Shelach (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — Eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Shelach 5765

Questions

1. Is it possible that the entire people of Israel could forget the Torah?
2. What is the relationship between a peshat (plain-sense) interpretation and a midrashic interpretation?
3. In what senses are the three gravest transgressions especially severe?
4. What should be done in a case of interpretive conflict: is it preferable to force the language or the reasoning?
5. Which of the hermeneutical principles concerning a particular case that leaves a general category results in a stricter ruling?
6. Why does the Torah repeat the passage about inadvertent sins that already appeared in Leviticus?

The Hermeneutical Principles

• A case singled out from the general category to make a different claim that is of the same kind.
• A case singled out from the general category to make a different claim that is not of the same kind.
• A case singled out to be governed by a new rule.
• A case that left the general category.

“And if you err and do not observe all these commandments that the Lord spoke to Moses; all that the Lord commanded you through Moses, from the day that the Lord commanded and onward throughout your generations; then it shall be, if it was done unintentionally without the congregation’s awareness, that the whole congregation shall offer one young bull as a burnt offering, for a pleasing aroma to the Lord, with its meal offering and libation according to the law, and one he-goat as a sin offering.”

— Numbers 15:22-24

“But if one individual sins unintentionally, he shall offer a first-year female goat as a sin offering.”

— Numbers 15:27

(111) “`And if you err and do not do’—idolatry was included among all the commandments for which the community brings a bull, yet Scripture removed it from that category in order to make it more stringent, and to subject it to a fixed rule: that the community should bring [a bull and a goat]—a bull as a burnt offering and a goat as a sin offering. Therefore this section was stated.

“And if you err and do not do'—Scripture speaks of idolatry. Do you say that Scripture speaks of idolatry, or perhaps only of one of all the commandments stated in the Torah? Scripture therefore says:Then it shall be, if it was done unintentionally without the congregation’s awareness.’ Scripture set this commandment apart as a matter standing on its own. And which commandment is that? Idolatry. Do you say that it is idolatry, or perhaps one of all the commandments stated in the Torah? Scripture therefore says: And if you err and do not do.' All the commandments came to teach about one commandment: just as one who transgresses all the commandments casts off the yoke, violates the covenant, and shows brazen contempt for the Torah, so too one who transgresses one commandment casts off the yoke, violates the covenant, and shows brazen contempt for the Torah. [And which commandment is that? Idolatry,] as it is said,to transgress His covenant’ (Deuteronomy 17:2), and covenant' means only the Torah, as it is said,These are the words of the covenant’ (Deuteronomy 28:69). Rabbi says: All' is stated here, andall’ is stated elsewhere; just as the all' stated there refers to idolatry, so too theall’ stated here refers to idolatry.”

— Sifrei on Numbers, Shelach

(112) “`But if one individual sins unintentionally’—idolatry was included among all the commandments for which an individual brings a female lamb or a female goat, a leader brings a male goat, and the anointed priest and the court bring a bull; yet Scripture removed it from that category in order to make it more stringent, and to subject it to a fixed rule: that the ordinary individual, the leader, and the anointed priest all bring a first-year female goat as a sin offering. Therefore this section was stated.

“[`If one individual sins’]—Scripture speaks of idolatry. Do you say that Scripture speaks of idolatry, or perhaps only of one of all the commandments stated in the Torah? You must say: what subject is being discussed here? Idolatry. Rabbi Yitzhak says: Scripture speaks of idolatry. Or perhaps it speaks only of one of all the commandments stated in the Torah? You can reason as follows: the community was included in the general category, and Scripture removed it from that category and changed its offerings; the individual was included in the general category, and Scripture removed it from that category and changed its offerings. Just as there Scripture speaks of idolatry, so too here Scripture speaks of idolatry.”

— Sifrei, Shelach

A. A General Look at the Verses and the Midrashim

Introduction

In chapter 15, after the laws of libations and hallah (the portion separated from dough), there appears an obscure passage, and from the verses themselves it is difficult to understand exactly what it concerns. From the plain sense of the text (see Malbim here, sec. 33), it emerges that the passage deals with a situation in which the people of Israel fail, unintentionally, to keep all the commandments of the Torah. In verse 23 the Torah again emphasizes that it is speaking about all the commandments in their entirety, from those given to us at Sinai on the day they were commanded, and onward throughout history.¹ The passage then becomes more specific and distinguishes between a situation in which “the eyes of the congregation” are the cause of this error—and that is the meaning of the phrase “it was done unintentionally without the congregation’s awareness” in verse 24—and a situation in which an individual errs in this way (see verse 27). At the end of the passage, the law of the intentional sinner is stated—”the one who acts with a high hand” (see verse 30).

On its face, the sinner here seems to be in the position of a child taken captive and raised away from Judaism—that is, he sins unintentionally with respect to the entire Torah (see also Nahmanides below). Such a situation means that the person does not know at all that a Torah was given and that it contains commandments, and certainly does not know what those commandments are. In the opening verses, where the Torah refers to a case in which “the eyes of the congregation” err with respect to all the commandments of the Torah, the situation is even more extreme. It is unclear how such a state of affairs could exist at all—that the entire people of Israel would forget the Torah. More than that: if such a thing did occur, what would “the eyes of the congregation” mean? Would there still be courts and officeholders dealing with Torah and halakha (Jewish law) in a situation where the Torah had been forgotten from Israel, Heaven forbid? And if everyone really forgot everything, it is unclear how they would then remember it again. Did they not also forget the law of the communal bull brought for an erroneous ruling? And we have not yet even addressed the promise, “for it shall not be forgotten from the mouth of his offspring” (Deuteronomy 31:21).²

The Midrashim of the Sages

The two midrashim (rabbinic interpretive expositions) cited above struggle with defining the situation addressed by these verses. Both conclude, on different grounds, that the text is dealing here with the sin of idolatry. The same can be found in many other midrashim as well (see Babylonian Talmud, Horayot 8a; Jerusalem Talmud, Nedarim 3:9; and more).

Despite what was said in the previous subsection, both midrashim assume as self-evident that the subject here is an inadvertent violation of one commandment, not an inadvertent violation of the whole Torah.³ On the basis of that assumption they try to determine which commandment is involved, and only on that point do they bring sources and proofs.

The reason for this assumption is not stated in either midrash, but one may conjecture that it lies in the consideration we raised above. The Sages apparently assume that it is impossible for the entire community to forget the whole Torah. Even so, two different possibilities still remain for understanding the verses:
a. the text refers to one specific commandment;
b. the text refers to an inadvertent violation of some commandment out of the totality of commandments, though not necessarily one specific commandment.

The second possibility is not tenable, because there are verses in Leviticus that tell us what must be done when an individual or a community errs with respect to one of the commandments. It is therefore clear that our passage concerns an exceptional transgression, and that this section was stated in order to introduce laws concerning it that differ from those applying to other transgressions. The midrashim conclude that this transgression is idolatry, which is equivalent to all the commandments combined—and that is why the Torah speaks here as if one had transgressed all the commandments.

The Structure of the Midrashim: A General View

In general, the consideration that proves that the subject here is idolatry is based on one of the hermeneutical principles concerning “a case that left the general category,” both with respect to the individual and with respect to the community. As the midrashim themselves explain, in an ordinary transgression an individual brings either a female lamb or a female goat as a sin offering, whereas here the Torah gives only one option: specifically a female goat (see also Rashi on verse 27, and Siftei Hakhamim there). In an ordinary communal inadvertent transgression—for example, an erroneous ruling of the court—the community brings a bull as a sin offering, whereas here the community brings a bull as a burnt offering and a goat as a sin offering (see also Rashi on verse 22).⁴ This anomaly—this departure from the general category—in the direction of stringency proves that in both cases we are dealing with a special transgression, one whose law differs from that of other transgressions, and the midrash concludes that this is the transgression of idolatry.

At the opening of both these midrashim there appears a law learned from the departure of idolatry from the general category: to treat idolatry more stringently by subjecting it to a fixed offering. Only afterward does there appear a discussion of how we know in the first place that the subject here is idolatry, and as we saw, that discussion again uses one of the hermeneutical principles of “a case that left the general category.” This progression in the midrashim calls for explanation.

The Hermeneutical Principle: Analysis by Elimination

First, we must clarify which of the four principles of “a case that left the general category” is being used by the midrash. When a matter was included in a general category and left it “in order to teach,” it teaches about the general category. Here, however, the conclusion concerns only idolatry, the particular case that left the category.

Another possibility is that this is a case of “a matter singled out to be governed by a new rule.” In that case we do not return it to its original category unless Scripture explicitly returns it. In this principle, the innovation is stated about the particular case that was singled out and not about the general category, and therefore it is a possible reading of our midrash: the particular case went out to teach a new point, namely, that it requires a fixed sin offering. We would then learn from this that inadvertent idolatry does not entail the offerings required for the inadvertent violation of other transgressions, because Scripture did not explicitly return it to the general category.

This possibility too is difficult, however, because Scripture explicitly states that the offering for inadvertent idolatry—if that is indeed the subject here—is different. Why should there even arise an initial assumption to apply the ordinary offerings for an inadvertent sinner to idolatry, when the Torah itself explicitly says the opposite?⁵

We are therefore forced to conclude that what we have here is one of the two principles called “a case singled out from the general category to make a different claim”—either a claim “of the same kind” or a claim “not of the same kind.” In such cases, the departure teaches about the particular case and not about the general category, and in that respect these principles fit our midrash. Clearly, this is not the principle of “a case singled out from the general category to make a different claim that is of the same kind,” because in that case the particular case is singled out in order to be more lenient, whereas here the Sages say that it was singled out in order to make it more stringent.⁶ It therefore seems, at least initially, that we are dealing with the principle of “a case singled out from the general category to make a different claim that is not of the same kind.” Here the particular case is singled out both to be more lenient and to be more stringent, and so that possibility could fit here as well.

This principle was discussed on our page for Parashat Tazria. We saw there that the departure of a particular case “not of the same kind” is characterized by the fact that it is described in a completely different way from the general category out of which it emerged. We asked there why a hermeneutical principle is needed at all in such a case, since the Torah itself tells us everything that applies to the particular case. We saw that the Raavad and Rabbi Netanel the Holy of Kinon agreed that this principle serves only to ensure that we do not project back from the particular case to the general category from which it emerged. In other words, we should not conclude that every individual’s inadvertent sin must specifically require a female goat, or that every communal inadvertent sin must require a bull as a burnt offering and a goat as a sin offering, rather than a bull as a sin offering.

But none of this appears in our midrashim. It does not seem that the discussion here is aimed at rejecting those theoretical possibilities with respect to the two general rules; rather, it seems to concern the laws applying to the particular cases themselves. If so, the question returns: why is any hermeneutical principle needed here at all? Nothing seems to be derived here, and it is unclear why—and even whether—any hermeneutical principle is being used here, and if so, which one.

Let us now try to follow the course of these midrashim, and in that way try to understand the function—if there is one—of the hermeneutical principle in the two midrashim under discussion.

B. Explaining the Course of the Midrashim

The First Midrash: A General Description

The first midrash deals with communal idolatry, that is, an erroneous ruling of the court regarding idolatry. As we have already noted, the midrash simply assumes that the subject is the transgression of idolatry, and gives no reason for doing so. It explains that idolatry was singled out from the totality of commandments in order to teach that its inadvertent violation requires a bull and a goat.

In the next section it asks how we really know that the subject is idolatry and not some other commandment among all the rest. As we explained above, it cannot mean just any of the other commandments. It is not clear why this clarification was not made before the conclusions that were drawn from it in the previous section.

The midrash answers that Scripture singled out this commandment, and apparently that means idolatry. But why should the fact that Scripture singled it out tell us that this is the transgression of idolatry? Scripture singled out some commandment, but how do we know that it is specifically idolatry? Perhaps the exegete inferred it from the reasoning that idolatry is the most severe of the transgressions.

Immediately afterward, however, the midrash again asks whether perhaps this is some other commandment. It is unclear what the author of the midrash found unsatisfactory in the answer just given. Why does he repeat the previous question? The new answer is that all the commandments teach us about this commandment, which is called “covenant.” This answer is puzzling, because the word “covenant” does not appear anywhere in our passage. At the end of the midrash, Rabbi’s opinion appears, deriving it from a verbal analogy based on the word “all.”

In practice, the course of the midrash suggests that the question of how we know that the passage speaks of idolatry is addressed three times, and each time a different answer is given. This is very puzzling. We have already noted that the very arrangement of the midrash is also puzzling: the departure of idolatry from the general category is expounded already at the beginning, when we still do not know at all that the subject is the transgression of idolatry—for that itself is learned from the departure from the general category.

A Proposal for Understanding the Nature of the Midrash: A Unique Departure from the General Category

Perhaps one may suggest a different proposal for understanding the course of the midrash. We asked why a hermeneutical principle is needed here at all, since in our passage the Torah itself explicitly teaches us the laws pertaining to idolatry. To this one may answer that the passage indeed teaches us the laws, but it gives no hint at all that the subject is idolatry. Without the derash (interpretive reading), we would think, in accordance with the plain-sense reading, that it deals with inadvertent violation of the whole Torah.⁷

If so, the principle of a particular case departing from the general category is needed here in order to reveal to us that the subject is the transgression of idolatry. It should be noted that in the second midrash this point is explicit in Rabbi Yitzhak’s view. The appearance here of the principle of “a matter that was included in a general category” is not its usual form. Normally, departure from the general category teaches some legal detail either about the general category or about the particular case, depending on which of the hermeneutical principles concerning general and particular is involved. Here, however, the departure from the general category does not teach any legal detail, because the special laws governing the offering for inadvertent idolatry are stated explicitly in the passage itself. Rather, the departure from the general category teaches us which commandment these special laws apply to. It teaches that the text is not talking about an inadvertent violation of any one commandment out of the totality of commandments, but only about one unique transgression. That is why the midrash concludes the first section with the words, “Therefore this section was stated.”⁸

In some respects, the departure from the general category here is not a hermeneutical principle at all. It is simply a description of the biblical situation. The reasoning is only that if the Torah speaks about an inadvertent sinner and states laws different from those otherwise known for such a case, one may infer that it intends to speak about a unique commandment. The identification of that commandment depends on additional exegesis.

Continuation of the Midrash

But now another question arises. It may indeed be clear that the passage does not concern just any one of the transgressions. Departure from the general category proves that there is a unique transgression here. But how do we know that it is specifically the transgression of idolatry? The first section established that the subject is idolatry; the second section explains in more detail how that conclusion was reached.

The midrash explains this by saying that all the commandments came to teach about one commandment. It seems that the conclusion that the subject is idolatry is based on reasoning. As we have already noted, the word “covenant” cannot serve as a reliable textual source here, since it does not appear in our passage at all. It is therefore impossible to understand this as a verbal analogy, or even as a mere textual clue. What leads to the conclusion that this is the transgression of idolatry is the reasoning that idolatry counts as an essential breach of the covenant, just like violation of all the commandments.

The explanation is simple. The three gravest transgressions in the Torah are idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. Forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed are severe in themselves and because of the damage they cause. Idolatry does not cause such damage in itself; rather, it uproots the entire foundation of the Torah. If there is no obligation to worship the Lord, but rather something other than Him, then all the commandments of the Torah lose their meaning. Thus murder and illicit sex may be transgressions equal in severity to the whole Torah, but idolatry is the actual uprooting of the entire Torah. For someone who worships idols, none of his observance has any meaning, since he is not serving the One who gave those commandments.

The expression “all the commandments” that appears here is not being used in the sense of equivalence, but in the sense of identity. There is one transgression such that violating it is completely identical—not merely equal in severity—to violating all the commandments.⁹ There is only one such transgression in the Torah: idolatry. It is the breach of the covenant and the casting off of the yoke, as though one had violated all the commandments of the Torah.

If so, this interpretation also answers the demands of the plain sense. One who violates the prohibition of idolatry in fact violates all the commandments of the Torah. This is another way of describing a situation in which all the commandments are violated, without that happening literally one by one.¹⁰

The Second Midrash

The second midrash deals with an individual’s inadvertent idolatry. Its schematic division is entirely parallel to the structure of the first midrash. The content of the second part, however—the part dealing with the sources for the conclusion that the passage is speaking of idolatry—is entirely different. Above we saw that the first midrash derives this from the expression “all the commandments” or, according to Rabbi, from a verbal analogy. Here that derivation from “all the commandments” does not appear. Instead, two other arguments appear. First there is an argument that derives it from the context—”what subject is being discussed here?”¹¹ Malbim explains that the continuation of the passage deals with the blasphemer, who according to at least one opinion was an idolater. According to this explanation, the midrash here uses the principle of “a matter learned from its context” (see the page for Parashat Kedoshim).

The second argument that appears here is Rabbi Yitzhak’s derivation from the departure from the general category. But as we saw when explaining the first midrash, even after that derivation one could still say that the subject here is some other specific commandment, and not necessarily idolatry. If so, how do we really know that it is idolatry?

More than that: if Rabbi Yitzhak states his argument at the end, it is not reasonable to understand the first part of the midrash as though it too were referring to Rabbi Yitzhak’s consideration. Therefore, despite the obvious similarity, it seems that we must also understand the first part of this midrash differently from the proposal we made regarding the first midrash.

A Possible Explanation of the Difference Between the Midrashim

We have already mentioned that the first midrash deals with communal inadvertent idolatry, whereas the second deals with an individual’s inadvertent idolatry. In part A we saw that, with respect to the community, there is no way to understand the verses in their literal sense as referring to an inadvertent violation of all the transgressions together. By contrast, in the case of an individual who errs, there is room to explain the verses as referring to someone who erred with respect to all the transgressions, and therefore his case is different. Let us now return to the two midrashim and once again note the differences between them.

The first midrash asks why this passage departed from the general category of ordinary inadvertent sins. Since it deals with communal inadvertence, we cannot explain it as speaking of inadvertence with respect to all the transgressions. The remaining possibility is one special transgression. Departure from the general category teaches us that the text cannot mean just any transgression, because for ordinary transgressions the law is already stated in Leviticus. Thus, by the end of the first section we have already learned from the departure from the general category that a unique transgression is in view. All that remains is to determine which transgression it is, and from the expression “all the commandments” we learn that it is idolatry, as explained above.

By contrast, the second midrash deals with an individual’s inadvertent transgression. Here there is also the possibility that the subject is someone who has inadvertently violated all the transgressions. Therefore the first section of the midrash, despite its similarity to the first section of the first midrash, cannot be interpreted as Rabbi Yitzhak’s exposition, because we still need to rule out the possibility that the subject is all the transgressions together. That is the purpose of the first section in the second midrash.

Explaining the Second Midrash

Perhaps one may say that for this reason the passage focuses on the lack of distinction between the ordinary individual, the leader, and the anointed priest—that is, the High Priest—and not, as in the first midrash, on the differences between the offerings brought by an individual for other transgressions and the case of idolatry.¹² As far as the leader and the anointed priest are concerned, there is in fact no stringency here, because ordinarily they must bring a bull (the anointed priest) or a male goat (the leader), whereas now all of them bring, like the ordinary person, a female goat. If the subject here were a violation of the whole Torah, we would not expect to find a leniency in this passage.¹³

If so, the passage is not speaking of all the transgressions together, and not of any one of them separately either, since the law for that is already stated in Leviticus. It now remains only to prove that the subject is idolatry. The midrash brings a proof from the context, namely from the blasphemer. It then adds Rabbi Yitzhak’s exposition, based on the fact that this passage departed from the general category. We asked: according to Rabbi Yitzhak, what proves that this is not some other specific transgression, but specifically idolatry?

To understand this, we must pay attention to Rabbi Yitzhak’s wording. He does not speak merely about departure from the general category in the abstract, but repeatedly emphasizes the departure from the general category both in the case of communal error and in the case of individual error. Why, in the section dealing with the individual, does he also bring in the departure from the general category in the communal case? It seems that he learns the individual from the community. There we saw that the subject is specifically idolatry, because it is a transgression identical to violating all the commandments, and therefore here too it is that same transgression. In other words, what teaches us here is not the individual’s departure from the general category, but the community’s departure from the general category.

In fact, his wording suggests that there is a double derivation here: the departure from the general category in the communal case proves that this is inadvertent idolatry, and the departure from the general category in the individual case, written together with the communal exceptional passage, teaches that the individual’s section deals with the same subject as the communal verses.

According to our explanation, there is no double application here of the principle of “a case that left the general category.” Rather, it is applied once with respect to the community, and afterward the individual is learned from the community. If so, the difficulty we raised about the circularity involved in using the principle of “a case that left the general category” disappears.

More than that: if the derivation were indeed from the principle of “a case that left the general category,” why would we need to use the community’s departure from the general category at all? Let us learn it directly from the individual’s departure from the general category. What is clearer in the case of the community than in the case of the individual? This proves that Rabbi Yitzhak does not mean to derive it from departure from the general category as such, except in the communal context. Even there, the fact that the subject is idolatry is based on the derivation from “all the commandments,” as explained above. The individual is then linked to the community, and from that it follows that the section about individual error likewise concerns inadvertent idolatry. This is not learned from the principle of “a case that left the general category” at all.¹⁴

C. Peshat (Plain-Sense Reading) and Derash (Interpretive Reading): Nahmanides’s View

Introduction

From everything described so far, it emerges that the plain sense of the verses concerns inadvertent violation of the whole Torah, something like the case of a child taken captive and raised away from Judaism, whereas the interpretive reading concerns inadvertent idolatry, which is equivalent—or more precisely, identical—to inadvertent violation of the whole Torah. Nahmanides, in his commentary here, brings both possibilities and tries to connect the plain sense with the interpretive reading.¹⁵ The conclusion he reaches is very close to the proposal offered here. Thus he writes (Numbers 15:22):

“`And if you err and do not observe all these commandments’—this passage is obscure in its meaning, and the plain-sense commentators [see Ibn Ezra there] erred in saying that it is an offering for one who failed to do what he was commanded to do, and did so inadvertently. Their words are empty wind…

“Now the obligation of this offering for the congregation’s inadvertent sin differs from the offering stated in the section of Leviticus, for there it is required to bring a bull as a sin offering, whereas here it is a bull as a burnt offering and a goat as a sin offering. Therefore our rabbis were compelled to say (Babylonian Talmud, Horayot 8a) that this offering is for inadvertent idolatry.

“Yet the language of Scripture, without our removing it from its plain sense and meaning, says: if you err away from the commandments and transgress all that the Lord commanded you through Moses, such that you do not do anything of all that He commanded you, you shall bring this offering. That is why it does not say here, as it says with the sin offerings elsewhere, `one of all the commandments of the Lord.’

“Thus, according to its meaning, this is the offering of one who apostatizes from the whole Torah inadvertently, such as one who goes and joins one of the nations and acts as they do, not wishing at all to remain within the community of Israel. And all this could happen inadvertently—for example, in the case of the individual, as one who was taken captive among the nations; and in the case of the community, if they thought that the time of the Torah had already passed and that it was not meant for all generations. Or if they were to say, as mentioned in the Sifrei (Shelach 115): Why did the Omnipresent say it? So that we should act and receive reward? We choose not to act and not to receive reward'—as the people of Israel would say and ask Ezekiel, as it is said:Men from the elders of Israel came and sat before me’ (Ezekiel 20:1). They said to him: Our master Ezekiel, if a master sold his slave, has he not left his domain?' and so forth. Or they might forget the Torah. This has in fact happened to us because of our sins, in the days of the wicked kings of Israel such as Jeroboam, when most of the people forgot the Torah and the commandments entirely, and as is described in the book of Ezra regarding the people of the Second Temple period. Such is the usage of the biblical language: the error mentioned here concerns the Torah and the commandments in their totality. Therefore our rabbis singled out for them one commandment such that one who errs in it leaves the community of Israel and all the commandments incumbent upon them, namely, idolatry. The sense of the verse is thus:And if you err’—by going after other gods; `and do not observe’—anything of all the commandments of the Lord. For one who acknowledges a deity other than Him has already nullified, in his own eyes, everything that the glorious Lord commanded, whether positive commandments or prohibitions. For if there is a deity other than Him, then reverence toward Him, His commandments, and all obligation concerning them amount to nothing.”

Almost everything we have said so far is implicit in these words of Nahmanides. Here we shall focus on his assertion that this explanation does not remove the text either from its “meaning” or from its “plain sense.” It seems that “its meaning” refers to the interpretive reading, namely that the subject is inadvertent idolatry, whereas “its plain sense” refers to the interpretation that the subject is a situation of forgetting the Torah.

What Is “Peshat”?

As we saw above, at least with respect to communal error, a situation in which all Israel are like children taken captive and raised away from Judaism is impossible. If so, the “plain sense” here can never actually occur. Can such an interpretation still count as plain sense? It may be the plain sense of the words, but in practice it cannot happen.

Were it not for Nahmanides’s compromise, we would have here a conflict between linguistic plain sense and rational plain sense. From the standpoint of reason and our understanding of reality, this seems forced; and yet, at the level of the wording, that does indeed appear to be the intended meaning.

There is a tendency to interpret the term “plain sense” as the literal meaning embedded in the words themselves. Interpretations that are not plain sense are then viewed as interpretations that move away from the literal wording and are generated by broader considerations.¹⁶

The saying of the Hazon Ish is well known: it is preferable to force the language than to force the reasoning. Some have pointed to a source for this in Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah, sec. 228, who writes accordingly.¹⁷

These rules seem to be rules for identifying the plain-sense interpretation. If so, the concept of plain sense is not really bare literal meaning, but rather the simpler meaning when the full range of considerations is taken into account. According to this principle, if there is a difficulty with the literal reading and from that difficulty one arrives at an interpretation along the lines of derash, then in many cases this is not derash at all, but plain sense. In cases where we have moved very far from the linguistic meaning, we will still continue to refer to it as derash. The definition of the term “plain sense,” then, is very difficult: it includes verbal and linguistic components, but also rational ones.¹⁸

Against the background of the difficulties we raised above regarding the literal interpretation of the verses in our passage, Nahmanides’s proposal—to interpret them as speaking of the transgression of idolatry, which also constitutes a violation of all the commandments of the Torah—certainly has a place even as a plain-sense interpretation. This is exactly what Nahmanides meant when he said that his interpretation does not remove the verses either from their plain sense or from their meaning.

If we now return to our midrashim, we can ask ourselves whether these are truly midrashim, or perhaps plain-sense interpretations. Nahmanides argues that this is an interpretation containing both plain sense and derash together. In other words, it is the best plain-sense reading once the linguistic difficulties and constraints are taken into account.

This point brings us back to the earlier claim that the hermeneutical principles used in these midrashim may not really be formal principles of derash at all, but merely forms of expression. The consideration that the transgression here has left the general category is a factual description of the biblical situation, and not an application of a hermeneutical principle whose result is an interpretation by way of derash.¹⁹

The question of the relationship between plain sense and derash, and the classification of the various interpretations—especially those that make use of hermeneutical principles—in this context, requires much broader clarification, and this is not the place for it.

Footnotes