath labors, in which a person performs one act and the result is completed later on its own. It frames the dispute between Magen Avraham and most later authorities (Acharonim) regarding placing wheat into a watermill on the Sabbath as a fundamental question: does “completion on its own” create Torah-level liability in all labors, or only in labors where that is their normal mode, such as baking and trapping? The Bi’ur Halakhah, citing Even HaOzer, rejects Magen Avraham’s proofs and argues from baking and from spreading a net that one is liable even though the result comes on its own. But the lecture sharpens the point that the proof from baking is problematic if baking is a special labor whose nature is precisely that it works this way. The discussion is compared to a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) in Bava Kamma about “winnowing with the wind assisting him” and the explanation of “the Torah prohibited planned labor,” and it is tied to the question of how to define the labor of baking: is the prohibition the very act of sticking the bread to the oven, while the baking itself is only a condition for punishment, or is the baking itself part of the forbidden act? From there, the views of the Riva, the Rashash, and the Minchat Chinukh are brought, and it becomes clear that the definition of baking also affects whether one can learn from it to the broader class of labors that “finish on their own,” as well as the topic of removing the bread from the oven in order to prevent severe liability.
Ongoing labors and watermills
Magen Avraham leans toward saying that placing wheat into a watermill on the Sabbath does not incur a sin-offering, because the grinding comes afterward on its own. Accordingly, he defines it as a rabbinic prohibition, which allows instructing a non-Jew in a case of a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a commandment. The Bi’ur Halakhah cites Even HaOzer that all the later authorities rejected his proof from Tosafot on page 18, and that in the versions before us there is no hint of this in Sefer Mitzvot Gadol or Sefer Mitzvot Katan, nor is there proof in Maimonides in chapter 8. The Bi’ur Halakhah concludes that the later authorities agree that specifically the proofs Magen Avraham himself brought in parentheses from Tosafot on 17b show that one is liable even when it comes on its own, and on that basis he applies liability to a watermill as well.
The Bi’ur Halakhah stresses that in baking in an oven, even though the baking comes on its own in the end, it is still considered a full act. Even when one does not bring the fire to the bread but rather the bread to the fire, one is liable. And the same applies, he says, to grinding in a watermill: although the grinding comes on its own in the end, one is still liable. The lecture notes that the Bi’ur Halakhah is making a verbal distinction here between bringing the fire to the food and placing the food on the fire, but says that for our purposes, either way, in baking one is liable, and so the later authorities prove from here that completion on its own does not exempt.
The difficulty of learning from baking to every labor and setting up the basic dispute
The lecture argues that the proof from baking against Magen Avraham is problematic, because in baking, and similarly perhaps in trapping, that is simply the normal way the labor is done. Therefore the Torah necessarily imposed liability there even when the act “finishes on its own.” Magen Avraham can reply that baking is a special case, and one cannot learn from it to the labor of grinding, where the normal mode is by hand, as with a hand mill, whereas a watermill is not necessarily included in the Torah definition of the labor. Even HaOzer, by contrast, understands that from the labor of baking we learn a general principle for all labors: even when the result comes on its own, one is still liable. So the dispute about watermills is presented as a derivative dispute flowing from a deeper one about how to understand the labors of baking and trapping.
Bava Kamma: winnowing and the assisting wind, and “the Torah prohibited planned labor”
The Talmud in Bava Kamma 60 compares tort law and Sabbath law in the case of “he kindled it and the wind kindled it further,” and asks: “Why should it not be like winnowing, where the wind assists him?” It answers in the name of Rav Ashi that on the Sabbath, “the Torah prohibited planned labor,” whereas in torts it is “mere indirect causation, and indirect causation in damages is exempt.” Rashi explains “planned labor” as “his intent was fulfilled, for he is pleased that the wind assists him,” and from here the lecture presents a novel point: the principle of planned labor can operate not only leniently but also stringently—when the wind assists and the result was intended and welcome, the person is liable. The lecture notes that there are contradictions from other passages regarding indirect causation on the Sabbath, and so distinctions are made, but that is what emerges from Rashi here.
The Rosh brings Rav Ashi’s answer but adds that the liability on the Sabbath is “because this labor is mainly done by means of the wind.” From that the lecture infers that the Rosh limits liability to labors whose normal mode is to be done by means of the wind, unlike the broader understanding that seems to emerge from Rashi. The lecture discusses two possible ways to understand the Rosh: whether this is an exemption of the type of an unusual manner, where doing it through the wind is not the normal mode, or whether it is a question of what is included in the learned categories of labor from the Tabernacle when there are two normal ways to perform a labor. From here, a practical difference is raised regarding labors like grinding in a watermill, where the action is not unusual but is not the only normal way either.
Comparing the medieval authorities (Rishonim) to the dispute between Magen Avraham and Even HaOzer
The lecture says that the dispute between Rashi and the Rosh is very similar to the dispute between Even HaOzer and Magen Avraham. Magen Avraham is similar to the Rosh in that he recognizes liability for causative action only where that is the normal way the labor is done, such as baking or winnowing; whereas Even HaOzer is similar to Rashi in that he applies the rule of “his intent was fulfilled” even when the completion happens on its own. The lecture emphasizes that the Rosh himself can be interpreted in two ways and therefore is not necessarily forced to line up specifically with Magen Avraham, but in any case the debate about labors that finish on their own is shown to have deep roots already among the medieval authorities (Rishonim).
“We do not tell a person: sin” and Tosafot in Eruvin
The Talmud in our passage states that we do not tell a person to sin so that his fellow may benefit, and Tosafot ask from the passage in Eruvin where Rabbi holds that “it is preferable to a haver that he commit a light prohibition, rather than that an am ha’aretz commit a severe prohibition.” Tosafot answer that the permission there was said when the prohibition of the am ha’aretz occurred “through him,” such as when he told him, “Fill yourself a basket of figs from my fig tree.” In that case the haver bears responsibility for the act and prefers a light prohibition in order to prevent the severe prohibition caused through his own fault. Tosafot establish that when “the prohibition was not caused through him,” we do not tell a person to sin even a light prohibition in order that his fellow not come to a severe prohibition.
The Riva: the forbidden act has already been done and will therefore finish on its own
The Riva adds that even regarding the one who himself stuck the bread in the oven, one cannot derive from there that it is permitted to remove it, because there in Eruvin “the prohibition has not yet been done,” whereas here “the act of prohibition has already been done and it will therefore finish on its own.” The lecture raises a difficulty with the Riva’s words, because clearly if the bread is not ultimately baked there is no liability for a sin-offering or stoning. So how can one say that the prohibition has already been done? The lecture therefore suggests that the Riva understands the sticking of the bread to be the completion of the forbidden act, while the later baking is an external condition for punishment, not part of the definition of the act itself.
Defining the labor of baking: a condition for liability or part of the act itself
The lecture sets out two ways to define the labor of baking. One possibility is that the forbidden labor is the very act of sticking the dough or bread to the oven, and the baking is only a side condition in order to incur a sin-offering or stoning. Another possibility is that the forbidden act includes both sticking it in place and leaving it there until it bakes, such that the baking itself is part of the act. According to the first definition, one can understand the Riva’s language that the prohibition has already been done; even though punishment depends on actual baking taking place, removing it from the oven is not “saving” him from a transgression that has already happened. The lecture connects this to the idea that the intervention is meant to prevent future wrongdoing, not necessarily to save from punishment, and distinguishes between preventing a future forbidden act and “saving” an act already done from turning into one with severe consequences.
The Rashash and the Minchat Chinukh: baking close to nightfall and the practical difference
The Rashash compares sowing and baking and argues that just as in sowing one is liable even though rooting will happen only later, so too in baking one is liable even though the baking is done later on its own. The Rashash innovates that one who bakes on the Sabbath toward nightfall is liable even though there is not enough time for the baking to finish while it is still day, because the act of sticking it in place is the act that creates liability, and the completion can be after the Sabbath. The Minchat Chinukh disagrees and understands that the baking itself is part of the definition of the labor, so if the completion happens after the Sabbath it is not included in the labor of baking on the Sabbath. The lecture presents this as a sharp practical difference between the two definitions.
The implication for the discussion of “it finishes on its own” and a proposed answer for Magen Avraham
The lecture concludes that according to the Rashash, the whole discussion of a labor that finishes on its own becomes unnecessary with respect to baking, because the labor is complete with the act of sticking it in place, and the continuation is not part of the labor but only a condition. From this it is argued that one can formulate an answer for Magen Avraham for why one cannot learn from baking to every other labor—not only because baking is normally done that way, but because baking is not seen as an “ongoing” labor at all, rather as an act that is completed immediately, with the continuation serving only as a condition. The lecture ends by saying that the continuation of the clarification will be completed at the beginning of the next lecture, and closes by opening another question about indirect causation in torts and the possibility of liability under the law of fire, with reference to Bava Batra 26 and Tosafot’s discussion of the house of Bar Maryon in relation to winnowing and the assisting wind.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s begin. Last time we started dealing a bit with the parameters of the labor of baking, and we talked there—I started talking there, sorry—about the parameters not only of the labor of baking but of ongoing labors in general. Meaning, the question is whether, when a labor finishes on its own—I did some action, and the labor then finishes on its own—even in that case we are liable. Now, of course that’s the case in baking, right? In baking I put the food on the fire, or I put the fire—light the fire under the food—and the cooking or baking themselves happen afterward on their own. But it’s not at all simple that from baking you can learn to all the other labors. Last time we already saw Magen Avraham regarding a watermill. I’ll just briefly remind you—maybe I’ll share it for a moment. So the discussion there is about putting wheat into a watermill on the Sabbath, or telling a non-Jew to put the wheat into a mill operated by water. The context there is that instructing a non-Jew is permitted if it’s a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a commandment. Meaning, if I told a non-Jew to do an act that is itself only rabbinically prohibited, that’s what’s called a double rabbinic prohibition, and all this is being done for the sake of a commandment, like wheat on Passover or things of that kind. So the discussion that’s really in the background is: what is the law of putting wheat into a watermill? That’s what interests us. In terms of Magen Avraham’s context, the question is: if it’s rabbinic, then it would be permitted to tell a non-Jew to do it for the sake of a commandment; if it’s Torah-level, then it would be forbidden to tell a non-Jew to do it even for the sake of a commandment. By the way, that itself is also a dispute, but that’s generally how people rule. But for us what matters is specifically the parenthetical remark in Magen Avraham, meaning the question whether this really is rabbinic or Torah-level, irrespective of whether one may tell a non-Jew to do it or not. What matters for us is whether it’s Torah-level or rabbinic. So Magen Avraham says, and if the…
[Speaker B] That if it’s Torah-level, then it’s forbidden. What? If it’s Torah-level it’s forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Torah-level is certainly forbidden. But his claim is that it’s not Torah-level, only rabbinic. Why? Because this itself is a labor that finishes on its own, until he grinds it in a hand mill, right? In a watermill it’s only a rabbinic prohibition. And he proves this from the Talmud, that even if they put it in on the Sabbath there is no liability for a sin-offering, right? That’s what he says here: “Rather, it must be that even if they put it in on the Sabbath there is no liability for a sin-offering.” “And so wrote Sefer Mitzvot Gadol and Sefer Mitzvot Katan explicitly, and Tosafot on page 18,” and Tosafot in our passage he also mentions. But it’s analogous to sticking bread in an oven, and Tosafot in Menachot. In short, he brings several places from which it seems that it is in fact a Torah prohibition in the parentheses, but he himself claims it is not a Torah prohibition, and so too seems implied by Maimonides. Therefore his conclusion is that one may tell a non-Jew to do it, because it is a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a commandment. That’s Magen Avraham up to here; we saw his words last time. Now, Even HaOzer, as brought there in the Bi’ur Halakhah—let me read from the Bi’ur Halakhah: “See Magen Avraham who…” wait, let’s enlarge this a bit—“See Magen Avraham, who inclines to say that placing wheat into a watermill on the Sabbath incurs no liability for a sin-offering, because the grinding afterward comes on its own,” right? The grinding that happens later happens on its own, so there is no Torah prohibition here. “And he brought proof for this from Tosafot on page 18, and all the later authorities rejected his proof. And likewise in the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol and Sefer Mitzvot Katan before us no hint of this is found. And likewise in Maimonides in chapter 8 there is no proof for this.” In short, all the proofs he brings, according to the Bi’ur Halakhah, are not proofs. “And the later authorities agreed”—namely Eliyahu Rabbah and Even HaOzer and Degul MeRevavah and Chelkat Mechokek—to what Magen Avraham himself brought as proof from the words of Tosafot on page 17b. Specifically what Magen Avraham brought in parentheses—those, says the Bi’ur Halakhah, really are good proofs: what he brought in parentheses in favor of the view that this is a Torah prohibition. Right? Regarding a net—one who spreads a net, and at the time of spreading it an animal enters it and is trapped, that he is liable even though it comes on its own. “And so too when one bakes in an oven”—and this is the important point for us—“and so too when one bakes in an oven, even though the baking comes on its own in the end, nevertheless it is called a real act, even though he does not bring the fire to the bread but rather the bread to the fire, and the fire acts afterward on its own; even so, he is liable. And so too in our case, even though the grinding comes on its own in the end in a watermill, even so he is liable. And see Even HaOzer there for further proofs.” In short, he says that most later authorities reject Magen Avraham’s position and maintain that such a thing is a Torah prohibition. And the proof he brings here—he says there are more proofs in Even HaOzer—but the proof he brings here is from baking: in baking we see that someone who puts bread into the oven, even though the baking happens afterward on its own, is still liable. So you see that the fact that a labor finishes on its own does not exempt—it still…
[Speaker C] Regarding spreading a net, is that only if it enters at the time he spreads it, or also if it enters afterward?
[Speaker B] Obviously it means it enters afterward.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, regarding the trapping it could also be if it enters later. Whether it’s at the time of spreading or not is a specific discussion there in the passage. But for our purposes let’s leave that aside, because that takes us into the parameters of trapping. For us, even if it happens afterward. So the point is that something that happens later on its own does not—it does not—it does not exempt. It is also a Torah prohibition, against Magen Avraham. In parentheses I’ll just add: notice that he says baking is called a real act, even though one does not bring the fire to the bread but the bread to the fire. That implies that according to him, if I were to put the fire to the bread, then really—after all there are two ways of violating the prohibition of cooking. You can bring fire under the food, and you can also—not necessarily light it—but take an existing fire and place it under the pot. Or alternatively, you can take the pot and put it onto the fire. And the Bi’ur Halakhah says there’s a difference between these two things. When you bring the fire and place it under the food, that he does not call completion on its own. That he calls a direct act by hand.
[Speaker B] Yes.
[Speaker D] Obviously.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And only when you place the food on the fire are you, so to speak, not touching the fire; the fire isn’t acting by your force, and therefore that is a case of completion on its own. There’s room to hesitate here—it’s not so simple. Even if I put the fire under the food, in the end what does the cooking is still the fire. It happens on its own. But this is a standard halakhic distinction. Again, I’m not going into those details right now. For our purposes it doesn’t matter, because either way, in baking you are liable, and therefore the Bi’ur Halakhah and Even HaOzer and all those later authorities prove from here that labors which finish on their own also create liability. And then the practical difference is for a hand mill—if you put wheat into a hand mill, then even if it finishes on its own you’re liable. Of course I mean if you put it in on the Sabbath. If you put it in before the Sabbath, nobody would say you’re Torah-level liable. But if you put it in on the Sabbath, even though it finishes on its own, you’re liable.
[Speaker E] Wait, I understood—what is the issue of a hand mill here? We were talking about a watermill.
[Speaker C] A watermill, obviously.
[Speaker B] He distinguished—he’s distinguishing that a watermill is something else, it’s not the normal way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m talking about a watermill. You said a hand mill. Not a watermill—you said a hand mill. Sorry, sorry, a watermill. So the point is that with a hand mill I turn it—that’s a direct act by hand. Not only is it the normal way, it’s also not something that finishes on its own; I’m doing the action. That would be the parallel to bringing the fire under the food, not bringing the food to the fire. In any case, for our purposes, the proof the later authorities bring against Magen Avraham is a problematic proof. Because the proof is from the labor of baking—but in the labor of baking, and maybe also in trapping by the way, that is the way the labor is normally done. Meaning, after all, if we learn that we have a list of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor and one of them is baking or cooking, then we understand that, at least in baking and cooking, it doesn’t bother us that it finishes on its own. But it’s not certain that this is a general principle for all the Sabbath labors. It could be that in ordinary Sabbath labors, where the normal way to do it is directly by hand—for example, grinding, okay? In grinding, the normal way is to grind with a hand mill. If I do it with a watermill, that is an action that finishes on its own, and here it may be that one would be exempt, as Magen Avraham says. You ask him from baking? Magen Avraham will tell you: baking proves nothing against me. In baking, the normal and standard way to do it is precisely where the thing finishes on its own, finishes by itself. Therefore there, if the Torah imposed liability, obviously it imposed liability also in such a situation—otherwise how would anyone ever be liable for baking? In baking it’s always like that. Okay? But with a watermill, in the labor of grinding, one could say that what the Torah imposed liability for is only when the grinding is done by hand, like in a hand mill; but with a watermill, who says the Torah was talking about that? It could be that it’s permitted. Therefore the proof the later authorities bring against Magen Avraham is a very problematic proof. And basically what stands behind this is a question that really doesn’t concern a hand mill at all. The foundation of the dispute is the question what they hold regarding baking, and that’s why I’m bringing this whole dispute. The whole dispute begins from the question how one understands the labor of baking, not how one understands a hand mill. Why? Because Even HaOzer understands that the labor of baking is basically a labor that finishes on its own—but that’s not what makes it unique. From the labor of baking we learn to all labors that even if it finishes on its own, I am liable. Meaning, there is nothing special about the labor of baking in the fact that it finishes on its own; it’s a principle that is true of all labors. Magen Avraham, by contrast, says: what are you bringing me proofs from baking for? In baking, that’s a special rule within the labor of baking, because there its normal way is to be done on its own. Therefore there the definition of the labor includes even where it is done on its own. But don’t learn from here to the labor of grinding or other labors. So the argument between Magen Avraham and Even HaOzer—the argument about a watermill—is a derivative dispute. The beginning, the foundation of the dispute, is in the labors of baking and trapping. Because the labors of baking and trapping are both labors where the normal way of doing them is in a way that finishes on its own. Magen Avraham will say: if so, then in those particular labors it has been newly established for me that apparently one is liable even if it finishes on its own, but you can’t learn from there to other labors like grinding. Even HaOzer, by contrast, argues: no, there is nothing special about baking and trapping. Rather, from there we see the general principle that is true for all labors: even if it finishes on its own, one is still liable. Meaning, the question is whether the labor of baking is unique—that is Magen Avraham’s position—or whether it is a rule in all Sabbath labors that even if it finishes on its own, one is liable for it.
[Speaker F] Now, wait—so is the labor of baking like the labor of cooking?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. There isn’t a separate primary category called baking. The primary category is cooking. Baking is simply a type of cooking. Whether it’s a subcategory or a primary category isn’t important—it’s included in cooking. Okay? Now it seems that the basis of this dispute is found in the Talmud on page 60 in Bava Kamma. I don’t remember whether I mentioned this Talmudic passage.
[Speaker C] You gave it to us on the source sheet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the source sheet, yes. I didn’t mean whether I mentioned it in previous lectures.
[Speaker E] No, you didn’t mention it in the lecture.
[Speaker C] The Talmud…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because this Talmudic passage is an important point. Let’s look at it for a moment. The Talmud there asks a question from tort law to Sabbath law. “The rabbis taught: If one kindled a fire and the wind fanned it, if there was enough in his kindling to kindle it, he is liable, and if not, he is exempt.” There it’s talking about tort law. I lit a fire, and the wind took the fire, and the fire burned my fellow’s field. The question is whether I’m liable. So the answer is that if I needed the wind, and without it the damage would not have happened, then I’m exempt. To that the Talmud asks: why? Let it be like one who winnows and the wind assists him. Right? In Sabbath law we see that even though the wind assists, that does not exempt me—I am still liable. Where do we see that? In the labor of winnowing. If I throw the grain into the air and the wind blows away the chaff, and then the kernels fall down without the chaff, I have effectively separated the kernels from the chaff by means of the wind, and so I’m liable for winnowing. So we see that the help of the wind does not exempt in Sabbath law. So why in tort law, if I needed the help of the wind, am I exempt? Several answers are brought here. What interests me is the last answer. Rav Ashi said: “When we say ‘winnowing and the wind assists him,’ that applies specifically to Sabbath law, because the Torah prohibited planned labor; but here it is mere indirect causation, and indirect causation in damages is exempt.” He says there is a difference between the labor of winnowing—in Sabbath law, sorry—and tort law. In Sabbath law there is a rule that the Torah prohibited planned labor, and therefore, according to the simple meaning of the Talmud, it comes out that in Sabbath law even in indirect causation you will be liable. In tort law the rule is that indirect causation in damages is exempt. If you only caused the damage indirectly—the wind really did it, you were only an indirect cause—then you are exempt. But in Sabbath law it does not bother us that you are only an indirect cause; even where you did it by indirect causation, yes, through indirect causation, even then you will be liable, because the Torah prohibited planned labor. Rashi says here: “Planned labor—his intention was fulfilled, for he is pleased that the wind assists him.” What does that mean? Rashi writes like this: since why did he throw the chaff and the grain into the wind? Exactly so that the wind would blow away the chaff and the kernels would come down clean. Meaning, that was his plan from the outset, and his intention was fulfilled. Meaning, the wind came and did exactly what he thought should happen, what he wanted to happen. In such a case, in Sabbath law, you are liable. Meaning, in Sabbath law, even though in the end the result has only an indirect connection to you, you only caused it indirectly—still, if this was your plan from the outset and the plan was fulfilled, your intention was fulfilled, you are liable. And that is a special rule in Sabbath law. Therefore, in Sabbath law, winnowing with the wind assisting him is liable. But in tort law, if there is help from the wind, even if you planned it in advance, that doesn’t matter; once the wind caused the damage, and your contribution was only indirect, you are exempt. That is what emerges from Rashi. Just one note: in these words of Rashi there is an interesting novelty about the laws of planned labor, and it’s relevant and important for us. Why? Because according to Rashi, usually when we talk about planned labor, planned labor is a principle that comes to be lenient in Sabbath law. Meaning, even things for which elsewhere in Jewish law you would be liable—on the Sabbath there is some additional requirement in order to incur liability: it has to be planned labor. For example, if you do an unintended act, or a labor not needed for its own sake, or various things of that kind, or a destructive act, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the Talmud in various places connect these to the law of planned labor. Wherever the act cannot fit the definition of planned labor, in Sabbath law you are exempt, because there is such a requirement: in order to do a labor for which you will be liable, it has to be planned labor. By the way, the phrase “planned labor” is written regarding the Tabernacle, not regarding the Sabbath, but since the Sabbath is juxtaposed to the Tabernacle we learn from that juxtaposition that in Sabbath law too, planned labor is required in order to incur liability. Now usually that means there is an extra requirement in Sabbath law, which basically means it is a leniency, right? Because an extra requirement means that if this requirement is not met, then in Sabbath law you won’t be liable, even though elsewhere in Jewish law, where it does not specifically have to be planned labor, you would still be liable. That’s the usual way it’s learned. Here there is a very interesting novelty, at least according to Rashi: here the principle of planned labor is brought as a stringency, not a leniency.
[Speaker E] But that already appears in the Talmud, with the courtyard—where the courtyard is another courtyard. I didn’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Talmud we learned it appears that if…
[Speaker E] He extends his hand into the courtyard, and the question is whether he transfers it to his own courtyard or to another courtyard, and it’s also written there whether his intention was fulfilled or not—if it’s into his own courtyard then his intention wasn’t fulfilled, and if it’s another courtyard then his intention was fulfilled. So it’s not really Rashi’s novelty; the Talmud itself already said it. In a moment, we’ll see that same principle—but there too it isn’t mentioned explicitly, though we’ll get to that in a second, maybe I…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll comment on that in a moment. In any case, according to Rashi it comes out here that the principle of planned labor can also serve to make us stricter, not only more lenient. What’s the idea behind this? I assume the idea behind it is the following. After all, we rest on the Sabbath as a remembrance of Creation. The Holy One, blessed be He, created the world in six days and rested on the seventh day. So on the seventh day He did not do what He did in the six days, and therefore we too are supposed not to do what was done in the six days. Now what was done in the six days? If we look at the Holy One, blessed be He, He did not do labor with hands—He doesn’t have hands. The Talmud says, “By His utterance He created the heavens,” right? Or, “Forever, O Lord, Your word stands firm in the heavens.” The Talmud says that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world with ten utterances—really that’s a Mishnah, not a Talmud. “With ten utterances the world was created.” Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world through speech, and the world came into being: “Let there be light”…
[Speaker C] “And there was light,” the world…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …came into being on its own. Okay, so there is no physical act here on the part of the Holy One, blessed be He. And when the Holy One, blessed be He, rested on the Sabbath, He did not cease from physical action, but rather from causative action. He did only things that afterward were completed on their own, and that He did not do on the Sabbath. So from here we see that even an action that finishes on its own, or that is done through indirect causation, is something from which one must rest on the Sabbath. That is what stands behind the Talmud’s idea according to Rashi.
[Speaker E] So basically, Rabbi, this reminds me a bit of Saadia Gaon’s explanation of “and He said” in Creation—that he claims it means the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. Not exactly—I mean, we won’t get into what the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, means—but it fits for me with Rashi’s “he is pleased” in this context.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I think here you don’t need Saadia Gaon. Obviously He is pleased with the world; otherwise He wouldn’t have made it.
[Speaker E] No, but there’s a question how to interpret “and He said.” Maimonides doesn’t like Saadia Gaon’s interpretation that it means will. But I think specifically here it fits—it really sharpens it for me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I don’t think Maimonides would disagree that the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted the world.
[Speaker E] No, he just doesn’t like attributing will to the Holy One, blessed be He. Okay, but I think it does sharpen for me this whole idea of “he is pleased,” because there is an act here that happened on its own, in accordance with my will.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’m not sure one can really hang this on the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there, because simply speaking, if the Holy One, blessed be He, made the world, then apparently that’s what He wanted to happen. Meaning, regardless of whether I read that into the word “and He said” or not. But I don’t know—I don’t deal with biblical interpretation, so I have no idea.
[Speaker G] It just doesn’t matter whether right now he’s pleased or not. What? Just that you’re saying it doesn’t matter whether right now he’s pleased or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously he’s pleased. I mean, otherwise he wouldn’t have done it.
[Speaker G] In any case, but…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rashi it really comes out here as a novelty that in Sabbath law one is liable even for indirect causation. There are contradictions from Talmudic passages, and later authorities speak about this—it isn’t simple, because in various places we see that on the Sabbath one is exempt for indirect causation. But this is how Rashi explains the Talmud here. And the Rosh there writes—and from his words it seems he explained it differently: “The rabbis taught: If one kindled and the wind fanned it, if there is enough in his kindling to kindle, he is liable, and if not…” If there is enough in the wind to kindle, even if there is enough in his kindling to kindle, he is exempt. “For what did he do?” What did he do? Even without him it would have ignited and caused damage. So he is exempt. “And if there was not enough in his kindling to kindle, and also not enough in the wind to kindle, and they joined together and ignited it, he is exempt. And we do not say that even though the wind assisted in making the fire, it is as though he himself did it alone—just as with winnowing, where the wind assists him, that we regard it as though he did the labor alone.” Right, that is the Talmud’s question. He is just summarizing the Talmud. Meaning: why don’t we say that? “Because there the Torah prohibited planned labor.” He brings Rav Ashi’s answer. “Even though it is only mere indirect causation, the Torah imposed liability in such a case because this labor is mainly done by means of the wind. But here it is mere indirect causation, and indirect causation in damages is exempt.” There are a few words here that he adds, which do not appear in Rashi, and that causes later authorities to understand that the Rosh probably did not learn like Rashi. These are the words: “Even though it is only mere indirect causation, the Torah imposed liability in such a case because this labor is mainly done by means of the wind.” If it had stopped there, we would have said he agrees with Rashi. But he goes on: “because this labor is mainly done by means of the wind.” That implies that he understands the principle in “winnowing and the wind assists him” as stemming from the fact that the labor of winnowing is normally done that way.
[Speaker C] So why—so if…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there were a labor that is not normally done by means of the wind, and I did it by means of the wind, according to Rashi what would the law be?
[Speaker B] Still forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You would be liable, right? Because indirect causation on the Sabbath—your intent was fulfilled—so for indirect causation I’m liable. It’s a general principle in Sabbath law. What does the Rosh say? No, only in winnowing.
[Speaker C] Is that like Or HaChaim, Rabbi?
[Speaker C] Rabbi, why…
[Speaker C] In tort law, according to the Rosh, would he be exempt?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Why according to the Rosh would he be exempt in tort law?
[Speaker C] For example, if someone winnowed and caused damage to his neighbor’s eyes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the Sabbath he’d be exempt too, not only in tort law. So what’s the problem?
[Speaker C] Indirect causation. I’m asking why, if according to the Rosh…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Indirect causation is exempt. He didn’t do it by a direct physical act. He only has indirect causation. When you merely cause and do not do it directly, you’re exempt.
[Speaker C] But you said that’s the normal way to do it, so…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter whether it’s the normal way to do it. This isn’t a problem of doing it in an unusual manner. It’s indirect causation. Indirect causation is exempt.
[Speaker E] He’s talking about the wind. He’s talking about fanning the fire. In tort law, the wind is about fanning the fire. Don’t compare it to winnowing—we’re talking about two entirely different labors. Winnowing for Sabbath law, and in torts the issue is fanning a fire.
[Speaker C] Right, but I’m asking. No questions.
[Speaker B] We have different rules here. I impose liability here and not there because the legal system is different.
[Speaker C] But according to the Rosh, if he says it’s the normal way it’s done, why wouldn’t he impose liability?
[Speaker B] Why in torts?
[Speaker H] Ruti, this is only on the Sabbath. Ruti, this principle only works on the Sabbath, not in tort law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In tort law too, the exemption applies whether it’s the normal way or not the normal way.
[Speaker G] Okay, that’s easier.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Otherwise the Rosh wouldn’t have needed to bring in the term “planned labor” at all. He should have said: winnowing is different from kindling and the wind then fanning it, because winnowing is normally done by means of the wind, whereas kindling and the wind fanning it is not. Why does he need to bring in planned labor? Because even the specific principle that is true only of the labor of winnowing and not of other labors—this too is based on the principle of planned labor. It’s just that the principle of planned labor, which Rashi extends to doing all labors with the help of the wind, the Rosh narrows only to such labors where the normal mode is to do them by means of the wind. And the implication is: what would happen if I plowed by means of the wind? Say the wind came and took the plow, I don’t know, something like that. According to Rashi I would be liable, because my intention was fulfilled. According to the Rosh I would be exempt. I would be exempt because this is not the normal way to plow. In winnowing, that is the normal way to separate the chaff from the kernels, and therefore there I would be liable. That is the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot… the Rosh, sorry. Okay? Now notice that this is really, really very similar to the dispute between Even HaOzer and Magen Avraham. Because what Magen Avraham is saying is like the Rosh, right? What does Magen Avraham say? That what we find in baking… Actually, before I get to Magen Avraham, one more sentence about the Rosh. What happens—there are two ways to formulate the Rosh. One way is to understand him in terms of, say, what happens in a labor where there is a normal way to do it by means of the wind—it’s not unusual and not a deviation and nothing like that—but it can also be done without the wind. It’s not clear. If the Rosh means a principle from the family of doing something in an unusual manner—that is, you are exempt because it’s an unusual manner—then in the situation I described, it’s not unusual; it is a normal way to do it with the wind. The fact that it can also be done without the wind—so what? It’s still not unusual. Okay? But if I understand… meaning, if the Rosh’s words were said only about a labor where it is unusual to do it by means of the wind—then if I can do the labor both with the wind and without the wind, even then I would not be liable when doing it through the wind. Only where that is the primary way to do the labor—the only normal way—is by the wind. What’s the idea behind that? The question is how we understand the Rosh’s approach. Do we understand his approach as belonging to the family of an unusual manner, meaning this exemption is an exemption of the type of unusual manner? So if you do it by means of the wind, that’s unusual, and one who does labor in an unusual manner is exempt. Then he says: fine, if it’s a normal way to do it, then you don’t have the exemption of unusual manner. I don’t care right now whether there is also a way to do it without wind. But if the way of doing it with wind is a normal way, then you can’t say it’s unusual, right? But if I understand it differently, and I think the Rosh means something else—that after all I learn the labors from the Tabernacle, that’s the accepted view at least. Okay, now I know that there was a labor of winnowing in the Tabernacle. But I don’t know how they did it in the Tabernacle; the Torah doesn’t say how they winnowed in the Tabernacle, right? So I say as follows: if the labor of winnowing can be done with wind and can also be done without wind, and both are normal in our lives—we see that some people winnow with wind, some people winnow without wind—now I ask myself what they did in the Tabernacle. I don’t know. I have no way of knowing. So it could be that I exempt someone who does winnowing with the help of the wind simply because I have no indication that this was how it was done in the Tabernacle, not because it’s unusual. And then it could be that I would exempt him even if it is a normal way to do it with wind, so long as it is not the only normal way or the primary way. Do you understand what I’m saying? No? Again. I can understand the Rosh’s words in two ways…
[Speaker E] You’ve started to confuse me, because first of all he says that if the wind is the regular way…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the question is what counts as “usual.” You can understand the term “usual” in two ways. You can understand it to mean that doing it by means of wind is not unusual. That doesn’t mean you can’t also do it in a regular, normal way without wind. Let me give you an example of where I’m heading. What happens with millstones? With watermills, obviously even if that’s a normal way to do it, it’s not the only normal way. Right? There are also hand mills. Okay? That’s regular grinding. But I think a watermill is not the only way, yet it’s also not unusual. People operate millstones by water too, right? Otherwise the discussion wouldn’t even come up. In fact, people really do operate mills by water; it’s not some odd thing. The point is that it’s not the only way to grind, because you can also grind with hand mills. Now the question is whether the Rosh’s words were also said about hand mills. Let’s say that in winnowing, the only way, or almost the only way, to do it is by wind. There’s no normal way to do it without wind. So in winnowing it’s obvious that the Rosh says what he says, that doing it by means of wind is a regular form of action. I’m asking what the Rosh would say about watermills.
[Speaker C] He’ll say that in the wilderness, in the Tabernacle, there were no watermills.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question. That’s the question.
[Speaker C] Because there wasn’t water there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t matter. The question is what exactly the Rosh means. If the Rosh means that in the labor of winnowing—and only in labors like that, where the only normal way is to do them by wind—there you’re liable, then with a watermill that isn’t the only normal way. It’s a normal way, but it’s not the only normal way. And then he would exempt, like the Magen Avraham.
[Speaker E] I didn’t understand why he would exempt. What? I didn’t manage to understand that. Why would he exempt? On the contrary, if that’s also a possible way, then he should obligate.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll explain the reasoning in a moment. First I’m just laying out the two possibilities.
[Speaker E] No, I don’t understand why in that possibility you said he would exempt. It sounds like the opposite—that he would obligate.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The usual way is by hand.
[Speaker B] I’ll explain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why he exempts—I’ll get to that in a second. I just first want to set out the two possibilities. The two possibilities are to explain the Rosh like this: either he’s talking only about labors where the only normal way is to do them by means of wind, and then in the case of a watermill he wasn’t talking about that, since there it is indeed normal to do it by water, but it isn’t the only normal way, because you can do it by hand as well. And then that’s it—he doesn’t enter the reasoning. That’s one possibility. The second possibility is: no, he says that as long as it’s a normal way, even if it isn’t the only one, as far as Sabbath is concerned you’re liable because your intention was fulfilled. Those are the two possibilities. What reasoning underlies this? That depends on what stands behind the Rosh’s idea. Is the exemption the Rosh gives—say, in a labor not normally done by wind. If I plow by wind, then the Rosh says that in such a case you’re exempt. Rashi would say you’re liable because your intention was fulfilled. The Rosh says you’re exempt. Why are you exempt? Are you exempt because it’s unusual? Because it’s an irregular manner? That’s one way to understand the Rosh. And then of course, with a watermill, what would the law be?
[Speaker D] Exempt?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Liable, because it’s not unusual. In a watermill it’s a normal way to do it. Since it isn’t unusual, you’d be liable, right? But if I say no—the exemption for plowing by wind is simply because they didn’t plow by wind in the Tabernacle. Do you see? Not because there’s some general principle about doing things in an unusual way that people don’t do. Rather, because the categories of labor are learned from the Tabernacle, and what wasn’t in the Tabernacle doesn’t generate liability. So hold on—if in the Tabernacle they didn’t plow by wind, then I can’t prohibit plowing by wind. Now if that’s what the Rosh means, then it could be that even in labors like grinding in a watermill he would exempt. Why? Because true, grinding in a watermill isn’t unusual, but on the other hand I don’t know whether that existed in the Tabernacle. Maybe in the Tabernacle they ground with hand mills? Because as far as grinding goes, there are two normal ways to do it, both with hand mills and with watermills. And because of that, it could be that here the Rosh would say you’re exempt even though it’s a normal way to grind in a watermill. Simply because you don’t know that it was in the Tabernacle. Do you understand the difference, Hani? Okay?
[Speaker F] That model could have implications for a lot of labors.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? Absolutely. Okay. For all labors of the grinding type, where there are two ways to do it—one with water or wind, meaning indirectly, and the other by hand. And both are normal; people do it both ways. That would be the practical difference between the two possibilities I’m raising in the Rosh.
[Speaker F] No, I mean, the possibility that the labor wasn’t in the Tabernacle—that could affect a lot of labors, because beyond the fact that it wasn’t in the Tabernacle, there are also technological changes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I said in the introduction that even things that weren’t in the Tabernacle but are very similar to what was there, we would still deem liable. It’s not—if in the Tabernacle they sheared wool from a sheep and I want to shear wool from, I don’t know, an angora, okay, whatever, it’s the same kind of labor, so as far as I’m concerned that was in the Tabernacle. But the difference between a watermill and a sheep…
[Speaker H] What? Wait, maybe instead of scissors they used some kind of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t know, maybe there really would be a difference and it wouldn’t be prohibited, I don’t know. But again, the fact that it wouldn’t be prohibited could stem from the fact that this is not how people normally do it—that would be the exemption of irregular performance—or it could stem from the fact that it simply wasn’t in the Tabernacle, and therefore I’m exempt. Do you understand that these are two different rationales? Am I looking at the people around me and asking myself what is a normal way to act, or am I asking myself what was in the Tabernacle? I don’t care how people act. The first approach is an exemption because it’s an irregular manner. The second approach is not really an exemption; it’s simply that there is no liability. There is no liability because it wasn’t in the Tabernacle, so this is not a prohibited labor.
[Speaker F] Fine, so if I take a non-electric shaving machine, okay, and remove the wool, is there a chance that one of them would say I might be exempt?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, why not?
[Speaker E] I want to ask about that regarding a washing machine on a Jewish holiday. What? In the Tabernacle they didn’t wash the way we wash today.
[Speaker F] Right.
[Speaker H] Then on Sabbath too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right.
[Speaker E] The question is really what’s the problem with pressing the button—I’m not doing any act of washing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that relates to what we’re talking about here regarding the act of washing.
[Speaker H] You don’t have to press it; you can use a Sabbath timer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A Sabbath timer is already obvious. But I’m saying, a Sabbath timer is obvious—why not press it on Sabbath itself? That’s another step.
[Speaker E] On Sabbath we already saw that that counts as doing labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Causing noise is rabbinic, leave that aside, it’s not relevant here. I’m talking about a Torah prohibition. A Torah prohibition, a labor prohibition. So pressing the button on Sabbath—first of all there’s the prohibition of closing an electric circuit.
[Speaker C] Which has nothing to do with washing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether I also violate the labor of laundering—that’s an excellent question, not clear at all. But closing an electric circuit is permitted on a Festival—no, sorry, I meant on the intermediate days of a festival. On the intermediate days, after all…
[Speaker E] The intermediate days are something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the intermediate days the laundering prohibition doesn’t stem from a labor prohibition, but because of distraction from the festival or something like that; it’s not in the category of Sabbath labor prohibitions. Except for Chayei Adam, who wants to say otherwise, but simply speaking it’s unrelated. On the intermediate days not all labors are prohibited. Very specific categories of labor are: writing and laundering and skilled work and the like. That’s a different discussion. By the way, there really are those who permit laundering on the intermediate days because today it’s no longer a burden and not such a thing—it’s done at the press of a button—so there are halakhic decisors who write that it has become routine and forgettable.
[Speaker H] But for the needs of Sabbath even by hand it’s permitted, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker H] For the needs of Sabbath even by hand it’s permitted, I think. If he doesn’t have a shirt for Sabbath, he can wash on the intermediate days.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so; in my opinion they generally prohibit it. Why?
[Speaker F] But we said, for example, if he grinds…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he grinds on Sabbath—
[Speaker B] For Passover, matzah for Passover…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not grinds—he gives it to a non-Jew. Not on Sabbath, before Sabbath. He tells the non-Jew to put kernels into a watermill. The water does the grinding.
[Speaker F] That’s permitted. So just like you now raised the issue of washing a shirt for Sabbath because he doesn’t have one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, let’s not get into those minefields. There’s no such permission. There’s no such permission. It’s not relevant to us, it’s unrelated; I’m not doing the laws of the intermediate days now. Right now I’m talking about the laws of labor on Sabbath.
[Speaker F] Fine, okay, let’s go.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. So the claim is basically that the dispute between Rashi and the Rosh here is very reminiscent of the dispute between the Magen Avraham and the Even HaOzer that we saw. Because the Rosh is basically saying that your liability in winnowing is due to the uniqueness of the labor of winnowing, because that labor is normally done by wind. Exactly like the Magen Avraham says regarding baking: he says baking is normally completed on its own, therefore there one is liable; don’t derive from that to other labors. Right? It’s exactly the same thing. It’s a principle of purposeful labor—what do you mean? Why should I care that it finishes on its own? After all, from the outset I planned for it to finish that way, and that’s exactly what happened. So that is purposeful labor. That is exactly what the Rosh says. Okay, so the Rosh is basically with the Magen Avraham, that this is…
[Speaker F] No, no, no, there’s a confusion here.
[Speaker B] The Rosh and the Magen Avraham are in the same camp.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the Rosh and the Magen Avraham are the same line.
[Speaker F] But that’s not “purposeful labor”; “purposeful labor” is what Rashi says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—“purposeful labor” is what the Talmud says. It’s just that the Rosh says purposeful labor is applied only to labors that are normally done by wind or normally finished on their own and the like. And Rashi says it applies to all labors. So I’m saying the Rosh goes with the Magen Avraham, because he says only those labors that are normally done on their own or by wind or by water or something like that—there the principle of purposeful labor creates liability. But in other labors that are not normally done that way, the principle of purposeful labor does not create liability, and even on Sabbath one would be exempt. In contrast, the Even HaOzer goes with Rashi. The Even HaOzer says: why do I care whether it’s baking or trapping or grinding? In the end, your intention was fulfilled—that’s what matters. You planned it and that’s what came out, so what if it happened on its own? You’re still liable. It’s exactly the same dispute. I only said parenthetically that the Rosh himself can be interpreted in two ways. The Rosh does not necessarily go with the Magen Avraham. It depends how you understand the Rosh. Rashi goes with the Even HaOzer, but the Rosh himself could go with either of them. Why? Because it depends on how I understand the Rosh. When the Rosh says that in winnowing one is liable because that labor is normally done by wind, does he mean that this is the normal way and not an unusual way, or does he mean to say that this is the only way to do it? And the difference comes out in grinding. Because in grinding, a watermill is a normal way, but it’s not the only way. And therefore it could be that even the Rosh would agree that with a watermill he would agree with the Even HaOzer, that in such a case maybe indeed there would be—sorry—the Rosh, wait, yes, would agree with the Even HaOzer, because in a watermill it isn’t an irregular manner, it’s a normal way to do it, so there the Rosh would say you’re liable, like the Even HaOzer says, not like the Magen Avraham. Therefore, whether the Rosh goes with the Magen Avraham or the Even HaOzer depends on how you interpret him. Rashi apparently goes with the Even HaOzer. Okay? In any case, for our purposes what we see from here is that the argument between the Even HaOzer and the Magen Avraham regarding labors that complete themselves really begins already among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). It’s an argument between Rashi and the Rosh—or at least one of the two interpretations of the Rosh—on the question of whether in the laws of Sabbath we really have such a general principle, as Rashi at least holds, learned from purposeful labor, that if the thing finishes by itself that doesn’t bother me; I’m liable. Exactly what all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whom the Magen Avraham cites there in parentheses hold, and as the Biur Halakhah rules, and as all the later authorities (Acharonim) say—that’s basically what Rashi says. And the source for it is the law of purposeful labor. That is the source for everything the medieval and later authorities say about a watermill. Okay?
[Speaker E] According to Rashi, according to Rashi there’s no such thing—every indirect causation on Sabbath is basically liable?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rashi, apparently that’s what comes out. And I’ll say again, there are contradictions from Talmudic passages on this, and therefore people still make distinctions even within Rashi’s view, but I’m not getting into that now.
[Speaker E] But by the way, from Rashi it’s not self-evident. Rashi relates to the fact that his intention was fulfilled; he doesn’t get into this question of whether that’s the normal way of the labor or not, and it could be he also thinks like the Rosh. Nobody said otherwise.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? “His intention was fulfilled” means that wherever his intention was fulfilled, he’s liable.
[Speaker E] But maybe Rashi meant that the intention was fulfilled and that this is also the way, that his intention was that this is how it should be done.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If so, the main point is missing from the text. He should have said it. He states here a general principle that on Sabbath indirect causation is liable. Now it could be that in a place where it’s unreasonable to do it by wind—plowing by wind—even Rashi would say you’re exempt, exempt because it’s an irregular manner. Fine? But regarding a watermill, here would be the difference. Because in a watermill, grinding by a watermill is not unusual; it’s normal. But it’s indirect. So according to Rashi you’d be liable; according to the Rosh, simply speaking, you’d be exempt—unless we interpret the Rosh to mean that the issue is irregularity, in which case the Rosh too would agree that one is liable. Okay? In labors where it’s unusual to do it by wind, it’s reasonable that even Rashi would say you’re exempt, but exempt not because indirect causation is exempt, rather because it’s unusual, because it’s an irregular manner. It’s not an exemption of indirect causation. The indirect connection does not serve as an exemption according to Rashi. That’s not the point. The exemption is because it’s unusual, that’s all. Indirectness as such creates liability. Okay, now that’s the dispute regarding labors that complete themselves, and as I said earlier, this whole story basically affects how we understand the labor of baking. Because in the labor of baking, according to Rashi and according to the Even HaOzer and all their camp, there’s really nothing special about it. Why is one liable in baking even though it completes itself? Because in all Sabbath labors one is liable; there is nothing unique about baking. In contrast, according to the Magen Avraham and the Rosh—at least according to one interpretation—no, baking is a unique labor. Just like trapping; it’s a unique labor. It’s a labor that is normally done this way, so in such a case one is indeed liable, but you can’t learn from that to other labors like grinding in a watermill and the like. Now let’s see—let’s continue to see the same principle regarding the definition of the labor of baking. The Talmud—I’m returning to our Talmudic passage. Here the Talmud says that we do not tell a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit. Okay? That’s what the Talmud says; therefore it rejects the interpretation that the case is inadvertent and establishes that it is deliberate. Tosafot asks on this as follows: “Do we really say to a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit?” Tosafot asks: but doesn’t it say in tractate Eruvin, “Rabbi held that it is preferable for the haver to commit a minor prohibition rather than for the am ha’aretz to commit a major prohibition”? A haver is a Torah scholar, and he prefers to commit a minor prohibition in order to prevent the ignoramus from committing a severe prohibition. It’s talking about separating terumah not from adjacent produce—not important for us right now, the details of tithing; I don’t want to get into it—but it’s a situation where the scholar commits a minor prohibition in order to prevent the ignoramus from committing a serious prohibition, eating untithed produce. Then Tosafot says like this: there, so apparently what do we see from there? That yes, we do indeed tell a person to commit a sin so that his fellow may benefit, right? We tell the Torah scholar to commit a minor prohibition so that his fellow will benefit and not commit a serious prohibition. Same thing here, right? We should tell a person to remove the bread from the oven—which is a minor prohibition, a rabbinic prohibition; if at all, according to the Ritva maybe it isn’t even prohibited at all—a rabbinic prohibition, in order that the person who stuck the bread in the oven be saved from a capital violation. That’s a very severe prohibition. So Tosafot says: then our Talmudic passage is difficult based on the Talmud in Eruvin. Because the Talmud in Eruvin basically says that yes, we do tell a person to commit a minor prohibition so that his fellow will be saved from a serious prohibition. Tosafot answers and says: no, it’s not difficult. There, in order that the ignoramus not eat untithed produce because of him, since he said to him: “Fill yourself a basket of figs”—a basket, that is—“from my fig tree.” Yes? The Torah scholar says to the ignoramus, take figs from my fig tree and enjoy yourself. Okay? What comes out? That if the ignoramus eats something untithed, the Torah scholar is the one who caused it. Meaning, the Torah scholar bears some blame for the prohibition that the ignoramus is about to commit. In such a case we tell him: then you commit a minor prohibition in order to prevent the ignoramus from committing a major prohibition, because when the ignoramus commits the major prohibition, you will in fact be implicated in it—you caused it. If so, you have to pay a price. Commit a minor prohibition to prevent him from committing a serious one. But here, the one who stuck the bread in the oven brought the prohibition upon himself; I have nothing to do with it. Now I come and ask: am I allowed to remove the bread to prevent you from a severe prohibition? Here Tosafot says no, absolutely not. We don’t tell you to commit a minor prohibition in order to spare someone else a major prohibition. We tell you that only where you had a hand in the other person’s major prohibition. There we tell you to commit a minor prohibition because in a sense you are saving yourself too in this matter. But if we’re talking about saving the other person, I don’t have to commit prohibitions so that the other person will be saved from his own prohibitions. Okay? “But here, where the prohibition was not caused by him, we do not tell him to sin—even a minor prohibition—so that his fellow not come to a major prohibition.” That’s what Tosafot says. What matters for us—we’ll get to this when we talk about “we do not tell a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit,” maybe the class after next, we’ll see. But now there is an important comment by the Riva. And the Riva says: “Even regarding the one who himself stuck it on, one cannot derive from there to permit it.” Yes? Seemingly, according to the distinction Tosafot made, then the person who himself stuck the bread in the oven should indeed be allowed to remove it. Why? Because he is certainly responsible for the severe prohibition that he himself is about to commit. By sticking the bread in the oven he put himself into the situation. That means that the prohibition that will eventually happen there is one for which he himself is responsible. If so, then seemingly we should tell him: commit a minor prohibition now so that a major prohibition not come about through you, just like in the Talmud in Eruvin. The Riva says no; you can’t derive from the Talmud in Eruvin to our case, and even to the one who himself stuck it on we do not say that he may remove the bread in order to permit him to remove it so that he be saved from a severe prohibition. Why? “Because there the prohibition has not yet been done, and it is better that he commit a minor prohibition so that a major prohibition not be done through him. But here, the act of prohibition has already been done, and it will finish on its own, so he should not commit even a minor prohibition with his hands.” What is he saying?
[Speaker C] He’s saying two things: he says it was already done, and also that it will finish on its own.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same principle: it was already done, and all that remains is just for it to finish.
[Speaker C] From the moment he stuck the bread in, it was already done. But then afterward he continues, “and it will on its own…”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Finish—that is, basically, it’ll happen anyway. We’ll get to that in just a moment.
[Speaker I] The Riva—actually, this point about the person himself who stuck it on, that one cannot derive it—I think that really is some kind of novelty here. I didn’t understand? This point of the person himself who stuck it on—that one really might have understood…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That the person who himself stuck it on would be allowed to remove it. So the Riva says that’s not correct—you can’t derive from the Talmud in Eruvin that the person who himself stuck it on is allowed to remove it. Why? Because in the Talmud in Eruvin we’re talking about a situation where the prohibition hasn’t yet happened at all. I told the ignoramus to eat from the figs. There is concern that when he eats them they’ll be untithed. In the meantime no prohibition has yet occurred, and whatever will be done will be done because of me. In such a case we tell me to transgress a minor prohibition in order to prevent the future prohibition from being committed. But here, in the case of one who stuck bread in the oven, the prohibition has already been committed: he has already stuck the bread in. So what are you trying to do, really? You’re trying to save him from the consequences of the act he already did. Here—or not to save him, to save yourself—here even where you are responsible for what will happen, we still do not tell you to commit a minor prohibition in order to save yourself from a prohibition you have already committed. That’s what the Riva says. And this is a very difficult point—it’s not at all clear what exactly underlies his statement. What Ruti pointed out before: there is apparently a contradiction here. On the one hand he says that once you stuck it on, the prohibition has already been done. Well, if the prohibition has been done, then what good will it do if I remove the bread? The prohibition has already been done, that’s it. After all, it’s obvious that the whole background to the question is that if I remove the bread, then I’ll be exempt from the prohibition, right? It’s obvious. I won’t incur stoning or a sin-offering. Right. That means it’s not true that the prohibition is completed the moment I stick the bread in the oven. It still also needs to bake. So how can the Riva say that the prohibition has already been done? What is missing? What is this ending stage that creates the dilemma whether to remove it or not remove it? To remove it or not remove it—that is the question, as Shakespeare said. So this expression of the Riva somehow pulls us in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the prohibition is done by the very act of sticking it in. On the other hand, the Riva is clearly saying that if I remove it, I won’t incur liability for a sin-offering or for stoning, because otherwise what’s the discussion here about removing it? Removing it wouldn’t save me from anything. The whole dilemma exists because removing it saves me. The question is whether I’m allowed to remove it in order to save myself. But clearly the assumption is that if I remove it, I will be saved. So how can he say that the prohibition was completed when I stuck it in? It wasn’t completed when I stuck it in. Okay? So here we have to understand what the Riva means. So let me preface the explanation a bit. One can understand—and first of all one basic premise is clear: obviously sticking it in is not enough for liability. No one ever disputed that. The bread also has to bake in order for me to incur liability for a sin-offering or stoning. That is completely clear.
[Speaker F] Wait, I had a question here. Meaning, if that’s completely clear, then what—so I can stick it in?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question. What do you mean “can you stick it in”? Afterward maybe you won’t be able to remove it.
[Speaker F] Fine, not important.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, fine?
[Speaker F] Wait, no—
[Speaker C] So we raised another example.
[Speaker F] Can I put a clay vessel in the oven?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean, a clay vessel in the oven?
[Speaker C] Earthenware, a jar, a ceramic pot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can’t. Why? Why should you be able to?
[Speaker F] No, it’s like sticking it in.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and therefore it’s prohibited.
[Speaker C] We’re talking here about inadvertence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, she’s talking about deliberate action. If it’s inadvertent there’s no question of whether you can; you acted inadvertently, what can you do. Right. But the definition of the labor of baking—and this brings me back to the foundation we’re dealing with all the time—is that baking is an unusual labor because its normal character is that it completes itself. Now as far as we’re concerned, we know there was baking in the Tabernacle, and since this is the normal way to do it, apparently one is liable. That’s a given. The question now is how to define the labor of baking. Is the labor of baking defined as sticking bread in the oven, period? You’ll ask me: but wait, how can that be? Didn’t we just agree that unless it actually bakes, he doesn’t incur a sin-offering or stoning? Right, but that would be only an external condition, a side condition. Essentially, the prohibited labor is the act of sticking it in. But in order to incur liability, the condition must also be fulfilled that as a result of sticking it in, the bread will bake. But that’s only a condition; it’s not that the cooking itself or the baking itself that happens after sticking it in is part of my act of baking. I already completed my act of baking. Okay? In a moment we’ll see the practical difference; it’ll become sharper. That’s one possibility. A second possibility is to say: no, this is exactly our whole discussion. The cooking or baking that happens as a result of sticking it in counts as a continuation of my action. It’s not an external condition, it’s not just a condition for liability; it’s part of the definition of the prohibited action. The prohibited action is sticking bread in the oven and leaving it there until it bakes. That is how the prohibited act is defined. According to the first way I defined it, no. The prohibited action is defined as sticking bread in the oven. But it is only a condition for liability; as far as the action itself is concerned, the prohibited labor is the actual sticking in. The second possibility I raised is: no. The prohibited action, by its very definition, is sticking it in and not removing the bread until it bakes. All of that is called the labor—the labor of baking. Okay? The baking or cooking is not an external condition; it is part of the definition of the action itself. My understanding is that the Riva’s claim is that baking is defined in the first way. What does that mean? The Riva certainly agrees that even if I remove the bread—that is, if the bread ultimately does not bake—then I am exempt. No one in the world disputes that; that’s obvious. But the Riva says yes, however, the baking is a side condition. It is not part of the prohibited act, not part of the definition of the prohibited labor itself, of the definition of the prohibition. And then he says: essentially, when you stuck the bread in the oven, you finished the prohibited labor; you already did it. True, in order to make you liable it is required that the condition also be met that the bread bake. But that’s not relevant—you already completed your prohibited act. It’s just that you can’t be held liable until the bread bakes. And that’s what the Riva says. In a situation where I come to save you even though you already committed the prohibition—that you cannot derive from there; who says that in such a case we permit you to remove the bread? That’s what the Riva is saying. Notice what the Riva assumes—what does the Riva assume? That the permission to remove the bread is intended to prevent the prohibition, or the result, the punishment?
[Speaker B] The punishment? The punishment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The prohibition has already been done. Right—not the prohibition. Because he’s basically saying—sorry—that it comes to prevent the prohibition, not the punishment. If it came to prevent the punishment, then why would what the Riva says be relevant? It’s obvious that if I remove the bread, true, the condition simply won’t be fulfilled, but in practice if the condition isn’t fulfilled then I don’t deserve the punishment, whether a sin-offering or stoning, whichever. Okay? The Riva says that’s irrelevant. Meaning, what does the Riva assume? The Riva assumes that the permission to remove the bread is meant to prevent the prohibition, not to prevent the consequence, the punishment. And therefore he says: how are you going to prevent the prohibition? The prohibition already happened. You already committed it. That’s what he says. Maybe let’s give a somewhat borrowed example, though maybe not entirely borrowed.
[Speaker H] Look, that means that from his perspective we’re not concerned with punishment at all. I didn’t come to exempt you from punishment; I want to prevent a prohibition. But to prevent a prohibition is impossible.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So to prevent punishment—now again, notice that the Riva is not stating the law. The Riva is explaining why the Talmud didn’t resolve from the Talmud in Eruvin, from that discussion in Eruvin, Rav Bibi’s question. Why can one still say that it’s prohibited to remove the bread? One can say that—but in the meantime we’re still left with a question; it’s not yet clear. The Riva is only explaining one side of the two sides of Rav Bibi’s question. Okay? So pay close attention: he’s not giving a final ruling here; he’s only explaining one side of Rav Bibi’s two sides. Fine? Now look, I’ll maybe give a few examples that sharpen this point a bit. What would happen, for example, if I made an attempt at murder. Okay? I took a gun, aimed it at someone innocent—I of course mean someone innocent—fired, and whoops, the firing pin was broken. So no bullet came out. In legal jargon this is called attempted murder, right? Attempted murder is not murder. Is the person who attempted murder less wicked than someone who succeeded in murdering?
[Speaker C] No. He’s just unlucky.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s equally wicked; besides being wicked, he’s also unlucky, exactly. Right? Meaning, he is equally wicked. He did everything necessary in order to murder. Bad luck for him—he didn’t succeed. There are no mitigating circumstances here, so much so that it’s really unclear why people are more lenient in punishing those who attempt murder than those who actually murder. To me that’s not a simple question; I really don’t understand why their punishment is lighter.
[Speaker B] No, maybe because of the result.
[Speaker C] The Riva would explain…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That to you.
[Speaker B] Everything depended on him; he had the intention, he had the means.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. What was missing was the result, which wasn’t dependent on him.
[Speaker C] The Riva could explain to you that even though he did the act—but the condition wasn’t fulfilled.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? So what if the condition wasn’t fulfilled as a condition? No, I thought the opposite. Since the labor didn’t come to completion.
[Speaker C] Because there was no result—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t deserve punishment? I’m equally wicked.
[Speaker C] Because the act is not the result.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?
[Speaker E] But the Ritva himself argues, just as the Torah basically argues, that the test of the result is significant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one second.
[Speaker H] But the Torah judges not wickedness but jurisdiction. Dani, I can be extremely wicked, and if I still haven’t actually committed any wicked deed, any crime, then you can’t punish me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, I’ll explain. All that was just an introduction. Good. What I’m really trying to say is this. Right now don’t look at the result of someone being murdered. I’m discussing the question whether I can prevent a person from being wicked. Not prevent the result from happening. Okay? I want to prevent a person from being wicked. Do you understand that it really makes no difference whether I prevent attempted murder or prevent murder? Right? In both cases I have reason to prevent him, because in both cases he is equally wicked. Even in the case of attempted murder, where the firing pin is broken and no result happened at all. If I’m talking about preventing criminality, not about saving the result or achieving a good result, but preventing criminality—then from the standpoint of preventing criminality, there is no difference between attempted murder and murder; both are equally criminal. “He intended to eat pork and instead lamb came into his hand”—the Talmud in Nazir talks about this. Yes, someone took a piece of meat, he was sure it was pork and he wanted to eat it, because he really loves pork, so he wanted to eat pork, and it turned out that he was not only wicked but also unlucky. The piece was kosher meat. So he didn’t manage to commit the sin he wanted to commit, but clearly he is equally wicked. In the end he did everything he could; he had criminal intent, he did everything he could, and in practice it just didn’t work out. That doesn’t testify to any righteousness on his part, right? He is equally wicked. So notice—why then is there no punishment? Why is there a condition for punishment? Excellent question.
[Speaker F] But punishment shouldn’t be for… okay, sorry.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, what I want to say is that in the criminal law of the state I really don’t understand why there should be a difference. I truly can’t understand it. By the way, today the difference is already very small. Once the difference was greater; there are different legal systems. Today in Israel the difference between attempted murder and murder is fairly small. There is some difference—that here there’s a mandatory minimum punishment and there there isn’t, I think—but you can still give the same number of years. In any case, for our purposes, I think criminal law should give the same punishment to both. There is no difference. Why is there a difference in Jewish law? It seems to me at least—I once wrote an article on this—that in Jewish law punishment is not meant to create deterrence, or at least not only deterrence, or the other purposes of criminal punishment. In Jewish law punishment comes to atone. And for atonement, there has to be a result, something to atone for. If a result occurred as a result of your act, then there is a stain on you. In order to remove that stain, to atone for you, then the punishment is called for—or the sin-offering in inadvertence or stoning in deliberateness, yes? The punishment or whatever it may be. But that is unique to Jewish law. Therefore in Jewish law there are various conditions for punishment—for example, that the result be achieved. If the result was not achieved, if the bread did not bake, you are equally wicked. There is no difference in your level of wickedness. But there is no stain that needs to be cleansed, atoned for. And therefore there are conditions for punishment. And what I want to say is that removing the bread, says the Ritva, may be intended to prevent criminality. But from the standpoint of criminality, if you stuck the bread in the oven, you are a full-fledged offender, and removing it will not prevent that. You are already an offender. And the purpose of the permission to remove it is not to prevent punishment. Punishment of course depends on the result occurring. But the purpose of permitting removal is to prevent criminality. Where the criminality has already occurred, there is no reason to permit removing the bread. That is one side of Rav Bibi’s dilemma. Okay? That’s how the Ritva explains it. Let’s now look for a moment at the Rashash and the Minchat Chinukh.
[Speaker F] Wait, sorry, I’m trying to think about this punishment issue. Meaning, the whole matter of bringing offerings, a sin-offering—at least the sin-offering here—that’s atonement for the act I transgressed, right? And stoning…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you need the result. Sorry? But you need the result. Without the bread baking there is no sin-offering.
[Speaker F] Meaning, without the result I have neither a sin-offering nor stoning at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m only claiming that that does not mean no transgression was committed here in the substantive sense. That’s what the Riva says. By sticking the bread in the oven, you committed the transgression; the attempted murder is already there. The fact that in the end nobody was murdered—that’s not the point. You already performed your wickedness, so why should we permit you to remove the bread from the oven in order to save you from punishment? If you’re wicked, then take the punishment too, there’s no problem. Only if I can save you from the criminality itself is there room to permit removing the bread.
[Speaker F] But there’s no saving from the criminality. In none of the cases we’ve seen—in the final analysis there’s no saving from the criminality, because the criminality has already been done.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not in all the cases we saw. We only saw…
[Speaker F] Sorry, we also saw the matter of picking figs.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there you save him from the criminality.
[Speaker B] From eating untithed produce.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From eating the figs—what do you mean—the untithed ones? That’s exactly what the Riva says: there, the transgression hasn’t happened yet; it will happen when the ignoramus eats the figs.
[Speaker F] If he hasn’t eaten them. But if he already ate them, then the criminality has already happened.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he already ate them, then it’s lost, it’s—
[Speaker F] Then tithing them afterward won’t help. Exactly, that’s what I’m saying: at some point saving from the criminality itself no longer helps.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore he—
[Speaker F] The Riva says—the Riva—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Says we’re talking about a case where he still hasn’t eaten. But in the case of one who stuck bread in the oven, he already stuck it in. You said: what do you mean, he already stuck it in, he still hasn’t formally completed the transgression, because after all the condition hasn’t been fulfilled. He says no: the fact that the condition wasn’t fulfilled only means there is no basis to punish him, but he committed the transgression, because sticking bread in the oven is the transgression.
[Speaker F] But the very fact that he commits a transgression—even at this stage at least—I still have no punishment at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because for punishment, criminality alone is not enough; the result also has to occur. Okay.
[Speaker E] Now seemingly—wait—maybe seemingly, I don’t know if I’m… this gives me the thought that seemingly if a person sins, maybe it’s better to go all the way with it so that he can atone for it. Seemingly if a person sinned inadvertently, then maybe it’s better that his friends not save him and not take out the bread, so that at least he’ll bring a sin-offering and atone for it. Because if they save him and take it out, he committed a transgression without the ability to atone. But in contrast, in a case of stoning, maybe it really is better to save him, because there the punishment is already too heavy, and it’s preferable that he not bear it, even if that means he won’t have the ability to atone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes, and maybe even in the case of stoning, no. We’ll see that in the next class. Maybe even in the case of stoning, no—because if he is an offender and the Torah decreed death by stoning for offenders, then let him take what he deserves. But you’re right that in principle one could distinguish. The point is that—by the way, since you brought this up—in the sixteenth century a controversy arose in Safed about renewing ordination.
[Speaker G] And there—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] People don’t all know this—what was the background to it? Those who wanted to renew ordination wanted it only in order to flog the forced converts in a religious court, and then they could achieve atonement. Meaning, people were actually looking for a way to flog offenders—the exact opposite of the mindset of our passage here. And why? Exactly what Hani said earlier. Because when you flog him, that is his opportunity to atone; otherwise you leave him with the stain, and he’ll arrive with it before the heavenly court and it will be worse—he’ll incur karet.
[Speaker C] That too—that’s what I said.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there’s also reason here to say that even from stoning it would not be right to save him.
[Speaker C] If the Torah said to stone him, then that’s what has to be done.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But a person can also repent. Exactly—what happens with repentance? The Torah said he has to be stoned even if he repents. Right.
[Speaker F] There are transgressions for which only death atones together with repentance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Repentance by itself does not atone—the four categories of atonement in tractate Yoma.
[Speaker F] What do you mean? But if they stone him, then he can’t repent?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, then he’s done for.
[Speaker E] But if they exempt him from stoning—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has the possibility of repenting.
[Speaker E] And therefore it’s preferable to exempt him from stoning as opposed to a sin-offering—fine, let him just pay the money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I said earlier: that distinction is possible, but it isn’t necessary. Because one could also say the same thing about stoning—if he deserves it, then let him get it; that’s what the Torah says. The Torah didn’t say it for nothing. If it said that such a person has to be stoned, then apparently he really should be stoned, so why should I save him from that? That’s what the Torah says. Look, next class we’ll actually see this reasoning directly—we’ll really deal with this very reasoning—but let’s leave that aside for the moment. So for our purposes, I’m now getting to the Rashash, the Minchat Chinukh… okay. Look here. The Rashash—you saw him in tractate Avodah Zarah. The Rashash says—he’s talking about the labor of sowing, and in the course of that he also recalls the labor of baking. And then he says: regarding sowing, as long as the seed has not taken root, it is as if it were placed in a jar. As long as the seed hasn’t rooted, it’s as if it’s just sitting in a vessel; basically, you haven’t really sown. Nevertheless, since through your sowing it will later take root, you are liable. Just like one who bakes or roasts is liable even though the baking and roasting afterward happen on their own. And so on. I’m not going to read the rest. That’s what he claims. Meaning, he says: true, a condition is needed for this labor actually to come into effect, but one becomes liable for the act of sowing itself, even though the rooting happens afterward. And then at the end he says—I’m moving to the last line—“From this it seems to me that likewise, one who bakes on the Sabbath close to dark is liable, even though there is not enough time for the baking to be completed while it is still day.” Look what a startling novelty this is. Somebody sticks dough into the oven three minutes before the end of the Sabbath. The bread will bake, but it will bake after the Sabbath ends. The Rashash says: he is liable. He has violated a Torah prohibition of baking. Why? Because he did the labor. That is baking. Placing it in the oven is itself the labor of baking. There is a condition that it actually bake—the Rashash does not deny that. There is a condition that it bake. If it doesn’t bake, there is no liability for a sin-offering or stoning. But that condition can also be fulfilled on a weekday. Why? Because the condition is not part of the act itself, of the forbidden labor. Rather, in order to punish him, the condition must be fulfilled—that is, there must be a result of his act, namely that the bread bakes. But for what do they punish him? For the act of placing it in the oven itself. He says the same about sowing. After all, with sowing it certainly takes a long time until it takes root in the ground. So with sowing it’s always like that: you sow on the Sabbath—how can you ever be liable? It always takes root on a weekday. That doesn’t happen in an hour. He says: right, so what? Baking would be the same. If you put it in on the Sabbath and it bakes, even if it bakes on a weekday, you are liable for the placing-in-the-oven. For that very act you are liable. That is the Rashash’s claim.
[Speaker F] Wait—on the side here, isn’t there something about danger to life?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this has nothing to do with danger to life. What does danger to life have to do with this now?
[Speaker F] No, sometimes you know that, I don’t know, a bear is wandering around in your yard. So then what? So maybe I’ll set a trap so that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a different question. A snake.
[Speaker C] That’s a question—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of what one is allowed to do where there is danger to life. That has nothing to do with us. I’m talking right now about the very definition of the act. Without danger to life, without anything. How is the forbidden act defined? And the Rashash’s claim is that if you now did the act of putting it in the oven, you are liable. True, there is a condition that it bake, but the condition can be fulfilled even on a weekday. And here we have the practical difference between the two definitions of the act of baking. If the act of baking is the placing in the oven, and the actual baking is only an external condition, then that can happen on a weekday and I would still be liable. In contrast, the Minchat Chinukh, who disagrees with the Rashash and claims that one would not be liable if it baked on a weekday, apparently understands that the baking itself is part of the definition of the forbidden act itself; it’s not an external condition. And if that didn’t happen on the Sabbath, then I didn’t bake on the Sabbath. Baking is prohibited when it is done on the Sabbath, not when it is done on a weekday.
[Speaker C] In other words, the Rashash says sowing is equivalent to baking, and the Minchat Chinukh says no—sowing is different from baking.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question whether it’s different from baking or not—that’s a good question. There’s a very, very long discussion in the Minchat Chinukh that I didn’t photocopy for you because you could drown in it there. It’s very unclear whether it’s the same or not the same. But for our purposes right now, it’s the same. Both assume it’s the same.
[Speaker C] It doesn’t sound like that.
[Speaker E] It doesn’t look like that.
[Speaker C] Why doesn’t it look like that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What would happen with sowing, according to the Minchat Chinukh, you’re asking? The Minchat Chinukh would say that with sowing one would always be exempt, because it takes root on a weekday. So there’s a long discussion there in the Minchat Chinukh; I don’t want to get into it there. It’s a long discussion. But for our purposes, his principle is that if baking—if I put the dough in the oven—for him what matters is the baking. If I put the dough in the oven on the Sabbath and it bakes on a weekday, I am exempt according to the Minchat Chinukh. Why? Because he sees the baking not as an external condition, but as part of the act that I am doing, and therefore it has to be done on the Sabbath itself. That is the practical difference between the two possibilities I spoke about earlier.
[Speaker F] I didn’t understand. Can we go back for a second?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. I said there are two possible ways to define the labor of baking.
[Speaker F] Everybody—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Agrees that the labor of baking—placing dough in the oven by itself does not create liability. The bread also has to bake in the end. But there are still two ways to understand this. First definition: placing the dough in the oven is the forbidden labor, and that’s what one becomes liable for. Why do we need the actual baking? Only as a condition for punishment. If there were no actual baking, then the labor would not be significant enough and I wouldn’t be punished for it. That’s the first definition. According to that definition, if the baking takes place on a weekday, I am still liable. Right? Because in the end, the act I did on the Sabbath was a significant act. The proof is that it led to there being bread baked here. Why should I care that it baked on a weekday? The baking itself is not the forbidden labor. The forbidden labor is the placing in the oven; it just has to be significant in the sense that a significant result comes from it. Why should I care that the result came on a weekday? That’s the first definition. That’s the Rashash. The definition of the Minchat Chinukh says no. Since I placed the dough in the oven, the action that takes place afterward—the actual baking—is drawn after the placing in the oven, and the whole process is considered my action. When I ask what the act of baking is, it means placing dough in the oven and leaving it there until it bakes. That is called the labor of baking. Therefore, says the Minchat Chinukh, if so, then the whole thing has to happen on the Sabbath. If it bakes after the Sabbath, that won’t make me liable, because in order to be liable, the act of baking has to be done on the Sabbath itself. That is the practical difference. Okay? Now, if I return to the Rivah—the Rivah I mentioned above probably understands like the Rashash, right? He basically says the placing of the bread in the oven is the transgression, and afterward there is only a side condition. So the Rivah goes like the Rashash—that’s the claim. Fine, one can branch out here into many things. What exactly is the Rivah saying? So then really, why, really—why shouldn’t I remove the bread and in effect reveal retroactively that the transgression is not a transgression? I formulated it one way. I said: I won’t reveal that the transgression is not a transgression; I’ll only spare him the punishment, but the transgression has already been committed. There is another way one could formulate it: I am permitted to remove the bread in order to prevent a transgression, but not in order to save an act that has already been done from becoming a transgression. I’ll give you an example. Say a woman—well, let me explain. Actually, not a woman, leave that aside for a second. The Ritva in tractate Chullin asks a question. Suppose I recited, “Blessed are You, Lord… who creates the fruit of the tree,” and then I lose interest; I don’t want to eat the apple. I intended to eat an apple, I made the blessing, and now I don’t want to eat the apple. Do I have to eat the apple in order to save the blessing from being a blessing in vain? The Ritva’s conclusion is no. What?
[Speaker C] Because in this case too the eating would cause it to be a blessing in vain? In this case, would the eating itself also make it a blessing in vain?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The eating would be a blessing in vain?
[Speaker C] What do you mean? No, I’m asking. You’re saying he doesn’t want to eat, but he’ll force himself so that the blessing won’t be in vain. I’m asking whether in that situation—like gross overeating—maybe that too would make it a blessing in vain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this isn’t gross overeating, he just doesn’t feel like it. I don’t think so. Don’t think so. But the question is whether he is obligated to eat in order to save the blessing. The Ritva’s conclusion is no. There is a discussion about this in a responsum of Rabbi Kook, and other later authorities also discuss it: do we have an obligation to save transgressions that have already been committed—not an obligation to prevent future wrongdoing, but an obligation to save transgressions that have already been committed? And the claim is—there are two possible formulations in this Ritva. One can explain that the Ritva says there is no obligation to save transgressions that have already been committed. It has already happened—what is there to save now? For whatever I was guilty, I was guilty; the Holy One, blessed be He, will judge me according to what I am. Another way to define it—and this is what seems implied by the Ritva’s wording—is that it simply is not a blessing in vain. Because when I made the blessing, I intended to eat, and that isn’t called making a blessing in vain. The fact that afterward I didn’t eat because I didn’t feel like eating—when I made the blessing, I did not make it in vain, because I intended to eat. So here the claim is that there is nothing to save, because there was no transgression. The first formulation says: there is no obligation to save an act that has already been done from becoming wrongful. I’ll give you an example. A woman was divorced on condition that she not drink wine. All right? If she drinks wine, the divorce is void. Fine, for ten years she’s not supposed to—if she drinks wine, the divorce is void. She gets divorced, marries someone else, and has children. All right?
[Speaker C] And now she’s wondering whether to drink wine. Five years have passed. She’s wondering whether to drink wine. If she drinks wine, then all her relations with the second husband—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Become adultery by a married woman, because her divorce is canceled and she is married to the first husband, and her children—her children become mamzerim. Now I ask: is she allowed to drink that wine? Wait, sorry, but that already happened—she already completed the divorce. But the divorce was conditional; if she drinks wine, the divorce is void. But the very fact that they married her off into a new marriage canceled the divorce. It didn’t cancel the divorce; the divorce exists conditionally. Is one allowed to do such a thing? Is one even allowed to make such a condition in a divorce? Yes, there are such things. The Talmud is full of such conditions. There is some custom, enactment, decree not to stipulate conditions in divorces, but fundamentally in Jewish law certainly yes—the Talmud has dozens of pages dealing with such conditions. No, but I’m saying, in effect the divorce has already violated the condition by the very fact of the marriage. No, no, sorry—in the marriage itself they already violated the divorce. No, what do you mean violated? Why violated? Because as a divorcée she is allowed to marry, what’s the problem? Right, but that means she finished being divorced. She didn’t finish being divorced. There was an act of divorce that permitted her, but if she drinks wine, that will cancel the act of divorce, because the divorce was conditional. If she drinks wine, that means that retroactively there never was a divorce; there was no divorce, and her marriage to the second man is a marriage… it doesn’t take effect. I admit that it seems to me that the very remarrying should itself already cancel the divorce. In Jewish law it is not so. In nullification… in Jewish law it is not so. Now the question—again, let’s shorten this because this is only an illustrative example; I don’t want to get into the matter too much. The question is whether she is forbidden to drink wine. I claim that she is allowed to. Certainly she is allowed to. Maybe she has become a new legal entity? No, she is allowed to drink wine, and that will make the children mamzerim and all her relations acts of forbidden intercourse, acts of a married woman. Not that it won’t make them that—it will produce that result. But who says it is forbidden to turn acts that have already been done into prohibited acts? Where do we see that? It is forbidden to engage in prohibited intercourse, but when she engaged in it, it was permitted. Is there now an additional prohibition against turning the intercourse she already had into prohibited intercourse? Who says so? Fine, but that is exactly the point. It is not forbidden to turn acts of intercourse into prohibited acts of intercourse. It is forbidden… I don’t know whether there is such a thing. But that is exactly the point: the very fact that she married has already turned some of the actions—no, no. I’ll say it again. If she drinks the wine, I am not claiming that her children won’t be mamzerim and that the relations with the second husband won’t be acts of forbidden intercourse; they are, and she would be liable to death for those relations. No, but you say—and you also said that drinking wine doesn’t turn things retroactively into prohibited things, other things. It does turn them. That’s what I keep saying. It turns the relations into acts of forbidden intercourse. It’s just that there is no prohibition against making that reversal happen. It turns the relations into acts of forbidden intercourse, but where do we find that it is prohibited to turn relations that were already done into acts of forbidden intercourse? There is a prohibition against performing the prohibited intercourse itself, but if when I did it it was fine, and only now because of some condition it becomes a prohibited act—who says it is prohibited to do such a thing? It’s the same thing I’m saying about the blessing. Who says there is an obligation to save an act that has already been done so that it not become a prohibited act? Now the same thing here: I now want to claim in a different formulation—who says there is an obligation to remove the bread in order to save the placing in the oven from becoming a prohibited placing in the oven? The placing in the oven has already been done. Who says there is an obligation upon me to save placements-in-the-oven so that they not become prohibited placements-in-the-oven? It is forbidden to do prohibited placements-in-the-oven, but the placing has already been done. Who says I have an obligation to remove it so that the placement not turn into a prohibition? Notice, this is a different formulation from what I said earlier. Right. On the contrary… sorry, on the contrary.
[Speaker F] But here we’re not discussing the prohibition… wait, wait, Nechama, Nechama, just a second. I want to sharpen the point because it’s not clear. The formulation I gave earlier said this: the transgression has already been committed. It does not depend on the condition. The condition is a condition for punishment. Without the condition, you won’t be punished. And then I said: since the transgression has already been committed, what’s the point of removing the bread? We do not remove the bread in order to prevent punishment. Now I am proposing a different formulation. The transgression has not been committed. Only if the condition is fulfilled will the act become a transgression. And still I say there is no permission to remove the bread. Why? Because there is no permission to remove bread in order not to turn an act that has already been done into a wrongful act. There is a prohibition against doing a wrongful act, but there is no obligation not to turn an act already done into a wrongful act. That is something completely different. Do you see? This is a different formulation from what I said before. Now I want to argue that the condition indeed also conditions the act. Meaning, if the baking did not happen, then there was no transgression either—not just that I am exempt from punishment. And nevertheless I claim that there is not necessarily permission to remove it, or an obligation to remove it. Okay? So let me return for a moment to something else. The whole time I was thinking whether at some stage here it might indeed ultimately be permitted for me to remove it—no, sorry, permitted for me to put it in the oven, because if there is no completion of the labor here—when it comes to removing it, I’m saying again, to put it in and remove it afterward, to plan in advance: I’ll put it in and then I’ll remove it, and then I’ll violate the rabbinic prohibition of removing bread, but at least the Torah prohibition—according to the last formulation I gave, then it comes out that if I removed it, I really did not violate the labor of baking. According to the first formulation I gave, the moment I put the bread into the oven I violated the labor of baking. The removal only prevents punishment, but it does not save me from the prohibition. That is exactly the difference between the two formulations we gave. Okay. All right? And still I think there’s a difference between the woman, where there’s no prohibition, but you still wouldn’t advise her to do that. I said, madam, of course you are not violating any prohibition here, but you are putting yourself into a terrible situation now. So are we now discussing advisability—whether it’s advisable for her to do it? I’m not talking about what I would recommend to her and what I would do; I’m asking the question of what is permitted and what is forbidden. Right, but here, if we compare it to the case of removing the bread, here specifically the point is that we might actually recommend to him to take advantage of it, that it’s worth it for him. Recommendation is not Jewish law. I asked what is permitted or forbidden, not what we recommend. But if you were spelling it out here, you would expect a prohibition here from something that there is no prohibition there—it’s not so clear that there is a prohibition here. I didn’t understand. There you said there’s no prohibition, fine. Where is “there”? And here I’m asking whether there is permission. Nechama, Nechama, what do you mean “there”? In the case of the woman—the wine, the wine. Right. There’s no prohibition there, fine, she has a zone of permission and she decides what to do. And here you’re saying there’s a prohibition, there’s no permission. They’re not really connected. No, of course not. I brought it only as an example; I’m not making an analogy. Here, moreover, removing the bread itself is certainly a prohibition—a rabbinic prohibition, but definitely a prohibition. Drinking wine is something permitted. There the whole discussion is only what it does to the original transgression. Here there is a problem with the removal itself; it itself is a prohibition—a rabbinic prohibition, but still a prohibition. All right? But practical judgment can be completely independent of whether there is a prohibition or not. That already gets into Tosafot, because Tosafot asks: after all, he won’t listen to us. Is he crazy enough to put himself into liability for stoning? He’ll violate the removal of bread, which is a rabbinic prohibition. He’ll listen to us. So why would we make a decree at all? That too is a consideration. Yes, so it’s similar to those kinds of considerations; we’ll talk about that more, but that’s a different discussion. Fine, I really didn’t get to what I wanted. There are actually two more points here that I wanted to go through. First of all, the connection—you know what, the connection to the previous discussion. Look, according to the Rashash, according to the Rashash there is no room at all for the whole discussion we had at the beginning of the class. Because according to the Rashash, no labor here is completed on its own at all. The labor was completed the moment I put the bread in the oven. So what was the discussion I had at the beginning of the class? Whether for labor that completes itself one is also liable or not. The Rosh—that is Rashi, Even HaOzer, Magen Avraham, and all that we saw there, right? And the question whether this is unique to baking or whether it is true for all Sabbath labors. That was the whole first discussion of the first part of the class. But according to the Rashash—just a second—according to the Rashash there is no room at all for that discussion. Because the Rashash says that the completion of the labor is at the moment I put the bread in the oven. What follows is no longer part of the labor; it is only a condition. So it has no connection at all to the question whether when a labor completes itself I become liable. The labor did not complete itself: when I put the bread in the oven, it was completed. What is missing is only the condition that it become baked. So all the previous discussions are irrelevant. All the previous discussions are irrelevant. But the question is whether this is relevant only to the Sabbath or also to other kinds of labor. What do you mean? If I put the wheat into a water mill— I’m talking about baking, only baking. Only baking? Baking. In baking, if I go with the Rashash regarding baking, that in baking the placing in the oven itself is the prohibited labor and not the whole process including the actual baking that comes afterward—if I define it that way, there is no room for the whole discussion we had at the beginning of the class. It’s not relevant. We are not dealing here with a labor that completes itself. The labor was completed the moment I put the bread in the oven. The actual baking is only a side condition; it is not the completion of the labor. It’s not relevant. And then one cannot learn anything from the labor of baking to anywhere else. That is another answer for the Magen Avraham, by the way. People ask the Magen Avraham: why not learn from baking in general? He can say: I won’t learn from baking, because in baking this is a labor that is completed at the act of putting it in, not a labor that completes itself. How did I explain it earlier? Earlier I explained that the Magen Avraham would answer: I understand like the Rosh, that the labor of baking is a special labor because its normal way is to complete itself. Now I’m saying something much stronger. The Magen Avraham will say: I understand like the Rashash. And since I understand like the Rashash—so what do you want from the labor of baking at all? It isn’t relevant. In the labor of baking, one is liable for the very placing in the oven. So what difference does it make that afterward it completes itself? Of course that won’t exempt you, because you did the placing in the oven; obviously you are liable. The baking that comes afterward is only a side condition, maybe even only a condition for punishment. Okay? So that’s another explanation for the Magen Avraham—our whole previous discussion doesn’t get off the ground. Only according to the Minchat Chinukh, who holds that the whole process—the placing in the oven and the baking that follows from it—all of that is considered my labor in the labor of baking, only then can one discuss: yes, all of that is my labor, but at the end of the day it completes itself. Then one has to discuss whether perhaps this is only in baking because it is unique, or whether it applies to all Sabbath labors—but that entire discussion exists only according to the Minchat Chinukh. All right, I need to stop here. I see that we’ll have to complete a bit at the beginning of the next class and then move on. I already gave you a handout. Did you finish the page I sent? Yes. Okay. For next time there will already be another page. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. About what I asked earlier—that it relates to torts, regarding winnowing. I’m asking now about torts, not about the Sabbath. A person who winnows is damaging his surroundings, because the chaff—say he does it near his neighbor’s yard—and the chaff causes damage to the eyes. Now, you say this is indirect causation, so he would be exempt? So he’ll just always act by indirect causation and always damage the environment? First of all, that’s a good question about every case of indirect causation. Why is one exempt in tort law for indirect causation? You could always do damage indirectly. That’s why, in situations where the Sages found it appropriate, they prohibited certain forms of quasi-direct damage—but that’s a different discussion. Beyond that, I’m talking about his liability as a person who causes damage. In a case where he throws the chaff and that chaff causes damage with the help of the wind, that’s a Talmudic discussion in tractate Bava Batra 26, and there Tosafot in the discussion of Bei Bar Maryon—which Tosafot extends in speaking about the relationship between that and winnowing, where the wind assists him. In principle one could say that he is liable under the category of fire, but then it is his property that caused damage, not him directly as a damager. Which category? Sorry? Liable under the category of fire. The category of fire, okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. All right then, goodbye.
