Bamidbar (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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Midah Tovah — Sabbath Eve, Bemidbar 5765

Questions

1. For what did Aaron’s two sons die?
2. Can two different explanations be adopted simultaneously?
3. Why must an owner pay when his property causes damage?
4. Rabbi Chaim of Brisk’s method of “two laws.”
5. Rabbi Breuer’s method of “two aspects.”
6. Was the world formed through a big bang and an evolutionary process, or was it created by the Holy One, blessed be He?

The Hermeneutical Principles

• Two verses that contradict one another.
• The common denominator.

The Lord spoke to Moses after the death of Aaron’s two sons, when they drew near before the Lord and died.

— Leviticus 16:1

Aaron’s sons Nadav and Avihu each took his fire pan, put fire in them, placed incense upon it, and brought before the Lord alien fire, which He had not commanded them. Fire came forth from before the Lord and consumed them, and they died before the Lord. Moses said to Aaron, “This is what the Lord spoke, saying: Through those who are near Me I shall be sanctified, and before all the people I shall be glorified.” And Aaron was silent.

— Leviticus 10:1–3

Nadav and Avihu died before the Lord when they brought alien fire before the Lord in the wilderness of Sinai; they had no children. Eleazar and Ithamar served as priests in the lifetime of Aaron their father.

— Numbers 3:4

Nadav and Avihu died when they brought alien fire before the Lord.

— Numbers 26:61

“When they drew near before the Lord and died.” Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says: They died because of the drawing near, and not because of the offering. Rabbi Akiva says: One verse says, “when they drew near before the Lord and died,” and another verse says, “they brought before the Lord alien fire.” The verse “when they brought alien fire before the Lord” decides between them: they died because of the offering, and not because of the drawing near. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah says: the offering was sufficient on its own, and the drawing near was sufficient on its own.¹

— Sifra, Aharei Mot, parashah 1

A. The Death of Nadav and Avihu

Introduction

The passage dealing with the death of Aaron’s two sons appears highly obscure and vague. On the one hand, they are presented as men of supreme sanctity; according to rabbinic tradition, they were even greater than Moses and Aaron themselves—“Through those who are near Me I shall be sanctified.” On the other hand, the Holy One, blessed be He, decides to put them to death publicly.

The reason for their death is not entirely clear from Scripture. In the three biblical sources cited above, their death is described as punishment for having brought alien fire without being commanded to do so. The meaning of this is not entirely clear. By contrast, in the portion Aharei Mot we find a general formulation that reveals a little and conceals much more: “when they drew near before the Lord and died.” It is unclear whether this is a reason for the punishment, or perhaps a description of the Torah’s attitude toward the act—namely, a reference to the background of the sanctity of Aaron’s two sons, their closeness to God.

The Sages and the commentators also dealt extensively with this passage. In several midrashim (rabbinic interpretive texts), four reasons are given for their death; see, for example, Bemidbar Rabbah, parashah 2, section 23, and elsewhere. The commentators propose several additional reasons. Our midrash confronts two kinds of sources and makes assumptions about their meaning. It presents a dispute among tannaitic sages over how to relate to the contradiction between these sources, and here the hermeneutical rule of “two verses that contradict one another” appears—the same rule we already discussed in the page for Bo. In this week’s page we shall continue that discussion.

The Structure of the Midrash

The midrash presents two possibilities for the reason for the death of Aaron’s two sons: drawing near and offering. Rabbi Yosei the Galilean derives from the verse at the beginning of Aharei Mot that they died because of the drawing near—“when they drew near.” We should note that he clearly understands that verse as giving a reason for the punishment, not as describing their closeness to God.

Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, argues that we have two contradictory verses here. One is the verse cited by Rabbi Yosei the Galilean, and opposite it stands the verse, “they brought before the Lord alien fire,” that is, a problematic act of offering. Rabbi Akiva’s solution to the contradiction comes from a third verse—indeed, there are actually two such verses, both in the book of Numbers—which teaches that the cause of death was the offering, not the drawing near.

At the end of the midrash a third opinion is brought, that of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, who holds that each of the two reasons is independently sufficient. We should emphasize that his words rest on two assumptions:

1. There were two different reasons for the death of Nadav and Avihu.
2. Each of those reasons was sufficient in itself to warrant their death.

The need for both assumptions is clear. On the one hand, we must resolve the contradiction between the verses, hence assumption 1. On the other hand, assumption 2 is also required, namely that each reason by itself was sufficient. Otherwise the Torah’s descriptions in the two places would each be incomplete: they would have died neither because of the offering nor because of the drawing near, but only because of the combination of the two.²

Comments on the Rule “Two Verses That Contradict One Another”

Several observations emerge from this midrash regarding the rule of “two verses that contradict one another,” in light of the different tannaitic approaches.

1. As in the examples cited in the page for Bo, we once again see that Rabbi Akiva is the one who chooses to use this rule. Recall that the list of hermeneutical principles expresses the method of Rabbi Ishmael, whose school differs from that of Rabbi Akiva in its methods of interpretation.

This point was already discussed in the page for Bo, where we saw that the rule of “two verses that contradict one another” functions differently for Rabbi Ishmael than it does for Rabbi Akiva. According to Rabbi Akiva, the third verse decides in favor of one of the possibilities, whereas Rabbi Ishmael seeks a compromise that reconciles the two poles.

2. In this midrash there are two tannaitic sages who disagree with Rabbi Akiva. It is unclear whether they disagree with the very use of this hermeneutical rule, or whether this is only a local dispute. We should again recall what we noted previously: Rabbi Yosei the Galilean is generally considered part of Rabbi Akiva’s school.

3. Rabbi Yosei the Galilean decides in accordance with the verse in Aharei Mot. It is not clear how he reconciles the contradictory verses in Numbers. In principle, one could say that he too recognizes the contradiction, but in his view the deciding verse is the one in Aharei Mot, not the verses in Numbers. Yet that is difficult to maintain, since apart from the verse in Aharei Mot we have no countervailing verse that points to drawing near, rather than the offering of alien fire, as the cause of death. From the plain sense of the language, it seems that Rabbi Yosei the Galilean does not see any contradiction at all between “drawing near” and “offering.”

4. Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah seems, at least on the face of it, to offer a perfect logical solution to the contradiction, and it is not clear why Rabbi Akiva does not accept it. We should recall that in the page for Bo we already saw how difficult Rabbi Akiva’s method is. He leaves some verses in Scripture without any interpretation at all—namely, those rejected by the third verse’s decision. This sharpens the advantages of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s proposal. It should also be noted that Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s proposal undermines, in principle, the application of the rule of “two verses that contradict one another,” since in most—perhaps all—cases in which we encounter a contradiction, such a solution could be adopted in place of the problematic decision produced by a third verse.

Between “Drawing Near” and “Offering”

The expressions “drawing near” and “offering” are themselves unclear. The midrash seems to assume that they contradict one another. Yet in Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s view, these two expressions do not necessarily conflict.

The commentators—this can again be seen in Malbim on the passage—connect these expressions to disputes found in other midrashim, from which it emerges that according to one opinion, Aaron’s sons did not bring alien fire at all, or at least were not punished for that. They were punished because, out of excessive joy, they drew near beyond their proper boundary, that is, into the innermost area beyond the place where they were permitted to be. This is why, in the portion Shemini, immediately after their death, the command appears: “Speak to Aaron… that he not come at all times into the sanctuary.” This is the meaning of the term “drawing near.” Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, holds that they took fire from the hearth, and that this was alien fire; that is the meaning of “offering.”

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s View

Malbim on the passage interprets all the verses in accordance with Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s approach and reconciles them. In the page for Bo we noted that the rule of “two verses that contradict one another,” as it appears in Rabbi Ishmael’s list, is meant to guide us toward finding a suitable compromise that gives each of the contradictory poles its proper place and reconciles them. We also saw there that this is not what Rabbi Akiva does in cases of contradiction. Rabbi Akiva instructs us that when there is a contradiction, we should not adopt strained methods of harmonizing the verses; rather, we should seek a halakhic (Jewish-law) determination by means of a third verse.

If so, an interpretive harmonization such as Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s is not Rabbi Akiva’s method but Rabbi Ishmael’s. Rabbi Akiva makes a halakhic decision and leaves the interpretive problem in place. We noted there that when a reasonable compromise is available, Rabbi Akiva too will adopt it. The dispute concerns what we should do when the proposed compromise is strained. Rabbi Akiva’s response here suggests that he regards the options of Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah and Rabbi Yosei the Galilean as strained, and therefore prefers the decision of the third verse.

What Is Implausible in Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s Solution? Local Solutions

The question of what is implausible in Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s proposal concerns the interpretation of the verses and not the level of principle. We shall therefore focus on the question of what is implausible in Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s solution, since that may touch the foundations of this hermeneutical rule, as noted above.

One could understand that Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s solution seemed implausible to Rabbi Akiva only for local reasons. For some textual or substantive reason, Rabbi Akiva may simply have found it unlikely that the two causes jointly constituted grounds for punishment. With respect to the view that the two causes together formed the basis of the punishment, one could argue that if each cause on its own is insufficient to warrant the death penalty, it is not plausible that a merely quantitative combination of two such causes would produce a qualitative change.

However, as we saw above, Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s view is that each of the causes was sufficient on its own. Against such a view, Rabbi Akiva could say that it is implausible that two different causes, each of which was independently sufficient to kill them, happened by chance to converge in a single case. Perhaps he also finds it implausible that the Torah would describe each one separately in a different section, since the underlying idea is really one idea—an improper alteration in the sacred service.

What Is Implausible in Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s Solution? A Principled Explanation

However, Rabbi Akiva’s consistency in his use of this rule points to a more principled direction. It may be that Rabbi Akiva is simply unwilling, at the level of principle, to accept the existence of two different explanations for the same phenomenon. In his view, the punishment imposed on Nadav and Avihu cannot stem from two different causes.

True, on the logical plane there is no obstacle to two different causes producing the same result,³ but in God’s governance of the world this is unacceptable. In divine governance, every result has one cause and no more. It should be noted that the conjunction of two causes together constitutes, logically speaking, a single cause: the cause is drawing near together with offering. But here we are dealing with one out of two distinct causes, and that is an implausible situation.

We encountered a similar phenomenon in the discussion of the rule “building a prototype from two verses,” or “the common denominator,” in the page on Shemot, toward the end of part II, and see also the page on Tetzaveh. There we saw that this rule operates only on the assumption that every halakhic result has one cause and only one cause, and never one out of two possible causes.⁴

The issue of parallel explanations will be discussed in the next part.⁵

B. Parallel Explanations

Introduction

In the pages on Vayetze, part III, and on Vayechi, near the end, we saw several contexts in which we encounter two explanations of the same phenomenon, or two interpretations of the same verse. Such a situation usually raises problems, because we hesitate over which of the two explanations we should choose. Yet we often assume, almost as a first intuition, that combining them is not an option, and that we must choose one of the two.

We gave examples such as the apple falling on Newton’s head, where one may hesitate between a theological explanation—seeing the blow as punishment for a sin—and a physical explanation. Another example is becoming religiously observant, or abandoning observance, which some attribute to a value-based decision and others to psychological circumstances—drives, influences, and the like. We noted there that this assumption is not in fact necessary. It is possible to regard both explanations as correct at once. Let us now examine several possible ways of constructing such a combination.

Different Ways of Adopting Two Different Explanations

As noted, there are several different ways to adopt, simultaneously and in one way or another, both of the proposed explanations. Let us briefly list some of them:

1. One may see the combination of the two explanations as the true cause. For example, when a person becomes religiously observant, psychological circumstances may play a role—such as a crisis and the like—together with a value-based decision. This combination, and only this combination, creates the situation in which a person decides to change his outlook and way of life. This is like the version cited by Malbim above from the Yalkut in Rabbi Akiva’s name.

2. One may regard both as true, each independently. This is Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s approach above.

3. One may regard one as primary and the other as an ancillary condition. For example, psychological circumstances cause a person to examine the alternative path, and then a value-based decision comes and instructs him that this path is indeed more correct.

4. One may treat the two explanations as two different aspects of a single explanation. For example, the claim that the world originated in a big bang and developed through evolutionary processes does not necessarily contradict the claim that it was created and developed by the Holy One, blessed be He. One may say, for instance, that evolution and the big bang were the means by which God created and developed His world. Such a solution presents the two explanations as two faces of the same process. Sometimes one aspect is the cause and the other is derivative; at other times these are two faces that appear together.

5. And of course one may also see them as contradictory possibilities, only one of which can be true. This is probably Rabbi Akiva’s approach—at least in circumstances where the other solutions seem strained.

In what follows, we shall see several expressions of these different methods in Torah interpretation and halakhic interpretation.

Example: Damage Caused by One’s Property

To illustrate the matter, let us take an example.⁶ Later halakhic authorities discuss the question whether a person’s obligation to pay when his property damages someone else’s property stems from the simple fact that his property caused the damage, or whether it is the result of blame resting upon him because he was negligent in guarding his property. At first glance, these are two parallel explanations, and we must choose one of them. This is model 5 above.

But the situation is not so simple. Everyone agrees that if there was no negligence in guarding the property, the one whose property caused the damage is exempt from payment. Everyone also agrees that if the object that caused the damage is not the person’s property, he is not liable to pay for the damage it caused. If so, all agree that both factors are required together. This is model 1 above.

And yet the later authorities argue that there are still two different sides here, and that we must choose between them. The question is whether the factor that generates liability is the fact that my property caused damage, with the additional condition that I was negligent in guarding it; or whether, on the contrary, the factor that generates liability is the negligence in guarding, with the additional condition that the object be my property. Here we arrive at model 3.

If the condition is required because, with respect to an object that is not my property, no duty to guard it rests upon me at all, then we arrive at model 4. The condition is needed in order to activate the primary factor.

The question that arises here is why we should assume that only one factor is primary and the other is merely an ancillary condition. Why not assume that both conditions are necessary? Alternatively, it is not clear why we should not assume that each of them independently—either that the object is my property or that there was negligence—is sufficient to impose liability.⁷

Implication: “Two Laws”

The possibility we ultimately raised is what, in the study hall of Rabbi Chaim of Brisk, is called “two laws.” We suggested that within the obligation to pay for damage caused by one’s property, there are two distinct laws: negligence can create liability, provided that the condition is met that the object is my property; and the fact that it is my property can also create liability, provided that the condition of negligence is met—otherwise the owner is exempt as a case of unavoidable accident.⁸

To which of the models above does the method of “two laws” correspond? That is not always clear. Sometimes it is a conjunction—both the first and the second; sometimes it is a division—either the first or the second. Here, for example, one might have said that it is a conjunction, like model 1: both negligence and ownership together create the liability. But we already raised that possibility above, and noted that the later authorities do not understand it that way.

One might also have understood it as a combination similar to Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah’s, namely that each of the two possibilities alone is sufficient to create liability for payment. But that does not seem to be the case here either.

It seems that the combination under discussion here is of type 1, but more complex. We are not saying that both negligence and ownership are required. In fact, we are combining here two separate combinations. Above we constructed two type-3 combinations: one sees ownership as the focus and negligence as the condition, and the other sees negligence as the focus and ownership as the condition. Now we combine those two combinations, and regard them as parallel tracks, each of which can obligate payment. In such a situation, even if one of the grounds of liability is absent in a particular case, the other can still serve as a sufficient ground of liability.

Two Aspects⁹

A proposal similar to this one was advanced by Rabbi Breuer in order to answer the difficulty raised by biblical criticism. Biblical criticism points out that there are passages in the Torah that seem as though they were written by different “authors.” There are several proofs for this, and it is difficult simply to brush them aside. Rabbi Breuer’s solution is to see the two sources as parallel explanations, like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah above. Each passage presents one aspect of the halakha, and the complete picture is the combination of the two aspects.

For example, the portions Mishpatim and Behar both describe the laws of the Hebrew slave. In both there is a source for the ear-piercing of a slave who does not wish to go free. Yet in Mishpatim it appears that after the piercing he serves his master forever, whereas in Behar it is written that he goes free in the Jubilee year. A solution of Rabbi Breuer’s type would tell us that Mishpatim deals with the laws of the Hebrew slave, and from the perspective of the laws of Hebrew slavery he should indeed serve forever. But Behar tells us that there is another aspect as well: the laws of the Jubilee. From the perspective of the laws of the Jubilee, that slave cannot remain a perpetual slave, and he must go free in the Jubilee year. Thus both aspects are true, and both exist in the slave simultaneously. From the perspective of the laws of slavery he should have served forever, but from the perspective of the laws of the Jubilee he goes free in the Jubilee.

Of course, regarding the practical question of when that slave actually goes free, we must make a determination. And the determination is that the law of the Jubilee prevails. The reason is that from the perspective of the Jubilee laws he must go free in the Jubilee year, whereas from the perspective of the laws of the Hebrew slave the owner is merely permitted to have him serve forever. Therefore, the combination instructs us to release him in the Jubilee year.¹⁰ There is an external constraint that prevents us from fully realizing the conception implied by the laws of slavery.

Yet there is still a consequence to the fact that he is, in one respect, a perpetual slave—namely, in areas where no external obstacle prevents us from realizing that conception. Such a situation arises in those laws that do not lead this combination into a necessary contradiction. For example, several medieval authorities write that something acquired permanently gives its owner ownership of the corpus itself, and not merely usufruct, which is roughly parallel to rights of use. If so, this slave, though he goes free in the Jubilee year, may still be regarded as belonging to his master with ownership of the corpus itself—from the side of the laws of slavery that apply to him—since the fact that the slave is emancipated in the Jubilee year does not logically contradict his being subject to that kind of full proprietary ownership.

Footnotes