Mysticism – Lesson 18
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Segulah-based healing and Sabbath desecration according to Maimonides
- The passage in Makkot 11: erasing the Divine Name as a segulah-based rescue
- Whether the permission in Makkot is general or unique to erasing the Name
- The reason for the prohibition: not that it “doesn’t work,” but that the segulah dimension lacks halakhic status
- An expert amulet on the Sabbath and the Radbaz’s explanation
- Maimonides versus Nachmanides: what counts as segulah-based and what counts as natural
- Three practical categories and their halakhic implications
- Siamese twins, a pursuer, and the dispute over symmetrical separation
- Jerusalem Talmud Terumot, “Give us one of you,” and sanctification of God’s name
- Fetal reduction as a parallel and the question of the severity of the prohibition
- Drawing lots over lives: Sefer Chasidim, Jonah, and the distinction between a mystical lot and a distributive lot
- A mystical lot that requires a forbidden act and the connection to segulah-based healing
- Concluding question: Rabbi Shimon Shkop, interest, and the law of justice versus Torah law
Summary
General Overview
The text lays out a halakhic-conceptual framework that distinguishes between natural medicine and segulah-based medicine, and argues that according to Maimonides, even if a segulah works, one may not desecrate the Sabbath or violate a prohibition in order to activate it. It brings proof from the passage about David and Achitophel in Makkot 11, and explains that the discussion there sharpens a fundamental doubt about whether one may violate a prohibition for the sake of a segulah-based rescue, while also suggesting that the permission there may apply specifically to erasing the Divine Name. It then constructs a map of three categories: natural treatment, which is permitted both on weekdays and on the Sabbath; segulah-based treatment that works, which is permitted on weekdays but forbidden at the cost of violating a prohibition; and segulah-based treatments that do not work, which according to Maimonides are forbidden even on weekdays. After that, the discussion moves to the question of lotteries involving human lives through examples such as Siamese twins and a storm at sea, and distinguishes between a “mystical” lot that seeks to uncover a hidden truth and a “natural” lot that distributes chances equally. Finally, a side question appears about a contradiction between “the law of justice” and Torah law in the context of interest.
Segulah-Based Healing and Sabbath Desecration According to Maimonides
The text states in the name of Maimonides, in his commentary to the Mishnah in Yoma, that there is no permission to heal by way of a segulah when doing so involves a prohibition, and therefore it is forbidden to desecrate the Sabbath for segulah-based healing. It brings a story about someone who wanted to travel to the Rebbe of Belz on the Sabbath so that he would write an amulet for a dangerously ill patient, and describes how Rabbi Shlomo Kluger became angry and forbade it—not because the amulets “don’t work,” but because it is forbidden to desecrate the Sabbath for segulah-based healing. It sharpens the point that the prohibition does not necessarily stem from concern for “do not practice divination” when we are dealing with something that works, but rather from the fact that the permission of “and live by them” to override prohibitions was stated with regard to healing by natural means, not segulah-based healing.
The Passage in Makkot 11: Erasing the Divine Name as a Segulah-Based Rescue
The text cites the Talmudic passage in Makkot 11: David dug the drainage channels, the deep waters rose and threatened to flood the world, and David asked whether it was permitted “to write the Name on a shard” and throw it into the deep, even though this would involve erasing the Divine Name. It explains that Achitophel answered with an a fortiori argument from the sotah ritual: if it is permitted to erase a Name written in holiness in order to make peace between husband and wife, then all the more so it should be permitted in order to save the entire world. David then did so, and the waters receded. The text emphasizes that the question in the Talmud is “whether this is permitted or forbidden,” not “whether it will work,” and suggests that this itself shows that David was in doubt whether one may violate a prohibition for the sake of a segulah-based rescue.
Whether the Permission in Makkot Is General or Unique to Erasing the Name
The text argues that the conclusion is not simple, because the Talmud specifically resorts to an a fortiori argument from erasing the Name in the sotah ritual, rather than to the general permission of ordinary rescue. It suggests that this may be a specific law concerning erasing the Divine Name—that is, that God “waives” this particular prohibition for the sake of rescue—but that one cannot derive from here a general permission to violate other prohibitions for the sake of segulah-based rescue. It notes that he has seen such an interpretation among later authorities on the passage, and that he heard this from Rabbi Meshulam Meshulami as proof that there is indeed a prohibition against carrying out segulah-based rescue at the cost of violating a prohibition.
The Reason for the Prohibition: Not That It “Doesn’t Work,” but That the Segulah Dimension Lacks Halakhic Status
The text describes a common explanation among later authorities that the prohibition stems from the fact that segulot are uncertain, but rejects this with the difficulty that even a doubt involving danger to life overrides the Sabbath. It cites the Radbaz’s concern about a “slippery slope,” that the masses will invent nonsensical remedies and violate prohibitions on their basis, and presents this as something like a rabbinic decree. It argues that the wording of Maimonides, as inferred by the Birkei Yosef, points elsewhere: even if the thing works, since it does not operate “by way of nature” but on a segulah plane that lacks objective halakhic standing, there is no permission to violate a prohibition for its sake—similar to the fact that dreams are not relied upon even when there seem to be clear indications of their reliability.
An Expert Amulet on the Sabbath and the Radbaz’s Explanation
The text raises the question why an “expert amulet” is permitted on the Sabbath, and answers in the name of the Radbaz that the permission is not because one may rely on a segulah in the context of a prohibition, but because it is considered “a manner of clothing,” and therefore there is no forbidden carrying. He explains that only an amulet that is effective is considered like eyeglasses that serve the body, whereas a non-expert amulet is like glasses that do not help one see and therefore are not considered a “garment.”
Maimonides versus Nachmanides: What Counts as Segulah-Based and What Counts as Natural
The text presents an internal difficulty: if, according to Maimonides, whatever works is “natural,” how can one speak about a segulah that works? It suggests that there is a narrow category of “supernatural but effective” that Maimonides accepts when it is clear that there is no physical-chemical interaction but some other kind of action, such as an expert amulet or writing the Name on pottery to stop the waters. It argues that Nachmanides is much broader and recognizes even physical actions that work though their source is foreign, whereas Maimonides rejects the possibility of “other powers” and rules that whatever truly works does so from the side of holiness and from God. It mentions a line of interpretation concerning the scapegoat through Ibn Ezra’s remark, “When you are thirty-three years old, you will know the secret of Azazel,” together with Nachmanides’ interpretation, and concludes from this a way of thinking according to which “the other side” is imaginary and has no independent power.
Three Practical Categories and Their Halakhic Implications
The text summarizes a map of three types of procedures: natural medicine, which is permitted on weekdays and on the Sabbath; segulah-based medicine that works, which is permitted on weekdays but forbidden when it requires violating a prohibition; and other segulah-based treatments that do not work, which according to Maimonides are forbidden both on weekdays and on the Sabbath. It argues that what is permitted or forbidden on the Sabbath and on weekdays serves as a “litmus test” for diagnosing the nature of the procedure and whether it belongs to the natural or segulah category.
Siamese Twins, a Pursuer, and the Dispute over Symmetrical Separation
The text describes an article he wrote in Techumin 25 about separating Siamese twins, and argues that not only is it permitted, but one must separate them in order to save at least one. He recounts hearing on the radio about a Haredi couple who refused the operation following the instruction of halakhic decisors, and both children died, and he presents the debates he had about this—mainly with Mordechai Halperin, who argued that all halakhic decisors forbid it in a symmetrical case. He distinguishes between a situation in which one is a “parasite” and the organ belongs to the other, in which case separation is permitted under the law of a pursuer, and a symmetrical case in which there is no clear natural ownership over the organ, where it is argued that one may not kill one in order to save the other.
Jerusalem Talmud Terumot, “Give Us One of You,” and Sanctification of God’s Name
The text grapples with the proof brought by those who forbid such action from the Jerusalem Talmud, tractate Terumot, and from Maimonides in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah: non-Jews demand, “Give us one of you, and if not we will kill all of you,” and the ruling is that one may not hand anyone over. It quotes the difficulties raised by the commentaries on Maimonides as to how the principle “who says your blood is redder?” applies here, when that person will die anyway together with everyone else, and it brings strained resolutions such as those of the Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh. It cites an interpretation by Professor Anker according to which this is a law in the category of sanctifying God’s name, not in the laws of murder, and therefore it is not relevant to Siamese twins or fetal reduction, where there is no surrender to terror. It adds proof from the placement of the law in Maimonides specifically in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, chapter 5, rather than in the Laws of Murderer and Preservation of Life.
Fetal Reduction as a Parallel and the Question of the Severity of the Prohibition
The text presents fetal reduction as a similar situation in which there are halakhic decisors who forbid it in principle on the basis of the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot, and sometimes permit it because a fetus is not considered full-fledged murder. It notes that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein argues that this is “literally do not murder,” but says that the plain sense of the halakhic decisors does not seem to support that. It argues that according to the understanding that this is about sanctifying God’s name and not about murder, one should not apply the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot to fetal reduction, since this is an act of rescue and not handing someone over to non-Jews.
Drawing Lots Over Lives: Sefer Chasidim, Jonah, and the Distinction Between a Mystical Lot and a Distributive Lot
The text brings a common claim that the source of the prohibition against “drawing lots over lives” is Sefer Chasidim, and presents how this question arose in the discussion of Siamese twins when a lottery was proposed to determine who would be saved. It quotes Sefer Chasidim 679, which forbids casting lots during a storm in order to throw one person into the sea, and also quotes Sefer Chasidim 761, which permits it when “the other ships pass in peace,” and then “it is known that there is someone on the ship who is liable,” in which case they may cast lots three times. It explains that the distinction is that in the first case there is no indication that there is a “guilty party,” and therefore the lot is useless and throwing someone overboard is murder, whereas in the second case there is such an indication and therefore the lot is relevant. He concludes that there is no intrinsic prohibition against a lot involving lives; rather, the prohibition is against “doing foolish things” and killing without basis. He adds that in the case of Siamese twins the lot is not meant to identify the guilty party but to distribute rescue chances equally where the outcome itself cannot be equally divided, and he compares this to drawing lots among heirs when unequal fields cannot be divided, where what is distributed is the “expected gain” and no heavenly revelation is being sought. He argues that such a distributive lot has nothing to do with “do not practice divination,” and is not a problem of reliance-based commitment, because it is clear that both children have full acceptance to participate in the lottery in order to gain a chance of being saved.
A Mystical Lot That Requires a Forbidden Act and the Connection to Segulah-Based Healing
The text qualifies this by saying that if we are dealing with a Jonah-type lot whose purpose is to determine a hidden truth, and its use involves desecrating the Sabbath or some other prohibition, then perhaps the principle applies that one does not violate a prohibition for the sake of rescue on a mystical plane. It distinguishes such a mystical lot from the distributive lot in the case of Siamese twins, which is not “mystical” and does not require higher revelation.
Concluding Question: Rabbi Shimon Shkop, Interest, and the Law of Justice versus Torah Law
The text closes with a question about a contradiction in Rabbi Shimon Shkop between “the law of justice” and Torah law in the case of an interest-bearing contract: financially, does the money “belong” to the lender even though the Torah forbids the borrower to pay interest? It answers that the Torah can nullify the force of the law of justice when there is a scriptural decree, and in a case where the Torah allows the borrower to keep the money and make use of it, this teaches that he is not a thief and that the lender’s ownership has been removed with respect to that payment. It rejects the possibility that the money remains the lender’s property while only return is forbidden, and argues that such a position does not fit the premise that the borrower is permitted to hold and use the money.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s begin. Last time I started dealing with the Mishnah in Yoma there, about rescue, segulah-based healing, the use of segulah-based healing. And Maimonides, in his commentary to the Mishnah in Yoma—I brought these passages—writes that one does not have permission to heal someone by segulah-based means if it involves a prohibition. Meaning, it is forbidden to desecrate the Sabbath for segulah-based healing. I brought a few stories about this. There’s a story—I don’t remember if I mentioned it—there’s a famous story about someone who wanted to travel to the Rebbe of Belz on the Sabbath so that he would write an amulet for a patient who was dangerously ill. And I don’t remember who it was—Rabbi Shlomo Kluger, I think—who became very angry about this and strongly objected, and said that under no circumstances is such a thing permitted. Not because the amulets of the Rebbe of Belz don’t work, which is probably also true, but because it is forbidden to desecrate the Sabbath for segulah-based healing. That was basically the claim. I brought some sources and discussions on this matter. We could expand on it, but I just want to bring one source that I once heard in some lecture in Bnei Brak. I still remember someone speaking there—that was when I first encountered this prohibition against desecrating the Sabbath for segulah-based healing. So the Jew who gave the lecture there—his name is Rabbi Meshulam Meshulami, Ashkenazi, not Kurdish. In any case, he brought—I think it was he—he brought proof from the Talmud in Makkot 11. Let me share the file for a moment. The Talmud says:
[Speaker B] Like this: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “The curse of a sage, even if undeserved, comes about.” From where do we know this? From Achitophel. For when David dug the drainage channels, the deep waters rose and sought to flood the world. When David dug the channels there on the Temple Mount, the waters of the deep began to rise and threatened to flood the world. He said: “What is the law—may one write the Name on a shard and throw it into the deep so that it will stay in its place?” Meaning, is it permitted to write the name of God on a piece of pottery, on a shard, and throw it into the waters of the deep so that they remain in place. What’s the problem with that? Writing the Name and throwing it into the water amounts to erasing the Divine Name. There is a prohibition against erasing the Name—“You shall not do so to the Lord your God.” It’s counted as a prohibition by all the enumerators of the commandments, and the question is whether one may do it. No one answered him a word. He said: “Whoever knows this matter and does not say it—may he choke in his throat.” If there is someone here among the sages standing around who knows the answer and doesn’t tell me, then he should choke. Achitophel then derived an a fortiori argument on his own. He said: “If, in order to make peace between husband and wife, the Torah said that My Name, which was written in holiness, should be erased in the water, then to save the whole world all the more so.” Right? In the case of the sotah, we write the Name of God and erase it in water, and the purpose is to make peace between husband and wife—peace, or separation, but to resolve the tension between husband and wife. For that purpose, the Torah was willing for us to erase the Divine Name, despite the prohibition involved. So in order to save the entire world, all the more so. There it is to save the marital peace of one couple; here it is so that the waters should not flood the whole world and destroy everything—then certainly, certainly one may do it. He said to him: permitted. Therefore Achitophel answered David that it was permitted, by force of this a fortiori argument. He wrote the Name on the shard, threw it into the deep, and it descended and remained in its place. So King David did it—he wrote this Name on a shard, threw it into the deep waters, and the waters indeed stopped. It reminds me—I saw this now on WhatsApp, I think yesterday someone posted it—about the great wonder of the Rebbe, where the Rebbe arrived at some hotel and there was no room. So he said: I see terrible things that are going to happen here in this hotel if they don’t find me a room; terrible disasters will befall this hotel. The hotel owner panicked, immediately cleared a room and found him a place. Then the Rebbe prayed, and indeed nothing happened. See what a miracle—that is, the Rebbe prayed and nothing happened. In any case, he threw the Name on the water and the waters did not rise. And despite that, it is written: “Achitophel saw that his counsel was not followed, and he saddled the donkey, arose, went to his house, to his city, gave instructions to his household, and strangled himself.” And less important for our purposes, the Talmud shows that once David said that he should choke, then even though he didn’t meet the criterion—because the person who didn’t say the matter, he did say it—still in the end he did choke. Fine, that’s another discussion. But for our purposes, what exactly do we see in this Talmudic passage? Seemingly this passage is actually proof in the opposite direction—that one may carry out a segulah-based rescue at the cost of a transgression. Because here there was erasing the Name, and since this was intended to save the world, they permitted it. So one may violate a prohibition in order to save the world, even though this rescue is obviously a segulah-based rescue—it uses the Divine Name to stop the rising of the deep waters. But first of all, what is the discussion even about? Why was David unsure? What, he doesn’t know that danger to life overrides all the transgressions in the Torah except for three? And if this is danger to life for the entire world, I assume it would override even those three. But even without that. Who said so? Like the daughters of Lot, where it was a transgression for the sake of Heaven—they had relations with their father, exactly, they had relations with their father because they thought that was the only way to save humanity. Fine, and that’s less important for us. Let’s say for now that here we’re not dealing with one of the three cardinal transgressions, so what was King David’s hesitation? Why did he ask the question and wait for an answer? Already from the hesitation itself you see that it was not obvious to King David that this was permitted. Why? After all, danger to life overrides everything. Apparently not—presumably because this is segulah-based rescue and not rescue by natural means. Who said one may violate a prohibition for that? Erasing the Name is a prohibition—who said one may violate a prohibition for the sake of a segulah-based rescue? That may itself have been David’s doubt.
[Speaker C] Maybe he wasn’t sure it would work?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He asked whether anyone knows—not whether it would work. Sorry? He asked whether it is permitted, not whether it will work.
[Speaker C] Yes, but it’s permitted when you’re sure it works and to save the
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] world—then it surely would have worked. He didn’t ask whether it works or not; he asked whether it is permitted or forbidden. Meaning, the assumption that appears in the Talmud is that it definitely works. The only question is whether it is still permitted. Now, if it works, why should it be forbidden? When there is a segulah-based rescue, maybe that was King David’s doubt—that segulah-based rescue may not be carried out at the cost of a transgression; in this case, erasing the Name is a transgression. That’s one side. On the other hand, the answer he got… actually now that I think about it, someone asked something here in the chat just now. Wait, let me look. Ah—whether the danger was really substantial. What Shlomo said earlier, whether there was doubt if it would work or not—the Talmud itself proves that you’re wrong. Because otherwise, what kind of answer is this? After all, Achitophel’s answer was that he made an a fortiori argument that one may erase the Name of God in water to make peace between husband and wife. So what? But here the question is whether it will work. In the case of husband and wife, it works; the only question there is whether it is permitted or forbidden. The Torah says it is permitted. So how is the a fortiori argument relevant? I’m discussing whether it is permitted or forbidden, not whether it works or not. And you bring me an a fortiori argument. So clearly the question was whether it is permitted or forbidden, not whether it works.
[Speaker C] No, but when you erase the Divine Name for husband and wife, it’s not certain that it will work, that peace will prevail
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What now?
[Speaker C] Obviously it’s also not certain that there will be peace.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously there will be peace! Either cold peace or warm peace, but there will be peace. The house won’t remain with that tension inside it. Yes. So that’s clear. But it’s also clear from the simple meaning of the Talmud. And here it’s clear proof from the Talmud’s actual line of reasoning, but it’s also clear from the wording of the Talmud. The question was whether it is permitted or forbidden, not other questions. So King David’s doubt was whether one may carry out segulah-based rescue at the cost of violating a prohibition. But that’s only a doubt. Seemingly the answer he got was that it is permitted. Meaning, in the final analysis, he had a doubt, so I understand that the question or thesis that it is forbidden is not absurd. There is such a side. But if you ask what the actual law is, it seems that the conclusion of the passage is that it is permitted. But it’s not so simple. Because the fact that the Talmud needed some kind of a fortiori argument, and it specifically talks about erasing the Name—an a fortiori argument of erasing the Name—so why didn’t it make an a fortiori argument from ordinary rescue? Rather, it seems this is a specific law about erasing the Name. Meaning, let’s say eating pork would still be forbidden. The prohibition of erasing the Name is permitted because specifically that prohibition, God waives when it is intended to save something. But that is not a general statement about all prohibitions. From the plain sense of the Talmud it seems that this is a law stated specifically regarding the prohibition of erasing the Divine Name. And therefore, the conclusion of the passage is—I’ve seen once among later authorities that this is how they explain the passage in Makkot itself. Look there in Otzar Mefarshei HaTalmud; I think it brings such a view from some obscure later authority, I no longer remember. But I heard it from that man, Rabbi Meshulami, that apparently from here you see that there is a prohibition against doing segulah-based rescue at the cost of violating a prohibition. Meaning, it is forbidden to carry out segulah-based rescue even where there is danger to life if it involves a prohibition. Now, why indeed should it be forbidden to do segulah-based rescue if it involves a prohibition? After all, if segulah-based rescue works, then danger to life overrides the entire Torah, so what do I care that there’s a prohibition? Seemingly the only question is whether it works or not. If it works, it should be permitted. What difference does it make? So in fact, the common explanations among later authorities—if you look, you’ll see that they say it’s because it’s not certain. Segulah-based rescue is not certain to work. But what do you mean it’s not certain to work? Fine, so there’s doubt whether it will work. A doubtful danger to life also overrides the Sabbath. So I saw that the Radbaz, I think, writes that they don’t even apply the laws of doubtful danger to life here, because there is some concern that the masses will start inventing all sorts of remedies from all sorts of baseless sources, and all these things will also be done at the cost of violating prohibitions. Because of that slippery slope, something that is not certain to work was not permitted at the cost of a prohibition. It seems to be some kind of rabbinic decree, not the core law. Because at core law, even doubtful danger to life overrides the whole Torah. But it seems to me that this is not the plain meaning of the formulations—not the Mishnah, not the medieval authorities, not the later authorities—that is not their plain language. The point is not whether it works or not. And I brought here the Birkei Yosef of the Chida, who infers this from Maimonides’ wording in his commentary to the Mishnah in Yoma, where it clearly implies that he is saying it does work, but since it is not by way of nature that we tested in a laboratory—or in Maimonides’ words there, by way of reason and understanding—therefore it is forbidden. Not because it doesn’t work. Meaning, this joins the collection of laws that I brought in previous lectures, which tell us that there is some limitation on resorting to mystical, segulah-based realms—not because of concern that maybe it doesn’t work. Remember, for example, regarding the reliability of dreams? There I brought Maimonides’ own view, that even in a place where there are indications that the dream—clear indications that the dream—is reliable, we still don’t use it. We don’t use it, even though it has consequences. Meaning, you take second-tithe money and treat it as ordinary money—they permit prohibitions for you. Why? Because dreams have no standing in Jewish law. I also brought confession, self-imposed prohibition, and various other laws, where because there is no connection to our subjective dimension—what I basically called mysticism, yes, mysticism meaning something esoteric or subjective—these things have no halakhic standing. And so here too I want to argue: it’s the same claim. This is what the Birkei Yosef is basically saying in Maimonides, that the point is not that it doesn’t work, but that even though it works, since it works only on the segulah plane and not on the natural plane, there is no permission to violate a prohibition for its sake—to desecrate the Sabbath for it, and so on.
[Speaker C] So why is it permitted to go out on the Sabbath with an expert amulet? I can’t hear. Why is it permitted to go out on the Sabbath with an expert amulet?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. An expert amulet—I brought the Radbaz on this in the previous lecture—he says that what makes it permitted to go out with an expert amulet is not that it works, but that it is in the manner of clothing, so it is not considered carrying.
[Speaker C] So what does that mean—then why—even a non-expert one is in the manner of clothing? Why specifically an expert one?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because if it’s not expert, then it’s not in the manner of clothing. What difference
[Speaker C] does it make whether it’s expert or not? If an amulet is like clothing, then
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] expert, non-expert—what difference does it make? No, only an expert amulet is like clothing. Because an expert amulet—someone who goes with it—is like eyeglasses. When I walk around with eyeglasses, there is no prohibition of carrying from private domain to public domain. Why not? Because for me it is like a garment. Now think about someone who wears glasses that don’t show anything, just fake glasses that don’t work—that would not be considered in the manner of clothing. What makes it like clothing is the benefit it provides, because then it means it is basically part of my body, like clothing—it serves my body. An expert amulet, because it works, when I wear it on me it is clothing; it is some implement I use, like the clothing I wear. But a non-expert amulet is like glasses that don’t let you see.
[Speaker C] Like a watch, whether it works or doesn’t work.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Okay. So the claim is basically that even though these things can work, still one may not violate a prohibition for them. Now notice, I want to make a very clear distinction here in Maimonides, because it touches on questions from the last several lectures. Is this forbidden because of “do not practice divination”? If it were forbidden because of “do not practice divination,” then it should also be forbidden on a weekday, right? Regardless of the Sabbath. On a weekday too it should be forbidden. Right? Yes.
[Speaker C] But
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since we are dealing here with something that works, there is no “do not practice divination” here. Right? I’m speaking about Maimonides’ view. Maimonides’ view is that if something works, there is no prohibition on it. All the prohibitions are basically prohibitions against being foolish. To take things that don’t work seriously—that is the prohibition. But if there is something that works, then it is not under the prohibition family of “be wholehearted,” “do not practice divination,” sorcery, and all those things. Therefore, on a weekday there is no problem doing it. On the other hand, on the Sabbath they did not permit desecration. Why? Because this is segulah-based healing. It works, and therefore on a weekday it is permitted, but on the Sabbath they did not permit it, because on the Sabbath there is a special rule regarding segulah-based healing—not only on the Sabbath but with prohibitions in general: segulah-based healing is not included under the rule of “and live by them,” that you may heal even at the cost of violating a prohibition. In any case, the claim here—the important point for us—is that on one hand this is a kind of healing that is segulah-based, not natural. On the other hand, it works. Meaning, this is an effective treatment that does not work by way of nature, but rather by way of segulah. What happens there? That is permitted on a weekday, but forbidden on the Sabbath, or forbidden where it involves a prohibition. Now notice—why am I saying this healing is obviously segulah-based? Here there is no diagnostic problem. Right? Because the problem I raised was: what actually counts as supernatural? What is segulah-based healing? If it works, then according to Maimonides it is natural. If it doesn’t work, then it doesn’t work. So how do you… According to Nachmanides there are things that work that are segulah-based, and things that work that are natural. So then the diagnostic question arises: how do you know which of these is segulah-based and which is natural? Right? That’s what I asked regarding Maimonides. According to Maimonides there is no problem. The answer is simple: what works is natural; what doesn’t work is segulah-based, or mystical, fine? Okay. And therefore forbidden. But here we suddenly encounter a new category. Even according to Maimonides there are things that do work and are not by way of nature—they are segulah-based. Right? That’s what follows from Maimonides’ commentary to the Mishnah here in Yoma—similar to Nachmanides, in short.
[Speaker D] What? Like Nachmanides, in short.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, very similar to Nachmanides. And this brings back the question: so wait, then what exactly is the disagreement about? The whole big dispute—we saw the responsum VeYashev HaYam—so in the end it turns out that Maimonides also holds the same picture? It seems to me not. This connects to something I pointed out in one of the previous lectures. I said that, for example, an expert amulet—that’s the example I think I brought—even if it works, it seems pretty clear that it is segulah-based. Here there’s no diagnostic problem. Why? Because I put the expert amulet on myself, but it doesn’t create a chemical interaction with my body. So there is no interaction at all. So how does it work? Let’s say, after we’ve done a double-blind, systematic, controlled experiment and neutralized the placebo, right? And all those things—spontaneous healing, placebo, everything. Fine? What remains is that this amulet works in a statistically significant way, beyond placebo and all that. I ask myself how it works. After all, it somehow affects the body’s physiology but without any chemical interaction. So that, I can understand Maimonides saying: here there is no diagnostic problem. It is clear that it works segulah-wise, not naturally. Meaning, it turns out that Maimonides does not claim that there is no such thing as the supernatural or as something segulah-based that works. That is the point I want now to add. There is such a thing. But Maimonides narrows it very sharply in contrast to Nachmanides. That is the dispute. Maimonides limits it to those things about which you can clearly say that they are segulah-based. An amulet, or the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, that stopped the waters there for King David—where it is clear that no physical thing stopped the waters, no force was applied to the waters to keep them below. So that was apparently a segulah-based action. Likewise with an amulet that works—that is a segulah-based action. Maimonides is prepared in principle to accept that there are such things. It’s not that he denies the whole idea; it’s not that he claims there is only nature and nothing beyond nature. But Nachmanides argues that there are also remedies… where one does physical actions with them and they are still segulah-based. Maimonides says: if it works through chemistry, then it is natural and it works. If not through chemistry, then it doesn’t work—unless it’s an expert amulet, the Divine Name, I don’t know, such segulot or others that have some source and may perhaps work segulah-wise. Everything else does not work. According to Nachmanides there are also other things that work, but they come from an alien source, from the “other side,” from some other source. Maimonides says there is no such thing. Whatever works by the power of the Holy One, blessed be He, works—whether naturally or segulah-wise. Other things do not exist; they do not work; there are no other things that work. So from Maimonides’ perspective, in fact it comes out the opposite of the opposite. According to Maimonides, if there is something segulah-based that works, then it is necessarily not forbidden. It necessarily does not belong to idolatry or to other powers, because if it works, then it is from the Holy One, blessed be He; otherwise it would not work. That is what Maimonides writes explicitly. Only things that come from the Holy One, blessed be He, work. Other things do not work. So for Maimonides it comes out the other way around: if there is something segulah-based that works, then obviously it would not be forbidden. It is not a novelty that it is not forbidden—on the contrary, it is the most obvious thing that it not be forbidden. Because if it is segulah-based and works, then it clearly comes from the Holy One, blessed be He, and not from some other source. Things that come from another source are things that do not work. So segulah-based healing by definition is healing that comes from the side of holiness, from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He. Except that there is a special novelty here: one may not violate a prohibition for it. But there is no principled prohibition against using it on a weekday or where no prohibition is involved. Go ahead and use it—no problem. This novelty, that danger to life allows prohibitions to be overridden, was said only about natural healing, not segulah-based healing. But this has nothing to do with “do not practice divination” and the whole family of previous prohibitions. Meaning, those treatments for which one may not desecrate the Sabbath, or may not use through a prohibition, are precisely the test case for that intermediate level between natural medicine and ineffective esoterica. There is an intermediate level, and that is esoterica that does work. Esoterica that works—if it works, then it is from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He, from the side of holiness. Therefore Maimonides says: then it is permitted; why should it be forbidden? According to Nachmanides you cannot say such a thing. So notice, the dispute is still a very substantial dispute; it is not as narrow as it may seem. Because according to Nachmanides, when you see segulah-based healing that works, you have no way of knowing whether it is from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He, or not, because the other camp also has power to make things that work. According to Maimonides, if you see something segulah-based that works, then it is certainly from the right side,
[Speaker C] because for Maimonides there is no “other side” at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no power to any other side. I once spoke about this, and I also wrote about this Ibn Ezra on the scapegoat sent to Azazel. I said that I have a whole approach there on the scapegoat to Azazel, the discussion of Nachmanides and Ibn Ezra in Parashat Acharei Mot—if that’s the weekly Torah portion soon. In the end, it doesn’t matter, whoever read it read it, not important—but the final result is that Ibn Ezra writes, “When you are thirty-three years old, you will know the secret of Azazel,” and he doesn’t reveal it. “When you are thirty-three, you will know it.” Some kind of riddle from Ibn Ezra. So Nachmanides writes there what this means: go thirty-three verses after the verse about the scapegoat to Azazel, and you’ll see that it says there, “And they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the goat-demons.” That’s what “when you are thirty-three you will know it” means—go thirty-three verses further, and then you’ll know the meaning of the scapegoat to Azazel. And what does it mean? It means that after you finish the whole move with the scapegoat to Azazel, you actually discover that all the goat-demons—“they shall no longer sacrifice their sacrifices to the goat-demons”—the other powers, the other side, Satan, and all those things, are all fantasies. There’s nothing there. There are no such things at all. There really is no other side, no “other side.” The “other side” exists only in our overheated imagination. That is really the lesson of this passage of the scapegoat to Azazel—but again, I’m not going into it here, it’s a long argument, I wrote about it in a few places. So for our purposes, what comes out here is a new point for the map that’s gradually being built here: basically, we divide the procedures—rescue procedures, or medical procedures, if you want to narrow it specifically to medicine, though for example the water at Shittim is not medicine, it’s rescue—we divide them into three categories. One category is natural medicine. With that there is no problem, either on a weekday or on the Sabbath. That’s one category. The second category is segulah-based treatment that works. Segulah-based treatment that works is permitted on a weekday but forbidden on the Sabbath. Again, when I say Sabbath I mean any prohibition, not specifically desecrating the Sabbath. It is forbidden to do this at the cost of violating a prohibition. Other segulah-based remedies—first, they don’t work according to Maimonides; second, they are forbidden both on weekdays and on the Sabbath. That’s the map—the metaphysical map or mystical map, according to Maimonides. Through the halakhic expressions of the different situations, we can have some kind of diagnosis of what kind of case we’re dealing with. Is this a segulah from the side of holiness, a segulah from the other side, or something natural? Okay, and each of these has a different halakhic implication. The natural is permitted on weekdays and on the Sabbath. The segulah that works is permitted on weekdays and forbidden on the Sabbath. The segulah from the other side—which, in parentheses, also doesn’t work according to Maimonides—is forbidden on weekdays and forbidden on the Sabbath. In other words, whether it is permitted or forbidden on the Sabbath and on weekdays is our litmus paper for diagnosing the procedure we’re talking about—which of the three types it belongs to, how mystical it is, and what kind of mysticism it is. So the claim that emerges from here—and now I’m qualifying a bit the rationalism I presented until now in Maimonides’ view—is that Maimonides does not deny the possibility of supernatural things. If there is an established amulet, you tested it and it works, fine, maybe that can happen. So it can work—but only from the side of holiness. It can come only from one direction, not from the other side. Okay, so this is a moderate rationalism. Okay, that’s the first remark. Now, in light of these things, it’s interesting to examine another topic, and that is drawing lots over life and death. I spoke about this once. It is somehow accepted among the halakhic decisors to think—the source is Sefer Hasidim, but it’s accepted among the decisors to think—that there is a prohibition against drawing lots over lives in life-threatening situations. They discuss lotteries in general, how much they may be used; some want to argue that except for the cases the Talmud explicitly establishes, one may not use lotteries at all. But that is not the accepted approach. Still, drawing lots over lives is generally assumed by the decisors to be forbidden. Where did this come up? I’ll go a bit into this topic to explain what this is about. When I once wrote an article about separating Siamese twins—two children born conjoined, or with a shared organ, say even a shared brain sometimes or a shared heart, joined in a very fundamental way with shared organs, not just a connection you can cut and separate, but actually shared organs—and in certain situations medicine can tell us that within less than a year, nine months, something like that, both of these children will die. The only way to save at least one of them is to do a separation surgery. The moment I do the separation surgery—say they have one shared heart—then the heart will remain with one of them, and the other will of course die because he cannot exist without a heart, or without a head—although there are not a few people who seem to manage, but in principle we’re not supposed to be able to exist without a head. So the question is whether such a separation surgery is permitted. I got interested in this issue after I’d spoken about it once, because of some radio report I heard about a Haredi couple who had Siamese twins, and they were hospitalized at Tel HaShomer, and the doctors asked permission to perform a separation surgery, and the halakhic decisors forbade it. And because of that, the parents did not agree. They didn’t do the surgery, and both children died. And when I heard that, it really outraged me. I looked into the issue a bit to see what was going on—why some forbid it, why some permit it—and then I wrote an article in Techumin 25 arguing that not only is it permitted, it is obligatory to separate Siamese twins. This is a life-saving situation. So I had a very long argument, even before the article was published, during the stages of clarifying and shaping the issue, mainly with Mordechai Halperin but also with other people—very difficult arguments over these matters. They didn’t fully agree with me. Mordechai Halperin didn’t agree with me at all. He said he had checked with all the halakhic decisors and they all forbade it; there wasn’t even one who permitted it. And I told him that in my view one must do it. Not just that it is permitted—it is obligatory. And maybe I’ll sharpen it a bit more. The claim is that we need to distinguish between two situations. There is a situation where, say, there is a shared heart. There is one case where the heart naturally belongs to Reuven, but Shimon is a parasite; he somehow also manages to be nourished from Reuven’s heart. In such a situation, the decisors permit it. In such a situation, the decisors permit leaving the heart with Reuven, because it’s his heart, and Shimon, who is attached to him, is going to kill him—that is the law of a pursuer. So one may kill Shimon under the law of a pursuer, and then they perform the separation surgery and leave Shimon to die. There is an unwritten discussion, by the way, of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein; there’s a description of it in the Philadelphia Inquirer in 1976. How do I remember that? Of course—the Sixers, Philadelphia ’76. So there was an article there describing Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s reasoning. He asked some interesting questions there. He asked the nurses who came to speak with him—it was, I think, a case of being joined at the head, the children were joined at the head—he asked the nurses whether these were even two distinct beings. Did they behave differently? After all, they had one brain. Because if it is one being, that’s a nice argument—if it is one being, then of course there is no problem removing part of it in order to keep it alive, right? Just as one may amputate an arm to keep me alive. So the first question he asked was whether this was in fact two beings. And the nurses claimed that they had different personalities, they behaved differently. I really don’t know exactly how that worked there with the head, but they had different personalities, so these were two separate beings. Then he entered the actual topic, and he brought one example there, and another example I remember from the priest who discussed the matter, because the doctors went to ask a priest. The parents, who were Haredi, went to ask Rabbi Moshe Feinstein. And the similarity between the considerations of the priest and those of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein is astonishing. It’s just the same thing. It’s unbelievable how similar it is. One of them—I no longer remember who gave which example—one of them gave an example of a parachutist. Two parachutists are descending, one of them has his parachute rip, so he grabs the legs of the other one, and now there is one parachute with two people hanging from it. But the parachute can’t support two people. Is the one above allowed to kick the one below to his death so that he can remain alive with the parachute? So he argued that of course yes. Because after all, the parachute is mine, and the person is a pursuer—he wants to kill me. Yes, it’s like two people walking in the desert and one of them has a flask of water. If the other one comes and wants to take my water, I may shoot him dead, right? At least according to Rabbi Akiva, who says “your life takes precedence.” Because this is my water—our water, as they say. So it’s my water, and if he takes it from me, then he is a pursuer. And the priest—notice this, it’s really interesting—the priest gave an example of mountain climbers who drive a peg into the mountain and hang from it, and one of them has his peg ripped out of the mountain, so he grabs the legs of the other one, and now both of them are hanging from the other person’s peg. Is he allowed to kick the one hanging below in order to save himself? And the priest said yes. Or maybe the priest said it about the parachutist and Rabbi Moshe about the peg, or vice versa—I don’t remember. But look at this: it’s really the same kind of discussion. In any event, the conclusion was yes—but yes only where one can define one of them as a pursuer and the other as pursued. Meaning, if there is someone to whom the heart or the brain naturally belongs, such that the other is merely parasitic in relation to him—merely parasitic in relation to him—then in such a case one may kill the parasite because he has the status of a pursuer. But what happens if it is impossible to define to whom the heart or the brain belongs? It is symmetrical. There is one parachute for two people. And in the end it turns out the parachute cannot carry them both. Am I allowed to throw one of them off so that I survive? Of course each of us can try to throw the other off. Survival of the strongest. Okay? There Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said absolutely not. Forbidden. And so did all the decisors. Mordechai Halperin checked with all the greatest decisors there—so he told me—and they all forbade it. Why? Because you are not allowed to kill one person in order to save the other. I told him that in my eyes this is absurd. Completely absurd. Why? Because in the name of the prohibition against killing Reuven in order to save Shimon, you leave both Reuven and Shimon to die. The alternative you choose is not that now you didn’t kill Shimon and therefore Shimon will survive. Now not only will Shimon die; Reuven will also die, and Shimon will die. Both of them will die. So that’s better? At least kill one, and the other will survive. That is not the same thing as “who says your blood is redder.” In the case of “who says your blood is redder,” someone threatens me with a gun to kill so-and-so, and if not he will kill me—there the law is that I may not kill so-and-so, and I have to let myself be killed. But there the question really is whether he alone will die or I alone will die. So they tell me: your blood is no redder than his. You may not kill him. That is clear. But here that is not the situation. Here it’s something entirely different. Here the alternatives are not either that he dies or I die. The alternative is either both of us die, or only he dies and I remain alive. He is going to die anyway. So why shouldn’t I kill him? It makes no sense. So he told me: but there is a Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot against you. The one Maimonides brings in chapter 5, law 5, of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah. Gentiles besieged a city and said to those inside: “Give us one of you, and if not, we will kill all of you.” So the halakhic ruling is—there is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, not important now—that one does not hand anyone over. Let them kill everyone; one does not hand over the person they asked for. That is already really an example just like the Siamese twins. Because there the alternative is that all of us die, or we hand over one and at least the rest survive. If we don’t hand him over, he too will die together with all of us. So at least hand him over and we’ll survive. And there it says one does not hand him over. So Mordechai Halperin tells me: you see, that is proof against you. Siamese twins are the same situation. We see that “who says your blood is redder” is said even in such a case. And why? What is the explanation? Because at the end of the day, when you perform the surgery, you are sending one of them to his death. So you are in fact killing him with your own hands. If you leave them as they are, both of them will die—what can you do? But you may not kill someone with your own hands in order to save the other. And I told him that this simply cannot be. It is impossible.
[Speaker C] It’s just not the same thing there. It’s not the same thing at all. Because here one threatens the other. If there are two of us, he threatens me and I threaten him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s not threatening anything. What do you mean threatening? We are both being harmed by a shared source. We have a flask of water that belongs to both of them. No one is threatening anything. He wants to live; he’s not threatening me. It’s exactly the same thing.
[Speaker C] It’s that here, here, here, you are handing over someone who really is not—he is not directly physically threatening you.
[Speaker B] Not when two people are walking in the desert, right?
[Speaker C] So if I don’t, then one of us will definitely die.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same here—what do you mean? Here too both of us will die.
[Speaker C] It doesn’t sound like the same thing to me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? It’s exactly the same thing. On the face of it, a good objection. I told him: look, I need to think about this objection. But it cannot be right. It cannot be right. It cannot be that we leave two people to die so as not to murder one of them when he is going to die anyway. And then I started looking more carefully into this Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot—it is also in the Tosefta Terumot—and in fact the commentators on Maimonides ask exactly this question. The Kesef Mishneh there brings it, and so do all the commentators there, Lechem Mishneh, all of them. How does “who says your blood is redder” apply here? Here they are all about to die—or not just both of them, but the whole city is about to die. So that one person whom you don’t want to kill is also going to die anyway. So at least hand him over so the others can survive. What sense does it make that in addition to his dying, we also die? If he is going to die anyway, at least hand him over. So how is the reasoning of “who says” relevant? The Kesef Mishneh there really strains himself. He argues that we have to say that the reasoning of “who says your blood is redder” is not really the basis of the law of “be killed rather than transgress” in murder. It is only said as a kind of verbal explanation. But we have some tradition—he hangs it on a law given to Moses at Sinai, some tradition, I don’t know exactly what—that one may not kill under any circumstances, and that was said also in this situation. Why? There is no logic, no source, nothing. Fine, but there is such a Jerusalem Talmud, and in that sense he is right: there is a source in the Gemara. I don’t know how it derives from the Torah, or how they derived it. So he says: all right, apparently they had an oral tradition, a law given to Moses at Sinai, I don’t know exactly what. The Lechem Mishneh, for example, argues that it is simply because it is not certain that they will kill everyone. Why hand him over? Maybe even if you don’t hand him over, they won’t kill all of you. They are threatening, but who says they’ll follow through? So because of that doubt, one may not hand him over—because he will certainly die, while we are only in doubt. That’s a novel idea, but you can hear it. But notice that according to this interpretation, if it were clear that we are going to die, then surely it would be permitted to hand him over. Right? Now in the end I said, leave all that aside, I don’t need it. I found an interpretation by Professor Anker from Bar-Ilan, from law at Bar-Ilan. He wrote an article about this; I think it also appears in his book. And he argues—and in my opinion correctly—that this law is really a law in the Laws of Sanctifying God’s Name. What does that mean? When gentiles besiege a city and demand that we hand over one person so that they won’t kill us, we may not surrender, because surrender there is a desecration of God’s name. We are commanded to die in sanctification of God’s name. This is not from the laws of preservation of life, not from the laws of murder and preservation of life—it is from the laws of sanctifying God’s name. A practical difference would be Siamese twins. In Siamese twins, if I perform a separation surgery, I have not yielded to a threat of gentiles. I have not handed over a Jew to gentiles to kill him. There is no desecration of God’s name here. This is an act of saving life. Instead of both of them dying, I perform surgery and at least one survives. Therefore the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot and Maimonides are not speaking in the laws of preservation of life; they are speaking in the laws of sanctification and desecration of God’s name. There there is a special rule, and it has nothing to do with “who says” at all, absolutely nothing. In fact the reasoning of “who says” was never said there; it does not apply there, just as all the commentators say. There it is a special law: one does not surrender to terror. One does not surrender to terror even at the price that all of us die. Just as one does not ransom captives for more than their value, and all sorts of things of that type, where basically they do not want a desecration of God’s name or to open the door to future problems and so on—a kind of surrender to terror, okay? But fundamentally it is a special law. For example, fetal reduction—that too is a similar question. In fetal reduction, suppose there is a mother with many fetuses in her womb, say three fetuses, and the doctors estimate that all three of them will die. It is too crowded there; there is not enough living space, or nourishment, or whatever—they cannot all three survive. So one needs to reduce; that’s the euphemistic term we use. It means aborting one of them, say, and leaving two. So is that permitted or not? On this matter the decisors argue that in principle it should be forbidden on the basis of the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot, because it’s the same thing: “Give us one of you” in order to save the others—otherwise they all die.
[Speaker D] But a fetus doesn’t really have full life. That’s it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there are decisors who permit it because these are fetuses, and the prohibition against killing a fetus is not really full-fledged murder. It is a lighter prohibition, “one who sheds the blood of man.” Okay? Rabbi Moshe Feinstein argues that it really is “you shall not murder,” but the plain sense of the decisors does not seem that way. So because it is a lighter prohibition, they permitted it. But on the principled level, in such a situation they forbade it. According to what I am saying, that is incorrect, because fetal reduction is like separating Siamese twins. There is no surrender to terror here. There is no desecration of God’s name in doing it. I am doing an act to save their lives. I am not yielding to threats. I am not handing someone over to gentiles. There is no issue here of desecration or sanctification of God’s name. It is only a question of the laws of murder and preservation of life. And in the laws of murder and preservation of life, clearly one should do it. There is no room here for the reasoning of “who says.” Only in the laws of sanctification and desecration of God’s name—surrender to terror, things like that—there the Jerusalem Talmud says one may not surrender. By the way, there is proof, a good proof for this point: Sheva ben Bichri appears there in the Gemara.
[Speaker D] So in the end that Haredi couple didn’t get your article? You hear? In the end that Haredi couple didn’t get your article? Your arguments?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That Haredi couple—their children had died long before the article was published. I heard about it on the radio only after the whole story was over. Afterward I investigated in order to understand what the halakhah is in general. I don’t even know who they are; I didn’t know them. I only heard about the case on the radio. In any event, the claim—the nice proof for this issue—is: where does this law appear in Maimonides? This law does not appear in Maimonides in the Laws of Murder and Preservation of Life. It appears in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, in chapter 5, which deals with sanctifying and desecrating God’s name. And you know that the placement of a law in Maimonides—this is one of the interpretive rules in Maimonides—the placement of a law in Maimonides should be used to understand the nature of that law. Maimonides is precise about where he places his laws. And if he places this in the laws of sanctifying and desecrating God’s name rather than in the laws of murder and preservation of life, then that means the problem here is not a problem of murder; it is a problem of desecrating God’s name. There is no murder when you hand him over to the gentile. It’s not murder; he is going to die anyway. On the contrary, you are saving yourself. What you violated here is desecration of God’s name, not murder. But where there is no desecration of God’s name, and it is only a question of the laws of murder and preservation of life, there it is obvious that it is permitted and obligatory to do it. That was my claim, and therefore the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot is not relevant to the matter at all. And then he raised a new argument. Now I’m starting to get to the topic. So he raised a new argument. He said: yes, but how will you decide? How will you decide whom? After all, in the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot too, the question is whom to hand over. If they ask for a specific person, the Gemara itself makes an interpretive qualification there, like Sheva ben Bichri, who was liable for death to the kingdom, or just some specific person who was not liable to death—there are distinctions in the Jerusalem Talmud itself, a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. But if you don’t have a specific person—if they don’t demand a specific person—then the question is: how do you decide?
[Speaker D] So I told him I’d do a lottery.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the one who has the heart—what? No, I’m talking about a symmetrical case,
[Speaker D] where the heart is exactly in the middle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t have to be in the middle in terms of its physical location, but functionally it is completely symmetrical. It doesn’t have to be that it doesn’t move a millimeter this way or that way. Functionally it is symmetrical. This doesn’t go by millimeters. I’m not expert enough in the medical aspects, but doctors distinguish between the two situations.
[Speaker D] Right, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he asked me: okay, then how do you decide? So I said: by lot. So what does that mean, by lot? But the children can’t draw lots. So I said: what do you mean, the children? We have a strong presumption that if the children were grown up, they would certainly agree to a lottery. Why? Because at least one of them will survive; otherwise both die. So obviously they would agree to a lottery. So we—as a court acting as the father of orphans, or as their guardian—will conduct the lottery for them, because they are infants, they don’t understand these things. So the guardian will do the lottery on their behalf. Then he told me: absolutely not—even they themselves would not be allowed to agree to a lottery. Why? Because one does not draw lots over lives. It is forbidden to draw lots over lives. It starts in Sefer Hasidim, and afterward the decisors also bring it, and therefore— So I told him: first of all, I don’t understand the prohibition. Second, even if there is such a prohibition, why isn’t it overridden by life-saving necessity?
[Speaker D] But that itself is the prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—a prohibition to draw lots over lives? What prohibition? Is that one of the three severe transgressions? In Jewish law there are three that are not overridden by life-saving necessity.
[Speaker D] So you empty it of content if you say that life-saving necessity simply overrides it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—it’s not empty of content. There is no such prohibition.
[Speaker D] No, assuming there is such a prohibition, I understand that if there is such a prohibition, then it is not overridden by life-saving necessity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what comes out. What do you mean, assuming there is? Assuming there is, then there isn’t.
[Speaker D] No, assuming there is a source that such a prohibition exists,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then it would have to be one of the three severe transgressions in order not to be overridden by life-saving necessity.
[Speaker D] Why not bloodshed?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why bloodshed? He is going to die anyway.
[Speaker D] No, but what I’m saying is that if, assuming there is a source for such a prohibition, then the claim that it is overridden by life-saving necessity—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no source for such a prohibition.
[Speaker D] Fine, fine—but you ask: and even if there were such a prohibition, it would be overridden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—if there were a prohibition on drawing lots, I could understand that. But in a situation of life and death it cannot stand, because this is life-saving necessity.
[Speaker D] What lottery? Did you kill a dead man? The prohibition is drawing lots over lives, so obviously when we’re talking about a case where there is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is forbidden to draw lots even over lives.
[Speaker D] So what lottery is forbidden if not over lives?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Some say it is forbidden to conduct any lottery except for the things perhaps written in the Gemara, because of “you shall not practice divination”—that is, resorting to mysticism. And even about life-and-death cases they say: what do you mean? In life-and-death cases it is overridden because this is life-saving necessity. Fifteen severe transgressions?
[Speaker D] No, I thought there was a prohibition only against drawing lots over lives specifically.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know where to invent such a thing from. Without a source I do not accept such a thing. And by source I mean from the Torah, not Sefer Hasidim. Sefer Hasidim is not a source.
[Speaker D] I understand, I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not out of disrespect for Sefer Hasidim. Maimonides also is not a source. Right, right. Unless he shows me that it appears in some actual prohibition, he cannot invent a prohibition.
[Speaker C] With Achan, wasn’t that a kind of lottery in his time?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.
[Speaker C] I’m saying with Achan—Achan—wasn’t that a kind of lottery in his time, right? I understand. With Achan, Achan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, Achan—that was by God’s instruction. By God’s instruction.
[Speaker C] Yes, but still, a kind of lottery like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, come on, that’s by God’s instruction. By God’s instruction you can do anything. You can even marry two sisters by divine command. Right? Like Jacob according to Nachmanides. In any case, that was the argument. I told him: according to your view, if someone is standing—
[Speaker D] You told him simply: what is the source? What? You simply asked him: what is the source?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he said: Sefer Hasidim. You know, for most decisors, if it appears in the medieval authorities that is also a source. I don’t understand that way of thinking, but it is common. In any event, apparently if it is written by one of the medieval authorities, then presumably he had some source that we don’t understand. Fine, okay. In any case I told him: tell me, if someone is standing on the roof of a burning house, is he forbidden to jump down because maybe he’ll die? But if he remains above, he will definitely die, he’ll burn. Could it enter your mind that he would be forbidden to jump down? Obviously he is allowed to. So what is the difference between that and drawing lots? Drawing lots means that I agree that they may operate on me in a way that will kill me in order to save the other, if my lot comes up—or vice versa. It is the same thing as jumping from a burning house. What is the difference?
[Speaker D] No, what do you mean? Jumping from a burning house is just me regarding myself. I make my own calculations. Maybe I’ll die here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Each one makes the decision for himself. When he agrees to the lottery, he agrees that they may kill him in order to save the other if his lot comes up. He’s not speaking about the other one. I don’t need to agree on the other one; the other one needs to agree about me.
[Speaker D] The lottery is forbidden because it’s something mystical, and “you shall not practice divination.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, so you’re saying it’s only because it’s mystical? In a moment we’ll get to that. So the claim is that obviously one is allowed to take a risk upon oneself in order to give oneself a chance of being saved when the alternative is certain death. Because this way at least you have a fifty-percent chance to survive. And since these little ones are minors, they can’t make the decision themselves, so their guardian will conduct the lottery on their behalf. It’s all very simple. So he said to me: fine, then what do you do with Sefer Hasidim? Sefer Hasidim writes that one does not draw lots over lives.
[Speaker C] Isn’t it in a case of uncertainty, Rabbi? When it’s certain that someone will die, why not do it? If it’s uncertain, but when both will die, why not…
[Speaker B] Yes, maybe the whole example is about uncertainty. This is the passage from Sefer Hasidim: “People on a ship—”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And there was a storm wind—they are not permitted to cast lots, such that if the lot falls on one of them he must be thrown into the sea. This is not to be done as they did with Jonah son of Amittai. Now, if an asmachta does not effect acquisition in monetary matters, all the more so in matters of life and death one should not rely on a lot.” Yes, and here too you can see quite clearly that this was not said specifically about lives. “An asmachta does not effect acquisition,” and so on. He says there are places where they cast lots by God’s instruction, and so on. They knew in what kind of matter to cast lots, but you may not rely on a lot, as it says, “And I will cast lots for you there before the Lord your God.” Joshua, by the way—that’s Achan. “And even in monetary matters one does not cast lots except when dividing equally,” and so on. In short, this is the source in Sefer Hasidim. But for some reason—and afterward I saw that Rabbi Ovadia and other decisors cite this—there is another passage in Sefer Hasidim where he writes the opposite. That one is section 761; this one is 679. “People traveling by sea, and a storm wind arose against them to break the ship or drown them in the sea, while the other ships pass safely—then it is known that there is someone on the ship who is liable, and they are permitted to cast lots. Whoever the lot falls upon three times in succession may be thrown into the sea. And they pray that it not fall on the innocent but on the guilty,” and so on. And this is—yes, this is what he writes on Jonah: “and the lot fell on Jonah… ‘Take me and throw me into the sea.’” Yes, and why didn’t they say to Jonah, “Throw yourself into the sea”? Rather, he did not want to throw himself. Yes, and they threw him. All right? So here it is permitted—they are permitted to cast lots. What is the difference? In truth, when you look carefully at his language—and afterward I saw that some later authorities make this distinction, and some do not; Rabbi Ovadia brings it and then rejects it, I don’t understand why—
[Speaker D] There is one ship, while the other ships pass safely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The source is really a midrash of the Sages. The midrash on Jonah writes that the storm there threatened only his ship. There were ships all around, and the water there was calm. Now look at his wording.
[Speaker C] Jonah says, “for on my account this great storm is upon you.” What? Jonah says, “for on my account this great storm is upon you.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s it, yes. That’s good, but the question is whether it’s true. And look at the wording: “People traveling by sea, and a storm wind arose against them to break the ship or drown them in the sea, while the other ships pass safely.” You see? That means the wind threatens only this ship. So he says: “it is known that there is someone on the ship who is liable, and they are permitted to cast lots.” So obviously this is not a contradiction. Some decisors say he contradicts himself, and therefore they say he got confused. Nonsense. He is clearly referring to his earlier passage. In the background you can see that he understands that ordinarily one may not cast lots. But here, in the case where the storm was only upon this ship, it is permitted. Look again at the earlier passage. One second, one second. “People on a ship, and there was a storm wind—they are not permitted to cast lots.” There he does not say that it was only upon this ship and not on the others. There was a storm wind. There it is forbidden to cast lots. What is the difference between a storm that affects only this ship and a storm that affects the whole sea?
[Speaker D] It indicates that there is one person selected by Heaven.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Basically, what does it say here in simple terms? It says this: if there is a storm at sea and you are there, the storm is in the sea, and you want to cast lots in order to throw someone overboard and save yourselves, you may not do that—not because one does not cast lots over lives, but because it won’t help. Why assume there is someone on the ship such that if you throw him into the sea, the storm will stop and you will survive? Where do you get that from? There is no indication of that. So what is forbidden about drawing lots is that you are murdering someone. You are throwing someone into the sea without any indication whatsoever that in fact—there has to be someone there who is guilty. Therefore Sefer Hasidim says in the second passage: but if the storm was only upon this ship, while the other ships pass safely, then “it is known”—that is an indication—that there is a person on the ship “on whose account this storm” has come. Because I have an indication that there really is someone here because of whom this whole thing is happening. In such a situation it is permitted to cast lots. Why? Because where the lot can actually help, it is permitted to cast lots. What is forbidden about casting lots over lives is only when the lot will not help—not because there is some independent prohibition against casting lots over lives. It simply won’t help.
[Speaker D] So just in Siamese twins—in Siamese twins, no one is guilty.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. So that’s one point first of all. So we see here that there is no prohibition at all against a lottery in life-and-death situations. There is only a prohibition against doing foolish things. Just deciding that someone is guilty and throwing him into the sea—obviously that is forbidden. But that’s not because there is some prohibition about lotteries. And beyond that, the whole problem with a lottery is that you don’t know whether it fell on the right person. That is why you need to do it three times, as we just read. But for Siamese twins that is irrelevant. The lot in Jonah was a different kind of lot. It was a lot meant to identify the person because of whom the storm had come. Who says the lot landed on the right person, even if such a person exists? Who says so? How do you know that this lot hit the right person? Who says the hand of the Holy One guided the lot onto the person it should fall on? Maybe it was just random, I don’t know, maybe something else intervened there. You can’t rely on that—like dreams, right? No dream is without nonsense. You can’t rely on a dream. But in the case of the lot for Siamese twins, you don’t need to rely on any lot in that sense. The lot is not supposed to determine which of them is guilty of something. The lot is completely arbitrary. It is simply that—instead—where do we use lots in Jewish law? For example, partners who want to divide property, or heirs who want to divide money, they cast lots, right? Why do they cast lots? For example, when we have…
[Speaker D] So that each one has equal rights?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When we have two fields that are not equal, okay? One is good and one is poor, and you can’t divide them—they’re small, say each one is only four by four, okay? So they’re not divisible. All right? What do you do when there are two heirs? You draw lots. What’s the rationale behind the lottery? The rationale behind the lottery is not that the Holy One, blessed be He, will reveal to us who deserves the better field, as you’ll often find in books—that’s nonsense. The purpose of the lottery is precisely this: to divide in a place where I can’t divide the property, I divide the chances of winning the property. It’s a division of expected gain. Where I can’t divide the gain itself, I divide the expected gain. So that each person has equal expected gain, not equal gain. The best thing would be equal gain. But where that’s impossible, like in the example I gave earlier, then the most equal way possible is to divide the chances of receiving the larger gain. That’s the most equal division there is. That is the rationale of a lottery. A lottery of this kind—there is absolutely no logic in the world to forbid it. Anyone who says such a thing is forbidden simply doesn’t know what he’s talking about. What kind of thing is that? This is not a lottery that involves “do not practice divination,” some resort to I don’t know what, mystical matters, that the Holy One, blessed be He, will reveal to us who is guilty and who is innocent and who… It has nothing to do with that at all. It’s simply a lottery whose purpose is to divide the chances, that’s all. It’s a sensible, natural, legal way to proceed—on the contrary. I want a lottery like that in which the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene, nothing intervenes, and it gives both of them an equal chance. Only such a lottery is permitted. A lottery that doesn’t give both of them an equal chance—you can’t do that. Same thing with Siamese twins. What happens with Siamese twins? I can’t give each of them half a life. There’s no such thing. One will live and one will die. There’s no way to divide the outcome. So what do I do? I divide the chance of getting the better outcome. That’s the most equal division that can be made in such a case. How do you do it? I hold a lottery over who will remain alive and who will die. That is a division of the chance to receive life, because I can’t divide life itself. It is certainly permitted to do that. Therefore I say: Sefer Hasidim is unrelated to our case in two ways. First, there isn’t even permission to conduct a mystical lottery in a place where there is some indication that such a lottery is relevant. If you know there is a person here who needs to be identified. Even there, the source is a basis for discussion: can such a lottery point me to who is guilty or not guilty? Who says the lottery points to anything? He says that nowadays we also don’t know how to draw lots, and therefore nowadays it is forbidden to do this because we cannot know. But in principle, let’s say we had some clear method for how such a lottery is done, then perhaps it would be permitted where you have a person who is guilty. But where by means of this lottery you are trying to identify someone guilty when it’s not even clear that there is someone guilty here—when there is a general storm at sea—it is forbidden to do, not because there is a prohibition on conducting a lottery. Therefore with Siamese twins there is no problem at all; it is permitted to conduct a lottery where it is useful. There it was forbidden to conduct a lottery because a lottery would not help. But here it certainly helps—it will save one of them. Why should it be forbidden to conduct a lottery? That’s point one. Point two: I say that even if there were a prohibition on conducting a higher, mystical lottery even where the storm was around only one ship, for example in our times when we do not know how to cast lots as Sefer Hasidim says, then in our times even in such a situation it would be forbidden. Because who knows whether this lottery really identifies the right person or not. So let’s say that nowadays it’s impossible to conduct lotteries in both situations. I claim that with Siamese twins it is still permitted to conduct the lottery. Why? Because this is not a lottery that comes to identify some specific one out of the two. It is a lottery that comes to divide the chances equally between them. This is not the kind of lottery regarding which it even makes sense to speak of prohibitions. And asmakhta certainly does not apply here. What is asmakhta? It means there is no real commitment of mind to it. Here there is certainly full commitment of mind, because these two children would no doubt agree if they understood. Because asmakhta means that you don’t truly commit yourself to it. Here there is definitely such commitment—what would they prefer, to die? The only way to gain a fifty-percent chance of being saved is to participate in the lottery. You don’t want to participate in the lottery? Then you are sentencing both yourself and your fellow to death together. So obviously there is full commitment of mind on the part of both of them to participate in the lottery. So there is no problem of asmakhta here, no problem of “do not practice divination,” there is nothing here. What I’m saying is that we do indeed see that, at least among the halakhic decisors, there is reservation about using lots as a way to decide a question. In the case of Siamese twins the lot does not decide any question; it simply divides the chances between them. But where the purpose of the lot is to decide a question, there is reservation about deciding a question in a mystical way. One does not use a lot unless there is some procedure known in some tradition—I don’t know exactly what—but in principle one does not use a lot without that. That’s with a lot of the kind meant to decide questions, not a lot that divides chances. So here again is an example of looking at the mystical dimension of lotteries, in the sense that there are lotteries that in fact resort to mystical planes. I believe that the lot will reveal something to me that I cannot identify on my own. That is a mystical use of a lot. But there is a completely natural and logical use of a lot that has nothing to do with mysticism at all. Simply an equal division of chances in order to divide property, or in order to separate Siamese twins, or things of that kind. Okay, for now let’s stop here. Any comments or…?
[Speaker F] Can I ask a question not necessarily connected to the class? Yes, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe one more remark—just one more remark to close the matter. If I want to conduct a lottery like Jonah—Jonah on the ship—there’s a storm only around their ship, no storm around the other ships, okay? Now I want to cast lots, but this lot involves desecrating the Sabbath or some prohibition. Am I allowed to?
[Speaker B] It could be that not, because this is basically a mystical way of saving, right? And in order to save in a mystical way, we saw earlier that it’s not certain
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that one may violate a prohibition, like with the names. Even if it is mystical, it’s—
[Speaker C] an equal division, it’s a division of chances with—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] with a lot? No, I’m saying that in Jonah’s case it is not a division of chances. With Siamese twins yes; with Siamese twins there’s no problem, because that is not a mystical lot. But the lot on Jonah’s ship is a mystical lot. You want, through the lot, to identify who the sinner is on the ship. I understand. Right, so I’m saying that where this would involve a prohibition, it may be forbidden to do it. That’s just an indication like that, to see how it connects to what I said earlier. Okay, yes. Who wanted to ask? Eliav, you wanted to?
[Speaker D] Yes. I asked on the website and I didn’t understand the answer. When there is a contradiction in the view of Rabbi Shimon Shkop, when there is a contradiction between the theory of law and the Torah’s laws—then what is the status of the money now? For example, someone who lent with interest. So now there was a contract in which they
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] both agreed to lend with interest, all right? The Torah said
[Speaker D] otherwise, so clearly the Torah determines it. No, but in the contract both agreed to lend with interest, all right? So now it is forbidden for the borrower to repay the money with interest. Right. But the money—its legal status—is that it belongs to the lender.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Once the Torah says he is forbidden, then that means he keeps the money with himself, and the Torah says the money belongs to him. The Torah can uproot the theory of law when it does that.
[Speaker D] But why do you get to that? It should be enough just to say that the money still belongs to the lender
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and he is forbidden to make use of the money. He can’t betroth a woman with it, he can’t buy anything with it—so in what sense does the money remain his? Ownership of the object itself? And what? What will he do with it? He is forbidden to make any use of it.
[Speaker D] He will.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is forbidden to make any use of it.
[Speaker D] He is a robber if he makes use of it. He is holding it by force. He can hold it by force.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he now goes and buys
[Speaker D] with it. No, he can’t. He’s a robber. Why? That’s the question—why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he uses the money, then he is a robber. He is using money that is not his.
[Speaker D] I’m speaking about the lender, right? What? We’re talking about the lender?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, about the borrower. The borrower is supposed to pay interest. Right? The Torah forbids him to pay interest. Okay. So he did not pay the interest; he keeps the money with himself, right? And you say: what do you mean, but the money belongs to the lender because he agreed to lend it to him. So you are saying that any use he now makes of the money is actually robbery? Right. But the Torah says he is allowed to keep the money and is supposed to keep the money and make use of it. So that means the Torah removed the lender’s ownership. When the Torah displaces the theory of law there is no problem. All Rabbi Shimon says is only that when the Torah does not displace it, then the theory of law also has standing. But if the Torah says: here I have a scriptural decree, here the theory of law does not apply—it is not valid.
[Speaker D] For some reason I remember that Rabbi Shimon Shkop writes that if the lender comes by force and takes the money from the borrower, then the money belongs to him. Because in its legal status, in reality, the money really belongs to the lender; it’s just that the Torah forbids him to return it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember him writing such a thing; in any case, I don’t agree.
[Speaker D] But how can one argue against this point?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The moment the Torah allows me to keep the money and make use of it, that means the Torah does not see me as a robber. And if that is so, it means the Torah removed the lender’s ownership. It transferred the money to me.
[Speaker D] Okay, and if I answer you that no—in fact the Torah did not want to nullify the lender’s ownership, the money still belongs to the lender, only the Torah forbade returning the money. To the borrower?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we have not found such a thing anywhere. The money remains with him and he does with it whatever he wants.
[Speaker D] Okay, I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, Sabbath peace. Goodbye.
[Speaker D] Sabbath peace.