Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 38: Two Who Litigated

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[0:00] The need for three judges in monetary cases
[1:53] The double detailing of monetary law
[3:18] General and particular in interpreting the Mishnah
[7:37] The need for a “tzrikhta” between thefts and injuries
[9:23] The Talmud’s “for what purpose?” question
[16:53] Differences between ordained judges and experts
[18:32] The history of ordination until the period of the Amoraim
[23:12] The mixing of passages and its effect on three judges
[26:01] Rabbi Hanina’s statement about examination and interrogation
[53:56] Why does the Talmud ask, and what does it mean?
[55:19] The question of two judges—does the ruling stand?
[57:35] An expert accepted by the public—can he judge alone?
[1:01:32] Maimonides versus Shmuel—analysis of a contradiction
[1:08:38] An insolent court and three sitting over the document
[1:19:35] The wording “we sat, three” — why are two signatories needed?
[1:22:59] The signature of two and the need for “and one is no longer here”
[1:24:18] The absence of “and one is no longer here” and its implications
[1:25:26] Rav Nahman versus Shmuel: three judges for validation of documents
[1:26:40] The strength of the certification with three judges
[1:28:04] Summary and questions from the audience

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, just one more moment and I’ll read. All right, so we’re on the topic of two who judged. It comes up here somewhat incidentally. I said that I thought that for general education it was still worth not skipping it, to get to know this aspect too. We’ve been dealing a lot with a religious court for validating documents. We saw various laws about it—whether testimony is needed before it, what happens if one of the judges is disqualified—while always in the background there sits this fact that for a court to validate documents you need three judges. That was the subtext of all the cases we’ve studied until now, and here it comes to the surface, this assumption that has quietly accompanied us until now. So I thought I wanted to touch on this a bit.

The background to this is a passage at the beginning of tractate Sanhedrin. I’ll enlarge the page a bit, okay. So in the Mishnah there, there’s a breakdown of all the panels that have to sit for each and every issue in the field of Jewish law. Capital cases are with twenty-three, monetary cases with three, lashes—there’s a dispute whether that’s with three or twenty-three, fines—in short, all the possible litigations in Jewish law, each has some court composition or number of judges that have to sit. There is of course a court of seventy or seventy-one that deals with the bigger matters, but litigations between people, or criminal law, go up to a court of twenty-three.

These things are learned throughout the beginning of tractate Sanhedrin, in the first chapter, from verses. Meaning, for each such context there’s a source in the verses for how many judges have to sit in that kind of case. The Mishnah opens with a statement about monetary cases that’s formulated doubly and not entirely clearly: “Monetary cases with three; thefts and injuries with three.” On the face of it there’s a redundancy here. Thefts and injuries are a subgroup of monetary cases, so why say both? That’s what the Talmud here deals with, and the Talmud asks: “Are thefts and injuries not monetary cases?” In other words, why write it twice? If all monetary cases require three, then thefts and injuries certainly do too.

Rabbi Abbahu said: “What does it teach?” Meaning, words are missing here and have to be added. Of course this isn’t an alternate text of the Mishnah, but words to clarify the meaning. “What does it teach?”—what are the monetary cases? Thefts and injuries. All right? So that’s really the specification of those monetary cases being discussed here as requiring three. In other words, this comes to narrow the term “monetary cases.” And what does it exclude? If it comes to narrow, apparently something is left outside. So they say that thefts and injuries are what are meant here by “monetary cases with three.” Another category is admissions and loans. Okay?

Just as an aside, one of the interpretive principles by which the Torah is expounded is general and particular. General and particular is exactly the structure that appears here. General and particular means they tell me “monetary cases,” which is a general statement, and then they bring examples: thefts and injuries. And then the rule among the interpretive principles says that if such a form appears in the Torah, then the particulars that come after the general term come to narrow it. They basically come to say this: what I said generally applies only to examples of this type, and not to examples belonging to other categories. So what they do there is make a generalization around the examples that were brought, but that generalization has to be of the same kind as the examples. Meaning, only what resembles the examples, and not everything included in the general term. Exactly the same thing—it’s simply applying general-and-particular interpretation to the Mishnah.

I once wrote a book on general-and-particular interpretations in the Talmudic Logic series, and there I argued—I didn’t even notice this then—that this looks like a principle specific to Scripture, and that in other texts we wouldn’t use such an inference. But that’s not true. I showed there, for example, from responsa literature—even in Maharam of Rothenburg there are later authorities who learn by general and particular, trying to infer what Maharam of Rothenburg meant in some sentence he formulated. There are also various sources in the Talmud and post-Talmudic texts where you see that even in ordinary non-biblical texts we interpret by general and particular. I never noticed it, but in fact that’s what the Talmud is doing here. The Talmud is doing exactly that kind of interpretation here.

And now we also need to understand why. Why is this important? Because you have to understand that when they say admissions and loans as opposed to thefts and injuries, that doesn’t cover all areas. There are other areas too. How do I know what about the rest? So as I said, thefts and injuries are an example, not the full definition. They’re an example. Everything similar to those examples will require three. What’s similar to admissions and loans—that’s also a lot of things, but they resemble admissions and loans—won’t require three. Or rather, that’s not what the Mishnah is talking about here. Okay, so these are examples around which I’m supposed to generalize.

By the way, in the world of law there are major debates about exactly how we’re supposed to interpret examples that are given. For example—yes, the example Hart gives, the well-known legal philosopher, jurist, philosopher of law—he says: “No vehicles may enter the public garden.” Now the question is—right, in a public garden there’s some sign saying no vehicles may enter here. So what is a vehicle? Is a child’s ride-on toy a vehicle? I don’t know, a statue with a tank commemorating victory in some war—is that allowed in the garden? Tractors doing repairs—how exactly do we interpret this matter of ‘vehicle’? So that’s a general statement. You could say: like cars, motorcycles, and the like. But again, the question is how to understand ‘and the like.’ How much like? How similar does it have to be, and how not?

The way the Torah found to deal with this is the way of general and particular, particular and general, general and particular and general—just different structures that place the general terms and particulars in different positions and tell us, in each such structure, exactly how to treat the particulars, or how much to generalize around them and how much to exclude from the general term. So all in all this is a very sophisticated and very old method for dealing with problems that are basically new problems in the legal world. And I think the Torah has a very detailed and beautiful technique for dealing with these problems. This is of course not a mathematical method, but it does give me decent indications of how to make my generalizations, and that’s really what we did in that book I mentioned to you, on general and particular.

All right, back to our subject. So the Talmud interprets the Mishnah by general and particular. It’s really saying: “monetary cases” written as requiring three—what are they? Those like thefts and injuries, like the examples that appear afterward. “And this was necessary,” says the Talmud. “For if it had taught monetary cases, I would have said even admissions and loans. Therefore it teaches thefts…” Yes—what is the “this was necessary”? It means why one of them alone would not have been enough. Either tell me thefts and injuries require three, or tell me monetary cases require three. Why do I need both—“monetary cases require three, thefts and injuries require three”? Why both? When you explain why both are needed, you have to explain what would have happened if each of the two had been said alone.

So they start with this: if it had said only “monetary cases,” then of course we would have thought that includes admissions and loans too, right? Because that’s all monetary cases. So clearly the explanation has to be added. The question is why the explanation alone, without the introduction “monetary cases,” wouldn’t be enough. And that’s what the Talmud says next: “And the reason it teaches thefts and injuries is because the essential source for three is written regarding thefts and injuries. Thefts are written, as it says, ‘the owner of the house shall come near to the judges’; injuries—what is that? Injury to his body; what is injury to his property? It taught: what are monetary cases? Thefts and injuries, but not admissions and loans.” In short, there’s a need for both; each side by itself would not have sufficed, and therefore both were needed.

If it had written only thefts and injuries, I would have thought that this applies to admissions and loans too, and that they only mentioned thefts and injuries because that’s the source for needing three. So they brought that source. But really I would have applied it to admissions and loans too. Therefore the Mishnah had to add here “monetary cases”—which monetary cases? Only thefts and injuries—so that you don’t come to expand it in any way.

By the way, I think this is also the basis for the logic of general and particular. Because in the logic of general and particular we should always ask ourselves what would have been wrong if I had said only the general term, or what would have been wrong if I had said only the particulars. Why do I need the combination of both? And the solution is always something of this type. So I never noticed this, but just now while speaking I realized that the passage here really contains an explanation of this interpretive principle of general and particular.

Okay, now the Talmud says: “And for what purpose?”

[Speaker C] Can I ask a question for a second? Yes, yes. So if thefts and injuries are a particular of the general term “monetary cases,” why does the Talmud specifically understand that admissions and loans are not just another particular? When you have general and particular, can you learn only the particular actually mentioned and no other particular?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. You asked two questions that are definitely related to each other. In other words, a common mistake—and we discuss this in that book—is that what’s written in the language of the tannaitic rules is… “General and particular—you only judge according to what is like the particular.” And people—sorry—say “the general includes only what is in the particular,” or something like that. If we interpret that literally, then indeed we could reach the conclusion that it means only the particulars explicitly appearing there and nothing beyond them. We show there that this is not true. It does include additional particulars, but those particulars have to be similar in the way we define there—they have to resemble these particulars, but there are more particulars. So this is some kind of generalization.

But on the other hand, that generalization obviously stops somewhere. Where does it stop? After all, there’s no hint of that in the verse—or here in our case, in the Mishnah. Of course that depends on our reasoning. We need to understand the essential characteristic of those particulars that were mentioned, and then choose other particulars that resemble them in that essential characteristic and say, okay, the law applies to those other particulars too. But if there are particulars that don’t resemble these in the essential characteristic, then those are what we came to exclude. And in our case, those are the two categories of thefts and injuries versus admissions and loans.

What lies behind this? What lies behind it is basically the nature of the legal obligation. When we talk about admissions and loans, the court does not create the legal obligation. In admissions and loans, if I borrowed, I have to repay even if the court didn’t determine that. By the very fact that I borrowed, I must repay. Right? If I admitted something to someone, I have to give it to him regardless of what the court ruled. The court’s role is not to create my obligation or my legal status, but to uncover it and enforce it. If I don’t do it, then the court has to compel me. But the obligation exists even without the court’s ruling.

The claim of many later authorities here is that with thefts and injuries, that’s not so. If I stole or injured someone, my obligation is the result of the court’s ruling. In other words, the obligation doesn’t exist beforehand. In that case, the court creates the obligation, and doesn’t merely reveal it and enforce it. It’s an interesting question why, because with thefts, simply speaking—what do you mean? If I stole from someone, I have to return it to him. Why? What does that have to do with a court ruling? We won’t go into…

[Speaker B] “And he shall return the stolen item.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear. “And he shall return the stolen item.” Right. No—just because it says “and he shall return the stolen item” proves nothing. The question is whether “and he shall return the stolen item” is an instruction to the court to obligate me to return it, or an instruction to me. But it’s pretty clear in Jewish law that it’s an instruction to me. So there’s a lot of room here to wonder why exactly thefts and injuries are understood here as an obligation created by the court and not merely revealed by it. Wait, there’s some background noise here. Created by the court—I’ll mute. Whoever wants can break in, okay?

[Speaker C] Maybe it has to do with the kind of damage caused, because with thefts and injuries, maybe intuitively it feels like a more serious, bigger harm than in admissions and loans. Although a loan can be for a lot of money, so the harm there too…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If anything, then all the more so I’d expect that with thefts and injuries the obligation would not depend on the court’s ruling. I’m obligated by the very fact that I stole or injured, regardless of whether the court also ruled that way. The court just has to reveal it or enforce it on me if I don’t pay. If it’s more severe, that’s actually a reason why I’d be obligated by the very fact that I stole or injured.

[Speaker D] Maybe in cases of thefts and injuries you need investigation, because there it really can be unclear cases. Whereas a loan—loans happen every day, it’s not something unusual, it’s straightforward, it doesn’t require much investigation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be, although again, if the truth is that I stole, then it’s pretty clear that I’m obligated. I’m obligated even without investigation.

[Speaker D] Maybe you didn’t steal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but I know that I stole. Let’s say I know I stole. Are you saying I’m not obligated until the court determines it? That’s not plausible.

[Speaker E] Maybe with thefts, because they placed it in the thief’s possession.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the thief acquired it. Okay, so here that already depends on whether it’s after despair of recovery or before despair, and that takes us into all the answers raised here. I’m not going into that now. Or for example, if the thing I stole was lost, and I now have to pay its value instead. It could be that there the court’s determination is what matters. If the very object I stole is what I have to return to the other person, that’s what’s called “your money is with me.” Meaning, his property is sitting with me, so obviously I have to return it to him. What does that have to do with the court’s ruling? But when that property has been lost, burned, I don’t know, something happened to it, and now I have to pay in its place—maybe only about that obligation do they say it’s one that the court creates.

I’m not going into that now, but on the conceptual level that’s what the Talmud is basically saying: thefts and injuries are a category set against admissions and loans. And what about additional categories? So as I said, they all fall under one of these two categories—either the category of obligations that the court creates, and for that you need three ordained judges; or obligations like admissions and loans, where reality itself determines the obligation, and the court only has to make sure the person does what he is supposed to do, but the court’s determination does not create the obligation.

And that also sounds very logical, because why do you need a court of three ordained judges? Precisely because we’re talking about situations in which the court creates the obligation. So if the court creates the obligation, no wonder the Torah requires specifically a very particular court, of three ordained judges or more. But if the court is merely clarifying an existing obligation, then why should I care who sits there in the court? Bottom line, I’m obligated; the court just has to determine that I’m obligated. It doesn’t have to establish or create a new obligation. So there’s logic behind this distinction too.

In any case, we continue. Yes, so “for what purpose?” asks the Talmud. “If you say that we do not require three…” For what purpose did they distinguish here between admissions and loans and thefts and injuries? Is it to say that for admissions and loans we wouldn’t need three judges at all? But didn’t Rabbi Abbahu say—and here we come to our topic—“Two who judged monetary cases, everyone agrees that their ruling is not a valid ruling”? After all, Rabbi Abbahu, who is the one speaking above, who says that admissions and loans are not included in what the Mishnah is talking about, Rabbi Abbahu himself said that two who judged, their ruling is no ruling. Meaning, he agrees that you need three. So how can we say—and of course “two who judged” means in all monetary cases; the medieval authorities already note that here. So it’s hard to assume that Rabbi Abbahu interprets the Mishnah’s “thefts and injuries” as contrasted with admissions and loans regarding the need for three, because in admissions and loans too, according to him, you need three. So in what respect is it said?

Rather, that we do not require experts. By the way, the expression “experts” in the Talmud is one of the most confusing terms there is in Sanhedrin. There are places where “experts” means ordained judges, and places where “experts” means not ordained, at least according to a large number of the medieval authorities. We’ll encounter one of them shortly, in the Talmud on page 5. In any case, here the expression means ordained judges. So what you need in thefts and injuries is three ordained judges; what you need in admissions and loans is three who are not ordained.

And again, why? Because in thefts and injuries the three judges have to constitute the legal obligation, create the law, so they must be qualified ordained judges. But in admissions and loans, what requires three is just that the clarification be done properly. But it’s clarification, not the creation of a new law, and therefore three judges who are not ordained are enough. Presumably “not ordained” also doesn’t mean they’re not experts in judging. They are experts, they know the subject—only they did not undergo the formal ritual of ordination.

Now here I want to give some preliminary background, which I also wrote for you briefly. Strictly speaking, judges who sit in judgment are required to be ordained. That’s the simple view. We’ll see in relation to our issue in a moment, but that’s the simple view: they must be ordained. Everything written in the Torah about judges—called “elohim” there, “elohim” basically means judges in the Torah—is interpreted by the Sages as referring to ordained judges. What does ordained mean? Moses our teacher was authorized by the Holy One, blessed be He, to judge, and from him begins a chain of ordination. He ordained Joshua and the elders and so on, just like at the beginning of Pirkei Avot. And any panel of ordained judges can ordain others, attach them to itself, and continue the chain.

And so ordination continued from the giving of the Torah until after the destruction of the Second Temple—say roughly the end of the tannaitic period. That’s the accepted view. By the way, there are quite major disputes about this, but that’s the accepted view: that ordination more or less ceased with Rabbi Yehuda ben Bava. There’s a story in the Talmud about five students, and he saved them by ordaining them. But shortly after him, the Romans basically no longer allowed ordination—didn’t allow it to continue—and a little after that it apparently ceased, and the Amoraim were no longer ordained.

The Tannaim were more or less ordained—I don’t know if all of them, but most were. The accepted view is that the Amoraim were not ordained. But as I hinted there, there are many disputes about this, because there is evidence of ordained people up through the tenth or eleventh century CE, which is much, much later—even after the redaction of the Talmud, deep into the end of the Geonic period. What?

[Speaker B] How can ordination be given outside the Land of Israel?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—in the Land of Israel. There were ordained people in the Land of Israel until the eleventh century. Not only that—there were also “ordained” people in Babylonia, and the question is to what extent that ordination was really ordination. There was Rabbi Hofni ben Ali—Rabbi Hofni ben Ali the judge—there were various famous ordained figures. Those who headed the great academies in Babylonia were regarded as ordained up to the time of Maimonides. We’re talking about the twelfth century, and they were called ordained. The accepted view is that they were not really ordained; it was a borrowed expression. A bit like how people speak today—if someone is asked whether he was ordained as a rabbi, that’s obviously a borrowed expression. He isn’t ordained in the original halakhic sense; he was certified by some body, but that’s not really ordination in its original Jewish-law sense.

So that’s why I’m saying there are major debates in this context about when ordination ended, but the accepted view is that roughly by the end of the redaction of the Mishnah, the end of the tannaitic period, it had ended. The common assumption is that Amoraim were not ordained. One thing is clear: the Babylonian Amoraim certainly were not ordained, because that was outside the Land of Israel. So even during the period when ordination still existed in the Land of Israel, the sages in Babylonia were not ordained. And of course that doesn’t mean they weren’t experts. So it’s very important to distinguish between the formal ritual of ordination and checking the professional criteria—whether he is an expert judge or not. Obviously the judges of Babylonia were also expert judges, okay? They just couldn’t be formally ordained because it wasn’t in the Land of Israel.

[Speaker B] And beyond the Land of Israel, there’s also this issue of—exactly, what is this “experts”? Is it only people with knowledge, or the whole matter of ordination is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s exactly what I just said. That’s exactly what I said now: that in the Talmud there is sometimes a difference between ordained judges and experts. In the Talmud passage I blackened out here before you, “we do not require experts” means ordained judges. But on page 5, for example, where I referred you, “an expert accepted by the public may judge even alone”—there it doesn’t mean ordained. How do I know? Because immediately afterward Rav Nahman appears and testifies about himself that he is an expert accepted by the public. Rav Nahman was a Babylonian Amora. In Babylonia there were no ordained judges. Therefore there it’s pretty clear that “expert” does not mean ordained, but expert the way we use the term today—professional expert, meaning he’s a Torah scholar, but he was not ordained in the formal sense. Okay? So I return.

[Speaker C] But ordination—you can only receive it in the Land of Israel and not outside it? But for example Moses ordained the elders at Sinai too, not in the Land of Israel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not clear at all. It could be that that was simply because they hadn’t yet reached the Land of Israel. But once they had already come to the Land of Israel, then it had to be there. There were other things too—there was permission for private altars, there were various things in the wilderness that were not so in the Land of Israel, or the prohibition on eating meat until they came to the Land of Israel. So there are changes between before the Land of Israel and after. I’m speaking right now after they were already settled there. All right?

[Speaker E] Unrelated, but actually in the wilderness there was no permission for private altars. What? Unrelated, but actually in the wilderness there was no permission for private altars—they were obligated only to the Tabernacle, even for meat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—until the Tabernacle.

[Speaker D] Until the Tabernacle there was permission.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and after that there wasn’t—

[Speaker D] there was—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and when they entered the Land of Israel maybe there was. So that’s why I’m saying there were changes between the period of the wilderness and the period of the Land of Israel, changes in various directions. In any case, for our purposes, let’s leave that. We’re dealing now with after there was already a Sanhedrin in the Land of Israel, there were ordained judges, and from there onward ordination is only in the Land of Israel.

Okay, so returning to the Talmud. The Talmud says: admissions and loans—three, but not ordained experts; thefts and injuries—three experts. The Talmud asks: what does he hold? If he holds that the passages are intermingled—and this is an important point for our subject—what does that mean? “Intermingling of passages” means this: we learn the law of ordained judges from the section of bailees—and, if you like, also torts connected to that section—and there the word “judges” appears three times, and from that we learn that ordained judges are needed.

If there is an intermingling of passages, then the Talmud says there is a verse within the section of bailees that deals with admissions—“that he says, ‘this is it,’” partial admission, we talked about this once—which is a verse dealing with loans, and it is located in the middle of the section of bailees. So you see that the sections are mixed together. If the sections are mixed together, that means what’s written in the section about needing ordained judges applies to everything—loans too, and thefts and injuries too, or bailment and the like. If you say there is no intermingling of passages, then what’s written in the section refers only to what appears in that section—meaning thefts and injuries—but admissions and loans, which are not written there, do not require ordained judges.

So that’s what the Talmud says, seemingly: what’s here depends on the question whether there is or isn’t an intermingling of passages. Now the Talmud says like this: if he holds that the passages are intermingled, then admissions and loans should also require experts. So what does he hold—that there is intermingling? Fine, then how can it be that admissions and loans require three but not experts? If it’s written in the section, then that section says everything in it requires ordained judges. So how can he say they don’t require ordained judges?

And if we say there is no intermingling of passages, then why do we need three? Then where does he learn that three are needed? In the end, either they require three—and then ordained judges too—or they do not require ordained judges, but then they also do not require three. After all, the derivation that they require ordained judges and the derivation that they require three come from the same place. So if that source also talks about admissions and loans, then admissions and loans too require three ordained judges. If it doesn’t talk about admissions and loans, then they don’t even require three—not only do they not require ordained judges. Then nothing is required! So where did he get this hybrid creature from—that three are required, but not ordained judges?

So he says: really, he holds that the passages are intermingled. And by strict law, they really should require experts too. Meaning, he holds there is intermingling. In principle, if so, then admissions and loans too should require three ordained judges. And why, then, do we not require experts? Why does he say experts are not required? Because of Rabbi Hanina. For Rabbi Hanina said: by Torah law, monetary cases and capital cases alike require examination and interrogation, as it says, “You shall have one manner of justice.” And why did they say monetary cases do not require examination and interrogation? So as not to lock the door before borrowers.

“From now on…” yes, so what is he saying? Rabbi Hanina is basically saying this: fundamentally, every testimony that comes before the court requires examination and interrogation. You have to cross-check the testimony, see that the witnesses are speaking truth—or at least speaking accurately; it’s not always deliberate lying—but you have to cross-check their testimony and ask when it happened and how it happened and compare and so on. But in monetary cases—where here this means only admissions and loans, and we’ll soon see why—why did they say monetary cases do not require examination and interrogation? It doesn’t mean all monetary cases; it means only admissions and loans. Why? Because with admissions and loans we want not to lock the door before borrowers.

If when the lender sues the borrower and asks him to return the money, he has to bring witnesses and the witnesses will undergo full-scale cross-examination, detailed examination and interrogation—he won’t have the energy for all that mess, and he won’t lend. Why does he need all that headache? So in the end, precisely for the borrower’s benefit, we make things easier for the lender when he comes to collect. When the lender comes to collect, we say: bring two witnesses, and we won’t require detailed examination and interrogation. If you bring two witnesses, we’ll take the money from the borrower. Then the lender won’t be afraid, and he’ll be willing to lend, and borrowers will be able to find lenders if they get into distress. So in the end the goal is to be lenient for borrowers.

[Speaker E] So by Torah law you really need three, but by rabbinic enactment, because of not locking the door—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Three, but not ordained experts?

[Speaker E] Three, but rabbinically, that you don’t need experts for loans—or is that Torah law too?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbinic. Meaning, the claim is—and that’s what he says—that fundamentally there is an intermingling of passages, and therefore admissions and loans too really should require three ordained judges. But there is a rabbinic enactment so that the door not be locked before borrowers. In loans they wanted to be lenient. And what are the leniencies? A: the witnesses are exempt from examination and interrogation. B: and this is what the Talmud adds here, they also do not require the judges to be ordained, because it’s hard to find three ordained judges and gather them to judge this case. Take three people who know how to judge, and they too can judge it. They wanted to ease the process. All right?

[Speaker B] And maybe also only ordained judges can conduct examination and interrogation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t think that’s true. No.

[Speaker C] I have a more general question that’s true in other examples too: how can the Sages essentially uproot a law the Torah established and be lenient about it? Even if the reason is logical, in the end they’re uprooting a Torah law for the sake of something social or whatever it may be. Like prosbul—there are other examples. I know there are others. I’m asking about the very power.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, they can uproot a Torah law by passive omission but not by positive action. That’s a Talmud in Yevamot page 90, although there are medieval authorities who pointed to a few places where they uprooted a Torah law even by positive action where there was great need. But here it’s different, because we’re talking about monetary law. There there is a principle: what the court declares ownerless is ownerless. Meaning, the court has the right to declare property ownerless if it sees fit. That authority is grounded in Torah law. They derive it from a verse in Ezra—not important now—but it’s Torah law. What the court declares ownerless is ownerless.

Now if that’s so, then there’s no problem, because what did the court really do here? If the non-ordained judges judge, they have not violated any prohibition. It’s just that their ruling is not valid because they are not expert judges. You and I too can sit and judge whatever we want, only it won’t have any significance, right? So there’s no prohibition here. The whole point is simply that I don’t have to obey them. Their ruling is not binding. Then the Sages come and say: we declare this money ownerless. Meaning, we give them authority, we give force to their decision, and obligate the people to obey. And how do they do it? They simply declare the borrower’s money ownerless. They say: you’re right, fundamentally the borrower shouldn’t have had to pay the lender because there were no ordained judges here—but we declare your money ownerless and nevertheless obligate you to pay.

So in monetary law specifically, the Sages can enact enactments that can even override Torah law not only by passive omission. All right? Yes—maybe one more note. What Idit remarked earlier is really true: if both sides agree, then of course any panel can judge any issue. We’re allowed to agree on whatever we want. You can seat three cattle herders there, you can decide that the judges in Munich will decide our dispute—it really doesn’t matter. In the end, if both sides agree, everything is fine. That works under contract law. We’re speaking here only about a panel that can impose itself on the parties, not a panel founded on the parties’ agreement. Okay?

[Speaker B] But afterward, over the generations, it was also not only in monetary law, but in marriage and divorce. Divorce too—so that no daughter of Israel should remain chained and so on, something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there it’s not so simple. Because in marriage and divorce they really didn’t do anything. What’s the issue when a court today deals with marriage and divorce? It isn’t judging any issue; it’s basically functioning like a halakhic decisor. Suppose judges sit over a divorce case and decide that the woman is divorced or not divorced. That’s a ruling in matters of prohibition and permission; it’s not a judicial ruling. They’re only saying the woman is divorced or is not divorced, that’s all. They aren’t creating any state here. In monetary law there is an act of “what the court declares ownerless is ownerless.” In places where the court uproots a marriage—“the Sages uprooted his marriage from him”—that is an action of a court. But that truly cannot be done by a court that is not ordained, or even by the greatest court of the generation. That’s a different area.

[Speaker B] And they didn’t do it? They didn’t do it after ordination collapsed?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only afterward—only on those grounds that the Talmud already established for doing it.

[Speaker B] Fine, the grounds yes, but the court? The question isn’t about the grounds, but about the court.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. If the grounds—if the Talmud already established it, then it gave authority to the court to do it under the principle of “they act as our agents,” because the Talmud already did it. There it really is an enactment of an ordained court. Okay.

All right, in any case, the Talmud asks: “From now on…” I’m on the second-to-last line of the darkened passage: “From now on, if they erred, they should not have to pay.” Right? If they’re authorized to judge, then why do you obligate them to pay? A court authorized to judge—if it errs, it is exempt from paying. So he says: all the more so, otherwise you lock the door before borrowers. Therefore we obligate them to pay.

If so, then the Mishnah is teaching two different things: “Monetary cases with three laymen; thefts and injuries with three experts.” The Talmud says this is a bit strange, because now let’s return to Rabbi Abbahu’s interpretation. So how did we understand what Rabbi Abbahu said? He says that fundamentally you need three ordained judges in both thefts and injuries and admissions and loans. A rabbinic enactment, so as not to lock the door before borrowers, says that for admissions and loans three laymen suffice. Again, laymen in the sense that they are not ordained, not necessarily in the sense that they are not Torah scholars, okay? Three laymen. Why? So that the door not be locked before borrowers.

Now go back to the Mishnah. How does Rabbi Abbahu read the Mishnah? “What does it teach?” right? “Monetary cases with three” means three laymen, because that’s admissions and loans; “thefts and injuries with three” means three experts. So the Talmud says: I don’t understand. In both places you say “three,” and in each place it means something else—in the very same sentence? The same word in the same sentence is interpreted in two different ways? That’s not plausible.

[Speaker E] And second, then “monetary cases” is no longer a heading?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hm? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] Then if it means “monetary cases with three laymen, thefts and injuries with three experts,” then “monetary cases” is no longer a heading, it’s no longer a general term.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very true. That’s an excellent comment, and we’ll get to it in just a moment. I remind you of my comment about general and particular. When we read the Mishnah—when the Mishnah says “monetary cases with three,” what does it mean? What does it mean?

[Speaker B] Is it a general term, or does it mean admissions and loans?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This isn’t admissions and loans. It teaches categories, right? What does that mean? “Categories”: monetary cases are judged by three — which monetary cases are written there? Robberies, injuries, and damages. To exclude admissions and loans — that’s a conclusion; it isn’t written in the Mishnah. Right? Meaning, the first term, “monetary cases,” is a heading; it’s not synonymous with admissions and loans, it’s a heading. Monetary cases are judged by three. Which monetary cases? Robberies and injuries by three. So the Talmud’s first question isn’t clear. Because the first question of the Talmud says: “Monetary cases by three, robberies and injuries by three” — what does that mean? Really, is the first talking about three laymen and the second about three experts? Why would that be? The first is also three experts. What it says is monetary cases by three experts. Which monetary cases? Robberies and injuries by three experts. It’s all experts; it’s not being interpreted once as laymen and once as experts. But for that — to understand the Talmud — you have to read the continuation. And furthermore, that was only the first difficulty. A second difficulty: why do I need “three” and “three”? Why write “three” twice? Why write “monetary cases by three”? That just means robberies and injuries. Okay? Why say “three” again? Therefore the Talmud asks, from whichever way you look at it. The Talmud says like this: look. If, as you’re telling me, it teaches categories — meaning the first part is a general heading — then it’s all experts, and you’re right. But then I don’t understand why it says “three” twice. Monetary cases by three experts — which monetary cases? Robberies and injuries. That’s it. Why do I need “by three” again? Okay? So what will you say? No, it’s not general and specific, not heading and second part. Rather, “monetary cases” at the beginning means admissions and loans, and robberies and injuries are the second category. But then I understand why I need both “by three”s. However, then you’re telling me that in the same sentence the first “by three” refers to laymen and the second “by three” refers to experts. That’s also unreasonable. So decide how you’re reading it. If the first part is a heading, then I don’t understand why I need “three” twice. If the first part is synonymous with admissions and loans, I understand why I need “three” twice, but I don’t understand how you interpret the same term differently in the same sentence. The first “three” means laymen, the second “three” means experts. So whichever way you look at it, says the Talmud, Rabbi Abbahu’s approach isn’t clear. Okay? That’s what the Talmud is asking, and that’s why these aren’t two separate questions. That “and furthermore” isn’t two questions; it’s the second side of the same question — it’s a two-pronged attack. Decide: if it’s a main heading, then it doesn’t work that “three” is written twice; if it means admissions and loans, then it doesn’t work that the word “three” is interpreted differently in the same sentence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rather, Rava said: it teaches two things, because of Rabbi Hanina. What does that mean? Rava comes to disagree with Rabbi Abbahu, but not in the law. In the law he agrees with Rabbi Abbahu; he disagrees only about how to read the Mishnah. Okay? And what he is basically saying is that “monetary cases by three” means admissions and loans — not that it teaches categories, as Rabbi Abbahu said. This is not a general-specific exposition; rather, admissions and loans by three, and robberies and injuries by three. Okay? So then I understand why “three” is written twice. But how did he answer the second question? Or the first one? Why do you interpret the first “three” as laymen and the second “three” as experts in the same sentence? Because of Rabbi Hanina. What does “because of Rabbi Hanina” mean?

[Speaker E] Both are interpreted the same way, but because of the rabbinic enactment, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What he means is that the Torah law — the law of the Mishnah — is talking about Torah law. Monetary cases by three — that means admissions and loans by three ordained judges. Robberies and injuries also by three ordained judges. Admissions and loans have a rabbinic enactment that lowers us from three ordained judges to three laymen. So the word “three” is not really being interpreted in two different senses; rather, both instances of “three” really mean experts as a matter of original law. Why divide it into two? Because at the rabbinic level there is a difference between them. But that’s only rabbinic — that’s what Rava claims. Okay? So for our purposes, at the moment it seems Rabbi Abbahu’s opinion was rejected. Again, not the halakhic opinion. The halakhic opinion wasn’t rejected; rather, his suggestion for interpreting the Mishnah, that it teaches categories — that, the Talmud says, is out of the question. But Rava doesn’t disagree with Rabbi Abbahu halakhically; he rescues him by offering a different reading of the Mishnah. He suggests how to read the Mishnah differently while leaving Rabbi Abbahu’s halakhic view in place: that both “three”s mean experts as a matter of original law, but in admissions and loans there is a rabbinic enactment that lowered it to three laymen. Okay? That’s the reasoning of Rava and Rabbi Abbahu. As for reading the Mishnah, apparently only Rava’s reading remains.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the Talmud brings a third Amoraic view, which is really the second at the halakhic level. Because Rava and Rabbi Abbahu are the same view halakhically; the difference between them is only how to read the Mishnah. But here Rav Aha son of Rav Ika disagrees with them and argues differently halakhically. Rav Aha son of Rav Ika said: By Torah law, even one is valid, as it says, “Judge your fellow with righteousness.” Rather, it is because of people sitting idly on street corners. What does that mean? Essentially, by Torah law one is valid. Which one? I don’t know.

[Speaker E] Apparently not an expert, apparently not an expert — that’s what one would say because of those people sitting idly on street corners.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll see in a moment, we’ll see. By Torah law, one is valid, as it says, “Judge your fellow with righteousness.” “Judge” is singular, so apparently that means one. Not exactly a million-dollar proof, let’s say, because even those who say that three are required as a matter of original law will explain the verse “Judge your fellow with righteousness” to mean that the court should judge its fellow justly. It doesn’t necessarily refer to a single individual. In any case, that’s how Rav Aha son of Rav Ika learns it. “Rather, because of people sitting idly on street corners.” So why did they want three? Why require three? I’m talking about three laymen, yes? Why? Because if you take one — who knows? That one could be an ignoramus. Fine? Take three, because out of three there’s a reasonable chance that at least one knows what he’s talking about. Right? By the way, you could draw a rather interesting conclusion from here about the state of Torah knowledge in Babylonia. Or even how Babylonia regarded the Land of Israel, because they’re interpreting the Mishnah to mean that out of any three you take, one of them knows how to judge. That’s quite a far-reaching move. But that’s a hasty conclusion, because I think what’s written here means that if you take three and ask them to judge for you — meaning you’re choosing in advance three people whom you yourself think are Torah scholars, you’re not just grabbing three cattle herders from the marketplace. The only thing is, you yourself are an ignoramus. So the fact that you think they’re Torah scholars doesn’t yet guarantee that they really are. But among three such people whom an ignoramus thinks are Torah scholars, there’s a decent chance that at least one really is. That doesn’t mean that any random three people you pick off the street will include one fit to judge. Okay? That’s just a parenthetical remark.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says: by Torah law one is valid, and in order to make sure there is at least one Torah scholar there, the sages required — required implies rabbinically, yes? — they required three. The Talmud asks: really? If you take three, won’t they also be people sitting idly on street corners? And if you take three, aren’t they just three idlers? The Talmud answers: it’s impossible that there won’t be one among them who has learned. If you take three, then the odds are good that at least one of the three will be learned, a Torah scholar. “If so, then if they erred they should not have to pay, because all the more so there are many idlers there” — that already isn’t relevant for us.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is Rav Aha son of Rav Ika saying? First of all, halakhically he disagrees with Rava and Rabbi Abbahu. He says that by Torah law one is valid. What do they say? By Torah law, three are valid, right? Here, by Torah law one is valid. By the way, “one is valid” seems to apply both to admissions and loans and to robberies and injuries, at least on the face of it. Okay?

[Speaker E] But according to Rav Aha’s explanation it sounds like he is appointing them to be his judges. I didn’t understand. The litigant chooses the judges.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter who chooses; that’s not important — whether it’s us, the community, the litigant, whoever it is. You choose three judges; there’s a reasonable chance one of them will be a Torah scholar. It doesn’t matter. It doesn’t say here that it’s specifically about a formal acceptance process. Okay. So basically, on the face of it, he’s saying that by Torah law one is valid in all monetary law, not specifically in admissions and loans. Apparently. I don’t know — it doesn’t say otherwise here. So we’ll see in a moment. And the fact that three are required is rabbinic. At the end of the day, what is his claim? What does the law say? That apparently in all monetary cases one is enough as a matter of Torah law, and rabbinically they require three so that among them there will be one learned person, a Torah scholar. Okay? How does he read the Mishnah according to his view?

[Speaker E] But according to that, that one doesn’t have to be an expert. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because—

[Speaker E] If he were an expert, you wouldn’t need the other two. Apparently, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment. But how do you read the Mishnah according to his view? What does “monetary cases by three” mean? Robberies and injuries by three.

[Speaker B] What do you mean? Maybe again rabbinically. What is rabbinic there? That the requirement for three.

[Speaker E] Which—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which rabbinic requirement there?

[Speaker E] The issue of people sitting idly on street corners, in groups of three.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, then that’s true both for admissions and loans and for robberies and injuries too, isn’t it?

[Speaker E] No, because with robberies and injuries it says “judges.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, so now you’re already pulling us into the whole issue of overlapping passages. So right — with robberies and injuries it says three ordained judges. That’s written in the Torah. So there’s no discussion about that. It’s obvious that it means three ordained judges; even Rav Aha son of Rav Ika agrees. The whole question is only about admissions and loans. We’ll see that now. On the face of it, it seems Rav Aha son of Rav Ika holds that there is no overlapping of passages, right? That admissions and loans aren’t written in that passage. Therefore the rule of three ordained judges wasn’t said regarding them. So what is said? One. Which one? Ordained or ordinary? We’ll see in a moment. But one. Then the sages came and said: we require three. Notice: in the previous approach, the sages came to be lenient, and they lowered the requirement from three ordained judges to three laymen. According to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika, the sages came to be stringent. Originally one was enough, and the sages require three. That’s the opposite move, but it ends at the same point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, halakhically Rav Aha son of Rav Ika also agrees that in admissions and loans you need three laymen, and in robberies and injuries three expert ordained judges. Therefore, when he reads the Mishnah, he too reads it like Rava: admissions and loans means admissions and loans, and robberies and injuries means robberies and injuries by three expert judges. The first is three laymen; robberies and injuries are three experts. And everything we said before remains true. So where is the difference between Rav Aha son of Rav Ika and Rava and Rabbi Abbahu? Only in Torah law.

[Speaker E] Only—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only in Torah law — what the law was before the rabbinic enactment. He holds that for admission and loan, one was enough; whereas Rabbi Abbahu and Rava claim that three ordained judges were required. In other words, the question is whether the rabbinic enactment of three laymen came to be lenient — that’s what Rava and Rabbi Abbahu held — or whether it came to be stringent, and that’s what Rav Aha son of Rav Ika says. But after the enactment, there is no dispute in practical law: everyone agrees that for robberies and injuries you need three experts, and for admissions and loans three laymen are sufficient. So basically there is no difference between them in practice, and there’s no difference between them in how to read the Mishnah either. None at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore — or maybe before I continue — Rashi and Tosafot, if you saw them, disagree here on the question of what Rav Aha son of Rav Ika thinks about the overlapping of passages. Look at Tosafot; I told you to read it: “And by Torah law even one is valid.” Rashi explained in his commentary that he holds there is no overlapping of passages written here. And Tosafot asks: that’s difficult, because if so, why do I need “Judge your fellow with righteousness”? If there is no overlapping of passages, then why do I need the verse “Judge your fellow with righteousness” to teach me that one is enough? If there is no overlapping of passages, then I would say there’s no requirement at all, so one is enough anyway. Why do I need to bring a verse from which we learn that one is enough for admissions and loans? If there is no overlapping, then there is no requirement for anything beyond that; and if there is no requirement, then anyone can judge, including one. So what does he do—

[Speaker E] With what is written, “because this is it”? I mean, it’s not overlapping passages, it’s something else; I’m not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not getting into how he interprets the Torah right now; that’s a complicated issue in itself. But he holds there is no overlapping of passages.

[Speaker E] He argues that it is in a different passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. No, it’s not in a different passage; according to him it speaks about a deposit and not about a loan. A loan isn’t mentioned there. Partial admission speaks about a deposit, not a loan. Fine, but that’s in Bava Kamma 107; we’re not getting into that now. In any case, for our purposes, Tosafot brings in the name of Rashi — because that is what Rashi writes — that according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika there is no overlapping of passages. If so, Tosafot asks Rashi: why does Rav Aha son of Rav Ika bring the verse “Judge your fellow with righteousness”? It’s unnecessary. After all, if there’s no requirement, then one is obviously valid to judge. Why do you need a verse for that? Therefore Tosafot says: it seems that even according to the one who does hold that there is overlapping of passages, he said this. Tosafot says that Rav Aha son of Rav Ika holds there is overlapping of passages — or at least can hold that there is — and still one is enough by Torah law. Why? Because there is a verse teaching “Judge your fellow with righteousness,” and he says that despite the overlapping of passages, only one judge is required, not three.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But notice the conclusion that comes out of Tosafot: who is the one that Rav Aha son of Rav Ika requires by Torah law? Ordained, right? Because after all, there is overlapping of passages, and overlapping of passages teaches me that you need three and they need to be ordained. Now “Judge your fellow with righteousness” says that one is enough, right? It doesn’t touch the question of whether he is ordained or not. So the simple conclusion is: one ordained judge. Exactly. So according to Tosafot, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika says that by Torah law the one required is one ordained judge. Now, there are medieval authorities who say this — the Rosh — and some explain Maimonides this way too, if you saw that. It’s a bit difficult in the flow of the Talmud; apparently they had a different version of the text. Because if it were one ordained judge, then what good does it do for the sages to enact three? If you make it three laymen, one of them will be ordained? Ordained people are known and famous. Everyone knows who is ordained to judge and who isn’t. So it is pretty clear in the Talmud that it means one who is a Torah scholar, not one who is ordained. And if you take three, it’s likely that one of them is a Torah scholar. But ordained — what’s the issue? He has a certificate of ordination, so to speak. Everyone knows who the ordained ones are; they are known by name. These are not people you need to gather at random. So there are those who claim that Tosafot and the Rosh and Maimonides had a different version of the Talmud, and the Talmud did not ask that with three it is in order to ensure that one is there — but never mind. That is Tosafot’s view.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is Rashi’s view? Rashi says there is no overlapping of passages. Therefore, according to him, the one required by Rav Aha son of Rav Ika is one non-ordained person. No overlapping of passages means one, and not ordained. Tosafot asked: then why do I need “Judge your fellow with righteousness”? Good question. In my opinion, there is a good answer to that too. You need one — but one who knows how to judge, who judges justly. For that you need a verse; otherwise I might say, take anyone you want and let him judge. Why would that be true? You need “Judge your fellow with righteousness.” The emphasis is on “with righteousness,” not on “judge” being singular. The singular “judge” I would know anyway.

[Speaker C] A question: if you need one who knows how to judge justly, then what do you need the other two for? They’re completely unnecessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In order to ensure that there is one. You know — do you know how many times I’ve heard people say, they don’t—

[Speaker C] They themselves don’t know, they aren’t ordained, they aren’t experts, they don’t have knowledge themselves.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. Not ordained and not expert are not synonymous. I’m going back to my introduction. So let me say it again: first of all, we’re talking here about expertise not in the sense of ordination, but ordinary expertise — what is called here “learned.” Meaning, a Torah scholar. Another thing: do you know how many times I’ve heard people on the street say, “So-and-so is a tremendous Torah scholar”? And unfortunately I know that so-and-so, and he is very far from being a tremendous Torah scholar. In other words, ignoramuses have a tendency to identify people as great Torah scholars based on some external impression.

[Speaker C] That’s what I’m saying — so what good do those two do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They don’t know—

[Speaker C] Whether he really is like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those two help a lot — that’s exactly what the Talmud explains. We read it earlier. The Talmud explains exactly this point. Those two don’t help in the way you mean, and the Talmud asks exactly your question. If you take three ignoramuses, then you’ve got three ignoramuses. The Talmud answers: no — if you gather three ignoramuses, statistics also carry weight. One of them will be learned.

[Speaker C] It’s a statistical issue. Right, but once statistically we could prove that one of them is an expert, we could throw away the other two.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I knew how to identify which one it was. But who knows how to identify him? I’m an ignoramus; I don’t know how to identify him. So put three there, and there’s a reasonable chance the statistics will do their work. As our sages said, even a stopped clock—

[Speaker C] A third wise — that’s nice. What? A third wise, that’s nice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I answered that before, Yael. Are you with us?

[Speaker C] I heard, I heard.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. I’m not sure it’s as optimistic as it sounds, but maybe — I don’t know. In any case, the point is yes: even a stopped clock shows the exact time twice a day, right? So even a complete ignoramus, when he says about three people that they are tremendous Torah scholars, one of them might actually be one. That’s more or less the statistics — just so you understand the other side of the coin. Meaning, if you hear an ignoramus saying about someone that he’s a tremendous Torah scholar, you can ignore it. Maybe if he collects three such people, one of them by chance really is.

[Speaker B] A great mighty nation, vast and numerous. Yes, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that’s for our purposes. And the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot is very important for us, because that dispute essentially says that this one, according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika, according to Tosafot is ordained, and according to Rashi he is learned — meaning, he is a Torah scholar but not ordained.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the Talmud comes and asks: what is the practical difference between Rava and Rav Aha son of Rav Ika? What kind of question is that? I just explained the dispute. What do you mean, what difference is there between them? What is the question?

[Speaker E] If Rava says you need three judges, then he can’t agree with what Shmuel says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, now you’re already giving me the answer. I’m asking about the question. What was the question?

[Speaker E] What? It’s obvious what the difference is between them. One says three and one says one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so why does the Talmud ask what the difference is?

[Speaker E] Maybe according to the view that says—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That both of them say the same law. I’m repeating what I said earlier: there is no practical difference between them. Both say that by Torah law — sorry — both say that robberies and injuries require three ordained judges, and admissions and loans require three laymen. The Talmud asks: forget your theories about what the original law was; bottom line, is there any difference between them? After all, bottom line, they say the same law.

[Speaker D] If there’s a practical difference in some additional case. Right — when there are three… what you said, Nehama… what I mean is, to be lenient he required three; two would say, but maybe after the fact there is or…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now you’re already giving me the answer, Nehama. I’m asking why the Talmud asks. What is the Talmud’s question? The Talmud asks: what is the difference between this one and that one? What is there? I already explained what the difference is. The answer is: no, you explained it to me in the theory of the law; in practice they say the same thing. They arrived at it by different paths. What the Torah law is — that’s a difference, but it’s a theoretical difference. I’m asking whether there is any practical difference between them. After all, both say that for robberies and injuries you need three ordained judges, and for admissions and loans three laymen are enough. Both say the same thing, so what difference does it make? What is the difference between them?

[Speaker D] If we learned that they still have different approaches, maybe there is nevertheless a practical difference; that’s usually how the Talmud works, no? Right. “Two who judged,” I and my master who expounded… That’s an answer, that’s an answer — the rabbi is asking what the question is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying the question is exactly what you just said, Nehama — that’s what I said. Since in practice they basically agree, the Talmud asks whether there is nevertheless some practical difference, or whether it is only a theoretical difference in how we arrive at this law. That is exactly what the Talmud asks. And then the Talmud says yes, there is a difference. What is it? The difference between them is in what Shmuel said: “Two who judged — their judgment is valid, but they are called an insolent court.” According to Rava, he does not accept Shmuel; according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika, he does accept Shmuel. So the difference between them is with regard to Shmuel’s ruling. What happens if two people violated the rule and judged admissions and loans? Is their ruling valid after the fact, or is it void? According to Rava, who says that as a matter of original law you need three, and the sages only eased matters by waiving the requirement for ordained judges but not waiving the requirement of three — then there is a Torah-level requirement for three. If two judged, their judgment is invalid. But according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika, even one who judged has a valid ruling, right? What the sages did was to be stringent: they said, we want three. So the Talmud asks: what happens if they violated that and only two judged? Fine — after the fact, maybe their ruling is valid, because ultimately they did fulfill Torah law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In fact, let me sharpen what I said earlier. If we examine these two who judged and find that among them there really was one learned person, then there is no problem. Because in the end, I don’t really need three. All I required three for was so that statistics would ensure that one of them would be learned. Well, that happened here. So why invalidate the ruling? The ruling is fine. Initially we say: don’t rely on that; but after the fact it’s okay. But what I just said has a practical implication: “two who judged, their judgment is valid” is true if I checked afterwards and found that one of them was learned. But not every time two judged is the ruling valid. Okay? So here there is room for uncertainty.

[Speaker E] Maybe the objection is because it’s two, and that’s not a number that can decide?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] Maybe the objection to two is because you need a balanced court?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — the opposite. You need a court with a tilt; a perfectly balanced court is forbidden. But that’s not the issue here.

[Speaker E] And because of that there are those who reject that two is even an option.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Here the Talmud explicitly is not talking about that. Because the Talmud says the whole problem with two is that they are not three, not that they are balanced. On the contrary, from this Talmud there are those who bring proof against the principle that a court must incline one way, because you see from the Talmud that even two could have been fine were it not for the requirement of three. The Talmud has no problem with the lack of a numerical tilt to one side. But that’s another topic; I don’t want to get into it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyway, what comes out here is a dispute about two who judged. Now in the Talmud on page 5 — again, I’m going to start moving a bit faster because I see I won’t finish — the sages taught: monetary cases are judged by three, but if one was an expert accepted by the public, he may judge even alone. Yes? And afterwards Rav Nahman says that he is the one called an expert accepted by the public. I brought the continuation only so you can see who we’re talking about. When it says here “an expert accepted by the public judges alone,” it does not mean an ordained judge. Because Rav Nahman was a Babylonian judge, right? So he wasn’t ordained. So when it says here “an expert accepted by the public may judge alone,” that does not mean ordained. Simply speaking, right? It means learned — someone recognized as an expert by the public. There are major disputes here about what exactly “expert accepted by the public” means. Does “expert” mean what we mean by it — namely that he is a great Torah scholar — or does it mean that the public appointed him? That he has authorization to judge? Simply speaking, an expert accepted by the public needs both things. He needs to be a very prominent expert, one of a kind in the generation — not just an average Torah scholar, but a very well-known expert — and the public must recognize that and have given him authorization to judge alone. That is the accepted understanding among the halakhic decisors. In any case, that is what is written here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is how this fits with what we saw until now, with the passage in Sanhedrin on page 2. Because on the face of it, what we have here contradicts both of the views we found there. Here we see that even one can judge. And there the Talmud discusses a practical difference regarding two. Meaning, one opinion says even two cannot — that certainly doesn’t fit. And the one who says two can, seemingly says two but not one. Maybe by some principle like “most is as the whole,” or something like that, but not one. Yet here we see one can judge. On the face of it, this goes both against Rav Aha son of Rav Ika and against Rava. Okay? But as Ruti said earlier, not true — because here we’re talking about one individual who is an expert accepted by the public. We are not talking about just any individual who judged. So clearly this is a separate category. And that category is independent. Here a person can judge despite not being three and despite not being ordained. But that has nothing to do with the dispute above. This is a law of its own. It’s speaking about exceptional individuals — outstanding, well-known Torah scholars who received authorization and are recognized by everyone as major judges. So it has nothing to do with that discussion at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, we still have to understand where this law comes from. Is it a Torah law that this expert accepted by the public can judge? Because there is still some connection to Rav Aha. According to Rava, it’s hard to accept even this enactment — unless we say that there is an additional leniency here: according to Rava, there is one leniency from the sages that they are satisfied with three laymen and not experts, and another leniency that if there is someone who is an expert accepted by the public, then they even waive the numerical requirement. Meaning, not only do they no longer have to be ordained; they don’t even have to be three. Then you have two leniencies. Okay. These are the possibilities, and all of them come up in the halakhic decisors and commentators.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, for example, at Maimonides. Maimonides writes as follows: “Even though a court has no fewer than three, one is permitted by Torah law to judge, as it says, ‘Judge your fellow with righteousness.’ But by rabbinic law, it is not until there are three. And if two judged, their judgment is not a judgment.” This Maimonides is very strange. I assume you saw the Kesef Mishneh; this Maimonides is strange. On the one hand, he rules like Rav Aha son of Rav Ika, that one may judge by Torah law, right? Second, rabbinically you need three. Then he says, “and if two judged” — what would we expect him to say? Their judgment is valid. But he rules that their judgment is not valid. But the Talmud says that according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika their judgment is valid. So how does Maimonides rule like Rav Aha son of Rav Ika and at the same time also say that two who judged — their judgment is invalid?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Another thing we see here: “a court has no fewer than three.” What does that mean? If one is permitted by Torah law to judge, then what does it mean that a court has no fewer than three? Right — no “maybe” about it. That’s what Maimonides says. One who may judge by Torah law is not called a court. A court is only three. One may judge, but he is not a court. They learn that from the verse “Judge your fellow with righteousness.” Let’s skip ahead for a moment to the next law, law 14, immediately after this one. “One who was an expert accepted by the public, or who took permission from a court — he is permitted to judge alone, but he is not considered a court.” He says this even about the single judge who is an expert accepted by the public in the passage on page 5, not just about the single judge who may judge by Torah law according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika. Even he — it’s nice that he can judge, but he is not called a court. “And even though he is permitted, it is a command of the sages that he seat others with him, for they said: do not judge alone, for no one judges alone except the One.” Meaning, this expert accepted by the public should seat two others next to him, because in the end, when you sit there judging alone, you are making yourself into the Holy One, blessed be He. “No one judges alone except the One” — only the Holy One judges alone. Therefore, proper conduct says: put two flowerpots next to you for the sake of courtesy. Ultimately, it’s obvious that in such a panel you’re the one who will decide, but still there need to be three there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, we see that according to Maimonides, an individual who judges is not a court. He may perhaps judge, but he is not a court. The Shulchan Arukh also brings this, and also brings the practical implication of it — that this individual who can judge is not a court. Therefore, for example, if someone admits something before him, a litigant’s admission is not considered an admission. It’s like an admission outside of court. Even though he can judge, the litigant can retract the admission. Why? That is the practical implication of the fact that this one, although he can judge, is not considered a court. Meaning, you can judge, but an admission made before you is not considered an admission in court; it is an admission outside of court. That is the consequence of what Maimonides says here — that this individual is not a court. Okay.

[Speaker E] But if he admits outside of court, then he isn’t considered as testifying? No, it’s not considered that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At the very least, he can retract it. Look at the Or Sameach, who answers this difficulty in Maimonides. We asked about Maimonides: how can you say on the one hand that you rule like Rav Aha son of Rav Ika, that one may judge, and afterwards say that two who judged, their judgment is invalid? How can that be? After all, according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika, two who judged — their judgment is valid. “If you look carefully in chapter 5, it is evident from there that he holds that by Torah law one needs a single ordained judge in monetary cases.” He understands that when Rav Aha son of Rav Ika says one may judge, that means one ordained judge — which of course fits with how Tosafot read Rav Aha son of Rav Ika, that there is overlapping of passages, right? Like the Rosh reads it. “Only by rabbinic law do we require three, and therefore two who judged — their judgment is invalid even after the fact. For so the sages enacted, because outside the Land of Israel there are no ordained judges, and we judge only because we act as agents of the Land of Israel, as in the ruling about injury. If so, with two, who do not act according to the law, their agency is nullified, and therefore even after the fact it is not a valid judgment.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is he saying? He says Maimonides read our Talmud differently. In our Talmud, Rav Aha son of Rav Ika derives “one” to mean one expert. According to that, one expert is required by Torah law. And when the sages lowered it to three laymen, they did not merely waive expertise; they increased the number — three laymen — in order to ensure that maybe one of them would be learned. And now what happens if two judged? So he says like this: if two judged, then the Torah law certainly wasn’t fulfilled, because these are two who are not ordained. So by Torah law your judgment is void.

[Speaker E] And the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the rabbinic law also wasn’t fulfilled, because the rabbinic law requires three laymen and you only put two. So in any case, your judgment is invalid. Meaning, what is he basically saying? He is saying that Rav Aha son of Rav Ika — unlike what I said when I read the Talmud, namely that according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika the sages only came to be stringent and not lenient, that by Torah law one was enough and the sages required three, unlike Rava who says the sages came to be lenient — according to Maimonides it’s more complicated. According to the Or Sameach, the sages did two things according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika: they were lenient in that they waived the requirement for ordained judges, and they were stringent in that they wanted three instead of one. They did two things. Therefore, if you go on the rabbinic track, then you need three laymen. You want to proceed on the Torah track? Then don’t give me two laymen; give me one expert. Two laymen fit neither the Torah track nor the rabbinic track, and therefore if two judged, their judgment is invalid even according to Rav Aha son of Rav Ika.

[Speaker E] Wait, and if it’s two experts in Babylonia? What—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] What I didn’t understand is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying—

[Speaker E] You’re saying that if it’s two laymen, then it doesn’t work. But if it’s two experts in Babylonia who are not ordained, then what? Then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem?

[Speaker E] Their judgment isn’t valid — I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] Why shouldn’t their judgment be valid if they are two experts even though they’re not ordained?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You need three. You need three. Are you talking about an expert accepted by the public?

[Speaker E] Are you talking—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About an expert accepted by the public, like Rav Nahman?

[Speaker E] An expert accepted by the public can judge alone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about people who are not experts accepted by the public — Torah scholars, but not unique figures of the generation. You need three. If only two judged, their judgment is invalid. Okay, that’s what he says. Afterwards he says that the Rosh also learned this way; he infers it from the Talmud — not important right now — but that’s his claim. Not everyone agrees, I should say; not everyone agrees with this. In Maimonides, many commentators — and also in Shiurei Rav Shmuel, if you managed to see it — hold that the single judge needed is a layman, and nevertheless once they instituted three, you need specifically three and not two. It does not have to be one expert. Those are two different understandings in Maimonides’ view. I’m not getting into that whole issue now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that’s some background. I really did that pretty quickly. Did you manage to see the page? Did you also see Shiurei Rav Shmuel, the Or Sameach? I can’t hear. Yes, but not the—

[Speaker E] Even HaEzer—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even HaEzer I said that if you don’t have time, skip it. In any case, what I’ve said here more or less covers the essentials. The analysis and the different possibilities in Rav Shmuel are a bit more expanded, but ultimately these are the points I’m making here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, now I’m going back to our Talmud in Ketubot — all of that was just background. The Talmud says like this: “Three who sat to validate a document, and one of them died, they need to write: ‘We were sitting as a panel of three, and one is no longer with us.’” Three are sitting to validate the document. Again, the assumption is that you need three. What is our context? What kind of legal matter is this?

[Speaker E] Monetary law with two? There’s a page here — what is this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Isn’t this admissions and loans? What is it? What kind of legal matter is it?

[Speaker E] A document is loans.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Loans, right. Because three are sitting to validate the document, and a document simply means a loan document, okay? Or a document of acknowledgment that I admit I owe someone. So admissions and loans. And with admissions and loans, that’s the whole topic we saw in Sanhedrin. The Talmud says: three sat to validate the document — meaning, you need three. Up to this point that’s clear, right? We saw that according to all opinions you need three initially. We’ll see what happens if two judged after the fact. But initially, of course, three judges are needed to judge. So we understand why throughout the discussion, for document validation, the Talmud requires three judges, right? That emerges clearly according to all views in the Talmud in Sanhedrin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And one of them died” — one of them died after they finished judging, and now they are signing the validation clause. Yes, they want to write an approval, as we already saw, the validation, the confirmation on the document. Now only two can sign. So they need to write, says the Talmud, “We were sitting as a panel of three, and one is no longer with us.” And therefore only two of us signed. Fine? In order to clarify to anyone reading this validation, this confirmation, that the approval was done properly — there were three judges, not two. Of course, what is the subtext? The subtext is that if there were only two—

[Speaker B] Then the validation is void.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore they need to make clear to everyone that in this case it was not only two who sat. But if in fact only two sat, then it’s obvious from the Talmud that the validation is void.

[Speaker E] Even if they judge.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? That’s how this connects with everything we learned until now. Okay. The Talmud says: Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said, if they wrote in the document, “This document came before us in court,” then they no longer need that. Meaning, if it says in the validation clause, “This document came before us in court,” then you don’t need to add that one of us is no longer alive. Why? Because “court” means three.

[Speaker E] Because “court” means three. Right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Court” means three. Notice the point here that relates to what we saw above. Does this necessarily go against Shmuel’s view? What does Shmuel hold about two who judged?

[Speaker E] Their judgment is valid, but they’re an insolent court.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand? He—

[Speaker E] He says that with two, the judgment is valid. Yes. So the ruling stands; we don’t invalidate it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is that called a court?

[Speaker E] But it’s called an insolent court. Yes, it’s called an insolent court.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what about Maimonides, who says that one who judges with fewer than three, even if his judgment is valid, that is not a court?

[Speaker E] Maimonides maybe can’t say something against Shmuel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He can. He rules not like Shmuel. Shmuel, who says “two who judged, their judgment is valid,” is saying two things: first, their judgment is valid; second, it is called a court. Meaning, for example, an admission before them would count as an admission before an insolent court — but it is still a court.

[Speaker E] No, also in the fact that he says “an insolent court,” he is saying “court.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what I said.

[Speaker E] No, because he also said “two who judged.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: “two who judged” — first, their judgment is valid; second, they are called a court. Shmuel says both things.

[Speaker C] But it could be that their judgment is valid and yet they are not a court.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could have been, but Shmuel doesn’t say that, because he says they’re called an insolent court, so he does call them a court.

[Speaker C] Yes.

[Speaker D] But maybe people wouldn’t rely on such a situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, you’re already getting into explanations. One second, Nechama, first let’s understand the difficulty. So in effect Maimonides rules against Shmuel on both fronts. First, he claims that if two judged, their judgment is not valid, except for an expert accepted by the public, but otherwise their judgment is not valid. Second, even if there is one case of someone judging alone, in any event that is not a court. Right? That’s what Maimonides says. Unless we say that Maimonides agrees that two are in fact considered a court, only one is not, because two might be like the majority counts as the whole or something like that. But simply speaking, Maimonides says that only three are called a court. That’s the straightforward reading of Maimonides. And if so, now let’s return to our case. What does the Talmud here say, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak? He says that if in the text of the validation document it doesn’t say, “we sat as three,” but rather says, “we were in court.” Okay? Then you don’t need to write that one of them was absent.

[Speaker E] He holds like Maimonides and like Rabbi Abba.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because if it says “court,” then that necessarily means three. Right? According to Shmuel that’s not true for two reasons. First, if two judged, their judgment is valid. Second, they are even called a court. Meaning, if you wrote “court,” that still doesn’t rule out the possibility that they were only two. In the Talmud here you can see that two are not even called a court. So here is proof for Maimonides for what he wrote against Shmuel. Not only is Shmuel wrong that if two judged their judgment is valid—our Talmud explicitly shows that—but it also shows that those two, even if they judged, cannot be regarded as a court. Not an insolent court and not a court at all. Here is the source for Maimonides for why he rules as he does. And here it is brought as Jewish law. Okay. So if that’s so, then even though he rules like Rav Acha the son of Rav Ika in that Talmudic passage, he still rules that if two judged their judgment is not valid, because that emerges from our passage. By the way, the Kesef Mishneh really does bring our Talmud here as one of Maimonides’ sources. Now the Talmud asks: But perhaps it is an insolent court, and like Shmuel? For Shmuel said: If two judged, their judgment is valid, only they are called an insolent court. Notice, the Talmud is precise: maybe what we have here is not only that their judgment is valid, but that it is also called a court. Because

[Speaker E] it says there

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that we judged in court, and court means three, so what’s the problem? You have to bring in Shmuel in full. You are basically saying: if we accept Shmuel, that two who judged both have a valid judgment and are also called a court, then there really is a problem. Even though you wrote that you sat in court, you still have not ruled out the possibility that there were only two. That’s why, for example, they bring Shmuel’s ruling. If they had brought merely the statement that if two judged their judgment is valid, without saying they are called an insolent court, that would not have been difficult. Here again is another precise support for what Maimonides said: even if you disagree with Rabbi Abbahu and say that if two judged their judgment is valid, that still does not mean those two are a court. To that the Talmud says: true, but there is an opinion of Shmuel that those two not only have a valid judgment but are also called a court. So if here it says that this was done in court, who knows—maybe those judges hold like Shmuel, and after all, as practical Jewish law we do not rule like Shmuel, and therefore we would suspect that the document has not been properly validated. So add and write that one of them is no longer here. You must add that. Why does the Talmud say that you do not need to add it if you wrote that it was in court? So the Talmud answers: because it says, “in the court of Rav Ashi.” The commentators explain here that it does not specifically mean Rav Ashi himself, but rather the court of the leading sage of the generation. The leading sage of the generation—the example is Rav Ashi—but the intent is that it was done by the court of the leading sage of the generation. The Talmud asks: But perhaps the sages in Rav Ashi’s academy hold like Shmuel? Maybe they too hold like Shmuel—and notice, even though we do not rule like him. So it says: “and Rav Ashi told us.” No, this is not Rav Ashi’s court; it is Rav Ashi himself. So what have we gained by saying it was Rav Ashi? Maybe Rav Ashi holds like Shmuel?

[Speaker E] It seems elsewhere there is a place where Rav Ashi holds that you need three.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know of such a place.

[Speaker D] Maybe it’s enough if we simply say—Rav Ashi is enough—people think he is expert enough that one can rely on him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s Rav Ashi—let’s remember for a moment. Rav Ashi was the leading sage of the generation, right? That is exactly why he is brought here as the leading sage of the generation, so he is also an expert accepted by the public. No, no—but he is an expert accepted by the public. An expert accepted by the public can judge alone even apart from Shmuel.

[Speaker D] So how does that

[Speaker E] help?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? Then it’s even worse! If it was Rav Ashi, then the situation is even worse. Because if it was Rav Ashi, then it is certainly possible that he judged alone, but I have no problem with that, because his judgment is valid. So why should I care? If it says there that it was Rav Ashi himself, then true, it could be that he judged alone because he was an expert accepted by the public, but there is no problem, because according to all opinions, and as practical Jewish law, we saw in Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh, an expert accepted by the public can judge alone, so there is no problem. If it was not Rav Ashi, then you need to add that one of them is no longer here. Okay? I’ll draw your attention to one more thing that the legal authorities mention here: it says here, “and Rav Ashi told us.” It does not say that he sat in judgment; it says that he told us to sit in judgment. If he himself had sat in judgment there would be no problem at all, because he was an expert accepted by the public even though he was not a court. But if he told us, then the Talmud apparently understands that he appointed us, and he certainly would not miss the point. The leading sage of the generation does not miss the Jewish law. We are not experts accepted by the public; we are ordinary people. If Rav Ashi seated them to judge, apparently we were three. You can rely on the fact that Rav Ashi acted properly. So either way: if Rav Ashi himself judged, there is no question because he was an expert accepted by the public. If he told us, then there is no question because clearly we were three. Therefore, if it says here that Rav Ashi was responsible for this matter, then we can be at ease. In any other case, even if it says “we are a court,” you still have to write, “one of them is no longer here.” Okay? Tosafot says as follows: “We sat as three together, and one is no longer here.” Meaning: you have to write “and one is no longer here.” Notice what the novelty is in the Talmud itself. The novelty is that three sat to validate the document. Fine. Without this Talmudic passage, what would we have said? Let two sign and say, “we testify that the document has been validated.” The Talmud comes and says: no. In the text you need to write two things. First, “we sat as three”—there were three of us. Second, why are only two signed? Because one died. Both things have to be added. The novelty of the Talmud is in both, not only in “one is no longer here,” but also in the fact that you have to write “we sat as three,” because otherwise we would have thought it is enough for the two of us simply to sign, and that’s it. The Talmud says no: if the two of you sign, there will be concern that only two of you sat. Therefore you have to write, “we sat as three.” The Talmud says: if it says “we sat as three,” then why do you need to write “one is no longer here”? After all, we wrote that there were three. We wrote that we sat as three. Now only two are signed, so presumably the third cannot sign, and we wrote there that we sat as three. Maybe because we sat as three but the third died before the validation? Then there would be concern that the ruling was issued by two; I don’t know. But still, that is what the Talmud says. Notice, the novelty in the Talmud—and this is important for the legal authorities when understanding the legal authorities—the novelty is double. Meaning it is not enough that two sign; two things are needed: first, that they write that three sat; second, that they add that one of the three died. Each of these writings by itself is not enough.

[Speaker C] If we believe them after they write this, we could have believed them before too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, before?

[Speaker C] Before they wrote it. If they were signing, if they were only

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if two were signing.

[Speaker C] We believe them,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We believe them, but maybe they are not Torah scholars and they do not know. Or they hold like Shmuel, that if two judged their judgment is valid. And as practical Jewish law we do not rule that way. This is not a question of whether they are lying; we believe them.

[Speaker E] Maybe others would learn from this and do it—no, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, there the concern is that they rule like Shmuel, the Talmud says. And in Jewish law we do not rule like Shmuel, so there is a concern.

[Speaker C] In this writing we want to make sure

[Speaker F] that they rule

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that they themselves know that the Jewish law is not like Shmuel.

[Speaker F] Okay? I have a question. Yes. All the time until now we’ve been talking about the fact that for issuing the court’s validation document, two signatures of court members are enough. Right? And here we need proof that three sat in the court.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—that even though two signed, in the validation itself, in the legal act, three were seated.

[Speaker F] Fine, but basically that solves the whole issue we discussed about whether if there are two judges and one is disqualified, does that matter or not. So why should I care, since in the end I only need two signatures.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if one is disqualified, then it may be that he disqualifies all of them; that’s a discussion we did not get into here. The Ketzot proves from here that there is no law of “one found to be a relative or disqualified” with judges—that one does not disqualify all of them, only with witnesses. So that is already a different question.

[Speaker F] But in principle I’m saying, basically the third one is—he’s not really a judge. Yes, but sort of, he’s a bit secondary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, because to judge there must be three, and if he is a disqualified judge, then three judges were not seated. The problem is not that two signed; the problem is that three did not sit. In effect only two sat, because the disqualified one does not count.

[Speaker C] The signature of the two is like the testimony of two witnesses that the judgment was given in a sitting of a court of three. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? So Tosafot says: “We sat as three together, and one is no longer here.” Meaning: you have to write “and one is no longer here,” since it explicitly says “we sat as three,” and only two sign it. Why? That’s exactly Tosafot’s question: why do you need to add “and one is no longer here”? We already said that three sat. Tosafot says yes, but if three sat and only two are signed, people will think that something went wrong here. Maybe, for example, the third died before the ruling was given, I don’t know. Therefore you have to add it. But certainly, if he did not write “and one is no longer here,” it is valid. So Tosafot says, obviously even if he did not add “and one is no longer here,” that omission does not invalidate it. After all, we did write that there were three; this is only a remote concern. Know that he has proof of this, Tosafot says, from the fact that it says: “And if he wrote, ‘in court,’ then he no longer needs it.” After all, later in the Talmud Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak says that if it says, “we sat in court, and this document came before us in court,” and we signed, then there is no need to add “and one is no longer here,” and then it is valid. Why?

[Speaker C] “In court” means three. If it says “in court,” then by definition it was three.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot says: and we are speaking about a case where he did not write “and one is no longer here.” And what is being discussed there is a case where they did not add “and one is no longer here.” Meaning, what is missing there is not only “we sat as three”; it is also missing the “one is no longer here.” How does Tosafot know that? Because if “one is no longer here” were not missing, how could the Talmud later say, “perhaps it is an insolent court”? After all, if we say “one is no longer here,” then we were three, so what does “insolent court” have to do with it? Therefore it is clear that we are discussing a case where “and one is no longer here” was not written. So why is there no need to write it? There is no need to write it because clearly it is not indispensable. Okay? That is Tosafot’s proof. So in any case, we see that this whole matter of “one is no longer here” is some kind of stringency, but in principle, if we write that “we sat as three,” then after the fact that is enough. Now just one final note here from the second Tosafot: “But perhaps the sages in Rav Ashi’s academy hold like Shmuel,” namely that if two judged their judgment is valid. Meaning, just as Shmuel holds generally, so too they hold with regard to document validation. But Shmuel himself could very well hold that for document validation you need three, for Rav Nachman holds like Shmuel in the first chapter of tractate Sanhedrin that if two judged their judgment is valid, and Rav Nachman himself holds that document validation requires three in the chapter Chazkat HaBatim. Rav Nachman holds that for document validation you need three, and Rav Nachman holds like Shmuel that if two judged their judgment is valid. By the way, this is not completely clear—this is how Tosafot assumes it; I’m not entirely sure it’s correct—but that is what Tosafot says. And then he says: if so, we see that there is a possibility that even someone who holds like Shmuel, that if two judged their judgment is valid, still requires three for document validation. And what is written in our Talmud is the concern that maybe there is an opinion that even in document validation, if two judged their judgment is valid. But Rav Nachman, and maybe also Shmuel, are not of that opinion. Where does this distinction come from? Why would someone who says that if two judged their judgment is valid nonetheless require three for document validation? It seems to me that this connects to a comment I made in one of the previous classes: it could be that in document validation, because it is a court act and we write it on the document, when we see only two signatures people will belittle it. People will say this is not a serious court. Fine, if two judged, their judgment is valid, but the validation is meant to give an official stamp. After all, on the document itself there are also two witnesses signed, right? On the document itself too there are two witnesses signed, so why do I need validation at all? I want to validate the document in order to give it some sort of stamp that is stronger than two witnesses. Such a stamp can be given only by a court of three. Therefore it may be that even someone who holds that if two judged their judgment is valid agrees that for document validation you need three. And this is excellent proof for what I said on logical grounds one of the previous times. I said that it could be that for document validation everyone requires three because—and two witnesses testifying to it are not enough, because I already have two witnesses on the document itself. What do the second pair of witnesses add? Remember I said there, when an objection is raised to the validation—remember, with that judge against whom an objection was raised to the validation—I said, what good is the whole validation document? Yael asked, Yael Eigenberg, why do we need the validation at all if one can also claim that it is forged? So I said there—I brought the Ritva there—I said that validation is stronger, sorry, that the court validation document is stronger than the document itself. On the document itself two witnesses are signed, but when you see a court signed, that has public credibility; people do not challenge that, and even if they do challenge it, it can be authenticated very easily. But in order for it to have that extra credibility beyond two witnesses, there have to be three signed there, so that you can see that three sat in judgment and not two who are functioning here as witnesses. If it is two who are functioning here as witnesses, how are they any better than the two witnesses on the document itself? What have we gained? Therefore Rav Nachman says that even though I hold like Shmuel that if two judged their judgment is valid, for document validation you specifically need three. Okay? All right, we’ll stop here. If anyone has a comment or a question, you’re welcome. Thank you. Okay then, goodbye.

[Speaker C] Thank you very much.

Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 38: Two Who Litigated

Table of Contents

Full Transcript

Leave a ReplyCancel reply

Table of Contents

Full Transcript

שתף

Leave a ReplyCancel reply