Behar (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Eve of the holy Sabbath of Parashat Behar, 5765

Questions

1. What is the difference between the sabbatical year and the Jubilee? Does the Jubilee have social significance?
2. What is common to, and what differs between, cancellation of debts and the release of slaves and return of lands?
3. What is the logical significance of a refutation of a kal va-homer?
4. Two ways of understanding a hermeneutical kal va-homer.
5. “Bare” and “colored” parameters at the foundation of kal va-homer.
6. Identifying the logical kal va-homer as a degenerate form of the hermeneutical kal va-homer.
7. A bit about ad hominem, the incommensurability of values, and Occam’s razor.

The Hermeneutical Principles

Kal va-homer (a fortiori inference). Ha-tzad ha-shaveh (the shared feature).

“In this year of Jubilee, each of you shall return to his holding.”
(Leviticus 25:13)

“And this is the matter of the remission: every creditor shall remit what he has lent to his neighbor; he shall not press his neighbor or his brother, because a remission for the Lord has been proclaimed.”
(Deuteronomy 15:2)

“In this year of Jubilee” — this one releases slaves, and the sabbatical year does not release slaves. But is this not inferable by kal va-homer? If the Jubilee, which does not cancel debts, releases slaves, then the sabbatical year, which does cancel debts, should all the more so release slaves. Therefore Scripture says: “In this year of Jubilee” — this one releases slaves, and the sabbatical year does not release slaves. By the same kal va-homer, the Jubilee should also cancel debts: if the sabbatical year, which does not release slaves, cancels debts, then the Jubilee, which releases slaves, should all the more so cancel debts. Therefore Scripture says: “And this is the matter of the remission: remit” — the sabbatical year cancels debts, and the Jubilee does not cancel debts; the Jubilee releases slaves, and the sabbatical year does not release slaves.”
(Sifra, Behar, section 2; see also Sifrei Devarim, paragraph 112)

A. Release of Slaves and Cancellation of Debts in the Jubilee and the Sabbatical Year

Introduction

The Torah commands us to designate every seventh year as a sabbatical year. In the sabbatical year agricultural labor is forbidden, and there is also a remission of debts. After seven sabbatical cycles, the fiftieth year is the Jubilee, and all the agricultural prohibitions of the sabbatical year apply in it as well, see Maimonides, Laws of Sabbatical Year and Jubilee 10:16, and several additional special laws are added. For example, in the Jubilee Hebrew slaves whose ears have been pierced are released, and lands that were sold return to their original owners. Our midrash (rabbinic exegesis) deals with the relation between the laws of the sabbatical year and the laws of the Jubilee, and it turns out that each has a unique stringency relative to the other.

The Course of the Midrash

The midrash is built on two halakhic (Jewish-law) assumptions that appear explicitly in Scripture: the Jubilee releases slaves, and the sabbatical year cancels debts. Two other laws remain open from the standpoint of Scripture: whether the Jubilee also cancels debts, and whether the sabbatical year also releases slaves.

The midrash opens with the basic comparison: the Jubilee releases slaves, and the sabbatical year does not. It then raises a difficulty by way of kal va-homer: if the Jubilee, which does not cancel debts, releases slaves, then should not the sabbatical year, which does cancel debts, all the more so release slaves? In response, it cites the verse in our weekly portion, which teaches that in the sabbatical year slaves do not go free.¹ The verse teaches us not to draw the kal va-homer proposed by the midrash.

Afterward the midrash returns and challenges its halakhic starting points: why should we not learn, by the reverse kal va-homer, that the Jubilee also cancels debts? To this the midrash brings the verse in Deuteronomy 15:2, which teaches that only the sabbatical year cancels debts.

Parallel to the Midrash on Parashat Shemini

We have here two opposing kal va-homer arguments, both based on two data points, and each yields the opposite conclusion from the other. According to the first kal va-homer, the conclusion is that the sabbatical year releases slaves. It is important to note that the second kal va-homer is based precisely on the opposite assumption, namely, that the sabbatical year does not release slaves. By contrast, the second kal va-homer leads to the conclusion that the Jubilee cancels debts, and here too the first kal va-homer is based on the opposite assumption.

Such a structure can arise when the Torah does not determine its position regarding two of the four laws involved in the discussion. In that case, the Sages try to complete the two missing laws in the table by means of kal va-homer. But in such a case the two completions will always contradict one another. On the page for Parashat Shemini we encountered such a structure, and there we pointed out that it assumes that kal va-homer is not a logical consideration but a textual one. Kal va-homer operates only on the basis of halakhic assumptions stated explicitly in the verses, and whatever is absent is treated as though it were not there, at least from the standpoint of Scripture.

Here, however, the situation is different. In Parashat Shemini we saw that when there are only two data points in the table, two contradictory alternatives are always open to us. In such a case one can complete the missing data in one of two ways: either through a deduction from other verses that teaches one of the missing laws, after which the other can be completed by kal va-homer; or through a logical consideration that decides which of the two opposing kal va-homer arguments we should choose.

But in our case the final table in fact does not accord with logic. The missing data are completed in such a way that both opposing kal va-homer arguments are false. Such a situation can arise only if the Torah itself completes the two missing laws. And indeed, in our case the Torah itself teaches all four laws involved. The table generated here is one that has no kal va-homer logic.

Year / annulment	Cancellation of debts	Release of slaves
Sabbatical year	+	–
Jubilee	–	+

The Purpose of the Midrash

At first glance this midrash seems superfluous. All the laws appear explicitly in the verses or are derived from them, and the kal va-homer arguments in the midrash have no halakhic significance. The kal va-homer arguments raise alternatives that are not correct as a matter of law, and the verses reject them. If so, the kal va-homer arguments merely present this structure methodically.

Their purpose seems to be one of two things:

1. To show why both verses involved are needed. Each of these verses is intended to exclude a kal va-homer that would have led to an incorrect conclusion.
2. To prevent an erroneous kal va-homer from being made on the basis of part of the data, namely, three of the four data points.

In effect, according to the second possibility, the midrash seeks to point explicitly to a halakhic situation whose data do not satisfy the logic of kal va-homer.

The Halakhic Role of the Midrash

At first glance this is a confirmatory midrash rather than a creative one. The laws are not generated by the midrash but appear explicitly in the verses. The midrash raises only alternative options, whose purpose is to show why the verses are necessary.

But that is not the whole picture. It is hard to say that the two rulings — that the Jubilee does not cancel debts and that the sabbatical year does not release slaves — appear explicitly in the verses. These are deductions, and deductions that one certainly might not have made. To sharpen the point, it should be added that in the Jerusalem Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 3:5, it seems that there is debt cancellation in the Jubilee as well. That passage in the Jerusalem Talmud apparently does not derive the verse in Parashat Re’eh as we do.

If so, these laws are not explicit in the verses, and the deduction that derives them from the verses is itself a midrashic consideration. We may now ask what makes it superior to the kal va-homer arguments presented in our midrash, which lead to opposite conclusions. Why does the exegete choose the conclusions in the pattern described in the table above, rather than filling the table, or at least one of its cells, by means of kal va-homer? Put differently: why is kal va-homer a weaker consideration than the deductions from the verses that ultimately determine the halakha?

Apparently the reason is that kal va-homer arguments, in a situation where there are only two data points, lead to two opposing conclusions, and therefore each cancels the other. There is no way to use kal va-homer to fill a cell in the table, since it is unclear which cell we are supposed to fill, and filling one contradicts filling the other.

If so, the midrash now looks like a creative process and not merely a confirmatory inference. The exegete really does raise these two possibilities as attempts to fill the halakhic table before him. Only after he fails is he forced to fill the table by means of the two deductions.

According to this possibility, we have before us two laws: there is cancellation of debts in the sabbatical year, and there is release of slaves in the Jubilee. If the logic of kal va-homer were applied to such a situation, then we could derive a third law, namely, either that there is cancellation of debts in the Jubilee or that there is release of slaves in the sabbatical year. But these are two contradictory possibilities, which cancel one another. Therefore we arrive at deductions from the verses that teach us the correct structure of the two.

The conclusion is that these kal va-homer arguments are what lead us to the deductions from the verses. This is contrary to what we suggested above, namely, that these arguments were intended only to explain why the verses teaching the two missing laws are necessary.

The Meaning of the Situation Described in the Table

As we noted on the page for Parashat Shemini, the halakhic structure described in the table above indicates that the logic of kal va-homer does not operate in our case. More explicitly: one cannot infer that the sabbatical year is more stringent than the Jubilee, nor can one infer that the Jubilee is more stringent than the sabbatical year. The logical explanation probably lies in the fact that the relation between the sabbatical year and the Jubilee with respect to cancellation of debts is based on a different parameter from the one underlying their relation with respect to release of slaves. By one measuring rod the Jubilee is more stringent than the sabbatical year, whereas by the second measuring rod the sabbatical year is more stringent than the Jubilee.

This is indeed how Maimonides formulates it when he rules in accordance with the laws that emerge from our midrash. He writes as follows in Laws of Sabbatical Year and Jubilee 10:16:

“The sabbatical year has an advantage over the Jubilee, for the sabbatical year cancels debts whereas the Jubilee does not. And the Jubilee has an advantage over the sabbatical year, for the Jubilee releases slaves and causes land to revert. This is the law of the sale of fields stated in the Torah, and it is a positive commandment, as it is said: ‘You shall grant redemption to the land.’ The Jubilee causes land to revert at its beginning, whereas the sabbatical year cancels debts only at its end, as we have explained.”

Maimonides teaches us that there is one aspect in which the sabbatical year exceeds the Jubilee, and another aspect in which the Jubilee exceeds the sabbatical year. There are several measuring rods that can assess stringency and leniency between two subjects from different halakhic perspectives, and each can yield a different hierarchy. We will continue to clarify these points below, in the third section. Before that, we shall introduce a brief discussion of aspects of the principle of kal va-homer that arise in this midrash.

B. Assumptions about Hidden Parameters in Kal Va-Homer

Introduction

In the first section we noted that in the case of the sabbatical year and the Jubilee there are two different measuring rods that define relations of stringency and leniency between them, and therefore one cannot generalize and establish a sweeping relation of stringency and leniency. In this section we will consider a similar problem, one that would seem capable of disrupting every ordinary hermeneutical kal va-homer.

The Jerusalem Talmud’s View as an Example of an Ordinary Hermeneutical Kal Va-Homer

Let us take, for example, the approach of the Jerusalem Talmud mentioned above. The Jerusalem Talmud holds that the Jubilee also cancels debts. If so, from its standpoint there are three data points in our table:

Year / annulment	Cancellation of debts	Release of slaves
Sabbatical year	+	–
Jubilee	+	+

It seems that the Jerusalem Talmud derives its ruling from the second kal va-homer in our midrash. From the laws of slave release that emerge from the verse in our weekly portion, one may infer that the Jubilee is more stringent than the sabbatical year. One then applies this to the laws of debt cancellation and concludes that if it applies in the sabbatical year, then all the more so it applies in the Jubilee as well. This is an example of an ordinary hermeneutical kal va-homer based on three data points. In such an inference, we rely on two data points and derive from them a generalization about an overall relation of stringency and leniency between the two contexts under discussion. We then use that general principle to derive the missing law from the third data point.

The Problem

However, in light of what was said above, we must ask ourselves: how do we know that the measuring rod determining the hierarchy with respect to cancellation of debts is the same measuring rod that underlies the laws of slave release? We saw above that there can be a situation in which the two columns of the table are governed by two different parameters, or measuring rods, and one cannot infer from one to the other. If so, even in cases where the Torah did not disclose the missing law, the fourth entry in the table, how can one complete it by means of a hermeneutical kal va-homer? It is always possible that a different measuring rod is involved, and sometimes its direction may even be reversed, exactly as we saw above regarding cancellation of debts and release of slaves.

It is important to note that this problem accompanies every hermeneutical kal va-homer, not only the one with which we are dealing here. In our case an explicit example appeared that forced us to distinguish between two parameters underlying the two columns of the table, and their directions are opposite. But such a possibility can certainly exist in any table of a hermeneutical kal va-homer. We must therefore clarify on what the assumption of the ordinary hermeneutical kal va-homer is based, since it ignores from the outset the possibility that two different measuring rods may be operating.

The Working Assumption in the Hermeneutical Kal Va-Homer

There are two possible ways to understand the ordinary hermeneutical kal va-homer:

1. The simplicity assumption: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we assume that the same measuring rod is involved. This is the principle known as Occam’s razor, according to which one should not posit unnecessary assumptions unless there is some constraint that forces one to do so. We discussed this idea in the pages on Parashat Shemot and Parashat Tetzaveh, where we dealt with the principle of ha-tzad ha-shaveh. That principle is based on the assumption that when the same phenomenon appears in two different sources, its basis probably lies in the element common to both, and not in each one separately.

There is, however, a difference between kal va-homer and ha-tzad ha-shaveh. In the scheme of ha-tzad ha-shaveh, we know the halakhic property in both contexts. Therefore we assume that it has a common root, the “parent case” underlying the principle of derivation from a paradigm, and not two different roots. But in kal va-homer, as we saw here, we have no hint that there is anything common to the two measuring rods. This is therefore a more speculative assumption, namely, that there ought to be a common measuring rod. Here perhaps lies a clue as to why the rule that punishments are not imposed on the basis of an inference is stated chiefly regarding kal va-homer, see the page on Parashat Mishpatim and elsewhere. This principle inherently involves a certain speculation, the generalization from the given measuring rod to all other cases, by the very structure of its basic scheme. This is the reason for the specifically hermeneutical character of kal va-homer, that is, for its inclusion among Rabbi Ishmael’s hermeneutical principles, even though it is part of the ordinary modes of reasoning of human logic, see the page on Parashat Noach and elsewhere.

If we return to our example, the assumption of the Jerusalem Talmud is that the legal fact that there is no release of slaves in the sabbatical year but only in the Jubilee stems from some unique feature of the Jubilee that is stronger than the sabbatical year. According to Occam’s razor, one scale of stringency governs all the laws. Hence cancellation of debts, too, will be governed by the same scale, and it is therefore plausible that cancellation of debts also applies in the Jubilee.

2. A hierarchy without “color”: In the first possibility we explained that the scale of stringency is based on some qualitative consideration. The scale and the hierarchy are quantitative results of that consideration. Here we will propose another possibility: what determines the relation between the laws is a “bare” relation of stringency and leniency, without any “color.” That is, the relation between the target case and the source case is not a relation of similarity in some specific parameter, but a relation of leniency and stringency pure and simple. According to this proposal, the reason the legal property that teaches, namely, release of slaves, exists in the target case, the Jubilee, and not in the source case, the sabbatical year, is that the target case, the Jubilee, is more stringent than the source case, the sabbatical year, and not because of some unique feature of the Jubilee. This general stringency can yield other stringent legal consequences as well, such as cancellation of debts, and therefore the assumption is that in every context, such as cancellation of debts, the target case will be more stringent than the source case.²

Returning to our example, the assumption of the Jerusalem Talmud is that the legal fact that there is no release of slaves in the sabbatical year but only in the Jubilee does not stem from a unique feature of either the Jubilee or the sabbatical year, but from the general fact that the Jubilee is simply “stronger” than the sabbatical year. And if the Jubilee is indeed stronger, then cancellation of debts, which applies even in the sabbatical year, will certainly apply in the Jubilee as well.

In the next subsection we will see an interesting implication of the second way of understanding kal va-homer. We shall find that according to this possibility, the logical kal va-homer looks very similar to the hermeneutical kal va-homer.

The Logical and the Hermeneutical Kal Va-Homer

We have already mentioned several times in the past, see, for example, the page on Parashat Noach, that there are several kinds of kal va-homer. The logical kal va-homer, that is, kal va-homer based on reasoning, rests on one legal datum and derives its conclusion through a principle supplied by reason. For example, the kal va-homer brought in the illustrative baraita concerning Miriam: if, had her father spat in her face, she would have had to be shamed for seven days, then when the Divine Presence is angry with her she surely ought to be shamed for fourteen days, or seven, according to the principle of dayyo, “it is enough.” There is no generalization here from two data points that serves to derive the conclusion; rather, there is a rational principle that the Divine Presence is more stringent than her father.

We have more than once noted that this is a simple form of logical thinking, and it is not clear why it is included among the hermeneutical principles. Beyond that, it is not clear why it was chosen as the example of the general mechanism of the hermeneutical kal va-homer, which is based on three data points and on a generalization. We may now suggest an understanding of this in light of what we said in the second possibility above.

If we try to formulate the logical kal va-homer in a hermeneutical way, we get a pattern that at first glance seems quite artificial:³ if, when her father spits in her face, where the degree of stringency is low, she must be shamed for seven days, then when the Divine Presence spits in her face, where the degree of stringency is high, all the more so she must be shamed.³

Let us now compare this with the formulation of an ordinary hermeneutical kal va-homer. A hermeneutical kal va-homer is based on three data points. The framework within which it appears includes two subjects, or properties, and two contexts. In the example from the Jerusalem Talmud, for instance, the two contexts are the sabbatical year and the Jubilee, and the two subjects are cancellation of debts and release of slaves. Can all these also be identified in the logical kal va-homer? What are the subjects and what are the contexts? What are the three given laws that serve as the basis for the kal va-homer argument?

Identifying the Logical Kal Va-Homer as a Degenerate Form of the Hermeneutical Kal Va-Homer

If we nevertheless insist on identifying these two mechanisms with one another, we find that in the logical kal va-homer the two contexts are her father and the Divine Presence, and the two subjects are stringency and shame. We can now speak of three data points even in the logical kal va-homer:

1. When her father spits in her face, this is a low degree of stringency.
2. When the Divine Presence spits in her face, this is a high degree of stringency.
3. When her father spits in her face, she must be shamed for seven days.
4. Conclusion: when the Divine Presence spits in her face, she too must be shamed for seven days.

Thus, as if by magic, we have produced a hermeneutical structure even from the logical kal va-homer. Suddenly we have three data points, two subjects, and two contexts, even in the logical kal va-homer. What difference, if any, remains between these two kinds of kal va-homer?

A brief look shows that the difference is that in the hermeneutical kal va-homer the parameters are laws, or specific halakhic properties, that is, “colored” parameters, whereas in the logical kal va-homer one of the parameters is general, not “colored”: stringency itself. It sounds artificial to say that the Divine Presence is more stringent than her father because the degree of stringency in relation to it is higher. This is merely repeating the same claim in different words.

The reason for this artificiality is that in the hermeneutical kal va-homer the first step is a generalization on the basis of two legal data points. This generalization brings us to a conclusion about a hierarchy of stringency between the target case and the source case. That is the stripping away of the “color” of the scale, which leads us to the abstract rule of derivation revolving around sheer stringency, bare stringency, as distinct from any specific property. In the logical kal va-homer, by contrast, stringency is itself one of the data points. It comes from reasoning and not from a generalization of two “colored” legal data points. In the logical kal va-homer there is no need to strip away the “color” in order to arrive at the kal va-homer argument. The uncolored rule of inference appears in the data themselves. In the end, both mechanisms assume that what determines the result is bare stringency and not the “colored” legal property.

The two mechanisms of kal va-homer thus begin to look similar. If so, the fact that the logical kal va-homer was chosen in the illustrative baraita to serve as the example of the hermeneutical kal va-homer now seems less puzzling. Both are based on general and uncolored stringency, and not on the specific legal property, as we might have thought at first glance.

Identification of the Two Possibilities

In fact, one can see that the two possibilities we proposed for understanding the hermeneutical kal va-homer are really two facets of one and the same possibility.

The simplest explanation of the two systems of relations is to ground them in bare stringency, and not in any “colored” relation. That is the working assumption, so long as the contrary has not been proven. For example, when a pirkha (refutation) is raised against a kal va-homer, we have shown that the relation is not one of bare stringency but of some “colored” relation, and in fact there are two different relations between them running in opposite directions. That is precisely the meaning of a pirkha: proof that the relation between the target case and the source case is not “bare” but “colored.”

An illustration of this is the well-known fallacy in logic known as ad hominem. At the beginning of all the standard textbooks in logic there appears a list of fallacies. One of them is the fallacy in which we rely on a person of authority, by virtue of talent and the like, instead of bringing evidence about the matter itself. For example, when a person says to his fellow: “How can you disagree with this? Even Einstein says what I am saying!” Instead of bringing proof for his claim, he cites the view of a person known as talented, and uses that name to persuade his opponent.

But this fallacy, like the other fallacies, rests on some kind of healthy intuition. Otherwise we would not fall into it so often. It is plausible, though by no means necessary, that a wise person like Einstein will be more likely to be right than some other person. There is indeed no absolute guarantee here, and that is why in logic it is classified as a fallacy, since logic deals only with necessary, or analytic, inferences. Yet in many cases it is certainly a reasonable argument.

A similar argument underlies kal va-homer. The fact that the Jubilee is more stringent, or stronger, than the sabbatical year with respect to release of slaves suggests that it is likely to be no less stringent, or strong, also with respect to cancellation of debts. This is exactly like what we saw regarding Einstein: if he is wiser in the realm of the natural sciences, it is likely that he is wiser in other areas as well, although probably not in all of them.⁴ If a refutation is raised against the kal va-homer, or against Einstein’s authority in the field under discussion, then it becomes clear that the matter depends not on bare stringency, or bare wisdom, but on some “colored” parameter with a specific direction.

C. Between the Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee

Introduction

We shall conclude with a brief attempt to trace the relations between the two parameters linking the sabbatical year and the Jubilee, or cancellation of debts and release of slaves.

The Relations Between the Two Axes

We saw in section A that the Jubilee is more stringent than the sabbatical year in that release of slaves applies in it, whereas the sabbatical year is more stringent with respect to cancellation of debts, as Maimonides states in chapter 10 of Laws of Sabbatical Year and Jubilee, cited above. This halakhic relation between the sabbatical year and the Jubilee indicates that the two parameters are different, and indeed opposite in direction. Cancellation of debts depends on a parameter relative to which the Jubilee is less stringent, whereas release of slaves depends on a parameter relative to which the Jubilee is more stringent.

On the other hand, throughout the midrash there is apparently a basic assumption that even if the two parameters are not identical, there is clearly some connection between them. The very fact that the midrash tries to derive cancellation of debts from release of slaves, and vice versa, indicates that it sees a connection between these two laws. At first glance one can see that both involve some kind of annulment, and both have an economic aspect concerning property and money. So there is a connection between these two axes, but in the end they are opposite in their direction, and therefore also in the hierarchy they create.

A First Hint in Maimonides’ Words

In the words of Maimonides cited above, he does not spell out what these two axes, or parameters, are. But he does add another datum: the Jubilee is more stringent than the sabbatical year also with respect to the return of sold lands. These return only in the Jubilee and not in the sabbatical year. It would seem that the same parameter by which the Jubilee is more stringent than the sabbatical year, the one that governs the release of slaves whose ears have been pierced, also underlies the rule that fields return to their owners in the Jubilee.

What do the return of lands and the release of slaves have in common, as opposed to loans? It would seem that slaves and lands are the result of purchase-and-sale transactions, whereas debts are the result of loan transactions. If so, we can take a further step and say that in the Jubilee property rights created by sales transactions, of lands and of slaves, are annulled, whereas in the sabbatical year debts created by loan transactions are annulled.

The Torah wants loans to lapse every seven years, but not more often. Therefore it makes no sense for loans also to lapse in the Jubilee, since the previous year was a sabbatical year, and all debts had already lapsed there. Lands, on the other hand, are supposed to be less mobile, that is, immovable property, and therefore they do not return to their owners every seven years but only in the Jubilee.

The Jubilee undermines, or at least qualifies, human and social concepts of ownership. In fact, even the price of land takes into account that it is sold only until the Jubilee, so there is no injury to a person’s capital. The Jubilee deals with freedom, and with a person’s relation to his land.⁵ The sabbatical year, by contrast, strikes at the concept of capital, the means of production. A person took a loan from his fellow, and now the Torah nullifies the loan and leaves the money in the borrower’s hands. This is a statement with direct social significance.⁶ This can also be shown from other details of the laws of debt remission in the sabbatical year, but that is not our subject here.

Back to Our Midrash

At the beginning of the discussion, the author of the midrash thought that there was a common factor to these two laws: both have a social aspect. Therefore he compares the Jubilee to the sabbatical year and derives from the Jubilee that the sabbatical year, too, should release slaves, or vice versa. At this stage the exegete thought that there was here a bare parameter, not a “colored” one, of stringency, which created a universal hierarchy between the Jubilee and the sabbatical year. At this stage the Jubilee was supposed to be more stringent than the sabbatical year, or vice versa, in every aspect.

Once we become aware of the contradiction between the two kal va-homer arguments, it becomes clear that the parameters are “colored.” At that point the verses are brought in to teach us that there are two different hierarchies. The two parameters are different: one is colored primarily by a social concern, and from that perspective the sabbatical year is more stringent than the Jubilee. The other is colored by freedom or by relation to the land, and from that perspective the Jubilee is more stringent.

As we saw, these two parameters are opposite in direction. One possible explanation for this, though certainly not the only one, is that it makes no sense to release slaves or lands in the sabbatical year, since these are assets sold for a longer term than a loan, especially since the slave whose ear was pierced wanted to remain with his master. By contrast, it makes no sense to cancel debts in the Jubilee, for the reason we raised above: it would create a situation of debt cancellation in two consecutive years.

As we saw, when the parameters are “colored,” one cannot draw conclusions from the hierarchy created along one axis to the hierarchy created along the other.

Footnotes

We should note that the proposal presented here is only an illustration of the possibility that there are two “colored” parameters, without any commitment that this is in fact their true “color.” What matters for us is the logic of two colors, and not necessarily the colors themselves.