A Look at Torah and Torah Study – Lesson 17 – Rabbi Michael Abraham

All right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time we dealt with the meaning of command, and we’ll see — or I already noted — that it really has two, it goes in two directions, two meanings. One meaning is to define the realm of Jewish law. Simply, whatever falls under command is what’s called Jewish law. There are other parts of the Torah that are not commands — stories, I don’t know, recommendations, all kinds of things like that — they don’t belong to the legal side of the Torah. So that defines this category called Jewish law. Beyond that, of course, command also takes part in the mode of observance. Because we said that fulfilling a commandment, or any law, has religious value when it comes out of obligation to the command. Meaning, if by chance you do some act that also happens to be a commandment, you didn’t perform a commandment. Meaning yes, the possible example here is — yes, the pioneers who drained swamps here at the beginning of the immigration to the Land, the beginning of modern Zionism — those who didn’t believe, and didn’t do it out of obligation to Torah or commandments, did not fulfill the commandment of settling the Land. They did acts of settling the Land, but that has no meaning as a commandment, because you’re not doing it out of obligation to the command; you’re doing it out of some kind of national feeling, and that doesn’t mean it has no value, and it also doesn’t mean we don’t owe them gratitude for what they did. But the religious value of an act is determined by the question whether it was done in order to fulfill the divine command. Same thing. Same thing, everything is the same. Meaning all acts, even moral acts, have no religious value — again, they have no religious value unless they come in order to fulfill the command. That’s the meaning of legal value, religious value, I don’t know what to call it. It has moral value, but even that is conditioned on your giving charity in order to fulfill the moral command, even if it’s not the religious command. Fine, we’ll talk about doing something not for its own sake later — no, we’ll talk about that later. Meaning, the fact that someone gives you a forecast — look, if you do this, maybe you’ll eventually come to do that act with religious value. Fine. The question, though, is what the value of the act is right now. You’re talking about something instrumental. Meaning, it’s worth doing even this way, even though it has no value, because later on it’ll bring you to do things that do have value. Fine. That’s a different discussion.

[Speaker B] What about, say, repentance, and then his past actions afterward? If intentional sins can become merits, or something like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Intentional sins become merits only in the sense of how the Holy One, blessed be He, sees it now. But the act doesn’t receive religious value if it didn’t have religious value. I don’t think so, it doesn’t seem that way to me.

[Speaker C] Meaning, he did an act — he didn’t intend to violate anything, he did a good act, but then he didn’t believe, and now he repented — does he now, retroactively, get reward for it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t seem so to me. Again, by reasoning — I don’t know, I’m not worthy enough — but by reasoning it doesn’t seem so to me. No. What was done, was done. You can say that the Holy One, blessed be He, will give you merits as if that act had been a commandment. Fine, but that’s already the question of how the Holy One, blessed be He, relates to you as you are now, because after all, what does He care what you did in the past? Meaning, He sees you according to what you are now. So if you repented, and that act contributed something to your present spiritual state, then no problem: He’ll relate to you as if you were a person who accumulated commandments all his life. But that doesn’t repaint the act retroactively. Meaning, the act that was done was done with the motivations with which it was done, and that’s what determines its nature. Meaning, I don’t think you can speak about it in that sense; otherwise it sounds like some kind of scriptural decree with no logic at all. Okay? What else? This determination that intentional sins become merits, or become accidental sins, is a rabbinic determination. Meaning, it’s not written explicitly in the Torah. So the sages apparently said it on the basis of some sort of reasoning. As a matter of reasoning, I don’t see it. Meaning, you can say that the Holy One, blessed be He, now sees me as righteous — fine, all true — but a reasoning that says the act retroactively receives value, I don’t see the logic in that. Yes, it reminds me a little bit — here I’m drifting a bit — but it reminds me a bit of a woman who was divorced on condition that she not drink wine. Fine? Let’s say, on condition that she not drink wine for ten years. After a year she married someone else, they had children. Fine? Nine years passed from the divorce, eight years from the second marriage, and now she wants to drink wine. Fine? She’s seized by a fit. So she comes to drink wine. Now, is she forbidden to drink the wine? Why?

[Speaker D] Because the divorce is conditional.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, a condition is not an obligation. I didn’t undertake anything. You divorce me on condition that I not drink wine. If I drink wine, then the divorce doesn’t take effect. Does that obligate me not to drink wine? Of course not. I’ll do whatever I want. Fine, okay, but can I drink wine? Ah, that’s the point. Meaning, it’s clear that the condition doesn’t obligate me not to drink wine, right? A condition can’t obligate me to anything. The Holy One, blessed be He, obligates me to do things, not conditions. You, the husband — or not matter, the giver — he can’t obligate me to do things. He can say, “Look, if you do certain things, I’m not willing to do my side of the matter.” Meaning, the divorce that I’m giving you, I’m simply not willing to do if you drink wine. Fine. So she can undo it, but she can now drink wine or not drink wine as she wishes, right? The condition doesn’t turn it into a prohibition for her. Except what? That now, if she drinks wine, the divorce will be void. If the divorce is void, then she’s basically committed adultery, the second husband — that wasn’t a valid marriage because she’s married to the first husband — so there was adultery, and not only adultery, but the children are illegitimate. Okay. Now the question is whether it’s forbidden for her to drink wine — I’m repeating the question. Is it permitted for her to drink, and turn all her marital relations into illicit ones and the children into illegitimate children? You might say it would be advisable for her—

[Speaker D] Not to do it, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Advisable is a different matter. I’m asking whether it’s permitted. No, she can, of course she can. The question is whether it’s permitted, whether she commits a prohibition by drinking the wine. Not a simple question. My straightforward inclination — there’s some Talmudic passage in Nedarim on 14a I think, or something like that, from which it seems this is a dispute among Amoraim, but I’m not sure. But my simple view is that it’s permitted. Because there isn’t — I’m saying, I don’t have clear proofs, but the reasoning is that it’s permitted. Why? That’s why it came to mind because of the previous discussion: because there is no prohibition against turning an act of intercourse into illicit intercourse. There is a prohibition on having illicit intercourse — that’s certainly forbidden. But intercourse that happened, as it happened, happened permissibly when it happened at that time, right? Now I turn it retroactively into illicit intercourse. There is… what?

[Speaker D] A conditional permission.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Through the condition. No, fine, but right now is it permitted for me to do this, right? What?

[Speaker D] It was always conditional.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, conditional. But I’m saying, in the end, what was done was already done. The fact that I drink the — the fact that I drink the wine now, what does that do, repaint the act differently? Why? Again, of course it will make the divorce a non-divorce, yes, that’s clear, because the divorce was only conditional. But was there an act of prohibition in the action that I did? Maybe you can even say that, I’m not sure. And the drinking of the wine — drinking the wine is turning that earlier act into a forbidden act. Is the act of turning it into that itself a prohibition? Where in the Torah’s 613 commandments is there a prohibition against turning an action into a prohibited one? There’s a prohibition against doing prohibited acts — that’s prohibited. But is there a prohibition against turning some act into a prohibited act? I’m not sure. There’s an interpersonal issue here with regard to her children; they become illegitimate, it ruins their whole life, of course. Fine. But I’m talking about the essential prohibition of drinking the wine, not the results and consequences and interpersonal issues. Rather, is there a prohibition? Is she, when she drinks wine, actually violating adultery? Is there “be killed rather than transgress” over wine? Yes, maybe now I’m thinking of that practical implication. They threaten her with a gun to drink wine, okay? Is that “be killed rather than transgress”? Meaning, sexual immorality is one of the things for which one must be killed rather than transgress, right? Now if she drinks the wine, then the earlier relations became sexual immorality. So is there “be killed rather than transgress” over drinking wine? I think not. In a question that will collapse the whole— whatever she’d prefer is beside the point. I’m asking what she is obligated to do. What she prefers, let her decide for herself. I’m asking what Jewish law expects of her, what she is obligated to do.

[Speaker D] We reached an impossible situation. Right. And now you choose between the two.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Now I’m asking what she is obligated to choose according to Jewish law. Does she have to give up her life not to drink the wine? If drinking the wine itself were a prohibition of “be killed rather than transgress,” okay? Then that basically means there’s “be killed rather than transgress” on drinking wine, meaning it’s adultery. Drinking the wine is itself adultery. And I claim not — drinking the wine is not adultery. It turns an act that was already done into an act of adultery. The turning of the act into an act of adultery is not itself adultery. In itself it has no prohibition. And that’s why I say it reminded me of this, because you asked whether repentance goes back and repaints the act done there. I don’t think so. In repentance it’s the mirror image. In repentance too, you’re commanded to repent. There’s a result, that the act is now considered merits and not intentional sins. It doesn’t really turn that act into another act. That act that was done was done, okay? You now have an obligation to repent, and maybe they’ll have claims against you if you didn’t repent. But that’s a prohibition concerning repentance. For example: do I have an obligation now to repent for Sabbath desecration? Do I have an obligation to repent now at the level that, if I don’t repent, it’s Sabbath desecration? Because if I don’t repent, then I still have the Sabbath desecration, and if I do repent, then I’ve undone my Sabbath desecration, right? So in that sense, the act of repenting now is an act of Sabbath desecration. Meaning, I’m basically — yes, and if you like, with idolatry or adultery, I return to the same question: is there “be killed rather than transgress” on repenting? Am I obligated to repent because otherwise I’m committing idolatry or adultery or something like that? Not plausible, right? It’s not plausible. Why? It does indeed change that earlier act so that it now gets some other status — it’s considered merits or the opposite, yes, depending whether toward liability or merit. But it’s not that the act itself now suddenly becomes a transgression into a commandment, or a commandment into a transgression. The act, when it was done, was done as it was there and then. A person is judged as he is at that moment, like with Ishmael and so on. So this coloring backward, I don’t think can be understood as a real retroactive change of reality. That’s not it. Rather there is a different relation now to what was. Meaning, from this point on, I look at what was in a different way. Okay. I talk about this a bit in the Sunday series, where I deal with philosophy of time — whether it’s possible to go back in time, change things retroactively, and things of that sort.

[Speaker D] Now when you talk about intentional sins, it suddenly occurs to me how intentional sins become merits. Suppose there’s someone who never gave charity, and everyone knew he didn’t give charity, and he stubbornly didn’t give charity on purpose. Then when he does start giving charity, both society and Heaven see how he changed his nature, and now from the fact that before he didn’t give and now he does give, all the times he didn’t give also become merits, because he changed his nature, he changed—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He changed, fine. So from now on, from the moment he changed, everything’s fine.

[Speaker D] And everyone knows — from the fact that Heaven knows he changed — so every time he gives now also colors the previous time… why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand why. What do you mean everyone knows, Heaven knows? What is that… If I did an act now, fine, from now on I’m righteous and I deserve all the treatment due to a righteous person. Why does that color what was differently?

[Speaker D] Because now it comes from the complete opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So his righteousness has greater significance. Okay. Fine. And then does that earlier act suddenly become Sabbath desecration? No.

[Speaker D] Or adultery?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It becomes also—

[Speaker D] Yes, some kind of something…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. But I’m saying: is that only in the sense of what spiritual level I’m on, or how much reward I deserve, or does it really become illicit intercourse? Is there “be killed rather than transgress” on drinking the wine? Let’s return to the example I brought. I don’t see why.

Okay, so basically last time, toward the end, I said that the fulfillment of a commandment gets value from responding to command. Meaning, if you do it because you’re obligated by the command — and any other motive you have for doing that commandment is basically devoid of religious value. And we discussed one who worships idols out of love or fear and is exempt, as Maimonides writes, unless he accepted it upon himself as a god. Accepting it as a god means obligation to command, right? Because a god is basically a factor such that the very fact that it speaks obligates. That’s what’s called a god. That’s why judges are called gods; we talked about that. And then I noted that on the face of it, this looks like something irrational. Meaning, you’re basically doing something even though you have no real reason to do it. And then we talked about altruistic actions. You remember that a bit, right? We talked about altruistic actions, meaning an act that I do out of a value-based motive and not out of some interest or other. Even love and fear of the Holy One, blessed be He — which are also, in a sense, some kind of interest. Because the value-based motive is really to do the truth because it is true. And you have to understand that when we talk about justifications — say ethical justifications, or legal justifications, or whatever — every chain of reasoning ultimately stops at some principle that no longer needs a further justification, right? Otherwise we’re in an infinite regress. Meaning, I ask why is this correct? Because of that. And why is that correct? Because of that. Turtles all the way down, yes, you know that story. Meaning, the chain has to stop, otherwise you haven’t really given a justification. Where does it stop? It stops at some principle such that if you ask “why” about it, the answer will be: that’s just how it is. Yes, some sort of axiom. Now an axiom itself — I didn’t say it exactly this way, but that’s really what stands behind what I’ve been discussing in the previous sessions — an axiom can be understood in two ways. You can understand an axiom as something arbitrary, and you can understand an axiom as something true in and of itself. It doesn’t require justification on the basis of other principles outside itself, because it is the basic principle. Because when I justify something, I justify it on the basis of something more understood than it, right? Otherwise there’s no point explaining principle A by means of principle B if principle B is no more understandable than principle A. That’s just an English-English dictionary, right? Meaning, that’s an explanation that doesn’t help us at all. So it turns out that I explain this by some clearer principle, and that principle by an even clearer one. Where does it stop? At the clearest principle — meaning at a principle than which there is nothing more self-evident, such that if I depended on it I’d gain something, meaning I’d get an explanation. Explanation is basically clarifying for me something that right now isn’t entirely clear. Now if I’ve reached something that is clearest to me, or most grounded from my perspective, then it makes no sense to justify it on the basis of something else. You can justify other things on the basis of it, but you can’t justify it itself, because I have nothing clearer than it. That’s the starting point. Now when you look at it that way, it means the axiom is not what people often think. It’s not something arbitrary. Rather, it’s what Descartes would call evident — something with inner clarity, natural clarity, meaning it’s understood from within itself. It’s self-evident. It’s not something that requires justifications from outside itself, additional justifications. It’s obvious, and therefore now I can start building on it. In that sense, yes, when we talk about, I don’t know, mathematical axioms — through two points there passes only one straight line, okay? One of the axioms of geometry. Okay? What is that? So in our simple, ordinary way of looking, this is basically something self-evident. It’s understood from itself. You look — after all, it’s an axiom, we have no proof based on more basic assumptions, right? It’s an axiom. Why is it true? Because I see it. Through two points there passes one straight line, no more. There’s some natural, inner, inherent clarity to it. But when you look at it as a mathematician, it’s arbitrary. It’s not self-evident. Because we’re looking at two points in our space, which is Euclidean space. One second. In our space, in our Euclidean space, it’s self-evident that between two points there’s only one straight line, no more. But when a mathematician talks about Euclidean geometry, he doesn’t see anything in front of his eyes. He says: let’s define a space that is Euclidean. It has to satisfy four or five axioms of Euclidean geometry. That is arbitrary. Now once those are the four or five axioms — I don’t remember how many there are, one of them I think was dependent, I don’t remember whether we ended with four or five, but never mind — the axioms of Euclidean geometry define a geometric space with those assumptions, and from there on I can derive all kinds of theorems. If it’s fertile and interesting enough and I can prove all sorts of theorems, then it’s an interesting field for the mathematician. The question whether there are aspects of reality to which that mathematical theory can be useful — that’s a question for the physicist, not the mathematician. The physicist has to determine whether our space is a straight, Euclidean space, or not. If it’s a straight space, I can take Euclidean geometry and apply it here, and then it becomes self-evident. But as a mathematical theory it is arbitrary. I could define any set of axioms I want, as long as I’m consistent and prove theorems on the basis of those axioms — all good, it’s a perfectly legitimate mathematical field. Regarding axioms there’s no sense in asking whether it’s true or false. That’s the meaning of an axiom in mathematics. There’s no such thing as true. In contrast to what I described before, where the axiom is self-evident and clearly true, so there’s no point asking if it’s true or not, for mathematicians an axiom is: this is how I decided. Meaning, I define it this way. That’s all. There’s no true or false here. If you don’t want it, don’t take it, don’t go with it. What do I care? I’m not claiming it’s a claim about reality. I’m saying that if these are the definitions, then I can prove certain results on their basis. Okay? So that’s exactly the two kinds of outlook on axioms. For us, the concept of axiom comes from geometry, from high school — that’s where we met it. And in geometry we’re very used to an axiom being self-evident. But mathematicians are used to an axiom being arbitrary. Meaning, you define a set of definitions, and now let’s see: group, set, vector field, doesn’t matter — some concepts for which you offer a definition, a collection of features, and from there you start seeing whether you can prove properties and theorems about them. So for them an axiom is arbitrary. There’s no problem developing a geometry in which through two points pass three straight lines, not one. That doesn’t fit our ordinary straight space. So what? But it’s a mathematical theory, and if you preserve consistency and prove everything in accordance with the definitions and fundamental principles, then all is well. It’s a perfectly kosher mathematical theory. Okay?

So because of this confusion in our relation to axioms, that often gets projected onto other fields too. For example, ethics or Jewish law. When we hit an axiom like this — I observe this because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded — and then they ask: but tell me, why observe what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded? My answer is: that’s just how it is. Fine, then you’re irrational. Because you’re doing something that has no justification for you. You have no explanation. Okay? Not true. This is the basic principle on whose basis I explain other things. I don’t need to explain it — not that I can’t, but I don’t need to explain it — because it’s self-evident. So for me, if the Holy One, blessed be He, commands, then it is self-evident that one must obey. I don’t need explanations here. On the contrary, if you ask me why I keep the Sabbath, I’ll tell you because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. Then you come back and ask: and why obey what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded? The answer is: because that’s just how it is. What does that mean? You can say “that’s just how it is” in an arbitrary sense. “Because I feel like it. I flipped a coin, and this morning I woke up on the side of yes, I’ll observe what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. Tomorrow maybe I’ll wake up the other way.” Okay? That’s one way to understand “that’s just how it is.” Because “that’s just how it is” sounds like some sort of straw dismissal, something arbitrary. But no. The “that’s just how it is” that I’m talking about here is one that is self-evident. Meaning, it’s obvious — I don’t need to give an explanation, because it is the most self-evident principle I have. Other things I’ll explain on its basis, but I have no way of explaining it on the basis of things even more self-evident. I have no things more self-evident. Okay? Now again, that’s for me. Everyone has to decide for himself what is self-evident in his eyes. But I’m saying that when Maimonides talks here about an act having religious value only if you do it out of obligation to command, what he really means is that obligation to command is the “that’s just how it is” that begins the whole system, on which all religious justification is based. Okay? I do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. Fine, why? Because that’s just how it is. If He commanded, you do it, period. And very often when people ask you — think about it — when they ask you, or whoever, why do you keep commandments, or why obey what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded — let’s say the Holy One, blessed be He, indeed commanded, and we accepted the claim that there was a revelation at Sinai and He gave the Torah. Suppose we got past all the factual and historical obstacles. It happened. Okay. So what? So He appeared at Sinai and gave the Torah — so what? Why should I observe it? Here people almost always get stuck. What will you explain? Because He knows best what’s good for us? Fine, I know better what’s good for me. What exactly is your claim? What do you want from someone who doesn’t do it? The only way, I think, to justify or ground such a thing is to say: because that’s just how it is. But not in the arbitrary sense — rather in the self-evident sense. Meaning, if God who created the world and us commanded, then it’s completely obvious that there is an obligation to obey what He commands. Now for someone to whom that isn’t obvious — it isn’t obvious. What can I do? There are also people to whom quantum theory isn’t obvious. Fine. There are things I can’t explain, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t true. It means I have no way of explaining them to you if you don’t agree with me. Okay. That doesn’t undermine my own view. Meaning, it doesn’t mean I can now convince you. That’s another discussion.

[Speaker F] As long as you’re not really coming to coerce someone else, then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do whatever you want? No, it could be that I’d also coerce. If in my value system there’s also an issue of coercing someone, then I’ll also coerce.

[Speaker F] So now you’re telling me — I mean — I’ll coerce you, and I’m telling you I don’t want that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you don’t want it, then I’ll beat you until you do want it. “We compel him until he says, ‘I want to.’” I’m saying again: I’m against coercion. But the claim that this is self-evident for me and you disagree does not in itself prevent coercion. Because from my perspective it is entirely true. The fact that you don’t agree and don’t see it — fine, then you’re wrong. Someone who wants to commit suicide — often you’d stop him, right? Or many of us would stop him, right? Why? He doesn’t agree with you. He thinks it’s right to kill himself now. No, because I know better than he does what is good for him. That’s the… So I’m saying, here too it could be the same kind of thing. Again, I’m not saying that’s actually my view — it isn’t. But on the principled level, there’s no barrier to that being so. Meaning, I don’t think that once I present my view this way, that obligates me not to coerce others. No, not at all.

[Speaker F] Yes, I understand. But it’s still — it’s frightening. Right. Because there’s some absolute truth you’re holding, some kind of fundamentalism, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With whom there’s no way to talk. Right.

[Speaker F] That’s why when people hear this they panic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. I totally understand why they panic. You don’t need to explain that to me.

[Speaker F] And when people suddenly think about some Jewish-law state and those kinds of steps, the fear starts. I’m telling you honestly, I’m like, wow… me too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I hadn’t thought—

[Speaker F] About things like that at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Me too, but the fact that people are afraid is not an argument.

[Speaker F] So I start becoming a democrat, like, because they also think…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Me too, but that’s not an argument. Just yesterday I read — I had some correspondence with a woman about this — there was some article in Haaretz, someone sent it to me, about—

[Speaker D] Some—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Principle, about some organization called Yachin, I think, which is supposedly the replacement for Kohelet but in a religious direction — not in the conservative-liberal direction, but in a religious one. With some goal of taking over the army, changing military morality, then state institutions, and things like that. Some kind of hardline Religious Zionist thing. What?

[Speaker D] Conservative-liberal sounds contradictory.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not contradictory — conservative and liberal are synonyms. But there’s a conceptual corruption today. Liberal, in the standard definitions, is right-wing. Somehow today things got mixed up.

[Speaker F] Today people say liberal and mean left-wing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, of course. Liberal is right-wing. If you ask in America, liberals are the Republicans, not the Democrats. Meaning, they’re the liberals. Economic liberalism means everyone does what he wants — that’s economic liberalism. Meaning, the government doesn’t get involved. That’s right-wing, not left-wing. Fine, leave it, never mind.

[Speaker D] So this whole thing where they’re acting out of a kind of panic…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, for us it’s the same as there, everything came from there. אצלנו it’s the same, nothing different.

[Speaker F] The thought that people grasp this as absolute truth and then say, yes, I can coerce…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, I’m afraid just like you are. Fine. But that still isn’t an argument. Okay, he thinks this is the truth and he thinks he should coerce you — right, so I’m afraid. Okay, what can I do? Fear is not an argument. I’m saying…

[Speaker F] No, it means the argument from the other side says that people who talk in this style need to be kicked out of the game.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, absolutely. Absolutely, absolutely. Of course. All true. And it still isn’t an argument against them. I defend myself, fine, because I also have my truths and I also don’t accept their truths. Fine. So I’ll defend myself. But from their perspective, the fact that this is based on some sort of “that’s just how it is” doesn’t mean they won’t also conclude that it should be imposed on others. Because for them it really is true. It’s not “just because.” Again, if that “because” were arbitrary, you’d be right. And if it’s arbitrary, then what are you coercing me for? You yourself don’t think it’s true — you just feel like doing it. That’s why I say: but here it’s a different kind of “because.” It’s not the arbitrary sort. It’s “because it’s clearly true.” And whoever doesn’t see that is blind. It’s like someone who wants to commit suicide. The common assumption is that you try to prevent it. Why? That’s what he wants. You think he shouldn’t, but he thinks he should. And there’s some assumption here that says: right, he thinks so, I have no way of convincing him, but I know better than he does what is right for him. Okay? That’s a kind of paternalism, right? Now anyone who is certain of his truth will naturally feel such paternalism toward others. It’s built in. By the way, I heard now — there’s a podcast called “One a Day,” maybe you’ve heard it? Very nice, I think. They just finished a four-part series called “Partner,” and there they talk about some mentally ill guy who was hospitalized in a psychiatric ward, and there was another woman hospitalized there who helped him commit suicide. He planned to commit suicide and she helped him, and there’s a clause in the law, section 302 I think, something like that, about assisting suicide, punishable by up to twenty years. She herself was hospitalized in a psychiatric ward, so there were discussions there: first, whether she was responsible for her actions, since she too was hospitalized in a psychiatric ward. No, not everyone hospitalized in a psychiatric ward is not responsible for his actions — you’ve gone too far. But yes, that requires examination, that’s one point. And the second point was whether her assistance really counted as significant assistance. And the third point was whether one can sue someone at all for assisting, since he did it of his own free will. He really wanted to do it; I just helped him. So what happened? I don’t get it. He did it. Without me he couldn’t have done it. Okay, but he made the decision, he did it, right, exactly. Meaning, what do you want from me? The question is: what is the logic of the prohibition on assisting suicide at all? Beyond whether there was assistance here and whether she is responsible for her actions — why on earth sue someone for assisting suicide? I mean, in the end someone carried out what he wanted. By the way, suicide itself is not illegal according to the law, you should understand that. No, what the person who killed himself did was not against the law. There’s no law forbidding suicide — that’s what they said there in the podcast. What, suicide? Ah, okay. No, by the way, it’s not absurd, because a suicide attempt can fail.

[Speaker E] No, so there would be punishment if you failed and didn’t succeed, because the one who actually commits suicide obviously can’t be punished, so he goes to hell. So in order to spare people who want to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s like the renewal of ordination, yes — lash him in order to exempt him from excision. Exactly. Lash him so as to exempt him from excision, exactly. Yes. Anyway, back to our topic. It just came to mind because we were talking about suicide. So in short, that’s why I say we have to understand the meaning of command, which has two implications. One implication is the definition of the domain called Jewish law, and the second implication is how I observe Jewish law. I need to observe it מתוך obligation to command, and whatever arises from commands — that’s the category called Jewish law. So it’s very important to clarify this concept, command. And here I move to our next source. Yes, in a moment. So until now we talked about “acceptance as a god” in Maimonides, yes, that you need to do commandments out of obligation. Look at another source in Maimonides that really says the same thing. Maimonides in chapter 8 of Laws of Kings — is it there?

[Speaker F] Yes, here it is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. Hold onto the table tightly, you’ll hear it by heart. “Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to observe them” — the context there is a resident alien. “Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to observe them is among the righteous of the nations of the world and has a share in the world to come — provided that he accepts them and observes them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses our teacher that the descendants of Noah had previously been commanded concerning them. But if he observes them because reason has determined them, he is not a resident alien and is not among the righteous of the nations of the world, but rather among their wise.” There are versions that read “and not among their wise,” but the more plausible version is “rather among their wise.” What Maimonides is basically saying here is repeating the same idea we saw also in Laws of Idolatry. Maimonides is basically saying that if you do not observe the commandments out of obligation to the command at Sinai, the divine command at Sinai, then it is not a commandment. You did a good act — meaning, you are among the wise of the nations of the world — but not among their righteous. “Their righteous” means it has no religious value. You are a good, wise, moral person — for Maimonides, that’s all the same. So you are a good person, but it doesn’t have religious value. Now Maimonides is speaking about a resident alien, or a non-Jew who keeps the seven Noahide commandments for this reason, but it seems to me straightforwardly by reasoning that the same is true for a Jew, if it’s the same idea. And the same thing comes up in his Commentary on the Mishnah in Chullin. Maimonides writes there — let’s start with the Mishnah. The Mishnah in chapter 7 of Chullin speaks about the sciatic nerve, yes, that’s the chapter on the sciatic nerve. The Mishnah says there: “It applies to a pure animal and does not apply to an impure one.” Meaning, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies to kosher animals. If you ate the sciatic nerve of a non-kosher animal, then you violated the prohibition of eating non-kosher meat, but not the prohibition of the sciatic nerve. Meaning, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve does not exist in an impure animal. Rabbi Yehuda says: even in an impure animal. Meaning, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies also in a non-kosher animal. Rabbi Yehuda said — now he raises an argument against the sages — “But was not the sciatic nerve forbidden from the days of the sons of Jacob, when impure animals were still permitted to them?” The sciatic nerve was said regarding our forefather Jacob, right? “Therefore the children of Israel do not eat the sciatic nerve to this day.” Now at that time, that was before the revelation at Sinai. There was not yet a distinction between impure and pure animals. So if there they tell you the prohibition of the sciatic nerve, then apparently the prohibition applies also in an impure animal, not just in a pure animal. Yes, meaning, both the sciatic nerve and an impure animal. Why not? Why not? What do you mean “we”? I don’t know collective thinking. Everyone thinks what he thinks, I don’t— We thought the patriarchs observed all the commandments before… But we don’t know. Maybe you know, I don’t. There’s a midrash that says the patriarchs observed everything including rabbinic festival cooking arrangements, Abraham our forefather. Fine, that’s an aggadic midrash, you don’t need to take it too far. What? So then did he give them butter and milk there? Fine, but that’s no proof he observed commandments — they were gentiles. You just have no proof he didn’t. Okay. Also phylacteries? Well, it says the Holy One, blessed be He, puts on phylacteries. Okay, fine, aggadic midrashim — don’t take them too literally. So straightforwardly it’s clear that the patriarchs did not observe the Torah. So Rabbi Yehuda says to the sages: if the sciatic nerve existed before the giving of the Torah, and there still was no distinction between pure and impure animals, then apparently the prohibition of the sciatic nerve also applies to an impure animal. So the sages answer him: “It was said at Sinai, only it was written in its place.” This prohibition was really said at Sinai. When the Torah was arranged in a certain way, they put it in the area of the story of Jacob in Genesis. But in fact: “It was said at Sinai, only it was written in its place.” Because after all, if we think about it, the Torah was given at Sinai; Genesis too was given at Sinai. The events that occur in Genesis happened earlier — assuming optimistically that they happened, yes?

[Speaker E] Without Exodus, Genesis wouldn’t have had meaning? What? Without Exodus, Genesis wouldn’t have had meaning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. If Genesis had been given by itself at Sinai, it too would have been Torah, no problem. That’s not the issue, it’s not about Exodus. But without the giving of the Torah, Genesis has no significance. Meaning, the events of Genesis have no significance. Their significance begins to be formed when they are written in the Torah and given at Sinai. Yes? When we say — this is the well-known Magen Avraham — “It is not done in our place to marry off the younger before the elder.” The Magen Avraham brings that there were some who had the custom to marry off daughters in order, because it says, “It is not done in our place.” Since when is Laban the Aramean the Holy One, blessed be He? And the fact that Laban the Aramean decided something turns it into a moral or legal value, or whatever? What exactly are you teaching me from Laban the Aramean? So he says — or rather people answer regarding this — that the Torah wrote, “It is not done in our place.” Why do I care what Laban the Aramean said? But when the Torah writes it, putting it in Laban the Aramean’s mouth, and when the Torah writes such a thing, we understand that it intends to convey to us that indeed this is how one ought to act, or ought not to act — not to give the younger before the elder. Okay? Things get their significance from the fact that they are written in the Torah, not from the fact that Laban said them. Okay? So here too, same thing. The fact that the children of Israel did not eat the sciatic nerve back then in Jacob’s time does not turn it into a commandment. It becomes a commandment from the moment it is written in the Torah and given at Sinai. And that’s what— it seems to me some kind of Judaism—

[Speaker F] That the Torah comes to teach us specifically that it doesn’t come hierarchically, meaning inheritance and those things come according to your deeds, because Jacob merited the birthright not because he — even though he wasn’t the firstborn. So what does that say? That in that period there was an assumption that you get inheritance according to hierarchy, according to your status in the family, and you can’t jump, can’t skip. But Judaism proves that people did skip.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, and today in Judaism it’s also like that. There’s some—

[Speaker F] Something. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Inheritance — the laws of inheritance distribute property very clearly. The firstborn gets a double share, and the rest accordingly, and who inherits and who doesn’t inherit, doesn’t matter whether one is righteous and one isn’t. No. You can be a head of a yeshivah, but you won’t receive the inheritance. Meaning, inheritance — unless the father gives you a gift — but you won’t… The inheritance laws are fixed laws in every case. Meaning, on the contrary, even with heads of yeshivot there are discussions that positions of authority pass by inheritance. That’s not good. Okay, it’s not good, but the Chatam Sofer says that Torah positions of authority really should not pass by inheritance, but it’s not so simple. Meaning, the simple assumption is that they do. And even the Chatam Sofer argues that they do pass by inheritance, unless there is someone else more fitting. But if two people are, say, equally suited, then the heir gets it, the position. Okay? Meaning, inheritance has significance even in spiritual positions.

Anyway, back to our topic. So what… So basically the sages answer Rabbi Yehuda: we think the sciatic nerve applies only in a kosher animal. Ah, but it was said regarding Jacob our forefather, when there still wasn’t any distinction between kosher and non-kosher animals? No. It was said at Sinai, not in Jacob’s time. It happened in Jacob’s time, it’s described in Genesis, but we observe it because it’s written in the Torah, not because it happened to Jacob. That’s one whole approach to Torah. Yes, the Torah was given at Sinai, including Genesis.

[Speaker D] This method — it’s not that I’m now going hierarchically—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, say I discovered in archaeological excavations — say I discovered there was no Jacob our forefather, or that his sons did eat the sciatic nerve after all, and there was no struggle with the angel, and none of it happened. That changes nothing. Once the Torah describes it that way, that’s what obligates us, not the events themselves. And conversely, if all those events really did happen, and Elijah the prophet came and told me that this is exactly how it was, but the Torah had not been given, or it was not written there, then that also would not obligate me. Meaning, in the final analysis, what obligates me is the fact that it’s written in the Torah given at Sinai, not the event that happened. Is there a better example?

[Speaker D] I didn’t understand — what example?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, the sciatic nerve?

[Speaker D] Where there was this condition — they prohibited the sciatic nerve too. Is there another example, or only the—? You’d think they didn’t run into this much in—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, it’s an abstract question.

[Speaker D] Just whether one can think of an example that would be more logical, or are we staying with— an example of what? Of this thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which thing?

[Speaker D] The gap in time — that what obligates is the Torah and not the events.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, this is simply the place where the Mishnah wrote it, but the Mishnah is dealing with the laws of the sciatic nerve, it’s not trying to teach me theological principles. But in the discussion of the sciatic nerve this came up. You’re asking whether it can come up elsewhere? Maybe it can come up elsewhere, I don’t know what…

[Speaker E] Didn’t we learn last semester that the sciatic nerve discussion is only a mask, and in practice what they’re really asking is the theological discussion?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker E] We said that the detailed technical discussions in the Talmud are really there to reveal fundamental principles.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, clearly. But those fundamental principles are what stands behind the prohibition of the sciatic nerve, not the question whether what obligates is the Torah or the events. That’s a meta-legal principle. It’s not the metaphysics that stands behind the laws; it’s simply legal methodology. How does Jewish law work? Is what obligates me the events that happened, or is what obligates me Sinai? That’s a totally different question from what the prohibition of the sciatic nerve expresses. Does the prohibition of the sciatic nerve damage the eternity within splendor and the third part on the left of eternity within splendor? Then that would be some metaphysical layer underlying the prohibition. That’s what I was talking about there. In philosophy of science too, by the way, there’s a division into two kinds of questions — at least I divide it that way. There are questions usually considered philosophy of science, namely the methodology of science: how science works, how you build a theory, how you refute a theory, the significance of experiment, the status of generalization, all kinds of things like that, theoretical entities, discussions of that sort. And there are questions concerning the meaning of particular scientific findings. Say quantum theory has some very surprising findings — do they have philosophical significance? That touches specifically on that scientific field, not on the methodology of science in general. Okay? By analogy, I’m saying that this discussion — whether what obligates is Sinai or the events — has nothing to do with the sciatic nerve. The sciatic nerve is an example, but this is a general meta-methodological discussion about Jewish law. When I spoke there about metaphysical abstractions, I was speaking about questions of the type of quantum theory — namely, what is the meaning of the prohibition of the sciatic nerve? What spiritual idea does it express behind it? What is that idea, if it can even be understood? So Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah there writes as follows: “Set your heart on this great principle brought in this Mishnah, namely their statement: ‘It was forbidden at Sinai.’” And he — now Maimonides explains the sages’ answer to Rabbi Yehuda — “And that is that you must know that everything from which we abstain or that we do today, we do only because of God’s command through Moses, not because God commanded it to prophets before him. For example, we do not eat flesh taken from a living animal not because God forbade flesh taken from a living animal to the descendants of Noah, but because Moses forbade it to us in what he was commanded at Sinai — that flesh taken from a living animal should remain forbidden, meaning that the prohibition stated to the descendants of Noah remains forbidden also to us. Likewise, we do not circumcise because Abraham circumcised himself and the members of his household, but because God commanded us through Moses to circumcise as Abraham, peace be upon him, circumcised. Likewise the sciatic nerve — we do not follow the prohibition of Jacob our forefather, but the command of Moses our teacher. Do you not see that they said: 613 commandments were stated to Moses at Sinai, and all of these are among the commandments?” Maimonides says: the Talmud in Makkot says that 613 commandments were stated to Moses at Sinai, but here we have a whole series of commandments that weren’t said at Sinai, but earlier. Right? Circumcision with Abraham our forefather, the sciatic nerve with Jacob, flesh from a living animal with Noah.

[Speaker D] But that’s not Sinai.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They were said earlier, yes. So why does it say that 613 commandments were said at Sinai? Maimonides says: because even the commandments said earlier have their force because they were said at Sinai. So what if they were said earlier? That’s not what obligates me. Not that we didn’t know — even if we did know, it wouldn’t matter. We need the command at Sinai to give them force, to turn them into a commandment. I think we discussed Tosafot and the Ritva, those who ask why one who is commanded and performs is greater than one who is not commanded and performs. Why? One explanation is the standard, well-known one: if you’re commanded, there’s some evil impulse pushing you to resist. The second explanation says: one who is commanded and performs is greater because besides the act being good in itself, he also responds to a command. So there are two gains when you are commanded and perform. If you’re not commanded and perform, you did a good act, but you didn’t respond to a command. We see there’s some value here — what turns the thing into a commandment is the very fact that you respond to a command, not the act in itself. The act in itself, if there had been no command, would not have been a commandment. What? Your intention when you perform the act is to discharge an obligation. Commandments require intention — not the mystical intentions of the Arizal. Commandments require intention means the intention to discharge an obligation. To discharge an obligation. That’s also true in prayer, by the way. When people talk about intention in prayer, before all the intentions of the words and before everything else, first of all it means the intention to fulfill a commandment, to discharge an obligation.

[Speaker E] Okay. But isn’t there an internal contradiction in saying “greater is one who is commanded and performs”? Why? How can someone not commanded be considered greater if he isn’t commanded at all? He isn’t greater — he’s lesser in a certain sense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s indeed lesser. I didn’t understand — the one not commanded is lesser.

[Speaker E] No, no, I’m just adding another argument against the second opinion. Okay. I didn’t understand—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The second opinion is that the one not commanded is greater?

[Speaker E] He says it’s obvious, yes. Yes, right, that’s what I’m saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it obvious?

[Speaker E] Not just because of those two reasons, but for another reason as well: a person can do something only if he’s commanded. If he’s not commanded, there’s no discussion to begin with.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? What do you mean? I want to do something — here, Abraham our forefather made festival cooking arrangements according to that midrash I mentioned earlier. He did it as one who is not commanded and performs, because he understood that it was an act — he understood the plain metaphysical meaning. He says: I understand that behind this act there is some spiritual value, and therefore I do it. And the fact that it is done voluntarily would seem to make it even greater than one who does it only because he is commanded. That’s why the sages had to say that one who is commanded and performs is greater, because the simple intuition is the opposite. The simple intuition says that one who does it voluntarily is greater. He did it without being commanded because he understood that this is the right act to do.

[Speaker F] Even though he isn’t commanded.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Anyway, here in this Maimonides we have something very similar to the Maimonides we saw in Laws of Kings. Maimonides in Laws of Kings says: when does your act have religious value? When you do it because of the command given to Moses at Sinai, right? Here too he says the same thing. Everything we do as a commandment is because of the command at Sinai — not because it’s good, not because Jacob did so, not because Abraham did so, but because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. And this joins up with “acceptance as a god” and all the other examples and sources we saw in Maimonides, who really understands that religious action has value only if it is done מתוך obligation to command. What? Why? Because that’s just how it is. Because what the Holy One, blessed be He, commands — it’s self-evident that it must be done.

Still, a side note — it’s not important to the main flow, but it is important for understanding these sources. What’s written here isn’t exactly the same as what’s written in Laws of Kings. What’s written in Laws of Kings is the question of what my motivation should be when I come to perform a commandment. And my motivation should be obligation to command. What’s written here in the Commentary on the Mishnah doesn’t touch my motivation. The whole question here is a theoretical meta-legal one: what obligates me to do this? It doesn’t matter right now what is in my consciousness when I do it. Rather, this is a question in the theory of Jewish law: what obligates me to do things? The events, what happened to Jacob our forefather, or the command at Sinai? I’ll give you an example to sharpen this. In Israeli law, the legislator doesn’t really care whether you pay taxes in order to fulfill the legislator’s command, or because you’re afraid, or because of habit. The legislator couldn’t care less, as long as you did what was required. Right? And law enforcement certainly doesn’t care. “The legislator” is just shorthand. Therefore, Maimonides’ question in Laws of Kings is completely irrelevant to ordinary law, to Israeli law, to secular law. It doesn’t matter — your intention is irrelevant. Do what you have to do, that’s all. The question in Tractate Chullin would interest even a secular legislator, because that is the question: by what authority do I come with claims against you that you must act? That’s what Hans Kelsen, the Austrian legal philosopher, called the basic norm — the Grundnorm. There is some basic norm from which, and on which, the validity of the whole legal system is based. So in the Torah, the basic norm is the revelation at Sinai. Obligation to God’s command — that is the basic norm. In Israeli law, the basic norm is legislation, obligation to the legislation of the Knesset. Okay? Now that also interests the Israeli legislator. Meaning, when I ask myself what justifies my coercing a citizen to do something, the answer is: because the Knesset legislated, and that is the basic norm from which we operate. That question can also be asked in the context of secular law, because it’s a theoretical question — perhaps by what authority does the judge speak, by what authority does the police act, and so on. So they say: because our system is that what the legislator determines is binding. And in that sense, the discussion made in the context of the sciatic nerve or of Maimonides in Chullin can also be conducted in the context of secular law. The discussion Maimonides conducts in Laws of Kings cannot be conducted in secular law, because there Maimonides is talking about the person. When you come to fulfill commandments, what should be in your consciousness? What should be the motivation from which you act? And if you didn’t do it because of that motivation, then the act is not a commandment. That doesn’t exist in law. But when I ask by what authority I may coerce you to do something, that is a theoretical question that can also be asked with regard to law, and legal theorists and philosophers of law indeed ask it. Why obey the law? From what does the law derive its validity? Good question, and it has to be discussed. And it’s a question that definitely can arise in a general or secular legal system too. So it’s not exactly the same thing, but for our purposes that’s just a parenthetical clarification, to show that these two sources don’t say exactly the same thing. But for our purposes, what we see here consistently in Maimonides is that command establishes the religious value of action.

Now, Maimonides in chapter 6 of Eight Chapters writes something that seems, at first glance, to contradict this. There Maimonides writes as follows — I think mine is jumping here the whole time, I don’t know if… “The philosophers said”— yes, “this is the difference between the virtuous person and the one who rules his impulses”; that’s the title of the chapter. “The philosophers said that the one who rules his impulses, although he performs virtuous acts, still does good while desiring depraved acts and yearning for them, and he struggles with his impulse and resists in his action what his faculty and desire and disposition of soul prompt him toward, and he does good while suffering in doing it.” Meaning, he has an evil impulse, he’s full of urges and drives, he overcomes them and still does only the right thing. Maimonides calls that type the one who rules his impulses. That’s one model, one type of person. But the virtuous person is the opposite type: he is drawn in his actions after what his desire and disposition prompt him toward, and he does good while desiring and yearning for it. Meaning, he does the good because his natural impulse is to do good. He doesn’t need to overcome urges in order to do good. That is called the virtuous person. Yes? There is the one who rules his impulses versus the virtuous person, the one who conquers his impulse versus the virtuous person. Those are the two types. Now Maimonides says: “And the philosophers are agreed” — yes, the philosophers agree — “that the virtuous person is better and more complete than the one who rules his impulses.” Meaning, the claim is that the person whose natural tendency is to do good is better than someone who has tendencies to do evil too, but overcomes them and still does the good. That’s the philosophers. “But they said: it is possible that the one who rules his impulses stands where the virtuous person stands in many matters.” In some places, in some respects, maybe they can be comparable. “But his rank is necessarily lower, because he desires the evil act.” Meaning, he still desires evil, and so his rank is lower. “And although he does not perform it, his yearning for it is an evil trait in the soul.” Fine? The very fact that you desire evil is a bad trait. “And Solomon already said something like this: ‘The soul of the wicked desires evil.’” Okay? By the way, from that verse I would not learn what Maimonides learns. That’s the dependence in the opposite direction. If you’re wicked, then your soul desires evil. That doesn’t mean that if your soul desires evil, then you’re wicked. That’s not an if and only if.

[Speaker F] No, if someone is wicked then certainly—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So therefore in the wicked person, his soul draws him to evil — that’s true. But it doesn’t follow that everyone whose soul draws him to evil is wicked. Who said so?

[Speaker F] On the contrary, I’d say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That if you conquer your impulse even though it pushes you to do something evil, you’re completely righteous—

[Speaker F] Even more righteous, because you’re fighting. But in some sense that wickedness did come out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean it came out?

[Speaker F] He has potential for wickedness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and he overcomes it all the time, overcomes it, he does only the good. So what? The verse doesn’t say that.

[Speaker F] The verse—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What it says is that the soul of the wicked desires evil. That’s all. No, the dependence is the opposite. If you’re wicked, your soul desires evil. It doesn’t say that if your soul desires evil, you are wicked. That isn’t there. You need a double condition, right? We hold like Rabbi Meir, who requires a double condition. “You are betrothed to me if you give me two hundred zuz, and if you do not give me two hundred zuz, you are not betrothed.” Why? Because if I tell you, “You are betrothed to me if you give me two hundred zuz,” that does not mean that if she doesn’t give me, she is not betrothed. Those are two different things. The inverse of “if A then B” is not “if not-A then not-B,” but rather “if not-B then not-A.” Right? The reverse of the consequent. So the proof from the verse is a shaky proof. “And he said, concerning the joy of the virtuous person in doing good acts and the sorrow of one who is not virtuous in doing them” — that is also the saying in Proverbs: “It is joy to the righteous to do justice, and terror to workers of iniquity.” Workers of iniquity feel bad when doing a good act, and the righteous person rejoices when doing a good act, because he really desires the good. This is already more in the direction of Maimonides, that if you’re righteous, you presumably also desire the good. Which would mean that if you don’t desire the good, then you’re apparently not righteous — or not fully righteous. Okay? “This is what appears from the words of the Torah that fits…” And when we investigated the words of the sages on this matter, says Maimonides, “we found that for them the one who desires transgressions and yearns for them is better and more complete than one who does not desire them and does not suffer in refraining from them.” Yes, among the sages, among the Talmudic sages, we find the opposite — namely that the one who rules his impulses is better than the virtuous person. “So much so that they said that the more a person is good and complete, the stronger his desire for transgressions and his pain in refraining from them will be.” And they brought stories about this and said, “Whoever is greater than his fellow, his evil impulse is greater than his.” So the fact that you have a big impulse doesn’t make you less righteous — more righteous. Meaning, the greater than his fellow has a greater impulse.

[Speaker F] That too, by the way, is a slightly tricky reading.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that I’m greater, and therefore I have a greater impulse, doesn’t mean that the existence of the impulse makes me greater. The dependence is the other way around. If I’m great, then somehow I also have a great impulse.

[Speaker E] No, the good impulse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “His impulse” here means the evil impulse, sorry.

[Speaker E] Wait, so if someone’s impulse is greater, that doesn’t mean he’s greater than his fellow?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not necessarily. That’s what I’m saying. Again, the direction of dependence is the opposite. If you are great, then yours will be greater. Is it only if you’re great that yours will be greater? No, not necessarily.

[Speaker F] Usually someone with a greater impulse is greater. What? Usually someone with a greater impulse, if he doesn’t channel it negatively, will come out a stronger person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the text doesn’t say that. It says that if you’re greater, then you have a greater impulse.

[Speaker F] No, it says “whoever is greater than his fellow, his impulse is greater than his.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So by default it’s not trivial that you’ll have a great impulse and also be great.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. But I’m saying, whether trivial or not is another matter. What does the text say? The text doesn’t say the direction Maimonides needs; it says the opposite direction. If you are greater—

[Speaker F] Then you’ll have to have a greater impulse. If you don’t have a great impulse, you won’t be great.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does it say that?

[Speaker F] It doesn’t say that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t say that.

[Speaker F] It doesn’t say that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe you need an impulse to become… Why? Where is that written? It’s not. Maybe you think so, but it’s not written. What’s written is that whoever is greater than his fellow, his impulse is greater than his. The impulse is the result here, not the cause. Understand? The one greater than his fellow — his impulse is greater than his. It does not say that whoever has a greater impulse is also greater than his fellow. It says that whoever is greater than his fellow, his impulse too is greater. The direction of dependence is the opposite. But he says—

[Speaker F] First he says he is greater. Right. And then he says why he’s greater?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not why. The opposite. Because he is greater, that is the result. It doesn’t say “greater because his impulse is greater.” There is no “because.”

[Speaker F] Once a person becomes greater, his evil impulse becomes greater too?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Because I grew, my evil impulse also grew, because—

[Speaker F] It fights.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It gives me a fight. That’s what it says. Again, you can say whatever reasoning you like, but I don’t see the proof.

Fine, never mind. In any case: “And not only that, but they said that the reward of the one who rules his impulses is greater according to the measure of his pain in ruling his impulses, and they said: according to the suffering is the reward.” The more you suffer, the more reward. The more impulse you have, the more you suffer, the more reward. And again — more reward, so what? Does that mean you are greater? It means you worked harder, so you deserve more reward. It doesn’t mean you’re greater. Okay. “And beyond that, they commanded that a person should rule his impulses, and warned against saying: by my nature I do not desire this transgression, and even if the Torah had not forbidden it. Rather,” they said — Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says — “a person should not say: I do not desire to eat meat with milk; I do not desire to wear wool and linen; I do not desire to have relations with forbidden women. Rather, I do desire it, but what can I do? My Father in Heaven has decreed it upon me.” Here they are already dictating an ideology. On the contrary, you are not supposed to identify naturally with the positive direction; rather, you are supposed to be psychologically indifferent to it and do it only because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. In that sense this fits very well with everything we’ve seen until now, right? That the value of a commandment comes from the fact that you do it only because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded, and not because you desire it and not because of anything else like that. On the contrary, the sages warn against that. Don’t do it because it makes sense, because it’s logical. Do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. In that sense it continues the same line. But look — in the end it does conflict. So Maimonides says: “According to the plain understanding of these two statements, at first thought the two statements contradict one another.” Here, who is greater — the virtuous person or the one who rules his impulses? So here, just as an interesting note, the philosophers came to one conclusion and the sages came to the opposite conclusion. So it requires study. What requires study? The sages told us the philosophers are wrong, no? What’s the question? No — not for Maimonides. If this is the conclusion of the philosophers, you don’t just throw it away. There’s a contradiction here, and you need to understand how to resolve it. Then he says: “But it is not so. Rather, both are true and there is no disagreement between them at all.” Maimonides says there is no contradiction. Why? “The evils that are evils according to the philosophers are those of which they said that one who does not desire them is better than one who desires them and rules his impulses regarding them; and these are the things universally recognized among human beings as evils, such as bloodshed, theft, robbery, fraud, harming one who did not harm him, repaying evil to one who did good to him, dishonoring parents, and the like. And these are the commandments about which the sages, peace be upon them, said: had they not been written, they would have been worthy of being written.” And some of our later sages who were infected by the disease of the theologians call them rational commandments. I don’t know what he has against that term. “There is no doubt that the soul which desires one of these things and yearns for it is a deficient soul.” In moral matters, in rational matters, it is a greater thing if your natural inclination leads you in that direction, not that you struggle against evil inclinations. That is in rational commandments. “But the things regarding which the sages said that one who rules his impulses regarding them is better and his reward greater — those are the decrees. And that is correct, because were it not for the Torah, they would not be evils at all. Therefore they said that a person should allow himself to desire them and not have anything preventing him from them except the Torah.” These things, in themselves, are not evil. The whole issue is the Torah’s command, right? So there, if you do it because reason compels, because of natural inclination, then you’re basically not doing it because of the command — and that’s a problem. By contrast, in moral commandments, if you do it because reason compels, that’s good, because there is moral value in the commandment and not only religious value. That’s basically his claim. And now he proves this from the words of the sages themselves. “Observe their wisdom, peace be upon them, and with what examples they illustrated this.” What did the sages bring as examples? They did not say a person should not say, “I do not desire to kill, I do not desire to steal, I do not desire to lie,” but rather, “I do desire it…” No. They brought only matters that are decrees. Their examples are meat with milk, wearing wool and linen, forbidden relations. Interesting that forbidden relations for Maimonides counts as a decree. But all their examples are these commandments and the like, which are what Scripture calls “My statutes.” They said: statutes that I decreed for you, and you have no permission to question them; and the nations of the world challenge them, and Satan prosecutes concerning them — such as the red heifer and the scapegoat. And those that the later authorities called rational they call commandments, as the sages explained. There are statutes and there are commandments. Commandments are the rational ones, and statutes are the decree-like ones. So Maimonides says that when the philosophers say the virtuous person is better, that’s about rational commandments. When the sages say the one who rules his impulses is better, that’s about the decrees. Therefore there is no contradiction; both statements stand.

[Speaker F] I think with forbidden relations, if you look at it more in a default way, people would say it’s better to marry someone I know from the family I know, and the inheritance stays in the family.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean “back then”? And today?

[Speaker F] Today we’ve already been conditioned that it’s something that isn’t — it’s psychology.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking whether it’s moral or immoral, not what human psychology says. I’m asking in rational ethical terms, not psychologically.

[Speaker F] No, to me it seems basically the most logical — you keep the money in the family.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes, maybe no. But Maimonides classifies it as a decree. By the way, forbidden relations is also not just marriage — it’s relations with a married woman, relations with my sister. And what does that have to do with keeping money in the family? If I sleep with my sister, that doesn’t keep the money anywhere. I’m not marrying her.

[Speaker F] Never mind, in the end you’d understand — say you say, marry and build a home.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the prohibition is on the intercourse, not on the marriage, in the prohibition of forbidden relations.

[Speaker F] In the end, instinctively don’t you think it’s immoral, forbidden relations?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I think not. Yes?

[Speaker E] Maybe with a married woman, because with a married woman—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s the husband here.

[Speaker E] Maimonides’ view?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not my personal view — Maimonides’ classification that forbidden relations are only decree-like. Right, what’s the problem with sleeping with one’s sister? I don’t understand what the problem is if they both agree and they’re adults, not children, yes? And the world is terribly shocked by a brother and sister living together, and I can’t understand what the problem is.

[Speaker F] I saw in some YouTube piece that in the Bible Belt they do it freely there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Really? I don’t know. דווקא in the Bible Belt I wouldn’t expect that. Those rednecks—

[Speaker F] Those rednecks in the Midwest. I don’t know. I heard stories from people who just came back. Could be.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I read in the newspaper once about some couple in Germany, I think, or Switzerland. But I don’t think it’s common. I don’t know. In any case, honestly, I really don’t see the problem. I mean, it’s only a matter of time until it goes through the same process homosexuality went through — once people thought it was terrible, and then they realized that basically, what’s the problem? Two adults decide between themselves. You can say it’s forbidden by Jewish law, but what is morally problematic about it?

[Speaker D] Meaning also genetics — what about genetics?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Genetics is just a technical issue. Fine, so I’ll use contraception or have surgery or treat the child. That’s a technical question. No, cousins are… yes, sure, genetically cousins are problematic. There’s that Facebook page, “When your mom and dad are cousins.” Don’t know it? They bring all kinds of foolish statements by people, and the title is “When your mom and dad are cousins.” Apparently his parents were cousins, since he talks such nonsense.

[Speaker F] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyway, with a married woman, I’m saying there’s an agreement. Once you agreed to marry and then you go with someone else, or she has relations with someone else — but even there, if everyone agrees, then what’s the moral problem? Everyone agrees. The husband agrees, she agrees, the other man agrees, everything is fine.

[Speaker E] Wife-swapping, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, yes.

[Speaker E] Wait, one more question. A case that happened this week in the north, I think in Safed: a fifteen-year-old girl with a forty-year-old man. As long as she agrees and her father—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said adults. If you decide she’s an adult, then what’s the problem? The whole point in law is that fifteen is not an adult; she is still a minor, and the assumption is that her judgment has not fully matured. In Jewish law that doesn’t matter? Of course it’s possible. In Jewish law even a girl of three is possible.

[Speaker F] And according to the law too, if she’s sixteen it’s okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t know. There are couples with a twenty-year-old woman and a sixty-year-old man.

[Speaker F] And that’s okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? What’s the problem? They’re both adults.

[Speaker F] Why doesn’t that shock people publicly?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying: that shocks people because I think they understand that a fifteen-year-old still isn’t mature. Meaning that’s all. She hasn’t made a fully lucid decision, and you’re exploiting that. When I used to be here in the physics department, I taught some students, and at a certain stage I saw there were lecturers who would take first-degree students and attach them to their research, to do some computer work or something like that. And of course then they’d continue with them into second degree and doctorate and so on. You hunted down the very best first-degree students, which is very flattering when a lecturer comes and says, “Come join me, do some computer work for me” or something like that, and you got the best student for master’s and doctorate. So I warned the students. I told them, “Listen, this is exactly like sleeping with a minor.” Meaning, you haven’t yet fully formed your judgment. If you’re such a good student, don’t worry, other professors will chase after you too. This gives you no bonus. Work for him, everything’s fine, but when you get to graduate school, reconsider whether you want to continue with him or not. And often that’s the same idea. It’s the same thing, obviously not morally identical, but it’s a similar idea. Okay? You’re basically grabbing someone who still isn’t academically mature in that sense, and you trap him. With his agreement, all fine — but it’s an agreement that you can’t really call full agreement.

Okay, how did we get to all this?

[Speaker F] The discussions. There always were and always will be people jumping at opportunities.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. People went like sheep to the slaughter there. That’s true. That’s often the way lecturers who can’t get good students operate. They go to the first degree.

[Speaker F] Yes, but it’s not marriage. In marriage she’s already bound.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, of course not. And it’s not only that she’s bound, it’s also a different type of relationship. So of course it’s not the same thing. But I’m saying the idea is similar.

All right, back to our topic. In the end, though, if we look now at what Maimonides writes here, there is still a contradiction to the move we saw earlier. His own contradiction he resolved. But the move we saw before is still not resolved here. Because in rational commandments, Maimonides really does say that the one who desires them naturally is preferable, right? Meaning, there I’m supposed to do it because of natural inclination, not because of command. It’s better if I do it because of natural inclination, right? So how does that fit with what we saw until now? What we saw until now is that commandments have religious value only if you do them מתוך obligation to command, and not because reason compels and not because of other things. So what will you say? That everything we saw until now applies only to decree-like commandments and not rational ones? First of all, Maimonides doesn’t state that anywhere. Second, with the sciatic nerve, okay, that’s indeed a decree-like commandment, so it’s easier. But in Laws of Kings Maimonides speaks about the seven Noahide commandments because he’s discussing the resident alien. And the seven Noahide commandments — Maimonides himself writes that they are things to which reason inclines. Those are rational commandments, the seven Noahide commandments. Maybe except for flesh taken from a living animal. But they are rational commandments.

[Speaker E] What’s rational about blessing God?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s rational about blessing God? He created you and you bless Him — bless the One who blessed. Never mind. Maimonides himself writes it’s rational, so leave the argument aside right now. So if he writes that it’s rational, then it means that even concerning rational commandments he says that you need to do it because of the command and not because reason compels, right? So how does that fit with what he says here, that in rational commandments the one who inclines to them naturally is preferable, not the one who does it only because of the command? What do you say? Again, it’s all logical nuances — there’s no contradiction here at all. Think logically: there’s no contradiction. Maimonides doesn’t write in chapter 6 why I need to do it. He’s only discussing whether, if I have a natural tendency to do this, am I better or worse? So he says if you have a natural inclination, you are better in rational commandments. Does that mean I need to do it because of the natural inclination? Where does he say that? He doesn’t. If I naturally incline toward doing good, I’m a better person. But still, it could be that in order for the commandment to be a pure and complete commandment, I need to do it because of the divine command. Meaning, I need to have a natural inclination to give charity, but when I actually come to give charity, I do it not because of that natural inclination, but because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. The fact that I have a natural inclination makes me more righteous or a better person, but says nothing about what my motivation is when I come to act. Two entirely different things. I already said that in chapter 8 of Laws of Kings Maimonides talks about motivation when we come to do something. What should our motivation for action be? The command — that should be the motivation, not rational compulsion. But does that mean the natural tendency is invalid? Of course not. On the contrary, it’s good that you have a natural tendency to do good. It’s just not good that it should run you. You should make decisions that you do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded; don’t go with your natural tendencies, go with what you decide upon.

[Speaker F] And if a person has no inclination to murder? None at all. He says, I don’t have such an inclination whatsoever, not to steal, not to violence, etc. So is his reward lower?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. As I said, it could be that “according to the suffering is the reward,” which speaks about reward, really will depend on how much work you invest. But that has nothing to do with your spiritual level. With reward, it may be that your spiritual level is lower, but you’ll receive much reward because you worked hard for even that lower level.

[Speaker F] Someone who has an inclination to murder?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. And the fact that you get much reward does not necessarily reflect spiritual level. Right. This is really like what is said among the Hasidim, for example: “One who says, ‘I will sin and repent, I will sin and repent’ — they do not allow him to repent.” Among the Hasidim — I don’t know where, but I once heard in their name — what is the initial thought there of “I will sin and repent”? Usually we understand it to mean: I’ll enjoy myself and then repentance will straighten things out, so I enjoyed all worlds — I had fun and also won’t be punished later, wonderful. Okay? But they say no. “I will sin and repent” — the practical point is in order to become a greater righteous person, because a penitent stands higher than a fully righteous person. So I want to sin in order later to repent and be at the level of a penitent, not at the level of a fully righteous person. So there really is an initial thought in the service of God of “I will sin and repent.”

[Speaker E] But that’s a major form of idolatry, what we talked about last time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there’s a lot to discuss there. I’m only saying that this is exactly what you said earlier — the practical implication that you said is dangerous, because people can… and that’s why the sages indeed say: don’t say “I will sin and repent, I will sin and repent,” because they won’t allow you to repent. But there is a real initial thought to say it. They warn you because it’s dangerous — don’t say it, fine? But such an initial thought exists. The initial thought is that if you sin and then repent, then you are at some higher level than someone who never sinned at all. So it would be better to sin and repent than not to sin at all. Yes, but if you sin, maybe you won’t repent — they won’t allow you to repent. And that’s exactly— and don’t worry, you’ll sin even without trying to arrange it deliberately. You needn’t be concerned about that.

Okay, I think I already mentioned the Avnei Nezer? No, the Eglei Tal, in the introduction. The Eglei Tal writes: “And while speaking of this I remember what I heard, that some people err from the path of reason in the matter of learning our holy Torah. They said that one who studies and develops novel insights and rejoices and delights in his learning — this is not so much learning Torah for its own sake, as if he were learning simply without deriving any pleasure from the learning, and only for the sake of the commandment.” Yes, he says there are some people who err from the path of reason. What does that mean? They think that if you enjoy learning, that’s invalid. You have to learn for sanctifying God’s name — yes, exactly — by suffering. That’s the initial thought he opposes. He says anyone who thinks so errs from the path of reason. “But the one who studies and delights in his learning, his own pleasure is also mixed into his learning.” Yes, that’s this whole approach. And then he says: “In truth, this is a famous mistake. On the contrary — this is the essence of the commandment of Torah study: that one should be joyful, happy, and delight in his learning, and then the words of Torah become absorbed into his blood. And since he enjoys the words of Torah, he becomes attached to the Torah.” He cites Rashi and the Zohar and so on. “And if you say that because of the joy he has from learning it is called not for its own sake, or at least for its own sake and not for its own sake — then this joy would weaken the power of the commandment and dim its light. So how could the good impulse increase because of it? And since the good impulse is strengthened by it, surely this is the essence of the commandment.” He has more proofs too, though they seem a bit shaky to me. But what he’s basically saying is that clearly there is an element of enjoying Torah — you’re more attached to it, you understand it better, and therefore the notion that it’s not good to enjoy study is mistaken. Yes, “too good to be kosher” — that’s the common approach. Meaning, once something is too pleasant, then apparently it isn’t kosher, so it must be forbidden. By the way, there is a point in saying “it’s too good, therefore it’s suspicious.” If it’s too good, then be suspicious. But the determination that if it’s too good it must not be kosher — that, I think, goes too far. In the morning blessings over Torah we say, “Make the words of Your Torah sweet in our mouths.” We want it to be sweet, right? So it’s quite clear that isn’t true. But this is a famous passage from the Eglei Tal. The continuation is less well known. “And I inform you,” says the Eglei Tal, “that one who studies not for the sake of the commandment of study, but only because he enjoys his learning, this is called study not for its own sake. Just as one who eats matzah not for the sake of the commandment, but only for the pleasure of eating.” Some people have questionable taste.

[Speaker D] And in—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They said: “A person should always engage…” even not for its own sake, because from not for its own sake one comes to for its own sake. “But one who studies for the sake of the commandment and delights in his learning — this is study for its own sake, wholly holy, because the delight too is a commandment.” What is this distinction? You could have concluded from the earlier passage that if you learn because of the pleasure, that’s the highest kind of learning. He says no. If you learn because of the pleasure, that’s not for its own sake. You need to learn because there is a commandment to learn. But the fact that you delight in it improves your performance of the commandment. The pleasure is not the motivation for which you learn, but if you do have that pleasure, it improves the quality of the learning and the quality of the commandment. Exactly like what I said earlier: if you naturally love doing good, excellent — that makes you a better person. But it doesn’t mean that because of that love of doing good, because of that good impulse, that is the motivation for doing good. It isn’t. The motivation should be to do the truth because it is true, as we saw. The fact that in things like Torah study or commandments the natural inclination joins the obligation — that’s perfectly fine. It means you are in a better spiritual state; there is some natural fit with the positive direction, with the good. So that’s perfectly fine; you are a better person. But it doesn’t mean the motivation should be the good impulse. The good impulse is not the motivation that causes you to act.

Okay, so here I’ve basically finished with the concept of command. And if I summarize: we saw that what establishes Jewish law is command. And the observance of Jewish law has value only if it is done מתוך obligation to command. From here on I’m now going to move from the plane of observance to the categorical plane. I said that clarifying the command — this whole move of defining command well — has two implications. One implication is how I’m supposed to observe commandments: from what motivation, what must be in my consciousness. We discussed that. But that’s not really our subject; I only did that as part of defining the concept of command. What matters for us is that command establishes this realm called Jewish law. And Jewish law is those things regarding which we have command — as distinct from the parts of the Torah that are not Jewish law. We spoke about the very first Rashi, if you remember, on Genesis, and there it isn’t Jewish law. It’s Torah, but not Jewish law. Okay? So this categorical distinction between the realm of Jewish law and the non-legal realm is what will occupy us from here on, because as I already told you at the beginning — and I’ll now repeat what I think is the essence of Torah — the essence of Torah is basically Jewish law. Everything beyond that requires clarification and definition. Therefore I now want to sharpen that claim further. From here on we’re really entering the conclusions. Okay. Stop here. Thank you very much.

[Speaker F] Now let’s talk about the first conclusion that follows from everything we’ve said. The first conclusion is that whatever is not Jewish law does not have the same binding status as Jewish law. Meaning, if we encounter a midrash, an idea in Jewish thought, or even things said by great Torah scholars in areas that are not the area of Jewish law, their status is entirely different. And it’s important to understand that, because sometimes we tend to mix the two together. We think that if something is written in a holy book, then it binds us to the same extent that a legal ruling in the Shulchan Arukh binds us. And the answer is no. There is a very clear distinction. Jewish law is normative; it obligates action. By contrast, the other areas — aggadic literature, thought, ethics — are areas of inspiration, learning, and understanding, but they do not necessarily obligate in the same sense of command. And that is what we’ll now try to develop. Let’s see how that is expressed in the sources. If we take, for example, the words of Maimonides: Maimonides writes in many places, both in his Commentary on the Mishnah and in Guide for the Perplexed, that there is a difference between legal rulings and matters of opinion and thought. In matters of opinion and thought, there is no such thing as “the law follows so-and-so.” The concept of legal ruling does not belong there at all. Consequently, there is room for a broad range of opinions, as long as they do not contradict the foundations of faith. And this is a huge opening for understanding the richness of Torah. It allows us to breathe within the world of Torah, to understand that there are things that are absolute and things that are open to interpretation, thought, and the personal development of each and every one of us. So let’s now dive into the sources and see how this works in practice.