Intention in the Commandments – Lesson 5

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so up to this point we saw Rava’s statement. We read through the Talmudic discussion dealing with Rava’s words, and we saw that the distinction between matzah and shofar blowing could be read in two fundamentally different ways. The Bach, let’s say in the Bach’s general direction, reads it as a distinction between shofar blowing and all the other commandments: that shofar blowing has some special kind of intention or something like that, and it comes to teach us that it does not. And most of the medieval authorities don’t learn it that way. Ritva and Ran and others don’t learn it that way. They understand that the difference, the initial assumption regarding the difference, is that matzah is a commandment that involves pleasure, and therefore there is the reasoning of “since he derived pleasure,” which replaces intention. But with shofar blowing, this is not a commandment involving pleasure, and therefore without intention it doesn’t help. So there was an initial assumption that with matzah, when Persians forced him to eat matzah and he fulfilled his obligation, that was despite the fact that commandments do require intention, except that there you have the reasoning of “since he derived pleasure.” And the practical implication is that with shofar, where you don’t have that reasoning of “since he derived pleasure,” then in fact he would not fulfill his obligation if he blows for music. In the end, we were left with the conclusion that according to Rava, commandments do not require intention. The “it comes to teach us” at the end brings us back to the same place. The difference is only over the question of what the initial assumption was and what the new point was. But in the end, bottom line, the conclusion is that commandments do not require intention. The differences in how we understand the initial assumption touch on the question of how we understand the view that commandments do require intention. Because even according to the view that commandments do require intention, one could still say that if Persians forced him to eat matzah he fulfilled his obligation, and Avuh deShmuel does not necessarily hold like Rava. Rava thinks so, but someone who disagrees with Rava could perhaps disagree with him. And why did he fulfill his obligation? Because “since he derived pleasure.” In principle, you need intention, but with matzah it’s a commandment of pleasure, “since he derived pleasure.” Where would the implication be? The implication would be with shofar blowing, because with shofar blowing, where you don’t have the reasoning of “since he derived pleasure,” if intention is required, if commandments require intention, then there he would not fulfill his obligation by blowing for music. Now up to this point we’ve seen Rava, and all along I kept mentioning: what does the one who says commandments require intention hold? Who is this person? Is there even such a person? In the Talmud itself no such person appears. In the Talmud you have Rava’s opinion, and after that there is a statement of Rav Zeira, which we’ll get into in a moment, but it is not presented in the Talmud as some explicit dispute among amoraim over whether commandments do or do not require intention. There are parallel places in Pesachim 115, in Berakhot 12 and 13 there, where it seems from the Talmud itself that there is some opinion that commandments require intention. Okay? Also, maybe from Rava’s inference one could say that already from there you can understand that this was an issue, that there is some such discussion. Is there such an opinion or not? In the Talmud itself at least, explicitly, it doesn’t appear. It doesn’t appear. What appears is Rava’s opinion, and then a discussion of Rav Zeira begins, which on the face of it is a discussion about the intention required to fulfill one’s obligation under the law of “hearing is like responding,” not intention under the law that commandments require intention. Fine, so let’s look at that. So later in the passage: Rav Zeira said to his attendant, his servant, “Have intention and sound for me.” Yes, he wanted his attendant to sound the shofar for him, and then he says to him: “Have intention and sound for me,” meaning, intend and then sound. Therefore he holds that the one sounding requires intention. The one sounding is the attendant, the blower, okay? So basically you see that someone who blows for music, that’s not good enough, he needs intention. On the face of it, what it says here is that according to Rav Zeira, commandments require intention, against Rava, because Rava says commandments do not require intention. The truth is that in terms of content, that’s not necessary. What? It’s already a bit forced; you have to make an interpretive adjustment. Even before the forced reading, it could be that what he’s telling him is: intend to fulfill my obligation, exactly. And if he is blowing for himself, he can also blow for me with intention, but if you’re blowing for me, then you need to intend to fulfill my obligation. That has nothing to do with the question—I can agree with Rava that commandments do not require intention. Intention. But in order for his commandment-act to count for me, he has to intend it. And maybe even the content of the intention has to be different. The content is not intention to fulfill his own obligation; the content is to fulfill mine. That’s different. Okay? And that’s one point. A second point: even in the wording of the Talmud, “therefore he holds”—I would have expected, if this were an opinion that disputes Rava, I would have expected: “therefore he holds that commandments require intention,” right? No? What does “the one sounding” have to do with it? He is the one sounding in the technical sense, but that wording throws us off. If you want to tell me that Rav Zeira is arguing against Rava, I would have expected the inference to be: “therefore he holds that commandments require intention.” But that’s not what it says. So I think the plain sense of the Talmud does not look like Rav Zeira is coming to dispute Rava. He’s coming to say that intention is needed in order to fulfill your obligation through someone else. The intention required under “hearing is like responding.” Yes, to fulfill someone else’s obligation. Right. Now the Talmud continues: An objection was raised. If someone was passing behind the synagogue, or if his house was adjacent to the synagogue, and he heard the sound of the shofar or the sound of the Megillah, if he directed his heart, he fulfilled his obligation, and if not, he did not fulfill it. So first of all, what does it say here? It’s talking about the intention of the one passing by—in other words, the listener—not the one sounding. Right? So basically this is talking about the listener’s intention. And what the Talmud says, what the baraita says, is that if the listener directed his heart, then he fulfilled his obligation. If he did not direct his heart, then he did not fulfill it. What about the one sounding?

[Speaker C] Wait, what kind of intention are we talking about here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are two possibilities. I don’t know. Maybe intention to fulfill one’s obligation? Right, at this point everything is still open. To fulfill one’s obligation? “And if he directed his heart, what of it? That one is not intending.” What does it help that he directed his heart? The other one isn’t intending. So what follows? What’s the difficulty? Why didn’t he fulfill his obligation? So what, who said intention is needed? Rav Zeira. Right? This is an objection to Rav Zeira. And whatever you say about Rav Zeira can be understood here as well. In other words, there’s no addition here beyond what there was in Rav Zeira. Rather, what is it? Rav Zeira said you need the intention of the one sounding. I’m showing you that the listener’s intention is enough; you don’t need the one sounding’s intention. Now, this too can of course be understood in two ways. If Rav Zeira is talking about the regular law that commandments require intention, then fine, the discussion is continuing about that law. But as we said, the plain sense of the Talmud doesn’t seem to be that. Rav Zeira is talking about the law of intention under “hearing is like responding.” In order for “hearing is like responding” to apply, the one sounding has to intend to fulfill the other’s obligation. Here the Talmud says the listener also needs to intend, but apparently the one sounding does not need to intend, and that is difficult for Rav Zeira. Notice: the whole discussion is within the law of “hearing is like responding.” Is it enough for the one sounding to intend, or does the listener also have to intend? Or the reverse: is the listener enough, or does the one sounding also have to intend? Okay? In short, the whole discussion can still be interpreted within the context of “hearing is like responding”; it has nothing to do with the law that commandments require intention. The Talmud says: Here we are dealing with a prayer leader, whose mind is on everyone. Yes, he intends to fulfill the obligation of the whole public. Already here, notice what’s written. What was the intention of the one sounding that we thought was missing? Intention to fulfill his own obligation? If that’s the intention to fulfill his own obligation, then a prayer leader is no different from an ordinary blower. In other words, if we say that the prayer leader presumably intends to fulfill the obligation of everyone who hears, then clearly we’re discussing intention to fulfill others’ obligations, not intention to fulfill one’s own. The intention required under “hearing is like responding,” not the intention required by “commandments require intention.” So this is already proof. With Rav Zeira, one still could have said: fine, maybe he means actual intention, although the straightforward reading is that he means the intention required under “hearing is like responding.” But from the give-and-take in the Talmud here, from this baraita, it seems clearly that the whole discussion is about the intention required under “hearing is like responding.” Therefore, the Talmud’s conclusion is that in order for “hearing is like responding” to work, both the listener and the one sounding have to intend. Intend what? To fulfill and to be fulfilled. Not as part of “commandments require intention”; that’s not the point here at all, but to fulfill and to be fulfilled. What about the question whether commandments require intention? Maybe like Rava, maybe not. In other words, it doesn’t say here that it’s like Rava, but it also doesn’t say that it’s against Rava. The objection is to Rav Zeira. Rav Zeira says the one sounding needs intention; from here we see that the one sounding’s intention isn’t required for “hearing is like responding.” The whole discussion, the whole discussion is only about “hearing is like responding.” If I were reading the Talmud straightforwardly, I wouldn’t connect this to Rava at all. This is a new passage. The first passage about Rava is over; we finished it in the previous class. Now a new passage begins about the intention of the listener and the one sounding, which is a law of “hearing is like responding.” It has nothing at all to do with the first part of the passage. It’s simply a completely different section. And if you read it that way—and that is the plain sense of the Talmud—then it means there is no opinion here that commandments require intention. There is no such opinion. At least it does not appear here in the passage. Okay? And it comes out even more than that: even if you say that commandments do not require intention, still, by the law of “hearing is like responding,” intention will be needed. Maybe Rava would agree to that too. It has nothing to do with your position on whether commandments generally require intention, because “hearing is like responding” is a different law, where it could be that intentions really are necessary, and Rava too would agree. If I connect Rav Zeira to Rava—notice—if I connect Rav Zeira to Rava, and we haven’t seen this yet, but in principle there are medieval authorities who connect them, quite a few who connect them, although on the face of it it really doesn’t seem that way. But if you connect them, then it means two things. First, it means that the whole discussion here is really taking place under the assumption that commandments require intention, because Rav Zeira’s view is that commandments require intention; he disagrees with Rava. Second, it means that if you assume he disagrees with Rava, then Rava is not talking at all about the intention of the listener and the one sounding, because after all commandments do not require intention. So it comes out that if I rule that commandments do not require intention, then there is also no need for the intentions required under “hearing is like responding.” Because the Talmud says—assuming I read the Talmud not as I suggested according to its plain sense, but rather as most of the medieval authorities read it, or as a large number of them read it—what do they say? They infer from Rav Zeira’s words that Rav Zeira disputes Rava. He is brought here as an opinion disagreeing with Rava, and he claims that commandments require intention. Fine? Now, he is talking about intention to fulfill another’s obligation. You can’t read the Talmud otherwise: intention to fulfill and to be fulfilled. But they apparently connect the two. They say: if you say commandments do not require intention, then there would be nothing to talk about regarding intentions under “hearing is like responding” either; that too wouldn’t need intention. If you say that both listener and one sounding have to intend, then apparently you hold that commandments require intention—according to the medieval authorities who connect the two. So if that’s true, a big practical implication follows. Because if those same authorities ultimately rule like Rava—Rav Zeira disputes Rava—then the question is what the practical Jewish law is. So if we rule like Rava, that commandments do not require intention, then even “hearing is like responding” does not require intending to fulfill and to be fulfilled, because according to their approach that depends on that. In other words, if you say commandments do not require intention, then if this didn’t depend on that, you couldn’t infer from Rav Zeira that he disputes Rava. He’s talking about the intention of the listener and the one sounding—what are you connecting him to the issue of commandments requiring intention for? Apparently you’re assuming the two are interdependent. And if the two are interdependent, that means that according to Rava this requirement of intention by the listener and the one sounding probably doesn’t fit. Which means that someone who rules that commandments do not require intention, like Rava, essentially would not require the intention of the listener and the one sounding in shofar blowing. What? It’s not talking about fulfilling others’ obligations. It says: if the commandment itself does not require intention—

[Speaker B] then why do I care what he intended? There’s no need to fulfill the obligation through the fact that he blows so that I can fulfill mine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine. But then if you read the Talmud—no. That’s true, but if you read the Talmud as connecting Rav Zeira’s discussion and the objections against him to the question whether commandments do or do not require intention—and that’s how all the medieval authorities understood it, those who held that Rav Zeira thinks commandments require intention—where do you see in Rav Zeira that commandments require intention? You don’t see it anywhere. What you do see is that he requires intention from the listener and the one sounding. So according to them, apparently the requirement of intention by listener and one sounding was only said if you hold that commandments require intention, because otherwise why connect Rav Zeira to that discussion at all? But if so, a big practical implication follows for one who rules that commandments do not require intention. Because one who rules that commandments do not require intention, according to that approach, would not require intention from the listener and the one sounding, since that requirement is only needed according to the view that commandments require intention. What’s the problem? Everything is fine; that was said in Rav Zeira’s view, who says commandments require intention. The objection is to Rav Zeira. It’s a baraita from somewhere else and it goes against Rav Zeira. Fine, no problem. But that baraita—isn’t it everybody’s view? What is that? Of the prayer leader. But that baraita goes according to the view that commandments require intention. But if you rule like Rava, that commandments do not require intention, then the whole discussion never starts. Obviously you can say that. That’s also what I said. There is something called a constructive existence proof in mathematics, meaning: you can prove something by simply building the solution, and then you’ve proven the existence of a solution. But if the medieval authorities read this as two questions that are connected to one another—look, they infer from Rav Zeira’s discussion that he thinks commandments require intention—then apparently they do not see these as two separate things. Because otherwise, what do you want? How do you learn from Rav Zeira that he says commandments require intention? What’s the connection? He’s talking about the intention of the listener and the one sounding. If you say that from here it follows that Rav Zeira disputes Rava, that Rav Zeira holds that commandments require intention—then basically you’re telling me that according to Rava, this whole discussion cannot be said. So if I rule practically like Rava, that commandments do not require intention, then the intention of the listener and the one sounding is not required, because according to that approach it’s apparently the same thing. Fine. And it goes according to the second view. Yes, in the Talmud in Pesachim there is a tannaitic dispute, Rabbi Yosei and the first tanna. Tosafot here mentions it. Tosafot asks this question here.

[Speaker C] About what? About whether commandments require intention, or about listener and one sounding?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, about commandments requiring intention. Tosafot here brings that Talmud. Look at Rashi. Rashi says: “the one sounding requires intention,” and that is the inference in Rav Zeira’s view. Rashi says: to fulfill the listener’s obligation. What is he coming to say? He’s coming to sharpen exactly this point. The one sounding needs intention not because commandments require intention, but an intention to fulfill another’s obligation under the law of “hearing is like responding.” That’s all. Rashi senses that really we’ve moved here to something else; it’s unrelated, a different passage. Look also at Rav Zeira’s earlier statement itself: “Have intention and sound for me”—intend to sound on my behalf, to fulfill my obligation. In other words, the content of the intention is not intention to fulfill your own obligation. He isn’t saying to him, “intend to fulfill your own obligation because commandments require intention.” He’s saying to him: “intend to fulfill my obligation.” In other words, this is the intention required under “hearing is like responding.” So Rashi consistently seems to understand Rav Zeira’s statement and the discussion that follows it as a discussion about the intention required under “hearing is like responding,” and not something connected to the question whether commandments do or do not require intention. Now the Talmud continues with another “come and hear”: Come and hear—if the listener intended but the one sounding did not intend, if the one sounding intended but the listener did not intend, he did not fulfill his obligation unless both the listener and the one sounding intended. Yes, both of them need intention. So far, fine—probably the intention of “hearing is like responding,” right? The Talmud says: It teaches “the one sounding” parallel to “the listener.” If you’re talking to me about the intention of the one sounding and the intention of the listener, I assume you mean the same kind of intention. Not that the one sounding has to intend one thing and the listener something else; otherwise, spell it out. Say: unless the one sounding intends to fulfill the listener’s obligation, and the listener intends to fulfill his obligation through the one sounding. But no, you say that listener and one sounding both need to intend. Intend what? The same thing. What does that mean? Just as the listener listens for himself, so too the one sounding sounds for himself. And it teaches: he did not fulfill his obligation. What does that mean? What does “for himself” mean? To fulfill his obligation.

[Speaker C] Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The kind of intention required by the view that commandments require intention, right? Because why does the listener need intention? The Talmud says the listener needs intention in order to fulfill his obligation. So the one sounding too only needs to intend to fulfill his own obligation, and he does not need to intend to fulfill the listener’s obligation. Right? And then once again that is difficult for Rav Zeira. Okay? Now this is a subtle point, notice. Wait, so—

[Speaker C] What does “and it teaches, he did not fulfill his obligation” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And it teaches, he did not fulfill his obligation”—that the one sounding’s intention is required. Because it says he did not fulfill his obligation.

[Speaker C] The one sounding’s intention is required—so that supports Rav Zeira, doesn’t it? Why? Rav Zeira says the one sounding needs intention, right? And here it says that if only one of them intended to fulfill his own obligation and not to fulfill the other’s, then he did not fulfill it. So that’s proof for Rav Zeira, not a difficulty against Rav Zeira. If the one sounding, if he intends to fulfill his own obligation, he isn’t intending to fulfill the other person’s.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, he didn’t intend to fulfill the other person’s obligation, and therefore he did not fulfill it. Wait a second. Okay, so is that proof? No. What is it really saying? “It teaches: he did not fulfill his obligation”—when did he not fulfill it? When one of the two did not intend. When one of the two did not intend, then he did not fulfill it, right? Why did he not intend? To fulfill his own obligation—not to fulfill another’s. Because “to fulfill another’s” we said is not the intention being discussed here, since the one sounding’s intention is parallel to the listener’s intention, right? Just as the listener intends for himself, so too the one sounding intends for himself. And about that it says that if the one sounding did not intend, he did not fulfill it. But if he did intend for himself, then he did fulfill it. So he doesn’t need to intend to fulfill another’s obligation; intention for himself is enough. So that is difficult for Rav Zeira. But what do you see here? That intention is required. The kind of intention required by the view that commandments require intention, yes. True, Rav Zeira’s discussion is only about the intention required under “hearing is like responding,” no problem, but from the baraita brought here, just on its own, it seems that here for the first time in the passage there appears clearly a requirement of intention in order to fulfill one’s obligation—partly against Rava. The difficulty against Rav Zeira is about what happens when you do not intend to fulfill someone else’s obligation, but the straightforward assumption here is that intention to fulfill one’s own obligation certainly has to be present in the listener just as in the one sounding—the same thing; both of them need to intend to fulfill their obligation. By the way, there’s something else you can see here: the listener intends to fulfill his obligation—what does that mean, to intend to fulfill it? Because that too can be understood in two ways: does he intend to fulfill it through this blast itself, or does he intend to fulfill his obligation under the rule that commandments require intention? Now with the listener those are almost the same thing, right? I’m not sure whether those are two different intentions or the same intention. In the Talmud here it looks like it’s the same intention. And therefore, when we require the intention of listener and one sounding, the intention of the one sounding is intention to fulfill your obligation. Does he also need to intend to fulfill his own obligation? That depends on the law of commandments requiring intention—that’s a separate dispute—but he needs to intend to fulfill his own obligation. But the fact that you need to intend to fulfill your obligation, that is not because of “hearing is like responding,” but because of the law that commandments require intention. The practical implication, once again as usual, is that if I hold that commandments do not require intention, then the one sounding would have to intend to fulfill the listener’s obligation, but the listener would not need to intend to fulfill his own, because the listener’s intention to fulfill his obligation is not part of “hearing is like responding”; rather, it is intention to fulfill one’s obligation because commandments require intention. Again, I didn’t understand. Right. And why does the one sounding have to intend? The listener has to, fine, but the one sounding? Why does the one sounding have to intend? You tell me why. To intend to fulfill his obligation, right, because after all it’s parallel to the listener. But if you say that all of this is required only by the law of “hearing is like responding,” then fine, I can understand the listener—but what about the one sounding? The baraita says that the one sounding also has to intend; without that the listener does not fulfill his obligation. On the face of it, this is talking about intention to fulfill the listener’s obligation. Maybe you could say that the listener’s intention to fulfill his obligation helps both for his own fulfillment and for the fact that he fulfills it under “hearing is like responding,” but you can’t say that there’s no requirement here of the kind of intention involved in “commandments require intention,” because otherwise the one sounding wouldn’t have to intend. The practical implication—

[Speaker F] So now even according to the one who says intention is not required, the listener would still need intention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but in the baraita here it doesn’t say that. The baraita here says that the intent of the listener is analogous to that of the one sounding the shofar, and it’s speaking according to the view that commandments require intent in order to fulfill one’s obligation, and they challenge Rav Zeira: why did he not fulfill his obligation—wait, sorry, yes, sorry, the other way around— they challenge Rav Zeira: why did he fulfill his obligation if we have these two intents; after all, you also need intent to enable someone else to fulfill, right? But that you need the two intents is obvious. That’s what the baraita says. Now the whole question is only why that is enough. Why you need it is obvious that you need it. The question is why it’s enough. After all, in order to enable someone else to fulfill, you need intent to enable him—not the content of the intent to fulfill one’s own obligation, but to enable the other. I’m talking now about the one sounding it. Okay? So it seems to me that that’s where you’re forced to end up here: that commandments require intent in the ordinary sense, and also the intent to fulfill and to enable fulfillment. Yes. It could be, as you said, that when the listener intends to fulfill through the blower, that’s the same thing as commandments require intent—but not because it’s the same law, rather because that one intent serves both laws, since the content of the intent has to be the same. If he intends to fulfill his obligation with this blast, then he is also intending to fulfill through the listener—I mean, through the blower—and also intending that this be a commandment. So true, it serves two different functions, but the same thing serves both functions. But still, with the one sounding it, that doesn’t happen in one and the same function. With the one sounding it, he needs two different intents: he has to intend to fulfill in order to fulfill his own obligation, and he has to intend to enable others to fulfill. It’s interesting, by the way: if he doesn’t intend to enable others, if he doesn’t intend to fulfill but does intend to enable others, the question is whether that is enough—yes, enough for the listener. The one sounding it has not fulfilled his own obligation if commandments require intent. Or perhaps the one sounding it needs to be performing a commandment so that the listener can fulfill through it by the rule of hearing is like responding, and then the one sounding it also needs intent so that the listener will fulfill, not only so that he himself will fulfill. Again: if he fulfilled his own obligation, then maybe he can enable the listener to fulfill. I’m not sure that’s the same thing, not sure it’s the same thing. Because when he enables, even when he fulfilled his own obligation, he can intend for his own commandment. No—to intend for the commandment under the rule that commandments require intent, not in order to enable the other. I need to have the intent to fulfill by force of the rule that commandments require intent in his case; it’s not enough that he intended. That depends on the question whether the commandment is to hear, whether the commandment is to sound—I already noted that once. But it could be that this is a requirement said only when, also when only he himself needs to fulfill his obligation. It could be that these two functions are realized in the same intent—exactly what I said earlier about the listener; that too is possible. Again: if the one sounding it fulfills his own obligation, then he can enable the listener to fulfill. Wait, we’ll get to that in a moment, I’m getting there.

So basically it seems to me that here, fairly clearly, the intent to fulfill one’s obligation already appears; a view appears here that commandments require intent, okay? That seems pretty clear in this baraita. Notice: that doesn’t necessarily mean that Rav Zeira agrees. Rav Zeira can say that commandments do not require intent, and all that is needed is the listener’s intent and the intent of the one sounding it. The baraita holds that commandments require intent—that’s not the point. But this baraita is difficult for Rav Zeira, because even without the one sounding it intending to enable, people still fulfill their obligation here, so it’s difficult for him. It’s still not smooth, because if that were the case, then I could answer: what’s the problem? This baraita follows the view that commandments require intent, so that’s a different issue there; but Rav Zeira says commandments do not require intent, and this baraita may not follow his view. Fine, but the direction is the opposite; the simple direction is the opposite: if you hold that commandments do not require intent, then I would expect you all the more not to require the listener’s and the speaker’s intent. If the baraita requires it and follows the view that commandments require intent, and still does not require the intent of the one sounding it, then someone who says commandments do not require intent certainly should not require the intent of the one sounding it.

So the Avnei Nezer brings two explanations here; it appears on the page: “And it teaches: he did not fulfill.” It seems, as indicated there, that this means: he did not fulfill if he did not intend to sound it for himself in order to fulfill. He sharpens it: that is, “to sound it for himself in order to fulfill” means commandments require intent; by force of commandments requiring intent, he did not fulfill. But if he did intend for himself, he fulfilled even though he did not intend to enable the listener. And that is difficult for Rav Zeira. What? Why? That’s also what I explained: if he happened to direct his intent. Fine, so that’s the simple explanation.

Now he brings in the name of the Vilna Gaon, and the Gaon explains it as follows: since it teaches “he did not fulfill” in the singular, and does not teach in the plural “they did not fulfill,” we can infer that only the one sounding it did not fulfill, but the listener did fulfill even though the one sounding it did not intend for him. In the final analysis, at bottom it’s the same thing, just a different inference from the wording, but in the end it’s the same thing. What is basically written here? That the one sounding it fulfills if he intended to fulfill, but the listener fulfills even if the one sounding it did not intend to enable him. Fine, in any case that’s what is written here. The inference is a different inference, but that’s what is written here.

Now the Gemara says—let’s say, in the final analysis, it seems to me that in this baraita it is very hard not to understand that commandments require intent, meaning that it disagrees with Rava: commandments require intent, okay? With Rav Zeira, it doesn’t look like he is talking about that, but from the connection the Gemara makes to Rav Zeira, somehow there was room to say that that’s how it understood Rav Zeira too. In any case, if I ask whether there is such an opinion that commandments require intent, the answer is yes: in this baraita it is written that commandments require intent. In any case, whether it’s Rav Zeira or not Rav Zeira, in this baraita it’s written, okay?

If I now had to say what the Jewish law is, I would rule that commandments do not require intent, because Rava certainly says commandments do not require intent. Rav Zeira in the simple sense also means commandments do not require intent. There is a baraita that says yes, but it is not like Rav Zeira, or it is difficult for Rav Zeira and they somehow reconcile it, but… the two amoraim do not go with it; we rule like the later authorities. They both don’t go with it. You’ll say there’s a baraita against them—fact is, the Gemara did not ask from this baraita against them. So what? Apparently they rely on what I mentioned, the dispute among the tannaim in tractate Pesachim, so they aren’t shaken by the fact that there is a baraita that goes against amoraim, because in any event it is already a tannaitic dispute. But in practice, for our purposes, the two amoraim decided that commandments do not require intent.

As for the second dipping, we need to look there, that’s… we need to see the details of the Gemara there. Is that a Mishnah or a baraita? There is… it begins with a Mishnah and afterward the Gemara explains the Mishnah. Yes. If he immersed without intending, does he need to immerse again? That’s a question of whether commandments require intent or not. Why doesn’t Rav discuss that topic? Because I don’t want to get into that topic there; we’re already tangled enough here. So we’ll see—if we get to it, we’ll get to it—but there, on the contrary, what’s difficult there is why they really connect it to the issue of commandments requiring intent. It isn’t really totally clear whether it’s connected to commandments requiring intent, but they connect it, and that’s the fact. So for now I’m only using it to say that in any case there is a tannaitic dispute, okay?

But as I said, many halakhic decisors, maybe most of them, rule that commandments do require intent, maybe as in the Shulchan Arukh that we saw. So apparently they probably didn’t read this the way I read it. They “didn’t succeed in intending,” as it were. Several medieval authorities write that Rav Kahana—Rav Kahana always slips in on me—that Rav Zeira is speaking about the law that commandments require intent. He too is speaking about the law that commandments require intent; that’s how they understand it. And therefore there is a dispute among the amoraim, and now all the discussions really revolve around Rav Zeira’s view, so one can understand that the Jewish law follows him and not Rava, even though Rava is later. There are discussions why we do not rule here according to the later authority. There are medieval authorities who really discuss this issue in Baal HaMaor and in Milchamot and elsewhere.

So the Meiri writes as follows: “As for the practical ruling: according to this view, the matter divides into three parts. The first: where the blower intends to discharge only himself, and in this case others do not fulfill through his blowing even if they directed their hearts to fulfill, since he did not intend to enable them, while he himself did fulfill, since he intended to fulfill.” So he says commandments require intent. Not reverse intent. What does the Mishnah say? I didn’t understand—what does the Mishnah say? If the blower did not intend to enable… not that he intended not to enable, but he did not intend to enable. We are not dealing with reverse intent. Reverse intent has not yet entered the picture for us at this point. Fine, we’ll get to that later. So here, on the one hand, the Meiri says commandments require intent. Therefore the blower has to intend in order to fulfill his own obligation, but if he did not intend to enable the other, then the other did not fulfill, okay? “But if he blew it as a song or was merely occupied with it, then even he himself did not fulfill.” Fine? So first of all, that’s the inference I said—that… it’s not only the inference for Rava; it may even be against Rav Zeira. This is the first time we encounter an opinion that commandments require intent. It’s written here; the Meiri is right. Whether that is Rav Zeira or not, that is another discussion, but here in the baraita it is written.

“The second: where he intends to enable particular individuals,” specific people, “and in this case only those individuals fulfill if they directed their hearts to fulfill, since he also intended to enable them. But if the listener intended to fulfill and the blower did not intend to enable, or if the blower intended to enable and the listener did not intend to fulfill, they did not fulfill until both the listener and the one sounding it intended.” “If the listener did not intend to fulfill” is an interesting remark. “The listener did not intend to fulfill”—is that by force of commandments requiring intent, or that the listener did not intend to fulfill through the blower? It could be that it’s the same thing. It could be that it’s the same thing. They are two different laws, but they are realized in the same thought. Meaning, again, that does not mean it is the same law, but two different laws that are realized in the same thought.

“And the third way: a prayer leader who blows in order to enable all those who hear him, even if they were not there, and in this case every hearer fulfills if he directs his heart to fulfill, even though the blower did not specifically intend to enable him. It therefore follows according to this ruling that commandments require intent both to fulfill and to enable.” What does “to fulfill and to enable” mean? What does “to fulfill and to enable” mean? Fine, “to enable” I understand—no, “to enable” is by the rule of hearing is like responding, and “to fulfill” is commandments require intent. Not that “to fulfill” means the intent of the one sounding it, and “to enable” means the one sounding it; no, “to fulfill” also applies to the one sounding it, not only to the listener. “Intent to fulfill” is commandments require intent, and “intent to enable” is by the rule of hearing is like responding. “And if he did not intend in these, he did not fulfill. And this is the view of the great decisors and authors here. And that which Rav Zeira said to his attendant, ‘Have intent and sound it for me’”—here suddenly he goes back to Rav Zeira. Meaning he understands that Rav Zeira holds commandments require intent; he identifies this baraita with Rav Zeira. I don’t really understand that. I’m saying the plain meaning of the Gemara is really not that, really not that. But okay, I don’t know, that’s how most of the medieval authorities learn it; I don’t know, quite a few medieval authorities learn it that way. The necessity of it isn’t completely clear to me. Right.

So they wanted… the fact that they want to is very nice. He wants, he wants—but it doesn’t come out, as the HaGashashim say. What do you mean, “I want”? Rava says either way commandments do not require intent, right? What are you going to do with Rava? So Rav Zeira says the same thing too. Whatever you do with Rava, do with Rav Zeira as well. But don’t tell that to the public. But you don’t have to lie because it’s difficult. If Rav Zeira holds differently, then he holds differently. It bothers you? Take a pill. We don’t interpret things according to what is difficult for us to say. We interpret things according to what we think is really the intended meaning.

Now, if we really understand it that way in Rav Zeira’s view too, then that means we have to go back to the Gemara. How exactly do you insert into Rav Zeira’s view the idea that commandments require intent? Meaning, that he disagrees with Rava. He doesn’t talk about it at all. He talks about the intent to fulfill and the intent to enable, hearing is like responding. How do the medieval authorities… in the baraita, I said, that’s clear. The Meiri is completely right. In the baraita it is clear that commandments require intent, so on that I’m not arguing. But why in the final line does he add that to Rav Zeira? Why? In Rav Zeira that’s not what the plain sense says.

It seems to me there is no choice but really to identify between the intent to fulfill one’s obligation in the sense of commandments requiring intent, and the intent of listener and speaker in hearing is like responding. Whoever holds that this is required also requires that; whoever holds that this is not required also does not require that. How? Why? Why is that so? So it seems to me one can understand this in two ways, at least two ways.

The intent of the listener and the speaker—the intent involved in hearing is like responding—is really a different intent; it is not the intent to fulfill one’s obligation. It is the intent to enable, and the intent that my act be effective for him. Fine? It is not the intent to fulfill one’s obligation; maybe we said that one thought accomplishes it, but these are intents of a different type, intents concerning the relations between them, not their relation to the Holy One, blessed be He. Fine? It’s a different type of intent. But these intents are required only because commandments require intent. Maybe there is such an assumption. Because if commandments did not require intent, why do you need to transfer something from you to me? I heard it, everything is fine, I fulfilled my obligation. The assumption is that the intent of the speaker and listener is required—not that it is the same thing as commandments requiring intent; it is something else—but it is required only if I assume that commandments require intent.

Or in a more extreme formulation: the intent of the listener and the speaker transfers to me the listener’s intent. After all, I hear the sound by myself; I don’t need him to transfer the sound to me. And as for the sounding itself—I don’t need to sound it, I need to hear it, if I assume the commandment is to hear. Okay? So why do I need the intent of the listener and the speaker? In order to transfer to me his intent to fulfill. If there were no need for intent to fulfill under the rule that commandments require intent, then it would be enough that I heard his blast and everything would be fine. Why do I need him to intend to enable me and me to intend to fulfill through him? So notice: I am not identifying the two intents; they are different intents. But I am saying that the intent to hear and to make heard is required only if the intent to fulfill the obligation is required. The dependence is functional; it is not identity. I’m not claiming that the intent to fulfill one’s obligation and the intent to enable are the same intent. They are certainly two different intents. But you need the intent to enable and to fulfill only if commandments truly require intent. Therefore, if Rav Kahana says to his attendant, “Have intent and sound it for me,” then we see that he wants there to be a law of hearing is like responding. So if you need here the law of hearing is like responding, apparently he understands that commandments require intent and he disagrees with Rava. That is the first possibility.

The second possibility: it could be that the listener’s and speaker’s intent is itself the intent to fulfill—not that it is required only because commandments require intent. This is the intent to fulfill. If you don’t hold that commandments require intent, you don’t need this—not because there is no need to transfer from here to there. These intents do not transfer the blower’s intent to the listener. These intents are the intent to fulfill. If you are not the one sounding it, it is not enough that you intend to fulfill your obligation. He has to intend to fulfill his obligation, and I have to intend to fulfill through him, and he also has to intend to enable me. Only then do I satisfy the rule that commandments require intent.

So what comes out is that the intent to enable and to fulfill, the intents of hearing is like responding, are themselves—that’s already identity, not functionality—those intents are the intent to fulfill one’s obligation in such a situation, when I fulfill through someone else. If I fulfill by myself, I need to intend to fulfill my obligation. That is the standard rule of commandments requiring intent. But if I am in a position where I hear someone else’s blast, it is not enough that I intend to fulfill my obligation. That is not enough, not because of hearing is like responding. It is not enough because something is missing in my own requirement of commandments requiring intent. If I did not sound it, then apparently the intent to fulfill one’s obligation in hearing is not enough for me to count as intending in the commandment. The listener’s and speaker’s intent is the fulfillment of the rule that commandments require intent when you fulfill through someone else. If you fulfill by yourself, then everything is as usual, as we have learned until now.

No, but that really explains it. According to this, it’s a bit different from what I said. We’ll still get to this Chazon Ish, but the claim is that according to this, he asks the question why the blower has to intend to fulfill his own obligation—not why he has to intend to enable the listener. Understand: I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about why he has to intend to enable the listener. Fine? So these are two… and of course this discussion can depend on the question what exactly the commandment is. Is the commandment to sound, or is the commandment to hear? If the commandment is to hear, then ostensibly if I heard and intended to fulfill my obligation, then I fulfilled my obligation. If the commandment is to sound, then not only do you need to transfer his sounding to me—you also need to transfer his intent to me. Right? Then you could say that because the commandment is to sound, you need the mutual intents so that his act will pass to me and his intent will also pass to me. Fine? So it could depend on the definition of the commandment of shofar: whether the commandment is to hear or whether the commandment is to sound. Although, as you mentioned earlier, even if I say that the commandment is to hear, that does not mean there are no requirements on the one sounding it. And that, I hope if we have time, we’ll still get to. Fine? But not in the simple way I would say: if the commandment is to hear, then I don’t care about the one sounding it; let him do whatever he wants. I heard. I need to intend to fulfill my obligation if commandments require intent, and everything is fine. He doesn’t need to intend that I fulfill through him, and he doesn’t need to intend to enable me, nothing. The commandment is to hear. But there are opinions that the commandment is to hear, and nevertheless it says here in the Gemara that you need intents to enable and to fulfill. Apparently they do not dispute that. Even one who says the commandment is to hear acknowledges that there are requirements on the one sounding it, even though on the face of it I would not have thought there should be requirements on the one sounding it.

Fine. Now let’s see some of the decisors. The Rif writes as follows: “It was taught: if the listener intended but the one sounding it did not intend, if the one sounding it intended but the listener did not intend, he did not fulfill until both listener and speaker intended. Rav Zeira said to his attendant, ‘Have intent and sound it for me.’” By the way, he reversed the order, if you noticed. “He did not fulfill until both listener and speaker intended. It was taught: the listener intended but the speaker did not intend”—that’s the end. Yes. “Rav Zeira said to his attendant, ‘Have intent and sound it for me.’ From here we learn that he held that the one sounding it too requires intent. That is to say: even though he intends to discharge himself of his own obligation, his fellow who hears his blast does not fulfill his obligation until the blower intends to make him hear. And this applies to an individual, but in the case of a prayer leader, since he has in mind the whole world, we do not require that he have him specifically in mind.” Fine?

Meaning, he brings the baraita first without the discussion that the Gemara has. Because he brings the baraita without entering the question whether the intent spoken of in the baraita is the kind of intent of commandments requiring intent or the intent of fulfilling and enabling. For him, it is the intent of fulfilling and enabling. It is not commandments requiring intent; not connected to commandments requiring intent. It is the intent to fulfill and to enable. The only thing is that in the baraita it should have said that this is a prayer leader, and therefore you do not need the intent to enable. But the Rif says that you do need the intent to enable. Fine? Therefore he brings this baraita in its plain sense. In this baraita he does not infer that the intent of the one sounding it is analogous to the listener’s intent. If we infer that, then it comes out that the baraita does not require intent to enable. After that they answer that this is a prayer leader. “Analogous to the listener’s intent”—what is that? Intent to fulfill one’s obligation, not intent to enable him. Therefore the baraita was difficult for Rav Zeira, right? And what did they answer? That this is a prayer leader. Wait, prayer leader—that’s regarding one who passes behind synagogues. Wait. No, that’s with one who passes behind synagogues. Here it’s “come and hear: if the listener intended but the speaker did not intend.” Yes, right, “it was taught: when is this said? In the case of a prayer leader”—yes, here too, fine.

In any case, for our purposes—wait, does he explain the baraita not the way the Gemara explains it? He brought it not the way the Gemara explains it. He brings the baraita in its plain sense: that you need the listener’s and speaker’s intent. According to the Gemara, that’s not what the baraita says. What the baraita says is that you need the listener’s and speaker’s intent to fulfill the obligation, but you don’t need intent to enable. The Gemara answers: fine, that’s talking about a prayer leader, and therefore there really is intent to enable. That is after the answer. But the Rif brings it in its plain sense; he does not say this is talking about a prayer leader. He brings it in its plain sense. So I don’t know whether he learned the Gemara differently, or had a different text of the Gemara, or he simply uses the baraita because if you read the baraita in its plain sense it is not how the Gemara reads it, and that is the correct law, that you need the listener’s and speaker’s intent. The law is the correct law, so he uses the wording of the baraita to bring the law, that’s all. Right, he says nothing about it. Right, in a moment we’ll get there.

“Even though he intended to discharge himself of his own obligation”—that is, he intended to fulfill. “Even though he intended to discharge himself of his own obligation, his fellow who hears his blast does not fulfill his obligation until the blower intended to make him hear.” It doesn’t say—this could be hypothetical. Even if you intend to fulfill your obligation, maybe that’s not required, but even if you do intend to fulfill your obligation, that won’t help; you need to intend to enable him. I don’t know, it’s open. The question is whether this sentence—precisely the central sentence—is this said hypothetically? It says that even if he intends to fulfill his obligation, that does not help, because he needs to intend to enable him. Or does it mean: no, obviously he needs to intend to fulfill his obligation because commandments require intent; only know that this intent is not enough in order to enable the other, because he also needs the intent to enable him. Maybe the sentence is hypothetical, maybe not hypothetical, okay?

Yes, but the question is whether what he says—even if he intended to fulfill—why? Because one needs to intend to fulfill, or no? It’s not required, but even if you intended to fulfill, that will not help you regarding enabling the other. Okay. Let’s say that if we identify the intent to enable and to fulfill with the intent to fulfill one’s obligation—the intent involved in hearing is like responding—then it works better, because then the Rif really said: even if you intended to fulfill, that is not enough, because you also need… Fine.

So in fact, yes, that is what I said here. On the one hand, he distinguishes between the two intents, right? He says that even though he intended to fulfill his obligation, if he did not intend to enable, then the other did not fulfill. Meaning, he distinguishes that there are two intents here. But does one also need to intend to fulfill one’s own obligation under the rule that commandments require intent—whom does he rule like? So it is not entirely clear. Not Rav Zeira himself either—I don’t know what he says—but the question is whether he rules that commandments require intent or commandments do not require intent. The question is whether this sentence—I brought it here, yes, what is underlined, as you see—“even though he intended to discharge himself of his own obligation, his fellow who hears his blast does not fulfill until the blower intended to make him hear”—is this hypothetical or practical? Okay, so that is the question of how the Rif rules.

Fine, you also said that he omits Rav Zeira and Rava entirely, right? That is already proof that he rules that commandments require intent. Why? Let him bring it. Bring what? This—that commandments require intent. He doesn’t write it. He should rule, omitting Rava, and say: and we hold like Rav Zeira, that commandments require intent. He writes nothing, unless you say that this sentence is not hypothetical. I don’t know. But to imply it in this way sounds a little strange. What? If commandments require intent—I don’t know, I didn’t check.

Fine. If we understand, as I said earlier, that the intent of listener and speaker in hearing is like responding is required only if we hold that commandments require intent, then maybe it is easier to understand the Rif. Once he said that you need mutual intent to fulfill and to enable, he has already said that commandments require intent; otherwise why do you need intent to fulfill and to enable? Still, as a decisor, I would expect him to say: you need to intend—leave the listener alone—to fulfill, to enable. I’m sounding it for myself. Do I need to intend to fulfill? Say that I need to intend to fulfill, that commandments require intent. He is issuing a ruling; this is not the Gemara. In the Gemara you say the Gemara assumes that if this exists then that also exists, so it needn’t say it. But from decisors I expect more explicit statements. So in the Rif himself it is not entirely clear to me how to understand his view on whether commandments require intent.

Just to remind you, we’ll also see in Maimonides that it isn’t clear what his opinion is. In my opinion it is clear that he holds commandments do not require intent, but most of his commentators learned otherwise. And the Shulchan Arukh generally follows the majority among the Rif, the Rosh, and Maimonides, and the Shulchan Arukh writes that commandments require intent, that this is the Jewish law. Between the two opinions, he says that the law is that commandments require intent. But I don’t know—in Maimonides, it seems to me that he understood that commandments require intent. Yes? No, the question is how he understood the Rif. Fine, we need to look in the Beit Yosef there.

In any case, I’m now reading the Ran. “And Rabbi Alfasi of blessed memory wrote this law of Rav Zeira, and left aside Rava.” He didn’t bring Rava. “Who concluded the discussion and said that in order to fulfill one need not have intent.” At first this sentence confused me. I think he means to explain here who Rava is—not that the Rif ruled that commandments do not require intent, but that he omits Rava, who says commandments do not require intent. “And there are those who think to say that Rav Zeira does not disagree with Rava, for Rav Zeira did not say ‘have intent and sound it for me’ for the sake of the commandment, but rather that there must be intent to hear and to make heard for the sake of some shofar blast, even if not for the sake of a commandment; and therefore intent for the commandment is never required, but intent to hear and to make heard is required.” There—so according to Rava this works out; he says what I said. You’re getting excited; I’m not getting excited so fast. What intent is Rav Zeira talking about? “To hear and to make heard for the sake of some shofar blast.” What does “for the sake of some shofar blast” mean? What is “some shofar blast” doing here? I want to intend to enable you, and you have to intend to fulfill through me. What is “some shofar blast”? It’s not a lesser intent or something; it’s a different intent, an intent of hearing is like responding.

He doesn’t mention here hearing is like responding at all. What is “some intent”? I think he means “some intent,” intent to exclude one merely occupied with it: that he understand that he is sounding, he doesn’t hear a donkey here, he hears a shofar. And this is the intent to hear and to make heard. The intent to hear and to make heard is not by force of hearing is like responding, but so that he not be merely occupied with it. “Intent” means that he is sounding a shofar—that is, he is hearing or making heard a shofar, and not the braying of a donkey. Okay? And not the intent to fulfill one’s obligation, which is the full intent. This is a minimal intent, just so that he won’t be merely occupied with it. And there is the full intent, which is the intent to fulfill one’s obligation.

All along, after all, we saw that there is a minimal intent—namely, that he not be merely occupied with it—and that is according to everyone; and there is the intent to fulfill one’s obligation, and that is the dispute whether commandments require intent or not. The language of the Ran here is quite clear: he is not talking about the listener’s and speaker’s intent by force of hearing is like responding. Maybe that is what he calls the intent of hearing is like responding, but it is not the intent to fulfill and to enable; that is not what he is talking about. The listener’s and speaker’s intent is not the intent to fulfill and to enable; rather, the listener’s and speaker’s intent means that you understand that you are hearing a shofar or sounding a shofar. As for the one sounding it, we already saw that this is absurd, because with the one sounding it, clearly this is not a donkey; the one sounding it is sounding the shofar, so he cannot think that this sound is the sound of a donkey. Meaning, he knows what this sound is. The listener can think that it is a donkey’s sound and thus be merely occupied with it. Fine, probably just a formulaic expression. We already saw that someone said this—I don’t remember who—but we saw it. He says here: “to hear and to make heard for the sake of some shofar blast.” Yes, not with intent for a song. Exactly. You need to understand that this is a shofar blast, but not commandments require intent, which is the full intent, so that he not be merely occupied with it. Because if you think this is a donkey and not a shofar, unlike one who sounds it as a song—one who sounds it as a song knows it is a shofar, he just is not doing it for the sake of a commandment—then one who thinks it is a donkey’s sound does not even know that this is a shofar blast, so he is merely occupied with it. That is exactly the point. It is like one who sounds it as a song; it is some minimal intent.

So he says: those who say that Rav Zeira does not disagree with Rava say that commandments do not require intent. According to Rav Zeira, commandments do not require intent. So what is required? The listener’s and speaker’s intent. I had understood all along that this was by force of hearing is like responding, but the Ran says no—it is some minimal intent, the intent that he not be merely occupied with it. And that is the listener’s and speaker’s intent that appears in the Gemara. According to this explanation in the Ran, this is not the intent of hearing is like responding, okay?

Good question. Against this addition of the Rif regarding the prayer leader, that apparently proves that this opinion is not correct—that this explanation in the Rif is not correct. Because if we are really speaking about some minimal intent, then what does this have to do with a prayer leader? Even if you are not a prayer leader, if you intended “I intended to enable him,” and someone passed behind the synagogue and heard me, then the minimal intent was there—I intended to sound a shofar, not a donkey’s snort. Right? So why do we have to establish it as a prayer leader? Okay? You’re right, that’s a correct point. And then this explanation, in my opinion, cannot fit into the Rif. Unless we were to establish that hearing is like responding—the listener’s and speaker’s intent, this minimal intent, means to enable and to fulfill. But then you wouldn’t call it minimal intent; that’s not what is written here. He also does not mention hearing is like responding; he does not… we’ll see later.

And therefore, if so, then it is clear why the Rif omitted Rava. The Rif omitted Rava because it is obvious—because everyone agrees; there is no dispute about this. Commandments do not require intent. All that is needed is this minimal intent, and that is what the Rif brought: that some minimal intent is required, but not the… commandments do not require intent. So you do not need to rule that commandments do not require intent; once you did not bring the requirement that the commandment needs intent, it is obvious that it does not. Okay? But as you said, you are right: I think that in the Rif as we have it, at least, this explanation doesn’t work.

Now he says: “And there are those who infer this from the language of Rabbi Alfasi in his legal rulings.” I didn’t understand this addition. Notice: “And Rabbi Alfasi wrote this law of Rav Zeira and left aside Rava, who has the teaching,” etc. “And there are those who think to say that Rav Zeira does not disagree with Rava…” Ah, now I understand. Now I get it. “And there are those who think to say that Rav Zeira does not disagree”—that is not necessarily an explanation of the Rif. First he simply brought the Rif. He says: the Rif left out Rava; he did not bring Rava. He still hasn’t said what that means. The Rif didn’t bring Rava. You might have thought that the Rif ruled that commandments require intent; therefore he didn’t bring Rava. “And there are those who think to say”—this is not necessarily explaining the Rif. Not only because of your difficulty, I’m saying this now—I had thought until now that it was simply a desire to explain the Rif, but it may be that the phrase “there are those who think to say” means they are not trying to explain the Rif, but rather they themselves learned the Gemara this way: that Rav Zeira does not disagree with Rava. And as for the fact that later it is established with a prayer leader—the Gemara established it with a prayer leader. Because there the Gemara tries to say that commandments do require intent, and there we are speaking about the listener’s and the speaker’s intent to enable and to fulfill. But Rav Zeira himself is not speaking about that. He is speaking about some minimal intent, that he not be merely occupied with it, the way I read the Gemara. Okay?

Now he says: “And there are those who infer this from the language of Rabbi Alfasi in his legal rulings.” Now he says there are some who learn this in the Rif, but I think your point is correct: it is difficult to fit this into the Rif. Because when the Rif brings the prayer leader and so on, it looks like he is talking about the intent to fulfill and to enable, not about some minimal intent.

And Rabbi Zerachiah HaLevi, the Baal HaMaor, objected that certainly, from the fact that we established this law of Rav Zeira in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who says that with an individual he does not fulfill until both listener and speaker intend—that’s the tannaitic dispute in the baraita at the end of the topic—it implies that Rav Zeira requires intent for the commandment, like Rabbi Yosei. Because from here Rav Zeira does indeed seem to disagree with Rava, unlike those “there are those who think” quoted above. And Rav Zeira holds that commandments do require intent. Why? Because Rabbi Yosei in the chapter Arvei Pesachim, 114b, implies that Rabbi Yosei holds commandments require intent, and the Sages dispute him there. If so, the law is neither like Rabbi Yosei nor like Rav Zeira. Because there we rule like the Sages who dispute Rabbi Yosei, by the rule that the Jewish law follows the majority. So Rav Zeira himself holds that commandments require intent, but the law does not follow him, because in the tannaitic dispute in Pesachim we rule like the Sages against Rabbi Yosei. Consequently we rule like Rava against Rav Zeira. That is what the Baal HaMaor says, and indeed the Baal HaMaor rules that commandments do not require intent.

“And Rashi too explained, ‘Have intent and sound it for me’—to discharge me of my obligation.” That’s what we read in Rashi, right? “Which implies that Rav”—I would read here “does not disagree with Rava.” I would read here “does not disagree with Rava.” I think it is a textual error. In this Rashi, if anything, I understand the opposite conclusion; then it comes out that Rav Zeira is speaking about the listener’s and speaker’s intent and does not disagree with Rava. It is something else, not a disagreement with Rava.

What do you think of the Baal HaMaor’s argument itself? Far from compelling. That Rabbi Yosei holds commandments require intent in Pesachim—that’s true. But Rabbi Yosei here is not connected to that. Rabbi Yosei here is talking perhaps about the listener’s and speaker’s intent. I don’t know. Why decide from Rabbi Yosei there to Rabbi Yosei here? Rabbi Yosei himself holds that commandments require intent, but the question is whether what he says here depends on the rule that commandments require intent. Rav Zeira can agree with Rabbi Yosei here—that the intent of the one sounding it is required, fine—but still hold that commandments do not require intent. In that respect he is not ruling like Rabbi Yosei but like the Sages. Especially since in a tannaitic dispute the law follows the majority, and Rav Zeira is an amora. The law follows the majority; there are Sages against Rabbi Yosei, so Rav Zeira too agrees that the law follows the Sages—that commandments do not require intent. And what he holds here like Rabbi Yosei is only that you need the intent of the one sounding it, that’s all. So the argument of the Baal HaMaor is a little weak. What? Why? Why—what is there to object to? He works with Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yosei here is not dealing with commandments requiring intent; he is talking about whether the intent of the one sounding it is required. So Rav Zeira agrees with him in that. The fact that over there he says also that commandments require intent—what does that have to do with us? We weren’t discussing that.

Now he says: “Therefore Nachmanides wrote in the book Milchamot…” The Ran continues. “Therefore Nachmanides wrote in the book Milchamot that indeed Rav Zeira holds that commandments require full intent, meaning to fulfill, and we follow him.” Again, what does “full” mean? As distinct from hearing is like responding? Hearing is like responding is not an incomplete intent; it’s a different intent. What does full or incomplete have to do with it? “Require full intent” means the intent to fulfill one’s obligation, and not merely that he not be merely occupied with it, right? In contrast to the “some intent” mentioned above.

So at this point we still are not yet talking at all about the law of hearing is like responding. Rather the question is whether a minimal intent, so that he not be merely occupied with it, is enough, or whether commandments require intent—which is exactly the dispute whether commandments require intent or not. If commandments do not require intent, a minimal intent is still required, because one merely occupied with it does not fulfill according to everyone. So that is the view that requires some minimal intent. If commandments require intent, then minimal intent is not enough; you need full intent. “Full intent” means the intent to fulfill one’s obligation. Fine? Full intent means the intent to fulfill one’s obligation.

“And if you ask: why? Rava, who is later, holds that in order to fulfill one need not have intent.” Yes? Nachmanides rules like Rav Zeira that full intent is needed, meaning that Rav Zeira disagrees with Rava. Fine? Rav Zeira disagrees with Rava. I said that this is the view of the medieval authorities who connect Rav Zeira’s statement with the law that commandments require intent—a connection that in the Gemara itself we do not see, and indeed the Gemara seems rather to indicate the opposite. In the baraita at the end one sees such a connection, but not in Rav Zeira’s own words. But here Nachmanides says that Rav Zeira says commandments require intent and disagrees with Rava, and the question is: then why do we rule like Rav Zeira, since Rava is later, and from Abaye and Rava onward the Jewish law follows the later authority?

“One can say that perhaps Rava did not say that according to his own view, but only to answer Abaye’s challenge. For Abaye said: if so, one who sleeps on the eighth day in a sukkah should receive lashes”—that’s the piece in the Gemara about adding to the Torah. “And he answered that this is not difficult, because even if we say commandments do not require intent, that is only for fulfilling—or perhaps for transgressing in its proper time—but not in its proper time, in order to transgress one does require intent. And now, according to Rava’s own view, it is possible that he holds commandments do require intent.” Everything Rava said, that commandments do not require intent, was only in the opinion of others, in order to resolve Abaye’s challenge there from sukkah and so on, but not that he himself really holds commandments do not require intent.

Yes? “And Rava too, although he said”—that is, “one who sounds the shofar as a song fulfilled, perhaps he said ‘that means,’ but he himself does not hold so.” Meaning, from the words of Avuh deShmuel it comes out that commandments do not require intent. I don’t think so, but from Avuh deShmuel’s words that’s how it seems. Now this is very interesting, because if you think commandments require intent, I would say that even from Avuh deShmuel it does not follow. Understand the Gemara—you remember the initial assumption of the Gemara? The Gemara asked whether in matzah, where Avuh deShmuel says one fulfills his obligation, that is because he did enjoy it, according to the medieval authorities—Rashi, the Ran, the Ritva, and so on—and in the case of sounding the shofar as a song, commandments require intent and therefore one really does not fulfill. Okay? That was the initial assumption.

Now if Rava really holds that commandments require intent, then he should have said the initial assumption. He should have said: in fact commandments require intent, and what Avuh deShmuel said is specific to matzah because he derived benefit from it—exactly the initial assumption. Why reject the initial assumption? You are coming to show that the initial assumption is wrong—why? The initial assumption is your own view. So what, maybe he was some knight on a white horse who wanted to present… the view that commandments do not require intent, saying: look, you cannot prove it from Avuh deShmuel. The truth is, that is what he said, but you cannot prove it from Avuh deShmuel because one could have distinguished. Yes, even though basically I think Avuh deShmuel also says that. All this is very strange, very odd, excessive chivalry. “Rava interpreted according to Abaye”—we do find this a few times in the Gemara. There was some kind of chivalry between them.

“But as for ‘come and hear’: for one who does not require intent regarding eating matzah, with sounding the shofar too he would not require intent. And since the statements of Rabbah and Rava do not decide for us what they themselves hold, it is preferable to adopt stringency like Rabbi Zeira, who holds that commandments require intent in order to fulfill.” Since regarding Rava we do not know—maybe it is his own view and maybe he said it only according to others—whereas in Rav Zeira it is clear that commandments require intent. So certainty removes doubt, as it were. Therefore you cannot say the law follows the later authority like Rava. Very forced. “Rava”—yes, later he has the version there with an aleph, like Rava.

“And so too Maimonides ruled in chapter 2 of the laws of shofar, that the one sounding it must intend to enable and the listener must intend to fulfill; therefore he did not fulfill. But in chapter 6 of the laws of leaven and matzah he wrote that if they forced him and he ate matzah, he fulfilled. And there is no contradiction between one ruling and the other.” I said there is a contradiction in Maimonides, so here is the first place we run into it—this is the Ran. He says no, there is no contradiction. “He holds that with sounding the shofar, since we see Rav Zeira said to his attendant, ‘Have intent and sound it for me,’ we conclude that intent is required. But with forcing him to eat matzah, since we do not see in the Gemara anyone who explicitly disagrees with Avuh deShmuel, we do not reject it. For although in sounding the shofar he did not fulfill, here he did fulfill, because he derived benefit from it, as we say elsewhere: one who is merely occupied with forbidden fats or sexual prohibitions is liable because he derived benefit.”

Several medieval authorities explained Maimonides this way: that Maimonides basically holds that commandments do not require intent, and therefore one who sounds the shofar as a song fulfilled—that is, no need for the listener’s and speaker’s intent. But with matzah—wait, sorry, the opposite. Sorry, the opposite. With sounding the shofar, the one sounding it must intend to enable and the listener must intend to fulfill; that means commandments require intent. So Maimonides rules that commandments require intent. And what Avuh deShmuel says about matzah—there he fulfilled because he derived benefit from it. Even according to the one who says commandments require intent, he fulfilled because he derived benefit from it.

We remain—even in the conclusion—with all those initial assumptions that we worked so hard over to explain how there could even be such an initial assumption. According to this explanation of Maimonides, that remains the conclusion too: that “because he derived benefit” solves even the problem of intent, not only the problem of being merely occupied with it. Remember the whole problem? Usually “because he derived benefit” solves the problem of one merely occupied with it. But the intent to fulfill before Heaven—why should deriving benefit help with the intent to fulfill before Heaven? What, if I enjoyed it then I intended to fulfill before Heaven? What does that have to do with it? Right? So I said—the explanation I suggested in Rashi—I said it could be in the initial assumption that if you do not intend to fulfill before Heaven, that is like one merely occupied with it. It is not some side requirement. It is like someone who thinks this is a donkey’s bray. To sound a shofar and make it into a concert is not really shofar-sounding with the wrong intent; you simply are not in the realm of shofar at all. That is called being merely occupied with it. Then it could be that “because he derived benefit” solves the problem even of the intent to fulfill one’s obligation. I saw that Rabbi Asher Weiss writes a similar rationale. So here, according to the Ran in Maimonides, that comes out as the conclusion, not only as an initial assumption. Because there it is an initial assumption in the view that commandments do not require intent. Here he says it as the conclusion in the view that commandments do require intent. And I said there that if that is the initial assumption in the view that commandments do not require intent, then the practical difference will be that according to the one who says commandments do require intent, you do not need the answer; there is no “this teaches us”—the initial assumption remains. There? That one who sounds the shofar as a song did not fulfill because commandments require intent, but with matzah he does fulfill because he derived benefit. All the “this teaches us” only teaches us within the view that commandments do not require intent. But if in practice we rule—and if Maimonides, as the Ran learns him, rules—that commandments do require intent, still in the case where they forced him, the Persians, to eat matzah, he fulfills. Why does he fulfill? Because he derived benefit. That is exactly the expression of the fact that there is a practical difference: the initial assumption there is a practical difference according to the view that commandments require intent. The initial assumption within the view that commandments do not require intent remains in the conclusion within the view that commandments do require intent. Okay?

If he intended to enable you? He does not intend—he does intend to enable you, to intend to enable the… and you? Sorry? What? Whoever he does not intend to enable cannot fulfill. Yes, that’s the prayer leader, like a prayer leader. If he is not a prayer leader, then only the person he intends for fulfills. That’s the Meiri; we saw the three levels. So that—the simple sense in Maimonides—is not understood, because Maimonides says, the Ran says that Maimonides ruled that the one sounding it must intend to enable and the listener must intend to fulfill. That is hearing is like responding; it is not commandments require intent. Agreed? Do you agree with Doron’s point? His inference in Maimonides doesn’t even get off the ground. I don’t know why almost no commentator—or no commentator—says this. The inference doesn’t get off the ground at all. There is no contradiction in Maimonides. No contradiction and no need for explanations. Maimonides says that commandments do not require intent, and therefore if the Persians forced him to eat matzah, he fulfilled. Not because he derived benefit. Because commandments do not require intent. Forget the rationale of deriving benefit. Deriving benefit does not help with intent. Because commandments do not require intent, that’s why he fulfilled.

What happens with shofar? You need the listener’s and speaker’s intent by force of hearing is like responding. Not because commandments require intent. I’m saying—I’m a bit reluctant to make such inferences, but since it is so compelling, I ask myself: then how did the Ran not feel this? Why doesn’t the Ran understand Maimonides this way? Unless the Ran understands that the intent of hearing is like responding is required only if commandments require intent, as in the Gemara. As we saw in the Gemara according to Nachmanides and others. Okay? Because otherwise it really is compelling. Meaning, one always asks why he didn’t answer Maimonides differently, or why he didn’t see this simple answer. In cases where the answer is not simple, I wouldn’t build anything on that. So he didn’t notice this answer, or didn’t think of it. But here it is such a compelling answer that somehow it seems he probably understands that the listener’s and speaker’s intent to fulfill and to enable is only according to the one who says commandments require intent.

By the way, we saw this in the Ran above as well. Because when the Ran above discussed the listener’s and speaker’s intent in the Gemara, there too he did not explain it by force of hearing is like responding; rather he said it was some minimal intent. Right? That you need the listener’s intent and the speaker’s intent—that is some minimal intent. He is speaking there according to the view that commandments do not require intent. Yes? So he says: then why do you need the listener’s and speaker’s intent? I would say: by force of hearing is like responding. What does that have to do with commandments? He says no, it is some minimal intent so that he not be merely occupied with it. All along, he does not introduce the issue of the intent to enable and the intent to fulfill if you hold that commandments do not require intent. Right? If you hold that commandments do not require intent, then for him it is out of the question that you would still need the listener’s and speaker’s intent. So when he comes to read Maimonides, he says: if you tell me that the listener’s and speaker’s intent is required, then what did I suggest? That Maimonides really holds commandments do not require intent, but by force of hearing is like responding you need the listener’s and speaker’s intent, and there is no contradiction. But the Ran cannot accept such a thing, because for the Ran, one who holds that commandments do not require intent also would not require the intent of hearing is like responding—according to either of the two possibilities I raised above, the two explanations I raised above.

Therefore when he sees in Maimonides that intent is required, even if he learns in Maimonides that the intent is the intent of hearing is like responding—not some minimal intent and all those things, but the intent of hearing is like responding—still, it is clear that Maimonides holds commandments require intent. Therefore he has to explain matzah, so he says: because he derived benefit. But that is the Ran. For my own part, in Maimonides there is no difficulty. There is no contradiction and no need for explanations. It is clear that Maimonides understands that what is required here is the intent to enable and the intent to fulfill by force of hearing is like responding. What is Maimonides’ source? Rav Zeira. He simply rules like Rav Zeira, that’s all. Rav Zeira holds like Rava that commandments do not require intent. And all he requires in terms of the speaker’s and listener’s intent is so that there be hearing is like responding—to fulfill and to enable, that’s all. And this remains consistent with commandments not requiring intent. There is only the baraita at the end that says commandments require intent, and we do not rule like it. Fine? And even why do we not rule like it? We already saw the tannaitic dispute in Pesachim, that the law follows the Sages who hold commandments do not require intent, and not Rabbi Yosei who holds that they do. So that is the simple explanation in Maimonides.

As for the Ran, perhaps—I’m saying—either he didn’t notice it, which is a bit difficult since it is so obvious, hard to believe, or he really conceptually ties things together: that one who requires the intent to fulfill and to enable by force of hearing is like responding probably also holds that commandments require intent, because otherwise he would not have needed it. The two possibilities I brought here.

“But many of the geonim hold that we maintain commandments do not require intent, and so too is the view of the Rashba.” Fine. In short, there is a dispute among the decisors too, and it is brought in the Shulchan Arukh as well. And as I said, in Maimonides himself I would understand that Maimonides rules that commandments do not require intent. The Ran says yes, but I think Maimonides holds commandments do not require intent. And I think the Beit Yosef says that Maimonides does hold… The Shulchan Arukh rules that commandments require intent. As for the Rif too, we saw there are two ways to understand him. He omitted Rava, and the question is how he understood the listener’s and speaker’s intent and Rav Zeira’s view, so with the Rif it is not entirely clear. The Rosh somewhere writes that commandments require intent, so it would be enough to have two out of the three in order to explain how the Shulchan Arukh ruled. Fine, we need to look in the Beit Yosef. I haven’t gone through everything there, but we need to see what he says. I assume he brings all the positions there and says what he thinks about Maimonides’ view, the Rif’s view, and so on.

Fine. Here I’ll just begin now the issue of opposite intent—that’s the next section. The Ran—it’s the same Ran later, we’ll see him in a moment—wrote: “Rabbenu Shmuel wrote,” that is the Rashbam, but to my surprise this is not the Rashbam in the topic in Pesachim; I don’t know, we do not have this Rashbam before us, only medieval authorities who cite him. “That although we say commandments do not require intent, that is only in an unspecified case, but if he intends not to fulfill, he does not fulfill.” Opposite intent: someone who intends not to fulfill does not fulfill. “For if you do not say so, there is a difficulty from the question raised in the first chapter of tractate Berakhot: where one is holding a cup of beer in his hand and thinks it is wine, he began with wine”—and Rashi explains: with wine in mind—“and concluded with beer. What is the law? Do we follow the opening or the closing? And it was not resolved.”

There, in Berakhot, the Gemara discusses what happens if someone begins to recite a blessing while holding a cup, and he thinks he has wine, but in truth it is beer, whose blessing is “by whose word all things came to be.” But he thinks it is wine, and he begins: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe,” and he intends to say “who creates the fruit of the vine,” and then suddenly notices that this thing is beer, and he concludes: “by whose word all things came to be.” Fine. But when he recited the opening of the blessing, it was with wine in mind. Meaning, he intended to conclude with the blessing for wine. So the Gemara leaves it unresolved. The Gemara does not know whether he fulfilled or not. So the Ran says in the name of the Rashbam: why was it not resolved? Let us resolve that he fulfilled, because commandments do not require intent. The fact that he did not intend—he said the correct words: “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe.” He only thought this was the beginning of the blessing on wine, and in the end he concluded correctly. So everything was said correctly; only the intentions were not as they should be. So what’s the problem? Commandments do not require intent.

Good—so in a moment… I don’t know if we’ll have time today, but this certainly comes up here. In my opinion not justly, but it comes up here. “Rather, we learn from this that although commandments do not require intent, if he intends not to fulfill, he does not fulfill. And there, after all, he intended not to fulfill with beer but with wine.” The Ran cites the Rashbam. It was in the Rashbam; all the medieval authorities who cite the Rashbam also cite this proof. No, but he intended with wine in mind. He had a different intent, with wine in mind. He thought it was wine. Yes, right.

“And based on this, the Rav wrote that this is why they had the custom to recite havdalah at home even though all the members of the household had heard havdalah in the synagogue, because they intended not to fulfill there.” The intent not to fulfill is also a trick people use. Someone who wants not to fulfill in a certain situation because he wants to perform the commandment later, then he needs to intend not to fulfill, and then even according to the one who says commandments do not require intent, he does not fulfill.

“And I say that since in any event we require the intent of the one sounding it to make heard for another reason, it is proper to act this way, because we have to say that in the case of one passing behind the synagogue we are dealing with a prayer leader, who has the whole public in mind. And certainly he intends to make heard only to one who wants to hear, but to make them hear in order to discharge them against their will he did not intend, for he is only their agent.” What is he saying here? He says: don’t infer from havdalah in the synagogue. Why? Because in havdalah in the synagogue you fulfill through someone else. So what? If you fulfill through someone else, then there indeed if you intend not to fulfill, that works. Generally speaking, the intent not to fulfill would not help you. He disagrees with the Rashbam. The Ran disagrees with the Rashbam. The Ran says opposite intent does not help; you fulfill even with opposite intent.

Ah, so how do I explain havdalah in the synagogue? He says havdalah in the synagogue is fine. Why? Because in havdalah in the synagogue, the one reciting havdalah intends to enable the listeners to fulfill. Now if the listeners do not want to fulfill, then clearly the one reciting havdalah is not intending to enable them if they don’t want to fulfill. Why would he intend that? It could be he can force them—but he does not want to; he does not intend to enable them. Therefore there, specifically in a case where we are talking about discharging someone else’s obligation through another person, there opposite intent is effective. But generally speaking, opposite intent is not effective.

And what about the Rashbam’s proof from beer and wine? He doesn’t mention that. Yet he has a proof from beer and wine, right? And it’s a strange proof, really a very strange proof. He doesn’t even bother challenging it, apparently because it is so strange. Is that opposite intent? It isn’t even an intent not to fulfill. At most it is like one who sounds the shofar as a song, maybe even better. One who sounds it as a song fulfills according to the one who says commandments do not require intent. And I already noted that sounding it as a song is not called opposite intent, even though he intended it for a song and not for a commandment. Is that opposite intent? I always brought the Arukh HaShulchan, if you remember: there is no such thing as someone doing things for no reason at all. You always do it for something. It’s like moving a utensil whose primary function is permitted with no purpose whatever—there’s no such thing as no purpose whatever; it’s always for some purpose. So when is this called some neutral thing and not opposite intent? There is always some other purpose for which you did the act, if not the commandment. One who sounds it as a song—that isn’t opposite intent, that’s just ordinary intent. Why? Because he did not intend not to fulfill. He simply intended—he did it for some other reason; he did not address the question whether he wanted to fulfill or not. That isn’t called opposite intent. So why is the case of wine and beer different from that? What, he intended not to fulfill with beer but specifically with wine? If it turns out to be beer, I don’t want to fulfill my obligation? And then suddenly he sees that it is beer and says: no, no, no, now I do want to? That’s bizarre. At most it is like one who sounds it as a song. What does it have to do with opposite intent at all?

Now true, the question is a good question. So why didn’t they resolve it according to the one who says commandments do not require intent? The Rashbam’s question is a good question. My problem is with his answer, not with his question. The question is a good question, but his answer is not the right answer—to say that this is opposite intent, because it is not opposite intent. But the question is a good question: so why indeed does he not fulfill? Or why indeed is it an unresolved question? Let them resolve it according to the one who says commandments do not require intent. So really there is no problem.

Fine, one could perhaps say that this itself is the doubt—whether commandments require intent or not. That is the unresolved question there. Elsewhere we do rule on it. Fine—no, perhaps one can say that. I didn’t understand. It is even better than one who sounds the shofar as a song. It is not worse than one who sounds it as a song; it is better than one who sounds it as a song. The intent was without that, like one who sounds it as a song. At least, at most like one who sounds it as a song, not worse than one who sounds it as a song. He did not intend not to fulfill; on the contrary, this is a blessing with which he intended to fulfill—just not on beer but on wine, not on wine but on beer. What? One who sounds it as a song did not fulfill according to the one who says commandments require intent.

Fine. So with opposite intent we’ll continue next time. We have an opposite intent to continue next time—