Does the Prohibition of Placing a Stumbling Block Before the Blind Apply to Causing a Secular Jew to Sin? – The Battle of Torah with Rabbi Sagi Mazuz – Rabbi Michael Abraham

This is an English translation (via GPT-6.1 Terra). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. It may contain inaccuracies in the transcribed content and speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

The foundations of the prohibition against placing a stumbling block: its source in the Torah, its extension to causing another person to commit a transgression and giving unfair advice, and the distinction between causing someone to transgress, assisting them, and committing the prohibited act oneself.
Secularism as a new phenomenon: the Rabbi proposes reconsidering whether traditional halakhic categories fit a reality in which people sincerely reject religious obligation itself.
Knowledge of the Torah versus recognition of its binding force: even extensive knowledge of Jewish law does not necessarily mean that a person sees the Torah as personally binding.
A child taken captive and a child taken captive plus: the distinction between a lack of knowledge that, once remedied, is expected to lead to recognition of obligation, and a secular outlook that does not change simply through exposure to information.
Karaites, precedents, and halakhic conservatism: a discussion of whether the historical treatment of ideological groups reflected a different assessment of reality or difficulty recognizing new phenomena and their implications for Jewish law.
Defining the secular person relevant to the discussion: the test is a person’s genuine attitude toward halakhic obligation, not their social environment, Torah education, or whether they left a religious community.
Maimonides and actions performed on the basis of reason: the distinction between the wise and the righteous among the nations serves as a basis for the claim that an act acquires religious value only when performed out of commitment to a divine command.
Extending the principle from commandments to transgressions: the Rabbi argues that a lack of religious commitment also removes the religious significance of a transgression, thereby removing the prohibition against causing one in the cases under discussion.
The limits of the permission and moral harm: a distinction between causing someone to transgress and directly feeding them prohibited food, and a qualified discussion of whether the prohibition against placing a stumbling block applies when moral harm is caused.
Presumptions, traditional identity, and assessing reality: a dispute over the beliefs of the typical secular person, the significance of surveys and traditional identity, and the impact of factual assessments on the burden of proof and practical application.
The challenge from the sin offering and personal responsibility: a discussion of the obligation of a child taken captive to bring an offering, the influence of education on belief, and the claim that a genuine conviction does not require professional philosophical inquiry.
Obligation to observe the commandments, mutual responsibility, and religious participation: the Rabbi stresses that obligation and mutual responsibility remain in force, but concludes that an atheist should not be counted toward a prayer quorum or called up to the Torah.
A sin offering for the lapse in awareness rather than the act: an alternative argument that adding an act during the same lapse for which a person is already liable does not constitute causing an additional transgression, even in the case of a religious person.
Forums for debate and considerations in halakhic rulings: a discussion of the lack of shared forums for Torah debate and the distinction between deciding a question on its merits and taking hardship into account when there is genuine doubt.

Summary

Overview

The conversation concerns Rabbi Michael Abraham’s controversial halakhic argument about the prohibition against placing a stumbling block when causing a secular person to transgress. In his view, when a person sincerely does not recognize an obligation to obey divine commands, their actions do not acquire the religious significance of either a commandment or a transgression. Causing them to act is therefore not necessarily prohibited under this rule. The discussion combines conceptual analysis, interpretation of Maimonides, an assessment of modern reality, and practical implications. Throughout the conversation, the interviewer challenges the assumptions and the extension of the sources.

## The prohibition and the new account of secular status
In the Sages’ interpretation, the prohibition against placing a stumbling block includes causing a person to transgress and giving unfair advice. It can apply whether the person acts unwittingly or deliberately. When the person cannot commit the transgression without the other’s help, the defining condition for the Torah prohibition is met.

The Rabbi argues that modern secularism does not necessarily fit the categories of apostate or transgressor. A person may sincerely reject the authority of Jewish law, rather than yield to temptation while recognizing an obligation. In his view, this phenomenon must be assessed on its own terms rather than forced into older classifications.

## Knowledge is not commitment: the “child taken captive plus”
The central distinction is between knowing the content of the law and recognizing its binding force. A scholar of Judaism may know the Torah in detail while viewing it solely as culture. Someone who grew up in a religious community and left it may hold the same view.

The Rabbi calls this situation a “child taken captive plus.” As he understands it, in the classic case of a child taken captive, providing the missing information is expected to lead to recognition of obligation. For the modern secular person, learning the laws is not in itself enough. In response to precedents concerning Karaites, he suggests that either the reality was different then or halakhic concepts lagged behind the development of new ideological positions.

## From Maimonides to denying a transgression’s religious significance
The Rabbi’s proposed basis is Maimonides’ statement in the Laws of Kings: a person who observes the seven commandments because of the divine command is considered one of the righteous among the nations, whereas someone who observes them on the basis of reason does not attain the same status. According to the textual reading “but rather one of their wise,” such actions may have intellectual or moral value without religious value.

The Rabbi applies this principle to Jews as well and extends it from commandments to transgressions: someone who is outside the framework of commitment to the divine command does not commit a transgression in the religious sense. He presents this last extension as his own innovation. The interviewer proposes a narrower reading of Maimonides, according to which commitment is required for the higher status of the righteous, not for fulfillment of the commandment itself.

## Practical implications and qualifications
On this approach, matters such as inviting a secular person for the Sabbath or serving food to someone who will not say a blessing may not raise the prohibition against causing a transgression. The Rabbi nevertheless distinguishes between causing someone to transgress and performing a prohibited act attributed to the person providing the help, such as personally dressing someone in a forbidden mixture of fabrics. He also does not decide whether causing moral harm would count as placing a stumbling block, although he is clear that it is wrong.

The permission depends on the person’s attitude, not on the label “secular” or “traditional.” Someone who recognizes an obligation but does not fulfill it is not covered by the argument. The dispute over the outlook of the typical secular person is therefore important in determining presumptions and the burden of proof when a person’s views are unknown.

## Obligation, mutual responsibility, and the alternative argument from the sin offering
The Rabbi stresses that a Jew remains obligated to observe the commandments and that the rule of mutual responsibility toward them remains in force. On the other hand, in his view an atheist should not be counted toward a prayer quorum or called up to the Torah, because their actions lack religious significance.

In response to the challenge from a child taken captive who is liable to bring a sin offering, he also proposes an alternative argument: the offering is brought for the lapse in awareness, while the act is a condition for liability. In his view, adding an act during the same lapse for which a person is already liable therefore does not add another instance of causing a transgression. He applies this even to a religious person who has forgotten that it is the Sabbath. At the end, he stresses that his conclusion follows from his understanding of the law and reality, not from a desire to make life easier in a mixed society. Hardship has a role in choosing between positions when there is doubt, not in determining whether a position is true.

Full Transcript

[Speaker A] Welcome to another episode of the podcast “The Battle of Torah,” about Torah controversies in Jewish history. Today we’re delighted to host Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham. Hello, Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hello, hello.

[Speaker A] Today’s episode is special, because we usually talk about controversies from the past. Today we’re talking about a controversy that Rabbi Michi—may I call you Rabbi Michi? Absolutely. A controversy that Rabbi Michi himself started. I like to compare four types of Torah scholars to people at a wrestling match. There’s someone who doesn’t watch the match and asks someone who was there to tell him who won. That’s most people: they say, we don’t know who was right, Shakh or Taz; just tell us who won the match. Then there’s someone who watches the match—that is, studies the material—but doesn’t know who won, so he asks his rabbi to tell him. That’s the second type. The third is the judge: most rabbis, who watch the match and say, Shakh convinced me, or Taz convinced me. And then there are a few who enter the wrestling ring themselves and fight to establish a particular position—in other words, they are the position. That’s Rabbi Michi today: he entered the ring and is fighting for an original position he himself put forward. That’s what we’ll discuss today. So first, let me express our great appreciation for your ability and willingness to enter the wrestling ring of the Torah world, the world of Jewish law. Perhaps you could introduce the new argument we want to discuss, which concerns causing a secular person to transgress. Does the prohibition against placing a stumbling block apply when you cause a secular person to transgress? Perhaps you could explain briefly what that prohibition is and why you think that in some cases, or with a certain kind of secular person, it doesn’t apply.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right. The rule itself comes from the verse in the Torah, “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). But the Sages derive from it that, beyond causing a blind person to stumble over a physical obstacle—which is the plain meaning of the verse—there are two other prohibitions. One is causing someone to violate a prohibition, and the other is giving someone unfair advice. This doesn’t necessarily mean a blind person, but anyone who is blind to the matter at hand. Once he receives bad advice from me, or I cause him to violate a prohibition, he’s blind in that respect. That’s the Sages’ interpretation. Just as an anecdote, I think the Book of Education says that the plain meaning doesn’t apply, only the interpretations. That’s very strange: a verse never loses its plain meaning. But the interpretations are certainly also part of Jewish law, and we’re talking now about the prohibition against causing someone else to violate a prohibition, right? Now, if I cause someone else to violate a prohibition, then he has committed his transgression, perhaps unwittingly, and I have violated the prohibition against causing him to stumble. In other words, placing a stumbling block is a prohibition in its own right. On—

[Speaker A] The person who causes it. On that person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, this applies whether the other person acts unwittingly or deliberately, right? In the Talmud in Avodah Zarah and elsewhere, we see this: say I cause a person under a Nazirite vow to transgress by handing him a cup of wine to drink. It’s pretty clear that he’s acting deliberately, not unwittingly: the Nazirite wants to drink wine and I hand it to him. If we’re on opposite sides of a river—if I’m on the other side and he can’t get the cup himself—then I’ve violated the prohibition against placing a stumbling block. Otherwise it might be assistance, or a rabbinic prohibition. But if we’re on opposite sides of the river, then I violate the prohibition against placing a stumbling block, whether he acts deliberately or unwittingly. Now the question is what happens if I cause someone to transgress who is—let’s call him secular, though there are different shades, and we’ll get into that in a moment. In that situation, seemingly, what difference does it make? At most I can say that he’s acting unwittingly, but still…

[Speaker A] The Talmud also gives the example of a non-Jew.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it’s forbidden even to cause a non-Jew to transgress. So in that situation, seemingly, I violate the prohibition in any case. But perhaps it’s important to emphasize that when you cause a non-Jew to transgress, you mean causing him to violate a prohibition that he himself is commanded to observe, one of the seven commandments. We’re not talking about telling a non-Jew to do something forbidden to us. That’s very important for our purposes. Because when I talk about causing a secular person to transgress, for example, I mean causing him to commit a transgression that applies to us. Now, when I cause a secular person to transgress, we come to the question of how to regard a secular person. What’s the status of such a person on the halakhic map? Now, here… I think there’s a lot to say about this, and I’m not sure how far we should go into it here. But briefly, I think the phenomenon of the secular person is new. We need to be careful when applying the usual halakhic categories to it. In the past, for example, the assumption of the Sages and of the decisors throughout the generations was that if a person committed a transgression, his desires had gotten the better of him. And if he declared that he didn’t believe in the whole system at all, or something of the sort, clearly that was still a matter of desire. In other words, they weren’t inclined to believe that he was genuinely and sincerely a disbeliever: that he didn’t think it was true, didn’t think it was binding at all. I think the assumption reflected in the… It isn’t stated explicitly, but I think it’s implied—at least as I understand it—in the rabbinic sources and the post-Talmudic sources as well: they still see him as a kind of transgressor. Perhaps, at most, an unwitting one, but a kind of transgressor.

[Speaker A] A Jewish apostate too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. Now, with this new phenomenon of the secular person, I think the decisors sensed, perhaps without always articulating it explicitly, that there was something here requiring a new approach. In other words, it’s not simply the usual concept of an apostate. That’s quite clear. Again, not entirely, but many decisors felt this. There’s the well-known Chazon Ish, for example; we won’t go into all those sources. Now the question is: what category does fit? Often, perhaps, they’ve applied the category of a child taken captive. A child taken captive, perhaps just—

[Speaker A] Could you briefly explain what a child taken captive is?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. A child taken captive is, say, a child captured by non-Jews and raised among them, who has no idea about Jewish law or halakhic obligation. When he grows up, he’s in a sense acting under circumstances beyond his control. Whether he’s acting unwittingly or under circumstances beyond his control is disputed in the Talmud, but he’s somewhere between those two categories. And the assumption when applying this here is that this is essentially the closest category to what we know today as a secular person. So I think the accepted approach today is that a secular person falls into the category of a child taken captive. I don’t think there’s a clear source in the Talmud itself about causing a child taken captive to violate a prohibition, but there is a discussion of what a child taken captive is: what is the status of his transgressions? Are they unwitting, or are they beyond his control? There’s a dispute among the Talmudic sages on that question. The straightforward ruling is that he acts unwittingly, though there are contradictions in Maimonides on the matter.

[Speaker A] We’ll get to that; I saw it later on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. In any case, that’s more or less the category normally attached to a secular person: he’s a child taken captive.

[Speaker A] Now, in that situation, is it permitted… Perhaps you could first explain how they arrived at the child-taken-captive comparison. After all, a child taken captive doesn’t know, doesn’t know Judaism. A secular person does know—though it depends.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Perhaps I really should say one more thing about the child taken captive. I don’t know what you planned for later, but let me say one more thing anyway. A child taken captive isn’t just about a lack of knowledge. First—and I’ll explain why in a moment—and second, it isn’t true that a secular person doesn’t lack knowledge. He does. It’s true that he sees people sitting in a festival booth or taking up the festival branches; he sees that there are Jews who observe various practices. But first of all, he usually knows very little; most secular people know very little. And second, even what they know isn’t relevant knowledge. Think of a professor of Native American culture, okay? He knows all the Native American rituals and exactly what they’re supposed to do and everything, but it doesn’t cross his mind that these things bind him in any way. It’s clear to him that they aren’t behaving rationally, that it makes no sense, but he studies it because it interests him, or whatever—to study that culture. Now, one can relate to Jewish culture in exactly the same way. For people coming from outside that world, it’s a collection of delusions. It doesn’t even occur to them to think that it’s binding in any way. But it’s their ancestral heritage, or simply an academic interest; each has their own motivation. They devote their lives to studying Jewish culture. And they might reach a level where they have mastered every secret of the Written and Oral Torah, down to the last paragraph of the Mishnah Berurah, backward and forward, for the sake of argument, okay? It doesn’t change anything. The fact that they have a great deal of knowledge says nothing. In relation to the category of a child taken captive, it’s not enough for him to know; he has to understand—or, if he knew, he would understand—that this knowledge is relevant to him. And that doesn’t hold for today’s secular person.

[Speaker A] So even—I mean—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though he knows the material, he doesn’t… Even if he knew it—usually he doesn’t, but even if he did—that still wouldn’t take him out of the category of a child taken captive. That’s essentially the argument. Now, if that’s really so, perhaps another word about the children taken captive in the past. They didn’t know anything either. And if they didn’t know anything, obviously they didn’t know it was binding on them. But there’s still a difference. That’s why I say applying the category of a child taken captive today is a little problematic. The assumption, at least the usual one, is that once a child taken captive finds out, he’ll understand that this is what he has to do, right? That’s clear. He grew up among non-Jews, so he doesn’t know. But if he had grown up among us, or met us later and become reacquainted with his roots and so on, the assumption is that he would probably understand that this is incumbent on him. He’d have desires like anyone else, but in principle he’d understand that it was binding. Because in the ancient world it was clear that you belonged to a particular religion. So if you grew up among non-Jews, you thought you belonged to that religion. When it became clear that you didn’t, that you belonged to this one, somehow it went without saying that this was what you had to do. That doesn’t happen today. Reality is different today.

[Speaker A] Reality—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Today the situation is different. If a secular person doesn’t know, and now we teach him everything and he knows it all, that still doesn’t mean he’ll understand that it binds him. And after all, the whole phenomenon of the professors I mentioned earlier: there can be people who are great Torah scholars, people who studied in religious academies, not only knowing the material but also knowing what it says, what it means, what religious commitment is, yet they studied and then left. It doesn’t speak to them now. They don’t think it’s binding; they think it’s folklore, a myth, I don’t know exactly what, okay? I still see such a person as a child taken captive.

[Speaker A] Why? Because he’s not doing it out of a desire to transgress, but rather…? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if he knew, or actually does know, it makes no difference. He sees it as a kind of culture that he studies and researches, but he doesn’t understand that it addresses him, that it binds him. And I think that’s a very significant difference. For example, think about idolaters, right? Idolatry used to be regarded as the gravest transgression there was, and it was clear to the Sages that idolaters—sure, perhaps their desires got the better of them, but they understood they were doing wrong. Clearly they were transgressors. Now, if I saw someone worshipping an idol today, it wouldn’t occur to me that he was a transgressor. He’s a transgressor in the sense that he’s violating the prohibition against idolatry, but he’s not a transgressor in the other sense. It doesn’t occur to him that it’s forbidden. On the contrary! That’s what he believes in! So why wouldn’t he do it? That’s what he thinks! This is a modern phenomenon. I’m not saying there weren’t such people in the past, but the presumption was that this wasn’t how things were; it wasn’t the normal situation. So when you saw someone worshipping an idol, the assumption was that he was a transgressor: a transgressor because of his desires, or for other reasons. But for us here, no: if he does it, he probably really believes in it. So this phenomenon of secularism is close to the child taken captive, but it’s one step further. That’s my argument.

[Speaker A] So it’s better in the sense that fewer expectations are placed on him, which is right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could call it more beyond his control, yes.

[Speaker A] Even more beyond his control than a child taken captive. Right. Before we understand why what you’ve just said affects the prohibition against placing a stumbling block, there were also people in the Sages’ time who didn’t observe things for ideological reasons—or at least, let’s say, in the Sages’ time and afterward. There were periods in Jewish history, the Karaites in the time of, I don’t know, the Geonim or Maimonides, right? They too didn’t observe things because of transgression as you call it, but because they thought, I don’t know, that one should be a Karaite. Let’s take a Karaite, because that’s the group we know most about. So if I understand you correctly, a Karaite who commits a transgression that follows from his Karaite outlook would, in your view, be somewhat like a secular person today? That is, he wouldn’t be a child taken captive, right? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, as for the way Karaites were treated then—again, I wasn’t there, so I don’t know exactly what the phenomenon was like; it’s hard to judge from a distance. But I can offer two interpretations. Two interpretations of what? Of why they were seen and treated as transgressors at the time—

[Speaker A] Even though you’re saying that, in principle, people acting out of ideology shouldn’t be treated as transgressors. Right, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know, there’s what Maimonides says about the children of those who went astray. Even Maimonides understands that someone who has grown up in that setting is hard to regard as a transgressor. But still, he might merely be acting unwittingly. Here I’m making a more far-reaching claim: that he isn’t even acting unwittingly. Exactly. Yes. So I think the way Karaites were treated then could, on my view, have come from one of two reasons. One is that they actually saw that the Karaites did understand that something was wrong here, that they did understand that our tradition was nevertheless the authentic, original tradition, and so some kind of desire was involved. It’s possible; I don’t know, I didn’t know them.

[Speaker A] That’s a claim I could also make about secular people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so it’s a matter of assessment. I’m saying I don’t think that’s the case with secular people, certainly not someone who didn’t grow up in that sort of environment at all. It doesn’t even occur to him. But I don’t know what the Karaites were like then; it’s hard for me to judge. I think an explanation that’s no less plausible, although a little sensitive, is that the Sages were accustomed to the Talmudic way of approaching things. And in the Talmudic period, that’s how things were. Now, what happens is that other ideologies develop, and it takes us a very long time to absorb this new phenomenon and formulate an appropriate response to it.

[Speaker A] A sociological phenomenon.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. To formulate a response—sociological, psychological, yes. To formulate a different response, different from the sources. After all, we’re committed to the sources; there’s a certain conservatism built into halakhic thinking, so people are accustomed to thinking in the old categories. That’s one reason, incidentally, why they try to fit today’s secular person into one of the categories: a certain kind of apostate, a child taken captive. They try to find categories. Because we’re used to it; that’s how Jewish law works. We’re used to taking every new phenomenon and trying to crack it or present it in terms of existing halakhic concepts. Introducing a new halakhic concept is not natural in the halakhic world. And so the natural tendency—and I have a criticism of this; I say it critically, though I’m not sure I would have acted differently had I been there—but a criticism… yes.

, but from a historical perspective, yes.

[Speaker A] Yes, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what I’m saying is that there was simply a kind of inertia there: anyone who committed a transgression was seen as a transgressor. And it took a very long time both for the phenomenon of ideological transgression to develop and for a halakhic approach to ideological transgression to develop. That’s why this approach of the Chazon Ish or Rabbi Kook, treating secular Jews as children raised in captivity and so on, has faced and continues to face a great deal of criticism. Many people react by saying: What do you mean? Why are you making allowances for them? They’re outright transgressors. It’s very hard to take in a new phenomenon that falls outside the conceptual frameworks we’re used to. So I think these precedents, which tell us how to treat apostates, Karaites, and all sorts of people like that, need to be taken with a grain of salt, as they say. We have to be careful, because I think applying these things to today’s reality requires us to filter them through our own understanding as people familiar with our present situation. And anyone familiar with today’s situation has to judge it as they understand it. If it fits the old categories, excellent. If not, we have to say honestly that it doesn’t and develop an appropriate approach. I think we could expand on this, if you’d like: how far one needs to live in a situation in order to judge it and formulate a position about it.

[Speaker A] Yes, about Gitto Cohen, Gitto Kahane, yes. Exactly. So we could discuss that; you’re familiar with the material. Yes, anyone interested can read about it on the Rabbi’s website and so on. Okay, so basically what you’ve explained so far is your approach to the secular Jew of today, right? I assume Enlightenment thinkers might have been different. It depends who. Yes, but today’s secular Jew, you’re saying, because he doesn’t live within… the typical secular Jew. I mean, there are all kinds of… the average secular Jew, right? You’re saying that because he doesn’t live in a society that observes the Torah and its commandments, even if he has the… perhaps the knowledge, even if he does have the knowledge, he’s considered a child raised in captivity plus, as you call it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. I’d go further: it’s not because he doesn’t live in a society that observes the Torah and its commandments. Even if he does live in such a society, the question is what he thinks, not what society he lives in. That’s precisely the difference, one of the differences from what I said about an earlier period. Today, living in a society doesn’t mean you share its beliefs. We live in a much more individualistic age. There are people who have left religious observance; in recent years there have been many. In the past, someone who left observance would completely leave religious society and become alienated from it, and would also become left-wing politically. There was a kind of total estrangement. Today that’s really not the case. There are very, very many people who have left observance who are, on the contrary, right-wing politically and fully involved with their old friends. Their families, of course, are also more accepting than they used to be. They can live in a religious society and still genuinely have left observance, not as a result of… Of course, there are also people for whom it’s a result of temptation, but people can also say: No, I don’t believe in it. I live in the same society, I grew up in that kind of home, all that’s true, I know everything, I was educated in it, and yet, if this is my authentic outlook, then I’m genuinely secular, a child raised in captivity plus.

[Speaker A] So perhaps before we move on to the halakhic argument that follows from this, just as a matter of fact, I think there may be a factual disagreement here. I think most secular Jews believe in God and that He gave the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not my impression, but I don’t know; I haven’t done a statistical study.

[Speaker A] So the secular person you’re describing here is someone who believes in God, or who doesn’t believe in God, or who believes in God but doesn’t think He gave the Torah. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or who doesn’t think it’s binding on him.

[Speaker A] Okay, or that He gave the Torah but it isn’t binding. All right, someone who doesn’t accept the religious, halakhic system.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s Maimonides at the end of chapter eight of the Laws of Kings, where Maimonides says that anyone who does these things…

[Speaker A] Wait, wait, perhaps you can say that in a moment. First, maybe you could explain why this reality affects the question of putting a stumbling block before the blind? Okay, so you’re saying that today, with a secular person who… doesn’t accept the halakhic system or doesn’t accept God’s very existence, and we may disagree about whether that’s the average secular person or not, with a secular person like that, putting a stumbling block before the blind doesn’t apply. There’s no… I’m not forbidden to cause a secular person like that to commit a transgression. And let’s just say that this has very, very practical implications. Right. There are many discussions among halakhic decisors about whether I may invite a secular person to my home for the Sabbath, whether I may offer refreshments or food to someone who doesn’t observe the Torah and its commandments, because he won’t say a blessing. So, on the face of it, that’s forbidden because it’s putting a stumbling block before the blind: I’m causing him to transgress. The decisors find all kinds of compromises and ways around it, but according to what you’re saying, the question doesn’t even arise. It’s not forbidden at all, so there’s no need to find a workaround. Could you explain why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I need to start not with putting a stumbling block before the blind, but with the prohibition itself. My basic claim isn’t that there’s no stumbling block here, but that he hasn’t violated a prohibition, so it follows that I haven’t put a stumbling block before him. So I have to start with the question of why he hasn’t violated a prohibition. Once I reach the conclusion that he hasn’t, it follows that I, by causing him to do it, haven’t violated the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind. Okay. But why do I think he hasn’t violated a prohibition? That’s the Maimonides passage I started talking about earlier. At the end of chapter eight of the Laws of Kings, Maimonides is speaking about a resident alien, a non-Jew, not a Jew. But he says that a non-Jew who observes the seven commandments because reason dictates it is among the wise of the nations of the wor—he’s not, he’s, he’s among the wise of the nations of the world… Shall I read it out?

[Speaker A] Please. “Anyone who accepts the seven commandments and is careful to observe them is among the righteous of the nations of the world and has a share in the World to Come, provided that he accepts and observes them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them… But,” skipping a few, a few sentences, “but if he observed them because reason dictated it, he is not a resident alien, nor is he among the righteous of the nations of the world, nor among their wise.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “But among their wise”; there are two versions of the text here.

[Speaker A] Okay, “but” or “nor,” yes. Yes. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So Maimonides is essentially telling us that a person can be… Think of Ahad Ha’am, right? Ahad Ha’am said, “More than the Jews have kept… kept the Sabbath, the Sabbath has kept the Jews.” In other words, through this saying he’s calling on us to observe commandments. Now, let’s assume he means keeping the Sabbath in every last detail. That’s not quite what he means, but let’s say it is. So a Jew like Ahad Ha’am who observes the Sabbath in every last detail is doing it not out of commitment to God’s command at Sinai, but because reason dictates it. He thinks it’s the right thing to do, possibly for all sorts of reasons: identification with the tradition of his ancestors, perhaps national cohesion, all kinds of things like that, or because the actions themselves make sense to him. In other words, he thinks this is how one ought to act, not because God commanded it, but because it’s the right way to act, morally or whatever it may be. A person like that, Maimonides says, is among the wise of the nations of the world, but not among their righteous. As I understand it, this means he acts rightly, he’s among the wise of the nations of the world, but his act has no religious value. He’s not among the righteous; that is, the act has no religious significance, even though it’s the right act. Why? Because a religious act is only an act that stems from commitment to God’s command. And that’s what Maimonides writes there: only because… only someone who does it because of the Torah God gave Moses at Sinai is actually among the righteous of the nations of the world, not merely among their wise.

[Speaker A] And you’re taking the righteous of the nations of the world and applying the same prin—the same principle to a Jew as well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. I maintain that Maimonides’ claim, when he speaks about the seven commandments given to Noah’s descendants, is also true of a Jew. Incidentally, quite a few commentators on Maimonides say this; I think there’s one who doesn’t, though I no longer remember who it was. I saw it in the Frankel edition; you can look it up there in the index. But to me it’s obvious as a matter of reasoning. I don’t need the commentators: I’m in the game, as we said. So it seems obvious to me on logical grounds that this is the case. And basically the claim is that an act not performed out of religious commitment has no religious value; it isn’t a commandment.

[Speaker A] When I read Maimonides, I didn’t understand him that way. I understood that someone who acts in order to be considered among the righteous… Actually, what are you saying? You’re saying that an act of observance doesn’t qualify as a commandment if I don’t do it because I know it comes from God, right? In other words, if I put on phylacteries now because a Chabad follower asked me to at the mall, and I just want to do him a favor because he’s my friend, say, then you’re saying that doesn’t qualify as a commandment, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you return to religious observance at noon, you’ll have to put on phylacteries again. Exactly. You haven’t put on phylacteries today.

[Speaker A] Yes, so according to you it doesn’t count as having put on phylacteries, right? What’s more, if I said the morning prayers to make up a prayer quorum for a friend, you’re saying it isn’t an act of observing a commandment, so it doesn’t count.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I read an interesting exchange between the Lubavitcher Rebbe and Rabbi Yitzhak Hutner on precisely this point.

[Speaker A] Oh, I know; that’s why I brought it up. When I read Maimonides, I understood him differently. I understood that in any case there is an act of observing a commandment, but to be among the righteous of the nations of the world, which is more than simply observing a commandment, you have to observe it with the awareness that it comes from God.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides doesn’t write that. Maimonides would have had to say: there’s the status of the righteous of the nations of the world and perhaps the status of a resident alien, or something like that, or the other way around: a resident alien and one of the righteous of the nations of the world. He doesn’t define two levels like that. He says that someone who observes the seven commandments for this reason is among the righteous of the nations of the world, and someone who doesn’t is not. He doesn’t give him another definition. So he’s an ordinary non-Jew. He doesn’t establish two levels here.

[Speaker A] An ordinary non-Jew, an ordinary non-Jew who has observed a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, an ordinary non-Jew who has observed a commandment is a resident alien. I mean, who has observed the seven commandments given to Noah’s descendants. He’s a resident alien. Where does Maimonides define that level? He would have to specify: if you observe them just because, then you’re a resident alien; if you observe them out of loyalty to God’s command, then you’re among the righteous of the nations of the world, which is some higher level.

[Speaker A] According to what you’re saying, there’s either the righteous of the nations of the world or their wise; there’s no ordinary resident alien.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. No, a resident alien is among the righteous of the nations of the world.

[Speaker A] Yes, I’m saying there’s no ordinary resident alien, as it were.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By their wise, he means people who behave well, but there’s no value.

[Speaker A] Yes, but they’re not resident aliens. So essentially, being among the righteous of the nations of the world is equivalent to being a resident alien.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is a resident alien? A resident alien means someone who accepts the commandments before a religious court, right? Accepting the commandments before a religious court is precisely that, isn’t it? He does it because God commanded it.

[Speaker A] So that’s one of the righteous of the nations of the world. I could have said that one of the righteous of the nations of the world is someone who accepts them and is careful to observe them; that’s Maimonides’ wording.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean to accept them and be careful to observe them?

[Speaker A] There’s accepting them: I’ve accepted that I’m a resident alien, but I’m a bit lax, casually observant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But when you accept these commandments before a religious court, you’re clearly declaring that you’re committed to God’s commandments. Right, but careful to observe them? What do you mean, that commandments require intention? That throughout his life, every time—

[Speaker A] No, “careful” means that for years I’m strictly observant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t… But careful to observe them for that reason! No, the emphasis isn’t on being careful to observe them; the emphasis is on the reason he’s careful to observe them. The issue here isn’t whether someone accepted the commandments and doesn’t observe them, or accepted them and does observe them, but whether he observes them because reason dictates it or because of the command. Where is the intermediate level of someone who observes them and accepted them before a religious court but cuts corners throughout his life? I don’t think that’s what Maimonides means. It doesn’t sound like it. Incidentally, what I said earlier, I would say even without Maimonides. To me it’s a matter of reason.

[Speaker A] Of course, yes. So basically, okay, what you want to draw from Maimonides here is that if a person performs an act without religious awareness—what do you call it? Religious awareness—then his act of observing the commandment has no value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there’s no religious commitment. “Religious awareness” is, again, a somewhat problematic concept. Some people do it because it brings them closer to God, because it gives them a spiritual experience. That’s worth nothing, because it isn’t a commandment.

[Speaker A] Yes, experience, awareness, commitment. Okay, commitment. And is the same true of a transgression? If I commit a transgression without—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Commitment. Exactly. Now, that’s already my own extension. Maimonides writes about commandments. Now, I argue—although some of the seven commandments given to Noah’s descendants also concern transgressions, but that doesn’t matter—I really do think that when Maimonides says this, he means something very categorical. He’s saying: if you’re not within the sphere of being commanded, your actions have no religious significance. Now there are two sides to this coin. On the one hand, your acts of observance aren’t commandments; they may be good deeds, but they’re not commandments. And on the other hand, your transgressions aren’t transgressions; they’re bad deeds, but they’re not transgressions. In other words, the religious dimension exists only within this sphere of commitment, and that’s true both of commandments and of transgressions. That’s the claim.

[Speaker A] Okay. And now you go one step further and say that because of this, the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind doesn’t apply.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And then I argue that if I cause someone to commit a transgression, we can discuss whether, if I cause someone to transgress under compulsion—if he acted under compulsion, not inadvertently—I’ve violated the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind. That’s not a simple question. On the face of it, people generally tend to think yes; it’s not a simple question. I tend to think not, but—

[Speaker A] Yes, it depends on how the compulsion is attributed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it depends on how the compulsion is attributed, all the familiar lines of inquiry. In a situation where I feed him something forbidden, actively administer the forbidden thing to him, then even if he’s under compulsion, I probably violate a prohibition, because the prohibited act itself is attributed to me. That’s Maimonides at the end of the Laws of Forbidden Mixtures and elsewhere: when someone actively administers something forbidden to an adult, not a minor—the Talmud discusses administering something forbidden to a minor in the tractate Yevamot, but Maimonides extends it to an adult as well, and Rosh wonders where he gets that from, and so on. But Maimonides says: if you actively administer something forbidden to an adult, say, in the case of forbidden mixtures, and suppose he acted inadvertently or even, probably, under compulsion, while I acted deliberately, then I’m liable to lashes. Now, one isn’t flogged for putting a stumbling block before the blind. If I’m liable to lashes, that means I’ve violated the prohibition of forbidden mixtures, and that’s why I’m flogged. But he wore the forbidden mixture; I only dressed him in it.

[Speaker A] Yes, there you performed an action. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there, even if you were under compulsion, it doesn’t matter, because the transgression involving the forbidden mixture is mine. I’m talking about a situation where the transgression involving the forbidden mixture is yours, and I merely caused you to stumble: I violated the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind. Here it will depend on whether you violated a prohibition. Because if you didn’t, then I didn’t violate the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind. Putting a stumbling block before the blind means causing someone else to violate a prohibition, but I didn’t commit the prohibited act myself. I violated the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind, not the prohibition of forbidden mixtures itself. So if I caused you to violate the prohibition of forbidden mixtures—I didn’t dress you in a forbidden mixture, which would be actively administering it, but I caused you to violate the prohibition: I gave you a garment and told you, ‘No, this garment is permitted; there’s no problem of forbidden mixtures,’ and then you put it on—then I caused you to violate that prohibition. In that situation, even if you were under compulsion or acted inadvertently, whatever the case, I violated a prohibition because I put a stumbling block before the blind. Okay? Not because I violated the prohibition of forbidden mixtures.

[Speaker A] Essentially, you understand the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind as arising from the fact that I caused the other person to stumble and harmed him. And then you say that if that person has no religious commitment, no harm has been done to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, because he hasn’t committed a transgression.

[Speaker A] He hasn’t committed a transgression, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Although one might think… We can go back to the verse. After all, we are extending the verse. The verse says, “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind.” It’s quite clear that this is so as not to harm the blind person. So if you now interpret it to include causing someone to transgress and giving unfair advice, it’s quite clear that this isn’t just some arbitrary scriptural decree. Rather, you’ve placed an obstacle before someone—a spiritual obstacle, but an obstacle nonetheless. Now, if he hasn’t committed a transgression, you haven’t placed an obstacle before him.

[Speaker A] And perhaps without even noticing it, you’re also arguing against the view that the problem with putting a stumbling block before the blind is that transgression becomes trivial in my eyes. In other words, there’s a view that says the problem isn’t only that he has stumbled, but also that transgressions become trivial in my eyes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not familiar with that view, but now that you mention it, I have to say it doesn’t sound plausible to me. Right. It doesn’t sound plausible to me. Perhaps why?

[Speaker A] Because it’s an extension of the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind. Okay, but let me raise a further objection. You also agree that—or as Maimonides put it, “among their wise”—there’s value in observing the commandments or avoiding transgressions, even if it isn’t religious value. It has value as a matter of wisdom, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With those transgressions that belong, say, to the realm of morality. Maimonides—perhaps one more point—Maimonides says these things in the laws of the resident alien, there in the Laws of Kings. And people have already asked me: if you extend this to Jews as well, why does Maimonides write it specifically there? Why doesn’t he write it about all Jews? I argue that this isn’t a problem. Why not? Because Maimonides is talking there about the seven commandments given to Noah’s descendants. And Maimonides writes that these are commandments to which reason inclines. Right? That’s how he defines the seven commandments given to Noah’s descendants. That means: which commandments is it relevant to discuss someone observing because reason dictates it? No one will redeem a firstborn donkey because reason dictates it, right? He does things because reason dictates them when they’re moral or, in any case, have some reasonable explanation: the rational laws rather than the statutes whose reasons aren’t apparent. Okay? The most natural place for this to appear is the commandments given to Noah’s descendants, because those are commandments to which reason inclines. So that’s where Maimonides makes the distinction: but know that if you do it only because reason inclines you to it, it isn’t a commandment. If you do it out of commitment to God, it is a commandment. But that’s not because this applies only to the seven commandments given to Noah’s descendants. It’s simply because that’s the natural place to discuss it, since the subject there is commandments to which reason inclines. So when you say to me, if someone redeems a firstborn donkey, he isn’t doing it because reason dictates it, I have to ask myself: why is he doing it? If it’s to please a Chabad follower, fine, a friend, yes. To please a Chabad follower, all right, then indeed, it’s like someone who worships an idol out of love or fear, which the medieval authorities explain as love or fear of a person.

[Speaker A] Yes. So essentially you agree that the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind can apply to a secular person too—a secular person by your definition, someone with no religious commitment at all—in a case where the act itself isn’t wise, right? In other words, if I cause someone to steal, trick someone into thinking it’s worthwhile to steal—I don’t know how to describe a situation like that—convince him it’s worthwhile to steal, then the prohibition would apply because I’ve harmed him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there’s room to discuss whether it would be… It’s clearly wrong. But does the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind apply here in its halakhic definition? I’m uncertain. Because you could say: isn’t it at least as bad as a physical stumbling block?

[Speaker A] Yes, that’s what I’m saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Indeed. But I’m not entirely sure, because moral obligation is a function of—at least part of it is a function of awareness. My moral outlook is Kantian, so what I say about Jewish law I also say about morality. So an act that you don’t perform because of moral commitment isn’t a moral act, or a transgression that you don’t commit…

[Speaker A] But it does him harm. The person who’s just stolen, say, suffers harm in the sense that his soul becomes repelled by theft.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That depends. Let’s ask psychologists whether someone who steals will indeed be led to steal even more afterward, even if he knows that stealing is wrong, okay? Maybe, but that’s a question for discussion. Does something like that actually fall under the halakhic prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind? It’s clearly wrong. Whether it falls under that halakhic prohibition, I’m not one hundred percent sure. There’s room to discuss it as one would a physical stumbling block, but there’s also room for doubt. Okay. But that’s only with commandments that are rational.

[Speaker A] Yes. Yes. Okay, so to sum up for a moment: you’re essentially saying that a person who doesn’t believe in religious commitment—and in your view that’s the average secular person today; I don’t think so, but that isn’t crucial—his actions qualify as neither commandments nor transgressions, because he has no religious commitment. And consequently I can’t cause him to stumble, because an act of that kind doesn’t apply to him, and therefore the prohibition against putting a stumbling block before the blind doesn’t apply.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just one more point: the disagreement we had earlier, which you also mentioned just now in passing, about whether this is the typical secular person or not, has a very important practical consequence. We need to look at the statistics, but it’s a very important practical consequence, because what happens if a secular person comes before you and you don’t know what sort of person he is? There we’ll follow presumptions, the majority, and then… anything that separates from a group is presumed to come from the majority, simply put. Yes, and then it really makes a big difference. Because if I’m right that this is the typical secular person, then even if I have no evidence, the burden of proof is on whoever wants to hold him obligated. You have to prove that he isn’t the typical secular person. And if the typical secular person is a believer who is committed, who knows about the obligation to observe the commandments, then the burden of proof is on me if I want to exempt him. So…

[Speaker A] Let’s perhaps give an example for a moment, to make it clearer: if I now see a secular person driving on the Sabbath, and he asks me how, where the way is to, I don’t know, to…Let’s go with the stereotype: to a party, right? To a pub in X. So, according to what you’re saying, Rabbi, there’s at least no problem of placing a stumbling block before someone, and therefore you can tell him, “Drive there,” because that prohibition doesn’t apply when he has no religious commitment. What I’m saying is that even if we accept your extension of the principle—that the prohibition doesn’t apply to someone with no religious commitment—an ordinary secular person believes in God and believes there are commandments, and so if… that are binding too. Binding, yes, binding. He just doesn’t observe them because he can’t be bothered. So I, I would have to clarify this with him during the drive: “Tell me, is this…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, when it comes to traditional Jews, I’m willing to accept what you’re saying. You see? I’m talking about secular people. Ah. Traditional Jews are different. We have no disagreement there, or at least I’d have to look at the statistics before I disagreed, because there are many kinds of traditional Jews.

[Speaker A] Okay, okay, so when I said secular, I meant—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who isn’t religious.

[Speaker A] No, no, I’m talking about secular people. Secular as in… okay, okay, so the dispute narrows a little. But I think most people define themselves as traditional. Uh… so all the surveys of, of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those surveys aren’t worth much, because…

[Speaker A] In short, because they do it for the folklore.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, exactly. I mean, the question is what kind of traditional Jew you are. There are lots and lots of people—I’m surprised every time I discover how many people recite the Sabbath blessing over wine on Friday night. There used to be even more, but there are still people who do it today. Yes. And these are people who don’t have the slightest… I know quite a few who don’t have the slightest sense of commitment. They don’t believe in any of it at all, but it’s part of the tradition. They’re used to it, they saw it at home, I don’t know exactly what, so they do it. They too might sometimes define themselves as traditional in surveys that… Every so often you find out from surveys how many people believe in God, and you discover astonishing percentages that surprise me very much. I think a large proportion of them don’t really believe, by my definitions. It connects with them on one experiential level or another, but as a factual claim—that’s another question. What belief is is itself another topic. But I’m saying you have to be careful with surveys like these; you have to understand what the question means and what the answers mean.

[Speaker A] Okay, so if we go back for a moment, the closest topic, the most similar concept, which you also mentioned, is really that of a child taken captive, right? That’s the closest among the familiar concepts of Jewish law. And regarding a child taken captive, the Talmud in the Sabbath tractate, at least as the law is ruled, says that when such a person returns to Judaism, he must bring a sin offering for each type of transgression he committed. Seemingly, according to what you’re saying, a child taken captive has no religious commitment while growing up among non-Jews. He didn’t know any Jews, right? Again, a child taken captive is someone who grew up among non-Jews. According to what you’re saying, since he has no religious commitment, I can’t require him to bring a sin offering, because he didn’t sin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, those are two different things. The child taken captive in those days, as I said earlier, was essentially someone who, if he learned and knew, would clearly understand that he was obligated. That’s the assumption. Okay? In that situation, you can regard him as having acted unwittingly. It’s like someone who is committed to Jewish law but doesn’t know a particular law; he hasn’t learned it.

[Speaker A] But I could also say about a secular person: if he had grown up and…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I argue that’s not true. With a secular person it isn’t a matter of knowledge. I mean, it’s not… Because if you expose him to the religious world, why on earth would he necessarily accept it? Who says he’ll accept that commitment at all? That’s exactly the difference between him and the child taken captive in the past. That’s why I argue that he’s a child taken captive plus.

[Speaker A] I, I think you’re too much of a philosopher, Rabbi. What do you mean? Do you think a secular person actually reads all the philosophy? Not at all. So, so why is a secular person secular? Because he grew up that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, he grew up that way? He really thinks that way, even if he isn’t a philosopher. And are religious people all philosophers? When they believe in God, is it after some profound philosophical investigations?

[Speaker A] No, they also grew up that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not only that. If, if, if it’s only because they grew up that way, then in my eyes they’re complete atheists. That’s not it. There are people who aren’t philosophers, but even someone who isn’t a philosopher makes decisions. That’s fine; not everyone has to be a philosopher. He makes decisions, and as far as he’s concerned the reasoning is sufficient. Perfectly fine. You can agree with him or disagree with him, depending on your philosophical temperament. That’s perfectly fine. As far as I’m concerned, it’s a decision in every sense. There’s no requirement that everyone be a philosopher. So what I’m saying is, but, but here, in this case, I argue that even someone who isn’t a philosopher—say a secular person who isn’t a philosopher, okay? Take him to an organized seminar, teach him the entire Code of Jewish Law from beginning to end. Do you really think he’ll start observing? Just teach him all of Jewish law. No.

[Speaker A] No. Yes, because he, because he… In my view the… it’s a kind of, again, a kind of factual disagreement. It’s because he grew up differently, but if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what do you mean, grew up? He really thinks that way. What do you mean, he grew up differently?

[Speaker A] He really thinks that way. I don’t think he thinks—I mean, I don’t think the average person is thinking, “Am I observing the Sabbath because God commanded it?” Rather, “I’m used to it, I…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I, I… Well, here we really do disagree. I’m just saying that if you were right, if I agreed with you—

[Speaker A] No, that was the next stage, what I wanted to say…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If, if I agreed with you, then all the commandments religious people observe would be worth nothing either.

[Speaker A] Do you think the average person, religious or secular, has actually weighed these things seriously?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can do that without paying conscious attention, too. What difference does it make?

[Speaker A] Yes, yes, Rabbi…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he has weighed them.

[Speaker A] He has reached a conclusion about what seems right to him, and now you have a disagreement with him. And coincidentally—wait—and coincidentally, most of those who grow up in an ultra-Orthodox home will be ultra-Orthodox, most who grow up in a religious home will be religious, and most who grow up secular will be secular?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It isn’t a coincidence, but yes, because your environment certainly influences how you think. A person is shaped by the landscape of his birthplace. So what? You know, a person who… a person who…

[Speaker A] Who… I, I agree that a person is shaped by the landscape… that it’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, because… No! Shaped by the landscape of his birthplace, but that doesn’t mean it’s deterministic. Ultimately, a person still makes decisions. When a thief comes before a court and is convicted, and then they bring character witnesses, I don’t know, he grew up in a terrible home and he suffered, and there are lots of mitigating circumstances—does that absolve him of responsibility? Of course not! Those are arguments for a lighter sentence, but they don’t absolve him of responsibility. In the end, when you choose to do something, it’s your decision and you’re responsible for that decision. And decisions—it’s not as though this thief sat down, engaged in philosophical reasoning, and concluded that he would or wouldn’t be a thief. The same goes for someone who doesn’t steal, okay? It doesn’t matter. This is how people act, this is how they weigh things. Some are more philosophical, some less philosophical; it makes no difference at all. As long as it really is his position, he really does think that way. Now, I might manage to persuade him otherwise with wonderful arguments, fine. But as long as I haven’t persuaded him, and merely knowing the information isn’t enough to persuade him, then as far as I’m concerned he’s a child taken captive plus. The assumption about a child taken captive is that knowing the information alone is enough to bring him back to observing the commandments. In other words, if he understands that he’s Jewish and that these are the commandments binding on Jews, he’ll start observing them. That’s the claim. And I think that was true of the world in the past. A person, you know, saw himself as belonging to this religion or that religion. The only question was where you belonged, but ultimately you did what you were supposed to do.

[Speaker A] And so all the discussions about a child taken captive are essentially irrelevant, because this is what you called a child taken captive plus. Yes, and so no discussion, no precedent, really changes anything, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. There’s another point here, which came up in responses I received afterward. The article was in Tzohar, and there were various responses, all of which—or several of which—returned to the same point. It’s a mistake that I feel it’s important to clarify. Obviously these people are obligated to observe the commandments, and obviously, if I can bring them back to the steadfast observance of Torah, as Maimonides puts it, and get them to observe the commandments, that’s certainly an absolute obligation. They’re Jews. Certainly. I’m not claiming that they aren’t obligated in the commandments. I’m claiming that they…

[Speaker A] And that the law of mutual responsibility applies to them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. They’re fully obligated in the commandments, but even if they observe them, they won’t manage to fulfill their obligations, because it isn’t observance of commandments. In other words, they can observe the commandments if they return and understand that they’re obligated, and then they’ll observe them. But they’re certainly obligated. More than that, precisely because of this… I have a greater mutual responsibility toward them, because they aren’t wicked. They haven’t chosen to rebel against this system and oppose it. They genuinely think differently. So they aren’t transgressors, and there’s no reason to exclude them from the law of mutual responsibility. All the sanctions and the rejecting attitude you see among the halakhic decisors and the sages and so on aren’t relevant to them. Precisely because I see them as disconnected from the commandments, that’s an argument in their favor, not against them. For example, I’ve said more than once that I think a traditional Jew is much worse than an atheist.

[Speaker A] That’s exactly what it is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because a traditional Jew knows… A traditional Jew of the kind we spoke about earlier, yes?

[Speaker A] Because he accepts that there’s a God and there are commandments, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. I don’t mean a Yemenite Jew now. So he’s much worse: he knows his Master and rebels against Him. He’s an outright transgressor. An atheist isn’t a transgressor. What do you want from him? That’s what he thinks.

[Speaker A] Yes. By atheist, you mean what you defined earlier as secular. Yes, yes. So all the objections people might raise against you from various earlier rulings don’t change anything, because there simply wasn’t such a category, right? That’s the summary. And on the other hand, it turns out that every person, let’s call him traditional, is not… I can’t count him in a prayer quorum, because his act has no consequence, no consequence at all. No, why? You can count a traditional Jew; you can’t count a secular person. A traditional Jew… Sorry, everyone you called secular, yes. I can’t count him… an atheist.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because—

[Speaker A] His religious act is essentially meaningless.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t call him up to read from the Torah, you can’t count him in a prayer quorum. Of course not.

[Speaker A] And his blessings have no meaning, everything. Yes, yes. Okay, and the responses you received—I saw that you received a lot of responses. You wrote this in Tzohar twenty years ago or thereabouts, right? And in a moment we may touch on that too. A lot of the responses were about, how shall we put it, various precedents. And you’re essentially saying there is no precedent. And even precedents that—and this seems to me a very novel point—even the precedents people bring, like the various groups we mentioned, the Karaites or things like that, which are basically similar, you say: granted, they are similar, really similar, but Maimonides didn’t have the same consciousness we have today. So Maimonides couldn’t really… You relied on Maimonides earlier, but that was Maimonides on the nations of the world and their sages. Maimonides didn’t treat the Karaites that way. So you’re saying that’s because thinking back then, 800 years ago, wasn’t sufficiently critical or developed, or equipped with historical awareness, to recognize that there’s a new phenomenon here. So are you saying that if Maimonides were alive today, he would rule differently from me concerning secular people? I mean, if I were… what’s Maimonides? Yes, no, if I were… Okay, okay. Did you receive any interesting response to this article, one that made you reconsider? Because now, for example, you’ve changed it a little from the debates twenty years ago. Twenty years ago you formulated it somewhat differently. You did compare it more closely to a child taken captive. For example, in dealing with the Talmudic passage in the Sabbath tractate that I mentioned earlier about a child taken captive, you said in the debate twenty years ago, “I agree that it’s similar to a child taken captive, and that in principle a sin offering has to be brought, but a sin offering isn’t brought for a sin; it’s brought for a lapse of awareness.” Now you’ve formulated it differently here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That there’s one lapse of awareness.

[Speaker A] Yes, you’ve now put it differently. You said it isn’t similar at all, because it’s actually a different category.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I don’t remember anymore, because it was twenty years ago and I haven’t reread it. In 2001–02, yes. I don’t know, yes, but I no longer remember what was there. If I don’t remember, it’s possible I really did write something completely different.

[Speaker A] Not completely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no, but if I were writing it today, I would put it on two levels: first, even if he is a child taken captive, he only has to bring an offering for one lapse of awareness, just one sin offering. And in my opinion he’s also a child taken captive plus.

[Speaker A] Ah, but if he has to bring one sin offering, that shows that sin is applicable to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but, but causing him to stumble still isn’t causing him to stumble, because the lapse of awareness already exists. I explained that there using Afikei Yam. If you’re familiar with Afikei Yam on what sin offerings are brought for.

[Speaker A] Wait, okay, so perhaps you could say a few words about that? Like…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Afikei Yam investigates—yes, he was Rabbi Chaim Ozer’s brother-in-law…

[Speaker A] Yes, wait, before that, perhaps you could state the Talmudic passage again? The Talmud says that when a child taken captive returns, he has to bring a sin offering for every transgression he committed. I’m just explaining the question, right? So we raised an objection from that—yes? People raised it against you, you raised it against yourself, right? From the fact that the child taken captive brings a sin offering, we see that a sin offering is applicable even to a child taken captive. So what you answered just now was: it’s true that a child taken captive must bring a sin offering and that sin applies to him, but a secular person today is a child taken captive plus, and therefore it isn’t relevant. Now you’ve given another answer. You said at the time that a child taken… really does have to bring a sin offering. So you would say, a child taken captive really does have to bring a sin offering, and even if I compared a secular person to a child taken captive, that doesn’t mean… because?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because, because the question is what you bring a sin offering for. I mean, a sin offering is brought for an unwitting transgression. Now, what happens if you committed two transgressions unwittingly? In principle you have to bring two sin offerings. But there are situations where, say, you committed several transgressions during one lapse of awareness. That is, you weren’t aware that it was the Sabbath, and you committed several… I harvested and kindled a fire, yes. Exactly. Then you’re liable for one sin offering. Why? Because there’s one lapse of awareness. You only didn’t know that it was the Sabbath. By contrast, if you know it’s the Sabbath, but you didn’t know that harvesting is forbidden and you didn’t know that hunting is forbidden, and you hunted and harvested, then you bring two sin offerings. Why? Because your two transgressions were committed because of two different lapses of awareness. Two different things escaped your notice: that hunting is forbidden and that harvesting is forbidden. But if the only thing you weren’t aware of was that it was the Sabbath—you know everything else, you just don’t know it’s the Sabbath—and you did several things, you bring one sin offering. Now, the conventional interpretation in Jewish law is that this is some sort of formal legal definition. In other words, you’re actually liable for every transgression, but the lapse of awareness causes one sin offering to atone for all the transgressions, because it links them all together for the purpose of sin offerings. It links all the transgressions, and therefore one sin offering suffices. And I argue—there’s the analysis in Afikei Yam, where he raises two nuances—and I argue that this isn’t right. Rather, you bring the sin offering for the lapse of awareness. It’s not that the lapse of awareness is a condition and you bring it for the transgressions; you bring the sin offering for the lapse of awareness itself.

[Speaker A] And the sins are a condition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Now, every sin you committed is just an expression of the fact that something escaped your awareness. If I happened to forget that hunting was forbidden today, would I bring a sin offering? I didn’t hunt! Obviously it has to find practical expression for the lapse of awareness to make me liable for a sin offering. But I’m liable for the lapse of awareness, not for the hunting, not for the act.

[Speaker A] And the condition itself isn’t enough for… obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because once I’ve brought a sin offering for that lapse of awareness, what difference does it make if I performed several acts? It’s true that the conditions have been met, but there’s still only one ground of liability. Ultimately there’s one lapse of awareness here, so it makes me liable for only one sin offering. Now, if that’s the case, what I’m arguing is, say he were a child taken captive—a secular person, never mind, let’s talk about an actual child taken captive. In that situation, suppose I invite him to my home for the Sabbath and he’ll drive to me. Now, he drives all the time on Sabbaths, right? So he’ll have to bring a sin offering for that lapse of awareness anyway. That’s even if he’s a child taken captive. So if I caused him to stumble in one more thing, what happened? I argue that even then we don’t regard his acts as transgressions; he brings the sin offering for the lapse of awareness. And that lapse already existed, so what difference does it make whether he performs ten acts as a result of it or five? The transgression, or the negligence—it’s not really a transgression, it’s negligence—the negligence that makes him liable for a sin offering is that he wasn’t aware, not that he acted. What he did is a consequence. Once he didn’t know, he acted; he committed the transgressions because he didn’t know it was a transgression. Okay?

[Speaker A] But it’s the same with a religious person too. I mean, if I’ve forgotten it’s the Sabbath, then if you…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you’ve already driven, say you forgot it was the Sabbath and drove, and I cause you to stumble by driving again, then on my view, yes, I mean…

[Speaker A] So you’re saying now that even if a religious person has a lapse of awareness, his sins have no significance—the sins…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he’s already done it.

[Speaker A] That result, yes, that result from the same lapse of awareness. If he’s already done it once, then adding…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More, yes, say…

[Speaker A] Exactly. I forgot it’s the Sabbath. Now, I don’t know, I’m going to harvest, and you tell me, “Harvest that other thing for me too.” There wouldn’t be any violation of “do not place a stumbling block,” because there wouldn’t actually be an act of transgression on the… Well, that’s another novel point on top of a novel point. And, well, we won’t spend more time on it because we’re beginning to run short of time. Now that we’ve understood that, there are questions from members of the podcast community. Most of the questions they asked have been asked and answered here, so I’ll just ask the ones we haven’t discussed. Rabbi Eyal Raznikovich, whom you know, I assume, asked us to raise this point and ask what you think about the lack today of forums like the one that existed twenty years ago. In other words, twenty years ago you wrote the article in Tzohar, and it prompted responses and responses to the responses, and that’s missing today. Do you agree that there’s no such forum today?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree, but part of that is probably the generation. Printed journals already have limited significance, unless you’re in the ultra-Orthodox world, say. Today it has to be on the internet.

[Speaker A] But it doesn’t exist on the internet either.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Now, because of the medium, the internet no longer gathers broad forums around it like those that gathered around the ten journals that existed, or something like that. Because there are so many pages and so much material on the internet, it’s hard to recreate that. It’s definitely missing. I’m just not sure how to solve the problem or fill that gap.

[Speaker A] So you agree with the assessment that it’s missing? Certainly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the way, even then, in the journal era, you didn’t get many responses to what you did. A discussion didn’t really develop.

[Speaker A] Unless there was—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A provocative article like yours.

[Speaker A] Even there, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even there, no, there wasn’t. You got six or seven responses there. Yes, but no, no, it didn’t generate a discussion. Most rabbis hadn’t heard about it. Most rabbis hadn’t even heard of this thesis. Whether they agreed or disagreed, they didn’t talk about it.

[Speaker A] Before today’s episode I brought it up in several groups of rabbis, and they were all very surprised. Ah, they hadn’t heard about it either.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, many were surprised, yes. That’s why I say that even in the journal era, it’s not as though there was a communal campfire where all the rabbis sat and had a comprehensive discussion. No, some were there and some weren’t. It wasn’t all that different from the internet situation today.

[Speaker A] A question from Mordechai Genzel—Genzel. I know what you’ll answer, but I’ll ask anyway. He asks: Did the desire to get along in a mixed society, without resorting to explanations such as maintaining peaceful relations, giving people the benefit of the doubt, or other devices that halakhic decisors used to manage the situation, play a role in determining your position, and if so, to what extent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. I mean, I don’t believe in consequentialist considerations. I think we have to discuss whether it’s correct or incorrect. If it’s correct, then it’s perfectly fine even if there’s no pressing problem, and if it’s incorrect, then even if there is a pressing problem, it’s incorrect. A pressing need has a role only in a situation where I’m uncertain. In other words, if I have two possibilities—perhaps this thesis is correct, perhaps it isn’t—then where there’s a great need or something like that, Jewish law too recognizes that you can rely on lenient opinions or on one side of a doubt when circumstances require it, or when there’s a pressing problem of one kind or another. I don’t accept considerations of hardship, goals, policy and so on as a basis for determining Jewish law.

[Speaker A] In other words, if I can translate what you’re saying, your thesis, your novel argument, isn’t that you’re uncertain and then say, “Well, I’m uncertain, but I have all sorts of needs,” and so on. Rather, you think it’s objectively correct.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. In my opinion, that’s the correct way to view our reality today. I understand.

[Speaker A] Well, Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you.

Does the Prohibition of Placing a Stumbling Block Before the Blind Apply to Causing a Secular Jew to Sin? – The Battle of Torah with Rabbi Sagi Mazuz – Rabbi Michael Abraham

Contents

Summary

Overview

Full Transcript

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Contents

Summary

Overview

Full Transcript

שתף

Leave a Reply Cancel reply