Ketubot Chapter 2, Lesson 43

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

Abaye’s reading of Rabbi Yochanan’s statement in the case of one witness
The Ran’s difficulty, and that of the medieval authorities, with the presumption of a married woman built from the witnesses
The Ran’s answer: a dispute over “closer to him” and “closer to her,” not a contradiction that necessarily implies lying
The Shulchan Arukh’s ruling and the implications of the three situations
Maimonides’ wording in the laws of divorce and the possibility that he disagrees with the Ran
Law 10 in Maimonides: “this one says, ‘this is my wife,’ and this one says, ‘this is my wife,’” and the dispute over how to understand the reason
The Mahaneh Ephraim’s approach: disqualification due to falsehood is not retroactive, and only takes effect after the span of immediate speech
The passage in Bava Batra and the question of testimony partially invalidated through contradiction
Rabbi David Povar sky’s objections and a defense of the Ran’s interpretation in Maimonides

Summary

General Overview

The lecture sets up Abaye’s explanation of Rabbi Yochanan’s statement in a case of two individual witnesses who contradict one another about a divorce, and examines whether combining them creates the presumption that the woman is married or whether the contradiction prevents that. The Ran, along with all the medieval authorities quoted in the Shitah Mekubetzet, asks how one can establish the presumption of a married woman based on their testimony when they contradict each other, and answers with an interpretive setup involving a possible mistake in “closer to him” and “closer to her,” so that neither is considered a liar. Against this, the lecture presents Maimonides’ wording and the Mahaneh Ephraim’s understanding that Maimonides combines them even in a direct, frontal contradiction. The Mahaneh Ephraim resolves this through the rule that disqualification due to falsehood does not apply retroactively, but only after the span of immediate speech, so the first testimony about her being a married woman remains in force. Later the lecture brings sharp objections from Rabbi David Povar sky and Rabbi Shimon Shkop from the passage in Bava Batra and from the discussion of “testimony that is partially invalidated is entirely invalidated,” and explores ways of defending the Mahaneh Ephraim, among them distinguishing between contradiction of one witness against one witness and a two-against-two case.

Abaye’s reading of Rabbi Yochanan’s statement in the case of one witness

Abaye explains Rabbi Yochanan’s statement in a case of one witness: one witness says she was divorced, and one witness says she was not divorced. Abaye rules that both are testifying that she is a married woman, and so a presumption is created that she is married, while the witness who says she was divorced is treated as one witness, and the words of one witness do not stand against two. Abaye explains that both agree she had been a married woman, and the dispute is only about the divorce, so she remains under that presumption.

The Ran’s difficulty, and that of the medieval authorities, with the presumption of a married woman built from the witnesses

The Ran, in the name of many medieval authorities, says that the woman does not stand under the presumption of being a married woman except by the word of these witnesses, because if it were known independently that she was married, there would be no need to say that both are testifying she is a married woman. The Ran asks how one can place her under the presumption of a married woman based on them when they contradict each other, since necessarily one of them is disqualified. The Ran connects this to the law in the chapter “All Who Take Oaths,” that two groups of witnesses that contradict one another are not combined by taking one witness from this group and one witness from that group, because either way one of the combined pair is certainly a liar. The lecture mentions the dispute between the Sma and Rabbi Akiva Eiger as to whether from such a combination at least one witness remains for imposing an oath, or whether there is not even one witness here because of the rule of “found to include a relative or a disqualified witness,” and also Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s citation from Tosafot in Sanhedrin that the rule of “found to include a relative or disqualified witness” applies only when the disqualification is known.

The Ran’s answer: a dispute over “closer to him” and “closer to her,” not a contradiction that necessarily implies lying

The Ran rejects the difficulty and explains the passage as referring to a case where both agree there was a divorce, but they disagree whether it was “closer to him” or “closer to her.” The Ran explains that in such a case people can make mistakes, and therefore neither of them is disqualified, because there is no necessity that one is lying; rather, one may have erred in assessing where the bill of divorce landed. The Ran thus draws a distinction between a contradiction that carries certainty of falsehood and a contradiction that may stem from possible error, so the testimony they combine on—that she is a married woman—remains valid. The lecture concludes that according to the Ran, if the contradiction had been direct regarding the very existence of the divorce, in a way that requires one to be a liar, then they could not have been combined for testimony that she is a married woman, and from the standpoint of the religious court she would be treated as an unmarried woman.

The Shulchan Arukh’s ruling and the implications of the three situations

The Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer, rules that if one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced, she may not marry. The Shulchan Arukh distinguishes that when she had no presumption of being a married woman other than based on them, and there is contradiction in their testimony such that one says she was divorced and one says there had never even been a doubtful divorce situation, she may marry from the outset. The Shulchan Arukh also brings that if both testify that she is a married woman and that he threw her a bill of divorce, but one says it fell closer to him and one says it fell closer to her, then even if she married she must leave, in line with the Ran’s framework. The lecture emphasizes that this structure yields three laws: a situation where the presumption of being a married woman predates the witnesses, a situation where the presumption is created only through them but the contradiction is direct and therefore no presumption is created, and a situation where the presumption is created through them and the contradiction is the kind that can result from error, in which case Rabbi Yochanan’s law applies.

Maimonides’ wording in the laws of divorce and the possibility that he disagrees with the Ran

In chapter 12, law 9, Maimonides writes: “A woman who had not been established as a married woman, and one witness came and said, ‘She had been a married woman and was divorced,’ and one witness came and said, ‘She was not divorced’—behold, both testify that she is a married woman, and one testifies that she is divorced, and the statement of one is of no effect in the place of two; therefore she may not marry, and if she married she must leave.” The lecture points to a nuance in his wording: the second witness says only “she was not divorced,” and raises the possibility that Maimonides abbreviated, but notes that on the face of it Maimonides does not distinguish between types of contradiction. The lecture suggests that the initial reading is that Maimonides combines the witnesses even when they truly contradict each other head-on, unlike the Ran’s interpretive setup, which limits the contradiction to a case of possible error.

Law 10 in Maimonides: “this one says, ‘this is my wife,’ and this one says, ‘this is my wife,’” and the dispute over how to understand the reason

In law 10, Maimonides describes a woman and two men who came from another country: this one says, “This is my wife and this is my slave,” and that one says, “This is my wife and this is my slave,” while the woman says, “They are both my slaves.” He rules that she is permitted to anyone, since each one testified for himself and therefore they are not believed. The Mahaneh Ephraim understands from Maimonides that the reason they are not believed is that each one has a personal interest and is testifying for himself, and infers that had they testified about another man’s married woman, she would have been established as a married woman even though they contradicted each other. The lecture offers an alternative reading of law 10, according to which the phrase “since each one testified for himself” can be understood as a principle similar to the Ran’s argument—that the contradiction over who the husband is prevents combining them for testimony that she is a married woman—and not as a ruling that one may combine them in a direct contradiction.

The Mahaneh Ephraim’s approach: disqualification due to falsehood is not retroactive, and only takes effect after the span of immediate speech

The Mahaneh Ephraim argues that Maimonides speaks even of witnesses who truly contradict one another directly, and he resolves the Ran’s difficulty by saying that the witness was still not disqualified at the time he testified that she was a married woman, because disqualification due to falsehood takes effect only after the span of immediate speech. The Mahaneh Ephraim says: “In what was contradicted, it was contradicted”—that is, regarding the divorce—but in what was not contradicted, their testimony remains. He rejects applying the rule “testimony partially invalidated is entirely invalidated,” arguing that in contradiction there is no definite cancellation of part of the testimony, as there is in refutation by proving the witnesses were elsewhere; rather there is a state of doubt, which does not invalidate the other parts of the testimony. The lecture formulates the logic that there is a difference between declaring a witness legally disqualified as a formal status and assessing a concern that he may be lying, and presents the possibility that even if one lied in the divorce component there is no reason to assume he lied in the shared component that she is a married woman.

The passage in Bava Batra and the question of testimony partially invalidated through contradiction

The Mahaneh Ephraim brings proof from the chapter “Presumptive Ownership” in Bava Batra, in the case where one says, “It belonged to my ancestors and I ate its produce for the years of presumption,” and the other says, “It belonged to my ancestors and I ate its produce for the years of presumption.” Rav Nachman says: granted they were contradicted regarding the eating, but were they contradicted regarding the ancestry?—and he accepts the testimony about the ancestors. The lecture shows that the Talmud there continues and ties this to the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda, and brings Rava’s position that according to Rav Huna, this group may come by itself and testify and that group may come by itself and testify for another testimony, but not for the same testimony. The lecture presents the possibility of distinguishing between a two-against-two case and one witness against one witness, and also distinguishing between the invalidation of testimony through formal refutation and non-acceptance because of contradiction. Rabbi Shimon Shkop concludes that although the way the Mahaneh Ephraim brings the proof is difficult, according to his formulation there is room for his words, especially in a structure where contradiction by one witness does not turn the witness’s statement into a “doubtful statement” in the same way as a two-against-two case.

Rabbi David Povar sky’s objections and a defense of the Ran’s interpretation in Maimonides

Rabbi David Povar sky writes that the words of the Mahaneh Ephraim are difficult, because in Bava Batra it seems that according to Rav Chisda, even in contradiction we say that testimony partially invalidated is entirely invalidated. Rabbi David argues that here, even according to Rav Huna, the situation is similar to Rav Chisda, because they are combining two witnesses who contradict each other into one testimony, and Rav Huna also concedes that this is ineffective. Rabbi David also rejects the Mahaneh Ephraim’s inference from Maimonides in law 10, and argues that Maimonides specifically framed the case where each one testifies for himself in order to teach that although testimony about oneself is not testimony, nevertheless a contradiction is created that does not allow combination. The lecture concludes that in any case, the Shitah Mekubetzet in the name of the students of the Rashba offers an answer similar to the Mahaneh Ephraim’s: retroactively they are not disqualified, and the testimony about the marriage is different testimony from the testimony about the divorce. In that way a framework is built that allows combination regarding the woman’s status as a married woman even when the contradiction is revealed only afterward concerning the divorce.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the previous lecture we saw the different possibilities for explaining Rabbi Yochanan’s statement, and afterward a similar baraita that also brings in the issue of betrothal.

[Speaker B] This is on page 85.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. One second, I’m going to mute, because I see there’s noise here. And Abaye explains Rabbi Yochanan’s statement in a case of one witness, right? In the latter clause: one witness says she was divorced and one witness says she was not divorced. That’s the second part of Abaye’s statement. Both are testifying that she is a married woman, and the one who says she was divorced is just one witness, and the words of one witness do not stand in the place of two. Meaning, there is one witness who says she was divorced and one witness who says she was not divorced, so basically both agree that she had been a married woman, and therefore we now have a presumption created that she is a married woman, and now one of them claims she was divorced, the other contradicts him and says she was not divorced, so she remains in that same presumption. One says she was divorced, but the words of one witness do not stand in the place of two. That’s what Abaye claims. On this the Ran asks—and really this is all the medieval authorities in the Shitah Mekubetzet; there are the Ritva, the Ra’ah, Nachmanides, and all of them in the name of Tosafot bring this. I pointed you to the Ran, but that’s just one example. “One witness says she was divorced.” From the fact that this language is used, it follows that she is not standing under the presumption of being a married woman except by the word of these witnesses. In other words, it’s not that it was already known to us that she was a married woman and now one says she was divorced and the other contradicts him and says she was not divorced. Rather, the fact that we treat her as a married woman is because of the two testimonies of these two witnesses. They have a kind of “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”—meaning, they are the ones who gave us the information that this woman is a married woman; it wasn’t known to us without them. That’s how he introduces it and says it. There’s some discussion about this among the medieval authorities, but in the end, from what I saw, it seems they all agree. Because that’s what “both are testifying that she is a married woman” means. The point is that both agree she had been a married woman; the dispute is whether she got divorced. If we know she is a married woman even without them, then why do I care whether both of them agree that she is a married woman? That’s irrelevant. Therefore the medieval authorities say we are dealing here with a case where I don’t have that information without them. The only reason I treat her as a married woman is because of their testimony. Now after that introduction, the Ran asks: “And if you say so, how can she be established under the presumption of being a married woman based on them?” How can we place her under the presumption of being a married woman on the basis of their testimony? After all, since they contradict one another, necessarily one of them is disqualified. They contradict each other—one says she was divorced, one says she was not divorced—so one of the two is certainly a liar. Like in the two-against-two cases we saw. So if that’s true, how can we combine them as two witnesses that she is a married woman? One of them, whichever way you look at it, is a liar. And that’s what he says: for this reason we say in the chapter “All Who Take Oaths,” the Talmud we saw when we studied the topic of two against two, that two groups of witnesses that contradict one another—this group may come by itself and testify, and that group may come by itself and testify, but not one witness from this group and one witness from that group. We saw there this nuance in Rashi and in the Ritva, where they say “this group may come…” The law follows the dispute between Rav Chisda and Rav Huna. Rav Huna says this group may come by itself and testify, and that group may come by itself and testify, because each group is presumed valid. Rav Chisda says not. Rav Chisda argues there is no presumption of validity here. We saw there two possibilities: there’s the Ri Migash and the Rashbam—this is a self-contradictory pair, so you don’t uphold them under a presumption of validity. But even Rav Huna, who says that each group may come by itself and testify, is careful to say that this is only when each group comes by itself and testifies. But if one witness from this group and one witness from that group come together as witnesses for another case, here we will not accept that testimony. Here, whichever way you look at it, there is only one valid witness and one disqualified witness. And I remind you that we saw a dispute between the Sma and Rabbi Akiva Eiger on whether in such a case we treat this as one witness, or whether there is not even one witness here. Because it may be that the rule of “found among them a relative or a disqualified witness” applies. Once one of them is a liar, he is disqualified, and then he also disqualifies the witness who is with him, and in that way we are left with no witnesses at all. The practical difference is with respect to imposing an oath. Meaning, do two such witnesses whom we do not accept still at least leave us with one witness, so that they would obligate the defendant to take an oath? But Rabbi Akiva Eiger argues—what are you talking about?—there is the rule of “found among them a relative or disqualified witness.” Sorry, that was the Sma. Rabbi Akiva Eiger argues—wait… sorry, that was Rabbi Akiva Eiger. But the Sma says no, that the rule of “found among them a relative or disqualified witness” doesn’t apply… no wait… no, Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that the rule of “found among them a relative or disqualified witness” does not apply in such a case, and therefore there is one witness here. The Sma says they do not impose an oath; there is not even one witness here. And Rabbi Akiva Eiger brings a Tosafot in Sanhedrin that says the rule of “found among them a relative or disqualified witness” applies only if the disqualification is known. And here we know that one of them is a liar, but we don’t know who. We can’t point to the disqualified witness. In such a case the rule of “found among them a relative or disqualified witness” does not apply. We saw all of that when we studied the topic of two against two. But for our purposes it doesn’t matter. Whether we count it as one witness or as nothing, clearly it is not two witnesses. Right? That’s clear. Now here in the Talmud it says it is two witnesses. Here there is a witness contradicting a witness. We combine both of them regarding the issue of divorce—of course there it is contradiction—but regarding her status as a married woman, we combine both of them, even though one of them, whichever way you look at it, is a liar. So the Ran asks: how can that be? What does it mean that “both are testifying that she is a married woman”? One of them is a liar; there aren’t two witnesses here.

[Speaker C] Still, one of them is a liar, but that’s not the same thing, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] In the case of two against two, they’re basically testifying against each other.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. In the case of two against two they testify about a case. Two say the judge is disqualified and two say the judge is valid.

[Speaker C] Right, right. But practically what’s happening is that they are testifying about each other that one of them is apparently a liar.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, same here too.

[Speaker C] But here it’s one witness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but they’re still testifying about each other that they’re liars.

[Speaker C] But it’s one witness, so why count him as a liar?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, whichever way you look at it? It has nothing to do with witnesses. There is a contradiction between them. One of them is a liar, not because the other presents him as a liar, but because there is a contradiction in what they say. They both can’t be telling the truth. Factually, one is lying—that’s logical. It has nothing to do with testimony. Either she was divorced or she wasn’t divorced; there aren’t two possibilities here. He becomes disqualified not because the other witness disqualifies him. He becomes disqualified because we know he is a liar.

[Speaker D] They’re both potentially disqualified. It’s not that one is actually disqualified, because we don’t know which one it is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t know which one, but it’s clear to us that one of them is.

[Speaker B] So if there’s only one, they don’t combine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t know which one, but we know that one out of the two is. Fine, we’ll come back to that point. I think this comment is in fact a good comment—Noa’s comment—but for now I pushed it aside; we’ll leave it for later. The Ran says: I have a question…

[Speaker E] I have a conceptual question. I mean, every time people raise this point of one witness from each group and then discuss… after all, it can’t be that they would accept one witness. On the face of it, it sounds like the testimony has no support if it’s just one witness. I don’t understand. I mean, every time I see that if you take one witness, then one witness on the face of it has no backing for his testimony.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So?

[Speaker E] So why do they raise that point at all? Why even bring the possibility that there’s only one witness?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because regarding her status as a married woman they do combine. There are two witnesses here with respect to the fact that she is a married woman. Both witnesses agree that she is a married woman. The two groups…

[Speaker E] Not groups—two witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Abaye sets it up as one witness against one witness. And this one says that she… a married woman. One says she was divorced and one says she wasn’t divorced, right? So now both agree that she is a married woman. So I have two witnesses about the fact that she is a married woman. Now regarding whether she was divorced, I only have one witness. One witness can’t override two.

[Speaker E] Yes, okay, that’s fine. It was in Maimonides, but okay, fine. I’ll write it differently. Okay, never mind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the Ran answers. He says as follows: this is no difficulty. By the way, they all answer this—the Ritva, Nachmanides, the Ra’ah, and the Ran. Incidentally, this is the same school of thought. Nachmanides is the first; after him came the Ra’ah, who was one of his students; the Ritva was a student of the Ra’ah; and the Ran was roughly the same generation as the Ritva, maybe a little later, and also among the students of Nachmanides. So these are all Spanish sages from the same school. So the Ran says: this is no difficulty, because the case can be set up where both agree that there was a divorce, but they disagree whether it was “closer to him” or “closer to her.” And in such a case people can make mistakes, as I wrote above; therefore one of them is not disqualified. What does he mean?

[Speaker B] They have no disagreement over the first half—the basic part of the divorce. Both agree there was a divorce.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I didn’t hear.

[Speaker B] In the first part they both agree there was a divorce. Yes. They only argue over whether it was closer to him or closer to her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he threw the bill of divorce and it landed somewhere, one witness thinks it fell closer to her, and then she’s divorced. The other witness thinks it fell closer to the husband, and then she isn’t divorced. So they’re not arguing about the facts; they’re arguing about their assessment of the reality. And here it’s entirely possible that one of them simply made a mistake, or didn’t see properly—not because he lied. In such a case he is not disqualified. So regarding the testimony whether she is divorced or not, of course this is contradiction. There it doesn’t matter whether he lied or not. Bottom line, one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced—there is contradiction. But regarding the question whether she is a married woman, there they both testified that she is a married woman, and we have no proof that one of them is a liar. It may be that neither one is a liar; one of them just didn’t see correctly exactly where the bill of divorce fell. The Ran says: in such a case you cannot conclude that one of them is a liar, and therefore I can accept both of them as two witnesses to the fact that she is a married woman. It follows from his words that if there really were a contradiction between the two witnesses—one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced—not just a disagreement about where the bill of divorce fell, then what would the law be?

[Speaker F] She isn’t a married woman, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She isn’t a married woman at all. Not only that—I mean, it’s not that I accept the testimony that she was divorced. I don’t need the testimony that she was divorced, because I don’t even treat her as a married woman in the first place. Okay? That’s what comes out of the Ran. And indeed, as we said, this is a very dangerous conclusion.

[Speaker B] What?

[Speaker D] What the Ran wanted to do was basically find a case that fits what the Talmud says: on the one hand, she must leave in a case of divorce where two witnesses come, but on the other hand, it shouldn’t be a case of two witnesses who contradict each other. So he basically set up the case not as a real contradiction, but as an error in assessment, not an incorrect fact.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there is contradiction here, but there isn’t a certain liar here.

[Speaker B] They contradict each other, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There isn’t one here who is definitely lying.

[Speaker B] You can’t conclude that one of them is a liar. So he isn’t disqualified.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So it’s clear that regarding the divorce, it makes no difference, because at the end of the day they contradict each other; I have no way to decide. One says there was a divorce and one says there wasn’t. But since in a contradiction of this kind I cannot conclude that one of them is a liar, I have no problem attaching both of them as two witnesses to the fact that she is a married woman. Because I have no proof that one of them is a liar.

[Speaker B] But why decide that she’s unmarried?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] If there’s doubt whether she’s a married woman, then why treat her as if she’s unmarried? Why? Why should she be considered a married woman? I don’t understand. After all, there are still two people saying a certain fact, so why not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which case are you talking about? The Ran’s case? In the Ran’s case she really is a married woman. Not unmarried—a married woman. What do you mean?

[Speaker E] No, she means…

[Speaker B] Before his answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand the question.

[Speaker B] You’re saying that if they…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced, they cannot combine regarding her status as a married woman.

[Speaker B] Right, right. And then she is considered unmarried. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So…

[Speaker B] I’m saying that’s a very dangerous conclusion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “dangerous” mean? That’s the reality. I have no witnesses that she is a married woman, so what exactly am I supposed to rule about her?

[Speaker B] But do you have testimony that she’s unmarried?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t need witnesses that she’s unmarried.

[Speaker B] An unmarried woman remains in her prior presumption.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Every woman is unmarried unless there is testimony that she is a married woman.

[Speaker B] If the truth is that she is a married woman…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then she herself knows that truth and she ought to be concerned. But I, as a religious court, can’t function without evidence. I have no evidence, I have no testimony that she is a married woman, so she isn’t. Okay? People are mixing in here a bit what she herself says. If she herself says she is a married woman, then there is a self-imposed prohibition—this comes up in the medieval authorities—but I’m not getting into that right now. Let’s assume she herself says she is unmarried. Okay. Look in the Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer; it brings this law as follows: if one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced, she may not marry. And if she did marry—if she had already been under the presumption of being a married woman—she must leave in every case. What does that mean? If she had been under the presumption of being a married woman independently of the witnesses. But if she had not been under the presumption of being a married woman except by their testimony—only because of their testimony—then if there is contradiction in their testimony, for example, one says she was divorced and one says there was never any doubtful divorce situation at all, no bill of divorce was ever thrown, then she may marry from the outset. That is what the Ran says. And if both testify that she is a married woman, but that he threw her a bill of divorce—both also say he threw her a bill of divorce—and one says it fell closer to him and one says it fell closer to her, then even if she married she must leave. That is what the Ran says, right? Meaning, this is basically a summary of the Ran’s words. Okay? If we want to write this as practical Jewish law, that’s what we should do. Okay? If there is a presumption, then three laws emerge from here. In the Talmud only one law is written, but out of the Ran’s discussion three laws really emerge. Out of the Ran’s introduction—this introduction here, see? This introduction—“it follows that she is not under the presumption of being a married woman except by the word of these witnesses.”

[Speaker B] Or…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other words, if she had already been under the presumption of being a married woman even without these witnesses, then of course she is a married woman and she must leave, and there is no question. Our whole discussion begins when her presumption of being a married woman exists only on the basis of these two witnesses. So that is the first law in the Shulchan Arukh. Now, if she is under the presumption of being a married woman because of them, once again it depends, and that’s what the Ran says in the next two sections. If both directly contradict each other over whether there was or was not a divorce, then they cannot combine on the point that she is even a married woman at all, and she is unmarried. Okay? “She may marry from the outset”—that is what the Shulchan Arukh says. Not just that if she married she need not leave. She may marry from the outset, because from our standpoint she is unmarried. But if there is a contradiction between them of the sort in which there is no certain falsehood in one of them, then that is Rabbi Yochanan’s law: she may not marry, and even if she married she must leave. In divorce. In a case of death, if she married she need not leave, right? We saw that. Okay, so that’s the Shulchan Arukh. Why is this Shulchan Arukh important? Beyond the fact that it summarizes the laws, you saw the Mahaneh Ephraim. The Mahaneh Ephraim learns Maimonides differently. He argues that Maimonides disagrees with the Ran. We’ll see that in a moment. And then—

[Speaker F] Doesn’t he need to argue that he simply rules like the Ran?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a second. We’ll see in a second. But you have to notice that if the Shulchan Arukh had really read Maimonides that way, it’s unlikely he would have brought the law in the way he does. Because when there’s Maimonides, usually the Shulchan Arukh follows him. It’s unlikely that the Shulchan Arukh would bring the Ran against Maimonides and not even mention Maimonides as “there are those who say.” He rules like the Ran, period. It seems the Shulchan Arukh holds that this law is agreed upon—that is, or at least agreed upon by Maimonides. It could be that there is some medieval authority here or there who says otherwise; later we’ll see that there is. But regarding Maimonides himself, it is very likely that the Shulchan Arukh did not read him the way the Mahaneh Ephraim did. He apparently understood that Maimonides too learned like the Ran. Maybe because he understood the Ran’s objections. Because in Maimonides’ wording it really doesn’t look like that, but we’ll see in a moment. So that’s the only reason I’m bringing the Shulchan Arukh here—to give the impression that at least from his perspective it seems Maimonides too should agree with this. So let’s now look at Maimonides. In chapter 12, law 9—there he brings this very law: “A woman who had not been established as a married woman”—you see? He goes straight to the second case, where she had not been established as a married woman—“and one witness came and said, ‘She had been a married woman and was divorced,’ and one witness came and said, ‘She was not divorced,’ behold, both testify that she is a married woman.” By the way, Maimonides is very precise in his language—notice. The first witness said, “She had been a married woman and was divorced,” and one witness came and said, “She was not divorced.” What does “she was not divorced” mean? Maybe she wasn’t a married woman at all? I didn’t see that she was divorced. It’s a little strange. He should have said: one witness came and said, “She had been a married woman and was not divorced,” or “She is a married woman and was not divorced.” Right? Maimonides specifies “she had been a married woman” specifically in the language of the witness who says she was divorced. Now the witness who says she was divorced obviously means she had been a married woman. That’s just an interesting point because—

[Speaker B] But why speak about an unmarried woman in terms of divorce? I don’t understand. Why say “she was not divorced” if she’s unmarried?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because one witness came and said that she—

[Speaker D] —was divorced, and then another witness came and answered, “What are you talking about? She was never divorced.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. The second witness contradicts the first. Fine, I’m saying again, if—

[Speaker D] —witnesses came saying she is a married woman—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what comes out, but in Maimonides’ wording there is a little room to discuss it, because usually he is precise in his language. And here somehow he specifically omits the matter that she had been a married woman, precisely in the witness where there was more reason to mention it. Yes. Because in the first witness, from the fact that he says she was divorced, it is obvious that he said she had been a married woman. She can’t get divorced without that. But if a witness says she was not divorced, there was room to say that then it is not correct to say that “both are testifying that she is a married woman.” That’s the point. Yes. Because the second witness never explicitly said that she is a married woman. It could be that Maimonides is simply brief in his wording and means to say: she had been a married woman and was divorced, and the second says the same thing except that she was not divorced. Meaning, he doesn’t spell it out, but his intention is that she is a married woman and not… probably. Fine. I remind you, by the way, that in the passage about splitting a statement that we touched on, we discussed the question of the difference between when we split things actually said in the witness’s sentence, and something said versus something that is implicit in what he says, like here. When a witness says “she was divorced,” even if he doesn’t say “she had been a married woman,” obviously included within that is that she had been a married woman. Now if we need to do some kind of splitting, then the question is whether we also split in such a case, or whether we split only when he said both things explicitly: “she had been a married woman and was divorced”—I accept the first and I do not accept the second. We saw that in the passage about splitting a statement. I’m saying here it’s less important. In any event, that is what Maimonides says: behold, both testify that she is a married woman, and one testifies that she is divorced, and the words of one are of no use in the place of two. And therefore she may not marry, and if she married she must leave. So he brings the law of the Shulchan Arukh, but he doesn’t even hint at the type of contradiction between the witnesses. On the contrary: one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced. He doesn’t say one says it was closer to him and one says it was closer to her. He doesn’t qualify and say “provided that one of them is not a liar.” Therefore, in Maimonides’ language, on the simple reading—again, that’s also how it appears in the Talmud itself—the Talmud says it that way too, and Maimonides is bringing the Talmud’s language. But in the Talmud we’re already used to the fact that it formulates things briefly and leaves it to the medieval and later authorities to provide interpretations and forced readings and explanations. Maimonides is a codifier. A codifier is supposed to speak clearly. And if according to Maimonides there is a legal difference between a direct contradiction—meaning one of them is a liar—and a non-direct contradiction, he should have said so. If Maimonides is silent and doesn’t say it, and simply says one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced, how am I supposed to read that? Obviously: one says she was divorced and one says she wasn’t divorced, period. Meaning, he disagrees with the Ran. Right? It seems from Maimonides’ words… sorry?

[Speaker B] You can read it as saying they combine. According to Maimonides, they combine.

[Speaker D] On a simple reading he disagrees with the Ran, though you can read it differently. But the initial reading is definitely that he disagrees with the Ran.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To read it differently would mean saying…

[Speaker D] Maybe “she was not divorced”—maybe she was never married at all? Then she wasn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that. Maimonides explicitly says not that, because he says “behold, both testify that she is a married woman.” So—

[Speaker B] The contradiction is when there’s one witness and another one witness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] When he says one witness came and said such-and-such, and then another witness came and said such-and-such, there’s already a hint there to… to the solution we saw at the end. What…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] Rabbi Shimon Shkop.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, let’s hold off on that for a second. Right now I’m first talking about whether Maimonides disagrees with the Ran. In the simple understanding, it seems he does.

[Speaker B] According to Maimonides they combine. According to Maimonides they combine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, unlike the Ran. No—the Ran too says they combine, but they combine only where one of them is not a liar.

[Speaker B] The Ran gives a forced reading.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And from Maimonides it doesn’t seem that he distinguishes between these two types of contradiction. It seems that in every case where there is contradiction—even a direct contradiction where one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced—even then they combine for testimony that she is a married woman. That is the simple sense of his wording; it is very hard to explain it otherwise. Very hard to explain otherwise. Maimonides is precise in his language, and Maimonides is a codifier; he’s not the Talmud. The Talmud is open to interpretations. Maimonides is supposed to write as clearly as possible. Maimonides is supposed to formulate exactly what he means. Therefore it seems rather clearly from Maimonides’ wording that he disagrees with the Ran. In law 10 too—that’s what the Mahaneh Ephraim brings—in law 10 Maimonides says as follows. It’s a particularly amusing case: “the lady of two masters,” so to speak. A woman and two men who came from another country. This one says, “This is my wife and this is my slave,” and that one says, “This is my wife and this is my slave”—meaning each says about the other that he is a slave. And the woman says: “They are both my slaves.” Best situation for her. I’m completely unmarried, and they’re both my slaves. Let them stop bothering me. What’s so bad about that, from the woman’s standpoint?

[Speaker B] What? Bad for the woman? Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is a woman—you know the saying that a good wife does her husband’s will? The opposite. A good wife makes her husband’s will. Meaning she determines what he will want. She determines what he will want. Okay, so “behold, she is permitted to anyone, even though both had established her as a married woman, since each one testified for himself, they are not believed.”

[Speaker B] But she also testified about herself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] She also testified about herself that they are both her slaves. So why does that matter?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does what matter?

[Speaker B] After all, she isn’t testifying about herself. She’s testifying that she is unmarried, that she isn’t married to either of them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What interests us here is not who is whose slave. That’s another matter. We are talking about the question whether she is a married woman.

[Speaker B] Right, but why does it matter if she says, “I’m not the wife of either of them—they are my slaves”? Right, right. So why, when she testifies about herself, do we accept it, but when they testify…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t need to accept—

[Speaker B] No—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —we don’t need to accept her testimony. She isn’t testifying about herself. She isn’t testifying about herself.

[Speaker B] If she had said “this is my husband,” you would ask that. After all, she didn’t say “this one and this one are my husbands.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She isn’t testifying about herself in any way. Even if she hadn’t opened her mouth, she would still be unmarried. We don’t need her testimony. There is no testimony that she is a married woman; automatically she is unmarried. Now how does Maimonides explain this? The Mahaneh Ephraim comments on this. How does Maimonides explain it?

[Speaker D] Because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because each one is testifying for himself.

[Speaker D] Everyone has an interest in the matter, so they can’t be… they basically are interested parties, and can’t testify.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s one possibility, though I thought of another possibility. One can understand this Maimonides differently. “Since each one testified for himself”—what does that mean? True, they both testify that she is a married woman, but each one testifies that she is the married woman of someone else. In this case, himself, because that’s the case. But that’s what Maimonides is saying: therefore they do not combine. Exactly the Ran’s argument. The Ran’s argument says that here clearly one of them is a liar, right? Do you agree? After all, clearly one of them is lying.

[Speaker D] At least one of them is lying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, at least one of them is lying, yes. So how can you combine both of them into testimony that she is a married woman? Exactly like our case with the Ran, with the contradiction where one is lying. It could be that what Maimonides is saying is not because he is an interested party testifying for himself, but because each one testifies about himself that she is his wife. The point is: about a different husband. In this case it is himself, because that’s the case, but it’s not because he is disqualified because it’s testimony about himself. Basically, the question is whether this is… I’ll tell you more than that. If a person testifies about himself that he is the woman’s husband, then we should have to split the statement. Right? You remember the passage about splitting a statement? When I testify about myself, the part in which I testify about myself is erased, okay? And what remains is the other part of my testimony. So here they testify: “She is my wife.” The part that says I am the husband—we erase that, because I testified about myself—but I am still claiming that she is a married woman. And the second witness goes through the same process. So what’s the problem? There are two witnesses here that she is a married woman. Therefore I argue that it is entirely possible that what Maimonides is saying here is the Ran’s claim: since there is a contradiction between them over who the husband is, this is not a problem of personal interest in testimony, but a problem that since, whichever way you look at it, one of them is a liar, you cannot combine both of them into one set of witnesses that she is a married woman. One of the two is lying. Exactly like the case of one saying she was divorced and one saying she was not divorced, according to the Ran. And then, of course, it follows from this that Maimonides is exactly like the Ran. Exactly. Right? But the Mahaneh Ephraim did not learn it that way.

[Speaker B] So that explains the Shulchan Arukh, why he thought that Maimonides too…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? It could very well be that that’s how the Shulchan Arukh understood it, although I’ll say again: in Jewish law 9 it’s a forced reading. Because in Jewish law 9 he writes it without qualification; he doesn’t distinguish between different kinds of contradiction between the witnesses. It somehow looks like he’s stating a general rule. But from that Jewish law, I don’t know, good question. So the Machaneh Ephraim claims this. The Machaneh Ephraim, yes, Rabbi Ephraim Navon, one of the sages of Turkey in the 18th century, I think, something like that. By the way, at the beginning of the modern era there was enormous flourishing in Turkey. Enormous flourishing in Torah scholarship following the expulsion from Spain—the entire Eastern Roman Empire, Greece, Turkey, and into the Middle East, there was a tremendous Torah boom. Sephardic sages arrived there, including the Shulchan Arukh and his uncle, yes, Rabbi Yitzhak Karo and others. When was that?

[Speaker B] Yes, yes, and the Rivash too, and others.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And they dispersed throughout the world, and there was a period when Turkey simply had some of the heaviest hitters around. Michtav Me’Eliyahu, Rabbi Eliyahu Alfandari, Michtav Me’Eliyahu. There’s the Machaneh Ephraim, which is an extremely important book, considered one of the most important later authorities (Acharonim), the Machaneh Ephraim. So he has one section that is notes on Maimonides, and he has another section—Rabbi Chaim Palagi, there were various figures—he has one section that is novellae on Maimonides, and another section that is numbered sections on various halakhic topics. Okay? So here this is the Laws of Testimony in Maimonides; this is the Laws of Testimony of the Machaneh Ephraim, because in Maimonides it goes according to the chapters and laws of Maimonides. When it says Machaneh Ephraim, section 6—you just don’t have the books, I send you the excerpts; I feel obligated to complete your education in this matter. So when it says section 6, it means the Laws of Testimony in the Machaneh Ephraim, not in Maimonides, because there there are numbered sections, section 6. So he writes as follows: “We read in chapter 2 of Ketubot: ‘One witness says there was a condition, and one witness says there was no condition there; both of them testify that it is a valid document, and the one who says there was a condition is only one, and the words of one do not stand against two.’” And he brings a Talmudic passage that we already skipped earlier. And the Talmud says this: there are two witnesses testifying about a document, okay? And one of them says: true, there was a loan document, there was a documented loan, but there was a condition attached to that loan. Okay? And the second says: no, there was a documented loan and there was no condition. The Talmud says: “Both testify to a valid document,” so we have two witnesses to the fact that there was a document. But there is only one witness saying that this loan was a conditional loan. “The words of one do not stand against two.” Exactly like in our case, where one witness says “she was divorced” and one witness says “she was not divorced.” And all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) here discuss the relationship between these cases. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now there, whether there was or wasn’t a condition—that’s a frontal contradiction. That’s difficult for the Ran. Right? Because according to the Ran you can’t combine them as testimony about the document, since, whichever way you look at it, one of them is lying. Right? That’s difficult. The Ran himself notes this. The Ran himself later in the discussion—I didn’t photocopy it for you because I didn’t want you to get tangled up in it—but the Ran himself notes this and draws distinctions between the cases. Because you have to remember that when I say it was a document but there was a condition, I’m slightly undermining the testimony that it was a document. It’s not exactly the same thing as “she was a married woman” and then I say “she was divorced.” Okay? “She was divorced” does not contradict the fact that she had been a married woman; it only says that she was divorced. Fine, but that point doesn’t matter right now. And then the Talmud says—and he writes, sorry—and the Machaneh Ephraim says: “And the Ritva, of blessed memory, wrote that this is speaking of a case where the second says: ‘This is my handwriting, but I did not hear about any condition.’ But it can be explained that if he said with certainty, ‘There definitely was no condition,’ then he is contradicting the witness. For if so, one of them is lying, and this would be one witness under contradiction, and the document would not be validated by his testimony at all.” What is he saying? Just like the Ran, right? The very same distinction of the Ran. There too, their contradiction is of a sort where there is not definitely a liar here. Because if there were definitely a liar, you couldn’t combine them. “And similarly the Ran wrote there in our chapter,” this is our Ran, “regarding one witness who says, ‘She had been a married woman and was divorced,’ and one witness says, ‘She is a married woman and was not divorced’—both testify that she had been a married woman, and the one who says she was divorced is only one, and the words of one do not stand against two. And the Ran asked: if so, how can we establish her in the presumption of being a married woman on the basis of their testimony? Since they contradict one another, necessarily one of them is invalid, for by this reasoning we say regarding two groups of witnesses that contradict one another: this one comes by itself and testifies, and that one comes by itself and testifies, but not one from here and one from there.’ So he says: this is no difficulty, for we establish it where both of them agree about the divorce, but they disagree whether it was closer to him or closer to her, and in such a case they are liable to err; therefore neither of them is disqualified.” That’s all a citation of the Ran.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other words, this Ran joins the Ritva on the case of there being a condition in the document, and from here we see the Ran’s rule, okay? There the Machaneh Ephraim continues and says this: so the Ritva and the Ran are in the same camp. By the way, the Ritva says the same thing in our passage. I don’t understand why he brings the Ritva from there. The Ritva on this very passage too—of one witness saying “she was divorced” and “she was not divorced”—also says the same thing. The Ritva appears in the Shitah Mekubetzet; Nachmanides says this too, and also the Ra’ah, as I already mentioned, like the Ran. “But from the words of Maimonides, of blessed memory, it appears that he is speaking even where they directly contradict one another. Directly. For he wrote in chapter 12 of the Laws of Divorce: ‘This one says, “This is my wife,” and this one says, “This is my wife”’”—this is not an exact quotation; he means Jewish law 10 that we read earlier—“behold, she is permitted to everyone, and even though both established her as a married woman, since each one testifies for himself, they are not believed. It appears from these words that the reason they are not believed is because each testifies for himself; but if they were not testifying for themselves, and instead one testified that she is Reuven’s wife and the other testified that she is Shimon’s wife, she would be established as a married woman based on their testimony, even though they contradict one another.” Why? Because Maimonides disagrees with the Ran. Even when there is a direct contradiction, I can combine the two witnesses for another piece of testimony. “And according to this, what he wrote earlier about one witness saying ‘she was divorced’ and one witness saying ‘she was not divorced’ is to be understood literally, even where they directly contradict one another.” Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So again, this seems a bit strange to me. Jewish law 9 he is willing to read in two ways. In Jewish law 10 he thinks he has proof that Maimonides is against the Ran. In light of Jewish law 10, he goes back to Jewish law 9 and says that Jewish law 9 too has to be read not like the Ran. I would say exactly the opposite. I would say Jewish law 9 clearly is not like the Ran, because he says it plainly, without making any distinctions. In Jewish law 10, I showed you earlier that it can be read differently. “Each one testifies for himself” is not because he testifies for himself and is therefore a litigant, but because of the very fact that their testimony is contradictory. Each is speaking about a different husband; therefore you can’t combine them. Exactly like the Ran. So דווקא Jewish law 10 can be read in two ways, but since in Jewish law 9 it is written straightforwardly against the Ran, I would read Jewish law 10 too the way the Machaneh Ephraim suggests here. The Machaneh Ephraim presents it in reverse; it’s not clear to me why. But practically, bottom line, he claims that Maimonides disagrees with the Ran in both of these laws. So what is the obvious next step?

[Speaker B] To reconcile Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because the Ran said what he said because of a difficulty, and what he said was a solution to that difficulty. Right? He says: how do we combine these two witnesses and say “both testify that she had been a married woman,” when they contradict each other? So to that he said: no, it’s talking about a case where they do not contradict each other. But if Maimonides disagrees with the Ran and says that in our Talmudic passage it’s talking even when they contradict one another, then the Ran’s difficulty—and the difficulty of all the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—comes back: so how do we combine them both to turn her into someone with the presumption of being a married woman? Maimonides now owes us an answer to that, if he does not accept the Ran’s distinction. Okay? That’s another reason to read Maimonides like the Ran. But if we decide that he is not like the Ran, as the Machaneh Ephraim says, then no. “And if you would say that the Ran’s difficulty should trouble us—that this is one witness under contradiction, such that necessarily one of them is lying and is disqualified from testimony? In my humble opinion, there is no difficulty at all.” In my view this is not difficult; Maimonides need not be alarmed by this question. “For here, at the time when he testifies and says, ‘She is a married woman and was not divorced’—still not divorced, sorry—he is still not disqualified from testimony, because he could retract within the span of immediate speech, and he is disqualified only after that span.” After all, every witness who testifies is disqualified only if two seconds pass. Why? Because who knows—maybe in the next second he’ll retract. So even if he doesn’t retract, you can’t say he was invalid from the very beginning. You have to wait the two seconds to see that he does not retract, and only then is he disqualified. So the Machaneh Ephraim says: if so, at the time when they testified that she had been a married woman, they still were not disqualified, neither of them. Even if one of them lied in the subsequent testimony, when he said she was divorced or not divorced, still, at the stage when he said she was a married woman, he was not yet a liar. Because he is only declared a liar after the span of immediate speech, when we see he does not retract. Therefore he is not disqualified. “Therefore, in that regarding which they contradicted one another, they contradicted one another”—that is, about her divorce; regarding the point on which there is contradiction between them, there is contradiction, nothing can be done, namely regarding her divorce. “But regarding that in which they did not contradict one another”—that both agree that she had been a married woman—“their testimony stands. Since at the time of the testimony they were not yet disqualified from testimony until after the span of immediate speech, and only from then onward are they disqualified.” That’s his claim.

[Speaker D] This whole thing is very difficult for me, because if each one testifies that… here, she’s married—one says married to Reuven and the other says married to Shimon…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we haven’t gotten there yet. Right now we’re still talking about “she had been a married woman and divorced” versus “a married woman and not divorced.”

[Speaker D] With the same man, as it were? Not in the case we saw…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, about the Talmudic passage. He’s talking about the Talmudic passage. He’s answering the Talmud’s difficulty according to Maimonides. So he said—he’s resolving the difficulty in the Talmud according to Maimonides. Meaning, after all… according to Maimonides it’s hard to understand in the Talmud how these two join together, because according to Maimonides it is talking even where the contradiction is frontal. The Machaneh Ephraim says: even where the contradiction is frontal and it’s clear that one of them is lying. But from when is he disqualified as a liar for testimony? Only after the span of immediate speech following the testimony in which he lied. But in that very testimony, where he said she had been a married woman, he is not disqualified. Since that is so, they can both combine and testify that she had been a married woman. That’s his claim.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I just want to sharpen the point. Notice: it’s not as strange and formalistic as it seems to us. Because think, for example, suppose these two witnesses come and say—one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced. Now it turns out that a week ago both of them testified about some loan—unrelated, a completely different testimony. What do we do now? Do we disqualify all their testimony up to now? Presumably not. Each one has a presumption of fitness. From the moment it becomes clear that he is a liar, he loses his presumption of fitness, if at all. After all, in a case of two against two we saw that according to Rav Huna they don’t even lose the presumption of fitness. But you can’t combine the two of them together. Still, that is from the point at which they lied. You have to remember: regarding the testimony that she had been a married woman, as to that it is not known that they lied. I know that one of them lied, regarding the testimony about whether she was divorced. Why disqualify other testimony of theirs? Previous testimony from a week ago we would not disqualify, right? So the Machaneh Ephraim says: this testimony too, that she had been a married woman, we do not disqualify. You have to remember: in order to disqualify testimony it is not enough to find that a person is a liar—I mean a liar by character, not that he lied in this testimony. If he lied in this testimony, then we won’t accept that testimony. But as for the testimony that she had been a married woman, I don’t know whether either of them lied, right? On the contrary, I know that one of them certainly told the truth, right? One second—one of the two certainly told the truth, we agree on that. One is a liar, but one tells the truth. Now here there is a truth-teller who says she had been a married woman. That certainly exists, right? Now the second joins him, and he too says she had been a married woman. Why assume that he is lying about this too, and that even the truth-teller lied? That makes no sense at all. It makes much more sense to say that here, in this case, this liar told the truth here; he only lied about the divorce. Right? Much more reasonable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore the Machaneh Ephraim says something very sensible. As for her being a married woman, there is no reason not to combine them. You have to remember that in future testimony we will not combine them, because in future testimony the problem is not the lie; the problem is the disqualification. In future testimony, when both of them come, what makes me not accept them is not that I think they are lying, but that one of them has the status of a disqualified witness. A disqualified witness cannot testify; even if he’s not lying, he cannot testify. But a disqualified witness is a status that only begins from the time it is established that he lied, which is after the span of immediate speech following his testimony. Therefore there is a difference between deciding whether they lied in this testimony and the question whether they are disqualified. Those are two different things. The disqualification is a formal legal act, and it only happens after the span of immediate speech following the testimony. From the time they are disqualified, we no longer accept their testimony regardless of whether they are telling the truth or not, because they are disqualified witnesses, and disqualified witnesses we do not accept. But until the time they are disqualified, I basically have to judge whether they are lying or not, because disqualified they are not. So let’s think: what is more reasonable? That they are lying about her having been a married woman, or not? Obviously not, no question. Because after all, one of these two witnesses is a truth-teller and he said that she had been a married woman. He probably didn’t lie; there’s no reason to assume he lied. Now the second witness lied regarding the divorce, whether there was or wasn’t a divorce, right? Did he also lie about her being a married woman? Presumably not, because he says what the truthful witness says; their testimonies coincide. So why assume he is lying when he says that she had been a married woman?

[Speaker D] But to say “presumably not” because there’s another witness who says it—I don’t know, that’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have two interpretive possibilities. I’m reminding you of the Netivot that we once saw regarding combining two witnesses. We have two interpretive possibilities. Either both of them are lying when they say that she had been a married woman, because the truth is that she was not a married woman; or both of them are telling the truth. Right? There’s no possibility here that one is lying and one is telling the truth—they are saying the same thing. Now tell me what is preferable to assume: that both are lying, or that both are telling the truth? I know that one of them lied regarding the divorce.

[Speaker D] Right, but that’s exactly it—if one of them lied regarding the divorce… because even if the presumption starts after…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this isn’t presumption. Again, not presumption. Don’t bring presumption into this. I’m not talking about presumptions. I’m talking now about a simple factual assessment, not Jewish law and nothing else. Ask a person on the street: what’s more likely? That both are telling the truth, or that both are lying? Without a presumption of fitness, not because of a presumption of fitness. My claim is that it’s much more likely that both are telling the truth. Why? Because the one who tells the truth also regarding the divorce is just a regular valid witness. And he said that she had been a married woman, right? Now if he told the truth, then it follows that the second also told the truth. Because it cannot be that the second lied; after all, he said the same thing. And to say that someone who lied regarding the divorce told the truth regarding her being a married woman—there is no contradiction in that. Even someone who lies sometimes, that doesn’t mean he always lies. Sometimes he lies. So if I had to rely only on him, that would be problematic, because I know that sometimes he lies. But if I already have a witness who says she had been a married woman, and I know he joins him, then either I suddenly make both of them liars—which is completely unreasonable—or I make both of them truth-tellers. But maybe they’re conspiring against the woman? But why assume they’re conspiring? There is one valid witness here.

[Speaker D] We don’t know that there is one valid witness here, because we

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We know.

[Speaker D] know that there are two witnesses that she is unmarried, and both of them say—let’s say—they’ll make that mental move.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then why would they say she’s divorced? There’s no logic in that. Then they should both agree that she had been a married woman and was not divorced, and that’s it, they solve the whole problem. This doesn’t look like a conspiracy. It’s a conspiracy of idiots. Yes.

[Speaker G] Maybe he wants to disqualify her from marrying a kohen. He wants to disqualify her from a kohen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s why there’s no migo, but that certainly isn’t a concern of conspiracy.

[Speaker G] What I wanted to ask—I’m very interested in this, and I also thought about this logic—but it only gives the religious court trust in that one witness. There is some logic in saying he is believed. On the face of it, he seems believable. On the other hand, legally speaking, there still aren’t two witnesses here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are. That’s what I said. Because regarding disqualification—if I want to say there aren’t two witnesses here, I need one of them to be disqualified. But the disqualification only begins after he lied.

[Speaker G] We’ll combine the two together, fine, but it depends…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there are two witnesses here. That’s what I want. This is important.

[Speaker G] There are two witnesses that she is married.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The whole problem, if he were lying—even though he is a witness, I wouldn’t accept his testimony because he’s lying. But a witness is a witness. Now the only remaining question is whether he is lying or not, and to me it’s quite clear that he isn’t lying. So why not accept his testimony? He only becomes disqualified after the span of immediate speech following the point at which he lied, and therefore from then on he stops being a witness. But before that he certainly is a witness. The whole question is only whether he is lying; and it’s likely that he isn’t. Fine, this is only according to someone

[Speaker G] who doesn’t think that if part is disqualified, all is disqualified.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, we haven’t gotten there yet, one second, we haven’t gotten there yet.

[Speaker G] But right, if we accept this idea…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just a second, we’ll get there, we’ll get there.

[Speaker G] In a moment we’ll see whether we accept this idea that he is a valid witness, fine. We’ll get there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But

[Speaker G] in another case it could be that what gives me trust in him is not enough.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only if he is a disqualified witness. But in a case where he is a valid witness and I can also trust him, then why not accept him?

[Speaker G] Fine, in general.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he has been disqualified, then obviously. A witness who has been disqualified—even if I have evidence that he is telling the truth, it doesn’t matter; he is a disqualified witness. But until he is disqualified, everything depends on whether he is speaking the truth, and here the indications are that he is speaking the truth, so why not? Okay? Therefore this is a very important point, because we are so captive to this idea that if there is contradiction between them, then one of them is disqualified. I claim that the question is phrased incorrectly—not that one of them is disqualified. One of them is lying, not one of them is disqualified. He only becomes disqualified from here onward. One of them is lying. But the fact that one is lying does not yet disqualify his testimonies, certainly not his earlier testimonies. If he spoke the truth, then he is fine. As long as he is not inherently a disqualified witness. Okay? Now he brings proof, “as we say in chapter Merubeh, where Abaye challenges him that an exposed plotting witness is disqualified retroactively, from the baraita that says plotting witnesses pay double payment and payment of…” Fine, there are some proofs there that in essence they are only disqualified after the span of immediate speech. It’s not important; it’s not worth getting into all the tangles there, okay? And in the end he says, “Rather, it is a doubt.”

[Speaker E] What does he mean here by that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, I’m getting to it in a second. I do want to read this passage. “And one cannot say here: testimony of which part is invalidated, all of it is invalidated, as we say regarding plotting witnesses who testified about the theft and the slaughter in one testimony,” yes? Witnesses came and testified that someone stole and slaughtered. The slaughter raises the amount he has to pay. Okay? Now they were exposed as plotting witnesses regarding the slaughter, so their testimony regarding the slaughter is void. Consequently, their testimony regarding the theft is also void. Why? “Because since it is one testimony, the testimony regarding the theft is also void, since within the span of immediate speech is considered as immediate speech.” So seemingly the question arises: then here too it should be like that. As for testimony they gave a week ago, I really would not disqualify it, that’s true. But the Machaneh Ephraim wants to say that concerning the first part of this very same testimony, with respect to which they were contradicted, there too we will accept it. Why? But it is the same testimony—if part is invalidated, all is invalidated. The Machaneh Ephraim says: “There it is different, because part of the testimony was certainly invalidated, for they were found to be plotting witnesses, and then it makes sense to say all of it is invalidated. But here, where there is no exposure as plotting witnesses, only contradiction, even part of the testimony has not been invalidated; rather it is only a doubt. For even if there were no presumption of being a married woman here, but one witness says she became betrothed and one witness says she did not become betrothed, we say it is a doubt, and therefore she may not marry.” What is he saying? He is claiming that “if part is invalidated, all is invalidated” applies when part of the testimony is invalidated—

[Speaker B] because the testimony is a single unit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that, more than that—even here the whole testimony is a single unit. But when does it invalidate the entire unit? When part of the testimony is invalidated. In a case of plotting witnesses, part of the testimony is invalidated. But here this is not plotting-witness exposure; this is contradiction. None of the testimonies has been invalidated. I can’t accept the testimony, but the testimony has not been invalidated. This is not testimony that has been found false. I cannot accept the testimony because, whichever way you look at it, apparently one of them is lying, and therefore concerning such a case we do not say that if part of the testimony is invalidated, all of it is invalidated. That is his claim, and therefore I can validate their testimony that she had been a married woman.

[Speaker B] So contradiction creates doubt and exposure as plotting witnesses creates invalidation? What? I didn’t understand. Contradiction creates doubt and plotting-witness exposure creates invalidation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—yes, exactly. Meaning, contradiction does not invalidate the testimony; it only causes us not to accept it. Exactly the same distinction I made earlier. There is a difference between invalidating the testimony—that is, turning the witness into a disqualified witness—and clarifying that what he says is false, and therefore I am forbidden to accept it. That is not the same thing. In other words, if part of the testimony has been shown to be false, that does not mean he is invalidated; rather, I cannot accept him because I suspect it is false. In the case of plotting witnesses, it is invalidated. So if it is invalidated, then everything else is invalidated too. But in contradiction, it is not invalidated. I’ll just remind you: Rabbi Akiva Eiger, whom I mentioned earlier, who argues with the Sema in the case of two against two, brings Tosafot in Sanhedrin. Tosafot in Sanhedrin says that where you combine witnesses from the two groups for another testimony, according to Rav Huna—I asked there, after all one of them is certainly disqualified, right? So I asked there: what is the status of the other? Do we have one witness here or do we have no witness at all, because one of them is found to be related or disqualified? Tosafot in Sanhedrin says that we do not say “one of them is found to be related or disqualified” if the disqualification is not recognized and known; rather, we only know that one of the two is disqualified, but we do not know which one. In that situation we do not say “one is found to be related or disqualified.” Similar to this is the reasoning of the Machaneh Ephraim here, because “one is found to be related or disqualified” and “if part is invalidated, all is invalidated” are very similar ideas. Either we invalidate part of the testimony and then the whole testimony is invalidated, or we invalidate part of the group of witnesses and then the whole group of witnesses is invalidated. So that only applies where it is clear that there is one thing that is no good. Here that is not clarified to us at all, because we do not know which of them is not okay. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now he brings a proof for this from the passage in Bava Batra. Let’s look for a moment at the passage in Bava Batra. “This one says, ‘It belonged to my fathers,’ and this one says, ‘It belonged to my fathers’”—this is about presumptive ownership of land, yes. “This one brought witnesses that it belonged to his fathers and that he enjoyed the years of possession, and this one brought witnesses that he enjoyed the years of possession.” Did you notice? In other words, each says that this land belonged to his fathers, Reuven and Shimon. Now Reuven brings two witnesses that it really belonged to his fathers, and also that he used the produce of the land for three years and no one protested. And the second, Shimon, has no witnesses that it belonged to his fathers, but he does have witnesses that he used the produce of the land for three years and no one protested. What is the law in such a case?

[Speaker B] Rav Nachman said—so he does not contradict that it belonged to Reuven’s fathers. Right. Rav Nachman said: set the use against the use…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Set the use against the use, and leave the land in the presumption of the fathers.” So there is contradiction regarding the testimony of use; let’s remove the witnesses here and leave it in the presumption of the fathers of the one who brought witnesses for that. So the Talmud asks: Rava said to him, “This is contradicted testimony.” Do you see the connection to us? This is contradicted testimony regarding the use; so why do you want to accept the testimony about the fathers, yes, that it belonged to his fathers? After all, if part of the testimony is invalidated, then all the testimony is invalidated, right? That’s the question. He answered him, Rav Nachman: “Granted, they were contradicted regarding the use; but were they contradicted regarding the fathers?” The contradiction is regarding the use, not regarding the fathers; regarding the fathers there is no contradiction, and therefore one can accept that. Very similar to our case. Right? What do we see here, before I continue?

[Speaker B] That if part of the testimony is invalidated, not all of it is invalidated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And why? Doesn’t that contradict the Talmud in Bava Kamma regarding slaughter and theft, where we see that if it is invalidated regarding the slaughter, then the testimony regarding the theft is also invalidated?

[Speaker B] There they agreed that it was his fathers’. No. Here the testimony wasn’t invalidated; rather a doubt was created. No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Here the testimony was not invalidated. This is contradiction, not plotting-witness exposure. Only here it’s contradiction of two against two, not one against one. Doesn’t matter. But still, it is contradiction and not plotting-witness exposure. In that case the testimony is not invalidated; I simply cannot accept it. This is exactly the proof of the Machaneh Ephraim. He says: so we see from here that if part of the testimony is not accepted—not that it is invalidated—then that does not invalidate the first part of the testimony. That is what he said in our case too.

[Speaker B] That’s his proof. Is this mechanism similar to “we split the statement,” right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a certain sense, yes.

[Speaker B] And specifically the Rashba, who is the father of “we split the statement,” here in this…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so that already—

[Speaker B] the medieval authorities (Rishonim) point it out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When do we say “if part is invalidated, all is invalidated,” and when do we split? We discussed that in the passage about splitting the statement. There’s the Rosh in Makkot 7a, where the Rosh brings the Raavad there—many medieval authorities (Rishonim) bring the Raavad—who says that splitting is done only regarding a litigant. Only regarding—sorry—not a relative, but a litigant. Regarding relatives or other things, we do not split.

[Speaker B] Not with witnesses. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, let’s return for a moment to the Machaneh Ephraim. “And I can bring proof for this, that in contradicted witnesses we do not say ‘if part of the testimony is invalidated, all is invalidated,’ from chapter Chezkat HaBatim. Regarding ‘this one says it belonged to my fathers,’” the Talmud we just saw, “‘and I possessed it for the years of presumption,’ and this one says, ‘It belonged to my fathers and I possessed it for the years of presumption,’ he brought witnesses that it belonged to his fathers, etc. Rava said to him: the testimony is contradicted, so their testimony should be entirely invalidated. He answered him: granted they were contradicted regarding the possession; were they contradicted regarding the fathers?’” Up to here this is a quotation from the Talmud. The Machaneh Ephraim says: “We see from here that when testimony is partially contradicted, we do not say ‘if part of the testimony is invalidated, all is invalidated.’” A crushing proof from the Talmud there. Except that the problem is that for some reason he skipped the second half of the Talmudic passage. Look at the second half of the passage—we stopped in the middle. Look.

[Speaker B] When this is compared to the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here it is. “Shall we say,” yes, up to this point Rava asked: this is contradicted testimony, and Rav Nachman answered him: the contradiction is about the use, not about his fathers. “Shall we say that Rava and Rav Nachman disagree according to the dispute of Rav Huna and Rav Chisda? For it was stated: this one by itself and that one by itself, and Rav Chisda said: what use do I have for lying witnesses?” Meaning Rav Huna leaves both on their original presumption, and Rav Chisda does not. “Shall we say Rav Nachman follows Rav Huna and Rava follows Rav Chisda?” What does that mean? Rav Nachman, who says we accept them, does so because he leaves them on their original presumption. Consequently we can accept their testimonies each separately, and therefore we accept the testimony about his fathers. Right? And Rav Chisda, who disqualifies both groups, will go like Rava, who says we should not accept the testimony about his fathers. That is what the Talmud says. Then the Talmud rejects it: “According to Rav Chisda, everyone agrees”—that is, according to Rav Chisda it is obvious that we cannot accept the testimony about the fathers. “They disagree only according to Rav Huna.” Rav Nachman is like Rav Huna, which is what we saw, and Rava claims that his position works even according to Rav Huna. “Rav Huna only said that regarding another testimony, but not regarding the same testimony.” So what do we see? Exactly the opposite of what the Machaneh Ephraim says. Just the opposite. Right? Rava says that this is for another testimony, but not for the same testimony we do not—that is, for the same testimony we do invalidate, even though this is not plotting-witness exposure but only contradiction. Directly against the Machaneh Ephraim.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, you have to remember that here this is two against two and not one against one. Right? Maybe, maybe there is room to distinguish—that in a case of two against two, since we already discussed this, because two against two is a Torah-level doubt, we do not leave things on the original presumption. Because two against two is a special type of doubt. Why? Because each of the two sides is absolute evidence, the evidence of two witnesses. Therefore this is not considered doubt but certainty against certainty. If it is certainty against certainty, then perhaps one could say that indeed in two against two, even in contradiction, both testimonies are invalidated—not merely left in doubt, but invalidated—because there are two witnesses saying you are wrong. In one against one, the testimonies are not invalidated; rather I just cannot accept them. That might perhaps reconcile the Machaneh Ephraim. But to bring proof from the Talmud in Bava Batra—that’s a bit difficult. There is no contradiction from the Talmud in Bava Batra, but to bring a proof from the Talmud in Bava Batra is really difficult, because on the simple reading Bava Batra says the opposite. Okay? Are you with me? A thin, still voice. Let me explain again. Look: the Machaneh Ephraim proves from the Talmud in Bava Batra that when there is contradiction, then the first part of the testimony that was contradicted is not invalidated. It can remain in place. Only in plotting-witness exposure—if one part was exposed—then the second part is also invalidated. What is his proof? His proof is from the Talmud in Bava Batra. What do we see there? There is contradiction of two witnesses against two witnesses about the presumptive ownership of the land. The question is whether we accept the testimony about the fathers. The Talmud says, in conclusion, Rav Nachman says yes, we accept it. The Machaneh Ephraim asks: why do we accept it? After all, the Talmud in Bava Kamma explained to me that when the testimony about slaughter is invalidated, then the testimony about theft is also invalidated. So why is it not so here? Proof from here that here this testimony, because it was contradicted, is not considered testimony that has been invalidated, but only contradicted testimony—and contradicted testimony does not invalidate the rest of the testimony. That is the proof he brought. Right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The later authorities attack him on this—Rav David, Rav Shimon Shkop, all of them attack him on it. From the Talmud you see the opposite, because the Talmud continues afterward—you stopped in the middle of the passage. The Talmud goes on and says that it depends on the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. If you have a presumption of fitness—if you don’t have a presumption of fitness, according to Rav Chisda, if you have lost the presumption of fitness—then the first part too is invalidated according to everyone. According to Rav Huna, for whom the presumption of fitness remains, there is a dispute. What is the dispute? There is one who says that it is invalidated—Rava says it is invalidated—not for another testimony, not specifically for a different case, but another testimony; however in the same testimony, no—and we are talking about the same testimony. So in the same testimony we see that it is invalidated even according to Rav Huna. So how can the Machaneh Ephraim tell us in our case, regarding a married woman, that they can remain in place despite the contradiction?

[Speaker B] Maybe we follow Rav Nachman and not Rava there? That Rav Nachman follows Rav Huna, meaning the use is invalidated but not the fathers.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Rav Nachman claims that even in the same testimony, not only in another testimony, they remain under a presumption of fitness. So actually, really, the Machaneh Ephraim’s proof from the Talmud can stand according to Rav Nachman’s explanation within Rav Huna. Yes, that can stand. Okay? Now, or as I said earlier, it could be there is a difference between two witnesses and one witness. But now the problem is bigger, because in our case—and this is what the later authorities point out—fine, there Rav Nachman really can say that we accept the testimony about the fathers. Why? Because in the testimony about the fathers there is only one group saying about the fathers, and I don’t know whether that is the lying group or not, right? So I leave it on its original presumption. But in our case the situation is much worse. In our case, who is the group testifying that she had been a married woman? Both of them together. But one of them is certainly a liar. Here even Rav Huna would agree that you cannot accept that testimony. Here too Rav Huna would agree with Rav Chisda, because even Rav Huna agrees that if you take one witness from this group and one witness from that group, they cannot go and testify together. So in that respect Rav Huna is like Rav Chisda. If so, then Rav Nachman too…

[Speaker D] Why don’t we divide here too between the two parts of the testimony?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] Even the liar says that she had been…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand the question. What’s the question, Yael?

[Speaker D] The question is why in this case don’t we divide? Which case is this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which case?

[Speaker F] The married-woman case,

[Speaker D] the case of the married woman.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, divide what?

[Speaker D] Like we said before, we do accept the part that this…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who are the two witnesses on the part that she had been a married woman? Both of them together. But one of them is a liar.

[Speaker D] We still don’t know that yet—we haven’t yet heard the part of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, you’re going back to the Machaneh Ephraim. You’re going back to the Machaneh Ephraim. I’m talking about something else. I’m not talking about the Machaneh Ephraim’s question, but about whether we say here: if part of the testimony is nullified, the whole testimony is nullified. So I’m saying: according to Rav Chisda, the Talmud says that we do say, if part of it is nullified, all of it is nullified, right? After all, they also invalidate the testimony about the ancestors according to Rav Chisda, right? Even though the contradiction was only about the possession, they also invalidate the testimony about the ancestors according to Rav Chisda. According to Rav Chisda. According to Rav Huna, no. But the later authorities say, fine, according to Rav Huna not—because there the testimony about the ancestors was given only by one group of two witnesses, one of the two groups, and there I don’t have a definite liar; maybe that’s the group telling the truth, so we leave them with their presumption of validity. But in our case, the first part of the testimony was given by the two witnesses from both sides, one of whom is definitely a liar. So here, really, even Rav Huna should say like Rav Chisda, that we should say here: if part is nullified, all is nullified. Here everyone should follow Rav Chisda and not Rav Huna, because even Rav Huna agrees that if you take one witness from this group and one witness from that group, you can’t combine them together. Right? That’s a very strong objection to the Machaneh Ephraim. But it seems to me that Yael did get the point, Yael Eigenberg. You can resolve the Machaneh Ephraim. I’m shortening the range here already because I see we won’t have enough time. Why? Because understand: the Machaneh Ephraim started precisely from this point—that the disqualification of the witness begins only from now on. At the earlier stage he still wasn’t disqualified; what, you suspect he’s lying? There’s no reason to suspect he’s lying; I have two witnesses who are certainly telling the truth. That’s what we proved at the beginning of the Machaneh Ephraim’s discussion. The reason I can’t combine the two witnesses is because, whichever way you look at it, one is a liar, and that is relevant only after the testimony, for future testimony. But if I’m talking about earlier testimony, the witnesses are not disqualified; it’s only a question of whether they were lying—that’s the whole distinction I made above. Now here there is no reason to assume they were lying, says the Machaneh Ephraim, so they combine, and there is no rule here of if part is nullified, all is nullified. What do you want? You want not to accept this because one of them is a liar, not because of if part is nullified, all is nullified. That rule does not apply here. You only want not to accept it because one of them is a liar—but the fact that one of them is a liar disqualifies only from now on; it does not disqualify retroactively. That’s what the Machaneh Ephraim says, and in my opinion he’s right. All the later authorities leave it as needing further analysis; they don’t understand what the Machaneh Ephraim wants, but in my opinion he’s right. That’s why at the beginning of his words one had to read carefully the difference between a lying witness and a disqualified witness. He becomes disqualified only from now on; as a liar, there is a concern that maybe he lied before, but suspicion of lying has to be checked to see whether it really exists or not. Disqualification you don’t check; someone who is disqualified, you don’t listen to him. But if it’s only a problem of suspected lying, let’s do the math and see that he is not suspected of lying. And therefore we accept his testimony, and there is no rule of if part is nullified, all is nullified according to Rav Nachman. And yes, the Machaneh Ephraim goes according to Rav Nachman, who holds that there is no rule of if part is nullified, all is nullified. In my opinion he’s right. Now Rabbeinu David, Rabbi David Povidarsky, does go on at length to challenge the Machaneh Ephraim with a whole collection of many objections. Look, he basically says his words are puzzling, because the Talmud says that Rav Nachman holds like Rav Huna, that with two groups of witnesses contradicting one another, this one testifies independently and that one testifies independently, and therefore he holds that the testimony about the eating is valid. And Rava holds like Rav Chisda. Right, that’s the continuation of the Talmud there in tractate Bava Batra. And if so, says Rabbi David, on the contrary, from there it is proven—from there it is proven—that only according to Rav Huna do we not say that testimony of which part is nullified is entirely nullified in a case of contradiction, but according to Rav Chisda even in contradiction there is also the rule that testimony whose part is nullified is entirely nullified, because according to him we say that the testimony about the ancestors is also nullified. So that is only according to Rav Huna. Now what’s the problem? Fine, so he goes according to Rav Huna; after all, the Jewish law follows Rav Huna. He says no—and here, in the coming section, where the witnesses testify that she was betrothed, one of them says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced, then even according to Rav Huna it is like that case according to Rav Chisda, because the very same witnesses who contradict one another we are combining to testify that she is a married woman, and in this Rav Huna admits that it does not work. After all, Rav Huna also agrees that you cannot combine one witness from this group and one witness from that group, because all that Rav Huna validates is only each group on its own, but one from this group and one from that group—he admits they do not combine. And if so, since one of them is definitely disqualified for testimony and his testimony is nullified, then automatically the whole thing is nullified. Basically he’s saying that even according to Rav Huna here it should have been nullified. Did you see his move? It’s exactly the move we went through. Meaning, I begin at the start of the Talmud passage—that is proof for the Machaneh Ephraim—but later in the Talmud passage you see that it is not proof for the Machaneh Ephraim but against him. And then one of you remarked: yes, but that’s only according to Rava; according to Rav Nachman the Machaneh Ephraim still stands. And then I object: not true, because according to—even according to Rav Nachman in our case it won’t work, because in our case the two witnesses contradict each other. And my answer now at the end is—and of course he doesn’t bring this, because he leaves it unresolved—but I claim he’s not right. My answer is that the Machaneh Ephraim sensed this, and the Machaneh Ephraim claims that on the basis of if part is nullified, all is nullified, this is not nullified. It is nullified only because they lost their presumption of validity. And I say: here that’s not true. Their presumption of validity worked from now on, but retroactively they did not lose their presumption of validity. There is only a concern that one of them is lying. Do the math and you’ll see that in our case that concern does not exist. Right? That’s the calculation we made: there is one who is certainly telling the truth and says she is a married woman; the second one indeed lied in the later part of the testimony. In this part either he lied—but then I have to assume that the truth-teller also lied, which is unreasonable—or I have to assume that although he lied in the later part, in this part he told the truth. And that is a much more reasonable assumption. Therefore here, says the Machaneh Ephraim, we accept these two testimonies.

[Speaker B] Meaning, according to the Machaneh Ephraim it only affects the future, and according to the way Rabbi David Tversky explains it, it already affects the past, the testimony that was just given.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It affects the past, the testimony that was just given, exactly. But only in a case where the two of them combine and one of them is a liar. Yes, yes. Yes. After that, in section 483, he brings—he rejects the Machaneh Ephraim’s reading of Maimonides and wants to argue that Maimonides also agrees with the Ran. Yes, he says: and Maimonides in chapter 12 wrote: one says, “She is my wife,” and another says, “She is my wife” — she is permitted to everyone. And even though both of them established her as a married woman, since each one is testifying for himself, they are not believed. End quote. That is Maimonides, Jewish law 10, remember? With the slaves and all the whole mess. And on this the Machaneh Ephraim wrote that it seems from his words there that the reason they are not believed is because each one is testifying for himself, but if they were testifying for others, etc., then they would be believed. But it appears, says Rabbi David, that this is no proof. On the contrary, one can say that where each one testifies that she is another man’s married woman, it is obvious that they are not believed, and there is no testimony here that she is a married woman, for two reasons: either because there is disqualification among them—after all there is only a concern that one of them is disqualified—or at least because it is testimony of which part is nullified, and therefore all the testimony is nullified. And if so, there is nothing novel in that. Therefore Maimonides wrote specifically in the case where each one testifies for himself that she is his wife, because there one might have said that since what he testifies for himself is not testimony—a person speaking about himself is not testimony at all—then automatically it is not considered contradiction. After all, there is no contradiction here if he did not testify about himself, because the contradiction is that I said she is mine and that one said she is his. But if what I said—that she is mine—isn’t testimony at all, because testimony about myself is not testimony, then in fact there is no contradiction. So one might have said that we would accept the

[Speaker B] testimony of both of them that she is a married woman. Then Maimonides comes and says no, even in such a case this is called contradiction. Okay? But could there be a case like this, where one says she is his wife and the other says: at the time she was married to me, and then I married her, and then the husband returned? No?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then there is no contradiction at all; then you see the timeline. That’s not called contradiction. Then it’s clear to us what happened there, and we have to act according to the conclusion. So what Rabbi David is trying to do is save Maimonides from the Machaneh Ephraim’s inference. Then Maimonides would be like the Ran, and then the question doesn’t arise and you don’t need the whole Machaneh Ephraim discussion, as we saw above, because according to Rabbi David’s approach it doesn’t hold water. But according to my approach—that he is not right and the Machaneh Ephraim is right—there is no necessity to say that Maimonides is like the Ran. On the contrary, I claim that according to the plain sense of Maimonides’ language, the Machaneh Ephraim is right: Maimonides is not like the Ran; he disagrees with the Ran. Okay? And therefore—so what is the answer? The answer is what the Machaneh Ephraim said. That is the answer for Maimonides. Now look, more than that: Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings from the Shitah Mekubetzet, from the students of the Rashba. And this is the language of the Rashba’s student: Tosafot asked, how can they say that both of them testify that she is a married woman, when the testimony is contradicted and one of them is disqualified—so how can they combine in this testimony that they are giving, that she is a married woman, as was said regarding two groups of witnesses contradicting one another? Yes, the same question as the Ran. How can you combine these two witnesses when they contradict each other? One of them is definitely a liar. How did you turn them into two witnesses that she is a married woman?

[Speaker B] But according to your approach, you say that he still isn’t disqualified?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, you’re already bringing answers. He’s raising the question. Okay? We’ve already seen the answers and the possibilities. He is raising the question. Now after he brings the Ran’s answer, that we’re dealing with a non-direct contradiction—yes?—he says: therefore one can say that when we say regarding two groups of witnesses that one from each group does not combine into one testimony, that applies only going forward, but retroactively they are not disqualified. And here, when they contradict one another, by then their testimony that she is a married woman was already complete testimony. And this testimony in which they contradict each other is another testimony, because marriage does not depend on divorce. They are two separate matters. What is he saying? Exactly the Machaneh Ephraim. So even if you are right—even if Rabbi David is right in rejecting the Machaneh Ephraim’s inference—then Maimonides is indeed like the Ran, and then there’s no need to get to the Machaneh Ephraim. But the Shitah Mekubetzet explicitly says the Machaneh Ephraim’s point. So he says that it has to hold water. What do you mean “has to”? The assumption is that medieval authorities (Rishonim) do not make mistakes. Later authorities (Acharonim)—you can argue with them, but medieval authorities (Rishonim) don’t make mistakes. That’s the assumption. Okay. And as I said above, there is no problem. The Machaneh Ephraim is indeed a possible explanation. No, I don’t think they rejected him. And if it’s not in Maimonides, then at least in the Shitah Mekubetzet one certainly has to say this.

[Speaker B] And the Machaneh Ephraim is also from the medieval authorities (Rishonim)? No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. That’s why I’m saying: Rabbi David argues with the Machaneh Ephraim; maybe the Machaneh Ephraim was mistaken and Maimonides holds like the Ran. But what will you say about the students of the Rashba? The students of the Rashba are certainly not like the Ran. So in any case there must be some other answer here for how these two witnesses are nevertheless combined. And that answer is the Machaneh Ephraim’s answer. So what was difficult from Bava Batra and everything we said? Well, we resolved that. Now the truth is, I thought to myself that maybe one could phrase another two versions of the answer here. After all, when I have the two witnesses combining and saying that she is a married woman, yes? Now suppose the witness who says she was divorced is the liar. What does that mean, that he’s the liar? That the truth is that she was a married woman and was not divorced. Right? Now if the witness who says she was divorced is the one telling the truth and the other is the liar, what does that mean? That she was a married woman and was divorced. Well then, whether he is telling the truth or whether he is lying, he says that she is a married woman. And likewise the other way around. So basically I have two witnesses regardless of the concern that he is lying, and no matter who is lying I have two witnesses that she is a married woman. This is really just another formulation of what I said earlier. What I really wanted to say is that there is no disqualification here. The disqualification begins only from now on. Your whole problem is just the concern that maybe there is a liar here. So let’s check and see whether there really is a concern that someone here is lying. And the answer is clearly not. So what’s the problem? They are not disqualified, and they are also not lying, and everything is fine. That is one formulation. A second formulation I can give is a distinction between one against one and two against two. When I have two against two—that’s what I also said in Bava Batra—when I have two against two, then I basically have two witnesses who disqualified the first group, and I have two witnesses who disqualify the second group. Right? In that situation, one can say that the testimonies are disqualified and you can’t combine them. But in our case this is a contradiction of one witness against one witness. One witness against one witness is contradiction, but I have not disqualified the first witness; I simply do not allow his words to be accepted. I have not disqualified him. So even if we assume that disqualification, if it existed, goes retroactively—not only from now on and onward as the Machaneh Ephraim says, but retroactively—even so, here there is no disqualification, because in order to disqualify a witness there have to be two witnesses that he lied. I do not have two witnesses that he lied. I have a concern that he is lying, but I cannot say that he is disqualified. In a two-against-two case I say he is disqualified, and therefore the Talmud in Bava Batra says that maybe this can work retroactively as well, because if he is disqualified then he also invalidates his earlier testimonies, because he is a disqualified witness, not merely a possible liar. And a disqualified witness—we do not accept his testimony. But in the case of one against one, how can you say he is disqualified? Are there two witnesses who disqualified him? In order to disqualify a person you need two witnesses. True, we understand that both of them cannot be telling the truth. One of them is definitely lying. But that still does not mean he is disqualified. It only means that he lied here. In order to establish a status of disqualification you need a legal process, with two witnesses and a determination by judges. So I’m saying: what is the difference between this answer and the previous answer? Earlier I wanted to say, like the Machaneh Ephraim, that disqualification, even if it exists, does not go backward. Now I’m saying: leave that aside—even if disqualification does go backward, here there is no disqualification. In a one-against-one case that is not disqualification. In a two-against-two case, that is disqualification. One against one is only inadmissibility; it is not disqualification of the witness. Therefore certainly it does not go backward. Okay? Rabbi Shimon here, in the section I mentioned earlier, basically says—he says like this: it further appears to me, humbly, that with one witness, even according to Rav Chisda, it is effective to combine their testimony so that she becomes a married woman on the basis of their words. Not only according to Rav Huna, who maintains each one in his presumption, but even according to Rav Chisda one can combine them. Why? Because with one witness it is not relevant to say that their declaration has the status of a doubtful declaration, even though we know with certainty that one of them lied in his testimony. Exactly what I just said. Because the only thing standing against him is one witness and not two, you cannot say that there is a doubtful declaration here; there is a clear declaration. I cannot accept it, but there is a declaration here. If there are two against two, then each side is an invalid declaration; there is no declaration here. Okay? That is the difference between contradiction of one against one and contradiction of two against two. That is basically what he is saying. Since if each one’s declaration were completed by another who testified in the same way, then his testimony would be accepted. What is he saying? Suppose there is one against one, and now one more witness comes and joins the witness who says she was divorced. What would the law be? One against two. Meaning that the testimony of the first witness, when he said she was divorced, was not nullified. The proof is that if another comes, they combine together and become a group of witnesses, and we will also accept the testimony of the first one. How can you say it is nullified? In a two-against-two case, even if more witnesses come and join one of the groups, it won’t help. Therefore you can say that the declaration is nullified. But in a one-against-one case, you cannot say that the declaration is nullified. For now the declaration is simply not accepted, not admissible—that’s all. It is not nullified. That is exactly what I said. In any case, look at the conclusion of what he writes: and in any case, the words of the Machaneh Ephraim are puzzling, because he did not explain his intention, and he brought from the Talmud in Bava Batra that in contradiction there is no relevance to the rule of testimony of which part is nullified is entirely nullified, whereas in the Talmud it is explicit the opposite, that the Talmud made it depend on the dispute of Rav Huna and Rav Chisda. What we saw in Rabbi David—he himself lays this out earlier, but I didn’t bring it. He says—look at the last sentence: and according to what I have written, there is room for his words, that according to Rav Huna and Rav Nachman, even one from each group is effective, as above. Yes—what he wanted to say about Rav Huna and Rav Nachman is that they basically say one can go backward; there is no if part is nullified, all is nullified. About that Rabbi David—and he himself—asked: yes, but there that was when the group testifying about the ancestors was one group out of the two, but in our case it is the two contradictors combining together, so here even Rav Huna should have joined Rav Chisda. Here according to everyone it should not work. Rabbi Shimon says: according to what I said, that is not true here, what I said above. Because according to what he said here, it turns out that when we go backward there is no disqualification. All there is is the question whether they are lying or not. Do the math and see that they are not lying. Therefore there is no problem. I think that is what he means. That is all for now.

[Speaker B] Thank you. Thank you all. Goodbye. Thank you very much, goodbye. Sabbath peace.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sabbath peace.

Ketubot Chapter 2, Lesson 43

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Abaye’s reading of Rabbi Yochanan’s statement in the case of one witness

The Ran’s difficulty, and that of the medieval authorities, with the presumption of a married woman built from the witnesses

The Ran’s answer: a dispute over “closer to him” and “closer to her,” not a contradiction that necessarily implies lying

The Shulchan Arukh’s ruling and the implications of the three situations

Maimonides’ wording in the laws of divorce and the possibility that he disagrees with the Ran

Law 10 in Maimonides: “this one says, ‘this is my wife,’ and this one says, ‘this is my wife,’” and the dispute over how to understand the reason

The Mahaneh Ephraim’s approach: disqualification due to falsehood is not retroactive, and only takes effect after the span of immediate speech

The passage in Bava Batra and the question of testimony partially invalidated through contradiction

Rabbi David Povar sky’s objections and a defense of the Ran’s interpretation in Maimonides

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Abaye’s reading of Rabbi Yochanan’s statement in the case of one witness

The Ran’s difficulty, and that of the medieval authorities, with the presumption of a married woman built from the witnesses

The Ran’s answer: a dispute over “closer to him” and “closer to her,” not a contradiction that necessarily implies lying

The Shulchan Arukh’s ruling and the implications of the three situations

Maimonides’ wording in the laws of divorce and the possibility that he disagrees with the Ran

Law 10 in Maimonides: “this one says, ‘this is my wife,’ and this one says, ‘this is my wife,’” and the dispute over how to understand the reason

The Mahaneh Ephraim’s approach: disqualification due to falsehood is not retroactive, and only takes effect after the span of immediate speech

The passage in Bava Batra and the question of testimony partially invalidated through contradiction

Rabbi David Povar sky’s objections and a defense of the Ran’s interpretation in Maimonides

Full Transcript

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