Biblical and Rabbinic Law – Lecture 5

I’ve actually finished the first part of this series, and now I’m moving to the second part, whose structure is basically parallel, as we’ll see at the end. Just to make the transition: in the first part I dealt with enactments and decrees, things that are traditionally called rabbinic laws. We saw there that there are two ways to understand the connection between enactments and decrees and the verse “do not deviate.” One possibility is specification or simple application. There is “do not deviate,” like the example I brought from a vow: “he shall not profane his word.” The Torah says I have to keep what I said. If I prohibit a loaf of bread to myself by a vow, then that is an application of “he shall not profane his word.” Obviously if I violate it, that is a Torah prohibition, because the Torah said “he shall not profane his word,” and this is a particular case. I called that specification or application. Another possibility is to speak about an asmakhta. Asmakhta means that it’s really not connected to the verse, but the verse is some kind of mnemonic device or something like that. And I proposed a middle possibility between the two, which says: it comes out of the verse, but not by way of specification, rather by way of branching out. What does that mean? The verse “do not deviate” tells me that the sages have authority. Now, when I eat poultry with milk, if I ate poultry with milk out of failure to recognize the authority of the sages, a principled failure to recognize the authority of the sages, then I violated “do not deviate.” That is a frontal act against the Torah’s command. But if I ate poultry with milk while recognizing the authority of the sages, only my inclination overcame me or something like that, then in that case it is rabbinically prohibited. I asked: if it is rabbinically prohibited, then how is it connected to “do not deviate”? So I said that the verse “do not deviate” reveals, in some indirect way, that there is such a category called rabbinic laws. Because if there were no such category, then the authority of the sages would also have no meaning, such that I’m forbidden to depart from it. We talked then, yes, Winnie-the-Pooh with traffic offenders and those examples. But the logical structure — that’s the important point — the logical structure is that I’m trying to propose here a middle way between two extremes. One extreme is the simple one: it is written in the verse, this case is a particular case of what is written in the verse, and therefore it is a Torah prohibition; that’s what the verse says. The other pole, the opposite extreme, is that it’s an asmakhta. It is not connected to the verse; it is a rabbinic law, and the verse is some kind of mnemonic device or something like that. That is the opposite pole. In the middle sits something that is branching out. Branching out means that it emerges from the verse, but not in the form of direct realization or direct application. Rather, the verse — or the spirit of the verse, some expansion of the verse — says that this is not just some enactment; it comes out of it, it is somehow connected to the verse, but connected to the verse not in a deductive way. Right? It’s not that the verse gives the rule and this is a particular case that applies the rule. Rather, it’s some more indirect kind of connection. That same structure itself I want to show in the second part of the discussion, which deals with derivations. On the face of it, derivations shouldn’t really be connected to this at all. Because it is accepted by all the medieval authorities except for Maimonides, apparently — and perhaps a few Geonim here and there, Rashi’s teachers in a few places — but almost all the medieval authorities hold that a law that emerges from a derivation is a Torah law. Derivation is a tool through which I interpret the Torah, and once I made a derivation and extracted some law from it, we are dealing with a Torah law. That’s the accepted approach. But Maimonides’ position is not like that. Rashi in Ketubot 3a also brings the position of his teachers, which was not like that, but he himself rejects it. But Maimonides apparently kept it, and therefore I want to devote the second part of this series to laws that emerge from derivations. And I will try to show that here too — I’m giving away the conclusion in advance so you can see the structure — here too we fall into the same dichotomy. There are those who understand, and this is the view of most medieval authorities, that derivations are simply a straightforward application of the verse. It’s just that there are other tools of application. The tools of application are not only the ordinary interpretive tools, but also an additional toolbox, the toolbox of derivation. The thirteen principles, the thirteen principles by which the Torah is interpreted. Right, analogy, kal va-homer. So the tools of application are not just the ordinary interpretive tools, but also an additional toolbox, the toolbox of derivation. That is the position of most medieval authorities. And therefore they say: fine, these are two different toolboxes, but in terms of halakhic status they are the same thing. It is simply interpreting what is written in the Torah, and once I interpreted that this is what is written in the Torah, then it is a Torah law. Right? Take the example “You shall fear the Lord your God” — to include Torah scholars — that’s an example Maimonides himself brings. So we include based on the word “et”; this is Rabbi Akiva’s method, that the word “et” comes to include. We include. That one must fear Torah scholars, reverence for Torah scholars. According to most medieval authorities, true, maybe I wouldn’t have said on my own reasoning that the word “et” comes to include — it’s a kind of Ben-Gurion-style assumption that ordinary speech is without all these “et”s. Ben-Gurion, after all, used to speak without “et.” “The Lord your God you shall fear,” right, not “You shall fear the Lord your God.” Meaning, he wouldn’t use the word “et.” So Rabbi Akiva’s assumption is basically that biblical language is also Ben-Gurion-style language. The word “et” is superfluous, and if it appears there, apparently it comes for derivation. So he says, then it comes to include. Fine? So if it comes to include, then after we have included… but we have this rule that “et” comes to include. After we apply that rule, now it becomes clear that from this verse comes the rule that one must fear Torah scholars. So the law is Torah law. We are commanded about this in the verse “You shall fear the Lord your God.” How does it emerge from the verse? Through the tools of derivation. It doesn’t matter. The novelty of derivation is that I can not only do plain-sense interpretation, but also midrashic interpretation. But after I did that, bottom line, that’s what the verse says. Now it’s a Torah law. You’re making it up, you’re making it up — why are you saying Torah scholars? Maybe it’s… by logic, say. I’ll talk about that more. By logic, say. Doesn’t matter. But the fact is, it’s a derivation. I’m not saying this… you have to understand, it’s not the same thing as an enactment. If there had been an enactment to fear Torah scholars, then we wouldn’t need the derivation. The sages can say by logic one should fear Torah scholars, so we establish a rabbinic law that one must fear Torah scholars. No problem, there are such laws in Jewish law. So why is there a derivation here? The derivation says that this law is not based on reasoning by which the sages decided that this will now be a new law. That is called a decree or an enactment, which is an ordinary rabbinic law. But here we are using a derivation. The derivation ties it somehow to a verse. True, behind this there is probably some kind of reasoning, and I’ll discuss that more, but it is clear that there is also a connection to the verse. The accepted conception among the medieval authorities is that this connection to the verse is a direct, simple connection. Meaning, it is an application of the verse. True, I wouldn’t have said it on my own, yes. Is this “et” one of the thirteen principles? No. The thirteen principles are Rabbi Ishmael’s. According to Rabbi Akiva we also have inclusions and exclusions. Fine? Dozens. Nobody counted them all. A law given to Moses at Sinai? The accepted approach is that it is Torah law. We will see later in Nachmanides that it is rabbinic. No, that’s not derivation. That is another, third category. Right. Is it just interpretation, like “an eye for an eye”? No, that is derivation. “In place of” and “in place of” — they learn it from a gezerah shavah. “He shall pay in place of the ox,” he shall pay money in place of the ox. So what is just interpretation? I don’t know what. “They shall be frontlets between your eyes.” “Frontlets between your eyes” — what does the word “frontlets” mean? You understand that it means tefillin, I don’t know, in some way. Either by tradition or by interpretation. So that is interpretation of the verse. That is not a derivation. There is no plain interpretation to which the derivation then gets added. That is the interpretation of the verse; there is no other interpretation. I might not know it from a simple reading of the verse, so I need some aid. But in the end it is the interpretation of the verse. And what is the difference between asmakhta and derivation? Yes, there is a difference, but I’ll get to that later. Fine? So the accepted approach among the medieval authorities is that something that emerges from a derivation — once the Torah revealed that there are such tools called the principles of derivation — after that innovation, we already know that these tools too extract laws from verses. Once I derived that one must fear Torah scholars, from my point of view that is what is written in the verse. So now it is a Torah law. Fine? After the Torah said that the principles of derivation are also tools for extracting laws from verses, then okay, bottom line I used those tools — it’s a Torah law. Their purpose was probably Torah-level, and that’s much more severe than rabbinic. It’s not purpose; it’s Torah law because it really is Torah law, regardless of purposes. But why did they do it in such a way? Because that’s how they… No, that’s exactly the point. The question “why” is illegitimate. Meaning, because you assume that the sages decide whether something is Torah-level or rabbinic because they want something. No. They decide because that is really the case. Because this is Torah law and that is rabbinic. The Holy One, blessed be He, wanted it, not us. We here, in that sense, are a hollow conduit. You’re assuming — and this is a common assumption among scholars — what was the purpose? Why did they do… Because they understood that this is correct. They had no purpose. It is much more severe than rabbinic… No, no, no. No, because they thought it was Torah law. Okay. No, they didn’t do it “in order to” — that’s exactly the point. They did it because they understood that this is what the Torah says. That’s it. They don’t know any “in order to” or anything; they’re not involved in the matter. The Holy One, blessed be He, decided. They merely uncover what the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted to tell us in this verse. As a fence or safeguard, could one say? Exactly. And that’s the difference. A fence, or a safeguard, or an enactment — there the sages establish a new law, and there… obviously there is some reason. They establish that one must read the Megillah or light Hanukkah candles because they want us to remember the miracle or something like that. Or they say don’t eat poultry with milk because they want to prevent you from coming to eat meat with milk. There it is obvious — there, the reasoning of rabbinic law is reasoning of “in order to.” The reasoning of Torah law is reasoning of “because,” not “in order to.” I’m not doing something in order to achieve something; rather, because that is what the verse says. Now, of course, the verse says it through the lens of derivation, not through the lens of plain meaning. Doesn’t matter. But in that sense I am passive. Meaning, what is written in the verse is Torah law; what is not written is rabbinic. I have no goals. If there is a dispute between rabbis, then that is a dispute in interpretation. So they are arguing over what the verse says, not because of “in order to.” Not for everyone are the 613 commandments the same commandments. Right, obviously, there are disputes about that. So that is what I discussed — Yeruham Fishel Perla asks in the introduction to the Book of Commandments of Saadia Gaon, he discusses the question of why count commandments at all. So he says that since we have a tradition that there are 613 commandments, after all there is no practical difference to the counting of the commandments. It doesn’t matter what we count and what we don’t count. If there are Torah laws that are not counted, then it has no practical difference. So why count? He says: since we have a tradition that there are 613 commandments, we need to figure out which commandments those are. In that accounting, sometimes we will need to understand why some commandment is not included or is included, and there there may enter the reasoning that perhaps this commandment is rabbinic and therefore is not included, and that will have halakhic implications — indirect implications. We don’t — you don’t need the counting itself for that; you don’t need that to understand whether something is Torah law, right? No, it has no halakhic practical difference. He assumes it has no halakhic practical difference, so what is there to do with it? What difference does it make? But the answer is no — the answer is not that there is practical importance so we need to count; that’s why he investigates… No, but how do you know if it’s rabbinic… It’s not connected to the question whether it is rabbinic or Torah law. Whether a commandment is counted or not counted is not connected to whether it is rabbinic or Torah law. There are many Torah commandments that were not counted. The fact that a commandment is not counted will not help you know whether it is rabbinic or Torah law. That is exactly what Yeruham Fishel Perla asks: so why count? It has no implication at all. So he says: it has indirect implications. Since I know there are 613 commandments in all, I need to do the accounting and see which are the commandments in my view. So sometimes I’ll discover that I have too many commandments, and then I’ll need to remove some. That happens on every page in Maimonides and Nachmanides and in the roots. They are constantly playing this game — how to get to 613. Remove this, insert that, in order to reach 613. Or the Halakhot Gedolot, all those who counted commandments. Now within this game of what to count and what not to count, I say: okay, this is probably rabbinic, and therefore it is not counted. So somehow, indirectly, a halakhic implication can emerge from this issue. But whether it is counted or not counted, in and of itself, says nothing. It has no practical difference. From where… according to those who hold that laws learned from derivation are Torah law, where does the authority come from that derivation creates Torah law? “Do not deviate.” Everyone agrees about this, by the way — even Maimonides. Everyone agrees that the verse “do not deviate” — this is the material with which I began at the very beginning of this series — that the verse “do not deviate” teaches two things: it teaches the authority of the sages to legislate, which yields rabbinic law — decrees, enactments, and the like — and it teaches the authority of the sages to interpret. That too is authority, because the sages interpret the Torah or derive from the Torah. I’ll derive differently — what’s the problem? Why do I have to listen to their derivation or interpretation? Because they have authority. When the Sanhedrin interpreted the Torah or derived from the Torah in a certain way, that requires a source granting them authority such that what they say binds me. Otherwise everyone will do whatever he wants. So the verse “do not deviate” gives the sages two kinds of authority: one is the authority of legislators, and the second is the authority of interpreters. Regardless of the perimeter of the tools they use? No, regardless, regardless. Both with the tools of derivation and with the tools of plain interpretation. Fine? This creates a certain philosophical problem. How do you know the sages have authority from this verse? Because they interpreted it that way. I think I discussed this at the beginning of the series. Right, but every system is built on some kind of circle at its beginning. Who reviews the Supreme Court? How does the Supreme Court decide whether to review itself or not? It’s absurd. It’s absurd, but what can you do? At the top of the pyramid there is one entity. You can’t — there’s no way to solve this problem. So obviously at the beginning there is some kind of loop where the sages take authority for themselves. Yes, fine, what can you do. If someone else grants them authority, then you’ll ask about his authority. In the end, it always has to start somehow from someone who takes authority for himself and begins the process. There is no other way out logically. What you said, the tradition of the 613 commandments is so strong and entrenched that it allows people to exclude. They discuss it. They really ask: where do we know this from? There is some aggadic statement at the end of tractate Makkot: 613 commandments the Holy One, blessed be He, gave to Moses at Sinai. To build such giant structures on top of that aggadic statement? More than that, Nachmanides says: maybe that is Rabbi Simlai’s own accounting, because he was the one who said that statement. Rabbi Simlai counted all the commandments according to his own view and came out with 613. Why shouldn’t someone else who disagrees insert something else in its place? Who says everyone agrees at all on this number? It could be that this is an ad hoc number, not an a priori number. It’s not a number that I know beforehand to be 613; rather, he counted what he counted and it came out 613. So Nachmanides really wrestles with this, and Nachmanides says: true, but somehow our tradition is stronger, and everyone assumes that this is the binding number, and therefore I too go along with it, despite the difficulties. It has significance — 248 and 365 — but all that comes from Rabbi Simlai. But who said this is agreed to by everyone? And so they made it 613, and then somewhere made sure it should stay 613? But who says that’s correct? What is this — 248 and 613 came out at a bar mitzvah and things like that? One of my hobbies, thank you. Mark Twain already said there is no steak tastier than sacred cows. Well, if someone disagrees then he brings the dissenting opinion, and if there is no dissenter then apparently there is no dissenting opinion — that is the assumption. Regarding Rabbi Simlai, if there were a dissenting opinion, apparently it didn’t make it there. No, it’s aggadah, that’s why I’m saying this is not a sugya devoted to clarifying how many commandments there are. There are also views saying there are three, ten, eleven… Yes, “he established them on one,” Habakkuk came and established them on one. There are all kinds of opinions. Too bad they didn’t go with ten. It wouldn’t help you; those ten contain all 613. In fact, with the seven Noahide commandments too, if you count from within our 613, there are many dozens of commandments that Noahides are obligated in. For Noahides it is called seven because forbidden sexual relations — what is forbidden sexual relations? Twenty. There are twenty forbidden relations. You can divide it however you want; in the end it’s the same details. Okay, so let me get back to the flow. What I want to say is that regarding the principles of derivation, or the midrashic laws, there is the same structure. The medieval authorities generally understand — just as they understood in the plain reading of Maimonides about enactments and decrees — that it emerges as a straightforward application of “do not deviate,” and therefore it is a Torah law. Maimonides says it is a rabbinic law, as we’ll soon see. Usually people understand him to mean that if it is a rabbinic law, then apparently “do not deviate” is some asmakhta or something like that, but not really. But that’s not so. We see in Maimonides in several places — and we’ll see that too — that again this is an intermediate situation. Meaning, it comes out of “do not deviate,” but as some kind of expansion, a broadening of the verse, not a simple application or specification of the verse. Therefore, the structure of this part of the series is the same structure as the previous part. I talked about the sorites paradox, which says that one must not surrender to dichotomous thinking; so here too, same thing. We usually understand either that it emerges from the verse and then it is Torah law, or that it does not emerge from the verse and then it is rabbinic. One can say no — it somewhat emerges from the verse. It is an expansion of the spirit of the verse. It is not completely detached from the verse, but neither is it its straightforward application. And I argue that this is true both regarding the legislation of the sages — enactments and decrees — and also regarding the derivations of the sages according to Maimonides. Okay? So first of all, I need to explain to you, to show you, that Maimonides really says this. Until now I only mentioned that he said it; let’s see it inside. In the second root Maimonides writes as follows: “We already clarified in the introduction to our composition in the Commentary on the Mishnah” — that is, in the introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah — “that most of the laws of the Torah were derived through the thirteen principles by which the Torah is interpreted, and that a law derived by one of those principles will sometimes be subject to dispute” — sometimes there are disputes about derivational laws. “And that there are laws which are directly accepted interpretations from Moses, about which there is no dispute, and there are laws about which there is no dispute but they bring proof for them by means of one of the thirteen principles.” Meaning, there are laws with no dispute, and the derivation from the thirteen principles is only some kind of proof for that law, but it does not emerge from the derivation. “For it is from the wisdom of Scripture that it is possible to find in it an indication pointing to that accepted interpretation, or an analogy that points to it.” In other words, what Maimonides is distinguishing here is between a creative derivation and a supporting derivation. A creative derivation is a derivation where the derivation creates the law; this is a new law that is now emerging, the sages are now extracting it by means of the derivation — it did not exist until now. And a supporting derivation is basically a law that I already knew, recognized; previous generations already knew it, and now I found a derivation that supports this law in the verse. But the derivation did not create the law; it only supports an existing law. Maimonides writes this here. Why? Why is that important? In a moment I’ll return to it, but there are many — at least in modern apologetics, but also Gersonides, for example, and others, also among the medieval authorities — who want to claim that there is no such thing as a creative derivation. Derivation is always supportive. So the derivation of Ben Zoma about the nights is really supportive, right? Huh? The derivation of Ben Zoma about the nights. Right, because basically they knew it before, they just didn’t know where it came from. Right, they didn’t know where it came from. Meaning, obviously there are supportive derivations. The reverse question is whether there are creative derivations. That is the question. There are those who want to argue that there is no such thing as creative derivations. Gersonides, for example, in the introduction to his commentary on the Torah, writes that there are no creative derivations. He says this because there can be no other way; meaning, it is impossible that these tools, the tools of derivation, are reliable enough in the eyes of the sages to create new laws. After all, you can do whatever you want with this. It makes sense; that’s exactly the act. Where does it come from? How did they get from “et” to the sages? Okay, so that is basically what Gersonides argues, and therefore he says there is no such thing as creative derivations. Derivations are always supportive. And therefore, basically, the big question is about that… well, I’ll get to it later, but the big question is: then why do all this nonsense? These are games. You know the law already from elsewhere, so why do I need to make all these strained moves with “et” and gezerah shavah and all that? Torah law and rabbinic law. No, but this is a known law. A known law — so what… No, but there are many Torah laws that until a certain time were not Torah laws. You can assume there is a creative derivation. But one who says there aren’t… I agree, I agree, because I don’t agree with Gersonides. It’s nonsense, but that’s the fact. Gersonides says… I agree with you, but Gersonides says no. Gersonides argues that everything is supportive. That’s what he claims. It can’t be, meaning it’s just not true. But if everything is supportive, then maybe beforehand it wasn’t known whether it was Torah law or rabbinic law — then it isn’t supportive, it’s creative. Because it basically means that you created a Torah law — no matter, before you didn’t know, but there is some halakhic implication. Gersonides is unwilling to accept such a thing. Gersonides says: you are not going to turn a rabbinic law into a Torah law because of some derivation; after all, with gezerot shavot you can do whatever you want. That is his claim, and so he is unwilling to allow this to have halakhic implications at all. He sees it as some sort of intellectual interpretive game, not really something with halakhic significance. That can’t be for many reasons, but that is what he claims. Here I only want to draw your attention to the fact that what I just read in Maimonides is directly against what Gersonides says. Because what Maimonides says here is that there are creative derivations and there are supportive derivations. There are derivations that we know through tradition, and the derivation comes to anchor them in Scripture, and there are derivations that create new laws. More than that: he says most derivations are of the creative type. Right? That’s what he says, that most of the laws of the Torah came out through the thirteen principles by which the Torah is interpreted. Fine? And then he says sometimes there is dispute, sometimes not. In a responsum he writes that the supportive derivations are maybe three or four. That most of the Torah’s laws are derivational laws. Creative, creative. No no, supportive. Who says that? Maimonides says that most of the Torah’s laws are midrashic laws, laws that emerge from derivations. Now what is the split between creative derivations and supportive derivations? Here he says: sometimes there is dispute, sometimes there is no dispute. He does not say how many there are of each kind. In a responsum he writes that the supportive derivations are maybe three or four. Ah, so most are creative? Yes, most are creative. The supportive derivations are maybe three or four. Exactly the opposite of Gersonides. Right, right. So what does it mean — if it is supportive, where does the law come from? A law given to Moses at Sinai? What is the theory there? Seemingly yes. I don’t know anyone among the medieval or later authorities who disagrees that the principles of derivation are a law given to Moses at Sinai. Scholars do not agree with that; we’ll discuss that later. Is this in the spirit of “everything that a seasoned student will one day innovate”? No, no, no. A law given to Moses at Sinai — that doesn’t matter. This arrangement of derivations, that supposedly creates… Gersonides is kind of going in the spirit of “everything that a seasoned student…” Yes, but he says everything was already said. But you know, Tosafot Yom Tov writes — in his introduction to his commentary on the Mishnah — what does it mean that everything a seasoned student will one day innovate was shown by the Holy One, blessed be He, to Moses at Sinai? He says it means shown to him, not given to him. Those are two different things. Otherwise it’s not innovation either. Exactly. He was shown it in prophecy, because if Moses our teacher had passed it on, then what meaning would it have that it will later be innovated? Then it would just be tradition. Rather, He showed it to him as a bonus, a gift to Moses our teacher. He showed him everything that… But it has no halakhic significance. Bottom line, it was innovated over the course of history. On the other hand, he sat in Rabbi Akiva’s study hall and did not understand what he was saying. Yes. In any event, Maimonides basically says here that there are supportive derivations, and in a responsum he adds that most derivations are creative derivations. Creative — he’s talking about supportive. That there are creative derivations; most derivations are creative. Now he says, “And we have already explained this matter there. And since this is so, not everything that we find the sages extracted by analogy from the thirteen principles is to be said to have been said to Moses at Sinai.” Not everything we see emerging from derivation should be said to have been said to Moses at Sinai. Not everything — the minority. “Nor should we say, with regard to everything we find in the Talmud supported by one of the thirteen principles, that it is rabbinic, because sometimes it is an accepted interpretation.” Therefore what is proper in this matter… so what do we do? How do we know what was said to Moses at Sinai and what was not? Or in other words, what is Torah law and what is rabbinic? “Therefore what is proper in this matter is that whatever you do not find written in the Torah, and you find in the Talmud that it was learned by one of the thirteen principles — if they themselves explained and said that it is a body of Torah law, or that it is Torah law — then it is proper to count it, because the transmitters said that it is of Torah origin. But if they did not explain this and did not speak of it, then it is rabbinic, because there is no scriptural text that indicates it.” That is a very strong statement. Seemingly, after all, the roots deal with counting commandments, not with the legal force of the law, whether it is Torah law or rabbinic. The question is what enters the counting of commandments and what does not. And Maimonides begins the discussion as though it is a discussion of what to count and what not to count. And therefore he says: if the sages say that it was said to Moses at Sinai or that it is of Torah origin, then we count it. Count it — does that mean it is Torah law? I don’t know, he doesn’t address it. But on the other hand he does address it. He says: “But if they did not explain this and did not speak of it,” he does not say “then we do not count it”; rather he says “then it is rabbinic.” So the law is rabbinic. Meaning, we see in Maimonides that for him, at least in this root, the question whether to count a certain law or not is determined by the question whether it is Torah law or rabbinic. It is the same question. Understand — it is not the same thing. To include something in the count of the commandments or not to include it is a technical question — what enters the count and what does not. As I said before, there are also Torah laws that do not enter the count of commandments. But not the other way around, usually. There isn’t the other way around. What? No one counts Hanukkah. The Halakhot Gedolot does. The Halakhot Gedolot counts it. Maimonides in the first root argues with the Halakhot Gedolot. So it is not accepted. The accepted view of 613 commandments is Torah law. The fact that some of them are not counted does not mean that things enter the other way around. Right. But still, at least in one direction — and according to the Halakhot Gedolot in both directions — there is no dependency. And Maimonides here says no. I’m talking to you not only about the technical question of counting commandments; I’m talking to you about the halakhic question, whether something is Torah law or rabbinic. That is a different question. And Maimonides ties the two questions together. So let’s go back a second — where does he learn from the Gemara that it is Torah law? The Gemara says it is Torah law. The Gemara is his source? Yes. The sages. The transmitters, what he calls the בעלי הקבלה — the transmitters. What does it mean it has to be written in the Gemara? The sages, in the various sugyot — that it is Torah law or that it is from Sinai — then I know it is Torah law. And if not, then it is rabbinic. But if it just says the law is such-and-such, then do you know what level the law is on? No, you don’t know. But if it says it is Torah law, then you know. And are there about thirteen places in the Gemara where it says such a thing? No, because this applies only to things that emerge from derivation. How many derivations do you know where it says they are of Torah origin or rabbinic? Few. That’s what Maimonides says. Maybe three or four. Right? Very few. And that is exactly what I mentioned before. Right. So they rely on the fact that there is a derivation in the Gemara and the Gemara says it is Torah law. What does it mean that it is Torah law? That the derivation is a supportive derivation. Because a creative derivation according to Maimonides is a rabbinic law. I said — it’s the same… again. I understood the opposite. I’ll explain. Maimonides says that most derivations are creative derivations, right? Most derivations are really rabbinic laws and not Torah laws. Only in those few derivations where the sages said they are Torah law — those are supportive derivations, which are Torah law. Now you got mixed up. Not me — Maimonides does. I think what Maimonides says is that when the sages say that this creative derivation is of Torah origin, then it is Torah law. If they don’t say it, then it isn’t… No, no, no. He says that when the sages say this derivation is a supportive derivation, then it is Torah law. Sometimes you see indications that it is a supportive derivation; sometimes the sages themselves say it is Torah law. In both cases, because it is a supportive derivation, it is Torah law. A creative derivation is rabbinic law. How do you know a derivation is creative and not supportive? If the sages did not say. Is a creative derivation Torah law? No, rabbinic. If they didn’t say what? What do they need to say for it to be Torah law? Exactly. Creative is rabbinic? Yes. But a gezerah shavah is effectively a law given to Moses at Sinai, and a law given to Moses at Sinai is certainly a law given to Moses at Sinai. That’s Rashi. Maimonides disagrees. Maimonides does not agree with that. And with Rashi too, I’m not sure that’s what he means, but I’ll get to that later as well. So “an eye for an eye” is rabbinic? Maimonides says “an eye for an eye” is a supportive derivation. Because the sages say that it is Torah law. Maimonides says so explicitly; with “an eye for an eye” he addresses it explicitly. A Gemara there? That it is Torah law or rabbinic? Torah law. Torah law, supportive, and therefore it is Torah law. But if most commandments, or most derivations, are creative derivations, then according to Maimonides most of the laws that emerge from derivations are rabbinic and not Torah-level. Yes, which is against all the other medieval authorities. No, yes, yes — that’s what we said at the beginning, that he’s the only one. Right, so this is the source. Here, here he says it. Now the point is — is there now some list or index of all the creative derivations and all the supportive derivations? No, but you can prepare one. But you’ll need a very large notebook. Out of the 613 commandments, which of them are supportive derivations — meaning Torah commandments — and which are not? No, the 613 commandments — all derivations that appear there are supportive, because only Torah law is included in the 613. All those that are rabbinic do not enter the 613 at all. And what he said, that the creative ones are rabbinic? The creative ones are rabbinic, so they will not be found in the 613. Notice, the picture is as follows. Look. Within the 613 commandments, all of which are of course Torah law according to Maimonides, there are two categories. One category is commandments that come from the Torah itself through simple interpretation or are written explicitly in the Torah. A small portion of the counted commandments are commandments that come from derivations, but the derivations do not create them; rather, the derivations serve here as support. These are supportive derivations. That too enters the count of commandments. A third category is commandments that emerged from derivations and we have no tradition about them; they emerged from derivations. The derivations created that law. Those are not found at all among the 613 commandments; they are rabbinic laws. They are not among the 613. So there are only three or four of those according to Maimonides? Three or four meaning a few. It doesn’t have to be exactly three or four — maybe ten, some few. What? That sounds like what you said in the name of Gersonides. No, the opposite. Gersonides says that all derivations are supportive derivations. Gersonides says that all derivations — the laws they created are really laws we knew even before the derivation. The derivation only comes to support them. In Maimonides’ language, Maimonides ties this to Torah law and rabbinic law; with Gersonides this is something else, I don’t know what he would say about that. But in terms of supportive versus creative, according to Gersonides all derivations are supportive. And according to Maimonides, a small minority of derivations are supportive, while most are creative. Yes, and are the creative ones like enactments or decrees? We’ll get to that later. It is rabbinic law. I will argue that there are several kinds of rabbinic law. Fine? And what is the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides? According to Maimonides specifically interpretation is Torah law and not enactments, and according to Nachmanides it comes out here that… Right, I’ll get to that in a moment. And what about things that interpret what is explicit in the Torah, like etrog or something? That is Torah law; I’ll get to that too, I promise. You’re getting ahead of the story. Yes. You said supportive derivations according to Maimonides are three or four, something like that? A few. I said: within the 613 there are supportive derivations or creative ones? Creative ones do not enter the 613. Okay, so it comes out that there are three or four supportive ones plus 609 that are written in the Torah or come from interpretation? Yes, interpretation not through derivation but through plain interpretive tools. Now that is basically the picture according to Maimonides, and there are some interesting exceptions. A law given to Moses at Sinai. Yes, that’s another whole chapter, and we’ll discuss that too. Maimonides says about that too that it is rabbinic law. According to Maimonides, a law given to Moses at Sinai is a rabbinic enactment. We’ll get to that soon; I’ll give you the full picture according to Maimonides. This book deals almost mostly… in this lesson… do we go all the way down to ten? Yes. Okay, so basically Maimonides introduces several innovations here. A first innovation in the general issue of derivations: that most derivations are creative, and that there can be creative derivations, that this is legitimate, that this exists in the words of the sages; and that only a small minority of derivations are supportive. That is the first innovation. The second innovation is that there is a difference in halakhic status between the two kinds of derivations. Each of these innovations is not necessarily agreed upon by the medieval authorities. The second innovation is that this has halakhic significance: a supportive derivation yields a Torah law; a creative derivation generates a rabbinic law. That is Maimonides’ second innovation. Maimonides’ third innovation is that only laws that emerge from supportive derivations are included in the count of the commandments, and not laws from creative derivations. Fine? That follows from the second, no? It follows in one direction — that it can appear there. It does not follow that it must appear there. The supportive derivations have to appear in the 613 commandments. True, the creative derivations according to the second rule cannot appear there, but maybe supportive derivations also won’t appear there because they are derivations. Maimonides says no: supportive derivations are Torah law, so they will appear there. Fine? Those are basically Maimonides’ three innovations, and this is the main source for his conception that derivations basically produce rabbinic laws, which is a very great innovation, as I said earlier. Many attacked him over this. Nachmanides in his glosses writes about this Maimonides that “the whole of this book is sweetness, and all of it delightful” — Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah — “and yet it was not worth writing because of this mistake.” That is what Nachmanides writes here in the second root. Again, this whole book was not worth writing because of what Maimonides writes here. Such a destructive and enormous error — it is simply forbidden to do such a thing; it cannot be correct, according to Nachmanides. He greatly appreciates Maimonides in many places, but language this sharp he writes only about this. Now, I’m telling you: from the time of Maimonides until today, in my opinion nobody managed to understand Maimonides’ view, except for one person, and to my shame I have to boast a little. Meaning, there are terrible entanglements in how to explain Maimonides. There are many difficulties, and we’ll see later — there are many difficulties in what he said. There are contradictions within his own words, difficulties against the Gemara, difficulties from simple logic. Meaning, it is very hard to understand what he means, how one can even say such a thing. And everyone pulls in some direction — and once again this is a short blanket, just like with the rabbinic prohibition; it is the same structure as in the first root — a short blanket that cannot cover all the difficulties. You solve these difficulties, those difficulties arise, and vice versa. In this book I tried to show a full picture that explains all the difficulties. Meaning, a complete account of Maimonides that explains everything. There are hundreds of difficulties. Hundreds of difficulties. I didn’t go through them one by one; I went through the types. I simply solved them by categories. Okay? Not by saying there are many places in the Gemara where something that emerges from derivation is explicitly called Torah law — so that is against Maimonides, as Nachmanides says. Fine, so I’m not solving each such place individually. I’m saying again: how do we explain this? Rabbi Benedict every Sabbath. What? Rabbi Benedict — he was the one who every Sabbath would reconcile Maimonides. Yes, but I’m saying on this point, this question of the status of rabbinic law, I don’t know of any discussion by Rabbi Benedict on this question. And there are several treatments of it, but none of them really provides an answer to all the difficulties. People themselves say so; it’s not just me saying it. Everyone, after proposing some answer or solution or interpretation of Maimonides’ conception, says: yes, but I know these and those difficulties remain, and bottom line I don’t know if I’m right. Almost every interpreter of Maimonides ultimately ends with a few apologetic sentences like that, because really no one finds a complete answer to this issue. Good. So here I want to begin, perhaps — what I want to do in the second part is to explain Maimonides’ position, the meaning of his statement that these are rabbinic enactments, what that means, and to provide a full picture of all the halakhic categories according to Maimonides. There are quite a few. It is not just rabbinic and Torah law, some two-part division. It is much more complex. But first I want to begin with a more general introduction. Let’s begin with the principles of derivation in general. Again, we need all these things in order later to build Maimonides’ conception. The system of principles of derivation — we know several such systems. The earliest source is a system of seven principles of derivation attributed to Hillel the Elder, and it appears in the Tosefta in Sanhedrin and at the beginning of the Sifra, at the end of the baraita of Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen principles there, in the so-called baraita of examples, where a version of that baraita also appears, and there seven principles are listed. The next stage is Rabbi Ishmael, who counts thirteen principles of derivation: “By thirteen principles the Torah is interpreted” — kal va-homer, gezerah shavah. The next stage: Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean counts thirty-two principles of derivation — the baraita of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean. After that, in the epistle of Rav Sherira Gaon and in other places, they already count many more. In the Gemara there are many dozens. What is the relationship between all these? Here, indeed, the views are divided — or rather, there turns out to be a dispute; they didn’t discuss it directly. In the conception of the medieval authorities, every single one I know of, including Maimonides, says that the principles of derivation are a law given to Moses at Sinai. All of them. No one disagrees with that. I’m talking about legal derivation; leave aggadic derivation aside, I’m not dealing with that. Aggadic derivation is homiletics, that’s not really derivation. Legal derivation is really derivation. I think I once told here the difference between pilpul and derash and interpretation. Three categories: pilpul, derash, and interpretation. What is the difference? Didn’t I say this? What is the difference between them? Interpretation, or pilpul and derash, sorry — pilpul and derash and interpretation or serious midrash, yes? Interpretation or serious midrash is an inference built on correct logic, and its conclusion is true. That is normal interpretation, the halakhic interpretation with which we work. Derash is an inference whose rules of inference, whose logic, are not correct, but the conclusion is. Think of all the sermons you hear. I talked about wedding-party witticisms. What are these? Because basically, obviously he is talking nonsense, right? But in the final line it is true: one has to fear Heaven and keep commandments. The conclusion is true. But how that comes from the midrash he said or from the contradiction in the words of the sages — it does not come from there. It’s nonsense, right? That is derash. In derash you arrive at the conclusion — that’s why “one does not refute a homily.” Why does one not refute a homily? What, your argument isn’t correct because maybe this midrash could… fine, but my bottom line is fine. The point is the bottom line. Forget all the homiletics I told you at the beginning; nobody is examining your logic. What is pilpul? The opposite. Pilpul is the opposite. Pilpul is when your logic is correct and the conclusion is not. Think about it — that’s exactly pilpul. Pilpul is where I bring you a halakhic argument that is one of those Purim pilpulim. I bring you a halakhic argument that is apparently correct; you won’t catch a mistake, but in the final line you understand that it is nonsense. “To purify the creeping thing with 150 reasons.” Yes, we once discussed how I can obligate a doorpost in tzitzit. Kal va-homer — those who understand formal rules will get it, some of them. Kal va-homer: if a four-cornered garment, which is exempt from mezuzah, is obligated in tzitzit, then a doorpost, which is obligated in mezuzah, should it not all the more so be obligated in tzitzit? Therefore a doorpost is obligated in tzitzit. Right? Now the inference is a proper inference; it is a classic kal va-homer. The Gemara has many such kal va-homers. It would be very hard to put your finger on what is wrong with the inference, with its logic, but in the final line it is obvious that this is nonsense. Pilpul is the opposite of derash. Pilpul is that the logic is correct and the conclusion is not. Derash is that the logic is nonsense and the conclusion is true. And in interpretation and true derivation, both are true. Is that like Rabbi Ovadia? What? Is that like Rabbi Ovadia? No, for Rabbi Ovadia, pilpulim are whatever he doesn’t like. For everyone, not just him. What the other person says is pilpul; what I say is the correct interpretation. But there are principles there, there are measures. What do you mean? What, what’s the definition? Is it like a formula? Yes, a kind of formula for derivation, exactly. Fine? But logically, how can it be that the conclusion isn’t true? If the logic is correct, how can the conclusion not be true? Because the premises are not true. Or because the logic itself is not really correct, but it’s hard to detect. Pilpulim, understand, are riddles. Pilpul is an art. If you ever read serious pilpulim, it is simply a real delight. Every Sabbath my Sabbath pleasure was to come to the pilpulim of Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz. There is no greater delight than that. It is all nonsense. All nonsense. All nonsense. His books on the Torah are all nonsense from beginning to end. And he has many books on the Torah, anthologies and such. But it is simply a work of art. You will not be able to catch where, what exactly is not correct there. Everything is wonderful; this comes from there, and this dispute comes out like that, everything is excellent. Only at the end he arrives at the conclusion that Vashti and Ahasuerus were disputing the same dispute as Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Sema, and accordingly such-and-such follows. You understand that it is nonsense, but try catching him. You won’t. Now sometimes he invents midrashim just so the pilpul will work. There are no such midrashim. But yes. Havatzelet HaSharon and things like that. Yes, exactly. He creates a midrash, not a creative derivation. But if the principles themselves are of Torah origin, then how can you distinguish between supportive and… Yes, that is Nachmanides’ question against Maimonides — exactly what you just asked. I said, I’m now beginning the introduction, and afterward we’ll come back and I’ll explain the whole matter. But that is Nachmanides’ main question against Maimonides, the one you just asked. Okay, but I’m returning to the introduction. In any event, systems of principles of derivation — all the medieval authorities hold that they are a law given to Moses at Sinai. And all scholars hold that they are not. All scholars say that this is a later invention that developed over the course of history. The wording or the use? Both. And there is good evidence for it. As I said earlier, just look at the picture I described before. Hillel the Elder had seven. Rabbi Ishmael had thirteen. Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean has thirty-two. After that you find more. So clearly this is a developing system. Before Hillel the Elder they didn’t even have that. When Hillel the Elder came to the Land of Israel, they were struggling there with Passover Eve that falls on the Sabbath — what do we do with the Passover offering? He gave them derivations using gezerah shavah and kal va-homer; they were not familiar with it. Meaning, scholars understand that this is where it was created, this is where it began, and then it developed over the generations. And the indications for that are not bad. Meaning, it is a very reasonable conception. Somehow connected to the topic of Petah Tikva. In any event, so how are we to understand the traditional conception? The conception that all of it is a law given to Moses at Sinai. It seems to me that what needs to be explained here is that the system of derivation — and maybe I spoke about this once — the Gemara in Temurah says that 1,700 kal va-homers and gezerot shavot were forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses, and Otniel son of Kenaz restored them through his pilpul. Three thousand laws and 1,700 kal va-homers and gezerot shavot. And only the gezerot shavot and kal va-homers he restored; the laws themselves cannot be reconstructed. Incidentally, that is why the Pnei Moshe, for example, on the Jerusalem Talmud writes that a sin-offering whose owner died — although that is a Torah law, meaning whether it should graze until blemished, or what one does with an offering whose owner died — he says that in our time this is rabbinic law, because it is written about it that this is one of the laws forgotten during the days of mourning for Moses. So once we reconstructed it, clearly we have no way truly to reconstruct a law given to Moses at Sinai. Whether yes or no — so right now it is rabbinic law, that is what he says, even practically. Interesting. Who says that? How did we reconstruct it? Memory or I don’t know what they did — a vote, or they thought what makes sense? I really don’t know, because how can you reconstruct a law given to Moses at Sinai? Kal va-homer and gezerah shavah can be reconstructed, as I’ll say in a moment, but a law from Sinai… And therefore the Gemara says that that cannot be reconstructed, unlike kal va-homers and gezerot shavot. Now what happened with the kal va-homers and gezerot shavot? What is this reconstruction? In my opinion, what happened there — this is a bit anachronistic, but it seems to me a reasonable interpretation. And this whole midrash of the sages is of course anachronistic. How did they know that laws were forgotten and Otniel son of Kenaz restored them? It is aggadic midrash. “Kiryat Sefer” — that’s Otniel — that he captured Kiryat Sefer, yes. But I’m saying this is aggadic midrash. They mean to say: this is how Jewish law works. They attach it to Otniel son of Kenaz, but I don’t think they are giving a historical description of what happened there. What are they really saying? They are basically saying that during the mourning for Moses, the greatest of the generation died, so the whole people did not study Torah. When we mourn, we don’t study Torah. Now if the whole people are not studying Torah, and all the Torah is transmitted orally — we are talking about the Oral Torah, laws given to Moses at Sinai, gezerot shavot and kal va-homers, not the verses — then those oral matters that no one engages in for forty days are forgotten, many things are forgotten, right? There is no one preserving them in the meantime; it is not written somewhere to help us remember. After forty days they suddenly returned to study, and they suddenly discovered — again, this is rabbinic anachronism, but no matter — they went back to studying and suddenly found that many things had been forgotten. What do we do? With laws given to Moses at Sinai, nothing can be done. Why? Because a law given to Moses at Sinai is a datum. It is like a verse. If we lost a verse, can we reconstruct it? If we don’t remember, we don’t remember. There are no means to reconstruct it. But with the kal va-homers and gezerot shavot that were forgotten there — what did Otniel son of Kenaz do? What is the “pilpul” of Otniel son of Kenaz? The point is, what he did, in my opinion, was scientific work. Basically, the Holy One, blessed be He, taught Moses our teacher the Torah. So he read the verses and explained them to him in plain sense and in derivation. He says to him, “You shall fear the Lord your God” — you need to fear the Holy One, blessed be He, and besides that, “to include Torah scholars.” He did not tell him that every “et” comes to include. He did not give him principles of derivation. Rather, he simply taught him how to read the Torah through the lens of derivation, the way one teaches a language. When you teach a language — I once discussed this — you don’t teach the rules, right? Beged kefet, this and that. You simply speak. How does a child learn a language? People simply speak to him. No one talks to him about rules, what is correct to do and what is not correct to do. The rules are learned in an ulpan. The child learns the language simply through speaking. Moses our teacher learned the world of derivation in that way. Therefore for Moses our teacher there were no principles of derivation at all, just as when a language was originally formed there were no rules of grammar. Rules of grammar are created afterward. When one conceptualizes how people speak, one creates rules of grammar. The same with principles of derivation. And this process of conceptualization, according to the sages, began with Otniel son of Kenaz. Just one second, I just want to complete the picture. With Otniel son of Kenaz, we forgot the derivational conclusions. So what did Otniel son of Kenaz do? He said: some things we still remembered, some things we forgot, some remembered, some forgotten. Everyone gathered what everyone still remembered — I’m just reconstructing to illustrate. Right? So he collected from everyone what they remembered, wrote down everything they remembered. And now he says: okay, I see here many, many derivational laws coming from verses, but I don’t know how they emerge from the verses. What do I do? I create rules. I say: ah, suddenly I find in many places that where the word “et” is written, suddenly I find something included. “Your older brother,” “your mother’s husband,” to include Torah scholars. I find in many places inclusions for which I have no explanation, and they all sit on a verse. Fine? So he began to create what are called principles of derivation. And the kal va-homers and gezerot shavot that were forgotten — when they were forgotten, they were not yet kal va-homers and gezerot shavot; they were just derivational laws. When Otniel son of Kenaz reconstructed them, how did he do it? He simply built a rule called kal va-homer, and a rule called gezerah shavah, and showed that many of the derivations we learned from Moses our teacher come from these rules. And then he said: if so, now I can apply them to other verses as well, including verses I don’t remember, and support existing laws or create new laws through these rules. That’s not Torah law. What? That’s not Torah law. He invented the rules. No, he didn’t create. No no no. He found, he discovered, he constructed. He built the rules. It could be they were already there. Exactly the same question arises with the laws of nature. When I now take facts — Newton, right? — Newton takes the facts and finds that there is a law of gravity. Do you claim that Newton invented the law of gravity or discovered it? He discovered it. Even though there is induction here, you are right that there could be error in the process, but bottom line, if the process was done correctly and if we are right, this is a revealing process, not a creative one. So too with principles of derivation. What happens is, basically the claim, which belongs to hermeneutics — how do we understand the interpretive process? What you basically suggested is that the interpretive process is a creative process. And I am claiming that the interpretive process is a revealing process. Meaning, Otniel son of Kenaz basically claimed: true, Moses our teacher did not call it gezerah shavah and kal va-homer and binyan av, but that is basically what he was doing. He himself was not even conscious of it, just as when I speak I am not conscious that I am speaking with beged kefet and subject-predicate and indirect object and things like that. But someone who knows those rules can show me that I operate according to them without being aware of them at all. But Moses received it. Moses received not the rules. He did not receive the rules. He received the perspective of derivation. Exactly. Moses our teacher spoke the language of derivation intuitively, like a child speaking a language learned from his parents. Afterward Otniel son of Kenaz comes and says: wait, let’s formulate the rules of this language. The rules of this language are kal va-homer, gezerah shavah, binyan av from one verse, from two verses. So Otniel son of Kenaz began, and with kal va-homer and gezerah shavah, say maybe more, Otniel son of Kenaz founded these rules. Little by little, this process of forgetting continued. When the sages describe it in tractate Temurah, in my opinion they are describing the entire history of the matter. It’s not just one case with Otniel son of Kenaz; it’s doubtful whether it even happened in the days of Otniel son of Kenaz. This is how it goes throughout history. Throughout history we forget, and then we take another part that until now was intuitive and turn it into something governed by rules. Because one who cannot work with intuition must produce rules that will help him function. Just as someone who comes to a new country and wants to learn to speak, but does not have the simple intuition for how one speaks correctly, is told: these are the rules. Work with the rules, and then you’ll be able to do it. A native speaker doesn’t need rules; he knows how to speak — it’s intuition. Moses our teacher, when he read a verse, would tell you what the derivation from that verse is. If you asked him on which principle he relied, he would stare at you — what principle? I don’t know what a principle is. That’s the derivation from the verse. That’s just how one says it, how one speaks. He wouldn’t know how to account for himself as to which rule stood behind it. That was done by his researcher, Otniel son of Kenaz. Otniel son of Kenaz basically studied what Moses our teacher had done, conceptualized it, defined the rules, created a toolbox called the principles of derivation, and now he can both explain what we remembered and reconstruct what we forgot. The advantage of science, by the way, beyond intuition, is that science enables me to solve problems for which I have no intuition. So then why did Moses ask the Holy One, blessed be He, about the second Passover, or things like that? Exactly because of that. No, why didn’t he use the rules? There were no rules. He didn’t have them. He didn’t have them, but he could have found them intuitively. But this is exactly the lack of intuition. For example, I’ll give you a modern example: today we wouldn’t ask; we would use the rules and derive, right? Right. Moses did not derive. No, he didn’t know how to derive because there were no rules. There were no rules. He knew how to read the verse and its derivational dimension, and there were things he did not manage. Where intuition fails, there is the advantage of the rule-based thinkers. Where is the advantage of someone who studied in ulpan? He is not a native speaker. When I try to formulate something for myself and my linguistic intuition does not give me an answer, I don’t know — here the one who studied in ulpan will have an advantage, because the one who studied in ulpan will activate the rules. He doesn’t need intuition; he will activate the rules and tell me how to say it correctly. Like with Stradivarius violins — I think I said this is an example from the philosopher of science Michael Polanyi. Stradivarius made marvelous violins, apparently — so the experts say; I know nothing about it. Today, with all our technological equipment, we still don’t manage to reach the level of his violins. Right? Now what are we really trying to do when we reconstruct? We look at Stradivarius’s violins and build some rules for how to make a violin correctly. What should be the proportion between its length and width, the thickness of the sound box, the tension of the strings, the material from which it is made — we try somehow to fit it into rules. If we succeeded in fitting it entirely into rules, then today a computer could make a violin on the level of Stradivarius. But we don’t succeed. Why? Because the way of working with rules is limited. It does not manage fully to reconstruct the intuition that the person we’re trying to reconstruct had. So on the one hand, suppose Stradivarius got stuck. Suppose he encountered a new kind of wood and asked himself: how exactly do you make a violin out of this wood, not the kinds I’m used to, this wood? I don’t know; I have no intuition. I’m not familiar with this wood, I’m not accustomed to working with it, I have no intuition here. Here we would make a better violin than he would, if we had the algorithm. Because we have the algorithm, we have rules, we know based on the type of wood what rules to apply and how to make the violin. But in places where Stradivarius has intuition, we have no chance of competing with him. Just like someone who studied in ulpan cannot compete with a native speaker where the native speaker truly has intuition for how to speak. He can be better than the native speaker in places where the latter lacks intuition. So can we today also innovate new rules? New rules in the process of conceptualization. Not only the law, but also the rules. No, so I’m saying: rules only in the process of conceptualization. We do this all the time. In the process of conceptualization — but not to innovate rules by creating them. Rather, to understand that within the work of the medieval authorities and the Gemara there is actually another rule that until now no one noticed. Seven, thirteen, and so on… Exactly. And that is the process of development of — one second — that is the process of development of the principles of derivation. The process of development of the principles of derivation — seven, thirteen, thirty-two, and so on — is not a process of invention, as the scholars think. But it is also not a process of transmission, as the medieval authorities describe it. It is a process of… discovery. Exactly — of discovery, of uncovering, of ongoing conceptualization. And all the time there is more and more. We know that in the world of Jewish law the number of rules keeps increasing all the time. So what, are people inventing laws? No. Rather, more and more work that was previously done intuitively is now done through rules. Until now it was done by intuition. The assumption is that if the work is done correctly, then those who worked intuitively were actually using these rules implicitly; they just were not aware of them. That is the point. And so if I summarize just this lesson: the principles of derivation are a law given to Moses at Sinai. All the medieval authorities say so, and they are right. All the thirteen, the thirty-two… all of them. But wait — the process of formulation and conceptualization of them was done over the generations. It is a law given to Moses at Sinai, but Moses did not know… Exactly. It is a law given to Moses at Sinai; this language was given to Moses at Sinai… the derivation of Rabbi Akiva, no? Exactly — this is Rabbi Akiva’s derivation. Moses our teacher learned this language and received it from the Holy One, blessed be He, but the rules — the rules were created over the generations, just as the rules of language are created later, after the language itself has already come into being. That does not mean the language was invented by the rule-makers, and it does not mean the rule-makers invented the rules. They discovered the rules; they formulated the rules. But these rules were also used by Moses our teacher, assuming we did the work correctly. There can always be mistakes, but in principle, assuming we did it correctly, these rules are a law given to Moses at Sinai even though they are formulated over the course of history.