Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 40

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This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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Zoom, convenience, and the continuation of remote teaching
Final assignment for scholarship students
The basis of the law of self-imposed prohibition: coercion, credibility, or vow
The responsum of Mahari Bash (Maharivash / Mahari Basan): vow, Samson-like Nazirite status, or litigant’s admission
Mahari ben Lev versus Ketzot: obligation or credibility, and the implication for prohibitions
Ketzot and Maharit against the “vow” approach: the problem of annulment and the source for Samson-like Nazirite status
A psychological explanation versus coercion by religious court: “we do not feed a person something forbidden to him” versus self-imposed prohibition
Symmetry in sexual prohibitions and the exception of the designated maidservant
Ketubot 9: “I found an open entrance,” money and prohibition, and self-imposed prohibition
Asymmetry between husband and wife, “I am impure to you,” and the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom
Shitah Mekubetzet: “as though he prohibited to himself something permitted” and the direction of vows
A plausible explanation, retraction, and persuasion: the possibility of permitting the prohibition a person created for himself
Sharp criticism of the “vow” approach: the Noda B’Yehuda and the example of Monday being “the Sabbath”
An intermediate proposal: “it is in his power to vow” as the basis for credibility, without the statement itself being a vow
Practical difference: a plausible explanation in litigant’s admission versus a plausible explanation in self-imposed prohibition, and Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky
The Ran in Nedarim on “I am impure to you”: Torah-level credibility or a rabbinic enactment
Tosafot Yeshanim and Rabbi Akiva Eiger: migo, “to disqualify her from the priesthood,” and self-imposed prohibition versus two witnesses
End of the lecture and continuation

Summary

General overview

The lecture opens with the question of whether continuing classes on Zoom even after the coronavirus period is possible and convenient, especially in small groups, and also describes institutional preparations for the fact that many are choosing to teach on Zoom next semester. The lecturer announces a final assignment for scholarship students, though others are also invited, to be sent about a week before the end of the semester and submitted about a week and a half later, on the topic of “Does the mother’s presumption help a son or a daughter,” emphasizing that this is a home assignment and not an article. After that, the lecture returns to the topic of self-imposed prohibition (“shavya anafshei chatikha de-isura”) and the dispute over whether one is coerced on that basis, and develops the basic question whether this is a matter of credibility or a vow-like mechanism, with a broad discussion of sources and practical implications, including students’ questions about coercion, spousal rights, and testimony versus a plausible explanation.

Zoom, convenience, and the continuation of remote teaching

Classes on Zoom are described as saving travel and all the surrounding hassle, and as more convenient for the planet as well. In a small group it seems “perfectly fine,” while in a larger group there are difficulties. Aryeh reports that the lecturers were asked who could continue teaching on Zoom next semester, and a teaching schedule is being built, with many choosing Zoom because it is convenient.

Final assignment for scholarship students

The lecturer states that there will be a final assignment for participants attending under the scholarship-student track, with the possibility for everyone else to join as well, and that the final grade will also be based on the assignment, in line with “the rector’s requirements.” He plans to send the assignment about a week before the end of the semester so it will not interfere with the ongoing learning, and then ask for it back around a week and a half later, giving about two weeks to work on it. He defines the assignment as more like a home exercise than writing an article, and presents the topic: “Does the mother’s presumption help a son or a daughter,” as an expansion of what was mentioned in the topic of “two against two with King Yannai,” expecting sources and questions without anyone being alarmed by possible difficulties.

The basis of the law of self-imposed prohibition: coercion, credibility, or vow

The lecturer presents that a dispute has already been seen over whether one is coerced with regard to self-imposed prohibition, and emphasizes that if this were only a moral-halakhic rule of “if you think this is pork, don’t eat it,” there would be no real place for the principle. The fact that a religious court can coerce conduct based on the statement indicates the fixing of a personal prohibited status. He suggests that the dispute may depend on whether self-imposed prohibition is understood as credibility or as a vow, and links this to a possible dispute between the Shulchan Arukh and Maimonides “depending on whether Bnei Ahavah is right or not.”

The responsum of Mahari Bash (Maharivash / Mahari Basan): vow, Samson-like Nazirite status, or litigant’s admission

The lecturer cites Mahari Bash’s responsum, according to which it is possible that self-imposed prohibition “touches upon the law of prohibitory vows,” meaning a vow-like legal effect, but points to the difficulty that “we do not find in such cases annulment by a sage.” He explains that the absence of annulment by a sage, and the fact that the Talmud relies on a plausible explanation rather than annulment, suggests that this is not an ordinary vow. Mahari Bash therefore suggests the possibility of a stringency “like Samson-like Nazirite status, which is not subject to annulment.” The lecturer notes that Mahari Bash also offers another possibility: that the law is “by the rule of a litigant’s admission, for he is like a hundred witnesses,” even in matters of prohibition when it concerns himself, and connects this to the link Ketzot also makes between litigant’s admission and self-imposed prohibition.

Mahari ben Lev versus Ketzot: obligation or credibility, and the implication for prohibitions

The lecturer describes Mahari ben Lev’s approach, according to which a litigant’s admission in monetary matters is not credibility but an obligation or gift, because a person is an interested party and only one witness, and therefore is not believed to clarify reality, but can obligate himself to give. He presents Ketzot, who brings proofs against him and concludes that a litigant’s admission is credibility, which the Torah innovated from the verse “that he says, ‘this is it,’” so that a person is believed about himself “like a hundred witnesses.” From there the door opens to apply that same innovation to prohibitions as well, and to interpret self-imposed prohibition as credibility rather than a vow. The lecturer raises practical differences involving suspicion and self-interest, and brings the Talmudic example of “witnesses are already on their way,” where an admission that looks like a legal maneuver is not accepted, emphasizing that on the obligation side such suspicions are less relevant.

Ketzot and Maharit against the “vow” approach: the problem of annulment and the source for Samson-like Nazirite status

The lecturer quotes Ketzot, who brings the view that some wrote that self-imposed prohibition is “by the law of a vow,” but Maharit “rejected this,” because if it were a vow, “a query for annulment would work for it.” He explains that Ketzot and Maharit do not accept the Samson-like Nazirite answer, because Samson-like Nazirite status rests on a source, and there is no source for self-imposed prohibition being “a vow that is not subject to annulment,” so they prefer the explanation of credibility. He also adds a historical aside that Mahari Basan “if I remember correctly was the teacher of Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto,” though he qualifies that there were two figures known by that name.

A psychological explanation versus coercion by religious court: “we do not feed a person something forbidden to him” versus self-imposed prohibition

A student suggests a psychological explanation: if a person is convinced that something is forbidden to him, then “internally it is forbidden to him,” similar to someone who saw an event and therefore cannot serve as a judge. The lecturer replies that this is indeed a valid principle of “we do not feed a person something forbidden to him,” but it does not exhaust the law of self-imposed prohibition, because in that law there are also cases where the religious court coerces the person to act in accordance with his statement even when he himself does not want to. He distinguishes between a case where the court tries to force a person to act against his own perception, which it cannot do, and a case where the court forces him to act in accordance with his own statement, which is characteristic of self-imposed prohibition.

Symmetry in sexual prohibitions and the exception of the designated maidservant

A question is asked whether a sexual prohibition applies to the woman as well or only to the husband, and the lecturer states that it applies “to both of them, both of them,” and that this is a general Talmudic rule, with one major exception: the case of the designated maidservant, where “she transgressed a prohibition and the man who had relations with her did not transgress a prohibition” (according to the Jewish law ruling there is no negative prohibition upon him, only a guilt-offering). He notes that there is “some other intricate point from Avnei Nezer” that he does not remember in detail.

Ketubot 9: “I found an open entrance,” money and prohibition, and self-imposed prohibition

The lecturer presents the topic in Ketubot 9 about a husband who says, “I found an open entrance,” and explains that the claim has monetary implications (a ketubah of one hundred or two hundred) and implications of prohibition (his wife becoming forbidden to him in certain circumstances), but that there are situations in which the religious court does not accept the claim for monetary purposes. He emphasizes that nevertheless “he is believed to forbid her to himself,” and Rashi explains that this is by the law of self-imposed prohibition, so that the husband is not believed to make her lose her ketubah but is believed to determine that, as far as he is concerned, she is forbidden to him, and therefore he cannot be forced into relations with her. Students raise the issue of harm to the woman’s rights and reputation, and the lecturer notes that one might imagine a civil claim for reputational damage, but that does not change the prohibition issue, and he again stresses that the husband can divorce at any time, so the suspicion that “he is just lying” is less plausible in that context.

Asymmetry between husband and wife, “I am impure to you,” and the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom

The lecturer explains that despite the symmetry of the prohibition, there is asymmetry in the structure of marriage “at least from the standpoint of Torah law,” since the husband can divorce “even without her consent.” Therefore, his claim that makes her forbidden to him does not infringe a right that she could in any case enforce, whereas if a woman says “I am forbidden to you,” she is not given the power “to remove herself” and force divorce, so that she will not bypass her lack of ability to divorce against his will. He notes that after the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom the situation became more symmetrical, raising the question whether those laws would also change, and links that to the basis of Rabbeinu Gershom’s prohibition. He also refers to the reality of women chained to dead marriages and to public discussion of coercing recalcitrant husbands, including mention of an article in Makor Rishon by Rabbi Sheilat of Ma’ale Adumim, who suggested “beating him” so that he would give a divorce.

Shitah Mekubetzet: “as though he prohibited to himself something permitted” and the direction of vows

The lecturer brings Shitah Mekubetzet on Ketubot 9, which explains that since the husband comes to religious court and says she is forbidden to him and he does not desire her, “she is thereby forbidden to him,” and even though by strict law she is permitted to him, “it is as though he prohibited to himself something that was permitted.” He interprets this language as fitting the understanding of a vow, and notes that there are additional proofs that Shitah Mekubetzet goes in that direction.

A plausible explanation, retraction, and persuasion: the possibility of permitting the prohibition a person created for himself

A question is asked what happens if, after the religious court accepted his words, proof is brought and he is persuaded that he was mistaken. The lecturer replies that self-imposed prohibition includes the rule of a plausible explanation, and if he explains that he erred in his understanding of reality, one can return to a state of permission. He notes that according to the vow approach one could also speak of an opening for annulment where the vow was made based on mistaken information, and links this to the distinction between a plausible explanation as an account of what he originally meant, and annulment by a sage as a later change following a serious declaration.

Sharp criticism of the “vow” approach: the Noda B’Yehuda and the example of Monday being “the Sabbath”

The lecturer presents a fundamental question: the person “did not intend to vow at all,” so it is hard to say that the law of self-imposed prohibition is a vow, because in a vow a person knows something is permitted and imposes a prohibition upon it, whereas here he is claiming to clarify reality. He cites the Noda B’Yehuda, who sharply attacks the understanding that a vow is the basis, asking, “What vow is there here, and what language of oath or konam is there here?” He gives an example: if a person says on Monday that today is the Sabbath, would he become forbidden to do labor “on the basis of a vow”? He adds the Noda B’Yehuda’s proof from the law involving Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel in sanctifying the new month: if this were a vow, one could not have required Rabbi Yehoshua to desecrate Yom Kippur “as it fell according to his calculation.” He explains the difference by noting that with festivals, “you—even if mistaken, you—even if intentional,” the authority of the religious court determines matters, which is not comparable to pork, whose status is determined by reality.

An intermediate proposal: “it is in his power to vow” as the basis for credibility, without the statement itself being a vow

The lecturer proposes explaining the “vow” approach differently: not that the person actually made a vow, but rather that since “it is in his power to vow” and prohibit the matter to himself, that gives him absolute credibility to say that the thing is forbidden to him, similar to his explanation of Mahari ben Lev regarding a litigant’s admission, which is based on the fact that it is “in his power” to obligate himself. He argues that in this way difficulties are resolved, such as why annulment by a sage does not apply here, because this is credibility based on the capacity to vow and not an actual vow taking effect. In this way one can also explain how the credibility can stand “even against two witnesses,” like a litigant’s admission. He notes a nuance brought by Sdei Chemed in the language “they were stringent” in Mahari Basan, as though this were a rabbinic enactment, but says he does not think that is what most sources imply.

Practical difference: a plausible explanation in litigant’s admission versus a plausible explanation in self-imposed prohibition, and Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky

The lecturer raises a difficulty against Ketzot: if self-imposed prohibition is learned from a litigant’s admission, why does a plausible explanation help in self-imposed prohibition, whereas Ketzot writes that a plausible explanation does not help in a litigant’s admission in monetary matters? Ketzot explains that in monetary matters a retracting explanation comes “to the detriment of the other party, who has already acquired through his admission,” and therefore it is like extracting money, whereas in prohibition there is no other party who has “acquired.” Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky objects: “Why should that matter to us,” if the underlying credibility is the same? He proposes a distinction according to which in monetary matters the credibility applies to the very legal status of the money with respect to everyone, because the person is the “owner” of his property, whereas in prohibition a person has no ownership over “the essence of the prohibition,” only over his personal conduct, and therefore the application of credibility is different.

The Ran in Nedarim on “I am impure to you”: Torah-level credibility or a rabbinic enactment

The lecturer brings the Ran in Nedarim on a Mishnah in which a woman says, “I am impure to you,” and the Ran asks how the Sages can decide not to believe her out of concern “lest she have set her eyes on another man” if on the Torah level she is believed, because “where did the intercourse prohibition go?” The lecturer quotes the answer of “Others,” that the first Mishnah is not Torah law but a rabbinic enactment intended to believe her because “she is embarrassed,” and again connects this to the question of infringing the husband’s rights and to the distinction he raised earlier between absolute credibility and limited credibility when harm is caused to another party.

Tosafot Yeshanim and Rabbi Akiva Eiger: migo, “to disqualify her from the priesthood,” and self-imposed prohibition versus two witnesses

The lecturer presents Tosafot Yeshanim on the topic where “both of them are assisting in the case of a married woman,” and asks why the witness who says “she was not divorced” is needed, if one witness saying “she was divorced” in any case does not remove her from the presumption of being a married woman. Tosafot Yeshanim reject the explanation that the marriage is known only from their own mouths, because then the witness would have a migo, “for if he wanted, he could have remained silent,” and answer that the migo is not valid because “perhaps he wants to testify in order to disqualify her from the priesthood.” The lecturer brings Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s difficulty: either way, if she herself says “I am divorced,” she is already disqualified from the priesthood by the law of self-imposed prohibition; and if she says “I was never betrothed,” this raises a discussion similar to “whoever says ‘I never borrowed’ is as one who says ‘I never repaid,’” and whether in prohibitions one can say that an admission was created regarding “she was not divorced.” Rabbi Akiva Eiger proposes a distinction: what works in monetary matters by the power of a litigant’s admission is not transferred in the same way to prohibition, because in prohibition “she never said that she was forbidden.”

End of the lecture and continuation

The lecturer concludes that the discussion has gone beyond the time allotted and refers to continuation in the summary, and announces that there will be no class on Thursday, “without making a vow,” with a promise to send material after he has thought about it.

Full Transcript

[Speaker B] What, is there some chance that classes will continue in this format even after the coronavirus ends?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Honestly, it actually doesn’t seem bad to me. It saves all the travel and all the fuss around it.

[Speaker B] And probably it’s much more convenient for the planet and for everyone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, actually in a small group I really think it’s perfectly fine. In a larger group I think there are differences that make things a bit harder. I don’t know.

[Speaker C] Aryeh, they asked us who could continue teaching on Zoom next semester too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then?

[Speaker C] They’re building a schedule for dividing up the classes, and really a lot of people chose Zoom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it’s convenient. Okay, just one note. As we already started, I think, last year or maybe two years ago—I don’t remember anymore—there’s going to be some kind of final assignment. At the moment, at least, I mean for those participating under the scholarship-student framework. Of course everyone else is also invited, but those participating as scholarship students are supposed to submit such an assignment, and in the end a grade will be given based, among other things, on the assignment. Those are the rector’s requirements. I think I’ll send it about a week before the end of the semester, because I don’t want it to interfere with our ongoing learning right now. And around the end of the semester, say another week and a half or something like that, I’ll ask to get it back. You’ll have about two weeks or so to work on it. Okay? I’ll simply choose a certain topic—I’ll already tell you—it’s the topic of whether the mother’s presumption helps a son or a daughter. I mentioned it in the topic of two against two with King Yannai, if you remember, so I’m just expanding a bit on what we discussed there. You’ll also be able to make some use of what we said there, and expand a bit—questions on this matter, some sources and questions on this matter. In other words, it’s basically like, let’s call it, a home assignment; it’s not writing an article. So it’s fine, I’m not expecting any special problems. There may be things there that are a little more difficult, but everyone according to what she can do—no need to panic over it. Okay, so I’ll send that, as I said, around a week before the end of the semester, something like that. Okay, we’re dealing with the matter of self-imposed prohibition. So we saw the question—if we saw it—a dispute over whether one coerces in the case of self-imposed prohibition. We talked about there being some kind of subjective credibility here, and the question is whether all we have here is simply a statement telling us that a person has to obey Jewish law, which is seemingly what is written in this rule of self-imposed prohibition: if you think this thing is pork, then don’t eat it. Right? A kind of statement like that. But as I said, as we saw, it can’t just be that, otherwise there is no place at all for this principle. One of the obvious implications is coercion by the religious court—that the religious court, even if you yourself do not want to act this way, will force you to act this way—which already means that this is not merely the duty to behave in accordance with Jewish law, but that there is some determination here that a person can determine his own prohibited status, or the status of his sphere. And we saw that maybe there is a dispute between the Shulchan Arukh and Maimonides, possibly depending on whether Bnei Ahavah is right or not. And I said that this will probably depend on how we understand the law of self-imposed prohibition: is it credibility, or is it a vow? I already mentioned these two possibilities last time, and now I want to get into them a little more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the first source for this matter is a responsum of Mahari Bash. Okay: “Although in my other investigations I have dealt with them at length, at present I do not have the strength to put them into writing. But what I have concluded concerning the essence of the law in the second inquiry seems to be as follows: In every place where they said ‘he made himself into a forbidden object’—self-imposed prohibition—it is possible that this touches the law of prohibitory vows.” In other words, he claims that this credibility of self-imposed prohibition is some kind of vow-taking. The person vows that this thing will be forbidden to him, and therefore it is valid. It is not on the plane of credibility rules, but on the plane of obligations created by vows. This of course raises a difficulty, which he himself senses, and he says: “Even though it is not actually exactly like a vow, for we do not find in such cases annulment by a sage.” After all, if this were a vow, then you could go to a sage who would release you from the vow. In the law of self-imposed prohibition, we don’t find that one goes to a sage who annuls the vow. More than that: in various places where the Talmud asks, wait, how can it be that we do or do not coerce him—what’s the problem? It could say that he went to a sage who released him from the vow, and everything is fine.

[Speaker D] Couldn’t he simply release himself with a plausible explanation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, a plausible explanation is not annulment of a vow. A plausible explanation is an explanation to the religious court of what he meant.

[Speaker D] Fine, but if he brought a plausible explanation then he doesn’t need a sage at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So we saw in our Talmudic passage—

[Speaker D] So that’s even easier; he doesn’t need any release from a sage at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you need release from a sage in a case where I am not giving a plausible explanation for my words. I didn’t give a plausible explanation; I meant it seriously; and now I go to a sage and he releases me. Why do I need to get to a plausible explanation? A plausible explanation means that from the outset that was not at all what I meant to say. But release by a sage is not like that. Release by a sage means I said it, and the sage releases me. From the Talmud it’s clear that release by a sage does not help in a case of self-imposed prohibition, and so that is apparently a hint that we are not dealing here with a vow. So he says: “Even though it is not exactly like a vow, for we do not find in such cases annulment by a sage—perhaps they were stringent in these matters, like Samson-like Nazirite status, which is not subject to query.” Yes, maybe there is a certain type—Nazirite status is a kind of vow. Now there are two types of Nazirites: there is a regular Nazirite and there is a Samson-like Nazirite. A Samson-like Nazirite is like what we know from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh): his parents basically—he was a Nazirite from the womb; his parents basically already received instructions to vow Nazirite status on his behalf, and when he was born he was already a Nazirite. It’s not that he accepted Nazirite status upon himself, like a regular Nazirite. Such a Nazirite cannot be queried for release. There is no release by a sage; it is something fixed. It cannot be changed. So he says: maybe they were stringent in these matters, like Samson-like Nazirite status. It is some kind of vow that, for some reason, cannot be annulled. And he also says: after that he retracts and says: “But one can also say that there is no need to come to the passage of vows, for it is only by the law of a litigant’s admission, for he is like a hundred witnesses, even in matters of prohibition insofar as it concerns himself.” In other words, the principle of a litigant’s admission is stated not only regarding money—where I admit to someone that I owe him money—but also regarding prohibition. And again, notice the connection he makes, just as Ketzot does, between a litigant’s admission and self-imposed prohibition. Because he himself feels there is a big difference between a litigant’s admission and self-imposed prohibition. Why? Because a litigant’s admission is in the monetary realm. And in the monetary realm I can always take my hundred shekels and give them as a gift to whomever I want. But I cannot give someone prohibited statuses as gifts. That is, prohibitions do not depend on what I want or do not want; the Torah determines prohibitions. Therefore, with a litigant’s admission I am willing to accept that a person has credibility, because in the end he can also just give those hundred shekels as a gift if he wants to someone else. There is nothing principled here. But in prohibitions, seemingly, I should be speaking about credibility, not about the ability to give gifts. I am not giving as a gift someone who is forbidden to me or to whom I am forbidden. Okay? So therefore you can speak in terms of a vow—that’s what he said above—but here he says: maybe not a vow, but credibility. And what does credibility mean? In a litigant’s admission you can give a gift of one hundred shekels, but in prohibitions what does credibility mean? The question is whether it is really forbidden or not forbidden. So he says that even though verbally this is not about money, with respect to prohibition a person is believed about what concerns himself. And that of course brings us back to the question of what the basis of a litigant’s admission is in monetary law. Because there too we saw the dispute between Mahari ben Lev and Ketzot already several lectures ago, where Mahari ben Lev claims that this too is a kind of obligation, like a kind of vow—an obligation to give a gift. When I admit that I owe you one hundred shekels, I am not believed that I owe you one hundred shekels, because I am an interested party and a single witness; I cannot be believed. So then why? What is the basis of my credibility when I admit that I owe you one hundred shekels? I am giving you a gift. That is what Mahari ben Lev says. After all, I can give you one hundred shekels as a gift, so it’s not that I really borrowed from you; we do not accept that admission as testimony, as an indication that this was in fact reality. But if you want to obligate yourself to give one hundred shekels, then fine, obligate yourself to give one hundred shekels. And here—so says Mahari ben Lev. Ketzot brings very strong proofs against him, and in the end Ketzot argues: no, this is credibility, not obligation. It truly is an innovation from “that he says, ‘this is it,’” from which they derive partial admission, that the Torah innovates that a person has complete credibility in the area that concerns himself. In other words, it is credibility, not obligation. Once that is so, there is no obstacle to saying the same thing about self-imposed prohibition. If it is obligation—a litigant’s admission—then of course with money I can obligate whatever money I want to whomever I want, but from that one cannot learn anything about prohibitions. Unless we say that in prohibitions it is some kind of vow, which parallels the obligation in money—a vow is an obligation in the sphere of prohibition. But if it is not a vow, as he said—after all it is not subject to query, you cannot release this vow—then if it is not in the category of vows, there is no basis to compare a litigant’s admission to self-imposed prohibition. But if we understand that even in a litigant’s admission this is credibility, not obligation—even though I am an interested party and only one witness, the Torah innovated that regarding myself I have credibility like a hundred witnesses—well, if the Torah innovated that, then it could certainly be that this innovation applies to prohibition as well and not only to money: that regarding myself I have credibility, meaning I clarify reality like a hundred witnesses. Then there is no need to resort to this innovation of a vow. Yes.

[Speaker E] Is there a situation, say in monetary matters too, where my credibility can be doubtful if there is concern that I have some interest in the matter? Never mind—I’m not just giving him money, but I say that I’m repaying a debt, and really I don’t owe him anything, but I’m just trying to look good to him, I don’t know, all kinds of things, to give him a bribe in that way—if there is suspicion, then the credibility also won’t be absolute.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. Could be. If there is suspicion, then really not. For example, the Talmud says that if he hears that witnesses are on their way—in other words, someone comes to admit, but he already knows that two witnesses are on their way to the religious court, and he quickly runs to admit—there indeed we will not accept his admission, because we know he is doing it as a kind of legal trick, because he already knows that we have witnesses; nothing will help. So where there is suspicion, it may indeed be that we will not accept his admission, according to the side that says this is credibility. According to the side that says this is obligation, then it has nothing to do with suspicion: he wants to obligate himself, so he obligated himself. That is exactly one of the practical differences that can exist. So he said: if indeed in a litigant’s admission we understand it as credibility and not as obligation, if so, it can be extended also to prohibitions, and then self-imposed prohibition does not even need its own source—we derive it from that same verse of a litigant’s admission, “that he says, ‘this is it,’” as I mentioned.

[Speaker B] According to Mahari ben Lev, can’t that be extended to prohibitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Say that again?

[Speaker B] According to Mahari ben Lev, since it’s kind of like a vow, can’t it also be extended to prohibitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it can. On the contrary. Mahari ben Lev argues that just as in a litigant’s admission this thing is obligation and not credibility, so too in self-imposed prohibition it cannot be credibility. Because if at all it is credibility, that would be learned from a litigant’s admission; and if a litigant’s admission itself is obligation and not credibility, then what about self-imposed prohibition? So self-imposed prohibition has to be a vow. So he joins the first opinion of Mahari Basan. Okay? Now in Ketzot it really goes along exactly the same lines. Ketzot is a better-known source. Mahari Basan, by the way, if I remember correctly, was the teacher of Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto. Although there were two Mahari Basans, so I don’t know—it was Rabbi Yeshayahu Basan and Rabbi Yechiel Basan. I don’t remember which one, but I think it was the teacher of Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto. So he came before Ketzot and Mahari ben Lev. And in Mahari ben Lev and in Ketzot it is the same thing, exactly along those two tracks. Mahari ben Lev says: there is no such thing as credibility; a person is one witness and an interested party, he cannot be believed about himself. So in monetary matters how do we understand the credibility of a litigant’s admission? It is obligation. In self-imposed prohibition, how do we understand it? Behold, it is prohibition; there is no obligation in prohibition. Is there obligation in prohibition? Yes—vow. So he works on the plane of vow. Ketzot argues against Mahari ben Lev, exactly like the second opinion here in Mahari Basan. And Ketzot says: no, even in a litigant’s admission it is credibility, and consequently in the law of self-imposed prohibition too one can say that this is credibility. There is an innovation that a person is believed regarding himself like a hundred witnesses—meaning, absolute credibility. And that is what Ketzot concludes. I’ll maybe enlarge the font here a little: “And some wrote that also in the law of self-imposed prohibition,” our passage in Ketubot 22, “it too is by the law of a vow. But I saw in Maharit, part 3, a responsum of Maharit, that he rejected this.” And he wrote that if it were by the law of a vow, query for annulment would work for it. Exactly the same point as Mahari Basan. He says: it cannot be a vow, otherwise one could go to a sage and ask release. And according to our approach, says Ketzot, also in the law of self-imposed prohibition it is by the law of credibility. For since the Torah gave every person credibility regarding himself, then whether in money or in prohibition, he is always believed regarding himself. In other words, exactly the same move as we see in Mahari Basan—the direction that does not accept the answer Mahari Basan suggested, that this is like Samson-like Nazirite status, where they were stringent here so that one cannot query and release this vow, and then you can remain with the model of a vow without the difficulty of why it cannot be annulled. Maharit and Ketzot do not accept that. They say: where would one get a source for such a thing? Samson-like Nazirite status has some source. But where is the source for saying that when a person makes a vow in self-imposed prohibition it cannot be annulled for him? Why not? If it is a vow, then it is a regular vow. Why shouldn’t it be possible to release it? What is the problem? What Mahari Basan says is really quite forced, and therefore they say it is unlikely to be a vow. If it is not a vow, then what is it? Apparently credibility. If it is credibility, then the source is a litigant’s admission, like a hundred witnesses, where too it is credibility. And then he disagrees with Mahari ben Lev also regarding a litigant’s admission, that the whole thing is credibility and not a vow and not an obligation.

[Speaker B] Can I ask something? Yes, of course. These two possibilities are formalistic, legal-halakhic possibilities. But could there also be another explanation? Maybe it’s not only credibility, but something psychological. In other words, once a person is convinced that this is forbidden to him, then I don’t think from what halakhic or legal side he has to obey that prohibition—it’s just that inwardly it is forbidden to him. And that is a bit similar to what you said in the past: why can someone who saw an event not be a judge in capital cases? Because he knows what happened and he cannot turn that into acquittal. So here too, this person knows. In other words, we are not discussing that knowledge, but as far as he himself is concerned, he knows. So I don’t have to analyze it halakhically—for example later, with the woman we saw, she knows she was raped. Even if for various halakhic reasons I say that it is not relevant and I do not hear her, she knows she is forbidden to her husband. So in the previous lecture—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the previous lecture we talked about that. That is what we will also see here later. We do not feed a person something forbidden to him. In other words, if he thinks it is forbidden to him, you cannot force him to do it, even though perhaps you have no proof—but as for him, the presumption is that he knows it. So it could be that we will not accept it in the laws of evidence, but you cannot force a person to do something that, according to him, is prohibited. I had an argument about this with Yael Eigenberg, yes, in the previous lecture, about the relationship between the husband and the wife there. Right? How can it be that they instruct the husband to divorce the wife? So we discussed it. But here you need to pay careful attention, because what you are saying basically takes me back to the conception I rejected at the beginning of the lecture, or already in the previous lecture: the conception that what exists in the law of self-imposed prohibition is nothing more than the obligation to obey Jewish law. In other words, the person says he knows that it is forbidden, so fine, they tell him: very good, act accordingly. No—but in the law of self-imposed prohibition we see that there is something beyond that, in the fact that the religious court, for example, coerces him. In other words, he does not want to do it, and the religious court will force him to act in accordance with his statement. Leave him alone—if it is only his right to behave as he understands, then why are you interfering in his life? Let him do what he understands, and if he doesn’t, then the Holy One, blessed be He, will settle accounts with him. We see that no—this is treated as actual credibility. That is, the religious court even intervenes, perhaps coerces and so on, which means that there is something beyond merely giving a person the possibility of acting as he wants or thinks is right. Therefore I think that is not enough. Obviously that factor also exists, but it is not enough. It will be that factor in addition to the law of self-imposed prohibition. In other words, beyond the law of self-imposed prohibition, in a place where we want to force a person to do something that according to him is forbidden, that we will not be able to do because of your principle—which is also correct. But it does not exhaust the whole law of self-imposed prohibition. And in the law of self-imposed prohibition there is something beyond that.

[Speaker B] You’re talking about coercion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. In other words, it cannot be that we force a person—we do not feed a person something forbidden to him, which is a valid principle. I’m only claiming that this is not from the law of self-imposed prohibition. In other words, it is something else that is also true. In other words, it may be here that divorcing his wife—I might be able to obligate him to divorce his wife, maybe yes. But to obligate him not to divorce his wife—that is, to live with her even though according to him she is forbidden to him—that is problematic. So we cannot force a person to do something that according to him is forbidden to him. So I’m saying that this can definitely be a valid principle; I think it is correct, but it is not the law of self-imposed prohibition. These are two different things. Because here we are speaking about a situation where, in the law of self-imposed prohibition, the person himself does not want to do what follows from his statement, and the religious court will force him to do it. You are talking about the opposite situation, where the religious court is trying to force him to do something against his statement. Then one says: you cannot force him—after all, he thinks it is forbidden, how can you coerce him to do something—and it is forbidden. Fine, that is a correct principle, I just don’t think that is what is written in the law of self-imposed prohibition. We’ll see later the Ran and others.

[Speaker D] I have a technical question. If the woman—if the woman is forbidden to her husband, say because she was raped—then is she also forbidden? From her side is there also a prohibition, or only from his side?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From both of them, from both of them. All sexual prohibitions are prohibitions upon both sides equally. That is a general Talmudic rule. Except—there is one place that is exceptional, and some other subtle argument of Avnei Nezer that I don’t exactly remember, maybe about a second-generation Egyptian convert, something. But the straightforward case is the designated maidservant. In the case of a designated maidservant, when someone has relations with her, then she transgressed a prohibition and the man who had relations with her did not transgress a prohibition. According to the ruling of Jewish law—there is a dispute in the Talmud—but the Jewish law ruling is that the man did not transgress a prohibition; he has to bring a guilt-offering, but there is no negative commandment on him. So that is the only place I know of where there is asymmetry in sexual prohibitions. But the general rule is that it is symmetric. Let’s continue for a moment. In the Talmud in Ketubot 9—I didn’t want to bring you into that because it’s a somewhat complicated passage—but the Talmud in Ketubot 9 talks about a husband who married a woman, and on the first night he discovered that she had already had relations. So he comes to the religious court and says, “I found an open entrance.” “I found an open entrance” has two implications: first, if she was already not a virgin, then her ketubah is one hundred and not two hundred—that we discussed at the beginning of the year; and second, if she was raped while married to him after betrothal, or had relations—if he is a priest, then even if she was raped; if he is an Israelite, then if she had relations willingly while under him—then she is forbidden to him and he must send her away. Now if a person says, “I found an open entrance,” this has two implications: one in prohibition and one in money. Now there are situations in which we do not accept his claim. We do not accept his claim, “I found an open entrance.” So on that the Talmud says: nevertheless he is believed to forbid her to himself. And Rashi there explains that this is by the law of self-imposed prohibition. If he himself says that she is forbidden to him, even though we will not accept that, for example, with regard to saying that she is not entitled to her ketubah, we will accept it with regard to the fact that, for him, she is forbidden to him. One cannot force him to have relations with her when according to him she is forbidden.

[Speaker E] So there in the same way he is also forbidden to her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but she can say, “I don’t—I don’t agree. I think—I did not have relations. He is claiming that I did.” So if he claims it, then he has forbidden her to himself. But we in the religious court, or the woman herself, are not obligated to accept that. So they say: on the one hand, from the monetary standpoint he will have to pay the ketubah, because we do not really accept his claim. On the other hand, according to him she really is forbidden to him. You cannot force a person to do an act that according to him is forbidden. That is exactly the argument we had in the previous lecture. So regarding that it says there—

[Speaker E] But in this case it could be that he still—her husband—she didn’t say that he is forbidden, but he turned himself into someone who would be committing a prohibition, because of self-imposed prohibition. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can’t be otherwise—that is what is written in the Talmud. He is believed to forbid her to himself, meaning that if he has relations with her, he transgresses a prohibition, even though she would not transgress a prohibition. Because according to her—what do you mean, she would not transgress? The Holy One, blessed be He, knows whether she had relations or not. But according to her, if she did not have relations, she transgressed no prohibition. Because reality is reality, and what the person accepted upon himself is something else.

[Speaker C] She is harmed in this situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker C] Meaning, if he forbids himself to her and she claims she was not violated, then although he has indeed forbidden himself to her, she’s also harmed by this, because she doesn’t have marital relations on that level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Right. That’s the dilemma. And there are debates around this too, including the Ran that we saw at the end of Nedarim. The Ran we saw at the end of Nedarim also talks about this issue. I lowered things a bit on my end, maybe the feedback is doing something. In any case, so the Ran. Yes, so the Ran in Nedarim—we’ll see this later—there really are debates around this, because here there really is a dilemma. In other words, Yael is right, Yael Elkayim is right, that on the one hand you can’t force a person to consume something forbidden, something that according to his own view is forbidden. On the other hand, the woman has her rights too, beyond the ketubah, which of course she’ll receive and which he cannot harm, but still, she also has the right to remain married. Meaning, she too is a party in this matter. But here you have to remember that at least from the standpoint of Torah law, the situation between husband and wife is not symmetrical. Meaning, when the husband decides, he can divorce her even without her consent, and therefore in that sense the other side doesn’t really exist. You may not like that, but from the standpoint of Jewish law, the woman has no say in this matter. In the Shitah Mekubetzet there on page 9, there are many discussions about self-imposed prohibition. So in the Shitah Mekubetzet: once he comes to court and says that she is forbidden to him and that he does not desire her, she becomes forbidden to him. And even though by law she is permitted to him, it is like forbidding to himself something that is permitted. By strict law she is permitted to him—why? Because we do not accept his claim in the evidentiary sense. ‘I found an open entrance’—he is not believed to say that; he is only believed to forbid her to himself. So the Shitah Mekubetzet asks: what happens then? After all, in reality, from our standpoint, she was not violated. So what does it mean that she became forbidden to him? So he says: although by law she is permitted to him, it is like forbidding to himself something that is permitted. What does that mean? It means it’s like a vow, right? The simple understanding is that this is exactly like the Meiri in Shabbat—that there is a vow here. There too later on—you’ll see afterward in the note if you want in the summary—there is more evidence that the Shitah Mekubetzet is going in the direction of a vow. Quite a few later authorities take that direction, and it’s very interesting.

[Speaker D] I didn’t understand why in a case where, say, she really was a virgin at the time of marriage, why in that case there’s no injury to her dignity, beyond the monetary injury—to her reputation, if later she wants to marry someone else, she’ll get a reputation that she…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is—who said there isn’t? There is injury.

[Speaker D] So why… is this something where they basically don’t take that damage into account at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they do take it into account. It could be that afterward, it could be that afterward she could sue him in civil court for damage to her good name, but that has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of the prohibition.

[Speaker D] The injury will still remain there, and she’ll still…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so he’ll have to compensate her for the injury, but there’s nothing to be done. There’s nothing to be done. In the end, from his point of view she is considered forbidden to him. We can’t force a person to consume something that according to him is forbidden, or to have marital relations… And maybe he’s just lying?

[Speaker D] Maybe he’s just lying because suddenly he didn’t like her skin color when he…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if he—he doesn’t need to lie, he can divorce her if he wants. It’s really far-fetched. After all, if he wants, he can divorce her whenever he wants, whenever he decides.

[Speaker D] So the difference would be the ketubah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] The difference would be the ketubah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The ketubah she receives in any case. He is not believed to say ‘I found an open entrance.’ He is only believed to forbid her to himself, but she will receive the ketubah. Also not…

[Speaker D] Even if she… even if it really was an open entrance she’ll receive two hundred zuz? Of course, of course.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not if the opening is open—if he claims an open entrance. He claims it, and because he is not believed, she will lose nothing from her rights. But according to his own view, since she is forbidden to him, you cannot force a person to have relations with someone forbidden to him. And you have to keep remembering in the background: the moment a man decides, he can divorce his wife against her will. Meaning, it’s not that we can protect her here; he can say, without all these excuses, ‘I don’t want her, take a bill of divorce and go home.’ That too he can do. So that always has to be remembered in the background. By the way, in truth, were it not for this law, as Yael objected earlier, were it not for this law, then it could be that we also would not allow him to stop having relations with her. After all, this is her right; she married him. The fact that he decided she is forbidden to him—fine, good for him—but she does not admit that she is forbidden to him, so by what right does he violate her rights? The claim is that these are not her rights, because if he can divorce her against her will, then everything depends on him. Therefore it is really only his right and not hers.

[Speaker D] But maybe there’s the commandment of conjugal obligation? What do you mean? Even if he doesn’t want to divorce her, he doesn’t want to live…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if he doesn’t want to divorce her, then he can’t; he is obligated to fulfill the conjugal commandment. But he can divorce her.

[Speaker D] I found a question also later in the Talmudic text, but it connects for me to now. If the woman says, ‘I am impure to you,’ right? Then she is essentially forbidding herself, and afterward she retracts. And now the Talmudic text doesn’t believe her. The Talmudic text knows she is impure, and the Talmudic text says we don’t believe her. Why? Maybe she has set her eyes on someone else and wants to go with someone else. Now why is that different from this case? She knows she is forbidden, and we said that from her side too there is a categorical prohibition…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So about that I said, that’s…

[Speaker D] What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …what I just said. We’ll get to that later when we get to the Talmudic text there. But that’s what I said here: there is asymmetry between husband and wife. We said there is symmetry except for one case. No—symmetry in the prohibition. There is asymmetry in the marital bond in the sense that when the husband decides, he can divorce his wife even if she does not agree. The woman cannot get divorced without the husband’s agreement. What does that… wait, wait, she knows, she really knows that she is forbidden, and they force her…

[Speaker D] …to continue. It’s a little crazy.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yael, Yael, let me explain. Yael, let me explain. Yael, let me explain. So I’m saying: where the woman comes and forbids herself to the husband, she has no such power, because we do not give her the power to harm the husband’s rights. The husband is entitled to the right that she help him fulfill procreation. And she cannot divorce him against his will, so since that is so, the fact that she determined that she is forbidden to her husband—with all due respect—that still does not give her the right to harm the husband’s rights. But when the husband comes and says, ‘I found an open entrance,’ apparently it’s the same thing—he is harming the woman’s rights. Not so. She does not have such rights, because after all he can divorce her even if he simply decides to without any ‘open entrance,’ just because he doesn’t feel like it. So therefore he is not harming any right of hers; he can do this to her anyway. So the basic asymmetry between husband and wife—and I’ll say again, it’s clear to me that you don’t like this, and I don’t like it either, but that is the Jewish law. Assuming that that is the Jewish law, there is asymmetry here in their relationship. When the woman comes and wants to forbid herself to the husband, she cannot do such a thing, because then basically—do you understand what that means? It basically means that if the woman wants to divorce even though the Torah does not give her the option to do this against the husband’s will, she can simply say ‘I am forbidden to you’ and that’s it, and then we will have to force him to divorce her. But she has no authority to divorce herself from him. By contrast, the husband can divorce her in any case. So if the husband comes and says ‘this woman is forbidden to me,’ we also have no suspicion that he is lying, because what is the suspicion? That perhaps he wants to divorce her? If you wanted to divorce her, you could have divorced her without this too. There’s no suspicion here at all. So the initial asymmetry, which may be immoral and outrageous and all that—but once we have posited it—has many consequences further on.

[Speaker E] Meaning, maybe here there’s a flaw, that if the Sages want to preserve the family and we suspect that she set her eyes on someone else, regarding the husband there’s no such suspicion—that he set his eyes on another woman; he can take her…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing, the same thing. Not only can he take her, he can also divorce the first one, he can do everything.

[Speaker E] Wait, let’s say that not according to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sages are not pleased with divorce,

[Speaker E] there was such a flaw—maybe there could be such a rationale with regard to the husband?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree…

[Speaker E] …with both things,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m only saying that to divorce as well he…

[Speaker E] can. He falls in love with someone else, he’ll take a second wife, fine…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree, I agree. I’m only saying that he can also divorce the first one. He can do both… right, both things together—both divorcing a woman against her will and also…

[Speaker B] …marrying a second wife—that’s from the same heart of the Jewish law. Rabbeinu Gershom made the situation more symmetrical. By the way, today after the ruling of Rabbeinu…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Gershom, it’s a big question whether this law would in fact change following Rabbeinu Gershom, because as we said here, basically the situation really should be symmetrical. Just as the woman cannot harm the husband, the husband also should not be able to harm the woman. But the argument was that since the husband can divorce her against her will or take another wife in addition to her, that is not considered harming her. But today, after the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom, she already has rights. Today the husband cannot divorce her against her will. Here it may very well be that the situation becomes symmetrical, and even if the husband forbids her to himself, perhaps we would not agree to it. It’s a big question, because it depends on what the basis of Rabbeinu Gershom’s prohibition is.

[Speaker C] What, are there cases—and we see them in day-to-day life—where the husband does not want to divorce the woman but he forbids himself to her and rebels, maybe a rebellious husband?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so the religious court…

[Speaker C] …forces him—so the religious court will force him to divorce. Yes, but many times they remain like this, chained… In the time of the Sages, Yael, this happened less.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the time of the Sages they would beat him until he arranged the matter. Today we are delicate. There was once an article in Makor Rishon by Rabbi Shilat from Ma’ale Adumim, where he suggested that with the problem of the recalcitrant husband, they should beat him—simply give him faithful blows until…

[Speaker F] It appeared in homes and in the media…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, it was in Makor Rishon, and there were all kinds of shocked reactions to it, I remember Aviad HaCohen and others—what do you mean, how can that be? In my eyes that’s such ridiculous self-righteousness. After all, the man is leaving her chained for her whole life, and of course you don’t want to hurt democracy and give him blows—give him blows until he gives the bill of divorce that he is obligated to give, that the law obligates him to give and Jewish law obligates him to give. What do you mean? If a person were chasing me to kill me, would you not kill him because in a democratic state we don’t kill people? We kill a pursuer. So this man is a pursuer, and once he is a pursuer—excellent, I’m entirely in favor of giving him faithful blows until he gives the bill of divorce. That’s all. But fine, those are really comments that don’t concern us here.

[Speaker G] In any case, I have a question about what Yael said. So basically they really are forcing her to consume something forbidden against her will.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again?

[Speaker D] Meaning, to force her to consume something forbidden…

[Speaker G] I said…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …that I’m not sure. It’s…

[Speaker G] …a dispute there in that topic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There in Nedarim, if you saw—and we’ll see it later—I’m only saying that there is such a side there. In the husband’s case there is no such side, because he can divorce her anyway. With the woman it’s disputed; we’ll see later. Fine.

[Speaker G] Here, I have another question though regarding the ‘open entrance.’ Suppose that after he forbade himself in court and everything, they brought him proof, I don’t know, and convinced him that she is not forbidden to him—can he now simply…?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: apparently in the law of self-imposed prohibition there is the law of a plausible explanation. So if I can succeed in giving an explanation for why I said ‘open entrance’—because I was mistaken about this or mistaken about that—then there’s no problem. It’s like a plausible explanation. And then it goes back to being permitted. It’s no worse than a plausible explanation. Someone who says it’s by the law of a vow, for example—someone who says it’s by the law of a vow—that goes back to Idit’s earlier comment, because someone who says it’s by the law of a vow would apparently say: I vowed; that has nothing to do with whether it was really true or not true. Bottom line, I vowed, regardless of credibility. But even in a vow, if it becomes clear that I vowed based on mistaken information, then that is exactly a reason to open an opening and permit it. And then the law of a plausible explanation, what Idit wanted to say earlier, connects to the law of a sage’s release. And then even by the law of a vow, it would in fact be possible to release him from this. Fine.

[Speaker B] Rabbi, while you were speaking I suddenly realized something. Could it be that the husband is obligated in this like a rebellious elder? Meaning that even if they prove it to him, and even if they show him that this is not the Jewish law, as far as he himself is concerned he is obligated to do what he thinks is true?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if they proved it to him, then he no longer thinks it’s true.

[Speaker B] He still holds his view.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then they didn’t prove it to him.

[Speaker B] So I’m saying—is this a different kind of obligation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean by ‘different kind’? I’m asking what the case is. They proved to him that he is mistaken? He wasn’t convinced.

[Speaker B] Then they didn’t prove it to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if they didn’t prove it to him, then no—it’s the law of self-imposed prohibition.

[Speaker B] I’m saying: is it like a vow or like credibility? It’s that he thinks this is so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a view that it’s a vow and a view that it’s credibility. But no matter what proof you bring, if the husband doesn’t believe it and remains of his opinion, then it’s vow, credibility, whatever it is—but that’s it, that’s what he has to do. Beyond the whole question—the larger question is, and this really surprised me, I was happy to see this Noda B’Yehuda, because the whole discussion that the later authorities raise against the vow approach is basically the question: why don’t we find that this vow can be released? But I ask a totally different question: the man never intended to vow at all. Where did they come up with the idea that such a thing should be considered a vow? The man made a claim because he really thinks so. Did it enter his mind that he was making a vow? What does one have to do with the other? To make a vow—when I say by a vow that a certain loaf of bread is forbidden to me, yes?—then I intended to make a vow to forbid the loaf to myself; I did not mean to say that the loaf is actually forbidden. But when the husband says, ‘I found an open entrance,’ he really thinks the woman is actually forbidden to him. It’s not that he is vowing to forbid her even though she is really permitted—that would be a vow. But here he really thinks she is forbidden. How can one say that such a thing is a vow? It’s completely absurd. Just on the simplest level.

[Speaker B] Why do we need a rebellious elder to perform the Jewish law according to what he thinks, even though that’s not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s something else, because there there is the authority of the religious court, and the authority of the religious court determines the Jewish law no less than reality itself.

[Speaker B] But here? He’s forbidden to rule, but for himself he has to do what he thinks.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, so what? Fine. Because that’s what he truly thinks—so what’s the problem?

[Speaker B] Why here don’t I say there is an obligation to accept the authority of the religious court?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should he accept it? What’s the problem? The religious court has no authority over this. Over a private individual, the religious court has no authority in this.

[Speaker E] Let’s say it’s not a vow—but could it be some kind of oath that takes effect? A person is convinced that he ate, and then they explain to him that he really didn’t eat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s ‘a person in an oath, excluding one under compulsion’—the Talmudic text in Shevuot 26. The Talmudic text speaks there about an oath under compulsion, and the compulsion described there is an error. It’s someone who swore about something he didn’t know. And the Talmudic text calls this ‘a person in an oath, excluding one under compulsion.’

[Speaker E] Here in the end he thought it was an open entrance; afterward they explained to him that it was…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I said it. So you’re repeating what I asked.

[Speaker E] You’re repeating that—it’s similar, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re repeating my point. What I pointed out is exactly that. The man did not intend to vow. The man did not intend to vow at all. What he intended was to say that in truth the opening was open.

[Speaker E] Such an oath is not considered an oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not an oath at all. He didn’t intend to swear. It’s not that he swore on the basis of incorrect factual information. He didn’t swear at all.

[Speaker D] It’s a clarification of reality, basically, and not some intention of something. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is a vow? A vow means: I actually think this woman is permitted to me, but I vow to myself not to benefit from her or not to have relations with her—that’s called a vow. But here the man comes and says… So look at the assumption.

[Speaker G] Maybe it’s just this kind of mechanism—it’s like when we take on a stringency upon ourselves, and then when we decide to remove it, it’s just like what one does with a vow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, where does that mechanism come from? Is there a verse for it? Where did this invention come from? It has no source. It has no source. I didn’t intend to vow and nothing of the sort, and you’re deriving from the passage of vows that I’m obligated to uphold it—and on top of that there’s no release for it. There is no source that this is a vow, and certainly no source that it has no release. They invent two inventions one on top of the other and produce a tower built on air.

[Speaker D] Maybe there’s just logic in saying that a person who forbids something to himself—which is the meaning of this self-imposed prohibition—is similar to a vow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he does not forbid anything to himself. But Yael, he is not forbidding anything to himself—he simply thinks it is forbidden.

[Speaker D] No, it’s not the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To forbid to oneself means to take something that is permitted, that I know is permitted, and to vow to forbid myself with regard to it. That is called a vow. To say that when I testify about something as being a piece of pork, and then it turns out I was mistaken, I didn’t see correctly—did I intend to vow to forbid that piece to myself? Of course not. I just said what I think, and afterward it turned out I was mistaken, okay. So what does that have to do with a vow? For a vow, you have to intend to vow.

[Speaker D] Even with a vow, if you vowed by mistake then you go back…

[Speaker B] Think for a second,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t…

[Speaker B] …make a vow to eat only kosher. I mean, you wouldn’t suddenly say, ‘I vow to eat only kosher food,’ because obviously that’s the Jewish law and I won’t eat non-kosher.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—and again, no, no, that’s not the argument. That’s not the argument. I’m saying: if I vow on the basis of incorrect information, then Yael is right. I go to a sage and the sage finds the opening and says to me: if you had known the correct information, you would not have vowed, and then he nullifies the vow, releases the vow. But I claim that there is no need to use that mechanism here, because from the outset it’s not that I vowed on the basis of incorrect information—I didn’t vow at all. I didn’t intend to vow. Even if the information had been correct, I still didn’t intend to vow. What I intended was only to testify that this is the information, that this is the reality. That is something completely different from vowing. To vow is to say: actually a woman with an open entrance is permitted to me, but I vow that she is forbidden. Then if it turns out that her entrance was not open at all, one can come to a sage and say: look, my vow was based on mistaken information, so release me from the vow. But here I never intended to vow at all; I’m simply giving you information. It may be that I was mistaken, it may be that the information is wrong, but where was there any intention here to make a vow? What does this have to do with a vow at all? How can there be a vow without intention to vow?

[Speaker G] The mechanism is the same. The mechanism is the same, because basically by the law of status, by the general law, she is my wife and everything is fine, but because I know this information, in principle there is a prohibition on me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, but you’re inventing things. What do you mean there’s a prohibition on me? Where does that prohibition come from? From the passage of vows? No, but it’s the same mechanism. What—where, where does it come from? If it’s not from the passage of vows, then what do you mean it’s the same mechanism? This woman isn’t an ‘open entrance,’ so why should she be forbidden to me? Because I lied? Is this a sanction for lying? What? Why should she be forbidden to me? So if you derive this from the passage of vows, I don’t see how, because he did not intend to vow. And if it’s not from the passage of vows, then please bring another source. Where from? Why all of a sudden? The man never imagined, never dreamed of vowing. This thing is complete nonsense.

[Speaker G] Right, he really didn’t dream of vowing, but it’s the same thing because basically she is permitted, but she is forbidden to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, she is not forbidden; she is permitted…

[Speaker G] …and she remains permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, she is permitted and remains permitted. If I had a source saying she is forbidden to me, then I could say she is forbidden and apparently it’s similar to a vow. But you don’t have such a source. You derive the prohibition from the passage of vows even though you yourself are saying it’s not a vow. No, I derive the prohibition from the person’s reasoning, from the person who knows the facts. No, if he knows the facts then she really is forbidden to him, not because of a vow, but because he knows the facts. The fact that we as a religious court were not convinced—that’s the law of evidence, it’s unrelated. But for him, what obligates him to refrain is the regular prohibition, unrelated to the passage of vows, because a woman who was violated under him is forbidden to him. That’s all. But that’s because he takes it upon himself…

[Speaker G] No, he doesn’t take it upon…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …himself. He simply thinks it’s true. That’s exactly the difference. There is no taking upon himself here at all. A vow is taking something upon oneself. Here he has taken nothing upon himself; he simply thinks that this is reality. That is exactly the difference. There was no taking upon himself here at all.

[Speaker D] Basically, with a vow, the person knows that the thing is permitted to him and decides that from the moment I say it, it is forbidden. And in the case of self-imposed prohibition, the person actually thinks it’s forbidden—it’s not that there’s some possibility…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. It may be mistaken, it may be…

[Speaker D] …that he is simply mistaken,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …he may be mistaken, or he may actually be right, it’s just that we as a religious court do not know, because only he knows the reality—that doesn’t matter. But the whole mechanism here is not at all a mechanism of taking something upon oneself. The mechanism is the question of what reality actually is. Therefore there is no connection. To say this is a vow is simply absurd. There is no such thing. All the later authorities can stand here in a chorus—it simply cannot be. That’s what the Noda B’Yehuda says here. I was very happy to see him at last, because others really ask this question or that question—but that’s not the point. Forget the point; where does the vow come from in the first place? He didn’t intend to vow. And what he wanted to innovate—I’m reading: ‘As for what is said, that self-imposed prohibition is by reason of vow and consecration, with all due respect for his honor’—look at the sharpness—‘I saw in his argumentation that he is mighty among the mighty, that you are a man among men, in sharpness and expertise and also with clear and upright intellect—what did he see to come to such nonsense?’ I see that you are such a great Torah scholar, sharp and expert. How did such nonsense come out of your mouth—that you say such a thing is a vow, on the basis of vow? ‘And although he saw this idea in a responsum of the Maharit, did the Maharit say it? The Maharit did not say it. He only brought it in the wording “and one cannot say,” and rejected it.’ Meaning, the Maharit actually brought this possibility in order to explain that such a thing cannot exist, and he rejected it. So where did this nonsense come from? And indeed, says the Noda B’Yehuda—and this really takes the words out of my mouth—indeed, without any need for refutation, why do we need to bring proofs against it? How can this be? The matter is not acceptable. What vow, what expression of oath or consecration is there here? And by what mechanism? He built some kind of mechanism here of vow—what does that have to do with anything? Why do I need difficulties that refute this principle that we are dealing with a vow? Explain to me how one can even speak here of a vow, and then we’ll look for difficulties and answers. If someone says on Monday that today is Sabbath, will he be forbidden from labor by reason of a vow? Suppose someone comes on Monday and thinks today is Sabbath. No—if he says, I know it’s Monday and I accept upon myself to act on Monday as if it is Sabbath, that’s a vow. But if someone comes and gets confused and thinks that although today is Monday, he thinks it is Sabbath—so he comes to court and testifies: today is Sabbath. So what, are we now going to obligate him to keep the thirty-nine primary categories of labor and their derivatives? What kind of thing is that? It simply doesn’t begin. It’s complete nonsense. So he says: ‘And if that were so, how could Rabbi Akiva tell Rabbi Yehoshua to go to Rabban Gamliel on the Day of Atonement that fell according to his own calculation?’ After all, he says to him—Rabbi Yehoshua said, today is the Day of Atonement, and Rabban Gamliel said, absolutely not, today is not the Day of Atonement. So Rabbi Akiva says to Rabbi Yehoshua: go to Rabban Gamliel on the Day of Atonement as it falls according to your calculation, go beyond the boundary, desecrate the Day of Atonement in order to show that you accept the authority of Rabban Gamliel. The Noda B’Yehuda makes a wonderful argument. He says: what does that have to do with it? I accept the authority of Rabban Gamliel, but by the law of self-imposed prohibition, it is forbidden for me to desecrate this day even though it is not the Day of Atonement, because this is the law of a vow. I vowed that this is the Day of Atonement. There is no Day of Atonement and no nonsense—there is no vow here at all. And why should we not say of Rabbi Yehoshua…?

[Speaker G] That’s not a good example, because Israel determines the appointed times.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with it?

[Speaker G] That’s exactly why it’s a good example. Here, now you explained why this example is wonderful. Because if this thing were a vow by the law of self-imposed prohibition, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has nothing whatsoever to do with whether Israel determines the appointed times. Rabbi Yehoshua vowed that this day, for him, is like the Day of Atonement even though it is not the Day of Atonement. So why should I care that Rabban Gamliel is really authorized to determine when the Day of Atonement is? He took upon himself a vow to behave today like the Day of Atonement. Exactly what you’re saying—that is the Noda B’Yehuda’s argument. It’s a great argument, a wonderful example.

[Speaker E] And then he says: but how are we to understand why self-imposed prohibition really doesn’t work here—why, because he is sure that today is the Day of Atonement, how can we force him to eat a piece?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what Noa said earlier. The one who determines what is the Day of Atonement is the president of the Sanhedrin. And even if you are sure that today is the Day of Atonement, it doesn’t matter, because ‘you’—even if in error, ‘you’—even if intentional. So if the president of the Sanhedrin determines that today is not the Day of Atonement, then it is not the Day of Atonement even if you are right.

[Speaker E] Ah—if they were to determine that this pork is a lamb…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—only with sanctifying the month and intercalating the year. Because there is a verse: ‘which you shall proclaim in their appointed times,’ and ‘them’ is written without a vav, so it can be read as ‘you.’ You—even if in error, you—even if intentional.

[Speaker E] But in the case where he said that Monday is Sabbath, it could be that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, according to the vow approach, apparently the same thing could apply. But here, according to self-imposed prohibition, according to the mechanism of self-imposed prohibition, it could very well be that he would have to keep Sabbath on that Monday.

[Speaker D] Why? Sabbath is from Creation, it’s not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either he vowed, or he is believed, or whatever it is—all the mechanisms of self-imposed prohibition could perhaps apply there too. But to force the person to go on the Day of Atonement that falls according to his own calculation—if this is a vow, you can’t do such a thing. And that’s what he says: ‘And why should we not say that Rabbi Yehoshua rendered himself a forbidden object by reason of a vow?’ Rather, certainly all this is nonsense. He says it in very sharp language; he says it does not belong here at all, it is simply absurd. ‘And what we say, “he rendered himself a forbidden object,” is because a person is believed about himself’—like the Noda B’Yehuda, like the Ketzot HaChoshen, like the Mahari Basan—that the meaning is like a litigant’s admission. Okay?

[Speaker G] But the fact is that in another example he wouldn’t have been able to do this, as Nehama asked. If it were pork, then they could not force him to eat it, if the argument is whether it is pork or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] Why is this a good example?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] This example is esoteric because in fact it’s about the authority of the religious court. But if, for example, they were arguing about whether the Oven of Akhnai—I don’t know—something that in essence is something, whether it is… well, the Oven of Akhnai also isn’t… but something I am sure is forbidden to me or not, a piece of pork, they could not force him to do it. And that is exactly the point. But precisely for that reason only this example is relevant. Why? Because in this example they tell me: look, this is an exceptional example. Here Rabban Gamliel really could force him to go on the Day of Atonement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They could not force him to eat the pork. But on the Day of Atonement he could. The Noda B’Yehuda asks: why? On the Day of Atonement too he should have been unable to. If it’s by the law of a vow, then what difference is there between the Day of Atonement and pork? You distinguish between the Day of Atonement and pork because the Day of Atonement is determined by the religious court, whereas pork is determined by reality. But if this is by the law of a vow, then that distinction is irrelevant. Because even regarding the Day of Atonement I vowed that for me this day is the Day of Atonement, and therefore Rabban Gamliel would not have been able to force him there either. On the contrary—that’s the argument. Therefore he says this is not… Then he says afterward: ‘And what he objected—that this is understandable only where there are not two witnesses contradicting him—that too is nonsense.’ Because the one who objected to the Noda B’Yehuda said: what happens if two witnesses come against that one person making a claim of self-imposed prohibition? From that he wanted… So the one making the claim of self-imposed prohibition would still have to guard himself from the prohibition even though there are two witnesses saying it is not forbidden. Okay? So the questioner to the Noda B’Yehuda says: look, from here we see it is a vow. Because if it were credibility, there is no credibility that works against two witnesses. The two witnesses told you it is permitted, so what’s the problem? We see that it is a vow, and therefore by a vow I forbade it to myself even though in reality it is permitted. So the Noda B’Yehuda says: that too is nonsense. That too is nonsense. ‘And a person is believed about himself more than two witnesses.’ Where did we see that? In a litigant’s admission. When a person admits in a litigant’s admission and two witnesses come to say he is not liable, he still has to pay. His admission overrides two witnesses, exactly like in self-imposed prohibition. ‘And therefore in a matter that is impossible, such as one who says that an ordinary day is Sabbath or the Day of Atonement, we do not say that he rendered himself a forbidden object,’ because this is credibility and not a vow. If it were a vow, then even in a matter that is impossible, like the Day of Atonement—here he feels Noa’s point in the comment—even in a matter that is impossible, like the Day of Atonement, we still would say self-imposed prohibition because it’s a vow—he vowed that it’s the Day of Atonement. Clearly it is not a vow. In short, the point is this: I want to propose some suggestion, and I proposed a similar suggestion in the discussion we had on the Ketzot concerning a litigant’s admission. There, the Mahari ben Lev argued regarding a litigant’s admission that a litigant’s admission is an undertaking, not credibility. And there are loads of proofs against him—it simply cannot be said. It’s complete nonsense. It simply cannot be said. For example, first of all the basic question is the same question the Noda B’Yehuda asks here. When I came and said that I owe someone money, it is clear that I meant to testify that I owe him, not to take upon myself an obligation to him for the hundred shekels, right? That was my intention. An undertaking is the monetary parallel to a vow. If you don’t intend to undertake, how can one say that you undertook? One can say you are believed, because we learned from the Torah that a litigant’s admission is credibility like one hundred witnesses. That I understand. But to say it is an undertaking? For a person to undertake, he must intend to undertake. When the person said he owes the other one hundred shekels, he was reporting to the religious court the reality as he understood it. He did not intend to undertake. That is the basic question also against the Mahari ben Lev regarding a litigant’s admission. More than that—we saw there, do you remember, I’ll remind you of the case: anyone who says ‘I did not borrow’ is as one who says ‘I did not repay.’ Reuven sues Shimon: you borrowed one hundred shekels from me. Shimon says… I didn’t borrow from you, you liar. Two witnesses come and say that Shimon did borrow, Shimon lied. Fine? So there are two witnesses against him; it turns out he lied, so there was a loan. Now Shimon comes and says: excuse me, excuse me, I repaid. I borrowed, but I repaid. He can’t, right? Why? Because anyone who says ‘I did not borrow’ is as one who says ‘I did not repay.’ There is a litigant’s admission on your part that you did not repay. Where? In the fact that you said you did not borrow, you also admitted that you did not repay, right? Now more than that, the Talmudic text says that even if afterward two witnesses come and testify not only that he borrowed—they also testify that he repaid—it won’t help. He will still have to pay. Why? Because a litigant’s admission overrides two witnesses. It is like one hundred witnesses. We spoke about that. Fine? It overrides two witnesses. His credibility is absolute. Now if this thing were an undertaking—there people tend to say, look, you see, it’s an undertaking, because credibility is not greater than two witnesses. So why do we accept his words more than two witnesses? Because apparently it is an undertaking. I ask you—tell me, did he intend to undertake? The person said, ‘I did not borrow.’ Is that called undertaking? We infer from his words that one who says ‘I did not borrow’ probably also says ‘I did not repay.’ But did he really intend to undertake and to say ‘I did not repay’ as an undertaking? The words he said were ‘I did not borrow.’ Is that an undertaking? It’s completely absurd.

[Speaker B] He says, ‘I’m not liable.’

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. All he meant to say was that I’m not liable. How can one say that he intended to undertake? You can say: if he testified that he is not liable, then of course embedded in that he also testified that he did not repay. That is testimony, that is credibility, not an undertaking. Okay? So the same thing here. Now, I explained there—there I suggested an explanation of what the Mahari ben Lev meant. In his wording one can hesitate a little, but I think perhaps it can be explained like this. What the Mahari ben Lev meant to say is: a litigant’s admission is like one hundred witnesses. That is credibility; it is not an undertaking. So what then? How can it be that the credibility of a person who is a single individual and a litigant—and here it overrides two witnesses? After all, apparently he is disqualified from testimony. And here it overrides two witnesses. How can it be that it is so strong? The answer is: because he can undertake. Not that this is an undertaking, but the fact that he has the power to undertake. If he wants to give one hundred shekels, can’t he give it as a gift? Then no one can say anything to him. If he says he owes one hundred shekels, the whole world can stand and shout that you do not owe one hundred shekels. After all, I can take one hundred shekels out of my pocket and give them. So the Mahari ben Lev is not claiming that he actually undertook here. Rather, he is claiming that since the person can also undertake—this is in his power, it is a kind of strong migo, we spoke about this—therefore, since it is in his power to undertake, that gives him credibility to claim that he is liable. It is credibility. This is an argument we saw—the Rosh brings it and others too—that what is in one’s power creates absolute credibility. One witness or an interested party, when it is in his power, that gives him absolute credibility. He is as if the owner over the matter. And the owner over the matter is believed about it for every purpose. I want to claim that in self-imposed prohibition, according to those who say it is a vow, it is the same method. They do not mean to say that he vows. What they mean is: since he has the power to vow—if he wants to forbid her to himself, he can simply vow, right? So since it is in his power to vow, in his power to make a vow, we therefore have absolute credibility to say that she is forbidden to him. That is what they mean when they say this. The credibility is based on the fact that it is in his power to vow, not that he actually vows. Therefore it is not relevant to ask—as we asked—well then, if it is a vow, why can’t a sage release it? It’s unrelated. I am speaking here about credibility, not about a vow. The credibility exists only because I had the option to vow. If it were a vow, then it would be forbidden to me by the law of a vow, and then one could go to a sage to release me. But this is not a vow. And the Mahari ben Lev too claims that this is credibility. But it is credibility—how is it so great? Even against two witnesses, as the Noda B’Yehuda says here. There are two witnesses against me, and I…

[Speaker F] …say self-imposed prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then two witnesses come and say that the opening is not open. It doesn’t matter. I say the opening is open, so I’m believed. Why? So some ask: because I made a vow? But a vow doesn’t depend on reality, so why should I care that two witnesses say otherwise? Absolutely not. I didn’t mean to make a vow, so it’s not a vow. But since I could have made a vow, and by that I would have prohibited her to myself even if a hundred witnesses were standing here, so now when I say that she is prohibited to me, I am believed because it was in my power to make a vow. The same mechanism as in a litigant’s admission. Or in other words, I’m now returning to the same point with which I opened the lecture. After all, the Ketzot and the Noda B’Yehuda and everyone else say: what sense does it make to compare them, what sense does it make to say that in self-imposed prohibition, from the law of prohibition? Fine, in a litigant’s admission there is an undertaking, but self-imposed prohibition has nothing to do with prohibition. What will you say, a vow? A vow is unrelated; the sage cannot permit it, he didn’t intend to vow, it’s irrelevant. So with self-imposed prohibition that doesn’t apply. What do they themselves say, the Ketzot and his camp? No, no, this is credibility. Self-imposed prohibition is like a litigant’s admission. A person has credibility regarding himself. I’m now turning the wheel back. I claim that both the Mahari ben Lev and the Mahari ben San say the same thing. They too compare a litigant’s admission to self-imposed prohibition, and they too claim that here it is credibility and there it is credibility. Only according to them it is credibility because I have the ability to obligate myself or to vow. To vow in matters of prohibition and to obligate myself in monetary matters. Okay? So this is actually very similar to what the Ketzot says, and it seems to me that this is the only possible way to explain it, because otherwise it is simply absurd. Both in a litigant’s admission and in self-imposed prohibition it makes no sense to say such a thing. It’s simply nonsense, as the Noda B’Yehuda said. It’s not a matter of disagreement — you have one reasoning, you have another reasoning. It just doesn’t apply, period. There simply is no such thing. There is no such opinion. Just one note: I brought here — look afterward in the summary, in Sdei Chemed. He brings a precise reading from the words of the Mahari ben San. Look above, I’ll bring it again above. Look at the Mahari ben San. He says, he writes here: “And it is also possible to say” — do you see the line before the end? Wait, sorry, no, before that, four lines from the end: “perhaps they were stringent in these matters as with Samsonite naziriteship, which has no annulment inquiry.” Now what does “they were stringent in these matters” mean? Is this a rabbinic law? It sounds a bit like a rabbinic law, right? What does “they were stringent in these matters” mean? By the way, I’m not sure. But Sdei Chemed claims, inferring from here, from the wording of the Mahari ben San, that basically the intention is only to a rabbinic law. And then the whole picture changes, of course, because then in truth, with the credibility of self-imposed prohibition, he really is not believed, and it is not a vow and not anything. There is only a rabbinic stringency to view his words as though he had made a vow. That’s all. Okay? Some kind of rabbinic enactment like that. You don’t need to enter into the boundaries of vows and ask what he intended and what he didn’t intend, because he didn’t intend to vow. It’s not really a vow. It is a rabbinic enactment that if someone prohibits something to himself, we should not make a mockery of the whole thing. If you prohibited it to yourself, we enact a rule: treat it as though it is really prohibited. Okay? And then it is only a rabbinic law, and then all the sting basically goes out of this whole passage. I’ll say again: throughout the medieval authorities and later authorities, it does not sound like it’s rabbinic. I strongly doubt whether this inference from the Mahari ben San is even correct. What is written, “they were stringent,” means that the Torah was stringent, not that “they enacted stringency.” But if that is an option, then maybe there is some other direction here. Now, a note — a few practical differences I want to bring regarding this matter. These are basically the two conceptions, and they brought various practical differences between them. One of them is Rav Shmuel Rozovsky’s question on the Ketzot. The Ketzot basically brought the Mahari ben Lev — I won’t read it all inside now — but the question is whether an explanatory excuse helps regarding a litigant’s admission. Someone asked this earlier, I don’t remember who, maybe Nechama. If someone made a litigant’s admission and afterward explained and gave an explanatory excuse, meaning he said: no, no, I didn’t mean to admit; I said it for such-and-such reasons. Okay? In the Talmud itself there appear various such explanatory excuses, what is called the claim of jesting and the claim of placating — that I said it “so as not to make my children look wealthy,” or “I was just fooling you.” Someone says: you owe someone money. I said yes, I admitted it. Afterward I say: no, no, I said it only so people wouldn’t think I’m some kind of millionaire, so they would know that I have debts, that a lot of my money is actually owed out, so all kinds of people won’t come to me with big expectations. So that is an excuse that may perhaps be accepted, and then my admission is not regarded as a litigant’s admission. The fact that I admitted that I owe does not yet mean that it is like a hundred witnesses that I really owe, because I gave an explanatory excuse for why I said that I owe — “so as not to make my children look wealthy,” or “I was fooling around with you,” and all kinds of claims of that sort. Okay? So those are claims in monetary law. The question is whether such claims help in a litigant’s admission — whether explanatory excuses of that sort help in a litigant’s admission. So the Ketzot claims that the explanatory excuse does not help in a litigant’s admission. He disagrees with the Mahari ben Lev and goes with the Maharḥash. Okay? These are later authorities brought in the Ketzot. So the later authorities ask on the Ketzot: according to his own position, self-imposed prohibition is based on the law of a litigant’s admission. It is a credibility a person has concerning himself, right? Now he says: so why in self-imposed prohibition do we see in our Talmud, in our passage, that the explanatory excuse does help? So why regarding a litigant’s admission does the Ketzot say that the explanatory excuse does not help? Okay? So he says — Rav Shmuel here explains that there is a difference between prohibition and money. But look at his formulation, wait, this is jumping here. “Now in Ketzot HaChoshen, siman 34, he wrote that the law of self-imposed prohibition…” What did I do here? This thing got too big.

[Speaker C] I’m putting one underneath the other because otherwise you can’t read it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can in the file.

[Speaker C] If they mark text wrapping and tell it “through” — right, there’s a sign here of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here, I put it inside the frame.

[Speaker C] This sign on the left side… wait, yes, here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so he says: “Now Ketzot HaChoshen in siman 34 wrote that the law of self-imposed prohibition is from the law of a litigant’s admission, and one law of credibility applies to both,” yes, it is the same law of credibility for these two things, from the verse “for this is it.” “And according to this, what the halakhic decisors distinguished between them regarding retraction by means of an explanatory excuse requires explanation, for it is effective in credibility that stems from self-imposed prohibition, but it is not effective when one comes to retract from a litigant’s admission that obligates him monetarily. And see Ketzot HaChoshen, siman 80, where he explains that an explanatory excuse is not effective to obligate the opposing party, who has already acquired rights by means of his admission. But this still requires some investigation — what difference does that make to us? After all, the essential law of credibility is one.” Right? What does the Ketzot say? So the Ketzot explains that once I made a litigant’s admission, then basically the other person already acquired the money. Right? Now I want to give an explanatory excuse and retract. That is like taking money away from its owner. Therefore I cannot do that by means of an explanatory excuse. Whereas in self-imposed prohibition, no one else has acquired anything. I prohibited it to myself, and now I give an explanatory excuse, so I say: I did not prohibit it to myself. Fine. That’s how the Ketzot explains it.

[Speaker D] Rav Shmuel says: that’s exactly the problem. It’s exactly like I’m going back to the case of the woman. What bothers him in the Ketzot is that there is injury to the other party, right? There’s someone…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s not a moral question, Yael, get out of that.

[Speaker D] Not a moral question, it’s a question of damages.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not damages either. It’s a question of credibility. “One who seeks to extract from another bears the burden of proof” — that’s all. When you take money from someone, you have to bring proof. The fact that you owe someone 100 shekels now — can I say, no, I don’t owe him? What do you mean? Say that until tomorrow. If you owe him 100 shekels, so long as you don’t prove otherwise, you’ll have to pay. So what is this explanatory excuse?

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand. My admission sort of put money in his hand, and now if I want to take it back out, I need to bring proof?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Ketzot explains. So on that Rav Shmuel asks — and that really may be what Yael meant — Rav Shmuel asks: what difference does that make to me? After all, the essential law of credibility is one. And if from the side of credibility an explanatory excuse works, why is it worse if by his retraction he harms the one who already acquired rights based on his admission? After all, in the end the money is his only because I admitted it. And if the explanatory excuse shows that I did not really admit, then I did not admit. It’s not that I am extracting money from him that is in his possession; it has now become clear that the money simply is not in his possession. So what is the problem? What is the difference? “However, it appears,” says Rav Shmuel, “that although one law of credibility applies to both, nevertheless there is a distinction between them regarding what this credibility takes effect upon.” I’m now reading in the fourth line from the top in the right-hand column: “regarding what this credibility takes effect upon, for since the basis of the law of credibility in a litigant’s admission is because he is an owner with respect to obligating himself” — by the way, the concept of ownership applies to the law of “it is in his power”; this is taken from the Rosh in Yevamot, I think, who says that the moment I can… it is in my power to do it, then I am considered the owner over the matter. If I am the owner over the matter, then whatever I say about it I have full credibility. So if so, then in money, where he is the owner over the money itself, his admission takes effect on the very status of the money, and there is here a clarification for the whole world that he owes money to so-and-so, or that this money belongs to so-and-so. Since with respect to any side of doubt regarding this money, whether it is his, he has the status of owner to obligate himself and say that it is not his. That is all in monetary law, because in monetary law his ownership is over the money itself. “However, in prohibitions he does not have the status of owner over the prohibition itself.” What, is he the master over the Torah? The Torah determines what is prohibited and what is permitted. Only regarding whether he himself must conduct himself with prohibition concerning this thing does he have the status of owner. The ownership here is only with respect to the person, not the object. Meaning, I can impose prohibitions on myself, but the thing itself is not under my ownership. Okay? And that is basically the difference between money and prohibition. Consequently, “the law of his credibility takes effect only regarding that.” Therefore his credibility takes effect only with regard to the question of how I must conduct myself, but the actual status of the object itself has not truly changed. In monetary law, the status of the object itself has changed. Okay, so therefore he says that there I cannot retract by means of an explanatory excuse, and therefore the Ketzot is right in saying that there is no explanatory excuse in money. Even though in the law of self-imposed prohibition there is a law of…”

[Speaker G] But why can’t we say that here this is basically what the Ra’ah said in the previous lecture, that if it also relates to others — if he obligates others — then even in the law of prohibitions he cannot retract?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course if he obligates others then even in the law of prohibitions he cannot retract.

[Speaker G] If in her admission, or in her self-imposed prohibition as a woman, she is actually obligating someone else, then she cannot get out of it by means of an explanatory excuse, that’s what…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite. The opposite. If a person makes a litigant’s admission and by that harms others, then the admission is not believed — not that he cannot retract from it. If that admission obligates others, then that is not an admission. Retraction from an admission is not related to harming others.

[Speaker G] The Ra’ah was talking about the explanatory excuse, that she cannot retract by means of an explanatory excuse if she says “to a specific man,” that’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, if she says that she married a specific man. Okay.

[Speaker G] Yes, yes, so there it’s the same thing, because she harms others, so she cannot retract by means of an explanatory excuse, exactly the same thing as here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then really you go back to the Ketzot’s own explanation, you’re right — that’s a correct point, I hadn’t thought of it. So you’re right: according to the Ketzot’s own explanation, not according to Rav Shmuel’s. Then it has nothing at all to do with the difference between money and prohibition.

[Speaker G] That’s where I wanted to get to.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has nothing to do with the difference between money and prohibition. In both, where he harms others, he really cannot retract. Okay, I hear. I think maybe that really is the difference — ah, that’s an interesting point indeed. Because then that really is the difference. If I understand it as real credibility, like the Ketzot, yes, then you are right, because that is genuine credibility, and where he harms others I have no credibility, or I cannot retract when I harm others, okay?

[Speaker G] And that is at the root of the law of credibility, this law that basically I am the owner over…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that’s exactly it — Rav Shmuel is not going with a law of credibility, but rather with what I explained in the Mahari ben Lev and the Mahari ben San. I said that because it is in his power, he is the owner. Since he is the owner, because he can vow or can obligate himself, he also has full credibility concerning the prohibition or the money. So Rav Shmuel, in his formulation, really speaks in that language. Now if that really is the situation, then I think his distinction is the correct one. And then according to this it may be that the Ra’ah would not be right — after all, the Ra’ah himself hesitates, we saw that. So it could be that indeed according to this, that would be the practical difference; the Ra’ah — that would be the practical difference. That’s a nice point, I hadn’t thought of it. Okay, now there’s also more here — well, I’m really not going to have enough time, so let’s at least see the Ran, because that really is a must. The Mishnah in Nedarim on page 90 speaks about a case where a woman says, “I am defiled to you.” Let’s leave aside all the context for the moment — first version of the Mishnah, later version of the Mishnah — but “I am defiled to you.” So the Ran there asks: since by law when she said “I am defiled to you” she prohibited herself to her husband, as in the first version of the Mishnah — that’s what the Mishnah says, that if a woman comes and says “I am defiled to you,” then she can prohibit herself to her husband, even though her husband has rights — remember what we discussed at the beginning of the lecture. She is believed. Why? Sorry — so she is believed. The Ran asks: “Because perhaps she has set her eyes on another, how can we allow her? And where did the prohibition of intercourse go?” Meaning, the sages come and say: yes, but maybe she’s pulling a trick on him because she has set her eyes on another, and therefore we will not believe her. Says the Ran: what do you mean we won’t believe her? If by Torah law she is believed, then where did the prohibition go? She is prohibited to her husband. What, you permit her husband an act of prohibition by positive action because she has set her eyes on another? So there is a problem here — how can this be? And then he says, and he brings several answers there, but the answer that interests us here is “Others…”

[Speaker B] say.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Others answered that the first version of the Mishnah is not stating the actual law, for by strict law certainly a woman is not believed to say ‘I am defiled to you’ in order to remove herself from her husband, to whom she is bound; rather, because regarding the statement ‘I am defiled to you’ she would be ashamed to say such a thing, they enacted in the first version of the Mishnah that she is to be believed.” Meaning, the first version of the Mishnah itself was only a rabbinic law. By Torah law the woman is not believed to say “I am defiled to you,” even though at first glance the Mishnah says that she is. What is the idea behind this? Exactly what we discussed earlier. The moment she infringes on the husband’s rights — that is the question. In the plain meaning of the Mishnah, it says that this makes no difference. If she is believed, then she is believed even if she infringes on the husband’s rights. But the Ran says: what are you talking about? If she infringes on the husband’s rights, it cannot be that she should be believed by Torah law; obviously this is only a rabbinic enactment. Exactly the same discussion I had just now with Noa — it is the same discussion. And on that Rav Shimon Shkop says in Ketubot — I brought you that passage — that this really depends on the question whether this is absolute credibility or credibility by virtue of a vow; I won’t go into it here now because we don’t have much time. But it really closely resembles the discussion I just had with Noa in the Rav Shmuel passage. One more point — two more points in Rabbi Akiva Eiger. So there in the Talmud in our passage, on page 2b, it says: “One witness says, ‘She was divorced,’ and one witness says, ‘She was not divorced’ — both agree that she is a married woman.” Right? One witness comes and says that the woman was divorced. One witness says no, she was not divorced. But both agree that she had been married. They disagree whether she was divorced, but both agree that she had been married. “And the one who says ‘she was divorced’ is only one witness, and the words of one do not stand in the place of two.” So once they both agreed that she was married, now a presumption of marriage is created based on two witnesses. Now one witness comes and says that she was divorced. One witness cannot remove a woman from the presumption of marriage; in matters of sexual prohibition there is no matter established by fewer than two. That is what the Talmud says. Okay? So on that the Tosafot Yeshanim ask here below, in this small piece, yes, this paragraph: “‘Both agree that she is a married woman’ — this is difficult, for why do we need that witness who says she was not divorced? Even without him she should still be forbidden, because in matters of sexual prohibition there is no matter established by fewer than two.” Right? Why do you need the witness who says that she was not divorced? Even without him, it is enough that there is only one witness saying that she was divorced, and we say there is no such thing — after all, there are two witnesses that she had been married; to remove her from that, you need two witnesses. Why do we need to bring in another witness saying that she was not divorced? Just say: if there is only one witness saying that she was divorced, he is not believed. What?

[Speaker D] At the beginning they already had two witnesses that she had been married — it goes back to the beginning. No, that’s obvious.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why do you need…

[Speaker D] to say they had two witnesses that she had been married? We need the two testimonies, one that she was divorced and the other that she was not divorced. So now we know that there was a situation that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So basically you’re saying that we don’t need what he said, that she was not divorced. All I need is his subtext, that she had been married. But the Tosafot Yeshanim apparently understood that when the Talmud brought this, it also made it depend on the witness who says she was not divorced. I need that too. And then he asks why. Really, it can also be explained as you said. So he says: “And one may say that this is not a migo, for perhaps he wants to testify…” Sorry, I skipped here. “For we cannot say that we would not know that she is a married woman except through them. For if so, then the one who says she is divorced should be believed by a migo, because if he wanted he could have remained silent.” What Yael suggested earlier as an explanation — the Tosafot Yeshanim senses that and rejects it. What do you mean? He says it cannot be based only on the fact that there are two witnesses here that she is married. Because if all we know, that she is a married woman, is only from these witnesses, then the one who says she was divorced has “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” What does he say? Since from him you know that she had been a married woman, then believe him also that she was divorced. Necessarily, we know that she had been married even without these two witnesses. And if so, then why do we need the witness who says she was not divorced? It is enough that one witness says she was divorced; one witness cannot remove her from the presumption that she is a married woman. So the Tosafot Yeshanim say: “And one may say that this is not a migo, because perhaps he wants to testify in order to disqualify her from marrying a priest.” What does that mean? After all, what is his migo? His migo is that this one who… basically the Tosafot Yeshanim say this: we do know that she is a married woman from these two witnesses, Yael is right, and what we need the witness who says she was not divorced for is only so that he too will be another witness that she is married. We asked: how can that be, since the witness who says she was divorced has “the mouth that prohibited,” because he could have said that she was not a married woman at all if he wanted to release her? So therefore he has a migo: believe him that she had been married and was divorced. The Tosafot Yeshanim say that is not a migo. Why? Because if he had said that she was not a married woman at all, then she would be permitted to a priest. But now that he says she had been married and was divorced, he prohibits her to a priest. Maybe his goal is to prohibit her to a priest, and therefore he has no migo that he could have said that she was never married at all. The rule in migo is that the alternate claim always has to give everything that the first claim gives. Meaning, if by lying with the weaker claim I want to achieve something, I could have achieved it better by the stronger claim. Here, he says, no — because maybe I want to achieve that she be prohibited to a priest, and by the stronger claim I would not have achieved that, because I would have presented her as single, and a single woman is permitted to a priest. So maybe I am coming to disqualify her from marrying a priest. That is what the Tosafot Yeshanim claim. So on that Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: difficult. “In any event,” says Rabbi Akiva Eiger — if she, what does she say? That’s the question. If she says, “I am divorced,” if she agrees and says “I am divorced,” then she herself disqualified herself from marrying a priest. Why? She is divorced.

[Speaker G] She says that she already got married.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the law of self-imposed prohibition. After all, she herself says about herself that she is divorced, so she prohibits herself to a priest. Consequently she is disqualified from marrying a priest even without their testimony. “And if she says, ‘I was never betrothed,’” if she herself says that she was never betrothed, then even if two testify about the divorce she would still be prohibited. Why? If two come and say she was divorced — not just one. You’re talking to me here about one? Leave that — even if two say she was divorced, she would still be prohibited. Why? Because exactly as “whoever says, ‘I never borrowed,’ is like saying, ‘I never repaid.’” This is an excellent example. She says, “I was never betrothed,” right? The moment she said “I was never betrothed,” what did she effectively say? “I was never divorced.” “I was never divorced.” Right? That is basically what she said. So if she says, “I was never divorced,” and now two come and say she had been betrothed and was divorced, this is exactly like a person who says regarding a loan, and two witnesses come and say that he borrowed, but they also say that he repaid. He will still have to pay, even though there are two witnesses that he repaid, because there is his own litigant’s admission that he did not repay. And here there is her litigant’s admission that she was not divorced. So she has rendered herself prohibited. She admits that she is his wife, that she was not divorced. Right? So even if there were two witnesses saying that she was divorced, that would not help.

[Speaker D] I didn’t understand the calculation. Again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: let’s figure out what the woman herself claims. After all, she can claim that she was divorced. If she claims that she was divorced, then I have no problem at all with the witness’s migo, because she is prohibited to a priest in any case. Whatever the witness says, she is prohibited to a priest. Why? She herself says she is divorced, so she has rendered herself prohibited. She herself prohibited herself to a priest, right? So there is nothing to discuss regarding the migo of the one witness. She herself prohibited herself to a priest. So it cannot be that we are talking about a case where she herself admits that she is divorced. What will you say? That the woman herself says: I was never betrothed. Now two witnesses come, one says that she is married and was not divorced, and one says that she is married and was divorced, and she herself says she was never betrothed at all. What is the law in such a case? Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: here, even if there were two witnesses saying she was divorced, I would not accept them. Not just one — two. Why? Because she herself claims that she was never married, and one who says “I was never married” is like saying “I was never divorced.” So if she admits that she was not divorced, self-imposed prohibition — then even two witnesses are ineffective against such a thing, right? Rabbi Akiva Eiger then answers: “Perhaps one may say that specifically in monetary law we say that an admission of non-payment is effective because of a litigant’s admission, but in prohibition, when one contradicts witnesses, it is only by the law of self-imposed prohibition; one cannot say that she admitted that she was not divorced and thereby rendered herself prohibited, because if she says that she was never betrothed, she never said at all that she is prohibited.” What is he saying? He says: after all, we made a comparison here, just like “whoever says, ‘I never borrowed,’ is like saying, ‘I never repaid,’” and then two witnesses come and say he borrowed and repaid. Seemingly, if two witnesses say he repaid — no. Since he said “I never borrowed,” in that he admitted that he never repaid, a litigant’s admission overrides even two witnesses who say that he did repay. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: but that is only in money. In self-imposed prohibition it will not work. Because here it is the same case: she says, “I was never betrothed,” and whoever says “I was never betrothed” is like saying “I was never divorced.” Now two witnesses come and say: you were betrothed and also divorced. By the monetary analogy, what should the law have been? She herself admits that she was not divorced, because one who says “I was never betrothed” is like saying “I was never divorced.” So she has rendered herself prohibited, and the status should be that she was not divorced — she is a married woman. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: that is only in monetary law, not in prohibitions. Why?

[Speaker F] Because with “I never borrowed”…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in prohibitions she never said — she said she was never betrothed; she never said that she is prohibited. How does Rabbi Akiva Eiger understand the law of self-imposed prohibition?

[Speaker E] It’s not clear why he needs that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He understands it as a matter of a vow.

[Speaker G] Right, I thought of that, but I was afraid after all Rabbi Yehuda’s dismissals and everything that happened.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He understands it as a matter of a vow. There’s no way around it. Because when he says — after all, you’re telling me she vowed. If she says “I am betrothed,” then she intended to vow, to say about herself that she is prohibited. But if she says “I am not betrothed,” that’s what she said. Do you want to say that when someone says “I am not betrothed,” she intended to vow and say that she is betrothed? That is the opposite of logic. So with a litigant’s admission he says — then why there? After all, he didn’t intend to admit. Right, but that’s credibility, not a vow, not an undertaking like what is written there; that’s credibility. Fine. But with self-imposed prohibition he understands it as a vow, and here there was no vow. She said: I was never betrothed. Did she intend to prohibit herself? To prohibit herself? Her intention was to permit herself, right? But as I said earlier, what really has to be said? After all, the whole reason I believe her is because she could have vowed — not that it is actually a vow, but because she could have vowed. Right? And as for being able to vow, she certainly can vow here too. So you cannot say this at all. Even according to the vow approach you can’t say it, right? Because I do not really hold that it is an actual vow, but rather that from the fact that she could have vowed, she is the owner, and I therefore also grant her credibility. But as for being able to vow — she could have vowed here too. So what does Rabbi Akiva Eiger want? It may be that one needs to refine the formulation a bit in the vow conception. The intention is not merely a general ability to vow, but rather that I can view this statement as a kind of vow, and therefore I view it as credibility — not just that theoretically she could have vowed. That would be a retroactive migo. She could have vowed in the past — so what? But she already did not vow. Now the question is whether she is believed about what she is saying now. Rather, the point is that I see in this statement something that, after all, could also have been a vow statement. So if it can be a vow statement, then she also gets credibility. Here perhaps one can say what Rabbi Akiva Eiger says. Because you cannot say that there was a vow statement here — after all, she said that she was never betrothed at all.

[Speaker E] She didn’t say, “I was betrothed and not divorced.” She said, “I was never betrothed at all.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only when she said “I was never betrothed,” that also includes “I was never divorced.” But you cannot say that there was some kind of vow statement here. There was no vow statement here.

[Speaker E] She could have vowed, in the sense of a migo she could have vowed. But here there isn’t an actual vow-type statement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe that is what Rabbi Akiva Eiger wants. And why is there no vow statement here? Right. Therefore Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that she also cannot be believed. Maybe that is it. Why doesn’t it work exactly like the case of “I never borrowed,” therefore “I never repaid”? Because a litigant’s admission is migo. A litigant’s admission is migo, after all, because he could have obligated himself. In prohibition I do not say this on the basis of migo. But here it is seen as a kind of vow too. No, no, no — not an actual vow, that’s what I’m saying. Since he could have obligated himself, it is in his power to obligate himself, so I also believe him that he is liable. But “in his power” in monetary law is migo — just a very strong migo. He could have obligated himself. So even if now he did not mean to obligate himself, it is still obvious that he could have obligated himself. In prohibition, apparently I do not grasp it as migo, but rather as some sort of statement that could itself have been a vow, and therefore I am willing to accept it as credibility. But if it only functions like migo, meaning: I could have vowed — that’s not enough.

[Speaker E] He requires a statement here, basically.

[Speaker G] Rabbi Akiva Eiger wants a statement. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though the statement would not actually be a vow, I claim that even according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger it would not really be a vow. But a statement of that kind, one that could have been a vow, we also grant credibility to. But if there is no statement at all that could have been a vow, then we also won’t grant the credibility…

[Speaker E] to her. But I still don’t understand why this can’t be applied like “I never borrowed,” therefore “I was never divorced.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in prohibitions we are not working with migo. Who says there is migo in prohibitions? These are not laws of evidence. This is credibility regarding prohibition. For credibility regarding prohibition you need two witnesses. Even if there is migo — who says migo helps in matters of sexual prohibition? In monetary law we found that migo can help.

[Speaker G] But just now we did use a migo with those two witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying, that is what Rabbi Akiva Eiger does not accept. He says: migo is not migo. Rather, this is a kind of statement that itself could have been a vow, so I am willing to accept it as credibility. But if it only works like migo, meaning I could have vowed, that’s not enough.

[Speaker G] Not here — I mean the migo that the witness had. We used a migo here, didn’t we? Isn’t it the same migo? That too is a migo in prohibition. What was the witness’s migo? At the end, what did the witness do to her? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, “the mouth that prohibited,” yes.

[Speaker G] “The mouth that prohibited” — maybe that too is in the laws of evidence, I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, here that really is a question. After all, when we spoke about migo — good question — if you remember, I distinguished between migo for witnesses and migo for a litigant. Migo for a litigant strengthens the claim of the litigant; migo for witnesses strengthens the testimony. So if the migo turns the witness into a valid witness, then now what establishes the status is two witnesses, not migo. The migo only removes the problem I had with the witness. Once I’ve removed the problem with the witness, I now have two witnesses, and so the requirement is fulfilled: “a matter shall stand by the mouth of two witnesses.” But when the migo comes as the migo of a litigant, then here what determines the status of the matter of sexual prohibition is the migo itself. There are no witnesses that the migo is constructing; rather, the migo itself is the proof.

[Speaker G] The Tosafot Yeshanim’s question wanted to rely only on the one witness. They wanted to exempt — they explain why one could have dispensed with the other witness and suffice with the migo that if he wanted he could have remained silent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it is still a migo for a witness.

[Speaker G] It’s a migo for a witness, but in order to rely only on him as one testimony?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But as testimony, not as a litigant. So that migo will make him equivalent to two witnesses. But the migo of a litigant does not turn the litigant into two witnesses; rather, it itself is the proof. This witness gets a status like two because he has “the mouth that prohibited,” so he is upgraded. But now, after he is upgraded, I have two witnesses. But “the mouth that prohibited” of a litigant is not that it turns the litigant into two witnesses — a litigant cannot become witnesses — rather, the migo itself constitutes the proof. The question is whether migo can constitute proof in such a case. A point that, honestly, I don’t know, maybe. Just one final note: look at it already in the summary. I brought Rabbi David’s responsum in our passage, and I already commented on it when we learned the passage of “the mouth that prohibited.” Because there is Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s difficulty on our Mishnah on page 22, in the case of “I was a married woman and I am divorced,” where Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks there from the law of self-imposed prohibition, and I think that there too you can see that Rabbi Akiva Eiger understands the law of self-imposed prohibition as a matter of a vow. Meaning, this is also consistent with his approach in what we saw here. But we’ve already gone over time. Okay, we’ll stop here. Goodbye.

[Speaker D] On Thursday I won’t be in the lecture, without making a vow. What? On Thursday I won’t be able to come.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Fine.

[Speaker D] Is there a new passage on Thursday?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll send you; I still need to think about it, I’ll look.

[Speaker C] Goodbye. Iris also says thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I saw. Thank you very much.

Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 40

Table of Contents

Summary

General overview

Zoom, convenience, and the continuation of remote teaching

Final assignment for scholarship students

The basis of the law of self-imposed prohibition: coercion, credibility, or vow

The responsum of Mahari Bash (Maharivash / Mahari Basan): vow, Samson-like Nazirite status, or litigant’s admission

Mahari ben Lev versus Ketzot: obligation or credibility, and the implication for prohibitions

Ketzot and Maharit against the “vow” approach: the problem of annulment and the source for Samson-like Nazirite status

A psychological explanation versus coercion by religious court: “we do not feed a person something forbidden to him” versus self-imposed prohibition

Symmetry in sexual prohibitions and the exception of the designated maidservant

Ketubot 9: “I found an open entrance,” money and prohibition, and self-imposed prohibition

Asymmetry between husband and wife, “I am impure to you,” and the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom

Shitah Mekubetzet: “as though he prohibited to himself something permitted” and the direction of vows

A plausible explanation, retraction, and persuasion: the possibility of permitting the prohibition a person created for himself

Sharp criticism of the “vow” approach: the Noda B’Yehuda and the example of Monday being “the Sabbath”

An intermediate proposal: “it is in his power to vow” as the basis for credibility, without the statement itself being a vow

Practical difference: a plausible explanation in litigant’s admission versus a plausible explanation in self-imposed prohibition, and Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky

The Ran in Nedarim on “I am impure to you”: Torah-level credibility or a rabbinic enactment

Tosafot Yeshanim and Rabbi Akiva Eiger: migo, “to disqualify her from the priesthood,” and self-imposed prohibition versus two witnesses

End of the lecture and continuation

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General overview

Zoom, convenience, and the continuation of remote teaching

Final assignment for scholarship students

The basis of the law of self-imposed prohibition: coercion, credibility, or vow

The responsum of Mahari Bash (Maharivash / Mahari Basan): vow, Samson-like Nazirite status, or litigant’s admission

Mahari ben Lev versus Ketzot: obligation or credibility, and the implication for prohibitions

Ketzot and Maharit against the “vow” approach: the problem of annulment and the source for Samson-like Nazirite status

A psychological explanation versus coercion by religious court: “we do not feed a person something forbidden to him” versus self-imposed prohibition

Symmetry in sexual prohibitions and the exception of the designated maidservant

Ketubot 9: “I found an open entrance,” money and prohibition, and self-imposed prohibition

Asymmetry between husband and wife, “I am impure to you,” and the ban of Rabbeinu Gershom

Shitah Mekubetzet: “as though he prohibited to himself something permitted” and the direction of vows

A plausible explanation, retraction, and persuasion: the possibility of permitting the prohibition a person created for himself

Sharp criticism of the “vow” approach: the Noda B’Yehuda and the example of Monday being “the Sabbath”

An intermediate proposal: “it is in his power to vow” as the basis for credibility, without the statement itself being a vow

Practical difference: a plausible explanation in litigant’s admission versus a plausible explanation in self-imposed prohibition, and Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky

The Ran in Nedarim on “I am impure to you”: Torah-level credibility or a rabbinic enactment

Tosafot Yeshanim and Rabbi Akiva Eiger: migo, “to disqualify her from the priesthood,” and self-imposed prohibition versus two witnesses

End of the lecture and continuation

Full Transcript

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