Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 12

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

General Overview
The Sages’ penalty for extending one’s hand on the Sabbath, duress, and putting oneself into duress
The example from tractate Shevuot 18 and the effect of rabbinic law on Torah-level law
The purpose of a non-monetary penalty, “declarative laws,” and examples from the Mishnah and the Talmud
Moving to Rabbi Bibi’s question: the possibility of learning from the previous passage and the rejection of that inference
Forgot bread in the oven (117b) and the question of removing it with a peel or a knife
Rabbi Bibi’s problem: one who stuck bread to the oven, unwittingly and intentionally, and a sin-offering versus stoning
Rashi and Tosafot: is there a conclusion in the passage or does the question remain unresolved, and the significance of variant readings
Writing a “Shulchan Arukh” out of the discussion: three situations and whether the permission saves from a prohibition or from a financial loss
Ritva on removing bread: is there a rabbinic prohibition in removing it, and what the permission depends on
Labors that are completed “automatically”: baking versus grinding and water mills

Summary

General Overview

The lecture continues from the previous discussion about the Sages’ penalty imposed on someone who extended his hand into another domain on the Sabbath, and sharpens the distinction between extending it before the Sabbath and extending it on the Sabbath itself. It examines why the falling of the object could lead to liability for a sin-offering despite a claim of duress, and suggests that someone who put himself into such a situation is not considered under duress. The lecture then brings an example from tractate Shevuot 18 about a rabbinic prohibition on marital relations during expected menstruation days, and how that also affects the Torah-level plane. It then explores the logic of penalties that are not monetary, but instead create an additional prohibition or physical suffering in order to deter in advance. After that, it opens Rabbi Bibi’s passage about someone who stuck bread to the oven on the Sabbath and whether they permitted him to remove it in order to prevent liability for a sin-offering or the prohibition of stoning, while clarifying the flow of the Talmudic discussion, the question of “do we tell a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit,” the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot over whether the passage reaches a conclusion or merely emends the wording, and the implications for formulating a practical ruling in the style of the Shulchan Arukh for cases of unwitting action, remembering later, and intentional action. Finally, a more fundamental discussion arises about defining baking as a labor that is completed “automatically,” and whether this principle is unique to baking or extends to other labors as well, through the words of the Magen Avraham about water mills and the clash with proofs from Tosafot based on the case of sticking bread to the oven.

The Sages’ penalty for extending one’s hand on the Sabbath, duress, and putting oneself into duress

The lecture proposes distinguishing between the baraitot such that when one extended his hand before the Sabbath, there is more reason to penalize him by not allowing him to bring his hand back, because even if the object falls, there is no liability for a sin-offering since the lifting took place on a weekday. The lecture states that when he extended his hand on the Sabbath itself, there is no room to decree that he must leave his hand there, because if he cannot hold out and the object falls, he would become liable for a sin-offering. The lecture asks why he should be liable for a sin-offering if he is under duress and cannot hold on for twenty-four hours, and answers that we say he “put himself into a situation of duress” and therefore is not considered under duress. The lecture also suggests other formulations: that the Sages are not concerned with full duress but with a situation where “he gets fed up” and throws it, or that the Sages refrain from decreeing not because of the person’s blameworthiness but because a decree that creates, in the world, an act of lifting and placing is producing the very result the Torah wanted to prevent, even if the person himself is under duress.

The example from tractate Shevuot 18 and the effect of rabbinic law on Torah-level law

The lecture cites the Talmud in tractate Shevuot 18 regarding the prohibition of having marital relations at a time when there is concern over seeing blood during the “three times” that are a rabbinic concern lest she see blood and one come to a prohibition punishable by karet. The lecture describes a man who says he disregards rabbinic prohibitions and has relations at such a time, and then it turns out that she saw blood during the act itself. The Talmud does not accept a claim of duress on the Torah-level plane, because the rabbinic prohibition itself is a warning that “this can happen.” The lecture concludes that once the Sages established a rabbinic prohibition, the person ceases to be under duress and becomes unwitting rather than coerced, creating a principle that a rabbinic prohibition can change legal status even with respect to Torah-level law. The lecture applies this to extending one’s hand on the Sabbath: someone who knows, or should have known, that the Sages prohibit bringing the hand back cannot later claim duress when the object falls.

The purpose of a non-monetary penalty, “declarative laws,” and examples from the Mishnah and the Talmud

The lecture raises the question of what a “penalty” means when it is not monetary, but instead creates an additional prohibition or an obligation to leave one’s hand outside in order to cause physical discomfort and deterrence. The lecture states that the purpose is that from the outset a person should not stick his hand out, because “he knows he’ll get himself into trouble,” and the penalty is meant so that it will never need to be carried out. The lecture compares this to examples where multiple prohibitions in the Torah serve as deterrence, and cites Bava Metzia, chapter “Eizehu Neshekh,” concerning two prohibitions for lending with interest, “so that he transgresses two negative commandments.” The lecture cites the Mishnah in tractate Bikkurim about the Sages’ ordinance that the priest recites the declaration of first-fruits for someone who does not know it, so that people would not refrain from coming out of embarrassment, and presents a principle that dealing with the halakhic problem automatically resolves the human problem as well. The lecture also cites the passage on “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral” and the concern over seclusion suspicion when the lender enters the widow’s house at night, illustrating that a halakhic decree also prevents social consequences. The lecture describes how the obligation to remain with one’s hand outside, or the idea that “someone who climbed a tree on the Sabbath has to stay there until after the Sabbath,” sounds crazy, but its purpose is declarative: to deter from the outset.

Moving to Rabbi Bibi’s question: the possibility of learning from the previous passage and the rejection of that inference

The lecture presents the thought that if from the discussion of extending one’s hand it emerges that the Sages are willing to decree even when this may lead to a Torah-level prohibition, perhaps Rabbi Bibi’s question can be resolved from there as well: whether the Sages prohibit removing bread even when that may lead to a severe prohibition. The lecture states that the Talmud rejects that resolution and suggests other ways to reconcile the baraitot, and says that it will return to this after entering the passage of “one who sticks bread to the oven.” The lecture outlines that Rabbi Bibi’s problem is also connected to the question whether people would obey a decree that creates an incentive to violate a rabbinic prohibition in order to escape a Torah-level prohibition.

Forgot bread in the oven (117b) and the question of removing it with a peel or a knife

The lecture cites the baraita: “If one forgot bread in the oven and the day became sanctified upon him, one may save food for three meals… and when he removes it, he should not remove it with a peel but with a knife.” The lecture asks, based on the school of Rabbi Yishmael: “You shall do no labor — excluded from this are shofar blowing and removing bread, which are skill and not labor,” so apparently there is no prohibition in removing bread. The lecture cites the Talmud’s answer, “as much as possible to do with a change, we do with a change,” and presents two possible understandings: either there is no prohibition at all and the change is only a general preference, or there is a rabbinic prohibition in removing it and in a case of need they permit it but require a change. The lecture raises the possibility that removing it with a knife itself involves a lighter prohibition, or else is fully permitted, and brings in the limitation of “food for three meals” into the question whether the permission stems from Sabbath need or from rescue limitations out of concern that one may come to extinguish.

Rabbi Bibi’s problem: one who stuck bread to the oven, unwittingly and intentionally, and a sin-offering versus stoning

The lecture presents the Talmud’s wording: “To return to the matter itself, Rabbi Bibi asked… if one stuck bread to the oven, did they permit him to remove it before he comes to liability for a sin-offering, or did they not permit it?” and establishes that this is speaking of sticking it on the Sabbath itself. The lecture clarifies Rav Acha bar Abaye’s difficulty to Ravina: if it is speaking of an unwitting case in which he later remembered (“he reconsidered and remembered”), there is no liability for a sin-offering because “its beginning was unwitting and its end was unwitting,” and if he did not remember, then there is no one to permit, because he does not know — so the case cannot be set up that way. The lecture brings Rav Sheila’s attempt to establish it as an unwitting case and say that the permission is for “others,” and Rav Sheshet’s rejection: “Do we say to a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit?” The lecture returns with Rav Ashi’s formulation: “Actually, it is an intentional case, and say: before he comes to the prohibition of stoning,” and concludes with the citation: “Rav Acha the son of Rava taught it explicitly… they permitted him to remove it before he comes to the prohibition of stoning.”

Rashi and Tosafot: is there a conclusion in the passage or does the question remain unresolved, and the significance of variant readings

The lecture explains that Rashi interprets “stoning” as being said “in the language of a straightforward statement and not in the language of a question,” and therefore a conclusion emerges that one may remove it in order to avoid the prohibition of stoning. The lecture brings Tosafot: “There are books that read: Rabbi Bibi asked, and it was taught explicitly in Rabbi Bibi’s question: the prohibition of stoning,” and explains that according to this reading Rav Acha the son of Rava merely corrects the wording of the question so that it returns to being an unresolved question about “the prohibition of stoning,” and does not resolve the doubt. The lecture states that the Talmud before us is generally according to Rashi’s version, while other medieval authorities could have had different versions, and that this explains why according to Tosafot there is no conclusion, only a correction: Rav Acha the son of Rava supports Rav Ashi’s proposed formulation of the problem rather than deciding the law.

Writing a “Shulchan Arukh” out of the discussion: three situations and whether the permission saves from a prohibition or from a financial loss

The lecture formulates three scenarios for deriving practical law: an unwitting sinner who has not remembered, an unwitting sinner who has remembered, and an intentional sinner. The lecture states that in the case of an unwitting sinner who has not remembered, others are forbidden to remove it because “we do not say to a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit,” and therefore one does not save him from a sin-offering through another person’s transgression. The lecture suggests that in the case of an unwitting sinner who remembered, there is no liability for a sin-offering, but there is still a question whether he was permitted to remove it, and makes this depend on how we understand the purpose of the permission: if the permission is meant to save from the prohibition itself that began unwittingly, then there would be reason to permit it even without liability for a sin-offering; but if the permission is meant to save him from “having to buy an animal for a sin-offering,” then where there is no liability there is no reason to permit it. The lecture concludes that in the intentional case the law depends on Rashi and Tosafot: according to Rashi, they permitted removal so that he not come to the prohibition of stoning, while according to Tosafot the question remains open. The lecture quotes Tosafot’s difficulty, “It is puzzling — let it answer: say, to liability for a sin-offering,” and shows that Tosafot assumes the permission is meant to save from the prohibition itself and not only from the payment, and cites Rashi’s phrase “a severe punishment,” which can be interpreted either as financial expense or as a marker of the gravity of the transgression.

Ritva on removing bread: is there a rabbinic prohibition in removing it, and what the permission depends on

The lecture cites Ritva, who asks, “What permission is needed?” if “removing bread is a skill and not labor,” and argues that there is not necessarily even a rabbinic prohibition. The lecture presents two approaches in Ritva: one can say that there is a rabbinic prohibition in removing bread with a peel, but with a knife it is entirely permitted because it is a שינוי, an unusual manner of doing it; or one can say that they permitted the removal of already baked bread “for the honor of the Sabbath,” but removing raw dough in order to prevent baking is not “for the honor of the Sabbath,” and therefore even with a knife there is a rabbinic prohibition. The lecture emphasizes that Rabbi Bibi’s passage deals with removing it “before it bakes,” and therefore the permission there is not necessarily the same permission as saving baked bread for Sabbath meals.

Labors that are completed “automatically”: baking versus grinding and water mills

The lecture raises a fundamental question: why in the labor of baking is one liable even though the person’s act is only placing it there, while the result occurs automatically through the heat of the oven. The lecture asks whether this principle is unique to baking, where “that is its normal manner,” or whether it extends to any labor whose completion occurs on its own. The lecture quotes the Shulchan Arukh on putting wheat into a water mill close to nightfall, and cites the Magen Avraham, who is lenient regarding telling a non-Jew for the sake of a commandment, and argues that grinding in a water mill does not incur liability for a sin-offering because “the labor is done on its own,” whereas “liability for a sin-offering” exists only with “a hand mill.” The lecture notes that the Magen Avraham cites Tosafot, who obligate in “something that comes about automatically,” likening it to “one who sticks bread to the oven and it bakes,” yet the Magen Avraham remains with his position, implying that the difference is that in baking this is the normal way the labor is done, whereas in grinding this is an unusual way. The lecture notes that Even HaOzer disagrees and brings proof from one who sticks bread to the oven also regarding a water mill, and says that this discussion will continue in the next lecture.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in the previous lecture, when we were dealing with this decree about bringing the hand back after he had extended it out, we ended at the point where the discussion moves over to Rabbi Bibi’s problem. So let me just briefly do that here, because I still want to get into Rabbi Bibi’s passage itself. This really ends — or not ends, but starts — with the suggestion to distinguish between the baraitot in such a way that the one speaking about a person who extended his hand before the Sabbath, specifically there there is more room to penalize him and not let him bring his hand back, because even if he drops the object — if he can’t hold out there with his hand all Sabbath and drops the object — there’s no liability for a sin-offering here, because the lifting was done on a weekday. But if he extended it on the Sabbath itself, then there is no room to decree against him, because if he can’t hold out and drops the object, then he comes to liability for a sin-offering. After that, maybe one more note — I also wrote this to you in the email, which I didn’t have time to mention — why really, if he can’t hold out and drops the object, is he liable for a sin-offering? Let’s say he extended his hand inside on the Sabbath, and they decree on him that he must leave his hand there until after the Sabbath, and then the claim is that if he can’t hold out and drops the object, he comes to liability for a sin-offering. Why does he come to liability for a sin-offering? He’s under duress. Meaning, he extended his hand inside on the Sabbath, now he’s trying to hold out, it doesn’t work — twenty-four hours to hold it there? So he’s under duress. Since he’s under duress, he should be exempt. So why do they say there…?

[Speaker C] He put himself into the situation of duress. It’s not duress. Nobody told him to stick his hand outside.

[Speaker B] Because in the end that was what he intended — he put the object where he wanted. Okay, fine, but he was under duress, what can he do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He wanted to leave his hand there, as the Sages instructed him, but he couldn’t hold out there for twenty-four hours.

[Speaker D] Who says he couldn’t hold out? Maybe he just got fed up.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?

[Speaker B] Even if he couldn’t hold out, maybe he just got fed up.

[Speaker D] Wait, one at a time, I can’t hear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so it seems to me that he just got fed up — that it’s really not talking…

[Speaker B] …about it falling by accident, but that it fell because he got tired so it fell from him. Like, because he dropped it because he no longer had the strength to hold it. Right, and that’s what I’m saying, that it…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …fell from him.

[Speaker E] But he put himself into this duress. So what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here you really can say that. The simple view is that he created the problem for himself — he cooked the stew, so let him eat it. Meaning, he took his hand out into the public domain on the Sabbath; he knew there was some kind of problem here. Now they tell him: leave your hand outside. He couldn’t hold out? You should have thought of that in advance and not stuck your hand out at all. What happens in such a case? So maybe I’ll bring you an example — I mentioned it there in the note, I referred you to my note in the summary — the Talmud in tractate Shevuot, page 18. The Talmud talks — Rashba sharpens this, but really it’s written in the Talmud — about what happens: after all, there is a prohibition on a husband and wife having marital relations when she sees blood, when she is a menstruant, when she is a zavah, and so on. Now there are certain dates, or certain times, when one still has to be concerned even though she hasn’t seen blood, because it is a time when she may see blood. For example, on a fixed date in the month or over a certain period of time — there are three, actually, three times when one must be concerned that the woman may see blood. What does that mean? If she hasn’t seen blood, then what’s the problem? The problem is that perhaps in the course of the relations, suddenly she will see blood, and then you have brought yourself into a prohibition punishable by karet. And because of that they tell you: don’t enter into this, because there is a significant concern that she will see blood here, so don’t have relations. Now this itself is a rabbinic prohibition. Having relations is a Torah prohibition punishable by karet, but as long as she hasn’t seen blood, this concern lest she may see blood is a rabbinic prohibition. Now a person comes and says: I disregard rabbinic prohibitions. I’m not interested; I only observe Torah prohibitions. Rabbinic prohibitions don’t interest me. So he had relations with his wife on this particular date, and then — boom — it turns out she saw blood during the act itself. What happens in such a case? The Talmud says: apparently he is under duress. He is under duress because she hadn’t seen blood — what could he do? The Talmud says yes, but he had been warned in advance, because the Sages said so. They told him that on these dates there is a chance that she will see blood, and that is exactly why they prohibited relations. Meaning: yes, but that’s only a rabbinic prohibition. On the Torah level I’m completely under duress. After all, it was only a rabbinic prohibition; on the Torah level it was permitted for me to do this. So that means I’m under duress: I violated a rabbinic prohibition, but as far as the Torah prohibition is concerned, I’m totally under duress. The Talmud says no. Because there is a rabbinic prohibition — and the rabbis made that prohibition precisely because of this concern — you can’t say, even on the Torah level, that you were under duress. Even though in fact the prohibition you violated was only a rabbinic one — on the Torah level it was permitted for you to do it — once the Sages established a rabbinic prohibition, that establishment of the prohibition is itself a warning. Pay attention: this can happen. So afterward you come and say, wait, I didn’t think this would happen, this was duress. What do you mean you didn’t think? The Sages told you this could happen. Now, true, when the Sages say it, it’s only a rabbinic prohibition, but it also has significance on the Torah level. On the Torah level you stop being under duress. By the way, you become unwitting, not intentional. You become unwitting, but under duress you are not. So it turns out that a rabbinic prohibition established by the Sages has ramifications on the Torah level. Okay? Meaning, a person who put himself into such a situation, even though it was only a rabbinic prohibition, cannot afterward say: look, I was under duress, what could I do? Same thing here. You basically extended your hand on the Sabbath; there is a prohibition in that. Right? And you also knew the law in advance, or at least you should have known it in advance, because ignorance of the law is no excuse. So you should have known the law that you would be forbidden to bring your hand back. So what are you saying? I’ll stick my hand out, I don’t care about a rabbinic prohibition, and afterward I’ll leave the hand there. Then — boom — it fell from you; you couldn’t hold out all day. So you say: I’m under duress, what can I do? No, you’re not under duress, because you’re the one who put yourself into this situation. You should have thought about that in advance. Someone who puts himself into a situation where he’ll be under duress cannot be treated as under duress.

[Speaker D] But it’s not the same situation at all. The ones who caused him to be under duress here are the Sages, because they don’t let him bring the hand back even though bringing it back is permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It.

[Speaker C] Here too they caused it with this prohibition.

[Speaker D] They caused him to be under duress, the Sages did. After all, it’s permitted to bring the hand back, and the Sages penalized that, so they are causing him to be under duress, so that in the end it will slip from him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the other hand, the Torah caused him to be under duress because it forbade him to have relations with his wife when she is a menstruant. What does that have to do with it? The Sages established something and he is obligated to listen to them, and he also knew that in advance. He knew in advance, after all, that the Sages forbid bringing the hand back. Okay? So what — the Sages say something, and they’re allowed to. From the Torah’s perspective, what the Sages say is binding just like what the Torah itself requires.

[Speaker D] But here I’m really asking: what is the Sages’ idea in this whole story?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, the Sages are causing a person… No, you’re not asking — the Talmud is asking. That’s the next stage. The question is, the Talmud itself discusses: okay, now from the standpoint of the Sages themselves, is it worthwhile to enact such a decree when in the end you are putting a person into a situation where he will commit a Torah prohibition? Good question — that’s exactly what the Talmud asks. Right now I’m only talking about the background. The background to that question is that there really is a Torah prohibition here; there is liability for a sin-offering. And about that I asked: why? He was under duress. So my claim is: not true, he wasn’t under duress, because he put himself into that situation. Okay? That’s one way to explain it.

[Speaker E] You could also say that in the end he carried out what he wanted; his intention was fulfilled. So what? So I don’t know if there’s duress here — meaning, there is considered intent in the labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what are you talking about? He left his hand there and really wanted to keep it there, and he couldn’t. He couldn’t hold out. Okay. So that’s one way to explain it. There’s another possibility: to say that we don’t call this duress. It’s hard for him and he can’t hold out. But if he were truly God-fearing and really made the effort — if it really mattered to him — he would hold out. So we are not concerned for a case of duress. In a true case of duress, maybe he really would be under duress. This is another possibility than the previous one, I’m saying. It could be that in a real case of duress he would indeed be under duress. So what? We have some concern that since it will be difficult for him, he’ll say, I’m fed up, I’m throwing the object, and that’s it. So in terms of the exemption for duress, that’s not called duress, because he could have held out. Maybe they’re mitigating circumstances, but that doesn’t make him someone under duress. So on the one hand we have some concern that he won’t hold out, but on the other hand the claim is not that he’ll reach the absolute limit of his ability and in the end it will really be duress. Rather, the claim is that once it gets hard for him, he’ll say, okay, I’m already fed up, and throw the object.

[Speaker C] But he can say… what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He could have…

[Speaker C] …said, I’m fed up, so I’ll just bring the hand back and violate a rabbinic prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why would he commit a Torah prohibition?

[Speaker C] He himself can…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s another question; in a moment I’ll get to that point.

[Speaker D] That’s a good point, an excellent question. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because that’s what I would do.

[Speaker D] I’d bring the hand back. At worst I violated a rabbinic prohibition, but at least I didn’t come to a Torah prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good question, we’ll get to it in a moment. We’ll deal with it quite a bit more. Another possible formulation is that the point is not — meaning, we… after all, the Talmud says that the Sages will not decree against him if he extended the object on the Sabbath itself. Because then, if he drops the object, he’ll come to a Torah prohibition. Now it could be that he really is under duress. This is a third possibility I’m suggesting now. It could be that he really is under duress, and he did not become liable for a sin-offering. But the Sages don’t want to decree, because the Sages don’t want to create this result — that there will be here a lifting in the private domain and a placing in the public domain. He himself would be exempt; he’s under duress. But people would come with complaints against us: you enacted a decree here that led a person to a Torah prohibition. Now again, from the standpoint of his own blameworthiness, he is not at fault — he’s under duress. But the fact is that a Jew lifted in the private domain and placed in the public domain. Meaning, a problematic result took place here, something the Torah wanted to prevent. So why should the Sages enact a decree in a place where that decree will lead to the non-fulfillment of the Torah’s will? And then the claim is that maybe the person really is under duress. True, it slipped from his hand under duress, and indeed no one blames him. And still there is a reason why, in such a case, it would not be proper for the Sages to decree. It would not be proper for them to decree not because they are causing him to sin, but because they are creating in the world the very thing the Torah wanted to prevent. Even though nobody is guilty of it — the person was under duress. The ones guilty of it are the Sages themselves, the ones who enacted the prohibition and caused it so that in the end an act of carrying out on the Sabbath would occur here. That’s another way to understand it, and then it really is a third formulation.

[Speaker E] I want to understand — I was trying to think of something similar just to make a comparison. Is this like, for example, the rule that one may not shave during Chol HaMoed because the assumption is that everyone has a beard and then no one enters the holiday looking scruffy, but today everyone looks like mourners during the holiday — so is that the Torah’s intention?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t quite understand.

[Speaker E] I’m trying to parallel it to another case because I’m not sure I understood what you said. Do you mean that the Sages created a problematic situation whose result is basically the opposite of the Torah’s intention? Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — with Chol HaMoed, the whole thing is on the table. The Sages forbade shaving on the holiday in order to force him to shave on the eve of the holiday. But there the assumption is that as a result of this prohibition, the problem won’t be caused. Why won’t it be caused? Because he’ll shave before the holiday.

[Speaker E] But Chol HaMoed is a whole week for me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that was their assumption. People shaved once a week then; that wasn’t considered looking scruffy.

[Speaker D] Today, when people shave…

[Speaker E] …every day…

[Speaker D] …the halakhic decisors say it’s not the same thing. Maybe the Sages started from the assumption that he really would bring the hand back, and then they say to him: listen, once you stick it out, know that even if you bring it back, that’s the penalty. The penalty is that you violated a rabbinic prohibition — that’s the penalty here. You’re violating an additional prohibition here. And they took into account that in any case he would bring the hand back.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, he…

[Speaker D] …won’t want to violate a Torah prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what’s the point? In any case he’s violating a rabbinic prohibition, so…

[Speaker D] What is the meaning of a penalty here? What is a penalty? It’s not a monetary penalty. What’s the penalty here? What is the penalty in the fact that the Sages create yet another prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To hassle him — to make him leave his hand there and not bring it back. What do you mean?

[Speaker D] But they know most people won’t do that, and in any case will bring it back.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That goes back to the previous discussion. I said we’d get to it. That’s another whole topic; we’ll still talk about it.

[Speaker D] I’m trying to understand the situation. It’s a situation that feels disconnected from me, because today, in reality, I don’t see a person who sticks out his hand and stands there the whole Sabbath with the object. It’s hard for me to picture such a situation. Most people would drop it. Were the Sages living in a reality where people would stand there with it outside?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Most people wouldn’t drop it. Rather, like you — or I don’t remember who pointed it out earlier — most people would simply bring the hand back in.

[Speaker D] So what did the Sages think? I’m trying to get into the Sages’ mindset. What did they think would happen? What’s the idea of this penalty?

[Speaker B] They thought people wouldn’t stick the hand out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. What they wanted to achieve was that a person from the outset would not stick his hand out, because he knows he’s getting himself into trouble, that’s all.

[Speaker B] A big penalty threat. Why?

[Speaker D] So that’s what I’m saying: when he knows he’s getting into trouble, it’s not that his hand will be stuck there, because obviously he’ll bring it back, but rather that he’s getting into trouble by violating another prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. It’s impossible — meaning, basically we tell you: leave the hand there. True, he always has the option to bring it back, but there is a prohibition in that; that’s always the dilemma. Right, he always can. It’s like when we tell a person: don’t eat poultry with milk lest you come to eat meat with milk. Fine — but a person wants to eat poultry with milk, so he says: I’ll violate the rabbinic prohibition and I won’t come to a Torah prohibition. We prohibit it on the assumption that he will observe that prohibition. The same is true here. Fine, but we’ll still discuss that. Who says he’ll obey them? That’s also Rabbi Bibi’s problem. In Rabbi Bibi’s problem, let’s say they forbid you to remove the bread so that it won’t bake. Now think about it — the person is heading toward a prohibition punishable by stoning. They won’t execute him because he’s exempt on grounds of insanity? The man is bringing himself with his own hands to a death penalty. There’s no such thing — nobody will comply with that.

[Speaker F] But stoning is not something that happens much in practice, right?

[Speaker C] What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t have to happen. After all, we’re talking about a case where he stuck bread to the oven and we’re saying that he is coming to the prohibition of stoning. That’s the situation. It happens once in a thousand years, but in that one time I’m talking about what the law is. Okay? So they tell me in that one case — there’s a dilemma now — Rabbi Bibi doesn’t know whether it’s permitted to remove it or forbidden to remove it. So Tosafot there asks: what do you mean? Would anyone really listen to you? Let’s say it’s forbidden to remove it. Would anyone listen to you and bring himself into liability for stoning, to be killed? He’ll violate the rabbinic prohibition and remove the bread. Fine — we’ll still talk about that.

[Speaker G] What happens if I, I don’t know, there’s a water outage and I need water for a baby, and I stick my hand out the window to fill a cup from the rain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. So what’s the problem?

[Speaker C] I have a lifting…

[Speaker B] …of…

[Speaker G] I do have a lifting, but I need to bring my hand back.

[Speaker B] If you live on upper floors, then you don’t have…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If outside your window is the public domain…

[Speaker B] …four handbreadths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If outside your window is the public domain, then it’s forbidden to do that. Now again, if your baby is in danger to life, then obviously yes. Saving life overrides everything.

[Speaker H] But all windows above ten… yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, never mind. I’m speaking hypothetically.

[Speaker G] So that’s like an exempt domain? The window is an exempt domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I’m saying — it’s all hypothetical. Let’s say you’re in some basement level, okay? There’s a window really at ground level. Fine, it doesn’t matter. I’m saying, if it’s danger to life, then you violate all the prohibitions because of danger to life. But if it’s not danger to life, then it really is forbidden.

[Speaker D] I’m trying a bit to understand the Sages’ whole way of thinking on this issue of penalty — where the penalty isn’t financial. Say if someone stole or whatever, then there’s a payment penalty, some sort of fine as the punishment for the sin. But here the penalty is that he violates another prohibition — what’s the penalty in that? I just can’t understand the mindset. Why do they think that if a person chose to violate a Torah prohibition — or chose to lift and take it outside — then now he’ll care about bringing it back? What’s the whole idea of the penalty? In other words, why penalize him at all? A person — it’s forbidden to stick your hand out. Someone stuck it out, that’s not okay. Why are the Sages trying to prevent something through more prohibitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, the assumption is that when there are more prohibitions, that does indeed deter a person from transgressing. It’s like on the Torah level too, we find in a number of places that the Torah puts two negative commandments on something in order to deter the person. For example, the Talmud at the beginning of the chapter “Eizehu Neshekh” in Bava Metzia asks why we need both the prohibition of neshekh and the prohibition of tarbit. When someone lends to another with interest, he violates two prohibitions: neshekh and tarbit. So the Talmud says: so that he transgresses two negative commandments. Meaning, at least in their time, the fact was — today I don’t think this logic really exists that much among people — but in their time there was…

[Speaker C] …how much they cared…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …one prohibition like that I can still allow myself, but if it’s two prohibitions, I’m not getting myself into that. Fine, that’s one possibility. But really, I agree that today I don’t think anyone would be deterred by the fact that there are two rabbinic prohibitions here instead of one. That’s not the… I think the basic mindset is that the person really would try to leave the hand outside. Meaning, that was their assumption when they prohibited it. Or alternatively, they would cause the person not to stick the hand out in the first place. Obviously the goal is not to stick it out in the first place. Obviously the goal is not to stick it out in the first place, so that he won’t even enter the situation. That’s perfectly fine — that’s the goal. Right. After all, the purpose of penalties is always that we won’t have to use them. The very existence of a penalty causes us not to need it. It’s like — you know, I once mentioned this — the Mishnah in tractate Bikkurim. The Mishnah says there that when they bring the first-fruits, they have to recite the declaration of first-fruits — those verses that are expounded in the Passover Haggadah, “An Aramean sought to destroy my father,” and so on. “An Aramean sought to destroy my father.” Now the Mishnah says that there were many who did not know how to read. Or who didn’t know these verses — not important — but they couldn’t say it themselves. So they enacted, so that people would not be ashamed… someone who doesn’t know how to read… no — so that people would not refrain from coming because of embarrassment, they enacted that the priest would read it for the person, or read it to him and the person would repeat.

[Speaker C] For everyone. Like counting the Omer in synagogue.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then the question is: why weren’t the Sages sensitive…? The whole concern of the Sages is that he won’t come. What about the concern over his embarrassment if he does come? Suppose he’s righteous and he does come, and now he’s embarrassed. You’re not aware of that? You’re worried only that the commandment won’t be fulfilled — meaning only God’s interest is present here, not concern for the person? Like, for example, when there is a tannaitic dispute regarding taking a widow’s garment as collateral. If I take collateral, it says: “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral.” Meaning, I take collateral — I’m forbidden to take collateral if a widow borrowed from me. I may not take collateral from her. So they ask there: what about a wealthy widow? Why — what’s the problem with a wealthy widow? A wealthy widow doesn’t need the collateral that I’m taking from her — say bedding or whatever, she has other bedding, she’s wealthy, so what’s the problem? But the Talmud doesn’t explain it that way. The Talmud says: maybe with a poor widow it is forbidden and with a wealthy widow it is permitted, because what happens with a poor widow is that you’ll have to return it to her, because she has nothing to sleep with at night, and then people will suspect you because you’re entering the widow’s house — a man and a woman alone at night in a house — so they’ll suspect you. And therefore they said that you should not take collateral from a poor widow.

[Speaker C] And with a wealthy widow…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …you don’t need to return it to her because she has other things, and then you won’t come to this suspicion, that you’re going to her house at night.

[Speaker C] Wait, so if a woman lent money — what? So if a woman was the lender, then according to this it would be permitted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, according to this answer, yes.

[Speaker C] According to that answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So now the same question comes up: tell me, is your concern only the problem of seclusion when he comes to her at night? What about the concern that she’ll have nothing to sleep with? The concern that this poor widow will suffer? The point is that if you… meaning, once you legislate because of the halakhic reason, the human problem won’t arise either. It’s not that they were insensitive to the human problem. Rather, let’s go back to first-fruits. Once they said that the priest… meaning, before they said the priest would recite the passage for the person, and the person had to recite it himself, what would happen if he didn’t know how to read? He simply wouldn’t come, so as not to be embarrassed. So the Sages say: in order to make sure he comes, we’ll tell the priest to recite it for him, and then everything is fine. What about the person’s embarrassment? There’s no problem of embarrassment, because if he doesn’t come there won’t be embarrassment. You only have to make sure he comes. The embarrassment problem then doesn’t exist anyway. So in that way you solve both problems. Addressing the halakhic problem is not because of indifference to the human or moral problem, but because the human and moral problem is resolved automatically. Okay. Now, along these lines, I basically want to say the same thing here. Meaning, the claim is that they penalize him to leave his hand outside. They are not penalizing him with another rabbinic prohibition. The second rabbinic prohibition is meant to make sure that he leaves his hand outside. That’s the point. Right. Now the question arises: okay, he won’t leave his hand outside; he’ll just take it back in, and that’s it. Fine. But the penalty itself is a penalty of leaving the hand outside. I’m not troubled by the rabbinic prohibition; I’m troubled by the suffering. I want to cause him physical discomfort, not another rabbinic prohibition. But Chani is right: fine, that’s what I want, but what he’ll do is not leave his hand outside — he’ll just bring it back in, and then all he did was violate another rabbinic prohibition. The Sages apparently assumed that once they establish some kind of rabbinic prohibition on this, then it won’t be done — or at least there’s a chance it won’t be done. Why not? For example, it could be that at first people don’t even realize that sticking the hand out into the public domain is forbidden. But once we establish a penalty that you are forbidden to bring your hand back, that becomes public knowledge, because it’s such an unusual thing that you have to stay with your hand outside, so everyone will know that this is forbidden. Therefore people won’t violate that. We’re not talking here about a person who brazenly violates rabbinic prohibitions; maybe he just wasn’t aware that there was a prohibition or something like that. But this prohibition everyone will be aware of, because it’s a penalty and everyone understands that a penalty was imposed here. Something like that — we need to think of some kind of solution. But clearly, in the Sages’ minds they envisioned a person standing with his hand outside for twenty-four hours. That really does look strange to us today — I don’t see who would stay like that — but as I said, we’ll get to this also in Rabbi Bibi’s problem, so for now let’s leave it. In the meantime, let’s move on.

[Speaker B] It’s like the prohibition that if someone climbs a tree on the Sabbath, he has to stay there until after the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, although there it’s a bit easier. It seems to me that staying up in the tree all Sabbath is one thing, but standing there with your hand stretched outside holding an object for twenty-four hours, with your hand extended outward the whole time—that really is something else.

[Speaker E] Which also isn’t what would actually happen—he’d fall asleep halfway through.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What would happen there? The whole thing is pretty crazy. Okay, so that’s why I think it’s pretty clear that this craziness was intended—there are several places where you can see that there are declarative laws. Meaning, there’s a law that basically comes to tell you how careful you have to be. I don’t think they actually meant in advance that you should remain with your hand stretched outside for twenty-four hours. Twenty-four hours. Rather, they told you: listen, if you stick it out, you’ll have to leave it outside, and the hope is that this will cause you not to stick your hand out in the first place. Fine. Of course, someone sophisticated will say: I’ll take it out and bring it back, and I’ll have two rabbinic prohibitions instead of one; I’m not going to leave my hand outside for twenty-four hours. Fine. So that’s regarding the final part of the previous passage, and then the Talmud says that from the fact that they rejected that answer—or didn’t give that answer in order to reconcile the two baraitot—you can see from here that the Sages are not troubled by this. Meaning, in principle they were prepared to decree that he leave his hand outside, and they didn’t care that he might end up violating a Torah-level prohibition. Okay, and from that perhaps one could resolve Rabbi Bibi’s problem—that the Sages also forbid him to remove the bread, and they don’t care that he’ll later come to a prohibition involving liability for a sin-offering, or a prohibition carrying stoning, or liability for a sin-offering, or something like that. Then the Talmud rejects that; the Talmud says no, and raises various possibilities for reconciling the baraitot in other ways. Maybe I’ll come back to that a little after we get a bit more into the passage of sticking bread to the oven, because the points there touch somewhat on what we’re going to discuss regarding Rabbi Bibi’s problem. Okay, so now I’m moving to our passage, the one about sticking bread to the oven, and the point is this. In this passage, basically—as I wrote for you on the handout—all kinds of aspects come up, of various kinds. Really, things that touch on several very fundamental issues in Jewish law: the definition of an unwitting transgressor, the laws of warning, what the difference is between unwitting and deliberate transgression, what happens if someone puts himself into a situation of compulsion, what happens with labors that happen automatically, or various things, or decrees that a person certainly won’t keep, saying to a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit—lots of interesting aspects come up here. We won’t devote a separate chapter to each one, but they’ll come up as we go along. So first, some background. A Talmudic passage on page 117b—I’m sharing the file. The Talmud says there, regarding one who sticks bread to the oven, it says like this: The Rabbis taught: if someone forgot bread in the oven and the day became sanctified upon it, one may rescue food for three meals and say to others, “Come and rescue for yourselves,” and when he removes it, he should not remove it with a peel but with a knife. Right—don’t take it out with the regular peel; do it with a knife, with some kind of alteration. “Really?” the Talmud asks. “Is that so? But the school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: ‘You shall do no labor’—this excludes the sounding of the shofar and the removal of bread, which are skill and not labor.” So there is no prohibition in removing bread, so what’s the problem with removing it with a peel? What’s the problem? The Talmud says: as much as possible to do it differently, we do it differently. The Talmud says no, nevertheless, if it’s possible to do it with an alteration, that’s always better. What is the meaning of this? This could be understood in two ways. One could understand that basically the prohibition of removing bread with a peel—yes, the Talmud at first thought there was no prohibition in that at all, that it’s completely permitted, not even a rabbinic prohibition. And on that the Talmud asked: then why does it have to be done with a knife? Do it with the peel itself—what’s the problem? The Talmud answered: no, there is a rabbinic prohibition involved. It’s not a Torah prohibition, but there is a rabbinic prohibition. And then they tell you: do it with an alteration, with a knife and not with a peel.

[Speaker E] How do we know that it’s a rabbinic prohibition? What? How are you deriving that it’s a rabbinic prohibition? Right, I also didn’t see where that’s written.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does it have to be done differently? Here there is—

[Speaker E] actual force to it, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does it have to be done differently? Why not with a peel but with a knife?

[Speaker H] In honor of the Sabbath? I don’t know. To emphasize.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, in honor of the Sabbath? I don’t understand. Let him remove it with a peel.

[Speaker H] It won’t look like work. There are all kinds of suggestions one could make.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that means there’s a rabbinic prohibition. So removing it with a peel is problematic, however you want to phrase it. The fact is that it has to be avoided, right? To do it with a knife and not with a peel.

[Speaker H] “Problematic” doesn’t mean there’s a rabbinic prohibition. What? “Problematic” doesn’t necessarily mean that; maybe you need some reasoning or proof that it’s the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it the same thing? I don’t understand. “Problematic” is a rabbinic prohibition—that’s the problem. What’s the difference?

[Speaker H] Maybe it’s some other problem?

[Speaker E] Maybe so that it reminds him—some distinction—not to do it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why with a knife and not with a peel? I don’t understand. If there’s no prohibition, then what’s the problem? Let him do it with a peel.

[Speaker E] Because of utensils, I don’t know—a work utensil is set aside, because a peel is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then there is a prohibition! I don’t care right now exactly how you want to define it—there’s a prohibition. By the way, if the peel… if removing bread is permitted, then why would the peel be set aside? It’s permitted to use it, because the removal itself is…

[Speaker H] They also bake with it. Ah, okay. The issue of set-aside doesn’t arise at all; if it’s permitted, you can also use a utensil whose primary function is for prohibited activity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently there is, apparently, a rabbinic prohibition here. But one could understand in two ways what the Talmud asked: why does it need to be done with a knife, do it with a peel. One could understand… one could understand that at first the Talmud thought that with a peel there isn’t even a rabbinic prohibition—it’s completely permitted—so what’s the problem? Or one could understand: no, everyone knew that removing bread is a rabbinic prohibition, but here it’s a situation of distress, a case of need, loss—the bread will burn and I also won’t have what to eat on the Sabbath. In such a case, it is permitted from the outset to violate the rabbinic prohibition, and the Talmud asked: then why do it differently at all? Not because the prohibition of removing bread doesn’t exist, but because removing bread does involve a prohibition, yet here we’re speaking about a situation of massive loss and I won’t have what to eat—here there is no prohibition in removing the bread. Not that there is none in general. And on that the Talmud says—on that the Talmud says, correct, but even in a place where you have justification, because there is some loss here, if you have the possibility of doing it without a rabbinic prohibition, then do it without a rabbinic prohibition. By the way, the same question can be raised regarding removal with a knife. When I remove it with a knife, is there a rabbinic prohibition in that, or is it an entirely permitted act?

[Speaker G] If I remove it with a knife, it could also be that I’ll cut the—

[Speaker H] the cake, when there’s such terrible need.

[Speaker G] That’s permitted after the fact.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that too is prohibited?

[Speaker G] It’s—

[Speaker B] permitted

[Speaker H] after the fact.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “permitted after the fact” mean? Is it prohibited or permitted?

[Speaker H] No, it has to be permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the question is in a case where there’s need. If it’s permitted, then what’s the novelty? Then obviously he’d do it with a knife, because there’s no prohibition involved—what’s the issue?

[Speaker B] There is a prohibition, it’s allowed, and this alteration is only for if it really saves the person, something where he has no choice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, apparently it seems that even removal with a knife involves a prohibition. But here, when you have need and loss and you won’t have what to eat and so on, then they tell you that you may nevertheless do it, provided that you do it with a knife, because that’s lighter than with a peel. Then what comes out is that there is a rabbinic prohibition in removing it with a peel. If you do it with an alteration by means of a knife, there is also a rabbinic prohibition, but it is lighter. Therefore they tell you: if there’s distress forcing you, at least do it with the lighter prohibition. Another possibility is to say, actually no—the opposite. They came to tell you that removal with a peel is rabbinically prohibited, and even in a place of need, don’t do that. Do it with a knife, and with a knife it is indeed entirely permitted, inherently. With a knife, really, it would be permitted even from the outset, not only in a case of need. The novelty here is not that a knife is permitted; the novelty is that a peel is prohibited. So naturally you should do it with a knife. And if you saw the Ritva in the passage on Rabbi Bibi…

[Speaker F] But it’s not only that here. What? There’s also the issue that it’s for food for three meals. And therefore? That there’s an emphasis on the purpose—what you’re doing it for.

[Speaker C] In honor of the Sabbath, three meals for the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. You rescue food for three meals because that’s what is permitted. That’s the whole story.

[Speaker F] Yes, so I’m saying it’s not just ordinary removal of bread; it’s removing bread because of a distressing situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You want to say that from here it’s proven that even removing it with a knife involves some prohibition, and they only permitted it because of the need? That it’s not that removal with a knife is completely permitted, because otherwise he could, by removing it with a knife, save as much as he wanted, not just three meals. Right—if he’s anyway doing it with a knife, since it’s permitted. That’s not entirely precise, because you have to know the context of the Talmud there. The Talmud there is speaking about when my house is on fire. Am I allowed to rescue things from it? The Talmud says you’re not. Why not? What’s the problem with rescuing things? Because there’s a concern that, since I’ll be frantic about my property, I’ll forget that today is the Sabbath and I’ll come to extinguish the fire. And extinguishing fire on the Sabbath is forbidden. Meaning, even actions that are in themselves permitted—when you do them in a context of rescue, sometimes they were stringent with you not to do them. So it could be that here too, because you want to rescue the bread, they tell you: look, if you start rescuing a whole bakery here, in the end you’ll come to extinguish the oven on the Sabbath. Therefore they tell you not to rescue more than food for three meals. But that’s not because removal with a knife involves a prohibition. It may be entirely permitted in another context. But here, when you’re doing it in a context of rescue, there is some concern that you’ll get started, completely forget that today is the Sabbath, and extinguish the oven. Therefore here they forbade you beyond food for three meals, and no more.

[Speaker F] Okay, I was just referring—I think, I don’t remember whether it was Tosafot or Rashi—there is someone there who does refer to this issue of honoring the Sabbath and the specific circumstances.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember; it could be. Let’s go back now to Rabbi Bibi. “Returning to the matter itself, Rabbi Bibi asked.” Rabbi Bibi was mentioned in passing in the previous passage; here they put his actual discussion on the table. If one stuck bread to the oven, did they permit him to remove it before he comes to liability for a sin-offering, or did they not permit it? Right—this means that he stuck the bread there, of course, on the Sabbath. If someone stuck the bread there before the Sabbath, no—meaning, he wouldn’t come to liability for a sin-offering. Even if the bread bakes on the Sabbath, even if the bread bakes on the Sabbath, even then he will not come to liability for stoning, because he placed it there before the Sabbath. Therefore Rabbi Bibi’s problem is talking about when he placed the bread in the oven on the Sabbath itself. And now there’s concern that when it bakes, the person will come to liability for a sin-offering. So did they permit him to remove the bread beforehand?

[Speaker B] So here where it says “sin-offering,” does that mean he placed it there unwittingly?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently. The Talmud also says that later on. Afterward we’ll see that they correct this, but at the beginning the Talmud assumes that we’re talking about sticking it there unwittingly. The Ritva here in his commentary—what?

[Speaker E] A question came up for us: why would this even be prohibited? After all, because it’s not a swept-and-covered fire? Meaning, it’s permitted before the Sabbath to place raw food that will cook during the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But we’re not—he placed it on the Sabbath.

[Speaker B] Ben Dorsai—not completely raw.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He placed it there on the Sabbath itself.

[Speaker E] Sorry. Okay, go on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ritva here asks:

[Speaker G] But I have a question—sorry—how can this be? Meaning, if he placed it there on the Sabbath, let’s say unwittingly, okay, meaning—wait, wait—meaning, the fire was burning on the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? He didn’t kindle a fire on the Sabbath. The fire was already burning from before the Sabbath. Now a person comes and takes this dough and puts it into the oven on the Sabbath. Okay. The Ritva here asks: “Returning to the matter itself, Rabbi Bibi asked: if one stuck bread to the oven after dark,” etc. The medieval authorities asked: what permission is needed here? What permission is needed? After all, removing bread is skill and not labor, as stated in the chapter “All the Holy Writings,” the Talmud we saw earlier. “And there is not even a rabbinic prohibition here.” The Ritva claims there is not even a rabbinic prohibition in removing bread. For there we say: “If one forgot bread in the oven and the day became sanctified upon it, one may save from it food for two meals.” And the Ritva’s assumption is that if there were a prohibition in it, they wouldn’t have permitted him. So let him remain without bread—it’s not life-threatening, he can eat other things.

[Speaker E] But there it’s talking about someone who put it in before the Sabbath, while it was still day, and the Ritva is talking about before the Sabbath. So what? Not that he put it in on the Sabbath itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The removal—the removal is done on the Sabbath. The Ritva says: why may he save from it food for two meals? After all, if he stuck the bread to the oven beforehand, then that means he won’t come to liability for stoning, right? So why is he allowed to remove it? Because there’s no problem at all, since there is no prohibition in removing it—that’s all. So the Ritva says: if so, it follows that this is not a rabbinic prohibition that they permitted in a case of need; there is no prohibition at all.

[Speaker D] And he didn’t know Tractate Rosh Hashanah? What? He didn’t know Tractate Rosh Hashanah, where Tosafot brings that it says there that it’s forbidden to remove bread?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. The Tosafot you’re talking about—is that the Tosafot there on 117?

[Speaker B] But—

[Speaker D] We saw it on the previous page too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you see there in Tosafot? On the previous page of Rosh Hashanah, where it says that one does not prevent children from sounding the shofar. What does that have to do with removing bread?

[Speaker B] “It is skill and not labor” is exactly the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but in both cases it’s not labor; however, with sounding the shofar there is a rabbinic prohibition, whereas with removing bread there is no rabbinic prohibition. “It is skill and not labor,” says the Ritva, means there is no Torah prohibition. What is there? Regarding the shofar, they forbade instrumental playing lest one come to repair a musical instrument or things like that. But with removing bread they did not forbid it, and it is completely permitted—that’s what the Ritva claims. Then he says: “And some answered that what is taught there—‘and when he removes it, he should not remove it with a peel but with a knife’—is in order that he make an alteration, but with a peel there is a rabbinic prohibition.” What’s the first answer? That removing it with a peel carries a rabbinic prohibition. If you do it with a knife, since you’re doing it with an alteration, that’s already completely permitted. But with a peel there is a rabbinic prohibition, and the permission granted to you to remove food for two meals is with a knife, not with a peel. With a peel it really is forbidden, even if you stuck it there before the Sabbath. Because the removal itself, with a peel, is a rabbinic prohibition. But with a knife they allowed it, because with a knife there is no prohibition at all. So this is the first approach we saw in the Talmud; the Ritva assumes here that with a knife there is no prohibition at all, not that it’s merely a lighter rabbinic prohibition. Okay? And with a peel there is a rabbinic prohibition. “Alternatively,” says the Ritva, since we are speaking here of a case where they have no knife in the private domain, they need to remove it with a peel. “Alternatively, there they permitted it in honor of the Sabbath, with baked bread.” There indeed there is a rabbinic prohibition, and they only permitted it because he needed it in honor of the Sabbath. Not that there is no prohibition, but if you don’t have the considerations of need and of the Sabbath, then there would be a rabbinic prohibition. “But here, where he removes it before it bakes”—because here he removes it before it bakes. He wants to eat it, right? He removes the dough while it is still raw. Because if the dough already baked, then he already violated the prohibition—it’s too late. Rather, I want to ask whether he may remove it before baking, while it is still raw dough. In such a case, this is not removal in honor of the Sabbath, because he’s not going to eat the dough. So if so, the removal is a rabbinic prohibition. And then even with a knife there is a rabbinic prohibition. You see? “And there is a rabbinic prohibition even with a knife,” unlike the Ritva’s previous answer. These are exactly the two possibilities I raised when I read the Talmud on page 117. And the Ritva here, in his two answers, basically goes in the two directions we mentioned: either there is no prohibition at all, or there is a prohibition, but in a case where you need it for the Sabbath they permitted it. Fine, so for now that’s just a side remark. Now the Talmud starts analyzing and clarifying Rabbi Bibi’s question. Rav Acha son of Abaye said to Ravina: What are the circumstances? If you say it was done unwittingly and he did not remember, to whom did they permit it? Rather, it must be that he came back and remembered. But would he then be liable? For didn’t we learn: all those liable to bring sin-offerings are not liable unless their beginning was unwitting and their end was unwitting. Okay?

[Speaker B] I—

[Speaker D] want to ask: why did he become deliberate in the middle of the process? After all, it already was—it’s already compulsion, not deliberate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what do you mean deliberate? He now knows that there’s a prohibition here; he’s not unwitting.

[Speaker D] He’s also not deliberate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He’s completely deliberate.

[Speaker D] Because he’s not taking it out?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the bread is baking through his action, and he knows that it’s baking. You’re only asking why we don’t call him compelled, because the reason he isn’t removing it is that the Sages forbade it. That’s the same question you asked in the previous part of the passage. So we’ll address that in a moment.

[Speaker D] No, no, that’s not what I’m asking. The act of putting the bread in—he did that unwittingly. Now he remembers that it’s forbidden, but forget for a second what the Sages said—let’s assume that it was totally forbidden even to take it out, the bread—let’s say it were even a Torah prohibition. In practice, the moment he remembers, he’s no longer deliberate, because now he isn’t doing anything at the moment he remembers.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker C] He is deliberate, but he is deliberate.

[Speaker D] Is he now liable to stoning?

[Speaker C] Again—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s not unwitting in the sense that he knows. What you’re saying is that he’s not blameworthy—that’s a different discussion. I’m not talking about blame right now.

[Speaker C] I think, Chani, what you’re’re saying is that the bread baked through the power of the unwitting act. Right. And the fact that he remembered in the middle is not through the power of deliberate action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is a rule that throughout the entire process the person has to be unwitting in order to incur liability for a sin-offering. If during part of the process he was deliberate—deliberate in the sense that he was not unwitting, he knows what is happening here—then he is not liable for a sin-offering. It has nothing to do with whether he’s blameworthy. The question whether he’s blameworthy is a different question. Is he blameworthy in this because the Sages forbade him to remove it, and therefore it baked against his will? It may be that he won’t be blameworthy, but that doesn’t mean he’s not deliberate.

[Speaker D] “Deliberate” and “knowing” are not the same definition. I’m asking: knowing—someone who knows and acts is deliberate. But someone who knows and now can’t do anything—why does he become deliberate?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For our purposes here, “deliberate” means “knowing,” okay? It’s a definition; there’s no point getting hung up on semantics. In this context, “deliberate” means “knowing.” That’s what is meant. I’m not addressing the question of blame right now. I’m addressing liability for a sin-offering. Okay? As far as liability for a sin-offering goes, you have to be someone who does not know throughout the whole process. It has to be unwitting from beginning to end. The question of blame is another question. So the Talmud says that therefore this can’t be it. Rather, the Talmud says: rather, was the question about a deliberate act, before he comes to a prohibition carrying stoning? The question was not about an unwitting act; it was about a deliberate one. And the question is whether he stuck it there deliberately, and he knew the whole time, and now he wants to remove it. This of course changes the wording in Rabbi Bibi’s problem, because Rabbi Bibi speaks about liability for a sin-offering. But the Talmud here apparently says: maybe the wording was not exact, maybe something got mixed up for you there; he was talking about a deliberate act. There’s nothing to discuss regarding an unwitting act. Then the Talmud says: wait a second, but maybe we really are talking about an unwitting act, and he indeed remembered in the middle. Rav Sheila said: actually, it was an unwitting act, and to whom did they permit it? To others. So we’re speaking of an unwitting act—sorry—he did not remember in the middle, he remained fully unwitting, and then he is standing to incur liability for a sin-offering. So we asked above: then what is there to permit? He doesn’t know at all that he needs to remove it; he’s not aware of the issue. The Talmud says: yes, but if others who see it—are they permitted to remove it in order to save him from liability for a sin-offering? Then the Talmud rejects that and says: Rav Sheshet challenged this—do we say to a person, “Sin, so that your fellow may benefit”?

[Speaker H] I think maybe we need to add that presumably the person isn’t on the scene, because otherwise I don’t need to violate the prohibition of removing the bread; I can just tell him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if you tell him, then he won’t be liable for a sin-offering.

[Speaker C] If you tell him, he’ll turn—

[Speaker E] from unwitting to deliberate.

[Speaker H] I’m saving him from the sin-offering in a much simpler way—I just tell him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’ll turn him into a deliberate transgressor. We’ll save him from the sin-offering, but not from the prohibition. In another moment we’ll see—but it could be that he’s not on the scene.

[Speaker H] Yes, that’s true, but we want to save him from the sin-offering.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not sure. For the moment let’s say he’s not on the scene. Fine, I’ll come back to that in a minute.

[Speaker H] Right, I know what this is talking about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a second, we’ll see. So in any case, the point is that they do not allow him to save the person from liability for the sin-offering. By the way, what about a deliberate act in such a case? Can another person remove the bread in order to save the other one from liability for stoning?

[Speaker B] Later on he says that in a capital case, yes—he gives an example there that if it’s to save him from death, it would be permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where? In the Talmud? Where does it say that?

[Speaker B] Later? Yes, later there was—

[Speaker H] But there it’s not clear whether it’s talking about the person himself or about others. The Talmud is speaking about the person himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The person himself—that’s the next Talmudic statement. Rather, Rav Ashi said: actually, it is a deliberate act, and say: before he comes to a prohibition carrying stoning. Right? We went back to the previous answer because that whole line doesn’t work. For an unwitting act it doesn’t work—whether he remembered, in which case he isn’t liable for a sin-offering, or he didn’t remember, in which case it’s talking about others, and we don’t tell others to sin to save me. Therefore there is no unwitting-case option. Rabbi Bibi’s discussion applies only to a deliberate act. Then the Talmud concludes: Rav Acha son of Rava taught it explicitly: Rabbi Bibi bar Abaye said, if one stuck bread to the oven, did they permit him to remove it before he comes to a prohibition carrying stoning? Okay? So it says explicitly that the issue was really about stoning; there was a mistake in the wording of the problem as cited above. But here, in the conclusion of the passage, as I asked you on the sheet, there is room for some hesitation. Rashi writes explicitly—Rashi says: “stoning”—and “Rav Acha son of Rava states Rabbi Bibi’s statement in the language of straightforward assertion, not in the language of a question.” Right? Here it’s Rav Acha son of Rava, correct? In the Talmud. Rav Acha son of Rava says in the name of Rabbi Bibi bar Abaye that they permitted him, that the discussion is about a case of stoning. Okay? And more than that, he says that this was not—

[Speaker C] in the language of a question, but in the language of a statement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, he brought it as a law, not as an open question.

[Speaker F] That’s why I think it’s also like—this is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] also—

[Speaker F] different from what was written at the beginning, where there was explicitly a question whether it was permitted or not permitted. Yes, yes, Geula, we’re… there’s a substantive change here in what’s written, both in the prohibition and in the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not sure they changed the wording. I’m not sure Rav Acha son of Rava is claiming that Rabbi Bibi did not hesitate at all—that Rabbi Bibi said it. Rather, Rav Acha son of Rava says: as for what Rabbi Bibi was uncertain about, I say that it is permitted to remove it.

[Speaker B] Not certain—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t know. It could go either way. It’s not certain that he is also changing the matter of whether this was an open question or an absolute determination. But Tosafot here does not write that way. Tosafot here says: “he taught it explicitly”—there are texts that read: “Rabbi Bibi asked,” and taught explicitly that in Rabbi Bibi’s question the issue was a prohibition carrying stoning. What does that mean?

[Speaker C] There’s a version where he asked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, basically—again—even in Tosafot it’s not completely clear what he means. One could understand that Rav Acha son of Rava presents it in the language of a question in Rabbi Bibi’s name, not in the language of a settled ruling. And one could understand that Rav Acha son of Rava isn’t here at all; rather the claim is that Rabbi Bibi himself—yes, Rabbi Bibi himself—raised this problem regarding a prohibition carrying stoning and not liability for a sin-offering. For liability for a sin-offering. Then it comes out that the question really remains in doubt; there is no resolution in the passage.

[Speaker B] Right? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? We are merely correcting Rabbi Bibi’s problem from a deliberate case instead of an unwitting one. But there is no statement here of what the law is in the end. I don’t know.

[Speaker D] But there is a statement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why?

[Speaker H] The Talmud actually says that this question has no answer. Right. Where did we begin? If there were an answer, we could have answered from that baraita. And it’s clear…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s go back for a second. According to Rashi, the Talmud’s conclusion is that it is permitted to save him. The Talmud reaches a halakhic conclusion. According to Tosafot, the Talmud merely corrects the question from unwitting to deliberate, but there is no halakhic statement here. So it comes out in practice that according to Rashi, the Talmud’s conclusion is that it is permitted to save him in a deliberate case. And according to Tosafot, there is no conclusion in the Talmud. The problem remains as it was.

[Speaker E] It’s like when we leave him with his hand outside. There’s no conclusion that it’s permitted… no, but yes… the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There the decree is a decree; it’s unrelated. What—I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] I’m saying, if we were to decree that when he takes his hand out on the Sabbath, we decree upon him not to bring it back in—what are we causing him? That in the end he might throw it and incur a Torah prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the Talmud there already said that you can’t learn the passage here from the passage there. There’s no connection between the passages. They’re two different things. The Talmud here—the Talmud here—I just want to draw your attention to the fact that this is not only a textual difference between Rashi and Tosafot. The question is what the Talmud’s conclusion is. Meaning, according to Rashi there is a conclusion to the Talmud; according to Tosafot there is no conclusion to the Talmud.

[Speaker H] It also seems that if the version says that Rabbi Bibi said it, then it comes out that his question was not about stoning but about a sin-offering. And if his question was about a sin-offering, then it follows that regarding stoning he does think it’s permitted to remove it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or that it’s forbidden, because he did it deliberately. There are arguments in both directions here.

[Speaker H] Yes. No, but from the fact that we decide whether this is a statement regarding… if it’s a statement regarding stoning, that means he knows what to do in a case of stoning, but he asks regarding a sin-offering. And the reverse: if he asks regarding stoning, maybe regarding a sin-offering it was obvious to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, regarding a sin-offering we already saw that the question can’t be asked. The Talmud itself said that regarding a sin-offering this drops out.

[Speaker H] Maybe that’s Rav Sheshet speaking, but maybe Rabbi Bibi didn’t think that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no indication of that here. The Talmud rejected the possibility of this doubt regarding an unwitting case—it’s not an option. The doubt was regarding a deliberate case. The question whether the doubt was resolved or not—that’s the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. Okay?

[Speaker D] I’m really sorry for stopping things, I just really didn’t understand the point at all. I didn’t understand… I don’t know, when I read the Talmud it’s clear to me that there is a conclusion here, and the conclusion is that it’s permitted in a deliberate case. I just can’t understand how one could read the Talmud otherwise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re reading the Talmud according to Rashi’s text. But Tosafot has a different text of the Talmud.

[Speaker D] So what is Tosafot’s text? I couldn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here. “There are those who read: Rabbi Bibi asked, and taught it explicitly in Rabbi Bibi’s question as a prohibition carrying stoning.” That means the text goes like this according to Tosafot—I’m going back to the Talmud. Rav Acha son of Rava taught it explicitly: “Rabbi Bibi asked”—I’m now reading according to Tosafot’s text—“Rabbi Bibi bar Abaye asked: if one stuck bread to the oven, did they permit him to remove it before he comes to a prohibition carrying stoning, or did they not permit it?” Period. And that’s the text according to Tosafot. Okay? You have to get used to the fact that the Talmud as it appears before us is generally Rashi’s text. Not only in this passage—generally. That’s the Talmudic text we have. Therefore, many times when people challenge Maimonides from the Talmud, they don’t notice that it is entirely possible that Maimonides had a different text of the Talmud. The Talmud we know, the Talmud that appears before us, is usually the version that Rashi had. In this sense, we are all students of Rashi. But other medieval authorities may have had different versions of the Talmud.

[Speaker D] Can you repeat Tosafot’s version for a second? I didn’t understand where it differs in the Talmud. With a question mark.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s do it again. I marked the Talmud—I’ll read it again. Now I’m inserting Tosafot’s text here. Rav Acha son of Rava taught it explicitly: “Rabbi Bibi asked,” not “Rabbi Bibi said.” “Rabbi Bibi bar Abaye asked: if one stuck bread to the oven, did they permit him to remove it before he comes to a prohibition carrying stoning, or did they not permit it?”

[Speaker D] Oh, so there’s a question mark at the end?

[Speaker C] A question mark.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And here it remains a question.

[Speaker C] And here it remains a question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They simply repeat Rabbi Bibi’s statement in the language of a question. Fine. And instead of “sin-offering” they write “stoning.” That was the difference. But it’s still a question; it is not resolved. And the truth is that the rhythm of the passage sounds more like Tosafot than like Rashi. Because the Talmud does not hint here that Rav Acha son of Rava is also coming to resolve the question. Rav Acha son of Rava is only coming to say that the question was about stoning and not about an unwitting case, right? In terms of the movement of the Talmud. In terms of the movement of the Talmud, what would we expect? If you hadn’t read the continuation, if you had read only “Rav Acha son of Rava taught it explicitly”—Rav Acha son of Rava, period, dot dot dot—what would you expect to come? An answer? No, of course not. The opposite. Because it had just said, “Rather, Rav Ashi said”—look at this section in the Talmud: “Rather, Rav Ashi said: actually, it is a deliberate case, and say: before he comes to a prohibition carrying stoning,” right? “Rav Acha son of Rava taught it explicitly.” What does that mean? Rav Acha son of Rava is not merely raising Rav Ashi’s words as a possibility or an answer. That was my text of Rabbi Bibi himself. Meaning, Rav Acha son of Rava comes to support the words of Rav Ashi. Rav Ashi raised his possibility only through logical considerations, because in an unwitting case it can’t work, so Rav Ashi says: fine, apparently Rabbi Bibi was speaking about stoning, not about an unwitting case, but about a deliberate one. Okay? Rav Acha tells him: you don’t need to speculate. I’m telling you: the wording in Rabbi Bibi’s statement is that it was stoning and not a sin-offering. Meaning, Rav Acha came here to support the thesis raised by Rav Ashi—not to resolve the question, but to say that the question dealt with a deliberate case and not an unwitting one. That’s all.

[Speaker F] But from the fact that they conclude—the Talmud concludes with this—is it clear that the possibility of a sin-offering dropped out? Or does that remain, because if it’s a sin-offering then there’s no answer at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sin-offering dropped out.

[Speaker F] Like, only because the Talmudic discussion itself ends with this, with the deliberate case? Yes, because nobody suddenly talks about a sin-offering anymore—that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it dropped out; you can’t explain it in terms of a sin-offering. Yes, that’s exactly the point. So there is a conclusion—notice—according to this reading. I’m saying: Tosafot is actually the straightforward reading of the Talmud, not Rashi. Because when you read the Talmud straightforwardly, Rav Acha is not coming to resolve the question. Rav Acha is coming to support Rav Ashi’s statement that the question was about a deliberate case and not an unwitting one. That’s all. That’s why it says “Rav Acha son of Rava taught it explicitly.” Meaning, what is Rav Acha coming to say? That what you, Rav Ashi, are proposing as a conjecture—I’m telling you that we learned it explicitly that way; I know the text that way, that it speaks of stoning and not of a sin-offering. But there is not a single word here that he is also going to resolve the question.

[Speaker D] But if the person regretted it, why shouldn’t they allow him? Isn’t it the same as the person with the jump?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a question of reasoning. We haven’t gotten into that yet; for now I was just reading the Talmud. That’s what the Talmud says. What the reasons are—why they permitted, why they didn’t permit—we’ll discuss that. But that’s what the Talmud says. Okay? Now I want to ask an additional question. I go back—basically, from the course of the Talmud one can now infer—I now want to write the Shulchan Arukh, okay? To write the laws that emerge from the Talmud. So there are several possibilities here. We’re talking about someone who stuck the bread there unwittingly—what is the law, did they permit him to remove it or not—in two cases: whether he remembered after sticking it there, and whether he did not remember. If he didn’t remember, the question is whether they permitted others. If he remembered, the question is whether they permitted him. And in a deliberate case, the question is whether they permitted him to remove it in order to avoid a prohibition carrying stoning. So let’s start going through the cases one by one and see what emerges from the Talmud. Regarding someone who stuck bread to the oven unwittingly and did not remember—

[Speaker C] So then there’s no problem here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Did they permit others to remove it in order to save him—

[Speaker C] from liability for a sin-offering?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, absolutely not. Because we do not say to a person, “Sin, so that your fellow may benefit,” right? That’s what the Talmud says. So there is a halakhic conclusion regarding someone who stuck bread there unwittingly. Meaning, the Talmud says that Rabbi Bibi could not have been speaking about an unwitting case, because there it is clear that they did not permit others to remove it. So from here, already when I write the Shulchan Arukh, I can derive a law. In the Talmud this is presented only as a clarification of what Rav Ashi was talking about, but from it I can also learn what the law is. The law is that if you stuck it there unwittingly, nobody can save you from the sin-offering if you did not remember. Now what happens if he remembered and he himself wants to remove it—not others? Then he—

[Speaker C] won’t sin. If he—then he won’t sin, he won’t be liable for a sin-offering, because his beginning was unwitting and his end was deliberate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What you think, Ruti—that’s one thing. I’m asking what the Talmud says.

[Speaker C] I’m saying: his beginning was unwitting and his end was deliberate, so he isn’t liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where—where does it say that in the Talmud?

[Speaker C] In the possibilities they raise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t see that. The Talmud says—plainly, the Talmud says—

[Speaker C] “If he remembered—would he be liable?”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why can’t we establish the case as one where he remembered in the middle? Why does the Talmud say that we can’t establish it that way?

[Speaker C] Because then he isn’t liable for a sin-offering.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because then he isn’t liable for a sin-offering. But did anyone say whether he is forbidden to remove it or permitted to remove it? I don’t know. One could hesitate. But the question whether it is permitted or forbidden to remove it—I don’t know, it’s an open question. It could be permitted to remove it; it could be forbidden to remove it; I don’t know. Right?

[Speaker G] But if there’s no sin-offering here, then what—there is stoning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.

[Speaker G] If there’s no sin-offering—right?—then is there stoning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then there is what—stoning?

[Speaker C] No, no, no, because it’s an unwitting case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no sin-offering and no stoning.

[Speaker G] No, but it’s deliberate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. It’s unwitting. We said that if—if it’s deliberate there’s no—

[Speaker G] sin-offering, so we’re back to what I said before: he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] deliberate in the sense of blame. He’s deliberate in the sense that he’s not unwitting; he isn’t liable for a sin-offering because he knows, but he isn’t blameworthy; when he stuck it there he was unwitting. Obviously there’s no liability for stoning here; it’s just that there’s also no liability for a sin-offering. It’s neither sin-offering nor stoning.

[Speaker D] The question is whether there is a prohibition here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly! That is the big question. Because here the dilemma comes up that I also asked you on the handout. If I read the Talmud as basically saying that there is no sin-offering here, and therefore there is no question—obviously they did not permit him, because why should they permit him? He isn’t being saved from liability for a sin-offering; there is no liability for a sin-offering here. Then, if I read the Talmud this way, the meaning is that the conclusion is that in a situation where he remembered, they did not permit him to remove it. Why? Because there is no reason to permit it; he isn’t liable for a sin-offering. But what does that assume? It assumes that the permission was not meant to save him the money—not to save him from the transgression. Because after all, an unwitting transgression still exists even if he remembered. On the contrary, it’s maybe even a somewhat more serious transgression, because the second part he is already doing knowingly, not unwittingly, right? After all, there’s no difference between whether he remembered or didn’t remember in terms of the severity of the transgression he is committing; this is an unwitting transgression at a certain level of severity, but there is some type of transgression here. Now, if they permitted him to remove it in order to save him from the transgression, then what difference does it make whether there is liability for a sin-offering or not? There’s an unwitting transgression here either way. So they should have permitted him to remove it also in a case where he remembered, in order to save him from the transgression, right? True, he isn’t saved from a sin-offering, but he is saved from the unwitting transgression. So if I read the Talmud as saying that in a case where he remembered they did not permit him because there is no liability for a sin-offering, then that means—what, really, was the permission to remove it meant for?

[Speaker C] Because of the punishment. Because of the payment. Rabbi, Rabbi, can this also be inferred from something else?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one second. First I want to explain this so it’ll be clear to everyone. Meaning, if I say that in a case where there is liability, in a case where he remembers in the middle there is no liability for a sin-offering, then clearly they did not permit him to remove it. So on that, you can’t explain Rav Bibi that way. What is he uncertain about? Here it’s clear they did not permit him to remove it. That’s one possible way to read the Talmud. This possibility assumes that the permission to remove it is not about saving him from a transgression, but about saving him the money. Here there’s no saving of money, so they did not permit it.

[Speaker G] Wait, could you repeat that sentence? There was too much noise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. There are two ways to understand why the Talmud rejects the possibility of explaining Rav Bibi’s statement in a case where I remembered. The Talmud says: because here there is no liability for a sin-offering. So what? You could understand that since there is no liability for a sin-offering here, then there’s no question—clearly they did not permit him to remove it, because there’s nothing to save him from, there’s no liability for a sin-offering. And you could read it differently: no, really the question could arise here too, it’s just that Rav Bibi wasn’t talking about that, because Rav Bibi is talking about liability for a sin-offering, and in such a case there is no liability for a sin-offering. As for the question whether they permitted him or did not permit him to remove it—that’s still a good question, and you can ask it even in the situation where he remembered in the middle. I don’t know, maybe yes and maybe no. It’s just that Rav Bibi’s words can’t be interpreted about this case, because Rav Bibi is talking about liability for a sin-offering, and in such a case there is no liability for a sin-offering. Do you understand the two possibilities? What’s the difference? Yes?

[Speaker C] Can you sharpen that point, that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one second, one second, Ruti, one second. So what’s the difference between the two possibilities? Whether it’s to save him from a prohibition or from a penalty. The difference is in the question why they permit a person to remove it. Exactly. Do they permit a person to remove it in order to spare him the transgression of baking unintentionally, or do they permit a person to remove it in order to spare him buying a cow for a sin-offering? An animal for a sin-offering. What’s the difference? The difference is that if I really remembered in the middle, then I still have an unintentional transgression—it doesn’t save me from the transgression. Rather what? In the laws of liability for a sin-offering, I’m not liable for a sin-offering. So if you say that in such a case clearly they did not permit me to remove it, what is the assumption? The assumption is that the permission to remove it is about saving money, and here there’s no saving money, so they did not permit it. But if I say no—the uncertainty whether they permitted him to remove it or did not permit him to remove it exists even in a case where he remembered in the middle, and what rejected that possibility was only that Rav Bibi does not fit it, because Rav Bibi is talking about liability for a sin-offering.

[Speaker C] Because then if it’s only if he removes it—if he removes it—if they permitted him to remove it, then a complete labor was never done, so maybe he would be exempt. If they permitted him to remove it before it was baked, then maybe he won’t be liable because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …because a complete labor was not done. Obviously, that’s the whole…

[Speaker B] issue,

[Speaker C] that’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] only to save him from the prohibition. Do you understand? So the difference here is this question, and it’s a very important difference for our topic. These are two ways to read the Talmud’s rejection, but in the subtext it really affects the question of what will be written in my Shulchan Arukh. Right now I’m trying to write a Shulchan Arukh. So I say: if he stuck bread to the oven wall unintentionally and also did not remember, the rule is that he himself is not deliberating whether to remove it because he doesn’t know, and others are forbidden to remove it because we do not say to a person, sin so that your fellow may benefit. I wrote that paragraph in the Shulchan Arukh. Now paragraph 2 in the Shulchan Arukh: a person stuck bread to the oven wall and then remembered—what do I need to write in that paragraph? I don’t know. On the simple reading of the Talmud, apparently I’m supposed to write that here they did not permit him to remove it, because the Talmud said that in such a case there is no question, right? But that’s not precise. One could say that in such a case, the very same doubt that Rav Bibi had exists here too. What the Talmud rejected was only the possibility of explaining Rav Bibi that way, because Rav Bibi was speaking about a situation of liability for a sin-offering, and in such a case there is no liability for a sin-offering. But the question whether it is permitted or forbidden to remove it exists in this situation too. And therefore, if that is the right way to read the Talmud, then in paragraph 2 of my Shulchan Arukh it should say: if he stuck bread on and then remembered, it is uncertain whether they permitted him to remove it or did not permit him to remove it—I don’t know. Is what I’m saying clear? Yes. And the difference is the question whether the goal of the permission to remove it is to save money or to save a prohibition. That’s the difference.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, I’ll say again: because it says liability for a sin-offering and not prohibition of a sin-offering, maybe that points to the money. I think that in Tosafot, regarding stoning, it says prohibition of stoning; it doesn’t say liability for stoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a nuance I wouldn’t build too tall a tower on. “He will not come to liability for a sin-offering” means he will not come to a prohibition for which one becomes liable for a sin-offering. I don’t think that’s a compelling inference. Okay, so that’s that. Now what happens in an intentional case? Let’s keep writing the Shulchan Arukh. What happens intentionally? Paragraph 3. So if he stuck bread to the oven wall intentionally, is it permitted to remove it or forbidden to remove it?

[Speaker C] Permitted, so that he not come to stoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It depends whether according to Rashi or according to Tosafot. According to Rashi, they explicitly permitted him to remove it. According to Tosafot, it’s uncertain; the problem remains open in the intentional case too, I don’t know. Okay? I’m writing this Shulchan Arukh only to sharpen for you what the significance is of the different possibilities we read when we explained the course of the Talmudic discussion. And really, look here at Tosafot. Tosafot says as follows: “But if he went back and remembered, is he liable?” Right? That’s exactly on this piece in the Talmud where the Talmud says: what happens if he remembered. So if he remembered, then he is not liable for a sin-offering, right? Tosafot asks: it is difficult—why didn’t it answer, “he may come to the prohibition that leads to a sin-offering,” just as it says later, “before he comes to the prohibition of stoning.” Tosafot remains with the matter unresolved; he is troubled by the Talmud and has no answer why the Talmud rejected the possibility of explaining that Rav Bibi was talking about a case where he remembered. You asked: fine, but when he remembers there is no liability for a sin-offering, right? But there is still a prohibition. Exactly. Just as, after all, in an intentional case too there is no prohibition of a sin-offering, right? So they changed the wording to “save him from the prohibition of stoning,” not “from liability for a sin-offering.” So change the wording here too to “save him from the prohibition that leads to a sin-offering.” Do you understand Tosafot’s question? Again. The Talmud says as follows: if we’re talking about a case where he remembered in the middle, it cannot be that Rav Bibi was speaking about that, because when he remembers in the middle there is no liability for a sin-offering. Tosafot asks: so what? So what if there is no liability for a sin-offering? Rav Bibi’s question is still relevant to this case: did they permit him to remove it in order to save him from the prohibition that leads to a sin-offering, not from the liability for a sin-offering. “Prohibition” here means unintentional baking, right? There’s no sin-offering here because he remembered in the middle, but the prohibition of unintentional baking is still here, and Rav Bibi’s question could arise here too: did they permit him to remove it so as not to violate the prohibition unintentionally, or did they not permit him? And Tosafot remains with the difficulty; he doesn’t know how to answer it. What would you answer? That in such a case clearly they did not permit it. Because if there is no liability for a sin-offering, why permit him? The permission is meant to save money, not to prevent a transgression. Right?

[Speaker B] But if he argues, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there’s something here that Tosafot apparently does not… but why would Tosafot… but why?

[Speaker B] If according to Tosafot it’s to prevent a prohibition, then I would think maybe here too they would permit it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot assumes that the permission to remove it is to prevent the prohibition, not to prevent the financial loss, and therefore Tosafot has trouble with the Talmud—why did the Talmud reject the option of understanding Rav Bibi this way? After all, Rav Bibi could have been explained as speaking in a case where the person remembered. But then what does Rav Bibi mean by “save him from liability for a sin-offering”? It means save him from a prohibition for which one becomes liable for a sin-offering, not from the liability for a sin-offering itself. The liability for a sin-offering itself is not here, but an unintentional prohibition is here—that’s what it means—just as they said in the case where it was intentional.

[Speaker C] But why on the Sabbath would we get involved in saving him money? That doesn’t fit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why doesn’t it fit?

[Speaker C] Why make financial calculations on the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person is about to lose thousands of shekels.

[Speaker C] Heaven forbid, we don’t do…

[Speaker H] A substantial loss, for example,

[Speaker C] there is a leniency.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one at a time. Ruti, Ruti started. One second, Ruti, finish what you were saying.

[Speaker C] I think that on the Sabbath you’re supposed to make considerations based on what’s right regarding the Sabbath, not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I have a substantial loss, then they permit me, with lighter prohibitions on the Sabbath, to prevent a substantial loss—what do you mean? Nehama.

[Speaker H] I wanted to say exactly that, about substantial loss.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. So in Tosafot we see—even though Tosafot remains with a difficulty, so it’s hard to infer definite conclusions from him—but Tosafot’s starting point is that the permission to remove it is not to save money but to prevent a prohibition. Right? That’s what you see in Tosafot. And therefore it’s no wonder that he really remains with the difficulty—so why does the Talmud rule out the possibility of establishing the case as one where he stuck it in unintentionally and remembered in the middle? True, there is no liability for a sin-offering there, but there is still an unintentional prohibition there too. So why can’t you say that Rav Bibi asked whether they permitted removing it in order to prevent the unintentional prohibition or not? And he remains with the difficulty. He doesn’t even consider saying that since there is no liability for a sin-offering, they didn’t permit him to remove it because that doesn’t save him money; because for Tosafot, the permission to remove it is not to save money. For Tosafot, the permission to remove it is to spare a prohibition, and in such a case too you spare a prohibition. I can resolve Tosafot’s difficulty and say no—the basis of the permission is to save money, and therefore you could not establish it in a case where he remembered, because in a case where he remembered he is not going to spend money, because he is not liable for a sin-offering. And in order to save someone from prohibitions, we do not permit him to violate other prohibitions. But Tosafot did not assume that. Those are the two ways to read the Talmud, okay? Can you say another sentence about the two possibilities?

[Speaker E] Just if you could go over those two possibilities again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When Tosafot asks his question, Tosafot assumes that the permission—the side that says they permitted removing it—is in order to prevent a prohibition, not to save money. Therefore Tosafot says: even if in the end there is no sin-offering, why can’t we still deliberate whether they permitted him to remove it or did not permit him to remove it? After all, it will prevent the prohibition. In contrast, if you accept my second suggestion, then he says no—the whole basis for permitting removal is to save money. In a place where there is a prohibition but there will be no liability for a sin-offering, they do not permit removing it in order to get rid of a prohibition, and money he is not going to spend because there is no liability for a sin-offering here. Therefore the Talmud said that you cannot establish the case where he remembered. And that is what Tosafot asked against. But if Tosafot asked against it, he probably does not accept it. Tosafot apparently assumes that the permission to remove it is a permission to prevent a prohibition, not to save money. Okay, makes sense. So this is what is written in Rashi: “Do we say to a person, ‘Go and commit a light prohibition so that your fellow will not become liable for a severe punishment’?” What do we see here? We’re talking about an unintentional case—notice that. In an unintentional case there is no punishment, there is liability for a sin-offering. So what does “so that your fellow will not become liable for a severe punishment” mean? One could say maybe this is the financial saving, against Tosafot. “A severe punishment” means having to spend a lot of money on an animal for a sin-offering, because it’s not a punishment—this is unintentional—but “punishment” for an unintentional act means buying an animal for a sin-offering. And then Rashi is really suggesting the alternative against Tosafot: Rashi says that removing it is meant to prevent the financial expense. But that is not necessary. One could say “so that your fellow will not become liable for a severe punishment” means he will not become liable for a sin-offering for an unintentional violation of a severe prohibition, namely desecrating the Sabbath, a severe prohibition. The punishment is only an indication of the severity of the transgression; it is not really the purpose of the whole matter.

[Speaker D] And in any case, in an intentional case too they wouldn’t permit it, because after all they’re working from the assumption that he didn’t heed the warning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the point is that he did heed the warning.

[Speaker D] He didn’t heed the warning because they don’t carry out stoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why don’t they carry out stoning? Of course they carry out stoning.

[Speaker D] Well, because they didn’t take him out—in practice they didn’t do…

[Speaker C] …that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] If he is stoned, then what’s the question? There’s no question in the Talmud—obviously they permit him to remove it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that obvious? You stuck it on, you deal with it.

[Speaker D] But if in the case of a sin-offering they permit it, then all the more so in the intentional case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The sin-offering case is the unintentional case. The sin-offering case is the unintentional case, so he’s not blameworthy; I want to save him. In the intentional case, you cooked the porridge, you eat it.

[Speaker D] But he regretted it. He regretted it, so what, we won’t save him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says he regretted it? Who says he regretted it? He didn’t regret it. He wants to save himself from stoning. Fine, that’s not… In the Talmud itself it says that he is stoned. Good question why; we need to look into that. Another question you asked earlier: why would we suddenly assume he’ll listen to us? Obviously he’ll remove it so as not to be stoned. That’s already a question Tosafot asks. Okay, we’ll still get to all of that.

[Speaker D] Why would a person put the bread into the oven at all with the intention of taking it out before it bakes?

[Speaker C] No, he doesn’t intend to take it out before then.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s trying to save himself.

[Speaker D] Right now he’s afraid to complete the labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Suddenly he’s seized by fear of stoning, so he takes it out. Or they saw him. Suddenly they saw him, so he says, “Oh, they saw me, I’m done for, I have to remove it right away, because they’re going to stone me now,” so that it won’t become a complete labor. One more question before we continue: where are you holding on the handout? Did you finish it? No. You told us not to finish it. So we made an effort not to finish it. Fine, no problem. I told you my impression was that this was moving a little too fast. But up to where did you get? We got to 11, we got to 10. 10. Content-wise, what is that, remind me? Somehow we got up to Maimonides basically, so… Maimonides on tithes, that’s 11. Maimonides, yes, Maimonides. Fine, so let’s start moving forward. Okay. Let’s start moving forward, because I see we’re not going to finish this today. I now want to discuss the first question that comes up here in connection with the Talmud. There are several fundamental questions that arise. First question: how is the labor of baking defined, and do we impose liability for labors that are completed on their own? Completed by themselves. What motivates discussing this here? After all, the whole discussion here starts from the fact that cooking or baking—it doesn’t matter; baking is of course included in cooking—it is not a separate primary category of labor. Baking and cooking are the same thing. I put something in the oven or on the fire and it bakes. The action that I performed was a completely banal action. I put something somewhere. The problematic result happens on its own. The fire or the heat of the oven does it, right? I only placed it there. I did not do the actual fixing or alteration to the object itself. Although you could call this an inferior kind of labor, as we discussed regarding carrying out. I didn’t do anything; it happened on its own. It’s also true that here a change occurred in the object—it’s not like carrying out—but the change in the object was not done by me. It happened on its own. I only placed the object somewhere. Okay? Now the question is how to relate to that. Obviously, since among the list of primary categories of labor there appears cooking and baking, which is the same thing, then one is liable. The fact that I didn’t do anything is very nice, but the given fact is that for such a thing one is liable. It is one of the primary categories of labor, right? Now the question is—and this is indeed what the Talmud concludes here—that if I do not remove the bread and it remains and bakes, I have violated the primary category of baking. Even though I only stuck bread to the oven wall, the oven baked it. That doesn’t bother the Talmud, right? It’s clear that such a thing is called the labor of baking. The question is why that is the law. Why indeed is that so? After all, I didn’t do anything. No, maybe now the opposite—maybe I will have to remove it so that there won’t be… no, just a moment, we’ll get to that later. So first of all there is a question about the definition of the labor of baking. Why is the labor of baking defined as a prohibition even though in fact I didn’t really do anything—it happened on its own? A second question is whether this is true only for the specific labor of baking, or whether it is true for all labors. No, not for all labors. For example, suppose I put my ox with a plow in the field, okay? Maybe because that is the usual way for it to be done. I gave it a kick, and then the ox starts running and the field gets plowed—but I didn’t do it. It happened on its own. Would I say there too that it doesn’t matter that it happened on its own—just like in the labor of baking—here too I would be liable? No, it doesn’t work that way. You have to press down on the plow. But say a tractor. Never mind, come up with a scenario where it happens on its own. That’s not important to me right now. Isn’t that a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel? Wait. Here of course the question arises—you’re already jumping ahead. I gave you this to read because… we’ll get to it, but I want to present it in a didactic way. So right now I’m asking two questions. A: what is the logic of the labor of baking? Why is one liable even though it takes shape on its own? B: assuming that in the labor of baking one really is liable—and we know that one is liable—will that also be true for all other labors? That even if it doesn’t bother me that the labor completes itself, I would still actually be liable. That is the question, the two questions I’m asking. Now, isn’t this a little similar to what we discussed in the very first class, that all the actions a person does in these labors are basically just moving things? If I move the paintbrush and it touches the page, then the page gets colored on its own and I only moved; I didn’t do anything. So I said: that is true at the conceptual level of carrying out as an inferior labor and all the other labors, but clearly in practice the Sages do not treat it that way. The Sages treat carrying out as an inferior labor. Why is it an inferior labor? Because the other labors—when I write, for example, if you look at it formally, it is placing ink on paper. But clearly, when you look at it non-formally, it is not the same as carrying out. After all, I created something here that did not exist before. A change in the object. It did not happen on its own; it happens by hand, I do it with my hands. On the philosophical level I said that the labor of carrying out reflects the perspective that exists in all the labors if we look at them formally. But in practice, the fact that carrying out is defined as an inferior labor means that in practice we do not see things as if they are done on their own. Even though philosophically yes, practically no. In normal human perception, when a person writes we do not treat it as: he placed the ink on the page and writing was formed on its own. He wrote. And it’s also not just random scribbling—he can just scribble nonsense and it won’t be called writing. Meaning, he did the writing with his own hands. Now here it does not complete itself on its own; he does it by hand. But in baking, it does complete itself on its own. Okay? So we need to ask: what if in baking too—if I had not done something, if I had not done the beginning, there would not have been the continuation and completion. Obviously I am the cause. But the fact that I am the cause does not yet mean that I baked; the fire baked. The question is whether the matter depends on what the usual way was for each labor to be done in the Tabernacle. Also here, regarding the fire—just a moment, don’t say it yet. Wait, but also regarding the fire, after all I lit the fire, I caused it to be active. No, I didn’t light the fire; someone else lit it. Here there is a fire that has nothing to do with a Jew at all—it has been there since before the day began. It has nothing to do with the issue. I only put the dish on the fire. So let’s see.

The Shulchan Arukh discusses the question of what happens in the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel—what happens if someone starts a labor before the Sabbath and it continues into the Sabbath. So that is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Strictly speaking it is permitted, strictly speaking it is permitted, but there are those who forbid it in a case of public noise. What does that mean, public noise? It makes noise, an audible sound. Since it makes noise, there may be room to forbid it there—again, rabbinically. Why? Because people will think that the person is doing this labor on the Sabbath, or there will be a degradation of the Sabbath, and therefore they forbid it in a case of public noise. Okay? Now the Shulchan Arukh says as follows: it is permitted to put wheat into a water mill shortly before dark. Gloss—the Rema: and we are not concerned about the noise, that people will say, “So-and-so’s mill is grinding on the Sabbath.” Right? We are not concerned about public noise. And there are those who forbid it with a mill and anywhere there is concern about audible noise. That is the law of public noise. And that is the accepted practice ab initio. The Rema says: between the differing opinions, I rule like the second opinion, that in a place of public noise I rule like those opinions that forbid it. Ab initio. But after the fact would he permit it? “However, in a case of loss one may be lenient.” In a place where there is loss, since this is a prohibition under dispute and it is rabbinic, if there is loss one may be lenient; that is what the Shulchan Arukh says. On this the Magen Avraham says: and there is degradation—we are not concerned about audible noise, we are concerned about audible noise—and there is degradation of the Sabbath. The Magen Avraham says: and if the mill belongs to a gentile, it is obvious that it is permitted to place things in it before the Sabbath. Why? Because if a gentile’s mill works on the Sabbath, no one will think to suspect that the gentile is desecrating the Sabbath. A gentile is permitted, there is no problem. The whole problem of audible noise is only when we are dealing with utensils that belong to a Jew, because then there is concern that people will think the Jew is doing labor with them on the Sabbath. But if the mill belongs to a gentile, then there is no problem at all. And a mill powered by water? What? The gentile’s mill is powered by water? For example, yes. Good morning. Wait, so if it belongs to a gentile, then it doesn’t matter how it works? No. If it is under the gentile’s domain, and if the Jew gives the gentile the wheat on Sabbath eve, even if the gentile grinds—but if the hour requires it, for example close to Passover, the Jew may stand watch over the mill so that it should not become leavened, because this is a double rabbinic prohibition. And he says: if the Jew stands there and needs this in order to make sure there is no leaven here—they are grinding flour for Passover—then even if the gentile grinds the flour and I stand beside him to supervise that there be no leaven, it is permitted. Why? The rule is that a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a commandment was permitted. What does that mean? A double rabbinic prohibition means that if I tell a gentile—this is forbidden for me, forbidden rabbinically. Suppose I tell a gentile to plow for me; that is forbidden rabbinically. I am forbidden by Torah law to plow; to tell a gentile to plow for me is forbidden rabbinically. What happens if we are dealing with a labor such that even if I myself did it, it would only be rabbinic, and now I tell a gentile to do this prohibition, where that prohibition itself is only rabbinic? That is called a double rabbinic prohibition, and that too is forbidden. Wait, sorry. Wait, but Beit… yes? So according to that it seems that this really is a mill powered by water. Wait just a second. If you don’t understand, ask; afterward we’ll talk. So that is a double rabbinic prohibition. Now if I say a double rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a commandment, that means for the sake of a commandment, that they permitted. That is the only thing they permitted: telling a gentile to do a rabbinic prohibition if this is done for the sake of a commandment, such as guarding against leaven. Okay, that is what the Magen Avraham says. Keep reading. How do I know why this is a double rabbinic prohibition, asks the Magen Avraham? When I tell the gentile to grind this wheat, right, then basically grinding is a Torah prohibition. That is not a double rabbinic prohibition. I am telling a gentile to do a Torah prohibition for the sake of a commandment. That is forbidden. What they permitted is telling a gentile to do a rabbinic prohibition. The Magen Avraham says: not true. For even if the Jew places it in the mill on the Sabbath, there is no liability for a sin-offering unless he grinds with a hand mill. Meaning, since we are dealing here with a water mill, then even if I tell the gentile to put it in the water mill, this is a double rabbinic prohibition, not a Torah prohibition. It is telling a gentile to do a rabbinic prohibition, and for the sake of a commandment they permitted it. Understood? What do we see from here for our purposes? All the surrounding framework is not important. What do we see for our purposes? That by Torah law it is permitted to put the wheat into a water mill… into a water mill this is a rabbinic prohibition and not a Torah prohibition. Why? The water does the work. Because the labor is done on its own. Not in the usual manner is something else. Wait, “not in the usual manner” is something else. On its own—the labor is done on its own. Whether in the usual manner or not in the usual manner is not yet part of the discussion. At this stage, since it is done on its own—not I who do it, the millstones do it through the power of the water. If it is a hand mill, where I myself would grind, that is the prohibition of grinding. Grinding is one of the primary categories of labor, a Torah prohibition of grinding. But if the mill grinds through the power of the water, and I only put the wheat into the mill between the stones, that is not a Torah prohibition. Why? Because the labor is completed on its own. That is what the Magen Avraham claims.

Now he brings a proof for this from the Talmud, from Tosafot on page 18. Therefore it is implied in Tosafot on page 18—not important right now—and the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol and the Sefer Mitzvot Katan and so on. Fine. Now in parentheses—look, there are parentheses here—he says: and see Tosafot, etc., that regarding a trap, in the name of Tosafot, it seems that one is liable for a sin-offering in a case of something that comes about on its own. And Tosafot similarly explained in Menachot 56, analogous to sticking bread to the oven wall and it bakes. What does that mean? These two Tosafot passages say: even a labor that is done on its own is a Torah prohibition. And therefore, in a water mill too, it is forbidden to put the wheat in there by Torah law, and consequently it is also forbidden to tell a gentile to do it for the sake of a commandment, because it is not a double rabbinic prohibition—it is a rabbinic prohibition involving a Torah prohibition, which they did not permit for the sake of a commandment. That is the view of those Tosafot passages that the Magen Avraham brought. And the proof Tosafot brings is from sticking bread to the oven wall. Because in the case of sticking bread to the oven wall, we see that even though the baking completes itself, I violate a Torah prohibition; I am liable for stoning, right? That is what it says in our topic. So if so, the same should apply to a mill, says Tosafot. And this also seems to be implied in chapter 8 of Maimonides. That’s it. The Magen Avraham closes the parentheses and moves on, not addressing those Tosafot passages at all. “And this also seems to be implied in chapter 8 of Maimonides; if so, when he tells a gentile it is a double rabbinic prohibition and is permitted in a place of commandment,” and so on. What does he answer to Tosafot’s proof from sticking bread to the oven wall? After all, Tosafot brought a proof that sticking bread to the oven wall—even though it completes itself—is nevertheless a Torah liability. So how does the Magen Avraham remain with his position? The answer is that in baking, that is the normal way to do it. Don’t bring me proofs from grinding. Grinding’s normal way is with a hand mill. If you put it into a water mill, then it completes itself. Something that completes itself is exempt. And you ask me from sticking bread to the oven wall, from baking or cooking? There it is different, because that is the normal way to do that labor. That is how the labor is defined. A person always does only the first thing, the first step, and after that it completes itself. In labors where the normal way is that they complete themselves, there really there is no such exemption; there you are liable. But what proof are you bringing me to a water mill? In the labor of grinding, it is not a labor that ordinarily completes itself. Ordinary grinding is when a person grinds by hand. So here, if I complete it in a way that happens on its own, says the Magen Avraham, there is no Torah prohibition, only a rabbinic prohibition. It’s like winnowing when the wind assists him. What? Like winnowing? Yes, I brought you the case of winnowing with the wind assisting him, but we won’t have time to get to that. But is the Magen Avraham clear? Meaning, what is important for us in the Magen Avraham’s approach—leave aside the double rabbinic prohibition in a place of commandment and all the framework; that’s only to understand his words. But for us, what matters? The Magen Avraham holds that a labor that completes itself—you are exempt from it—even though he himself understands that in the case of sticking bread to the oven wall, even though it completes itself, you are liable. And he isn’t bothered by that at all; he doesn’t even bother to reconcile it. Why? Because apparently it is obvious to the Magen Avraham: what kind of proof is that? In baking, that is the normal way to bake, so there it won’t be exempt just because it completes itself. But what proof are you bringing me to a water mill? In grinding, this is not a labor that usually ends on its own. So if you did it in a way that ends on its own, then indeed there will not be a Torah prohibition.

Now the Even HaOzer, which we’ll still read next time, really does bring a proof from sticking bread to the oven wall to a water mill; he disagrees with the Magen Avraham. Because he argues that the idea of baking is a general idea; it is not specific to baking. Even in labors whose normal way is not to finish on their own, if they finish on their own you will still be liable, exactly like sticking bread to the oven wall. Baking is not a special labor according to the Even HaOzer. According to the Magen Avraham, baking is a special labor. I only finished this so you could see the structure. We’ll return to this next time. Thank you very much, Sabbath peace. Sabbath peace, goodbye. Thank you very much.

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Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 - Lesson 13

Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 12

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The Sages’ penalty for extending one’s hand on the Sabbath, duress, and putting oneself into duress

The example from tractate Shevuot 18 and the effect of rabbinic law on Torah-level law

The purpose of a non-monetary penalty, “declarative laws,” and examples from the Mishnah and the Talmud

Moving to Rabbi Bibi’s question: the possibility of learning from the previous passage and the rejection of that inference

Forgot bread in the oven (117b) and the question of removing it with a peel or a knife

Rabbi Bibi’s problem: one who stuck bread to the oven, unwittingly and intentionally, and a sin-offering versus stoning

Rashi and Tosafot: is there a conclusion in the passage or does the question remain unresolved, and the significance of variant readings

Writing a “Shulchan Arukh” out of the discussion: three situations and whether the permission saves from a prohibition or from a financial loss

Ritva on removing bread: is there a rabbinic prohibition in removing it, and what the permission depends on

Labors that are completed “automatically”: baking versus grinding and water mills

Full Transcript

השאר תגובהלבטל

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The Sages’ penalty for extending one’s hand on the Sabbath, duress, and putting oneself into duress

The example from tractate Shevuot 18 and the effect of rabbinic law on Torah-level law

The purpose of a non-monetary penalty, “declarative laws,” and examples from the Mishnah and the Talmud

Moving to Rabbi Bibi’s question: the possibility of learning from the previous passage and the rejection of that inference

Forgot bread in the oven (117b) and the question of removing it with a peel or a knife

Rabbi Bibi’s problem: one who stuck bread to the oven, unwittingly and intentionally, and a sin-offering versus stoning

Rashi and Tosafot: is there a conclusion in the passage or does the question remain unresolved, and the significance of variant readings

Writing a “Shulchan Arukh” out of the discussion: three situations and whether the permission saves from a prohibition or from a financial loss

Ritva on removing bread: is there a rabbinic prohibition in removing it, and what the permission depends on

Labors that are completed “automatically”: baking versus grinding and water mills

Full Transcript

שתף

השאר תגובהלבטל