Ketubot Chapter 2, Lesson 39: Shavya Anafshei

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a litigant’s admission there’s a difference. In a litigant’s admission, a statement made outside a religious court is less serious; a statement made in a religious court is a serious statement. Meaning, you can’t say you were joking or just trying to brush someone off. In a religious court, it’s a statement you have to take into account as something being recorded, something being accepted. When you say it outside, you can say, “I was just brushing someone off, I said it just so they’d leave me alone,” or things like that. If in the case of the captive woman, even though they say it’s like a litigant’s admission, it could be that here too there would be the same distinction. Okay? But right now we really are talking about outside. So she gave an explanation for her words, and since that’s so, we accept it. “It was also taught in a baraita: If she said, ‘I am a married woman,’ and then went back and said, ‘I am unmarried’”—exactly our case—“she is not believed. But if she gave an explanation for her words, she is believed.” So here it says explicitly the answer we gave for the baraita above. Because what it says in the baraita above, that she is believed, seemingly contradicts what it says here, that she is not believed. So obviously, there it’s when she had an explanation, and here it’s without an explanation. Without an explanation she is not believed; if she has an explanation, then she is believed. Okay? That’s what the Talmud says. Now we can continue and read the Ra’ah that we stopped in the middle of earlier. So again, “And this is the language of the Ra’ah, of blessed memory: If she said, ‘I am a married woman,’ and then went back and said, ‘I am unmarried,’ she is believed.” Meaning, even though she contradicts her words, because she said that she had never been a married woman at all—right, when she says she is unmarried, she is basically denying what she said before; she is saying she never was a married woman in the first place—“for there is no rationale here of ‘the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.’” In a situation where the permitting statement contradicts the prohibiting statement, there is no “the mouth that prohibited.” So why is she believed even though that’s the case? The Ra’ah says: “If she gave an explanation for her words, she is believed.” Meaning, in matters that appear to us to be true, even though they are not known to us. Okay? What is he saying? It’s an interesting novelty, even though that really is the simple reading of the Talmud.

[Speaker D] That it’s a reasonable answer that really sounds plausible, even if we can’t prove it, but if there’s a logical reason for it then we’ll accept it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Meaning, it depends—it’s left to the impression of the judges. In other words, in the end this is not a case where she has to bring witnesses that she had persistent suitors she needed to get rid of. Rather, if the court gets the impression that that’s probably really the story, and that’s why she retracted, that’s good enough so that we won’t declare her a liar, but instead we’ll accept her second statement that she really is unmarried, and we’ll erase the first statement. Meaning, she wasn’t married; she just said that in order to brush them off. Okay? If it sounds far-fetched, or like she got fed up with her husband and suddenly announces that she is unmarried just so they’ll free her from him, or because he is refusing to give a bill of divorce, so she says, “No, no, I’m unmarried, I was never married to him at all”—in a case like that the court won’t accept it. Okay? So really here the Ra’ah sharpens a point that really is the simple meaning of the Talmud, but in the Talmud it doesn’t necessarily stand out: that there really is judicial discretion here. The question is whether it makes sense. She doesn’t need to bring proof that there was some nuisance she had to deal with. But the court does have to feel that it makes sense. It’s a kind of legal judgment that’s a bit problematic, because one judge may get one impression and another judge another impression, but there’s nothing to be done—that’s the situation. Now he says: “And it is possible that if she says, ‘I am betrothed to so-and-so,’ we do not rely on an explanation, since she has already admitted it to him, and she is no longer empowered to prejudice him.” Up to here. What is that last sentence? It could be there is a difference if she says specifically—

[Speaker D] —that she is married to a particular person, then that’s something more binding, something stronger in her commitment to the fact that she is married, than if she just says she is married. It’s true that this is talking about marriage to a specific person as opposed to “I was a married woman” in general, “I am a married

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] woman” in general, but the weight is on the “I am not unmarried.” Meaning, the moment she says, “I am a married woman of Reuven,” now when she comes and says, “I am unmarried,” it’s problematic to accept that because it has implications for Reuven. If she said generally, “I am a married woman,” she didn’t say to whom. Now she says, “I am unmarried.” So anyone who might have come, she could always have told him, “Yes, I’m a married woman, but not yours—it’s not you.” So when she says, “I am unmarried,” nobody can come and say, “Wait a second, wait a second, I don’t agree, she’s harming me, how can you accept her testimony that she is unmarried—she’s my wife.” Right? He can’t say that, because even without her saying “I am unmarried,” she could have brushed him off; she could have said, “I said I’m a married woman, but not your wife—someone else’s.” Okay? But if she said she is the wife of a particular person, now when she comes and says, “I am unmarried”—the problem is in the statement that she is unmarried, not in the statement that she is a married woman of a particular person—now when she comes and says, “I am unmarried,” she is now creating a problem for a particular person, who can come to the court and say, “Gentlemen, that’s not true, she is my wife and she is not unmarried, and don’t accept this, I do not agree.” And once she says she is unmarried, she is prejudicing him, because she is basically saying, “I am not your wife.” A woman cannot come to a man and say, “I am not your wife,” without bringing testimony for that. He is claiming that she is his wife. So if we’re talking about a particular person, then the Ra’ah says that in such a case she can no longer prejudice him, and she will not be believed to say, “I am unmarried.” Later authorities discuss this Ra’ah a lot; this is a very foundational Ra’ah in this topic of self-imposed prohibition, and notice—when you read this with proper sensitivity—there’s a key word here: “it is possible.” The Ra’ah is not certain about this, right? How did he say it? “And it is possible that if she says, ‘I am betrothed to so-and-so,’ we do not rely on an explanation, since she has already admitted it to him, and she is no longer empowered to prejudice him.” It is possible that this is the law. Meaning, he says: when she says “I am a married woman” in general, and she has an explanation, then she is believed to say that she is unmarried. But if she said she is a married woman of a specific person, then even if she has an explanation and retracts and says she is unmarried, the Ra’ah says maybe there, not.

[Speaker B] I’m not sure, but maybe that’s an inference from the case, because after all this is the case where she said, “I am a married woman of so-and-so,” of so-and-so that I am a married woman at all—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No.

[Speaker B] Clearly, and if we believe her that in a more severe case, then maybe it would work.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying—but the Ra’ah is not sure about this. Seemingly, what should be true? That’s the reasoning, so what’s the problem? Say that in the case of “a married woman of so-and-so” she won’t be believed to say that she is unmarried. But the Ra’ah is uncertain about it; he says maybe she won’t be believed, but I’m not sure. The question is why he isn’t sure—what are the two sides of the doubt?

[Speaker C] What? There’s some other issue here. Yes, I think there’s some other issue in the wording. Meaning, when she said, “I was a married woman and I am divorced,” then there’s a reason that maybe she really did obtain the divorce. But if she says, “unmarried,” then basically from the outset I wasn’t married. Clearly, that’s a contradiction. And if she says she was married to a specific person and “I am unmarried,” then here there’s a real contradiction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s also a contradiction in a regular “I am a married woman,” not only in “a married woman of so-and-so.”

[Speaker C] No, but still—as if here, if she says “this man,” then it’s like she has a kind of stamp of validity on the matter that I was married.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, she doesn’t have a stamp of validity. We’re not talking about a stamp of validity; that’s a different question.

[Speaker C] For us she has—she has, as it were, a living proof, so to speak, of her marriage; there’s the name of the man.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But we accept that she was a married woman even if there is no specific person here.

[Speaker C] But when we said she is unmarried, she’s basically saying she was never married at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, that’s different from “divorced.” Clearly, clearly—we’re talking only about “unmarried.” “Divorced” is “the mouth that prohibited.” “I was a married woman and I am divorced” is “the mouth that prohibited.”

[Speaker C] So the concept “unmarried” can’t apply if she was a married woman.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can—she lied! And she gives an explanation for why she lied, because she wanted to brush off suitors. So we accept that, right? The Ra’ah says yes, but if it’s a specific man—

[Speaker C] Exactly, there’s no specific person here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying—but why? What’s the difference? So he says, because she is not empowered to prejudice him. What does that mean? When what you say has implications for other people, there we won’t accept it. If it has implications only for you, fine—you are believed regarding yourself. But you can’t tell someone else that you are not his wife if he claims that you are. To prejudice someone else, you are not believed. We know something like this also from a litigant’s admission, right? In a litigant’s admission, when I admit—we’ve already seen this—when I admit that I owe someone money. Remember Rabbi Natan’s lien? We talked about it. When I admit that I owe someone money, if that admission has implications for a third party, I am not believed. For example, if I admit that I owe him money and therefore he should take the land—but that land is encumbered to some creditor, okay? So I’m admitting to him, very nice—but I’m harming the creditor, some third party. There, my admission is not accepted. A litigant’s admission is accepted in a place where all the consequences are only for me, the one admitting. So okay, I’m imposing consequences on myself—we accept that. But where I impose consequences on someone else, that’s called prejudicing another party. A litigant’s admission where it prejudices another party… if it harms others, right? If it has some implications for others that obligate others, we don’t believe him. The whole idea of a litigant’s admission—

[Speaker E] So why would they believe her in the first place? Even at the beginning she is obligating him at some stage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, in fact they’ll believe him, they’ll believe her only if he agrees. If he doesn’t agree, then they won’t believe him—what do you mean they won’t believe her?

[Speaker E] She needs to

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] be his wife from her own standpoint, because of self-imposed prohibition. But he doesn’t owe her anything. If he claims she is not his wife, then he doesn’t owe her anything. She won’t be able to marry anyone, because for us she is considered to have the status of a married woman.

[Speaker E] But even so, when she says that she is married to him she is also obligating him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She is obligating him, fine, but he—

[Speaker E] No, he isn’t, so why shouldn’t that also apply to the first statement?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he didn’t become obligated. She doesn’t obligate him, because we won’t recognize her as his wife from his standpoint. Only the obligations and prohibitions that apply to her, we accept. We won’t accept the implications for him.

[Speaker E] But you can’t accept both ends, that’s impossible. Either you believe her and give her everything—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or you don’t believe her and give her no. We do believe her, but only—

[Speaker E] with respect to her and not with respect to someone else. Fine, so if you believe her at the beginning, then why shouldn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you believe her afterward when she says she is unmarried? If we believe her only as to—because when she says she is unmarried, what follows? That she owes him nothing, but he demands what is owed to him. You can’t say that she is unmarried only from her own standpoint but not from his standpoint.

[Speaker E] Unmarried from— but also in the first statement—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the first statement you can do that. You can say that from your standpoint you are his wife, but he denies it; he doesn’t think you are his wife. What does that mean? It means you will be obligated to him in all your obligations as a married woman, and you will also be forbidden to marry anyone else, but he won’t owe you anything. But when you say that you are unmarried, you can’t say, “I am unmarried from my standpoint, but from his standpoint I am his wife.” In what sense, then, are you unmarried? Do you understand? The situation isn’t symmetrical. Here you can’t split it and say from her standpoint she is unmarried but he will relate to her as his wife. If she is unmarried then she won’t be with him at all; she won’t go there. It’s impossible—we cannot permit her to do something where someone else has a right that she should indeed do it. Okay? Okay.

[Speaker B] Ah, one could still say that the situation is not so completely impossible. Because theoretically the explanation could be plausible. For example, there are cases where people, in order to escape the Soviet Union—it was a right of citizens of Poland, including Jews among them, to leave the Soviet Union—so people simply married formally, perhaps taking Jews who were residents, citizens of the Soviet Union. And in such a situation, if I come and explain: we got married only formally, I of course said that I am his wife, but it was only in order to escape—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that would be an explanation.

[Speaker B] So that would be an explanation—what’s the problem? An explanation, but that’s in the case where I said I was married to him, for example, to so-and-so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] But that’s in the last case where we said it’s impossible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if the person says—if your spouse says, “No, no, I meant it seriously, it wasn’t formal”—

[Speaker B] No, no, but here we’re not talking about the spouse. As Rabbi said, we are judging only her side and not his side.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but on release, no. But on release, no—you can’t do that, that’s what I explained.

[Speaker B] When she says “I”—but if the explanation is plausible, why can’t you?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because you can’t, since an explanation enables us to believe her, but it cannot obligate him. He says, “Not true—your whole explanation is a lie.” So how can that work?

[Speaker B] Okay, but maybe he’s not in the picture, we don’t know. Maybe yes, maybe yes and maybe not. I’m trying to explain the “it’s impossible” side, and why he’s not one hundred percent sure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, ah—so you mean to say what the second side of the doubt is. Because on the principled level, the burden of proof becomes hers—whether there’s an explanation or not, as the Ra’ah said earlier, an explanation is not proof, only if it makes sense. Now, “it makes sense” is not enough to harm someone else. “It makes sense” is enough to place a status on the woman herself. Okay? So that’s the simple side of the evidence. Why is he nevertheless doubtful? Why nevertheless? Because really, once we truly believe her, then why should I care that this imposes legal consequences on someone else? We believe her. In other words, it’s like “the mouth that prohibited.” If we were to believe her in “the mouth that prohibited”—“I was a married woman and I am divorced,” okay? And suppose this was with respect to a specific person: “I was the married woman of so-and-so and I am divorced.” What would happen there? There it is “the mouth that prohibited,” we believe her. Once we believe her, we believe her—what difference does it make whom it affects? Meaning, already here we see the beginning of the dispute we’ll get to later: is self-imposed prohibition a form of credibility like “the mouth that prohibited”? If so, then why should I care if it is a particular person? I am believed. Once I am not a married woman, then even if it is a particular person, the fact is that I am not a married woman; believe me. It’s as if two witnesses came and said that I am not his wife. So why should I care that it is also at his expense? True, it’s at his expense—so what? But that’s the truth. Or not? Or is there only some sort of principle here saying that with regard to myself I can determine my own status—but that is only as long as the matters concern only me. But when the matters concern someone else, then not. For example, vows and things like that—we’ll see that later. But I’m saying, this “it is possible” of the Ra’ah itself already begins to raise the question of how to understand this self-imposed prohibition. Are we dealing here with—

[Speaker E] The “it is possible” of the Ra’ah isn’t about self-imposed prohibition, it’s about the explanation everyone talks about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but I’m saying, if the reality is… I didn’t understand?

[Speaker E] The “it is possible” of the Ra’ah is only whether we accept that explanation or not. Correct. And it’s not about the first side of self-imposed prohibition, not about the prohibition on herself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the same comment can be made there too. The same comment can be made there. If this is real credibility, then also the law of self-imposed prohibition itself—where I am harming someone else, would I be believed or not?

[Speaker E] And we see that even when she says—the first side always works, they always believe her from the side of self-imposed prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean they always believe her? Where always?

[Speaker E] Say if she says, “I am betrothed to so-and-so.” Yes. Then they believe her on that side.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If this is credibility—no, they don’t believe her. If this is credibility, then yes. And if this is a vow, or I don’t know, some kind of ability of a person to impose a status on himself, then the other person doesn’t owe her anything. We’ll see that later. No, the same issue exists with self-imposed prohibition too. You’re right that the Ra’ah is talking about the so-and-so, not about the “I was a married woman.” But they’re the same two possibilities. Okay, now the Talmud continues: “And there was also an incident involving one woman of high standing who was of great beauty.” It’s not clear what “great” means—probably wealthy, maybe important, something like that—and she was also very beautiful. “And men flocked to betroth her, and she said to them, ‘I am betrothed.’” As if—leave me alone, I’m already betrothed. “Later she arose and betrothed herself.” Now there was no bill of divorce, right? We didn’t see a husband, there was no bill of divorce, and suddenly she betroths herself. Wait a second—a month ago you said you were betrothed, so how are you now betrothing yourself to someone else? “The sages said to her: What did you see that led you to do this?” How can you do such a thing? “She said to them: At first, when unsuitable men came upon me, I said, ‘I am betrothed.’ Now that suitable men came upon me, I arose and betrothed myself.” She gave an explanation, right? I didn’t like them, so I told them I was betrothed—leave me alone. Now someone came whom I did like, so I told him, okay, let’s get married. “And this is the law. Rav Acha Sava brought the matter before the sages in Usha, and they said: If she gave an explanation for her words, she is believed.” Right? That is called an explanation, and we really do believe her. And now she is married to the second man and not betrothed to the first, and everything is fine—she had never been betrothed. At the end of the Talmud, which really matters less for our purposes: “Shmuel asked Rav: If she said, ‘I am impure,’ and then retracted and said, ‘I am pure,’ what is the law?” Seemingly that’s the same thing. What is there to deliberate about? He said to him: “Also in this case, if she gave an explanation for her words, she is believed.” “He repeated it from him forty times, and even so, Shmuel did not act on it in his own case.” Meaning, Shmuel repeated forty times what Rav told him in answer, but he did not permit it for himself in practice. Meaning, when his wife said she was impure and then went back and said she was pure, he did not accept it. Okay? Even though Rav told him this law, and he repeated it and repeated it, in the end in practice he was not willing to rule that way. That raises a big question of what—

[Speaker D] What do you mean, repeated it? I thought he asked the same question forty times. Each time he went back and asked the same question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I think the meaning is that he heard it from him forty times, and repeated it and thought about it and examined it, and it seemed that he was convinced by it—but in practice he wasn’t willing to rule that way.

[Speaker D] Fine. He was stringent with himself. A person is allowed to be stringent with himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person is allowed to be stringent with himself, but it’s not presented as stringency. It’s presented as something saying: I’m not sure he’s right. It’s not clear to me whether he’s right or not. Now here again, for us at the moment it’s a side question, because the question is what the difference is between saying “I am impure” and then saying “I am pure,” and saying “I am a married woman” and then saying, “No, no, I am unmarried.” Why is there some dilemma here and no dilemma there? Some want to explain—there’s the Ran here discussing it—some want to explain that perhaps here an explanation is not needed at all. Perhaps the doubt is not whether it would help or not, but whether an explanation is needed at all, or whether even without an explanation it is fine. And according to that, the answer he gives him is: “Also in this case, if she gave an explanation for her words, she is believed.” Meaning, only with an explanation, not without.

[Speaker D] Even if maybe despite the fact that she gave an explanation she is believed?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not despite—because of it.

[Speaker D] But if according to the understanding that an explanation isn’t required, then that “because of” is unnecessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—in the question he didn’t know whether an explanation is required or not required. It may be that she would be believed even without an explanation. What he answered him was: no, she is believed only with an explanation. Okay? Meaning, also in this case, like in the case of “I was a married woman” and then she retracts and says “I am unmarried,” also in this case an explanation is needed in order to believe her. Okay? Because the question “also in this case, if she gave an explanation for her words, she is believed”—the question is what that means. What’s the novelty here? What does it come to exclude? “Also in this case she is believed”? You might have thought she is not believed, so it teaches us that she is believed? No. Or “also in this case, even if she gave an explanation, she is believed”? Or only if she gave an explanation is she believed? The question is where the emphasis lies: is the emphasis on “also in this case, only with an explanation is she believed,” or on “also in this case, if she gave an explanation, she is believed”—you might have thought she is not believed even with an explanation. So there are two possibilities here; the Ran also brings this, but it’s a passage we may get to later. Good. Now let’s enter a bit into the law of self-imposed prohibition itself. How should we understand this law? On the face of it, it looks like some trivial law, because a person who says something about himself—right, a woman says, “I am a married woman.” So obviously, if you think you are a married woman, behave accordingly. It’s just an ordinary halakhic obligation, right? What is the novelty in the law of self-imposed prohibition? A person says about himself, look, I am a married woman, or I am married to a woman, or whatever, it doesn’t matter—anyone puts some status on himself—so we say, okay, if that’s what you say, then behave accordingly. That’s all. What’s the problem? And therefore, if that’s how one understands the law of self-imposed prohibition, first, there’s no novelty in it at all. And second, it doesn’t belong to the category of credibility. It’s not that we believe him in what he says. If that’s what you say, then preserve what you say and behave accordingly. Someone who knows that a certain piece of meat is pork—fine, then don’t eat it. That’s all. I don’t know whether it’s pork or not, but you know? If you know it’s pork, don’t eat it. That’s all. There’s nothing beyond that here. So there’s no novelty in self-imposed prohibition. And seemingly it also has nothing to do with credibility. I do not accept that she is a married woman, or I do not accept that this is a piece of pork. I’m saying: if that’s what you know, then Jewish law tells you to behave accordingly, that’s all. But that apparently is not the status of self-imposed prohibition here. Because after all, here we are talking about some kind of credibility. For example, if she wants to retract—she says, “I am a married woman,” and after that says, “No, no, I am unmarried.” If it were just the first statement, then what’s the problem? She knows what she knows and she has to act according to what she knows—why am I getting into her underwear? What does that have to do with us? If she knows she is a married woman, then let her act as she knows; if she knows she is unmarried, let her act as she knows. And if she’s fooling us, that’s her problem—the Holy One, blessed be He, will settle accounts with her. What does that have to do with us? Once we say that with an explanation we accept it or without an explanation we don’t accept it—what does that mean? It means this is a court discussion. It’s credibility. And the question is whether we treat her statement as a statement that we also accept as true. It’s like witnesses. We’re not merely saying, “Well, if you think it’s pork, don’t eat it.” No. If you think it’s pork and you eat it, we will flog you, because from our perspective it is pork. If you said it is pork, then we accept it at least with respect to you, and then we would flog you. And the simple reading of the sugya is that the law of self-imposed prohibition is that law. It’s not just telling a person, if you know something then act accordingly—do what Jewish law tells you, that’s obvious. Rather, the law is that what the person says, when he imposes a prohibition upon himself, is treated by the court as testimony. From our standpoint, now she has the status of a married woman; we won’t allow anyone to marry her, we will compel them not to marry her after she said she is a married woman, because she… she can’t. And if afterwards she retracts and says, “I am unmarried,” and she has no explanation, we won’t accept it, and we will maintain her as a married woman even though she herself may know she is unmarried and that she lied before. So she may perhaps do whatever she wants, but from our standpoint we won’t let her. And this is just a paradox that comes up a lot in self-imposed prohibition. Suppose the court heard a person—a woman or a man, doesn’t matter—impose upon themselves some kind of prohibition. Now the person himself knows that he lied, for all kinds of reasons, it doesn’t matter. The court did not accept that explanation. Fine? It holds him prohibited. Now I know—I know I am unmarried. That is the truth; after all, I know whether I got married or not, the court doesn’t know. Am I allowed to go somewhere far away where the court can’t see and get married? The court doesn’t accept it; from its perspective I have the status of a married woman. If it sees me getting married it… it will force me physically not to do it.

[Speaker D] That connects to the question whether there is a situation where—whether our statements create some state, some essence, something beyond—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I’m not talking right now on the metaphysical plane, I’m talking on the legal plane. Meaning, how we view her status.

[Speaker D] But legally, if she knows she is unmarried and she just said she is a married woman, then she’s allowed to get married even if the court doesn’t believe her. No, but if the court doesn’t believe her, in terms of the truth—the absolute truth—is that she is unmarried.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the court will force her not to marry if it sees her going to get married.

[Speaker D] And therefore I said this is the question: when a court rules something, does that create reality or not create reality? Because on the face of it, from the standpoint of truth she is unmarried. She knows she is unmarried, she was never married, she is unmarried.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree with your phrasing; I’m only saying that “creates reality” is a bit far-reaching. There are those who want to formulate it that way. I’m saying we don’t need to go that far. It’s enough that it is legally binding. Meaning, if in the eyes of the court you have the status of a married woman, then now you are forbidden to go off to Australia without anyone knowing and get married—not because there is some reality or whatever, but because there is your legal status. Once the court determined it, that is the legal status. You need permission from the court in order to marry.

[Speaker D] So I’ll get married here in Israel already, no need for Australia, fine. What? I didn’t understand. Just joking—I’m saying that in order to marry an Australian I already got married here in Israel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but you need to go to Australia so that the court won’t see that you’re getting married. It’s sitting here. You have to hide; they won’t let you.

[Speaker D] But that’s—suppose in our world today, where the world is global and indeed the connections between courts are instantaneous, meaning a court in Israel can notify a court in Australia that this woman is, you know, presumed by us to be a married woman, so okay. But in an earlier world where that wasn’t the case, and a person really goes from village to village, the woman is unmarried. In terms of truth, the absolute truth is that she is unmarried; she is not married, she was never married to anyone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, obviously. That’s why I asked the question. I agree that in the simple conception there really are two perspectives here. The perspective of the court is that it will not let her get married in any way. The woman herself—after all, she knows the truth. She knows she lied when she said she was married.

[Speaker E] And she is right in this case; it’s just that the court doesn’t know it is wrong, but it is wrong. It’s like all legal cases: if, say, a robber—suppose the court had something before its eyes and had no choice but to rule something, and I know that I didn’t rob, am I obligated to return it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, same thing. Obviously. Same thing. And therefore indeed—in monetary cases one can still say “the property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless,” and if the court decided, then it really isn’t yours anymore. But here—but here that’s not the issue.

[Speaker B] Or say if someone knows he is Jewish, his grandmother was Jewish, his mother now tells him he’s Jewish, but the court isn’t convinced without testimony and all that—the same question. The same question. So can you go somewhere else where a court does recognize it? Why? He doesn’t find—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t find any court that recognizes it. Listen. Problem. Right, I’m saying in all these cases it’s the same question: do I follow the truth as I know it, or the actual reality?

[Speaker B] As if it’s something technical; it’s not the actual reality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but that technical something—

[Speaker B] Some people live that way all their lives; they can’t do anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that technical something is the question. The question is whether I’m allowed to do it or not.

[Speaker D] Because the court has a lot of power.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no power—I’m not talking about power, I’m talking about whether I’m allowed to do it. Am I halakhically allowed to do it?

[Speaker D] But if he wants to be okay with the Holy One, blessed be He, and with himself, and with the truth—that’s the question. It doesn’t matter whether the court can impose sanctions on him or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying that is exactly what I’m asking. Is a person who wants to be okay with Jewish law allowed to go to Australia and get married even though if the court sees him it won’t let him do it? That’s the question. Because in terms of truth, as you phrased it, she really is unmarried, so why shouldn’t she marry? The court doesn’t know—fine, it doesn’t know, but I know. On the other hand, maybe the status established by the court is halakhically binding, irrespective of whether it creates reality, and therefore perhaps even you yourself would be forbidden to quietly go to Australia and get married. Interesting question. Okay? Anyway, that’s why I’m saying it is clear that self-imposed prohibition is not just a statement to keep Jewish law. That would be trivial, not credibility, nothing—it wouldn’t be relevant. Rather, it is some kind of case where we accept her statement as true in a certain sense. But even there there is room to discuss two ways, the Ritva’s possibilities. One possibility is to say that there is a law of self-imposed prohibition and that it is like testimony, like a litigant’s admission is like a hundred witnesses. So too self-imposed prohibition: when I testify about myself that I am a married woman, it is like witnesses. Therefore we believe her now that she is a married woman for all intents and purposes. That is her status; that is how we believe her. Again, without getting into the question of what she’ll do quietly in Australia. I’ve now gone back to the court’s glasses. From the court’s perspective she has the status of a married woman. That’s one possibility. A second possibility: no. She has the status of a married woman only with respect to herself. Meaning, the court accepts her words only regarding her own status, and on that it will also compel her. Everything is fine. But if someone asks the court, tell me, is she really a married woman? I don’t know, no idea. I can’t determine that. It’s not like testimony, not like a litigant’s admission or anything like that. Rather, it’s some kind of rule that if a person places himself into a halakhic status, the court will require him to be consistent with what he did. Okay? And this already brings us into these two conceptions that will come later—the Mahari ben Lev and the Ketzot and so on. Like we saw with a litigant’s admission, remember? With a litigant’s admission we saw in the Ketzot in section 34, subsection 4, that the Ketzot brings there the Mahari ben Lev, who argues that a litigant’s admission is not credibility. A person is not credible about himself; he is an interested party. So he is not believed to say, “I owe so-and-so one hundred shekels.” Rather what is it? It’s a gift, a vow, I don’t know, some kind of thing like that—he accepted an obligation upon himself. Okay? And the Ketzot strongly disputes him and says, what are you talking about? There is a rule that a litigant’s admission is like a hundred witnesses—that is testimony. What is the difference between the two? According to the Ketzot, when I speak of a litigant’s admission, the meaning is that the court believes as if there were two witnesses here that you owe him one hundred shekels. Because a person regarding himself is like two witnesses, that you owe him one hundred shekels. If someone swore that he would do something if this person owes one hundred shekels, okay? Is he obligated to do that thing? The answer is yes, because from our standpoint reality has been clarified: this man owes one hundred shekels. According to the Mahari ben Lev, no. According to the Mahari ben Lev, no reality has been clarified; the person obligated himself to give the other one hundred shekels. We did not accept his testimony that he borrowed one hundred shekels—that, no. You want to give him one hundred shekels, you obligated yourself? Then give. Okay, that is the Mahari ben Lev’s approach. And I already spoke about it then and said that this is an unreasonable approach, and there are very strong difficulties with it; I corrected it—we’ll get back to that later. Similarly—and by the way, the Ketzot is found in that same place, in section 34, subsection 4—it is the same discussion. There is one paragraph there dealing with self-imposed prohibition. And the Ketzot argues that with self-imposed prohibition too, these same two conceptions arise. There is a conception that this is a vow; this comes up among various halakhic decisors for the same reasons, because a person testifies about himself and so he is an interested party—why should he be believed? About what? It’s not credibility—it’s a vow. She accepted upon herself to behave like a married woman. Very good. So the court says: you accepted this upon yourself, we will force you to fulfill what you vowed. Okay? That’s one conception. The Ketzot himself does not accept this; the Ketzot argues that self-imposed prohibition is credibility. Meaning, when the woman says—as with a litigant’s admission, he says this is basically a type of litigant’s admission—that when a person testifies about himself that he is prohibited in something, it is like a litigant’s admission, it is as though a hundred witnesses came and said that he is prohibited. Therefore this is real credibility. If someone swore conditionally that she is a married woman, then his oath takes effect because from our standpoint she is a married woman. According to the conception of a vow, what are you talking about? She only vowed to behave as though she were a married woman, but she is not really a married woman. So if he swore on the assumption that there is a married woman, then he is not bound by that oath at all, nothing. Okay? Meaning, the question is: even on the view that this is not just the trivial statement “keep Jewish law,” but rather that there is some statement here where the court will require you to do something and not simply leave you to be faithful to your own path, rather the court accepts your words and acts in accordance with what you said—but even that can be divided into two understandings. One understanding, as with a litigant’s admission being like a hundred witnesses, is simply credibility. A person has credibility to prohibit himself. That’s it. And now we know that she really is a married woman. Okay? Second possibility: no. A person is not credible—he is an interested party, this is one witness, what does it have to do with anything? She cannot be credible in any way. Rather, why nevertheless, if she said about herself that she is a married woman, do we force her to behave accordingly? Because she vowed to behave like a married woman. That’s all. Now you also understand, for example, that if she said she is a married woman to a certain man, if this is a vow it has no significance at all. He is not obligated to behave in accordance with her vows. So even if we accepted with respect to her that she is his wife, that does not obligate him in any way. But if we accepted her words about herself as testimony—as a litigant’s admission is like a hundred witnesses—then in that case we know that she is his wife; we have two witnesses to it. Then from his standpoint as well, she is his wife. Do you understand? That is why I told you above that if the woman says, “I am a married woman to so-and-so,” it is not entirely clear whether she would be believed or not. It may be that this would only be a vow and the man would not be obligated to her as his wife, and it may be that this is actual credibility like two witnesses, in which case of course I have two witnesses that she is his wife, and he too cannot deny it.

[Speaker E] But then that leniency of the explanation together with witnesses is really a problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because then we don’t believe her. Everything starts from her credibility. So if she has an explanation—

[Speaker E] Two witnesses that she actually—but the credibility as two witnesses—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s only in a place where she really imposed a prohibition upon herself. But if she gave an explanation, then she told us, “No, no, I didn’t impose a prohibition on myself. I just said that.” So then it’s not two witnesses either. It’s not that she is going against the two witnesses. She is saying: you don’t have two witnesses, because I did not prohibit myself; I was just joking. Okay? If it were two witnesses, obviously the explanation couldn’t work against that. The explanation says: this is not two witnesses at all—I didn’t say I was prohibited.

[Speaker E] But with a litigant’s admission that doesn’t work. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If—

[Speaker E] If someone obligates himself with—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—who said it doesn’t? There’s a major dispute among the halakhic decisors. By the way, I referred you to it through the lectures on Rabbi Shmuel’s novellae. He talks about it. I didn’t want to send you straight into the sugya because there you would have needed to know all kinds of things, but Rabbi Shmuel basically talks about it. Even with a litigant’s admission, the decisors dispute whether in fact one can retract from a litigant’s admission with an explanation. Can he say, “I didn’t admit seriously”?

[Speaker E] But with an explanation we say something even more stringent, there’s some kind of explanation where he—because he obligates himself within the scope of speaking about something else entirely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Whoever says ‘I did not borrow’ is as one who says ‘I did not repay.’” Yes. Yes.

[Speaker E] Okay. So there it’s the height of the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He said, “I didn’t pay.” What do you mean? No, that’s not right—he said, “I didn’t pay.” He has obligated himself just like two witnesses. He can’t retract anything on this matter. If afterward he says—look what happens there, what the great absurdity is there—say a person comes, and Reuven claims against Shimon: “You borrowed one hundred shekels from me.” Shimon says, “I didn’t borrow.” Then two witnesses come and say that Shimon borrowed. They don’t know whether he paid or not, but he did borrow. So his admission was false. Now Shimon comes and says, “Wait, wait, wait—I paid, I retract, I paid.” It won’t help him, right? Why won’t it help him? The witnesses aren’t saying he didn’t pay; the witnesses are only saying there was a loan. Why can’t he say, “I paid”? Because anyone who says, “I didn’t borrow,” is as though he said, “I didn’t pay.” When you said at the beginning, “I didn’t borrow,” that already included saying that you didn’t pay. And even more than that: even if witnesses come that he did pay—after the witnesses came that he borrowed, even if witnesses also come that he paid—it still won’t help; he’ll still have to pay. Because a litigant’s own admission… wait, wait, one second—because even if he says, even if witnesses come and say he paid, he himself admitted that he didn’t pay, and a litigant’s own admission overrides witnesses; it is like a hundred witnesses. Here there’s room to ask whether, if the person says, “No, no, I paid, and what I said earlier, ‘I didn’t borrow,’ was because I wanted to brush someone off, I had an explanation,” maybe that would help him. That is a dispute among the halakhic decisors. Okay?

[Speaker E] Could it be that this wouldn’t apply only after witnesses came, but also before?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both before and after. Before, certainly—before is the easiest. Not certainly, but before is easier than after.

[Speaker E] Witnesses would come that he paid…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, witnesses that he paid, yes. So there I don’t think it makes a difference. Anyway, I’m just jumping ahead so you can see the picture. Basically that’s where we’re heading. There’s a very strong parallel between a litigant’s own admission and the law of self-imposed prohibition. The same two sides that come up with regard to a litigant’s own admission also come up with regard to self-imposed prohibition. The difference is only that with a litigant’s own admission I obligate myself financially, whereas in self-imposed prohibition I obligate myself—or impose on myself—a prohibition. Or I place on myself a prohibited status. But it’s really the same idea. And therefore, just as two approaches arise regarding a litigant’s own admission—whether this is literally credibility like a hundred witnesses, or whether it is some kind of obligation or vow or something like that—so too with self-imposed prohibition these same two approaches arise. Either it’s credibility, or it’s a vow, or really some kind of commitment or something like that. There is no commitment in the area of prohibitions, so people speak about a vow. In monetary matters you can obligate yourself; you don’t need a vow. But the idea is the same idea. Okay? So this comparison between a litigant’s own admission and self-imposed prohibition really runs all the way through here.

By the way, the Ketzot there in section 34 concludes that just as with a litigant’s own admission this is credibility, so too self-imposed prohibition is credibility. It’s not a vow; it’s credibility. Same thing. A person has credibility to impose legal statuses on himself, to obligate himself, to impose prohibitions on himself—the same thing. It comes from the same source too. Because otherwise there is no source for self-imposed prohibition. How do we know that a person has credibility? So if it’s like a litigant’s own admission, then we know it from “because that is what he said.” Rashi says that from there we derive the law of a litigant’s own admission. So from there we also derive self-imposed prohibition—that a person is believed to obligate himself, whether in monetary matters or in prohibition. Okay? That is the Ketzot’s approach. Okay? But there are others who say no, that there is a distinction between them, or that both are a vow, or that one is a vow and one is credibility—they distinguish between them and do not think it is the same thing. Okay? But that is the general picture.

Now let’s look at this a little more in detail. Maimonides in the laws of marriage—let’s do this somewhat briefly. By the way, how far did you all get with the source sheet?

[Speaker C] I got to ten; I didn’t manage eleven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. And the others? I just want to see what’s next. Yael?

[Speaker C] Up to seven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay. Nechama, what about you?

[Speaker B] I just had to open everything; I didn’t finish the last section, so up to Shmuel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, fine. So let’s look at Maimonides. Maimonides…

[Speaker C] Gali says she got to the end but didn’t manage it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I see now. Okay. Maimonides in the laws of marriage, chapter 24, says as follows: If a man saw that his wife committed adultery, committed adultery, or if one of his relatives or one of her relatives told him—someone whom he trusts, whom he relies upon—that his wife committed adultery, whether the one speaking was a man or a woman, because this is not actual testimony, since his mind is settled that this thing is true, he is obligated to divorce her and forbidden to have relations with her, and he gives her the marriage settlement. And if she admitted that she committed adultery, committed adultery, then she leaves without the marriage settlement. Because why does he have to give her the marriage settlement? Because he has to be stringent with himself since he believes them, but there is no proof that she committed adultery; there aren’t two witnesses here. Someone comes and I believe him, okay? He seems reliable to me. So I can no longer live with her, because she is forbidden to me if she committed adultery. So I have to divorce her. On the other hand, I have to give her the marriage settlement, because from her perspective she denies it. She says she didn’t commit adultery. So in order to avoid a prohibition I have to divorce her, but I can’t deprive her of the marriage settlement because I haven’t proven that she committed adultery. Therefore there is here something of the idea of self-imposed prohibition. It imposes law only on me; from her perspective she is not obligated by what I believe. But if I really believe it, what can I do?

[Speaker D] Could this be a great way to stir up conflict between people? Hey, if everything is fine and both of them are fine, no one…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then suddenly someone comes—

[Speaker D] just anybody, even someone who, I don’t know what, someone who… Yael, everything is known, obvious.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so the husband has to take that into account. There is such an opening, that it could mean he has to divorce her.

[Speaker D] He doesn’t have to divorce her; he has to divorce

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] her only

[Speaker D] if he believes them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It depends on him.

[Speaker D] Believes them? What does “believes them” mean? That phrase itself, that he believes them, is also very, very problematic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but what can we do—we have to make decisions.

[Speaker D] But maybe he trusts him in general, and now…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, in general. This statement right now that they said—“he believes.” If he believes, then she is forbidden to him; he may not live with her.

[Speaker D] What does “believes” mean?

[Speaker E] If things are good between them, will he believe it? Huh? If things are good between them, will he

[Speaker D] believe it?

[Speaker E] I don’t know, depends on him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What difference does that make right now? It really makes no difference why. If he believes them, then he cannot live with her.

[Speaker D] He may not feel great about them, but she is perfectly fine, she as… she is an upright person and she isn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Yael, all of that has nothing to do with the issue. The fact that she’s an upright person and everything is fine—nobody said anything about her. But he cannot live with her because from his perspective he believes she committed adultery. If someone tells me—someone, excuse me, just a second—someone tells me that this piece of meat in front of me is pork, okay? Now I believe him. I don’t have to believe him, but I do believe him. You understand that I’m forbidden to eat that piece? Even though someone else, who doesn’t believe him, might eat it. Why? Because if I believe him, I cannot eat pork. What can I do? Now if the man believes that his wife committed adultery, then according to his view he may not live with her. What can he do? So he has to divorce her; he cannot live with her. Now she is not at fault, because she claims she did not commit adultery and there are no witnesses that she did, and therefore she receives all her rights. That’s true. But he cannot live with her—he thinks it is forbidden to him, so what can he do?

[Speaker C] And this gives some kind of, some kind of encouragement—I don’t know if encouragement, that’s not the right word, not the right word—to those people to say something that isn’t true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It gives no encouragement whatsoever. Why is that encouragement?

[Speaker C] No, if the claim…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In my eyes it’s deterrence, not encouragement. Why say something untrue? You see what consequences it has. It’s deterrence, not encouragement. And if we didn’t believe it and didn’t obligate… if we didn’t believe it, if we didn’t believe it and didn’t obligate him to divorce her, that would be encouragement. Anyone could come because he knows he’s taking no risks. But here he comes and it has consequences; in my eyes that is very deterrent.

[Speaker D] I’m talking about those people who said it—maybe he wants to make trouble between them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe he wants to, maybe he doesn’t want to, anything is possible, but those claims are not relevant.

[Speaker D] I’m not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] casting aspersions, one second—

[Speaker D] I’m not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] casting aspersions. It’s not relevant. Nobody is casting aspersions on anyone.

[Speaker D] And he forbids his wife to himself. It’s not just him—he is forbidding his wife to himself. That’s one side of the story here, but there’s also the issue that a bad name is being spread about her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know about spreading a bad name about her. Let her defend herself in court. If I…

[Speaker D] She claims it didn’t happen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She can claim it until tomorrow.

[Speaker D] It doesn’t matter. But there is no such “but”—a person can’t prove that he didn’t do something. You can’t prove such a thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good Lord, I don’t understand what you want. I’m not talking about the question of whether she was harmed… we didn’t harm her and we don’t want to harm her. Everything is wonderful. I cannot live with her! What can I do, I cannot live with her. That’s it. I think she is forbidden to me. What am I supposed to do? Do you want to force me to commit a prohibition so she won’t be hurt? I’m not willing to commit a prohibition!

[Speaker D] No, because I think—excuse me—because I think she is forbidden to me because one person came…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and I believe him!

[Speaker D] And someone came and said she committed adultery…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and I believe him!

[Speaker D] Thank you, just some random person told me she committed adultery. Don’t say that a person has a character of a jealous type…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you decided, Yael, you decided… you decided that he’s random, that he came and decided… You can present anything that way. No problem, in whatever tone you want. The person is there and he believes him. That’s the fact. Now you can be smarter than he is, and you know the other person is fooling him, because you’re a genius and he’s an idiot. But he believes him! Okay? And from his perspective this woman is forbidden to him. Do you want to force him to continue living with her even though, according to him, it’s forbidden? It’s forbidden to him! He thinks it’s forbidden.

[Speaker D] I want to say… that only in a case where two witnesses come and say such a thing, then she should be forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I ask…

[Speaker D] I want to say that she is not forbidden to him. I want to say, as we said in the previous case, after all a religious court has the power to obligate something legally, right? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but not to obligate me to commit a prohibition.

[Speaker D] So I want to say…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yael, Yael, you’re mistaken. A religious court has no power to obligate me to commit a prohibition. A religious court can obligate me not to marry. Not marrying is not committing a prohibition. A religious court cannot obligate me to do something that according to my own view is prohibited. A religious court cannot obligate me to eat something that I think is pork. I think it’s pork; you can’t force me to eat it. You can obligate me… again, with this piece of pork. You can obligate me not to eat something that in my eyes is kosher. You cannot obligate me to eat something that in my eyes is not kosher. There’s no such thing. What you’re saying… I want to keep Jewish law. You can’t obligate the husband to have relations with a woman who in his view is forbidden to him, forbidden to him under a severe prohibition. It has nothing to do with the woman. The woman, all the best to her, let her defend herself, let her do whatever she wants. I cannot commit a prohibition.

[Speaker C] No, but she is forbidden to him only on the level of the idea. Meaning, the fact that someone told him… wait… so in terms of thought, the idea, the notion, the statement—okay, she is forbidden to him, right, according to Jewish law. But what is an idea?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do you know what an idea and a notion are? I don’t… She is halakhically forbidden to him. What do you mean, “an idea and a notion”?

[Speaker C] Wait, okay, Jewish law… but really, really, in reality, it didn’t happen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who told you it didn’t happen? There is one witness saying that it did.

[Speaker C] Who says?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She says. So what if she says? There is one witness saying that it did happen. Who told you it didn’t happen?

[Speaker C] Wait, wait, let me… okay, there’s some problem here between one witness… and one witness, I understand that in prohibitions one witness is accepted…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this isn’t ordinary prohibitions; this is a matter of forbidden sexual relations. Again. This is a matter of forbidden sexual relations; you need two witnesses.

[Speaker C] All the more so. If it’s in sexual matters, you need two witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct—for convincing the religious court.

[Speaker C] For

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] convincing the religious court you need two witnesses. But for knowing what the truth is, even one witness saying something is good evidence. To convince a religious court so that it will force us to act… I don’t understand. What evidence is she? She is evidence for nothing. She is an interested party.

[Speaker C] But that’s only according to whom he believes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She is evidence for nothing. She is an interested party. There is one witness here who says she committed adultery. There is a scriptural decree that you need two witnesses and one witness is not enough. So has that scriptural decree suddenly become an article of faith? I would have expected the opposite question. Once there is one witness, why don’t we obligate him to divorce her? No—there is a scriptural decree that only with two do we do that. A person comes and says something. Can you know that he’s wrong?

[Speaker C] No, no, no, what I’m claiming here is… that in essence, the husband’s power of belief in the person who said it is stronger than anything else. What does “power of belief” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand that. He believes him. I don’t know what “power of belief” means. He appears to him… the whole thing seems credible to him. That’s it. He knows the person; it says one of his relatives or one of her relatives; he knows the person, and it seems to him… I’m not isolating it. But Yael, I’m not isolating it. True, he knows his wife too and he knows this person too, and he reached the conclusion that he believes him. That’s it, and he doesn’t believe her. That is his conclusion. So what are you going to do now—force him to go on living with her even though according to his view it’s forbidden?

[Speaker D] It’s forbidden to divorce her; let him not live with her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what they say. That’s what they say: not live with her, and give her the marriage settlement.

[Speaker D] What does that have to do with it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s called not living with her. So what do you want, that she remain in his house and get nothing? Is that better? Nothing happens in the house, he doesn’t, she…

[Speaker D] She’ll stay without him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The proper way is to divorce her and give her the marriage settlement. And everyone understands that if she received the marriage settlement, then there is no proof at all about what she did. He is being stringent with himself because he is concerned.

[Speaker D] Not everyone understands. Everyone thinks now that she committed adultery.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then maybe you live in a certain kind of society, but in a society where this was the norm, everyone understood the situations. In our society the norms are different. Everyone understood. When the woman received the marriage settlement, it was completely clear that nothing had been proven. The person is concerned, okay, so he is concerned—what can you do?

[Speaker C] Wait, Liris has a question. Yes. She wrote something in Zoom in the chat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand that this is what Yael is asking, yes, that’s what Yael asked and I answered it. I don’t see what the question is. How can a religious court allow just some random person to come and stir up conflict? The religious court allows nothing. The religious court says that if the husband became convinced that his wife committed adultery—there are no witnesses at all—the husband thinks she committed adultery, okay? Then he divorces her and gives her the marriage settlement, with no witnesses at all; not even one came.

[Speaker D] And my question is about the passage of the suspected adulteress. If the husband suspects she committed adultery, then there is the whole passage of the suspected adulteress, not just this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. In the passage of the suspected adulteress she loses the marriage settlement and afterward she also dies. To divorce her you need the passage of the suspected adulteress? I can divorce her even without a reason. If I suspect she committed adultery, I divorce her; only she receives the marriage settlement. Only if I bring two witnesses that she committed adultery does she lose her marriage settlement. Why? Because if I simply feel like divorcing her. Now here it’s not even “I feel like it,” but simply that I’m saying: it is forbidden to me. What can I do? According to my view it is forbidden. Do you want to force him to commit a prohibition? There’s no such thing. What do you mean? Okay, moving on.

The second law: If his wife said to him that she committed adultery under him willingly—she herself came and admitted it—we pay no attention to her words, lest she has set her eyes on another man. She wants to get free of him, he won’t give a divorce, so she tells him untrue stories: “I committed adultery,” in order to force him to divorce her. So we pay no attention to her words. What does “we pay no attention to her words” mean? If he believes her, then he’ll divorce her, but if he doesn’t believe her, we do not force him to believe. But she has lost her marriage settlement. Why? Because of a litigant’s own admission. A litigant’s own admission. In monetary matters, a litigant’s own admission is binding. If you admit that you committed adultery and therefore you do not deserve the marriage settlement, then if he divorces you, you won’t receive the marriage settlement, because you said you committed adultery. A litigant’s own admission.

[Speaker D] Question: why not say here that a person cannot render himself wicked? She is rendering herself wicked—why do we accept the admission at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re not accepting anything; we pay no attention to her words—we’re not accepting anything. But as for her marriage settlement, she has lost it. It is a litigant’s own admission, yes. And if he believed her and relied on her words, then according to his own view he is obligated to divorce her. And the religious court does not force the man to divorce his wife on the basis of these things until two witnesses come and testify that this wife committed adultery before them willingly, and afterward they force him to divorce her. With fewer than two witnesses, the religious court does not force him to divorce her. More than that, even if he comes and tells the religious court, “I believe her,” Maimonides says: we do not force the husband to divorce the woman—which really is already self-imposed prohibition. After all, the man is saying: self-imposed prohibition. I am declaring that this woman is forbidden to me. So seemingly, according to your own view, you are obligated to divorce her. Why doesn’t the religious court force you to act in accordance with your own view? Maimonides claims: there is no coercion by the religious court. The law of self-imposed prohibition is your own conduct, but we do not force you to act in accordance with it. That is your consideration.

By contrast, in the Shulchan Arukh, as I pointed you there, the order is reversed. He reversed the order of the laws, and the Bnei Ahuvah comments on this. He says, in the Shulchan Arukh, it is written as follows in section 6: He writes, if there are no witnesses that she committed adultery but she says that she committed adultery—that is the second law in Maimonides, right?—we do not take this matter into account to forbid her. And if he believed her and relies on her words, then he is obligated to divorce her, but we do not force him to divorce her. That is the second law in Maimonides. After that, in his second law he brings Maimonides’ first law: If a man saw that his wife committed adultery, or one of his relatives or one of her relatives told him and he trusts them, and so on—then of course if he believes, he must divorce her, and so on. Here it does not say that we do not force him. So the Bnei Ahuvah says—Bnei Ahuvah is Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz; his commentary on Maimonides is called Bnei Ahuvah, and on the Shulchan Arukh it is Urim VeTumim—so he writes that the Shulchan Arukh reversed the order in order to tell us that in the second law they do force him. In the first law, if he believes the woman who admitted it—he believes the woman who admitted it—then he is obligated to divorce her, but they do not force him. But if he saw that she committed adultery, or if one of the relatives whom he trusts told him and he relies on them, there they do force him to divorce her. Meaning, his claim is that according to the Shulchan Arukh, in the law of self-imposed prohibition they do force him, unlike Maimonides.

A big question is why in the first case they do not force him. Right. The question is why in the first case they do not force him, when she says that she committed adultery. Okay? Seemingly there too it is self-imposed prohibition. So I really don’t know what the difference is, but if he is right, then at least in the second case we see, according to his view, that they do force him. And then he says—what?

[Speaker C] According to Maimonides’ view?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to the Shulchan Arukh’s view. No. Maimonides says that they do not force him at all in any of these cases. In the Shulchan Arukh it is written that they do force him—only in the first case, when she herself admits it, for some reason they do not force him. But in principle, regarding self-imposed prohibition they do force him. What they don’t force there is because maybe she has set her eyes on another man or something like that; I don’t know, maybe there is some special case there. But if someone comes and tells you, and you believe him, in that case they would force him according to the Shulchan Arukh, and according to Maimonides they would not force him. And then he says that there is a dispute here over the question whether we force compliance in the law of self-imposed prohibition. And this of course brings us to the question why. And the simple explanation is what I mentioned earlier: the disagreement over whether the law of self-imposed prohibition is fundamentally based on a vow, or whether it is credibility. If it is credibility, then they also force compliance. But if it is only a vow—fine, a vow you are obligated to keep, but that’s your own business, we don’t… The question of why we do not force compliance under coercion for commandments—that we will still clarify. But that is the stage we are at.

Meaning, at this point we are arriving at an understanding of the law of self-imposed prohibition, and I already mentioned the two understandings in the responsa of Mahari ben Lev and in the Ketzot—those are the first two passages I already mentioned—which basically raise the two understandings we spoke about: either vow or credibility. And I said that this Ketzot in section 34 does the same thing for a litigant’s own admission. So I’ve already given the background, and next time we’ll get into it. I’ll also send you more material, also something for the next order of learning. A little more addition. Okay, we’ll stop here. Thank you very much. Goodbye. Sabbath—

[Speaker C] peace. Sabbath peace. Sabbath peace.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye. Sabbath peace.