Simple Faith – Lesson 2

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is said about the holy patriarchs that they were shrewd in understanding and made themselves like animals—that the ultimate end of all wisdom is “more precious than wisdom is honor, and a little foolishness.” From all this shrewdness of understanding, one has to arrive at a little foolishness, at a life without proofs and without demonstrations for faith. The evidence and sign of this state is that proofs do not capture his heart and do not move him. Meaning, when do you know that you’ve reached that stage of life, that immediate intimacy? When even if they bring you proofs, it doesn’t budge you from there. Okay? That’s the indication that you’ve reached such a state. This is the great proof that he does not live and stand on a foundation of proofs—when we see that signs and wonders such as “let the carob tree prove it,” “let the stream prove it,” “let Heaven prove it”—yes, this is the oven of Akhnai—did not move them from their place. That is a sign that their life was not dependent on signs and wonders, that they lived a life of faith. By the way, this literary play is interesting, because in the oven of Akhnai, those proofs came from the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, our firm faith, that we do not let proofs move us from it—that is faith in ourselves, as it were, against the Holy One, blessed be He. That what we say is the right thing, and no Holy One, blessed be He, will move us from it. I mean, it’s “as it were,” but it’s true that this describes the situation correctly. That is, some state where even if they bring you proofs, signs, and wonders, it won’t help at all, because you know. Once you know, that’s something far beyond things built on the basis of one proof or another.

[Speaker B] I think there the issue was whether you know or don’t know. There the issue was that the Holy One, blessed be He, handed the decisions over to human beings. That was the argument. Yes, but on the other hand, it was an argument about principles, not an argument about facts.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I understand, but on the other hand, the Holy One, blessed be He, sends out a heavenly voice that tells us: friends, this is how you’re supposed to rule here.

[Speaker B] No, but the decision coming from Him was the principle. The principle that a person has to decide with his own intellect and not—no, no, I understand, but I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying that even—

[Speaker B] —if you’re convinced that it isn’t true now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but here there’s something far beyond that. Because if I brought a verse from the Torah, say, “It is not in heaven,” or something like that—we have to decide on our own, let’s say. But now a heavenly voice comes out and says: “Why do you argue with Rabbi Eliezer my son, seeing that the Jewish law follows him everywhere?” They bring proofs in his favor. What does that mean? I think it means that apparently we misunderstood the principle of “It is not in heaven.” We thought that the Holy One, blessed be He, was no longer in the game. But He Himself tells you, my friend, I am in the game. I’m telling you now that you need to rule like Rabbi Eliezer. That puts the principle itself in question, not just the question of the oven’s impurity.

[Speaker B] That’s why they ignored it—not only in the oven of Akhnai, they ignored it not only there, there are a few other cases there. In the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer, the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yehoshua, not Rabbi Eliezer. So what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I said that Heaven said Rabbi Eliezer everywhere.

[Speaker B] Ah, okay, fine. They completely got up against him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, in various places. Yes, there’s the case of skin lesions and Bar Nachmani, with “the bright spot preceded the white hair,” there are more examples too. But here, I think it’s not exactly that. There’s something here that threatens the whole outlook. The sages learned there—again, I don’t know, again, this isn’t a historical description, but never mind, the principle—the story does describe a kind of standing by my own outlook when it is tested against proofs. There are proofs here that attack the outlook, not just the statement that this oven is pure or impure, but the very outlook that we do not pay attention to a heavenly voice. Even the heavenly voice is supposed to know that we do not pay attention to it. Even the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to know that He wrote in His Torah, “It is not in heaven,” and yet He stands here and says, friends, the Jewish law follows Rabbi Eliezer. And we say: that’s as far as it goes.

[Speaker C] If He hadn’t told me—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He wanted to see whether He was pleased. Fine, that’s the whole story. But the story comes and says that they went after their faith against proofs and wonders, and that’s okay—He is testing me. You have to say: He is testing me. Exactly, and that’s exactly it! It’s like his parable about the husband and wife. So really, why did the heavenly voice come out? What, the Holy One, blessed be He, didn’t know that “It is not in heaven”? The point is that He was testing us. And they passed that test because they did not let the proofs move them from what was clear to them. Even though there, again, what was clear to me was actually me, not the Holy One, blessed be He.

[Speaker B] They understood from what that heavenly—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —voice said at Mount Sinai.

[Speaker B] Yes, that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mount Sinai. Elijah—it is “not in heaven.” So what were those signs and wonders? And that really is difficult. Yes, so what are these signs and wonders then? If the Holy One, blessed be He, truly did not want us to rule like Rabbi Eliezer but like Rabbi Yehoshua, then why did He make all those signs and wonders there? Exactly like the husband and wife. Yes, when you have trust and suddenly discover that it doesn’t stand the test, then you find all kinds of excuses, even strained ones, to uphold things anyway. But no, this is something else: “For the Lord your God tests you, to know whether they will abandon the received tradition and the Talmudic text in their mouths.” Yes, there is no choice but to say that this is some kind of test, because if in the end we decide to go against the Holy One, blessed be He, that apparently means that He too did not expect us to follow what He said. Sick people need proofs and wonders for faith. Here he now says the next thing, from what you said earlier—that really here there is already some expectation not to begin with inquiries at all, at least if you are healthy in your soul. Because your assumption is supposed to be that faith is something simple and clear; it is not supposed to be built on the basis of proofs. The moment you need proofs just to begin the process, that means something in you is sick. That’s his claim. I don’t know if it’s true, but that’s what he claims. But to live on proofs and wonders—that, Heaven forbid, Heaven forbid. Meaning, what is he saying now? Fine, but if you’re sick, then okay—a sick person needs medicine. If you’re sick, you need proofs and wonders; what can you do, if you don’t have faith then you don’t have faith. But not to live on that. After you’ve finished with it, you can’t go on living off this matter of proofs. What?

[Speaker C] Could it be that the question is whether this is an intellectual conception or a behavioral conception?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: there are sick people for whom the regular medicine doesn’t help; they need medicine, antibiotics, they need something else. Even with the proofs of Duties of the Heart, you can’t live on them either. Yes, that “even” is a bit qualified, but life is only from faith. What made Duties of the Heart so forceful and rich was not its Gate of Unity. I said: the Gate of Unity is the philosophical section of Duties of the Heart, and about that there’s the whole introduction in Lev Tov explaining why it’s forbidden to read it. What merited Ibn Ezra becoming supremely holy, and that the holy Sabbath would send him a letter—apparently there’s some story about Ibn Ezra, I don’t know it—that was not from his long discourses in Ibn Ezra where he speaks about astrological wisdom, but precisely from those few lines he always brings: “And we have nothing but the words of the received tradition.” On that they themselves stood and held their ground, and from that they drew all their vitality and nourishment. Even those who engage in proofs—Duties of the Heart, Ibn Ezra—basically begin, their foundation is a foundation of simple faith. Now here you have to pay attention, because here things get a bit more complicated. Duties of the Heart and Ibn Ezra, at least in his description—I don’t know what really was there, but in his description—they don’t use philosophy in order to arrive at faith. They already have faith. So that is their standing, that’s what he said. So why philosophy? If philosophy is a means for the sick, for those who can’t get there without it, they at least grasped—they at least grasped that even if you have faith, and that’s already stage two, even if you have faith, there is still value in inquiry. And I think he rejects that. And does it strengthen? Yes, it strengthens, or at least makes things more complete. Meaning, again, the value—maybe we’ll talk about this later—the value here is already the next stage of the argument. I said okay, I’ve arrived at faith, I already live this way, I experience the Holy One, blessed be He, everything is fine. Is there value in investigating? Just investigating—not in order to determine whether it’s true or not, but in order to deepen it more, to grasp it in a fuller way, maybe to strengthen faith. That raises the question whether it strengthens or doesn’t strengthen—I don’t know. But it could be that even if it doesn’t strengthen, it still has value. Because the value in it is not the fact that then my feeling is more firmly rooted in me; rather, the value is the very fact that I understand better what I believe in. Independently of that, it could be that my grasp of the matter will actually be weaker now, because I’ve become this sort of philosopher, so things already…

[Speaker B] The grasp of a worker—don’t touch it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So the question is whether there is such an approach. Duties of the Heart and Ibn Ezra apparently express a different position, and of course also Maimonides. Meaning, their view is that inquiry is not merely a means to reach faith, and maybe not even a means to reach faith at all. That’s a question—maybe it’s only for the perplexed; The Guide for the Perplexed, what Maimonides writes, is for the perplexed. But even for a person who is whole in his faith, here a second discussion begins: is there nevertheless value in undertaking this inquiry? He understands that there isn’t. That is, he thinks there isn’t. But here there were definitely quite a few good Jews who thought otherwise. In the words of the sages we see what the complaint against the generation of the wilderness was, and they said: Rabbi Yitzchak opened: “And I said: How shall I place you among the children… surely as a wife betrays her companion.” “And I said: How shall I place you among the children”—all the miracles and mighty acts that I did for you were not so that you should give reward, but so that you should honor Me as children and call Me your Father. And it says: “You shall call Me, My Father.” And what miracles did I do for any creature in the world more than for you—that I made you walk after Me while I walked before you and gave you light, as it says: “And the Lord went before them by day.” And it says: “You shall call Me, My Father.” And what did you do? “Surely as a wife betrays her companion.” It is not written “a wife,” but “her companion.” “From a wife” with the letter heh pronounced, yes? Rather, “her companion.” The wife betrays her companion, not her husband. Why is it “her companion”? Why? Rather, a person who takes a wife and lives with her many days—even if he is poor, yes—if he stops giving his wife what he had given her until now, his wife does not deny him. Rather, she says: when he was rich he fed me and gave me drink, and now that he is poor she does not deny him. But when she is a prostitute, if he gives her something then she acknowledges him, and if he does not give her something she does not recognize him. Therefore it says: “Surely as a wife betrays her companion.” A relationship of companionship is less than a marital relationship. A relationship of companionship is something that apparently depends on something. A marital relationship is not supposed to depend on anything, and therefore it begins with “you shall see Me as children who see a father,” and after that as a woman to her companion. These are two kinds of relationship—sorry, as a woman to her husband, not to her companion. The accusation is that you did not relate as a wife should. Not on the basis of give-and-take or proofs for his own purposes. And this is the foundation of what we are saying: the claim was that it should have been like a wife—faithfulness, living a life of faith with no proofs and no wonders at all, only faith. “And I will betroth you to Me in faith.” Betrothal is not for the sake of anything; it’s all or nothing. And the betrothal is in faith. The end of everything is faith—it is a state of faith, such that from all the proofs, signs, and wonders one must emerge into a life without signs and without wonders, but with faith, loyalty. “You shall call Me, my husband.” The end of everything is—and he will not question My ways—and this is faith. And in the end his claim is that there is room for inquiry for one who doubts, for the sick, one who is uncertain. But basically, an ordinary person simply does not need inquiry if he has faith. And even if you made use of inquiry, after you’ve already arrived at faith it has no value; it’s a ladder you are supposed to throw away after using it. Now here there are really several points I wanted to discuss. I think I’ve already mentioned this passage from Ein Ayah several times. I remembered—right, I spoke about those two stories on page 30 in tractate Shabbat, where Rabbi Chiya comes, someone comes to Rabbi and says to him: your wife is my wife and your son is my son. He tells him to do something and then he drinks two cups of wine, drank and burst. Rav Kook there really talks about this point of the basic faith you have, in that case in family members, but he broadens it more—that it does not stand the test of proofs and testimony. Someone tells you, listen, maybe he’s right. Maybe he’s right. Things have happened in the world. No. I believe, and that’s it. I’m not willing even to relate to the matter at all. So that too is the same phenomenon as what he describes here. Now I want to make a few comments. First comment: all along the way, it seems to me that he is not talking at all about the dangers involved. Surprising. Usually when we look for a text dealing with the question of philosophical inquiries, proofs, thought, and the like, we would immediately expect them to tell you: look, this is dangerous, because with proofs you can get to all sorts of places. He doesn’t mention that. There isn’t even a hint of that here.

[Speaker B] He points to a different problem, a deficiency, and that’s it. What is it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t say it’s forbidden, he doesn’t say it’s forbidden. He says your goal should be such that you won’t need it. He doesn’t write that it is forbidden. Yes, not “to stray after your hearts and after your eyes,” for example.

[Speaker B] He says for the sick. After that, you can’t live in a state of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so he says what the ideal state of faith is, but he doesn’t speak about prohibition, he doesn’t speak about prohibition and not about fears of error—he doesn’t mention it. There’s no such thing. The most basic thing we would expect to read in any text, certainly a text in our day dealing with inquiries and things of that kind, is always the dangers. What will happen? “Do not stray after your hearts and after your eyes.” Yes, not even a slippery slope, but direct dangers. Here you don’t need a slope; it already appears at the end of the slope. The moment you look for proofs, proofs can take you either here or there. You have no guarantee in advance where you’ll end up. Wherever you get, you get. I once told you about the difference between theology and philosophy, right? Something I once heard from someone—that the difference between theology and philosophy is that philosophy takes premises and derives conclusions from them, whereas theology takes conclusions and derives premises from them. That is, theology always begins with faith in God and then derives which premises will lead it to faith in God—but it begins with the conclusion. And a real philosopher, yes, is supposed to begin with premises, and then whatever conclusion he reaches, he reaches. Meaning, the moment you are a philosopher, take into account that you don’t know where you’re going to end up. Let’s see. Yes, now this is a naive picture. Maybe I’ll talk about it later, but it’s a naive picture. The philosopher too derives—

[Speaker B] Yes, there’s no such thing as—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —a real philosopher. But no, even a real philosopher derives premises from conclusions. In my opinion it is legitimate to derive premises from conclusions; I’ll talk about that in a moment. In any case, so what?

[Speaker D] If it isn’t biased.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’ll still talk about that. In any case, the first point worth noting is really that he does not speak at all about the question of danger—what can happen in inquiries. From his point of view, he is comparing two models of faith here and arguing for one of them. He is not speaking either about dangers or about anything of that kind, not about instrumental considerations. That is, he is speaking about the essence. Even the problem he sees in proofs, it seems to me, is not that this is weaker. I think that’s not the point. The fact that it is weaker is presented by him as an indication that you are still in a faith that is based on proofs. He does not bring that as an argument for why it is not good to base faith on proofs because it is weaker. Because if contrary proof comes or an internal contradiction comes, then you’ll throw it away. Even on that plane he does not say it. When he wants to give us an indication of when we know that we truly believe according to his model of faith, it is when proofs do not move us or contradictions do not move us. Meaning, from his point of view the problem is not that life on the basis of proofs can move us and then we will reach another view—an erroneous one, or give up faith, and the like. Rather, it is only an indication that our faith is not correct. His basic claim is that faith means loyalty. That’s all. Not because of any instrumental consideration, not because of outcomes, not because it is weak or strong.

[Speaker B] Meaning, this is a practical claim—like, he’s saying what should you do? He can’t do anything else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m getting there, one second, I’m getting there. So that’s the first point. And here indeed the question arises: why is that really so? Meaning, if people brought me arguments that this kind of faith weakens more quickly, and there is a danger that it will weaken—I understand, even though I don’t accept it, but I understand the claim. Okay? But if you’re not hanging it on that, then why? Then why really is this kind of faith better than that kind? There is no argument here. That is, there is some sort of assumption here, some postulate that says faith has to be something like this and not like that—not because of anything, not because the problem is that it leads to some bad result. In itself it is less good. And that is an interesting claim, a claim that is not always formulated this way when people deal with such questions of inquiry. He is really talking about what a state of faith is at all. The goal—say, when Maimonides in positive commandment number one says that the first positive commandment is to believe—then there may be room to understand it if we adopt what he says. Because if that positive commandment is a commandment—there are those who explain that… okay, the problem is well known. How can someone command me to believe? For the same two reasons I mentioned before, both the moral one and the logical one. Therefore it sounds problematic. One explanation says no—the first commandment is to investigate, and the assumption is that when you investigate, you will arrive at faith. That’s one route. The second explanation—

[Speaker B] But then too, why do I need to fulfill a commandment to investigate? Why do I need—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so the claim is that it really is not—

[Speaker B] —not a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In that sense. Rather, there is some sort of demand here, just as a person who, say, does not believe in God can still be held accountable for not behaving morally. Now why? Certainly not as a religious demand—what do you want from him? He didn’t believe in anything. The Holy One, blessed be He, will demand it of him. There is some expectation, just as a person believes his own eyes, he should believe his own moral feeling. So too he is supposed to understand that a person should examine his path.

[Speaker B] But then it isn’t a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Correct.

[Speaker B] It really isn’t a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. It really isn’t a commandment; it can’t be a commandment in the usual sense if one explains it that way. But there is still room to say that this is something demanded of everyone, even if he does not believe.

[Speaker B] I said that it’s a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. I already said that in Maimonides there are commandments that don’t command anything. So this does not necessarily have to be problematic specifically in Maimonides. The second explanation is perhaps in some sense the opposite. That is, it could be that by means of proofs you arrived at faith, and the commandment is to try to internalize it so that it will not remain standing on proofs. Now for such a thing there is definitely room—absolutely. Both morally and logically at the principled level, and I’ll speak about that in a moment. Basically they are telling me: don’t remain dependent all the time on these proofs. Try to fulfill “And know this day and bring it back to your heart”—yes? Internalize it. Reach a state where you have already built the relationship, and you are not constantly in a state of checking it, whether yes or no. By the way, one of the reasons it is forbidden to test the Holy One, blessed be He—this was once researched by Ari Casse—why is it forbidden to test the Holy One, blessed be He? It’s not necessarily because the thing might fail, but because when you are in a position of constantly testing Him, that means your faith is still not faith. That is the problem. When they tell you not to test the Holy One, blessed be He, if you really need the test in order to believe, it is impossible to forbid it to you. It is part of your path to arrive at faith. If you need it, do it. But if you are already there, and you are already committed to Torah and commandments, then they tell you: the expectation from you is to live differently, not to remain on this basis that constantly wants to test the Holy One, blessed be He. Now here I really want to go one more step further. Those who are afraid of inquiry—he doesn’t say what his view of inquiry is, of the fears and everything. For him it is something problematic in itself, not because it leads to fears. But I want to use those conceptions in order to return to him. That is, why do those who fear inquiry actually assume here, implicitly, some assumption that is not simple, and worth thinking about. Suppose a person examines, reads, or thinks about these philosophical, logical proofs, this and that, and comes to the conclusion that there is no God. So now I’ll tell him: look, don’t do this inquiry because you may reach a state where you do not believe. If he did not conduct that inquiry, does he believe? That is not a clear question. Because ultimately, if the result of the inquiry would lead him to a state in which he does not believe, there is definitely room to say that already now he does not believe. It could be that he doesn’t know it. After all, the moment you say there is information in the world that would lead me to think differently, so I do not look at it—what does that mean? It means that if all the information were before me, I would think differently. Meaning that I am already there.

[Speaker D] But that’s if it were there. But what about now? Believing or not believing is your conscious state right now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying. Here there is an assumption.

[Speaker D] You—

[Speaker B] You would get confused. You would get confused.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t want to get confused. These are two different claims, and I’ll address both. There is an assumption here, as I said before—an assumption, and one can accept it. But you should notice that there is an assumption here that is not self-evident. The assumption that says that potential faith or potential lack of faith does not interfere—or does not help, in both directions. It has to come to expression in consciousness, not in the subconscious, not in that part of me of which I’m unaware. Things that are inside are inside; that doesn’t interest anyone. The question is how I live. The question is what experience accompanies me. It’s not entirely simple. There is some assumption here that one has to think about—whether it is correct or not. Because one could say: what do you mean? The moment there are different arguments, books, people, all kinds of things. Let’s say for the sake of discussion that I know that if someone were exposed to all the arguments and answers and questions and everything, he would come to the conclusion that there is no God. Fine? Now he says, okay, so I won’t read the books. Does he believe? He doesn’t really believe. He may live in a consciousness of faith, he may deceive himself into thinking that he believes. But is such a thing called believing?

[Speaker C] The question is whether that’s what makes a person say, I won’t read. What? There’s some specific point here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person is a complex creature, after all. Maybe—a person is a complex creature, after all. There is something—

[Speaker C] Maybe there’s something inside him saying, quiet, I don’t want to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. One moment, maybe. But it could also be not. And it could be—I’m part of society, there are norms in society, “the heart does not reveal to the mouth.” I don’t want to expose myself to something that inside my heart, or in the subconscious, I know is there. So leave it, I don’t want complications, I don’t want to—

[Speaker C] Fine, you have no way to answer that, because you don’t know whether it’s this or that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but then now I ask: does that something inside—suppose it is lack of faith—and I don’t want, “the heart does not reveal to the mouth,” I want to go on living in the consciousness in which I have lived until now for all kinds of reasons—am I called a believing person at all? Is this thing really called faith? I’m not sure. And conversely, if someone inside has faith, like Rav Kook’s claims about the pioneers—someone who inside, unconsciously, has faith, but outwardly lives as a completely atheist person. Fine? Is that called a believing person or not? I don’t know. By the way, I tend to think that faith requires both things together. And it is not the same answer to the two questions. In order for you to count as a believer, it has to be both inside and outside. If it is only inside and not outside, then you are not a believer; and if it is only outside and not inside, then you are also not a believer. Neither the pioneers are believers, nor those who do not check, who do not investigate because they know that if they investigate they will leave everything—they are not believers either.

[Speaker C] Is there anyone who really does believe?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? Why not? People who believe both inside and outside.

[Speaker B] But maybe they believe in something false, and really they don’t believe at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. I didn’t say he’s necessarily right. I said he is a man of faith.

[Speaker B] Fine.

[Speaker C] So no one who really knows—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether I can know that. I have no idea. I can do the best I can. I don’t know how to verify that I’m really in such a state, but I can do my best.

[Speaker B] I don’t really understand the problem. Faith by definition… we had several… some whole lesson trying to define the difference between faith and knowledge, and whether it’s the same thing. It’s simply a collection of weighing considerations, and it seems to me more in that direction. So what does it mean that potentially it could be that afterward maybe I’ll discover other things? Right now, with all the data I have in hand—so what? Right now, with the data I have in hand, I believe. What do you mean? I believe because I weighed the facts…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true, absolutely not, absolutely not. If in your view, if you were to take into account all the data and considerations and everything, you would come to the conclusion that there is no God—

[Speaker B] No, that’s not true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s suppose that is the case. Maybe? No, suppose that is the case—not maybe, certainly. Suppose that is the case.

[Speaker B] If consciously too that is the case, then consciously too you do not believe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true, not true. If I know—

[Speaker B] Absolutely not true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I know people like that, to the extent that one can know.

[Speaker B] You don’t know. They can say all sorts of things, but if you know that if you think about the things you won’t believe—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. There are many people who will tell you: what, if I get to all sorts of arguments—

[Speaker B] —and everything, then I may get confused, and there are arguments in this direction…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What are you saying? After all, if I may reach a state where I won’t believe, then either way—if you reach a state where you do believe, there is nothing to fear, and if you reach a state where you do not believe, then it will be revealed retroactively that from the start you were not a believer. So again, I have nothing to fear. So why are you afraid?

[Speaker B] No, the getting confused is already a second argument; we’ll get to it later. I didn’t get confused. Right now I’m sitting and investigating something, I’ve reached some conclusion at the level of the inquiry I have. Now I know that if I continue to investigate, it could be that… but right now, with what I have in the inquiry, it could be that further proofs will surface that strengthen me. But right now, with what I have in the inquiry, I believe. If I continue to investigate, who knows what else I’ll discover.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You are defining faith in a very particular way. I, for example, do not agree with that definition. I do not think that someone who lives in a consciousness of faith is necessarily a believer. Because if he does so out of what we may call foreign considerations—considerations that are not truly a genuine perception that I really believe, but because, I don’t know, it’s good for me this way, because it’s convenient for me—

[Speaker B] Think now about some murder trial or something like that. They gather evidence. He’s innocent up to now in your eyes; you’ve built it up in yourself that he is a person—now someone—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —tells you: I have more evidence. No, no, no, I don’t want to see it, because it will ruin what I think now.

[Speaker B] Keep going and look for evidence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, keep going and look for evidence—you are presenting it too simplistically. After all, there are many people raising arguments for and against, and there is something to examine. You don’t need to search with candles for one piece of evidence. Okay, there are many people who say they have proofs. So you have to investigate. So you definitely need to investigate. And someone who does not do that is a criminal. A judge who does not do that is a criminal. Not necessarily.

[Speaker B] I’m saying, I’m already certain of what I saw.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does certain mean? You’re not certain of anything. If you’re certain, then fine, but I’m talking—

[Speaker B] —about the fact that forever you can—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —go on trying to find something under a rock. You can’t. If it’s not under a rock—again, you’re returning to under the floor, but it’s not under the floor. If you know there are other people in the world who have further relevant information, and you do not go to check because it will confuse you—does that seem to you like serious judgment?

[Speaker E] There are layers upon layers, and we live like that, not really. What authority do you have to determine that this one believes and that one doesn’t? This is a believer according to the sign that I built.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say that I determine it. I have no ability to make such a diagnosis—

[Speaker E] None of us has the ability to determine whether he believes or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But a person can determine it about himself. For example, I don’t think—I don’t think everyone decides whether he believes or not. I think I can determine it, not with certainty. And I’m not willing to accept—I am paternalistic on this point. Meaning, I’m not willing to accept that everyone says, no, I’ll define myself, don’t define me. Not true. I’ll define you. What do you mean? A person can define himself as a believer even if he is a mathematician; he’ll call it faith in God. Who are you to tell him that this isn’t faith in God? So fine, he can do whatever he wants, but I don’t agree. It’s not true. I do not accept that this is private domain. I do accept, of course, that I do not penetrate the recesses of the heart; I do not know what is in a person’s heart, and therefore I would not say that about anyone in practice. What I wanted to argue was a conceptual claim. I did not say that I have the tools to examine each person and determine whether he is there or not there; I know nothing. I’m asking a conceptual question. Suppose there is some creature, Elijah comes and tells me that inwardly, if he were to see all the evidence and everything, he would not believe, fine? Elijah the prophet comes and tells me this. Assuming that is the situation, do I define such a person as a believer? That is a conceptual question. I’m not speaking now about how I would know that. I do not know how to analyze human beings in such a way; who can see what is in a person’s heart? But I do think it is important to think about this conceptually. Why? Because it has practical implications. The practical implication concerns whether there is really room for this fear of inquiry that everyone fears. Because understand: if we define it this way, then what— I’m not even getting to confusion yet, I’ll get to that in the next stage—but suppose for the moment that we have no fears of confusion. Then all these fears of inquiry are absurd. And that’s either way. If the result of the inquiry will bring me to faith, then there’s no problem, then there’s no fear, right? And if it will bring me to heresy, that means that already now I am a heretic, so what good does it do not to investigate? So either way there is no reason not to continue investigating. That is, either I remain a believer, or in any case I was a heretic already. So what for? Why forbid inquiry? What is the fear? What is the problem?

[Speaker B] And that’s because if I don’t investigate, I’m not a heretic. Huh? I remain—I’m not a heretic because I didn’t go into the inquiry.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I said that you are assuming an assumption: that if inwardly you do not believe, only you do not permit yourself to become aware of that fact—that is, you are unwilling to read certain things or hear certain things that would bring you there, and therefore you remain as if in an experience of faith—you define that as a believer. I don’t think so. I would not define that as a believer. So here it’s a question of definition. Again, there is definitely room to discuss it, and it isn’t sharp-cut, because we do not know how to analyze it. But it is not a simple conceptual question. For a long time I have thought that this problem of fears of inquiry is a problem rooted in a mistaken definition of the concept of faith. Mistaken in my view; again, one can argue. But in my view it is mistaken. Because I think that a person who, as a result of inquiry, would arrive at a state in which he does not believe, is a non-believer already now.

[Speaker B] What difference does it make whether he investigates or doesn’t investigate?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but it’s not discrete; it’s continuous. He believes a little, he could believe more, he could—

[Speaker B] —not believe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Assuming that in the end he will have to make some decision. He will see everything—what decision will he make? That he believes a bit more, a bit less. Fine. If he reaches the conclusion that for him this is called—

[Speaker B] —not believing. It’s like the heap paradox. When he reaches the conclusion that for him this is called not believing, let’s say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For our purposes, he won’t keep the commandments in such a state. So he says that he also does not believe now. It can also be the opposite. What? Those who don’t believe are afraid to investigate because they fear the result. Right, right. But there too I say: the two sides are not symmetrical, because both conditions are required in order to be called a believer, while only one of them is sufficient in order to be called a non-believer. Meaning, there is no symmetry here. That’s what I think. That is, it seems to me that in order truly to be a believer, you must not merely recite faith and not live in some kind of external consciousnesses. Rather, you have to express something within you. And on the other hand, clearly there also has to be awareness; if it is only inside you, then what value is that? You need to be a believer in the philosophical sense and a believer in the religious sense—someone who joins a prayer quorum, someone I relate to as one of the community. In that sense, I think it isn’t enough.

[Speaker E] Wait, so until the period of the Enlightenment, okay, nobody was a believer? Like, say in the ninety-something percent—what do you want me to tell you?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We already agreed earlier that we can’t know, right? So what—until the seventeenth century we could know? You said that you can’t know.

[Speaker E] But the period of the Enlightenment—he’s talking, he’s also speaking against the Enlightenment thinkers. Okay. Now we know statistically in which society there will be more—there will be a greater representation of heretics? In a society that investigates.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that called heretics? That’s exactly the question. There is an entire society sitting in Bnei Brak that does not engage in inquiry, and there are no fewer heretics there than outside. They simply do not know that they are heretics, and they do not permit themselves to encounter the fact that inwardly they are heretics. And those who do permit themselves to encounter it rebel immediately because of that fear. A large part of the problem is precisely the fear of encountering what is inside. And these external measures—like where there are more heretics—also assume that same assumption: that someone who lives in a consciousness of faith even though inwardly there is nothing to back it up is not a heretic. And I deny that.

[Speaker B] And because of that they didn’t allow it, they excommunicated the books of Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. It’s an old dispute; it didn’t begin now.

[Speaker C] But if we add to this the—aren’t they acting on the assumption that faith is very, very strong? All these arguments…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I haven’t gotten there yet; I’ll get there, with God’s help. I just want to illustrate this maybe through something else. I think we’ve already spoken more than once about the fact that a logical argument never adds information for us. Right? When we say: all human beings are mortal, Socrates is a human being, therefore Socrates is mortal. The conclusion follows necessarily from the premises, and it is contained within them. When I say that all human beings are mortal and Socrates is one of them, then in that I have already said that Socrates is mortal. That conclusion—

[Speaker B] It follows necessarily and is contained within them—that’s the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The meaning of logical entailment is that the conclusion is actually contained within the premises. Meaning, if I take logic as a metaphor for inquiry, it—

[Speaker B] —doesn’t say anything,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So basically, think of it this way: suppose I discover a logical argument whose conclusion is that there is no God. What are you really saying? You’re really saying that in the premises I started from, that conclusion was already embedded—that there is no God. As long as I haven’t done the geometry, haven’t done the detailed calculation, I haven’t exposed the fact, proven the fact, that I was already not a believer anyway—I just hadn’t proved it yet. Meaning, it’s exactly the same as someone who knows the axioms of geometry thereby knows that the sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 degrees, but no child before eighth grade—whenever they teach that—knows it, right? Why not? He doesn’t know it in the conscious sense, but it’s information that is included within what he does know. So I’m only bringing this as a parable: if we treat inquiry as a kind of logical enterprise, as a kind of logical argument, then inquiry basically just brings out from within what is already there. And therefore the fear of inquiry seems to me perhaps even stronger precisely because people know they may discover things they don’t realize are already there inside. If someone were fully convinced about what was inside him, I wouldn’t expect him to be so afraid of inquiry, because in the end, what’s the problem? I mean, you’re a believer, right? So no problem—expose it more, uncover your faith even more. Maimonides says there is value in inquiry even for a person who already believes. So there’s something here that… again, not every inquiry is logic, but logic is a good parable for this issue because there you see very sharply that there is nothing in the conclusion that wasn’t already in the premises. And if this inquiry leads me to a state of unbelief, that means I was already not a believer to begin with. And then if I hadn’t inquired, I would have remained a hidden unbeliever—but still an unbeliever. So the question is whether there is really anything to lose from inquiry. In other words, the whole issue of fears—what I said before—that conception that because of the fear you mustn’t do it, seems to me a bit problematic. Now from here, of course, comes the second stage, which says: fine, even if this can… expose the fact that I do believe, the question is whether that has value. You can argue about it. You can say: I believe anyway, so maybe it has no value; therefore there’s no point in someone who already believes engaging in inquiry. That’s what I discussed there with Duties of the Heart and Ibn Ezra. Maimonides, of course, clearly disagrees with that, because he sees inquiry as something—again, continuing with the geometry parable—something that reveals more and more from within the things I believe. And therefore, on the contrary, the more I inquire, the more valuable that faith becomes, because then I know exactly what I believe in, I understand the implications, I know how to derive conclusions from it; it’s not just some raw, simple kind of faith whose value is actually less. Now here, in the end, I really want to get to what you said earlier, and I’ll keep going with this domino parable. Every argument—again, I’m taking logic as a parable for philosophical inquiry in general—every argument begins with basic premises. And so there’s another common mistake in these debates between inquiry and simple faith, because obviously inquiry is not an alternative to simple faith. It simply isn’t. There’s no such thing. Someone who doesn’t believe with simple faith won’t become a believer through inquiry either. And why not? Exactly for the same reason I said before: because a logical argument merely reveals what is already inside me. So when I ask myself what premises I’m going to assume when I set out on this inquiry—such premises can be adopted in all sorts of ways, of all sorts of kinds—and they won’t be the result of inquiry, those premises. The premises are the infrastructure from which I begin this inquiry. Those premises can definitely be—and usually, in my opinion, that’s what happens—drawn from beliefs we already have. And now if I understand it that way, then inquiry and simple faith are not two alternatives at all; they are simply two consecutive stages. You can argue about whether the second has value or not, but they are two consecutive stages. It’s not a competition at all. There is a first stage, which is the basic beliefs, the premises. From there onward I can now try to derive conclusions logically or philosophically. Okay? Once I’ve posited premises that include faith, the conclusions will be conclusions of faith. And if I posit different premises, then the conclusions will be different. So what determines whether I believe or not? The premises, not the logic I do on the basis of the premises. After all, if the premises determine it, then we are all simple believers. In the end there is only the option of simple faith; there is no option of faith that comes from inquiry, because inquiry begins—by the same reasoning I gave before—because the conclusion of the inquiry is ultimately contained within the premises. If you take those premises, you are basically a believer.

[Speaker B] It’s a bit simplistic, because even in logic you have lots of premises, and sometimes your inquiries lead you to give up certain premises. In other words, it’s the same thing here too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a place where I discover—

[Speaker B] Here too, in inquiry about simple faith, I’ll have all kinds of premises. It could be that some of my premises contain heresy, and then in the end I’ll have to use inquiry to give up some premises in favor of others.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very good, but then that dilemma too was already there from the outset. Again, inquiry doesn’t do anything that wasn’t there beforehand.

[Speaker B] It comes to reveal that there is a contradiction between the premises and then to throw one of them out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, and then that means that through this you discover what you really think in the end. It’s still the same thing. In the end, logic cannot convert a person. Logic can only reveal to him which religion he belonged to all along. And therefore this whole way of setting them against each other—faith versus inquiry—logic is just a mirror.

[Speaker B] What? It puts a mirror in front of his eyes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A mirror or an analytical tool. It’s not just a plain mirror, but a mirror that also helps me analyze, yes.

[Speaker B] So the basic premises are the result of simple faith?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Not necessarily simple faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, but how do we arrive at basic premises? There aren’t any arguments that justify them; rather, I believe that this is true. How do I know that between two points there passes one straight line? It’s obvious to me that it’s true. I call that belief—simple faith, I would even say. There’s no proof for it. Right, but it’s true.

[Speaker B] You can’t go through the—

[Speaker C] —the door suddenly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. There’s something in the way this problem is presented that is terribly problematic. They present it as two alternatives and then discuss what’s preferable and what’s not preferable, and maybe this is better and maybe that is worse, and these fears and those fears, when in fact these are not two alternatives at all—they’re simply the first floor and the second floor. Now, you can say that once you’re on the first floor, don’t bother with the second floor—it has no value. Fine, there are people who advocate that approach. Others think it is worth dealing with the second floor. But the fears and this competitive conception, that either you’re here or you’re there—there’s something very problematic there, I think. And one last point that I’ll try to get to as well is what you remarked earlier about confusion, because so far I’ve only discussed the assumption that I’m a perfect investigator—not successful at it. Okay? Then there really is room to say: look, since inquiry in itself is not something we object to in principle—again, that’s not what he’s talking about. He’s not talking about the confusions and fears; he’s talking about the value of innocence in itself, not because of the problems it may create. But I’m speaking more generally. Okay? So there is a bit of room to discuss it there too, and there too I’m doubtful, because it’s true that I might get confused, and still—what do you suggest? That you make the decisions for me? I’m supposed to reach the decision. If it really is someone who needs the inquiry in order to reach that conclusion—as I discussed last time—you can’t tell him not to do it because maybe he’ll get confused. What you can say, perhaps, is that if there’s someone who believes with simple faith and it’s already clear to him, then don’t get into all this nonsense. It could be—

[Speaker B] —that there will be mistakes there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then you’ll force yourself—and this actually happens quite a lot, by the way, this is a serious claim—you’ll force yourself to give up your simple faith because of philosophical considerations, because you don’t know how to answer them, like for example the room with the furniture, and here you’ll make a mistake. And this is an important point—just a second—this is an important point, because it really seems to me that people have a certain unjustified contempt for our intuitive conclusions. Meaning, if someone says, “I believe because that’s my intuition, I simply see it; it’s like I see a wall”—oh, that’s not rational, let’s see the considerations and the arguments. Have you checked that argument and this argument? And the assumption is as though if you work with arguments then you’re more sophisticated, and maybe the arguments will also lead you to throw away your original intuitions—especially if you run into contradictions, as you said earlier, and then you’ll have to throw one of them out. And there are countless examples of philosophers who fell into exactly that problem. Take an example not about faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, but faith in free choice. There is no human being who doesn’t believe in it, right? But there are many people whose philosophical doctrine is deterministic. Why? Because when they carry out the logical inquiry, define the concepts, ask the questions, they have no answer. So there’s no choice—I have to throw out my intuition. They don’t understand that these questions too, or these inquiries too, are the result of other intuitions. Because after all there is no conclusion without some premises that begin it, and the premises are always intuitive premises. And therefore now you have to verify, go back, if you really want to do philosophical work—exactly—verify the two intuitions against one another and decide which one is stronger. But someone who isn’t skilled in this—and there are many who aren’t skilled in this—there really is a genuine problem here. And that is the only point where I do understand this approach of innocence. The point that says people don’t understand the fact that when you have a good intuition, a logical argument also should not so quickly cause you to throw it away. Check carefully what the basic premises of the logical argument are, and see whether they are based on some intuition that is stronger than this intuition. Because without that, don’t be quick to throw it away. And many people don’t understand this. Therefore I think maybe there is room for this claim—of course, not in the case of someone who needs inquiry in order to arrive at faith, but in the case of someone who is already there and says, fine, but let’s examine it in order to be better grounded. Here they tell him: listen, equip yourself well with the tools, understand well what these tools are saying, and then there’s no problem, you can do everything. But many people don’t understand this, and therefore there may indeed be—

[Speaker B] But here, if you tell someone not to use logical tools before—