Ethics, Faith, and Jewish Law – Lesson 25 – Rabbi Michael Avraham

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whoever comes in, comes in. Can you hear me? Yes? I can’t hear you.

[Speaker B] One second—and what about now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, now I can. Good. Actually, what I wanted to do today—just a second, let’s share first—what I wanted to do today was really to take a specific moral issue and touch on it a bit. After all, until now we’ve only talked around the matter and not dealt with the matter itself. Not the topic in general, but it’s still appropriate to touch on a moral issue in its own right. I wanted to talk a bit about an issue that also has various implications, both current and conceptual, and that’s targeted killing when uninvolved people are harmed. A pinpointed killing, as some call it—though of course whenever people talk about a pinpointed killing, they mean something very much not pinpointed. In other words, you’re trying to eliminate one person, but you also hit all kinds of other points around the point you were aiming at, and the question is whether there is any justification for that. What is the justification? What is it based on? And so on. Now, in our public discourse here in the country, this is often tied to the argument between right and left, yes? The right is of course in favor: kill them while they’re still small, all of them. The left is against it: it’s immoral, you mustn’t harm them, what did they do to you? They’re innocent, uninvolved, and so on. And on the face of it, it seems that this argument too—like many other arguments that somehow split here between right and left—doesn’t really belong to right and left, because right and left is a dispute about some political-national worldview or another, but it has nothing to do with this dispute, which is in essence a moral dispute. Is it permitted to harm uninvolved or innocent people, or not? Why should that have anything to do with the question of right and left?

[Speaker B] The argument sometimes also changes depending on that, because some people will tell you they’re not uninvolved at all—they’re very much involved.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but you understand that even that itself—why should that have anything to do with right and left? Okay, so you have an argument about whether they’re involved or not involved, ostensibly an argument about assessing reality. Why should that be related to right and left? So that too looks like a skewed correlation, yes—an unreal correlation, an illusory correlation.

[Speaker B] I didn’t mean that it’s connected to political sides. I meant that it’s an argument on top of the argument about whether it’s permitted to harm uninvolved people at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I understand, but you can call it that and the question still remains: why is it connected to right and left? An argument about assessing reality, a moral argument, whatever you want—but why does it break down along right and left lines? By the way, today in general right and left aren’t really right and left anymore—never mind, today it’s yes-Bibi or no-Bibi—but I’m speaking now about right and left back when the terms still had some meaning unrelated to Bibi. So that’s really the initial question I want to pose here. And unlike many other questions, in the end I will want to argue that this actually is related to the dispute between right and left. The correlation is not an illusory one; it’s a real correlation. Illusory correlations are when we connect questions and claims that have no real connection between them—the correlation is apparent, not real. For example, opposition to religious coercion is also connected, in terms of the dispute, to right and left. Why is that connected to right and left? If you’re a secular right-winger, shouldn’t you oppose religious coercion? Or the other way around? In other words, why is this connected to right and left? Of course, the question of what right and left even mean—there’s economic right and left, political right and left, security, diplomacy—all of that obviously involves a more basic conceptual clarification, but I’m going to ignore that for now. I’m going to try to show the connection anyway, even without entering those discussions. Between right and left—even though with most of them there really is no connection to right and left. So on the face of it, the obvious conclusion is that these are illusory correlations, not real correlations. Illusory correlations are a situation in which there is a link between the answers you give to two different questions even though there is no connection between the two questions. Why does that happen? There are all kinds of psychological, sociological, and social mechanisms, but the common denominator is that these are side motives, not substantive ones related to the content of the questions themselves. Sometimes, by the way, there is an inverse correlation. For example, there was once a letter to the editor by some professor from the Technion who wrote there that he strongly recommends that the State of Israel increase its investment in higher education. Why? Because if you look around the world, you see that countries that invest heavily in higher education have a higher GDP. Higher education is basically an engine that increases GDP. So it’s worth investing. In the end it pays for itself—we profit from it. Now of course that argument doesn’t hold water, because the connection between the two parameters—there is a correlation between the two parameters, investment in higher education and the size of GDP—but the connection could of course also run in the opposite direction. Countries that invest in higher education do so because they have a lot of money, so they invest in higher education. Why? Because they have a high GDP. In other words, the connection is from GDP to investment in higher education, not the other way around. Just like when people often say that dieting isn’t worthwhile because people who diet are fat. So here again there’s an assumption that dieting causes them to be fat, whereas the truth is that being fat causes them to diet. So the direction of the correlation is reversed here. But sometimes there are correlations where neither direction is correct. In other words, there are situations in which a link is created between two things even though neither one is the cause of the other. Yes.

[Speaker B] Or in other words, there’s a third factor that causes both. Right, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s Leibniz’s parable of the clocks. He says: suppose you see two clocks that always show the same time. One explanation is that clock A is the cause of what clock B shows. A second explanation is that clock B is the cause of what clock A shows. A third explanation is that there is a third factor that synchronized the two clocks—the clockmaker, the one who made them. The clocks are simply synchronized with one another, even though neither is the cause of the other. Okay? So that’s a third factor producing the correlation between them. In other words, statisticians have lots of jokes about this issue: correlation does not necessarily indicate causation. Causation always creates correlation, but correlation does not always express a causal relationship. So in our context too, ostensibly, when you see a correlation between a right-wing worldview and support for targeted killings, and a left-wing worldview and opposition to targeted killings, then yes, there is a correlation. But the correlation does not necessarily indicate causation. In other words, it’s not that because you’re left-wing you arrive at such a view, or because you’re right-wing you arrive at such a view; rather, it’s an illusory correlation. That’s the initial thought, at least. Let’s try to enter the discussion itself a bit more and see where it actually comes from, what generates it. When we look at questions of this kind—dilemmas involving taking life, saving life, and so on—what can give rise to such a dilemma? Where does it come from? How is the dilemma created? On the face of it, after all, you’re not allowed to kill people, right? That’s clear. On the other hand, there are situations in which killing is justified. But if they’re innocent, then it isn’t justified to kill them. If it isn’t justified to kill them, then of course there is a prohibition of murder. But on the third hand, if I don’t kill them, then I also won’t strike the one person I do need to strike, and then he can strike me, harm me. Suppose there’s some arch-terrorist driving in a car, and with him are several uninvolved people. Now I can fire a missile at the car and eliminate everyone. I can’t fire only at him. If I could fire only at him, there would be no dilemma. But I can’t; I need to fire a missile that will eliminate everyone. So now the question is whether I’m allowed to do that in order to strike that terrorist. In other words, despite the fact that I’m killing uninvolved people—or not, maybe I’m not allowed to do such a thing. Yes, so here the dilemma is a clear one. On one hand, killing the terrorist is permitted and desirable. On the other hand, harming innocent people is forbidden. On the third hand, it is impossible to kill the terrorist without harming them. So what do we do now? Which of the principles prevails? Here it seems to me that in order to analyze this issue more systematically, we have to try to understand what the basic principles are that are participating in this game. Because usually, in contemporary discussions, the public discussions conducted around these things, you hear claims like “it’s proportional,” “it’s not proportional,” “more proportional,” “less proportional.” These aren’t claims you can really point to and formulate a position about; they’re more like gut feelings, general assessments. The discussion is not a systematic one. And the question is how to conduct this discussion more systematically. So here I’m saying: let’s try, as a starting point, to see what principles are taking part in the game. Usually, in dilemmas of this kind, there is a clash between two basic principles. One principle is what the Talmud says: that with regard to the prohibition of murder, one must be killed rather than transgress. There are three severe prohibitions for which one must be killed rather than transgress: idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. In the case of bloodshed, each has its own source, and in the case of bloodshed the source is reasoning. What is the reasoning? “מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי? דילמא דמא דהאי גברא סומק טפי”—what makes you think your blood is redder? Maybe that person’s blood is redder. What does that mean? If they tell me, “Kill So-and-so, and if not we’ll kill you,” what does the Talmud say? I’m forbidden to kill So-and-so even at the cost of my life, even if they kill me. Why? Because my blood is no redder than So-and-so’s blood. Right? In other words, why should I kill him in order to save myself? I have no right to harm someone else in order to save myself. What did he do wrong? He’s no guiltier than I am. Why should I kill him instead of dying myself? So this is the principle of being killed rather than transgressing in murder—or, from now on I’ll phrase it this way: a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. Right? You can’t save yourself by harming someone else’s life. Now this principle is basically a principle based on the assumption that human lives are of equal value. In other words, there is no way to determine whose blood is redder. And once you are faced with a dilemma whose two sides are equivalent—to kill him or to kill him, it’s equivalent because the value of both lives is assumed to be equal—in that situation the solution is: passive omission takes precedence. Right? If you have no justification for doing an act and killing him, then don’t do that act. What, you’ll die yourself? Fine—but that act you do not do. You cannot do an act for which you have no justification. So if there is no justification, then what is incumbent on you is to refrain, to do nothing. Passive omission takes precedence. Therefore, for example, Tosafot writes in more than one place—Tosafot writes: what happens if someone, say, throws me from the top of a tall building and below there is an infant sitting there. And now I’m about to land on him and kill him, and he will cushion my fall, yes? So I’ll survive. In other words, he will die and I’ll survive. Now the question is whether I’m supposed to throw myself aside so that I smash and die in order to save him, or whether I continue falling on him so that he dies and I survive, okay? So the question is which of those two is preferable. On the face of it, it would seem: what makes you think your blood is redder? Why should you kill him in order to save yourself? Right? According to the principle we saw earlier, a person does not save himself at the cost of another’s life. But here Tosafot says no—you do not need to throw yourself aside, sorry, you do not need to throw yourself aside. You may continue falling downward, even though the cost is that the infant will die and in that way will cushion your fall and you will survive. Why? Because clearly, just as my blood is no redder than his blood, so too his blood is no redder than mine. Right? Neither one is preferable to the other. There is equality in the value of life among all people. And therefore, when there is equality, we do not say to me: always prefer his life over your own. No—that’s not the meaning of the rule. The meaning of the rule is that if you have no justification to do something, do nothing. Passive omission takes precedence. Now what does it mean to do nothing? If they tell me, “Kill So-and-so, and if not we’ll kill you,” what does doing nothing mean? Doing nothing means not killing So-and-so. The meaning is of course that they’ll kill me. But in the case Tosafot discusses in Yevamot—the case where I’m falling from the rooftop and will hit someone else—are you moving? Yes, yes. When? Around five, five-thirty I finish here and then I’ll leave.

[Speaker C] Fine, then I’ll cover for you if I stay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So if I’m falling from the roof and I’m about to land on this infant who will cushion my fall, if the instruction is that passive omission takes precedence, then what am I supposed to do? Do nothing—simply keep falling. Because to tilt myself aside is an action. There is no reason for me to take an active step of sacrificing myself in order to save someone else. Just as I may not kill him in order to save myself, so too I’m not obligated to kill myself in order to save him. And here passive omission takes precedence means simply to continue falling. To tilt myself aside is an active deed. I’m doing something active here, and I don’t have to do something active—kill myself—in order to save… yes, if they tell me, “Look, we’ll kill him if you don’t commit suicide,” am I obligated to commit suicide so that they won’t kill him? No. Because just as my blood is no redder than his, so too his blood is no redder than mine. So the rule is that if there is equivalence between the two possibilities, then the halakhic instruction is that passive omission takes precedence. In other words, do nothing, remain passive. To do any act requires justification. Okay? It’s like—for example—why is the burden of proof on the claimant? They say that if you claim money from me, then the burden of proof lies on you. I’m in possession of the money, and if you sue me then the burden of proof is on you. Why? Some explain that it’s because most likely I’m right. There is a presumption that money is in the hands of its owner; a presumption that what is under a person’s hand is his. That’s basically the presumption they use. But surely that presumption is not statistical. It’s true that if you were to check all the objects in the world and ask what percentage of the objects belong to the owner of the house in which they are found, then it would be the great majority. But if you checked those same objects that are under dispute in a legal conflict, and there asked what the likelihood is that the object belongs to the possessor rather than the claimant, there’s no reason to assume an advantage for the possessor. Why assume the claimant is lying and the possessor is telling the truth? Maybe the possessor is lying and the claimant is telling the truth. So probability cannot decide in favor of the possessor. So why in fact is the burden of proof on the claimant? In my opinion it’s the same idea as passive omission takes precedence. The claimant wants the court to intervene and take the object from me in order to return it to him, to give it to him. For the court to act, you need to give it reasons. If you didn’t give it reasons, the court won’t act. So if you bring proof, then that’s a good reason. The court will see that you’re right, take the object from me, and give it to you. You’ve given it a reason to act. But if you didn’t bring proof, then why should the court act? Passive omission takes precedence. I don’t know who’s right, so I do nothing. Passive omission takes precedence means I remain with the money. The money stays with me. Okay? In other words, many times the rule that passive omission takes precedence is a rule that tells you what to do when the two options are equivalent. It’s not a rule that tells you which option is better. On the contrary, it tells you: if neither of the two options is preferable, what should I do now? And the answer is to do nothing. Because to do, to act, you need a reason. If you don’t act, you don’t need a reason. If you have no reason, you don’t act. Okay? Good. So that’s one side of the equation. In other words, I may not kill someone in order to save myself, because passive omission takes precedence. By the way, Maimonides in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, chapter 5, law 5, brings a Jerusalem Talmud in tractate Terumot. The Jerusalem Talmud says: what happens if gentiles besiege a city, and there is a Jewish community inside the city, and the gentiles demand that the community hand over one person, one Jew. And if not, they will kill all of us. Okay? Now the question is whether to hand him over or not. So it says in the Jerusalem Talmud—and Maimonides rules this way in Jewish law—that they do not hand him over. Even if he was already liable to death, they still do not hand him over. It’s a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan, doesn’t matter now, but in principle they do not hand him over. So the commentators there ask: there is no logic in this, because if we don’t hand him over, what will happen?

[Speaker B] More people will die.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All of us will die, including him himself. Right? So he will die either way. So why not hand him over? He will die either way, but at least we’ll survive. And the rule of “מי יימר דדמא דידך סומק טפי”—that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life—is not relevant here, because this is not a case where I’m saving myself at the cost of my fellow’s life. His life is lost either way. Even if I don’t hand him over, he will die, because they’ll kill all of us, including him. So I’m not giving up his life in order to save myself. So why really is it forbidden to do this? Maybe it creates…

[Speaker B] Some kind of precedent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there are all kinds of strained answers. The Kesef Mishneh, for example, says that perhaps the rule of “מי יימר דדמא דידך סומק טפי” is not really the true reason for this whole rule of being killed rather than transgress. And that’s odd, because Maimonides brings it as the reason; there’s no reason to say otherwise.

[Speaker B] Maybe you could say it would create some kind of precedent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.

[Speaker B] Maybe you could say it would create a precedent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Create a precedent—in other words, like the rule that one does not ransom captives for more than their value, so that gentiles won’t have motivation to keep doing this to us because they know we always give in in the end. Okay, I’ll formulate it a bit differently. I once saw in an article by Professor Anker—he was in the law faculty at Bar-Ilan—that he argues that this Maimonides is a law in the laws of sanctifying God’s name, not in the laws of murder and preservation of life. It really appears in Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, not in the laws of murder and preservation of life. Laws of the Foundations of the Torah deal with sanctification and desecration of God’s name. Why? And he says: we are not supposed to give in to a gentile threat. It is a desecration of God’s name if we hand someone over. So the point that we may not hand him over is not because we may not save ourselves at the cost of another’s life—because that really isn’t relevant here, he will die either way—but because this is a special, specific law about desecration of God’s name. In other words, we have to refuse to give in in order not to desecrate God’s name, that’s all. What practical difference does this make? In a case where, for example, the threat is not from gentiles but a natural threat. Am I allowed to throw—we’re on Jonah’s ship, okay?—and now I want to throw Jonah into the sea in order to save the other people on the ship. Am I allowed to do that? According to the explanation I proposed here, the answer is yes. Because giving in to gentiles is desecration of God’s name, but from the standpoint of the laws of murder and preservation of life, the logic says yes, hand him over. In other words, were it not for the problem of desecration of God’s name, the law would be to hand him over, because he will die either way, so at least let’s hand him over and save ourselves. So if we’re talking about a situation where there is no sanctification or desecration of God’s name, and it’s only a question of the laws of murder and preservation of life, then from that standpoint one should indeed hand him over. Like on Jonah’s ship. Or like another case called fetal reduction. A woman has, I don’t know, three or four fetuses in her womb, and the medical assessment is that if all are left there, all of them will die. So what they want to do—they call it reduction, that’s a euphemism, yes? They want to kill one of them and leave two or three who can survive. The question is whether that’s allowed. In light of what I’ve said here, the answer is yes. It’s allowed. Why? Because there it is not desecration of God’s name. I’m not yielding to a gentile threat and handing someone over to death. It’s a question of the laws of murder and preservation of life. The question is whether I’m allowed to do such a thing from that standpoint. Certainly yes. Because otherwise, that fetus I choose to kill will die anyway. Even if I don’t kill him, all four will die. And now I kill him and at least the other three will survive. Exactly like the case in the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot. Okay? So therefore, that too does not contradict this principle of being killed rather than transgressing, of passive omission takes precedence. So that is one side of the equation. Now the second side of the equation is the law of a pursuer. What happens in the law of a pursuer? Reuven is chasing Shimon in order to kill him. And I’m looking from the side, and they tell me that not only is it permitted but it is desirable to kill Reuven in order to save Shimon. I am obligated to kill Reuven in order to save Shimon. That is the law of a pursuer. Now the question is: how does that fit with the rule that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life? We said the value of all human life is equal, right? One does not sacrifice one person’s life in order to save another’s. Yet here, in the law of a pursuer, I kill the pursuer in order to save the pursued. Why? “מאי דמא דידך סומק טפי”—why is the blood of the pursued redder than the blood of the pursuer? Why am I allowed to kill him?

[Speaker B] The punishment for a murderer is death, no? Didn’t hear? The punishment for a murderer is death, so that means that if he kills him then in any case they’ll both die.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in fact there are various explanations here. One explanation is that I am actually killing—Rashi in Sanhedrin basically says—I am killing him in order to save him from the sin, from the sin of murder. In other words, true, the value of their lives is equal, and therefore one is not preferable to the other, but if I kill him, I save him from the sin of murder. If I leave him alone, then there will be a sin of murder and one person will also die. So I have either the option that one person dies and that’s it, or the option that one person dies and the other commits the sin of murder. Clearly it is preferable that one die and there be no sin of murder.

[Speaker B] There is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there is a decision in favor of one side because they are not equal. That’s what Rashi says.

[Speaker B] What? That explanation specifically sounds a bit strange to me, because in that case you’ll be committing murder.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I won’t be committing murder. I won’t be committing murder because I can kill this one or that one and it’s equivalent. If it really were equivalent, then I would have to refrain. I would have to refrain not because it’s murder, because after all if I killed him I haven’t done anything wrong in principle. The issue would be only that passive omission takes precedence. That’s what I would have violated, not murder. Because after all, life is going to be taken here in any case. So from the standpoint of the prohibition of murder there is no problem. But the halakhic instruction is passive omission takes precedence. Okay? But here, where there is an advantage to one life over the other—for example, if this one dies, then the other will commit murder, but if the murderer dies then there will be no murder by anyone—then since in any case one life will be lost, it is preferable for the murderer to lose his life, because at least then there will be no murder. In other words, the sin of murder is what breaks the tie between the two otherwise equal possibilities. Once the two possibilities are not equal, then passive omission no longer applies. Passive omission applies only where the two possibilities are equal. Okay? That is Rashi’s proposal. But it’s a bit difficult, because the Talmud brings an amoraic dispute about what happens when the pursuer is a minor. A three-year-old child takes his father’s gun and starts shooting people in the street. Now the ruling we follow—Rav Huna and Rav Hisda—the halakhic ruling is that the law of a pursuer applies even to a minor. Now a minor has no sin of murder. Right? He has no sin of murder because he’s a minor, he’s not subject to the commandments. So Rashi’s explanation won’t help explain the law of a minor pursuer. Another explanation—and this is what you said earlier—some people say it too. Namely: if you let the pursuer murder the pursued, then the pursued will die because the pursuer murdered him, and afterward the court will kill the pursuer because that is the punishment for a murderer. So the result will be that both are dead. By contrast, if you kill the pursuer, then at least the pursued remains alive. So it is preferable to kill one rather than let two die. But again, that does not explain the law of a minor pursuer. Because if a minor murders, we won’t kill him; he is not liable to punishment for murder. The court will not execute him. So that explanation also does not help us understand the law of a minor pursuer. There is a third explanation: basically, if the pursuer kills the pursued, then he is a murderer and is liable to death. So what they are telling me is: carry out the death penalty now, even before he murders, in order to save the life of the pursued. In other words, there is an innovation here, because I’m punishing him before the act has been committed, and in the end the act also won’t be committed, because once I kill him he obviously won’t murder. So I’m effectively imposing the death penalty when no crime has even been committed. On the other hand, it sounds like a kind of formalistic naiveté to say: okay, let’s wait until the crime happens and then I’ll kill him. In other words, he’ll kill the pursued, and now he’s a murderer and then I’ll kill him. That sounds stupid. So because of this formal discussion, kill him earlier instead—even though no crime has yet been committed—at least then the life of the pursued will be saved. In other words, then they really view you as carrying out the penalty the pursuer deserves—you kill him as punishment. It’s not prevention in order to save the pursued, or not only prevention in order to save the pursued; it’s punishment. It’s punishment for the murderer. The court authorizes the person on the scene to carry out a death sentence on the pursuer without all the criminal procedure usually required, with witnesses and a court of twenty-three and all that. And all this for what purpose? Of course, to save the pursued. But wanting to save the pursued isn’t enough; the pursuer has to deserve death. The death liability exists because of the punishment he is expected to receive, and that is what justifies killing him in order to save the pursued. That is another explanation. But that too does not explain a minor pursuer. Because with a minor pursuer, even if the child kills the pursued, he will not be liable to death. A minor is not subject to punishment.

[Speaker B] Maybe you could say that by pursuing, he turns his blood into something less red than the other person’s.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. In other words, what we are really saying—and I think this is indeed the natural explanation—is that the whole idea that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life is because of “מי אמר דדמא דידך סומק טפי”. One person’s blood is no redder than another’s. The value of both lives is equal. It doesn’t matter whether one is young and the other old, whether one is this kind of person and the other that kind; there is no difference. The value of life is infinite. Therefore every human life is equal in value to every other human life. Okay? But when the pursuer is the one who created this equation—that either I kill him or the pursued will die—after all, that didn’t arise by itself, right? He himself created that equation. If he weren’t pursuing the pursued, I wouldn’t have to do anything and no one would die. So he can’t say, “Listen, I decided to chase him,” and then tell others, “But don’t shoot me, because after all his blood is no redder than mine.” The one who created the equation that forces me to choose between your blood and his blood is you. Don’t create that equation and don’t place me in this dilemma. If you choose to create that equation, bear the consequences. In other words, if you choose to create this equation, then you are the one responsible for resolving the entanglement because you created it. In the ordinary case where a third party threatens me with a gun and says, “Look, if you don’t kill So-and-so, I’ll kill you,” then the one who created the equation is neither So-and-so nor me, but a third factor. So indeed the relationship between me and So-and-so is one of equality. The value of his life and mine is identical. I have no way to prefer myself to him or vice versa. Therefore passive omission takes precedence. But where that person is the one who created the equation—that is, I need to kill him in order to save the pursued because otherwise he himself will murder the pursued—he created the equation. In that case, if you created the equation, you are responsible for solving the problem, for untangling the knot. Therefore your life is worth less, your blood is less red than the blood of the pursued. And you may be killed in order to save the pursued because your blood is less red. The instruction of “מי אמר דדמא דידך סומק טפי”, in the direction of passive omission takes precedence, does not exist here, because there is no equality between the values of the two sides’ blood. That entire instruction is based on the fact that the value of the two lives is equal. But if the value is not equal, then there is no instruction of passive omission takes precedence. Okay? Now here we still need to pay close attention to what happens with a minor. I am basically saying to the person: look, you created the equation. So you are guilty, bear the consequences. Stop pursuing, and I won’t kill you. But you can’t make that claim against a minor. He lacks understanding—what do you want? He didn’t really create an equation in the sense of deliberating whether to kill or not kill. He’s a three-year-old baby, he understands nothing, he’s shooting with a gun, shooting bullets at people. There’s no real claim here that “you are guilty and therefore you should bear the consequences, you need to resolve the entanglement you created.” So it still seems that even this explanation doesn’t help us understand the law of a minor pursuer. But here I claim that actually it does. I can explain the law of a minor pursuer through this explanation. In this respect it is better than all the previous explanations. Why? Because my claim against the pursuer is not only that the pursuer is guilty of there being this equation, but rather the very fact that he created the equation. Now if he is also guilty, then of course it’s much easier. You created the equation; stop pursuing and I won’t kill you. But even if he is a minor, I have no claim against him—why did you create the equation, stop murdering. I have no claim against him; he lacks understanding, he doesn’t know. But still, who created the equation? The minor did. The pursued certainly is not guilty that there is such an equation, right? So true, the minor also is not guilty, but the pursued is not guilty either. And if the minor is the one who created the equation, then responsibility for resolving the entanglement is his. Notice: this is not guilt. I’m not claiming he is guilty. This is an argument about responsibility, not guilt. And if you are the one who created the equation, then bad luck—you are the one responsible for solving the problem. Okay? This is not a claim that you are guilty—you aren’t, you’re a minor—but it is a claim of responsibility. Responsibility can be imposed on someone even without guilt. This was an interesting question that came up in the Carmel disaster—you remember the great fire in the Carmel? There was, yes, all those failures and everything, and there was a public security minister, Aharonovitch—today he’s the Speaker of the Knesset. And he said, “I am indeed responsible, but I am not guilty. I accept responsibility but not guilt.” And everyone in the media laughed at him—responsibility, not guilt, word games. What does responsibility without guilt even mean? If you bear responsibility, then presumably you’re guilty. I claim that that’s not true. Again, specifically there one can discuss whether he was guilty or not; I don’t know the exact situation, I didn’t investigate the details. But at the principled level there certainly is a distinction between responsibility and guilt. It can happen that a certain person is not guilty and still the responsibility is his. Maybe let’s give the opposite example. Suppose a person drives while drunk. He drank wine, got drunk, and now he’s driving a car. If he drives drunk, it’s obviously very dangerous; he could run someone over, kill him. Now suppose he drove drunk and nothing happened. Fine. So of course I might charge him with drunk driving—that’s an offense against traffic law. But I won’t accuse him of murder, right? He didn’t murder anyone, he didn’t do anything; he just drove drunk. Okay? But if he drove drunk and also hit a person, then he may be charged with murder or manslaughter or negligence or whatever the exact charge is, I don’t know. But yes, obviously the killing will also be part of his culpability. Now I ask: what is the difference between him and the first drunk driver where nothing happened? In terms of guilt, both are equally guilty. Both did exactly the same act, were negligent to exactly the same degree. The only difference is that the first had luck and the second did not. This is an issue in analytic ethics, this question of responsibility for luck. So there is no difference between them in terms of guilt; why then do I hold the second one liable and not the first?

[Speaker B] Because the second caused a death and the first didn’t.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Because the second is responsible for what happened, not because he is guilty. He is also guilty, but the claim against him is not because of the guilt, because the first has guilt too. The claim against him is because the fact that you are blameworthy for being drunk rolls onto you responsibility for everything that happened because of your drunkenness. But that is responsibility, not guilt. If, say, I kill you with a gun, then the claim against me is a claim of guilt, not of responsibility. I am guilty; I did the act. The one who drove drunk did not intend to kill; he drove drunk, he was negligent. But clearly he did not perform an act of killing in the same direct sense; he did not intentionally kill. So basically the core discussion here is not a discussion of guilt but a discussion of responsibility. He has guilt for being drunk, but not guilt for murder. For the murder he has responsibility, not guilt. In other words, we are really making a distinction here between a discussion of responsibility and a discussion of guilt. Now if I return to the minor pursuer, I want to claim that although the minor pursuer is not guilty, because he is a minor and lacks understanding, he is responsible. That is, in the end, the one who created the situation, the one who killed, is him. Not through his guilt—he is not a murderer in the criminal sense, with criminal intent and a decision and so on. No, I can’t blame him in that sense. But responsibility is still his. And once the responsibility is on you, and I now have to decide whether to kill you or let the other one die, then your life is subordinated to solving the entanglement you created. The responsibility is on you. And if you accept that, then the explanation I proposed for the law of a pursuer—and what you also suggested, basically—can explain the law of a minor pursuer as well, unlike all the earlier explanations. This explanation can also explain the law of a minor pursuer. Of course that means we’re talking here about responsibility, not guilt. And in fact, if you look a bit at the situation, it’s obvious that it’s responsibility and not guilt. After all, the murder hasn’t yet happened, so guilt for what? He hasn’t killed anyone yet; I kill him before he kills. So how can one say I kill him because of guilt? Guilt for what? He hasn’t done anything. Obviously I kill him because of responsibility. The fact that he now intends to murder someone imposes on him the responsibility to solve the entanglement. And if his life must be taken in order to solve the entanglement, fine, then we will take his life. Because he is the one responsible for solving the entanglement. Okay? This is an argument of responsibility, not guilt. Fine. Now all this really means the following. We now have two principles in the field of discussion that ostensibly contradict one another, and we’ve now explained why they do not contradict. One principle is: a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life, one must be killed rather than transgress murder. Right? And this is based on equality in the value of life—you cannot prefer one person’s life over another’s. The second principle is the law of a pursuer. In the law of a pursuer, I do prefer the life of the pursued over the life of the pursuer. Right? There there is indeed a preference. And why? Because the life of the pursuer is worth less. Why is it worth less? Because responsibility for resolving the entanglement that was created falls on him—he created the entanglement. So the responsibility for resolving the entanglement that was created falls on him. That is the general picture. Now in many dilemmas involving saving life and preservation of life and so on, the dilemma is really: to which of these two principles do we assign the situation I’m dealing with? Let’s return to targeted killing. In targeted killing, basically I want to fire a missile at a vehicle, and in that vehicle there is a terrorist and, say, also uninvolved people—one, two, three, something like that. Okay? Now what are they basically saying to me? They are saying: look, the terrorist I can certainly kill, right? Why? So that he won’t kill me, right? Or my citizens, doesn’t matter. Hey—his blood isn’t less red than ours? No, the law of a pursuer applies here, right? Because of the law of a pursuer, his blood is less red than ours. And if one must choose whom to kill, we kill the pursuer and do not let him kill the pursued. So the terrorist I can certainly kill. That’s because of the law of a pursuer. What about the others? It seems forbidden. Why? Because a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. And I cannot kill an uninvolved person in order to save my life. Right? Therefore, in principle, with regard to him the law of a pursuer applies, and with regard to them the law applies that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. So basically I am allowed to kill him, and forbidden to kill them. What happens when I fire the missile? He I am allowed to kill—not obligated, allowed. And them I am forbidden to kill. So on the face of it, it seems forbidden to do this. Why should I take their lives in order to save my own life—or the lives of my citizens, whatever? My life is no more preferable than theirs. “מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי”. And I’m setting aside for the moment the issue that they are gentiles and not Jews; in my opinion there is no difference between the life of a gentile and the life of a Jew in this regard. So the conclusion that emerges from here is that on the face of it, it seems forbidden. Forbidden to fire the missile. You’re allowed to kill him when he is alone. You are forbidden to harm uninvolved people in order to save your own life or someone else’s. Now there would have been room here—and I say this in parentheses—to challenge this conclusion and say: no, in principle I am firing the missile in order to kill him. What fault is it of mine—and I’m allowed to do that. What’s my fault that other people were also sitting in that car? Why should that mean I can’t defend myself? After all, I am allowed to kill him. Now you want me not to kill him in order not to hurt them? That’s somewhat similar to what Tosafot said: if there is an infant below and I’m falling from a roof, I’m not supposed to tilt myself aside in order to save the infant. I don’t have to commit suicide in order to save the infant. The infant’s blood is no redder than mine. So similarly, the other people sitting in the car—true, they are innocent, but their blood is no redder than mine. And if in order to save myself I may kill the terrorist, then the fact that the missile will also hit them because they chose to sit in the same car with him—what’s my fault? Why should I refrain from defending myself because they sat there? There would have been room to raise such an argument too and say that really the question here is what counts as passive omission. Does passive omission mean firing the missile or not firing the missile? A person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life; passive omission means not killing that person and dying myself instead. But here the law of a pursuer applies, so in principle I am allowed to fire the missile at him. Now you want me to refrain from firing the missile, which is actually something I’m allowed to do. That refraining is not passive omission; on the face of it, it is active restraint. Because I am basically permitted to fire the missile. You want me not to do what I am allowed to do. Not doing what I am allowed to do is not passive omission; it is active intervention. And that effectively requires me to commit suicide in order to save the lives of the others sitting there in the car. Okay? So here—let me close the parentheses—there would have been room for that kind of challenge. But let’s ignore it for now. I want to argue that there is permission to fire the missile even without that argument. Why? Here I want to bring one more player into the arena.

[Speaker B] Human shield? The issue of human shield and things like that? I can’t hear. The discussion about a human shield?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean, a human shield? Here they are a human shield for him, but what does that add to the discussion?

[Speaker B] No, some people say that the terrorist will always stay near an innocent person so that we—what are we supposed to do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What did that innocent person do wrong? You’re forbidden to kill him in order to save yourself. What can you do? Fine, then it’s forbidden. So “human shield” is a declaration that needs an argument behind it. I understand the intuition of “human shield,” but the question is how you ground it in the kinds of reasoning I’ve described until now. So I want to make the following claim. When we look at a conflict of this kind, it is not really a conflict between two private individuals; it is a conflict between two peoples or two collectives. Right? Now it is clear that when a collective stands opposite me, within it there are some who hold weapons—the army of that collective. And there are other people who belong to that collective who do not hold weapons. But the thing standing opposite me is the collective as a whole, not the specific person holding the weapon. True, in terms of division of labor, the physical threat comes from the one holding the weapon. But that’s just division of labor. When he was young, he was the soldier; now he grew older, now this one is the soldier. But in the final analysis, what threatens me is not the private individual holding the weapon, but the people or collective fighting against me. Okay? Therefore what I want to claim is that the entire collective basically has the status of a pursuer. The collective is threatening me. It’s like if I’m holding a gun and threatening you, okay? Are you allowed to wound my leg in order to save yourself? The leg could say, “What do you mean? His hand is threatening you. Why are you—” But this is one organism with division of labor. The hand does the shooting and the leg does the walking, right? So too in a collective—it is also a kind of organism. There is division of labor. Some hands hold weapons, and others are the civilians who send the soldiers or the army or the terrorists. Okay? But basically, what stands opposite me is the entire collective. It is not only the specific terrorists or soldiers who are holding the weapons. But once what stands opposite me is the whole collective, that means the whole collective has the status of a pursuer. These are not uninvolved third parties. It is a pursuer, because it is the one threatening me. The fact that only Ahmad is holding the weapon does not mean that Muhammad is uninvolved. Okay? Therefore, since all of them have the law of a pursuer, I claim that I am allowed to harm them. Because they have the status of a pursuer.

[Speaker B] And from there we return to the whole issue of right and left. Right and left, because the left will tell you that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In just a second we’ll return to that—you’re right. I just want to say there is a responsum by Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli in Amud HaYemini, where he discusses the Qibya operation. That was a retaliatory action carried out, I think, in the 1950s, in some village in Judea and Samaria—or even in Jordan, I don’t remember anymore. Many civilians were killed there; there were serious mistakes there and many civilians were killed. And in his responsum he discussed the question whether it is permitted to harm uninvolved people as part of a military operation. His conclusion was that in principle it is forbidden, as I said earlier, because of “מי אמר דדמא דידך סומק טפי”. But this is a matter of the laws of war. The laws of war are different from the laws of preserving life between one private person and another. In war there are other permissions. Now, I really don’t like these reasonings about the laws of war, because “laws of war” is like some rabbit you pull out of a hat. Oh, it’s the laws of war, so everything is fine. What do you mean everything is fine? Who told you that under the laws of war this is permitted? Where is the reasoning? What is this “laws of war”? It’s a slogan, like a rabbit out of the hat. So what if it’s the laws of war? Where is the source that in war there are different laws, and what are those different laws? Where are the definitions? What I want to claim is that you don’t need to get to the laws of war. This is the law of a collective pursuer. Not war as such, but when the collective stands opposite me, then the whole collective has the status of a pursuer. Therefore I’m allowed to strike it. What practical difference is there between this and the laws of war? Suppose there is an entire collective pursuing me, and I’m a private individual. I don’t have the status of someone who can declare war. The UN doesn’t recognize me as a state. I can’t declare war. But what stands opposite me is a collective, the one pursuing me. According to Rabbi Yisraeli’s reasoning, there are no laws of war here, so I would be forbidden to fire a missile at such a car with a terrorist and uninvolved people. But according to my reasoning, I am allowed to fire the missile. Why? Because what stands opposite me is a collective pursuer, and everyone sitting in that car has the status of a pursuer. Therefore I am allowed to kill him. Now of course there is something a little troubling in this reasoning. Why? Because what follows from this? Then is it simply permitted to drop an atom bomb on Gaza, or kill everyone walking around there even without any connection to the fact that he’s sitting in a car with a terrorist and I need to fire this missile so what can I do, he gets hit too? No—independently, am I basically allowed to shoot people in the street there because they have the status of pursuers, or at least it is allowed, because everyone has the status of a pursuer? Here this reasoning bothers me a little. There’s something morally problematic here, at least. But that’s a mistake. Why is it a mistake? Because there is a rule in the law of a pursuer: if you can save the pursued by injuring one of the pursuer’s limbs, then the full law of a pursuer does not apply. If, say, Reuven is chasing Shimon to kill him, then I have to kill Reuven in order to save Shimon. But what if I can shoot him in the leg without killing him, and Shimon will still be saved? In that case I am forbidden to kill the pursuer. Because I can save the pursued by striking one of his limbs. And if I can save the pursued by injuring a limb of the pursuer without actually killing him, then I have no permission to kill the pursuer. Shoot him in the leg and that solves the problem. The whole permission to kill the pursuer exists only when you need that in order to save the pursued. If you can save the pursued without killing the pursuer, there is no permission to kill the pursuer. This is called: being able to save him by one of his limbs. And what I want to claim is that applying this to a collective pursuer means that I really cannot kill uninvolved civilians, even though they have the status of a pursuer, as I said earlier, because the whole collective standing opposite me has the status of a pursuer. So why can’t I just kill them casually? They have the status of pursuers, don’t they? They deserve death? Because I do not need to kill them in order to save myself. I am forbidden to kill the pursuer if that is not required for my rescue or for the rescue of the pursued. Even if he has the status of a pursuer, that’s irrelevant. Even if someone has the status of a pursuer, that does not automatically mean I may kill him. Only where that killing is required to save the pursued. Now here, if I just shoot at civilians in Gaza, that is not required to save the pursued; it contributes nothing to my security. So even though they have the status of a pursuer, I am forbidden to kill them. Where will the law of a pursuer come into expression? In a place where I need to kill them in order to save myself. In other words, without that I cannot be saved. There is no option of saving him by one of his limbs. In such a case—for example like the case of the missile fired at the vehicle—I am allowed to fire the missile at the vehicle and kill everyone, because there I really do need it in order to save myself. I can’t save myself without it. And if I can save myself without it, then save him by one of his limbs. Shoot the terrorist, who is one limb of the collective, and save yourself; you don’t need to kill the whole collective for that. If you look at the collective as though it were the body of a living person, then shooting one person is like shooting a limb. So you can shoot him and save yourself—the one holding the weapon—and then you have no permission to shoot other people, because you don’t need that for your rescue. So: save him by one of his limbs. But if I cannot save myself without killing them, and I have to kill all of them, including the uninvolved, then I do have permission to kill them, because they have the status of a pursuer. What implication does this have, for example? What if the person sitting in the car is Swedish—not Palestinian. A tourist. A tourist in Gaza riding in a taxi with the terrorist. In that case, according to the reasoning I’ve presented here, I am forbidden. Because he does not belong to the pursuing collective. He’s not Palestinian, he’s Swedish. Palestinians are the collective fighting against me; they have the status of a collective pursuer. But the Swedes do not. Therefore, in principle, if I need to kill the Swede in order to save myself, then “מאי חזית דדמא דידך סומק טפי”—what makes my blood redder than his? I am forbidden to kill him. My blood is no redder than his. That is the practical implication. By the way, according to the reasoning I mentioned in parentheses—that I’m allowed to fire the missile, what’s my fault that you sat there in the car? Should I refrain from firing the missile because of that?—according to that reasoning, even if he’s Swedish it would be permitted to fire the missile. But according to the reasoning I proposed here, that this is really a case of collective pursuit, that only applies when we’re dealing with people who belong to the collective fighting against me. But if these are people who do not belong to it, then there is no justification for killing them. So basically it comes out as follows: if I look at a targeted killing and ask myself whether I’m allowed to kill the uninvolved people, the answer is yes. At first I thought the answer was no. Why? Because they are an uninvolved factor, and their blood is no less red than mine, and here the law applies that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. So what explanation did I propose for why it is permitted to kill them? Because they are part of a collective to which the law of a pursuer applies in its entirety, because that whole collective is pursuing me, that whole collective is fighting me. So now the law of a pursuer applies to them, rather than the rule that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. Basically the discussion here is whether the other people sitting in that taxi or car fall under the rule that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life, or whether they fall under the law of a pursuer. That is what determines whether I am allowed to fire the missile or forbidden to fire the missile. What does that depend on? Now we have the tools to formulate the dispute. What does the dispute depend on?

[Speaker B] On the question of whether you see them as a collective or not. Do you hear? Whether you see them as a collective or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. In other words, whether you see what stands opposite you as a collection of private individuals, where the one holding the gun or rifle is the one threatening you but the others are independent factors. If that’s how you understand it, then the other people sitting in the taxi are uninvolved parties, and a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. But if you see it as a collective pursuing you, fighting against you, then they have the status of a pursuer; the entire collective has the status of a pursuer. And here we come to what you rightly said earlier, the difference between left and right. I claim that the correlation that exists between positions on this question and identification with left or right is not an illusory correlation; it is a real one. Why? Because a left-wing worldview tends to see people as individuals, and collectives as some legal fiction, a useful fiction, a conceptually convenient fiction—but not something that really and truly exists. Therefore it is no surprise that through such eyes I see before me a collection of private individuals pursuing me, and I relate to each as a private person, as an individual. If that is the way of looking at it, then when I need to fire the missile, I am forbidden to fire it because I will be harming innocent people. And a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. “מי אמר דדמא דידך סומק טפי”. But if I look through right-wing glasses, then through right-wing glasses it is the collective that is standing before me. This is a national outlook, a collective outlook. Yes, the far right is fascistic. Fascism really sees the nation as the basic entity and all the individuals as mere limbs within the collective. Okay? That is an extreme view, but even so a right-wing national outlook is an outlook that sees collectives as real entities playing on the field, existing here on the field. And once that is the case, a person with a right-wing outlook basically sees before him a pursuing collective. And once it is a pursuing collective, then everyone has the law of a pursuer, and therefore I am allowed to fire the missile. So it turns out that the dispute over targeted killings is indeed connected—this is not an illusory correlation but a real one—to the dispute between right and left. The left will see this as saving oneself at the cost of another’s life, which is forbidden, and the right will see it as the law of a pursuer. Therefore many times people do not know how to conceptualize the dispute for themselves in these terms. This is a real dispute with two sides, and each person needs to choose which side he is on. When people say, “There are no uninvolved people in Gaza, they’re all guilty,” they don’t really mean that; they don’t know how to conceptualize what they mean. It’s not true that they’re all guilty. But the pursuer standing before me is a collective pursuer, and once he is a collective pursuer, everyone has the status of a pursuer. Therefore if, in order to save myself, I need to harm them, then I may do it. The difference is with regard to a case where I do not need to harm them in order to save myself. In such a case, according to my reasoning, it is clearly forbidden. But according to the reasoning that they are all terrorists and all involved, then fine—go kill them in the street too, not only when they are sitting in a car with a terrorist. Okay? Therefore I think this conceptualization is very important. A great many people hold a position that I can understand why they hold, but they do not formulate it or conceptualize it properly for themselves, and therefore first, they do not know how to defend their position, and second, they draw incorrect conclusions from it. Now an interesting question is whether this dispute is a moral dispute. Is there a disagreement here about a moral principle? What is the dispute about?

[Speaker B] In a certain sense, partly yes, because there is something moral here, like we talked about with the collective. There’s also the issue of reality itself—all the factual factors that give us the environment in which we operate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Basically the dispute here is not a dispute about morality at all; it’s a dispute about metaphysics, a dispute about whether collectives are existing entities or just useful fictions and in reality only individuals exist. That is the dispute. But everyone agrees on all the moral principles. What are the moral principles relevant here? The law of a pursuer: if someone is pursuing me, I’m allowed to kill him in order to save myself. Everyone agrees with that, both right and left. And everyone also agrees with the principle that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life—that I may not shoot someone else in order to save myself because my blood is no redder than his. Everyone agrees with that too. In other words, there is no dispute at all about any of the moral principles involved in this dilemma. Everyone agrees. The dispute centers on a metaphysical question: is what stands before me a collective, or a collection of individuals? There is a consequence to that, because if you see them as a collective, then the principle you need to apply here is the law of a pursuer. But if you see them as a collection of individuals, then the principle you need to apply here is the rule that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. But again, the dispute is not over the principles themselves; the principles are agreed upon by both sides, both principles are agreed upon by both sides. There is no moral disagreement here. The dispute is a metaphysical one, with the consequence that it determines which of these correct principles we apply to the situation before us. That is the dispute—not a dispute in morality, but a dispute in metaphysics. Now, many times people feel there is a huge amount of—here I return to the course on morality, so I’m returning to the aspects we discussed—people think morality is subjective because, after all, different people understand morality differently, different groups understand morality differently, different cultures understand morality differently. And I claim that this is not true. In the overwhelming majority of cases there is full agreement on the moral principles. There is no moral dispute at all. In most cases the dispute is a dispute about one’s perception of reality, and that affects the question of which moral principle you will apply to that reality. But the dispute is not about the moral principle; the moral principles are agreed upon. The dispute is about how you perceive reality. I’ll give you the most extreme example possible: what about the Nazis? The Nazis murdered Jews, homosexuals, Roma, all kinds of people.

[Speaker B] They believed they weren’t human beings. I remember you brought this up in one of the courses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They viewed—or, there are various explanations—but one explanation is that they weren’t human beings, and another is that they were very harmful: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, they somehow wanted to destroy the world and the Aryan race in particular. It doesn’t matter right now how correct that view was. But it is clear that the Nazis fully recognized the prohibition of murder. They had no dispute whatsoever with the rest of the world about the validity of the prohibition of murder. Even in their view, it is forbidden to kill an innocent person. So the dispute with them is not a moral dispute; it’s a dispute about the perception of reality. The question is whether the people you are murdering are people who threaten you, in which case it’s the law of a pursuer. If they don’t threaten you, then what permission do you have to murder them? Are they perhaps not people at all? Yes, as he says. Then it would be permitted to murder them. But I’m saying: the dispute is about perception of reality, not about morality.

[Speaker B] Okay, although with them specifically, they also killed fully Aryan people who had one disability or another.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because perhaps they thought that was harmful, or again, a question of perception of reality. Perhaps. There are also moral disputes—I’m not saying there are none at all. I’m saying that in many cases, what looks to us like a sharp moral dispute is really a dispute about perception of reality and not a moral dispute. The moral principles involved here are agreed upon. The moral principles here are agreed upon; the dispute is about how we perceive reality in many cases. And that brings us back to the discussions we had about moral relativism. The question is whether the fact that there are different moral conceptions among different people or different groups indicates that there is no objective morality. Is that an argument against the moral realism we discussed? I said that first of all it isn’t, because describing the fact that there are many conceptions does not mean that all of them are also correct. It is entirely possible that one conception is correct and one is mistaken. So the fact that there are many conceptions does not mean morality is not objective; it means one is right and the other is wrong, but there is an objective morality binding on everyone. There is a difference between the descriptive claim that the whole world believes in the same moral thesis and the normative claim that the whole world is obligated to the same moral truth, or that there is one moral truth. Those are not the same claim. When you describe that there are different groups with different moral conceptions, that does not necessarily undermine the normative claim that there is one binding moral truth for the whole world. The fact that some people do not recognize it is simply because they are mistaken. So that was the claim I made then. Now I’m adding another claim. Even where there is a moral dispute, in most cases the dispute is not a moral one. The dispute is factual. Are Jews human beings or not human beings? Is what stands before me a collective, or is what stands before me a collection of individuals? And what does that really mean? That there is full agreement about the moral principles. The dispute is only about how I perceive reality and which principles I apply to that reality. But basically there is no dispute about the moral principles. Everyone agrees to the law of a pursuer, and everyone agrees that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. So there is no moral dispute here. This further strengthens the claim that morality is objective. There is one objective morality that binds everyone. And not only am I saying that even if there are disputes that doesn’t undermine this; I’m also basically saying that besides that, there aren’t really disputes. The disputes are usually not about morality. They are disputes about perception of reality. No wonder, and not by accident, that there are all kinds of descriptions of the Nazis—that before they shot people into some mass grave pit, they drank wine in order to get drunk. Why? Because they too understood that there was something deeply problematic here on the moral level. Even for them, murder was problematic. It was difficult for them to do it. But they had some rationalization—no, here it’s justified, and so on, never mind. A different perception of reality. But they too shared that shock, or that absolute rejection of acts of murder. It is not a dispute; they have no moral dispute with me. They have a dispute about perception of reality. So that is basically the description I wanted to offer. A few more comments in the minutes we have left. First comment: is the discussion I presented here really a halakhic discussion or a moral discussion? What would you say? Halakhic? What? Halakhic. Ostensibly a halakhic discussion, right? Being killed rather than transgressing murder, a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life, the law of a pursuer—these are all concepts from the halakhic world. Now, can I conduct exactly the same discussion before a completely secular forum? I think yes. Absolutely yes. I didn’t say anything here that is some principle unique to Jewish law. Everything I said here I can say—and I have said, not only can I say it, I’ve actually done it—in front of a secular audience. Again, some of them, if they were left-wing, could adopt one position; if they were right-wing, they could adopt another. That’s not the point right now. I’m not asking who is right. But the very discussion, and the explanation of the different views and different considerations, is universal. It’s not specifically unique to Jewish law.

[Speaker B] That’s also true. Everyone agrees on the most basic things, even things like these.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there is the law of a pursuer—everyone agrees. And everyone agrees that I may not kill someone in order to save myself. Everyone agrees to that. There is nothing here uniquely tied to halakhic thinking.

[Speaker B] There are people who’ll tell you otherwise, I suppose.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, I’m saying, there is no obstacle to presenting this before a secular forum as well. I think the overwhelming majority of secular people would agree. But it doesn’t matter—even if not, clearly this is not something unique to religious or halakhic thinking. This is a discussion that can absolutely be conducted in the context of a general moral discussion.

[Speaker B] I agree that it’s in the context of a moral discussion, but I still think that from a halakhic standpoint it’s that, because most people simply agree with the halakhic basis we’re ultimately talking about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously this discussion was a halakhic discussion. Obviously. All these principles are halakhic principles. I’m only saying that in this specific issue, there is nothing that distinguishes Jewish law from a general secular moral system. That’s what I mean. It’s the same discussion. I could have done it in exactly the same way, with the same words, in a completely secular philosophical forum. Even though this discussion is a halakhic one. What does that mean? It connects to another point that came up in this series. In recent lectures I spoke about the nondependence, or categorical difference, between Jewish law and morality. I said they are two different languages. Jewish law does not aim at moral goals, and therefore there is no point in challenging it with situations where Jewish law is not moral, and so on. Here we see a case that is apparently exceptional, where halakhic thinking parallels moral thinking. They proceed in the same way. And yet I would still want to claim, in light of what we discussed there, that when I conduct this discussion in a halakhic context, my goal is to clarify where and whether there is a prohibition of murder in the religious-halakhic sense of “לא תרצח”. When I conduct the very same discussion in the moral context, I want to clarify whether there is a moral act of murder here. It just so happens—or maybe not just so happens—that the principles according to which I conduct the discussion are very similar in both contexts. Fine. But that still doesn’t mean it’s the same discussion. Here it is a halakhic discussion, and there it is a moral discussion. We talked about this, if you remember, when I discussed the relationship between Jewish law and morality. I divided Jewish law into three categories: moral laws, non-moral laws, and anti-moral laws. Now in the moral laws there is a correspondence between Jewish law and morality, and even about those I argued that the correspondence is still accidental in principle. In other words, the fact that we reach the same conclusions does not mean we are pursuing the same goals. Jewish law pursues the religious goal, and morality pursues the moral goal. True, here there is correspondence. In non-moral cases there is no contradiction but also no correspondence. In anti-moral cases there is non-correspondence. But even where there is correspondence, that doesn’t mean these aren’t two different categories. They are two different categories that in this particular case just happen to proceed according to very similar principles. That’s all. Good, I think I’ll stop here, and we’ll finish our series here. Yes. Good, best of luck with your exams if you have any, and that’s it, goodbye.

[Speaker B] Goodbye. Have a good summer.