Shabbat Tractate, Chapter 1 – Lesson 11

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, one second, one second, I’ll get to that in just a moment. First of all I want to talk about the poor person who put his hand into the homeowner’s domain, into the house. The poor person who put his hand into the house—Nachmanides says you can’t even entertain the possibility that this would count as a public domain. There’s no such possibility. There is no public domain inside partitions. So what follows? It follows that Abaye’s novelty clearly was not that it’s not a public domain. Abaye’s novelty was that it’s not a private domain. And then what comes out? That basically Abaye is telling us that it’s neither a public domain nor a private domain; it’s something in between, right? And on that Nachmanides says: now you can understand Abaye’s question—so what is its status? Is it an exempt area? Or at least did the Sages make it into a karmelit? But according to Rashi, where the discussion is really about when you put your hand into a private domain, yes? Then they tell me the novelty is that it’s not a public domain—but what is it then? Presumably it’s a private domain. So why assume they made it into a karmelit? What does that have to do with anything?

And now I move to the opposite case, the case of the homeowner stretching his hand out. What happens if the homeowner put his hand outside? From the symmetry it’s clear that we understand it the same way. What we said about the poor person who put his hand inside, we’ll say about the homeowner who put his hand outside. And the novelty Abaye is coming to say is that the hand is in some kind of intermediate status. It’s not the domain it happens to be in, and it’s not the body—it doesn’t simply get dragged after the body—and it doesn’t belong to the domain it is located in. Then Abaye comes and asks: fine, but maybe they made it into a karmelit? Maybe it’s not an exempt area but a karmelit? So according to Nachmanides you can understand Abaye’s introduction and the connection to the next question Abaye asks in light of that introduction. After you told me in the introduction that it’s neither this nor that, now I understand the question that comes next: so what is it? Is it an exempt area? Because anything that is neither a private domain nor a public domain, plainly speaking, is an exempt area. Or perhaps rabbinically they determined that this thing would be a karmelit. But according to Rashi you can’t understand this. Because according to Rashi the whole novelty is only that it’s not—say, regarding the homeowner’s hand that goes outside—the novelty is not that it’s neither this nor that. The novelty is that it’s not the place of the body. But it could definitely still be the domain in which the hand is actually located. And even if you think not, first of all tell me that. Then I’ll ask whether it’s a karmelit or not. Why are you asking whether it’s a karmelit? It may simply be a public domain. So therefore Nachmanides says that according to Rashi, the connection between the question and the initial assumption is unclear.

[Speaker H] I didn’t understand one thing for a moment. I understood the whole move, just a question about the beginning of Nachmanides: why is his version good in his view? Why Rashi’s isn’t good, I understood. I just didn’t understand why Nachmanides’ version of the Talmudic text is good. Why, when they learn “it is not like a private domain” from the hand of the poor person—what does he learn from that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an excellent question, and actually that’s why I prefaced this with the two ways one can read Abaye. I said that “it is neither like a public domain nor like a private domain” could have been read as referring to one situation—say, the homeowner put his hand outside—and only about that one case, one case alone, we say: it’s not like a public domain and not like a private domain. Meaning, it doesn’t follow the body, and it also isn’t the domain in which the hand itself is located. Rashi did not interpret it that way. Rashi says it’s talking about two different cases. When the homeowner put out his hand, the novelty is that it’s not a private domain. When the poor person put in his hand, the novelty is that it’s not a public domain. So why look in both directions? Wait, wait—Nachmanides apparently read it in the first way. Now look at the continuation: “And according to the old version, this is its explanation: a person’s hand is not like the domain into which it is extended, whether that be a private domain or a public domain. It is not like a private domain, from the case of the poor person’s hand, for it teaches: ‘and the homeowner took from it, both are exempt’; and if it were like a private domain, it would be as though the poor person himself entered inside, in which case he would be liable. Rather, from the fact that the poor person is exempt, learn from it that it is not like the domain into which it is extended, but is drawn somewhat after his body.” Meaning, it is drawn somewhat after his body.

So according to Nachmanides, Abaye’s claim is basically that a person’s hand is neither like a public domain nor like a private domain, but something in between—it is somewhat drawn after the body. That’s the reading according to Nachmanides. And now you can understand what the question comes to say: so what is it then? Did they make it a karmelit? Do you follow me? In other words, when Nachmanides says it is neither like a public domain nor like a private domain, he’s talking about one case—about each of the two cases, but each one separately. In each of the two cases, the hand is not a private domain and not a public domain, but is somewhat drawn after the body. That’s the reading according to Nachmanides. And now you can understand what the question comes to say: so what is it then—did they make it a karmelit? In each of the two cases there is a double novelty: it is not a private domain and it is not a public domain. Not as Rashi says, where every time the novelty is only that it is not dragged after the body. Nachmanides says no, it is dragged somewhat after the body. Meaning, it does not get dragged completely after the body so as to count as the domain where the body is, but it is dragged somewhat in the sense that it is not considered like the domain where the hand is located.

[Speaker D] But that isn’t written in any version. In both versions they give two cases.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they give two cases only in order to bring the proof. But when Nachmanides says it is neither like a public domain nor like a private domain, he means that this very same hand is neither here nor there. I—

[Speaker H] I understand what—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —he is saying, but I don’t think he needed to reverse the version. But where do we learn it from? Every such novelty we learn from somewhere else in the Mishnah. That’s what Nachmanides says. But the novelty is a double novelty about one case, not two cases like Rashi.

[Speaker H] I understood Nachmanides; I just couldn’t understand where he learns it from by means of the fact that he changed the version. I could have learned everything Nachmanides says also from the Talmudic version found in Rashi and in my text. I couldn’t understand how he infers it from the change in the version.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How would you understand such a thing in Rashi? After all, Rashi says “it is not like a public domain, from the poor person’s hand.” What does that mean? How would you learn that it is not like a public domain from the poor person’s hand? How would you learn that? Because—

[Speaker G] He is exempt. In which case?

[Speaker H] Because the poor person is in the private domain—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —and his hand—

[Speaker H] —is in the public domain, and because he is exempt—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite, the opposite—the poor person is in the public domain.

[Speaker H] Sorry, the poor person is in the public domain, his hand is in the private domain, and the homeowner is exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does that mean? What do we see?

[Speaker H] That his hand is not a public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Meaning, the novelty is that the hand is not dragged after the body—that’s what Rashi explains. But that is not the novelty for Nachmanides. Nachmanides says that is obvious; that doesn’t need to be taught. The novelty is that to some extent it is dragged after the body. Meaning that it—

[Speaker H] —is not completely not dragged. The direction of the novelty is the opposite in Nachmanides from what it is in Rashi. I understood how Rashi learns it. I just didn’t understand how Nachmanides learns it from the version that appears before Nachmanides; I couldn’t understand how he learns it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The version is different, so I’m saying: according to Rashi’s version, you can’t learn like Nachmanides. How does Nachmanides himself learn? So he explains—come, let’s read.

[Speaker D] One side of it is logical reasoning, and the other side is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. One side is logical reasoning. He says: it cannot be dragged after the body; we do not find a public domain between partitions. You cannot call that a public domain. Now he says as follows—meaning one side in one direction—

[Speaker H] One direction. Meaning, in Nachmanides’ version they learn from both directions: “it is not like a private domain from the hand of the poor person,” right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. “For it teaches: and the homeowner took from it.”

[Speaker H] And then what does he learn from that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the hand of the poor person he learns, yes, that if the homeowner takes from it, both are exempt. And if it were like a private domain—from the exemption of the poor person he learns it, not from the exemption of the homeowner like Rashi. He says: if both are exempt, and if it were like a private domain, then it would be as though the poor person entered inside, in which case he would be liable. He learns it from the exemption of the poor person, not from the exemption of the homeowner. If the poor person’s hand entered into the homeowner’s domain, and it says that both are exempt—Rashi emphasizes that the homeowner is exempt. He says no, it says both are exempt, including the poor person. Now if that hand were considered like a private domain, then it would be considered as though the poor person himself entered from the public domain into the private domain, and he should have been liable. “Rather, from the fact that the poor person is exempt”—notice, not the homeowner—“learn from it that it is not like the domain into which it is extended, but is drawn somewhat after his body.” According to Rashi the novelty is that it is not dragged after the body. According to Nachmanides, it is obvious that it is not dragged after the body; the novelty is that it is yes, somewhat dragged after the body, that it is not totally not dragged after the body. The whole direction of the novelty is the reverse in Nachmanides from what it is in Rashi.

And then the question, says Nachmanides, is that according to Rashi it is unclear how the connection works between Abaye’s preliminary assumption and his question, whereas according to Nachmanides it is very clear. After you tell me that this hand has this detached sort of status—it is connected neither to public domain nor to private domain—then what is it? I would say: apparently it is an exempt area. So Abaye says: but maybe they decreed that it should be a karmelit? Here there is room to deliberate—did they decree, did they not decree—you can discuss it. But I understand the background of the discussion. I also understand why Abaye preceded his question with what he did. According to Rashi, says Nachmanides, it is hard to understand that.

[Speaker F] Regarding Tosafot, who have the text like Rashi, they say this proves that a hand not in the place of the body is not dragged after the body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And Tosafot, the French sages of blessed memory, resolve it”—let’s read. “And Tosafot, the French sages of blessed memory, resolve it, that he learned it from the fact that the beginning teaches: ‘and he put it into the hand of the homeowner.’ The reason is that he put it there; but had he not put it there, even though his hand remained there, he would be exempt.” Why exempt? We see that this is not considered like a private domain—not that it is not considered like a public domain. This is like Nachmanides. They just bring the proof in a different way, that’s all. Fine. “And it is also possible that Abaye learned it from the end of the Mishnah”—those are already different questions about how Abaye proves what he proves, and that is less important; one can formulate it in different ways.

But what was important for me to make clear is that the whole movement of the passage gets turned upside down according to Nachmanides and Rashi. The point of departure is reversed, and the novelty is reversed. According to Rashi, the status of the hand is not entirely clear as a starting point, and the novelty is that the hand is not dragged after the body. That’s all. That’s the whole novelty. What is it then? It may very well be the domain in which it is located, entirely. And on that Nachmanides asks: then what is Abaye’s doubt afterward—maybe they made it into a karmelit? Why? It is just a public domain, that’s all. According to Nachmanides, the point of departure is that the hand is certainly not dragged after the body; for that you don’t need Abaye, it’s obvious. The hand cannot be dragged after the body. On the other hand, says Nachmanides, Abaye innovates that it also does not belong to the domain in which it is located, because it is somewhat dragged after the body. And that is what Abaye innovated, that it is somewhat dragged. In his introduction, that is what he innovated. Then he asks the question: okay, so if this status is this kind of intermediate status, then how do we treat it? Is it a karmelit? Is it an exempt area? How should we view this thing now? That is basically the question.

[Speaker F] But it seems to me that in Tosafot it doesn’t sound that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? The Tosafot cited in Nachmanides?

[Speaker F] It doesn’t sound like Nachmanides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This Tosafot cited here in Nachmanides?

[Speaker F] No, no—Tosafot in its own place. There—well, I lost it, I’m sorry.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, no matter. In any case, okay, these are two directions; both appear among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). I just… this was the point that mattered, because when you read Nachmanides it’s rather hard to put your finger on exactly where he disagrees with Rashi, what the difference between them actually is. The point in my opinion—and this point is not sharpened in Nachmanides, but I think it is what lies behind what he says—is that Nachmanides reads “it is neither like a public domain nor like a private domain” the way I read it at the beginning. “It is neither like a public domain nor like a private domain”—that is what they came to say. That it is not dragged after the body is obvious. But I claim: yes, but it is also not the place where it is located. In other words, it is neither this domain nor that domain. And this is not talking about two different cases. It is talking both about the case of the homeowner’s hand that went outside, and about the case of the poor person who put his hand inside. About each of the two cases I say: the hand is neither inside nor outside. It hangs somewhere in the middle. That is how Nachmanides reads it, reads Abaye’s own sentence, the sentence in the Talmudic text: “It is neither like a private domain nor like a public domain.”

Exactly from this reading, by the way, Rashi came to exclude, as I said earlier. Therefore Rashi says no, no: it is not like a private domain in the case where the poor person put his hand inside—sorry, in the case where the homeowner put his hand outside—and it is not like a public domain in the case where the poor person put his hand inside. The novelty is always that it is not dragged after the body. That is the novelty according to Rashi. And according to Nachmanides, the novelty is the opposite: that it is somewhat dragged after the body, that it is not totally not dragged after the body. Okay? Now, how do we really understand Rashi? After all, Nachmanides asks a good question: how can you talk about a public domain that is located inside partitions?

[Speaker D] First of all, the opposite does make sense. The opposite—to take a private domain into the public domain—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That may be so, because in a public domain we do find places that are bounded off and are not part of the public domain. Every house is in the middle of the public domain, but it has partitions that define it, so it is considered a private domain. Or above ten handbreadths in the public domain, as Nachmanides himself says. Above ten handbreadths in the public domain is an exempt area. Meaning, public domain is something of a default. Okay?

[Speaker D] But a private domain is always what—something marked by some physical representative, as though I am extending the walls, as though Rashi thinks he extends the walls of the private domain inward; that is, the walls now turn around the hand of the poor person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, and then you can say that it is considered like a private domain.

[Speaker D] Inside the public domain. Right. Then Nachmanides’ difficulty doesn’t arise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it does arise on the other side. That’s why I began with the poor person who put his hand in. Nachmanides does not ask the question in that direction by chance. After all, it’s symmetrical.

[Speaker D] The poor person puts his hand into the private domain. Yes. I extend the walls of the private domain inward, as though I’m shrinking the private domain. Shrinking what? I brought the public domain inward, meaning I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I didn’t call the domain—

[Speaker B] —a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only the hand. What are you doing there, some kind of three-dimensional Klein bottle? I mean, how is the hand sitting in the middle of four walls of the private domain? You can offer answers for Rashi now. Nachmanides’ question is understandable.

[Speaker D] Yes, of course it is understandable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m trying to think within Rashi. No, because it isn’t symmetrical. Meaning, Nachmanides does not ask for nothing what happens when the homeowner put his hand outside. How can you define that as a private domain when it is in the middle of the public domain and there are no partitions? That Nachmanides does not ask. Right—there there is apparently room to say such a thing. Therefore he asks from this side of the passage.

[Speaker H] But what is the question? Rashi basically says that this is the novelty: the hand is not dragged after the body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what was the initial assumption? Why do we need a novelty? What, could anyone have thought that this would indeed be a public domain between four partitions?

[Speaker H] Yes, because it could be that if we assume the hand is dragged after the body, since I am standing in the public domain, then his hand belongs to the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the hand is standing in the middle of partitions. That’s what Nachmanides says. Nachmanides argues: it is located in the middle of partitions—how can the initial assumption arise that this would be a public domain? So look, I’ll continue what Hani said just now. It seems to me that in Rashi what one has to say is that when the hand is considered public domain, it doesn’t mean that the hand itself is considered a public domain. Rather, the claim is that when the hand is holding an object—say the poor person put his hand into the private domain and in his hand there is some object. That object—if I ask you where it is resting—on the hand? No—

[Speaker E] On the feet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the feet? Where the poor person’s feet are resting, that is where the object is considered to be resting. Because after all, the whole person is resting there. I don’t look at the object and the hand in isolation. That is the novelty according to Rashi. The novelty according to Rashi was: true, there is no public domain between four partitions—but who was talking about four partitions? I am claiming that when the hand holds the object in the private domain, it is considered as though the object is resting on the ground of the public domain.

[Speaker H] She’s saying it’s treated as resting on his body. Exactly. Once we have a state of rest, then if the object is resting on the hand, it is basically resting on the body.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The hand is a branch of the body. If I ask myself—just ask someone on the street—tell me, where is this object really resting? He’ll say, what do you mean? Where the person’s feet are. The entire person—even the person’s head—is resting on the ground of the public domain on the halakhic level, because the whole thing stands on the feet, and the feet are in the public domain.

[Speaker H] So that basically counts as the hand following the body. Right, exactly the same thing.

[Speaker B] That’s Rashi’s novelty. I don’t understand. But that doesn’t fit Rashi’s approach from the previous passage. So how does it work out? It doesn’t fit for him to say this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why he says it is not. There’s no problem with that; that’s why I prefaced it. There’s no problem with that. In the previous passage we are discussing the question of what kind of action it is when I place the hand or uproot the hand. Here I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about the question where the object is objectively located, independent of the movement of the hand. I’m asking about an object that is stationary: where is it considered to be resting? So Rashi can say: there was an initial assumption—true, it gets rejected, but that is the initial assumption that Abaye comes to exclude. Nachmanides asked: what was the initial assumption, what is the novelty in Abaye’s words? There is a novelty, because one could have said that a hand holding the object is not considered the place of the object. The place of the object is always defined on the earth. And when you ask me where on earth the object is resting, it’s not on the ground under the hand, but on the ground under the feet. Because the whole person is really resting on that place. All in all, you can definitely understand it. And therefore Abaye needed to teach that no, that’s not true. The hand is not dragged after the body. That’s what Nachmanides did not understand.

[Speaker E] Something here still isn’t entirely clear to me. If in the previous passage I understood from Rashi that the hand is not dragged after the body with respect to labor—whatever—but now here it’s with respect to where the body rests, I still can’t understand how you can say there one way and here the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? The hand is dragged after the body only in the sense that if you ask me where this is located, it is located where the body is. But if you ask me whether, when I placed the hand in another place, that counts as placing or doesn’t count as placing, that’s something entirely different. That speaks about the character of the action.

[Speaker E] But if the object is resting in the place where the body is, but the hand didn’t perform a placing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, correct.

[Speaker E] Meaning placing is not an action?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re asking me where the object is resting?

[Speaker B] At the poor person’s feet. Regarding Nachmanides, when he says that because this is inside partitions you can’t say the hand is a public domain—but why can he say it’s a karmelit then?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, karmelit is rabbinic; with karmelit you can do whatever you want. I’ll get to that in a moment. So I’m saying that according to Rashi, I think, that’s how one can resolve Maimonides’ difficulty. Again, Maimonides’ difficulty was: what was the initial assumption? In the end it is rejected; Rashi also doesn’t hold that way.

[Speaker D] Just—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Abaye comes to teach that it is not correct. And there is some novelty in that, because there was room to say it that way. That’s what I want to say. But in the final analysis, it really is not so.

[Speaker D] If the poor person takes out his hand, then he actually does nothing. Again? When—if the poor person takes out his hand now, then he really did nothing.

[Speaker H] Right. Right. Why? He did an uprooting. No, but the homeowner placed it for him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What uprooting did he do? Because it is resting in the place of his feet, according to the initial assumption you’re talking about. Yes.

[Speaker D] Yes. But that can’t be.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker D] It can’t be even according to the initial assumption, because in the Mishnah it isn’t permitted, it’s exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] He does do something—the poor person does something when he takes what the homeowner put into his hand and brings it inside. Yes. According to the Mishnah he does something; it’s exempt but prohibited.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re talking about when the poor person takes it outside.

[Speaker D] Yes, takes it outside to himself, that’s what I mean.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he performed a placing.

[Speaker D] In this question, according to the initial assumption, that means that the moment the homeowner put the object into his hand and he brings it inside, he did nothing because he is basically in the same domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not simple, because the homeowner—say my hand moved, and the homeowner put it into my hand, and I take it inside. Who performed the placing?

[Speaker D] The homeowner performed the placing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I performed the placing.

[Speaker B] Ah, you—

[Speaker D] The placing, okay, but not a transfer of domains, because the moment the hand that the homeowner put it into—so what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said a transfer of domains is necessary?

[Speaker D] The homeowner put it, sorry, into the public domain, because his hand is considered like the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And who said a transfer of domains is necessary? Tosafot already commented on Rashi about that in the earlier passages. Placing alone may also be a rabbinic prohibition. Tosafot argues that it is not, and indeed attacks Rashi. Tosafot says it is mere carrying. And Rashi can say yes—especially because in the end, after all, it did pass between domains. True, I didn’t do that part, but after all it began in the homeowner’s house and ended up in the public domain. So practically speaking, between the two of us, something happened here. So I contributed the placing part of the process.

Okay, let’s move on a bit, because I see this is taking us a long time. The four domains—I didn’t give you this introduction in the handout, sorry, because we already mentioned it, or I referred you to Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah there at the beginning—but you need to remember: on the Sabbath there are four domains. Private domain and public domain, and exempt area—those are Torah-level domains. And that’s it. There are really only three domains on the Torah level: private domain, public domain, and exempt area. And the rules are that an exempt area can connect to anywhere and that is permitted. The prohibition is from private domain to public domain, okay? From private domain to exempt area, or from public domain to exempt area, or the reverse—that is permitted.

Now the Sages came and introduced a fourth domain: karmelit. This whole domain is rabbinic. It is a certain kind of exempt area that they turned into a rabbinic public domain. And they call it a karmelit. Okay? Something that is neither a private domain nor a public domain—it is not enclosed by partitions, so it is not a private domain, but six hundred thousand do not pass there and it does not have the conditions required for a public domain, so basically it should have been an exempt area. But the Sages enacted that we relate to it like a public domain. In what respect? If I carry four cubits in a karmelit, that is rabbinically prohibited, like carrying four cubits in a public domain. If I carry from a karmelit to a private domain or from a private domain to a karmelit, then I have violated a rabbinic prohibition. Okay? So there is basically a rabbinic stringency here; this whole category of karmelit is a rabbinic domain.

[Speaker H] Now I want to ask about that for a second. First of all I’m interested in why they wanted to turn karmelit into this at all—why did they establish karmelit in the first place? And second, according to that, seemingly every place that is not a public domain of six hundred thousand—if I carry there, I am violating only rabbinic prohibitions. Because basically all the places I’m in today can be at most a karmelit. If I’m in Manhattan then I have a problem, or on the Ayalon highways.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, in principle that’s right. There is some dispute among halakhic decisors about what is required for something to count as a public domain. There is a width of sixteen cubits; many people have to pass there; according to some views six hundred thousand are also required—not according to everyone. According to some views six hundred thousand are required; there are all kinds of rules for what counts as a public domain. Maybe we’ll still touch on that later—not today but later. But there are certain requirements that define a public domain. According to some of those requirements, six hundred thousand are also needed, but not everyone agrees to that.

[Speaker H] And why did the Sages establish this? So people wouldn’t conduct commerce on the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so people would not come to confuse it with a public domain, because overall such a thing looks to people like a public domain. It’s not a house, it’s a public area. So we go out to a field—can one carry from a house to a field? People who are not Torah scholars will say: if from a house to a field is possible, then from a house to the street is also possible—what’s the difference? And then they’ll come to carry from a private domain to a public domain. So because there is a resemblance between karmelit and public domain, they determined that it should be considered a public domain on the rabbinic level. Okay. Okay, but since it is not enclosed by partitions, it is not really a private domain, so there is some kind of intermediate level here.

A regular exempt area, for example—there they did not determine that it should be a karmelit. The law of exempt area remained. It’s not that they abolished the concept of exempt area; rather, some of the domains that on the Torah level should have been considered exempt area, the Sages established as karmelit. But some remained exempt area even in practical Jewish law. For example, if there is something above ten handbreadths over the public domain, it is considered an exempt area even now. It is not a karmelit. It is an exempt area. Okay? Then the Torah-level law remains in place for it. The Sages were stringent only in those places, only in those kinds of exempt areas that resemble a public domain—fields, sea, rivers, deserts, and the like. Okay.

Now Abaye moves on to his question and says: “Abaye asked: with regard to a person’s hand, can it become like a karmelit? Did the Sages penalize him so that he may return it to himself, or not?” Now seemingly, if I read only the first part of Abaye’s words, I would think this is some general question of how to relate to a person’s hand—whether it is considered a karmelit or not. But from what follows you can see that this is not correct. Two parameters show us that this is not the point. One, the expression “did they penalize him.” And two, the expression “to return it to himself.” What does that mean? If a person’s hand were considered a karmelit, then the question would really be—say my hand is outside—whether I’m allowed to take that hand and transfer it to another private domain, or move my hand four cubits there in the public domain, or something like that. Why does Abaye’s question deal only with returning the hand here? If it’s a karmelit, there are many more implications. Therefore it seems there is no general question here whether a hand has the law of karmelit; rather, there is a specific question regarding a hand that was extended outside: can it be returned to the private domain or not?

Second, the expression is “did they penalize.” What does it mean, “did they penalize it to be like a karmelit”? A penalty apparently means: you did something wrong, and they penalized you. Meaning, fundamentally it is not a karmelit. But they told you, as a penalty, to treat it as a karmelit. For what purpose? For the purpose that you will be forbidden to return the hand to the private domain. Okay, so apparently from Abaye’s wording it seems the discussion is not whether the hand is a karmelit, but whether there is here a penalty to view a hand extended outside as a karmelit, in the sense that afterward it cannot be brought back inside.

[Speaker H] And really, I just wanted to ask—this is karmelit on the assumption that the hand is in the public domain and the body is in the private domain. We’re talking about it being a karmelit, right? Then seemingly it should also have been forbidden to extend it outward. I didn’t understand. Seemingly the hand should also have been forbidden to be put out. The discussion shouldn’t have spoken only about the return, but also about taking it out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, here the penalty is because you took it out—that was improper—so now they forbid you to bring it back.

[Speaker H] But if it’s a karmelit, then in any case it’s forbidden to return the hand, because he is taking it from a karmelit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The discussion now is to make the hand a karmelit. The basic law is that the hand is not a karmelit. But since you did something improper, now they told you: okay, we decree that this hand should be like a karmelit. What’s the practical implication? The practical implication is that you’ll be forbidden to return the hand. But the fact that it was forbidden to extend the hand outward—that was already the background, before the determination that the hand is a karmelit.

[Speaker H] But then, when they say karmelit, is that called a penalty? So then it’s not logical that it should be a karmelit because of the expression “did they penalize him.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? They penalized it to be like a karmelit.

[Speaker H] But from what I understood, if it’s a karmelit, we don’t say they penalize something to become a karmelit; they prohibit something as karmelit, they don’t penalize it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A regular karmelit is a general definition; it’s not penalties. Here specifically, by strict law this is not a karmelit. But the Sages wanted to be stringent with the person so that he would not return his hand inside, therefore they penalized him by making him treat it as though it were a karmelit.

[Speaker H] So then what is the problem with the expression “did they penalize him”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no problem at all, except that from it I show that this is not really a karmelit, but only that they penalized it to be treated as though it were a karmelit. Understood. That is what I proved from the expression “did they penalize him”—unlike approaches that could say: no, the hand really has the status of karmelit; it’s not a penalty, and that would have all the implications. For example, that from the hand you couldn’t transfer to another private domain. So no—they say “did they penalize him.” What are you talking about? It is not a karmelit by strict law. They just imposed some special penalty here because someone behaved improperly, so they penalized him—even though this is not a karmelit—to treat it as though it were a karmelit.

That is what Tosafot, for example, says: “Can it become like a karmelit—for example, where he put out his full hand outside and wants to return it to himself. But not in another respect; it is not that it is actually a karmelit. For we learned in the last chapter of Eruvin: a person may stand in a private domain and move things in the public domain, and it is not a karmelit. Rather, only with respect to the domain where the body is, which resembles two domains more closely.” It’s not really a karmelit; rather, there is some special penalty or special decree here.

But notice that Tosafot—why, how does he explain why here one might indeed tell us to treat it as a karmelit, or at least Abaye is in doubt about that? What is that possibility? Why is that so? Tosafot says: because it resembles two domains. It seems this is not a penalty for improper action, but simply that there is something here that can look like two domains, so the Sages say: you know what, treat it as a karmelit—not because you did something wrong. And indeed in the next Tosafot, “Did the Sages penalize him to return it—it appears to the Ri that the text reads: did they prohibit it, and it does not read: did they penalize him.” Why? Because Tosafot’s claim is apparently that this is not a penalty for an improper act; rather, because it looks like two domains, the Sages decreed to treat it that way so people would not come to confusion.

[Speaker H] But then to the same extent they should also have forbidden extending it out. For the same reason that it looks like two domains, don’t take it out—it would already be a karmelit.

[Speaker B] Indeed—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, it could be that according to that approach, in fact it would perhaps also be forbidden to extend it out. If it’s not a penalty for improper action, but simply because in such a situation it is appropriate to forbid it since it is confusing, then indeed it may be that it is a karmelit, and the practical implication would be that as a karmelit it would also be forbidden, for example, to take it to another private domain. Okay, that seems to emerge from Tosafot. Then apparently it is not clear why “to return it to himself” specifically. If they made it be treated as a karmelit—or even not “penalized” but “prohibited” to be like a karmelit—not specifically “to return it to himself,” to bring it back to him, but perhaps also to another private domain.

Then he says—“as we say below shortly.” I continue reading in Tosafot: “As we say below shortly, when we establish that it is not like a karmelit”—the setup later in the Talmud, where they establish that it is not like a karmelit, and the two baraitot follow the view that the hand is not a karmelit—“we say that it is forbidden to return it because of a penalty.” There suddenly the penalty comes in. Until now we didn’t think this was a penalty. Tosafot says: because really the text here is not “did they penalize him” but “did they prohibit it.” There later, when they want to distinguish between a case where he extended it before dark and where he extended it after dark, the issue comes up that maybe it is a penalty—if you extended it before dark, you didn’t do anything improper, so they did not penalize you; if you did it after dark, you did something improper, so they did penalize you. So there the expression of penalty enters the picture. But at this stage of the Talmudic discussion, this is a prohibition, not a penalty. It is an ordinary prohibition unrelated to whether you behaved properly or improperly. At this stage, even if you did it before dark, they would still forbid you to do this, even though ostensibly you did nothing prohibited.

[Speaker G] Can I just get a clarification for a second? Okay, just a simpleton’s question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear. Yael, we can’t hear you.

[Speaker G] You can’t hear me? You hear weakly. I’m saying—I want—can you hear now? Yes. Okay. Clarifying question, simple question. I do want the difference between “did they penalize him” and “did they prohibit it.” When they say “did they prohibit it,” does that mean prohibited on the Torah level?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. When they say “did they prohibit it,” it means that for this prohibition you do not need it to be preceded by some action that was improper. For example, if someone extended the object—his hand with the object—before dark, on an ordinary weekday when it was permitted to do so, it would still be forbidden for him to return the hand. Why? Because they prohibited this hand as though it were a karmelit. But if I understand it as a penalty, then it applies only to a person who behaved improperly. That means only someone who extended his hand on the Sabbath, not someone who extended his hand before dark.

[Speaker B] A prohibition is something broader than a penalty.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but both are rabbinic. Yes.

[Speaker B] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Now in Rashi itself it is not entirely simple. Rashi himself does indeed read “did they penalize him.” You see? Rashi says “did they penalize him,” and he even explains: since he began with it in a prohibited way. So in Rashi it is clear that already here he understands this law as a law of penalty because he did something prohibited. But look at the previous Rashi on “Abaye asked”—there nothing at all appears. “Now that we have seen that we do not cast it after his body for purposes of Torah-level liability, evidently it divides the domain.” Yes, after Abaye prefaces for us that the hand is not dragged after the body, then the hand’s domain is separate from the body’s domain. Then Abaye asks: “Did the Sages make it stringent upon him, so that where he extended his full hand into another domain he may not return it to himself, and it must remain extended until dark?” Why? “Because since it is not dragged after his body, it becomes like another domain on the rabbinic level, for they decreed a domain by their own words with respect to the Sabbath, from which it is forbidden to bring in and take out to private domain and public domain, and they called it karmelit.” Where are the penalties? He doesn’t mention any penalties. Since this is another domain, maybe they decreed not to do this. No penalty is mentioned. But later in that same phrase—“what, did they penalize?”—that’s the continuation of the same sentence. And there suddenly Rashi says: since he began with it in a prohibited way. So to me it is not entirely clear how to understand this Rashi. Simply speaking, Rashi is just explaining the two parts of the sentence. So Rashi says the first part of the sentence means they penalized it by turning it into a rabbinic prohibition of karmelit—they prohibited it. Why? As a penalty because he began with a prohibition. But that is just explaining the sentence. I don’t know—given Tosafot’s comment, I’m a bit unsure about this Rashi.

In any case, the Rashba asks here: “And it is difficult for me”—the Rashba asks about Abaye’s question—“let him resolve it from our Mishnah.” Why is Abaye uncertain? You can resolve it from the Mishnah. Why? “For it teaches: the homeowner extended his hand outside, and the poor person took from it, or placed into it; the homeowner is exempt.” And “exempt” means exempt but prohibited, for these exemptions involve an action, as we said above. Therefore the homeowner’s hand, which is extended into the public domain, is like a karmelit, and it is forbidden to bring it back to him.

Someone asked me that earlier—I’m not sure. He says: why can I not resolve the question Abaye raises, whether the hand is considered like a karmelit or not, from the Mishnah? After all, what does the Mishnah say? If the homeowner extends his hand outside, but he does not place it down, and the poor person takes from the homeowner’s hand, then it says both are exempt. The homeowner too is exempt, right? “Exempt” means exempt but prohibited, right? It is not exempt and permitted, because this is an exemption that involves an action. It is exempt but prohibited, as the Talmud says above on 3a. Why is it prohibited? It is prohibited because there is a karmelit here. So here we see that the hand is considered a karmelit; otherwise where would the rabbinic prohibition come from?

[Speaker H] I didn’t understand—which case in the Mishnah is he talking about?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That the homeowner extended his hand outside and the poor person took the object from it. So when it says both are exempt, it means both violated a rabbinic prohibition. Now he asks: which rabbinic prohibition did the homeowner violate? And you know what—even the poor person, not just the homeowner. The poor person too: if the hand is a neutral area, then the poor person should also be completely permitted. So what do we see? We see that the hand is like a karmelit, right? So then what is Abaye’s question—whether they treated the hand as a karmelit? Obviously there’s a rabbinic prohibition here. So no, that’s really not obvious at all, and it’s connected to the lesson we discussed about two people who performed it together. The Rashba answers like this: “And that is not so; there, it is because a labor was performed between them”—you have to add “between them”—remember the Talmudic discussion about two people who performed it together, “a labor was performed between them,” where one uproots and the other places down, and not because you made it into a karmelit. What does he mean? I’ll stop here because I don’t want to keep going. What he wants to say is this: the rabbinic prohibition discussed in the Mishnah is not a prohibition of transferring from a private domain to a karmelit, but rather the prohibition of two people who performed it together, in a transfer from a private domain to a public domain. After all, if we look at the action of the two people—the poor person and the homeowner—together, there was an uprooting in the private domain and a placement in the public domain. On the way it passed through the homeowner’s hand and the poor person’s hand and so on, but bottom line, a labor was performed between them. Except what? The labor was done by the two of them together, and you can’t make two people liable for that labor, so we say this is a case of two people who performed it together, which is a rabbinic prohibition. So the rabbinic prohibition here does not stem from the homeowner’s action alone, that he transferred from a private domain to a karmelit. If the poor person had not taken it from the homeowner’s hand, then even for the homeowner this would have been permitted, or exempt. Notice what I’m saying. Suppose the homeowner stuck his hand out and the poor person didn’t take from it. Abaye says it could be that in such a situation, not only did the poor person certainly do nothing, but even the homeowner is completely permitted—he didn’t even commit a rabbinic prohibition. Why? Because the only rabbinic prohibition, if the poor person takes it from him, is because in the end a full act of carrying-out took place here: uprooting in the private domain and placement in the public domain. But the poor person did half and the homeowner did half, so therefore I say each of them is under a rabbinic prohibition. But when the homeowner did half, and that’s it, and nobody completed the action, then it may be completely permitted. So you can’t prove from there that this thing is a karmelit. Okay? This sharpens what we talked about in that lesson on two people who performed it together—we discussed it. What happens if someone only uproots, and that’s it? He doesn’t place it down, and nobody else places it down, nothing. Is there a rabbinic prohibition here, or even a Torah-level prohibition of a partial measure? I argued no. Why not? Because the prohibition of a partial measure or a partial act exists only when, overall, a complete act was done, and each of two people did only half of it. But if one person did half an act and no one completed it—only half an act exists in the world—who says there’s any prohibition at all, even rabbinically? There’s nothing.

[Speaker B] But with the uprooting there’s a concern that he’ll place it down.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there’s a concern—so what? If the Sages didn’t enact a decree, then no. We don’t make decrees on our own. Either there is such a decree or there isn’t.

[Speaker B] No, that’s how we learned it: if he uproots it, there’s concern he’ll place it down, and therefore…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the Rashba says no. The Rashba claims this is permitted. It’s evidence for what we discussed there—where I said, if you remember, what the Sefat Emet said: that he distinguished between half an act and half a measure of the object. Half an act, he says, does not carry the rule of partial measure; it is completely permitted. Everything we found where one uproots and one places down, and each violated a rabbinic prohibition—that’s because together they performed a complete labor. Even the language of the Talmud is precise there, if you remember. The Talmud says, “a labor was performed between them”—between the two of them, when we look at them together, a complete labor was done. But if there is one person who did half a labor and that’s it, and it remains that way, then there won’t even be a rabbinic prohibition here—it will be completely permitted. There is no measure in an action, okay? Now the Talmud brings two baraitot: “Come and hear: if his hand was full of fruits and he took it outside, one teaching says it is forbidden to return it, and another teaching says it is permitted to return it.” Yes? Two baraitot. “What, do they not disagree on this: one master holds it is like a karmelit, and one master holds it is not like a karmelit?” Seemingly, Abaye’s question is the subject of a dispute between the two baraitot. Okay. But the Talmud rejects that: no. Everyone agrees it is like a karmelit, and there is no difficulty. Here it is below ten handbreadths; there it is above ten handbreadths. The Talmud says no: it could be that both baraitot hold that the hand really is a karmelit. More than that, the two baraitot do not disagree with each other at all; they are speaking about different cases. The baraita that forbids returning is speaking about a case where I took my hand out within ten handbreadths of the ground of the public domain—and that is public domain. The baraita that permits returning the hand says we are dealing with a case where I took my hand out high above ten handbreadths—ten handbreadths is about a meter—ten handbreadths and above over the public domain, which is a neutral area. Someone who took his hand out below committed a prohibition, and since he committed a prohibition, they penalized him not to return it. But someone who took his hand out above—above is a neutral area—didn’t commit any prohibition at all. Since he didn’t commit any prohibition, they didn’t penalize him, and he may return his hand. So two things come out here. First, the two baraitot don’t disagree at all according to this suggestion. Second, according to both of them, the hand really is considered a karmelit. Okay? Now if he took out the hand…

[Speaker H] Wait, wait, I didn’t understand. If the hand is considered a karmelit, then this isn’t a penalty. The moment he took it out below ten handbreadths, he’s forbidden to return it because he’s forbidden to transfer from a karmelit to a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is the penalty—that the hand is considered a karmelit. That’s what they penalized him with: to treat the hand as a karmelit. So the point is that the question that comes up here is this: if someone took his hand out above ten, then in effect he took his hand out to a neutral area. Why do I need a baraita to tell me he may return the hand? He didn’t commit any prohibition, right? The hand itself, being above, is considered a neutral area, from which one may bring it back into the private domain. So what is the novelty in saying that in such a case they did not forbid him to return his hand? Maybe they didn’t penalize because of private domain… The novelty is that this is a karmelit and not a public domain. There’s no reason to penalize here, and nothing to penalize. The hand is above ten handbreadths—it’s not a karmelit; it’s a neutral area. And there’s also no reason to penalize, because he didn’t do a forbidden act. So why do I need a baraita to innovate for me that in such a case there’s no prohibition on returning the hand? Obviously there is no prohibition.

[Speaker G] Because they initially treated it as a public domain and not as a neutral area.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Above ten is not a public domain in any case. Above ten is a neutral area.

[Speaker G] Even over a public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no such thing as that in a private domain, which rises up to the sky. Only in a public domain—above ten handbreadths in a public domain is a neutral area.

[Speaker D] But that’s why they say it’s not, I don’t know, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?

[Speaker B] So that’s the reason they basically say it’s not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Some kind of decree upon a decree? I think what has to be said here—I think what has to be said here—is that here we have that whole “they penalized him and forbade it” that we discussed earlier. There was room here to see the hand indeed as a karmelit. And that’s what the baraita comes to teach us. The hand is not really a karmelit; it’s a penalty imposed on someone who did a forbidden act. So someone who did a permitted act—obviously there’s no problem at all.

[Speaker H] I just want to ask about the Mishnah that Tosafot brought—from what page? Page 92? 98? I didn’t really understand why there it’s permitted. It says there that a person standing in a private domain and moving something in the public domain is allowed to do that? Right? But we said there’s a Mishnah that if it’s below ten handbreadths it’s forbidden to do it.

[Speaker F] No, no, he said that’s only because of this, not in that case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is forbidden to take it out, but he is allowed to move it around in the public domain. The hand is considered drawn after the body. For this matter the hand follows the body, as long as it doesn’t rest at least—the hand follows the body, and it isn’t considered as though he’s doing it in the public domain. But again, that’s a different topic; let’s not get into that now. So for our purposes here, Tosafot asks this question. He says as follows: “Here, above ten—if you say that above ten, even initially it is permitted to take it out, because it is a neutral area.” So what? What was the initial assumption—why do we need to teach that it is permitted to return the hand? “And one can say that it teaches us that even if he originally took it out by way of below ten, he may return it above ten, and we do not penalize him.” Tosafot explains not as I said earlier. Rather, he wants to say—yes, I said earlier that maybe the novelty is precisely this: that we are dealing here with a penalty, not with the hand really being a karmelit. And since it is a penalty, it depends: if you did a forbidden act, they penalized you; if you did a permitted act, they didn’t. And that itself is the novelty of the baraita: for a permitted act, they did not penalize. Once I know it’s a penalty, then obviously if the act is permitted there would be no initial assumption that they would penalize. The novelty is that it is a penalty. But Tosafot says not so. And for reasons that don’t matter—I just want to move on. Tosafot says that what they really want to say here is this: if you took it out below ten, where there is some kind of prohibition, but afterward when returning your hand you raise it above ten and then take it back into the private domain—that is permitted, and they do not penalize you. Now the interesting question is really why. After all, if you actually took it out below ten, then on the way out you committed a prohibition. So what does it matter that afterward, when returning it, you return it by way of above? And the answer is that apparently it’s not for nothing that this penalty is called “karmelit.” After all, this hand is not a karmelit. Rather what? Rabbinically they penalized him by treating the hand as a karmelit. But they didn’t just penalize him randomly; otherwise they should have said: they penalized him by forbidding him to return the hand. Why define the hand as a karmelit for this? Because they placed this decree into a known halakhic pattern—the pattern of karmelit. And then it works like this. If you took your hand out below ten, from our standpoint the hand is a karmelit. Okay. But that doesn’t mean you’re forbidden to return it. If you can return it in a way that would also be permitted from a karmelit, no problem. For example, raise the hand above ten handbreadths—you transferred the object from a karmelit to a neutral area, which is permitted, and now you take it from the neutral area back to yourself in the private domain, which is also permitted. In that case they did not penalize. Meaning, that’s Tosafot’s novelty. According to Tosafot, the novelty of the Talmud is that they did not turn this penalty into an absolute penalty forbidding the return of the hand full stop. They forbade returning the hand only in the sense that the hand is defined as a karmelit. But if there is something that is permitted even with respect to a karmelit, then here too they allowed you to do it—it’s not a problem. Notice this: it’s dancing at two weddings. On the one hand, the hand is not a karmelit. This is a special penalty—that’s clear. In the legal categories of karmelit, the hand is not a karmelit. It is a special penalty because of the prohibition. But since the Sages established the pattern of the penalty, and the pattern is that the hand is considered a karmelit, therefore one can draw halakhic conclusions from it. Once this is a karmelit—even though it is a karmelit only by force of the penalty—if I manage to do it in a way that would have been permitted from a karmelit, the Sages allow it. They did not forbid it to me. Okay? Now then, up to this point, what has come out is that both baraitot hold that the hand is considered a karmelit, right? Seemingly we’ve resolved Abaye’s doubt. Abaye asked whether the hand is a karmelit or not, right? Now they brought two baraitot and said: seemingly this is a dispute between baraitot. Then they said: no, this is not a dispute between the baraitot; both baraitot hold it is a karmelit—just this one is below ten and that one is above ten. So if both baraitot hold it is a karmelit, then we’ve resolved Abaye’s question. The two baraitot say the hand is a karmelit. But that’s not right—why? Because now the Talmud brings the opposite resolution. “And if you want, say instead: both this and that are below ten.” Both baraitot deal with a case where he took the object out below ten. “And it is not like a karmelit.” And both baraitot hold that it is not made like a karmelit. “And there is no difficulty: here it is before dark, here it is after dark. Before dark the Sages did not penalize him; after dark the Sages penalized him.” Again, both baraitot hold it is not a karmelit, and they also do not disagree with each other at all. They are simply speaking about different cases. The baraita that permits is speaking about someone who took his hand out before dark, so he did not do a forbidden act, and they did not penalize him. The baraita that forbids is speaking about someone who took his hand out on the Sabbath itself, and then they forbade him to bring his hand back. Here—you remember the Tosafot we read earlier?—here, for the first time, this concept of penalty really enters. Earlier, the word “they penalized him”—some manuscripts have it and some don’t. Here everybody has the reading that this is a penalty. Why? Because here we see that the penalty exists only for someone who did a prohibition. Someone who did not do a prohibition—the very same act is permitted for him, to return his hand. So you see that the act of returning the hand is not intrinsically forbidden; it is a penalty. They forbade it only for someone who misbehaved. Therefore here the conception enters that we’re dealing with a penalty. And that’s what Tosafot above said—that one must read “they forbade it,” because the conception that Abaye is talking about a penalty and not about a prohibition arises only at this stage of the Talmud. Up to here we didn’t think at all to tie it to the question whether you committed a prohibition or not. Okay? Now.

[Speaker F] May I add something? Yes. This is how I understood it: in general, when I define some state or place as a karmelit, theoretically that has nothing to do with prohibitions or actions you did. Right now it is simply a karmelit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I said—that’s exactly what I said. And if the definition is that this is a karmelit and it’s not a penalty, then what difference does it make what I did? Bottom line: now it’s in a karmelit, and I’m forbidden to bring it into the private domain. But if I say no—this is not a karmelit at all; it doesn’t meet the definitions, the regular halakhic definitions, of a karmelit. Rather, the Sages penalized him by treating it as a karmelit—then it’s a penalty only if you were in the wrong.

[Speaker B] But if it’s a karmelit, then it makes no difference whether it was before dark or after dark.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Therefore they say: it is not a karmelit; it is a penalty to treat it as a karmelit. So on whom did they impose the penalty? Only on someone who was in the wrong. But if he brought it out before dark, then they did not penalize him by treating his hand as a karmelit. That’s exactly the concept of the penalty. Right. Now the Talmud objects to the second rejection with a very surprising objection: “On the contrary, the reverse is more logical. Before dark—if he throws it down, he does not come to liability for a sin-offering—the Sages should penalize him. After dark—if he throws it down, he comes to liability for a sin-offering—the Sages should not penalize him.” The Talmud says: if you’re already distinguishing between bringing it out before dark and bringing it out after dark, the logical distinction should be the opposite. Namely, if he brought it out before dark, then they should penalize him by not allowing him to return the hand; and if he brought it out after dark, then they should not penalize him. Why? So the Talmud says: what if he brought it out after dark and you penalize him not to return the hand? Then he’ll have to hold his hand like that for twenty-four hours without bringing it back, and in the end he’ll let the object drop—and then what will happen?

[Speaker B] No, you mean after dark.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After dark—if he brought it out then, what will happen? He will violate a Torah prohibition, because he uprooted and placed down on the Sabbath. But if someone brought his hand out before dark and you penalize him, and he can’t hold out and he drops the object, nothing happened. So in effect he committed only a rabbinic prohibition, if that, because the placement was before dark. Right. Now this is a question—it’s a very strange thing. If he extended his hand before dark, then there’s no problem penalizing him—but there’s also no reason to penalize him. Right. If he extended it before dark, he did a permitted act. So what’s the problem?

[Speaker G] The problem is only the return, because he’ll need to return his hand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but I’m saying that the return itself also isn’t problematic—it’s only a penalty because you were in the wrong. Now I’m asking: why, if I did it before dark, was I in the wrong?

[Speaker E] Because clearly there will be a continuation to it—I’m not going to leave my hand hanging there all Sabbath. So true, I did it before dark, but if I bring it out before dark…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So it may very well be that bringing it out before dark is of course no problem. After all, when does the problem arise? When I brought it out before dark and left it there, Sabbath came in, and now I ask myself whether I may return it. That is forbidden to do. It is forbidden to do this—to bring it out before dark but leave it there, that is forbidden. Why? Because maybe it will slip from your hand, maybe you’ll place it down by mistake, for all kinds of reasons like that. That’s the problem. The problem is not bringing it out before dark, but that you also left it there until the Sabbath came in.

[Speaker B] But what’s the problem that before dark he returns it after the Sabbath has begun? After all, now it’s not a karmelit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—without returning it. Even before I return it there’s a problem. The very act of bringing it there—say below ten—below ten itself is problematic.

[Speaker B] No, but if I did it before dark?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I left it there.

[Speaker B] And left it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Left it there until the Sabbath came in. That’s the problem. Bringing it out itself isn’t problematic, but I left it there until the Sabbath came in, because otherwise the question never arises. If I already brought it out before dark, then everything is over.

[Speaker B] What’s the question whether it’s permitted to return? The moment I left it there, is it as if I uprooted it and brought it back to myself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Yes. No, if I brought it back before dark, then I brought it back—nothing happened. But if I didn’t bring it back before dark and it stayed there until Sabbath, and now the question is whether I may return my hand—that means first of all that I already left the hand there when Sabbath entered; the hand was still there. Here a problem already arises.

[Speaker B] But according to the reasoning they’re giving now, the hand is not a karmelit, right? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the problem is that if—

[Speaker B] It’s there, then is it as though the object is resting in the public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Within ten handbreadths—in the public domain, within ten handbreadths, that’s forbidden even without the hand being a karmelit. Otherwise you can’t understand the Talmud’s previous interpretation. The previous interpretation of the Talmud said: this one is below ten, this one is above ten. So what? Below ten they penalized him because he was in the wrong. Why was he in the wrong?

[Speaker B] Because I’m asking: if the hand was outside holding an object, is it as though it is resting there, and then she uproots it and brings it into the private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m talking about on the way out now, not on the way back. When I take the hand and move it to the public domain within ten handbreadths before dark, but leave the hand standing there, okay? Until Sabbath enters—here there’s a problem. What’s the problem? That can be discussed. For example, maybe there is concern it will slip from his hand, maybe there is concern he’ll place it down—various things could be problematic. But this is called a problem. Since there was a problem here, they say to me: don’t return the hand.

[Speaker H] I don’t understand. I have a question. This is a penalty of the Sages in general. The point of a penalty is to prevent a person from doing this in the first place, so that he won’t come to some prohibition. But here, in this whole situation where we penalize him not to return his hand, we may cause him to violate some sin-offering liability or Torah prohibition. So what’s the point of the Sages imposing such a penalty in this story? On the contrary—they should say from the outset: quickly bring your hand back inside and don’t violate anything. But initially, know that it’s forbidden to do this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hani, that’s the Talmud. You’re repeating what the Talmud says—that’s exactly what the Talmud says. The whole discussion of the Talmud from here on is what you just said. The Talmud asks: if you leave the hand there, he’ll end up dropping it. You forbid him, he’ll drop the object, and you’re bringing him to a Torah prohibition. So why on earth make such a decree? You come to prevent Torah prohibitions, not to cause Torah prohibitions. That’s exactly what the Talmud says. Okay, now just notice an interesting point.

[Speaker G] Wait, just one small question. If he took his hand outside and just left it there—he didn’t do anything—and then he brings it back after dark, is there still a problem? Meaning, there’s no problem of placement here, only a problem of uprooting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The uprooting was before dark. But from the Talmud we see that if you uprooted before dark, brought it into the public domain—or took it out to the public domain—and left the hand there until Sabbath entered, there is some kind of problem in that. What exactly is the problem? You can debate that. But there is some kind of problem here, and therefore it is considered an act that is not okay and needs a penalty. Okay? And then it says in any case—

[Speaker B] Surely the problem is that when the hand is resting outside, it’s considered as though it’s resting in the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. The hand resembles a placement in the public domain. Maybe there is concern the object will fall and then actually come to rest. Maybe there is concern that you’ll come to do this on the Sabbath itself too. You can offer a thousand reasons; it doesn’t matter. But there is some kind of problem here, and therefore the Sages penalized. Okay? And then the Talmud says: the Sages penalized in order to solve a minor problem, and in doing so they create a Torah-level problem. If this object slips from his hand during those twenty-four hours, then he violates a Torah prohibition. What sense is there in penalizing in such a case? What Hani asked earlier. So apparently the logic should be the opposite. Now look at Rashi here. Rashi says: “That is to say, where he extended it before dark, if you prohibit him from returning it and he throws the object from his hand in order to lighten

[Speaker B] his burden, he does not come to liability for a sin-offering, for there was not an uprooting on the Sabbath but only a placement, and there is only a rabbinic prohibition, because he did part of it, as we learned: ‘both are exempt but forbidden’; the Sages penalized him that he should not return it.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there’s an interesting note—but according to Tosafot this isn’t correct. Wait, wait—the Sefat Emet comments on Rashi here. The Sefat Emet comments on Rashi here that it isn’t clear where Rashi got this rabbinic prohibition from. Meaning, if I uprooted before dark, put it in the public domain, okay? And now they decreed that I should leave my hand like this and not return it. And let’s say I dropped the object and the object landed. Then Rashi tells us: here there is no Torah prohibition, because the uprooting was before dark, but only a rabbinic prohibition. The Sefat Emet asks: there isn’t even a rabbinic prohibition. There’s nothing here. Why does Rashi say there’s a rabbinic prohibition here? After all, the uprooting was before dark; what occurred here was half an act. Remember my inference from the Rashba above? Half an act is something permitted—even a rabbinic prohibition doesn’t exist. When is there a rabbinic prohibition? When one uproots and another places down. But if someone only did a placement, or only an uprooting, and that’s it—no one else completed it—then it is completely permitted; it is not rabbinically forbidden. That’s what the Sefat Emet asks on Rashi here.

[Speaker B] Maybe Rashi thinks that doing part of it is a rabbinic prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sefat Emet asks where that comes from. In the plain sense of the Talmud, there is no such thing; for half an act there is no prohibition. In Rashi you really do see otherwise. In Rashi you see that there is a prohibition on half an act. But—but—it’s not precise. Why? Because in a place where you can show that such a half-act really isn’t—even a rabbinic prohibition doesn’t exist. But the point is that even in Rashi it doesn’t say there is. Why not? In Rashi it says there is, because there was an earlier uprooting. True, the uprooting was before dark, not on the Sabbath, but you still can’t say that there wasn’t a complete act of carrying-out here, half of which was done on the Sabbath. That’s not the same thing as someone who does only half an act—he only uproots or only places down, and that’s it. It’s not that on the Sabbath he does it and the other half on a weekday. He doesn’t do a second half at all. There are three situations. If one uproots and another places down, all on the Sabbath—one uproots and another places down—that is two people who performed it together. Each one violated a rabbinic prohibition. There is a case where one only uprooted on the Sabbath, or one only placed down on the Sabbath, and that’s it. That is completely permitted. Even Rashi agrees that’s completely permitted. But if there is a case where one uprooted on a weekday and then places it down on the Sabbath—in that case the Sefat Emet compares it to someone who only placed it down and there was no uprooting at all, and therefore he says it should be permitted. Rashi says no, it is similar to the case of two people who performed it together. Why? Because all told, if you ask me, was there a complete act here of uprooting from a private domain and placement in the public domain? Certainly yes. It wasn’t all done on the Sabbath, but a complete act was done here. Half of that complete act was done by a person on the Sabbath. So that is half of a complete act. Half of a complete act carries a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker D] But Rashi on page 2 says that only the uprootings count and not the placements. Again? On page 2 Rashi says that the main focus of the rabbinic decree is specifically on the uprooting, not on the placement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly, but it doesn’t matter. There is still also a rabbinic prohibition for placement alone. When one uproots and another places down, both are forbidden, not only the one who uproots. But there is a Rashba there who says otherwise. There are commentators on the Rashba there who say otherwise. But in Rashi, I think this is what is written. And therefore you can’t infer from here that someone who only does a placement or only does an uprooting violated a rabbinic prohibition. Some people infer that from Rashi. It’s not correct to infer that from Rashi.

[Speaker B] But in Tosafot one could say that he really did a labor. The labor was interrupted. Because Tosafot thinks that if his hand came to rest, then that counts as placement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the R. Shimshon of Shantz—the R. Shimshon.

[Speaker B] So now when he uproots his hand from outside in order to return it inside, is he doing both an uprooting and a placement?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He did that before dark; the uprooting was before dark.

[Speaker B] But the moment his hand is resting outside, that is considered at rest, which is a placement of the object? So if he returns his hand, it’s as if he uprooted the object now and brings it back inside? No, I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The resting of his hand is not a placement. The resting of his hand is not a placement. Only the R. Shimshon of Shantz says that it is, and I already challenged the R. Shimshon of Shantz in this passage. And then I said that according to the R. Shimshon of Shantz, it may be that you have to explain the case here as one where the hand is moving around in the public domain and not standing still. Otherwise you can’t understand this passage according to his view.

[Speaker B] But Tosafot doesn’t require that it be placed on the ground. He says that even if it is in his hand, that counts as placement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—when the body comes to rest, not when the hand comes to rest. Fine. So that is a note on this Rashi and the Sefat Emet. Now the Talmud wants to resolve from here the issue of one who sticks bread onto the oven wall. Yes: “And from the fact that we do not answer…” Fine, here we have to stop. Let’s stop here. Our next topic is one who sticks bread onto the oven wall, so I’ll just finish a few more points from here because they really are already connected to the next topic, so from my point of view there’s no problem. We’ll simply move on to the next topic, which is Rabbi Bibi’s question itself. Okay, let’s stop here. If anyone wants to comment or ask, you can.

[Speaker D] Yes, I do. That Rashi on page 2 says that specifically for placement they are not liable—they are liable only for the uprootings. He writes it explicitly; that’s how I understood it then.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again—the Rashi, which Rashi are you talking about? The one on page 3a above?

[Speaker D] Page… no, page 2a, under the heading “both are exempt.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second.

[Speaker D] He writes: “And if you say there are two for each one…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean on the Mishnah? Yes. “Both are exempt, because one person did not do a complete labor, and it is forbidden to do so initially, lest each one come to do labor on the Sabbath; behold these are two by rabbinic law.” No, he doesn’t say that. He says that if you do an uprooting, there is concern that you’ll come to do a placement. But if an uprooting was done and you do the placement, then you too are forbidden; there is also a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker D] On the uprooting, but not on the placement?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, also on the placement.

[Speaker D] Why? He says: “And if you say there are two for each one—uprooting for the poor person, placement; uprooting for the homeowner, placement for the poor person, placement for the homeowner—the Talmud later asks this and answers that it counts only uprootings,” meaning the placements are not… they are not liable for the placement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, therefore… therefore we discussed there that there is a dispute how to infer from Rashi. You can infer from Rashi that placements are not liable, and you can infer from Rashi that placements simply were not counted in the Mishnah’s numbers. They didn’t deal with them, but that does not mean the placements are exempt. “It counts only uprootings” means that when it counted the cases, it counted only the uprootings; it didn’t count the placements. Because uprooting is something more significant. But that does not mean they are exempt for the placements. We discussed there that you can infer from Rashi either way. Fine. Okay, so let’s stop here.

[Speaker G] Yes, thank you very much. Thank you.