Acharei-Kedoshim (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

---

With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Friday eve, the Aharei-Kedoshim portion, 5766

Questions

1. Is “a matter learned from its context” equivalent to “let the obscure be learned from the explicit”?
2. Why is exposition from juxtaposition disputed among the Tannaitic sages, whereas “a matter learned from its context” is not?
3. Is there a difference between applying these interpretive rules in halakhic midrashim (rabbinic legal expositions) and aggadic midrashim (non-legal rabbinic expositions)?
4. What distinguishes the book of Deuteronomy from the other books of the Pentateuch?
5. Why, in many midrashim that use “a matter learned from its context,” does one find an opening formula emphasizing that this is one of Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen hermeneutical principles? Why does no similar opening appear for the other principles?

The Principles

• A matter learned from its context.
• Let the obscure be learned from the explicit.
• Juxtapositions.
• From a matter not explained in its place but explained elsewhere.

“You shall not steal, and you shall not deal falsely, and you shall not lie, one man to his fellow. And you shall not swear falsely by My name and profane the name of your God; I am the Lord. You shall not oppress your fellow and you shall not rob. The wages of a hired laborer shall not remain with you until morning.”

— Leviticus 19:11-13

“Our Rabbis taught: ‘You shall not steal’ (Exodus 20) — Scripture here speaks of kidnapping. Do you say it speaks of kidnapping, or perhaps only of theft of money? You must say: go out and learn from the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded: a matter learned from its context. What is Scripture speaking about there? Human persons; so here too, human persons. Another baraita taught: ‘You shall not steal’ (Leviticus 19) — Scripture there speaks of theft of money. Do you say it speaks of theft of money, or perhaps only of kidnapping? You must say: go out and learn from the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded: a matter learned from its context. What is Scripture speaking about there? Money; so here too, money.”

— Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 86a

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

In last year’s article we discussed the principle of “a matter learned from its context” and “a matter learned from its end.” We noted that most commentators count these two rules as two clauses of a single principle. This principle deals with situations in which there is some ambiguity in the meaning of a given verse, and that ambiguity is clarified either from the end of the passage (“a matter learned from its end”) or from the context of the neighboring verses (“a matter learned from its context”). The rule “a matter learned from its end,” at least where that precise term is used explicitly, appears only twice in rabbinic literature. By contrast, “a matter learned from its context” appears several times. We noted that it is usually introduced by wording close to the following: “Go out and learn from the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded — a matter learned from its context.”

In light of that distinction, we noted that one must examine the rule “a matter learned from its context,” which appears to be accepted by all sides in Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 4a, as against exposition from juxtaposition, regarding which we find in several places a dispute over whether it may be used at all.

In Yavin Shemu’ah, principle 147, the difference between them is explained as follows: in exposition from juxtaposition, one derives a law in one passage from the presence of that law in an adjacent passage. The rule “a matter learned from its context,” by contrast, comes to interpret the obscure element — in the literal sense of an ambiguous word — and only then to derive a law from that, rather than learning a law directly. We commented that this distinction sharpens the point that this rule is not a kind of analogy comparing the content of two passages, but rather an interpretive rule with legal significance, a mere clarification of what is already implicit. The author of Middot Aharon, chapter 14, states that this is what the Talmud usually calls “let the obscure be learned from the explicit.”

We also mentioned the dispute in the Keritot passage about a case in which the obscure text is a negative prohibition while the explicit text carries the penalty of excision: can one still use the rule of “a matter learned from its context”? If this were a kind of analogy, there would be no room for it, because it could be refuted on the basis of the difference in punishments. But if it is an interpretive rule, then there is room to understand what the obscure commandment refers to on the basis of the explicit one.

We then turned to the expositions cited above concerning the prohibition of kidnapping and the prohibition of theft of money, both learned through the rule of “a matter learned from its context.” From there we went on to discuss the prohibition of deception, which according to several early authorities is also derived from the verse about theft of money, “you shall not steal.” Our conclusion was that the basis of the prohibition lies in the Torah’s treating information as a kind of property over which a person has ownership, so that it can be stolen from him just like money. We examined the place of deception on the axis between robbery and falsehood, and interpreted the verses in the portion Kedoshim as a transformative unfolding and detailing of that axis. We based this on a proposed exposition by the rule of “a matter learned from its context” applied to the verses in Kedoshim — an exposition that the sages do not make explicitly.

We also explained why two separate expositions are needed regarding theft of money and kidnapping. If we had learned about one prohibition that it concerns money, then the other would automatically concern kidnapping, and vice versa. But if the prohibition of deception can also be learned from that same verse, then there is no proof that it must refer specifically either to persons or to money, since perhaps it refers to deception.

We concluded with a remark about the nature of the rule “a matter learned from its context” and about the purpose of the opening formula mentioned above. We suggested that contextual considerations are common even in plain-sense interpretation, and that the sages therefore found it necessary in these places to emphasize that they were engaged in exposition and not merely in plain-sense reading.

Perhaps one may say that in the narrative sections of Scripture, learning from context is a reasonable and accepted interpretive technique — as it is in other texts as well — and therefore it requires no special hermeneutical principle. This may explain why Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean does not list it as a hermeneutical rule. In legal sections, by contrast, we would not adopt such an interpretive method without authorization from Sinai.

We then suggested that perhaps the hermeneutical rule also exists in narrative passages, but the emphatic opening formula is unnecessary there. The reason is that there is no difference in status between aggadic midrash and plain-sense interpretation. With respect to a legal passage in Scripture, however, there is a significant difference: according to Maimonides, a halakha (Jewish law) derived through exposition has the status of rabbinic law. Even according to other early authorities, such a law is biblical, but still of lesser force. Therefore it is important to emphasize in the opening formula that this interpretation is an exposition rather than plain-sense interpretation.

In this week’s article we will examine in greater detail the expositions that use the rule of “a matter learned from its context” in rabbinic literature, and their relation to expositions based on juxtaposition.

B. Expositions Using “A Matter Learned from Its Context”

Introduction

At the outset we present the results of a survey of the expressions “a matter learned from its context” and “let the obscure be learned from the explicit” in rabbinic literature and in the writings of the early authorities. These remarks are offered as groundwork for future research, since here we have not been able to expand further. We will suggest a few basic data points that emerge from these sources, along with several general ideas for understanding them, but we will leave the main claims and the analysis of the results for more detailed examination in the future.

Already at this point we should note that neither expression appears in the Jerusalem Talmud, but mainly in the Babylonian Talmud and in Yalkut Shimoni, which is largely drawn from the Babylonian Talmud. Toward the end of our discussion we will address, briefly, the relation of these rules to expositions based on juxtaposition.

“A Matter Learned from Its Context”¹

A computerized search in the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project shows that this rule appears in this wording in rabbinic literature in eleven different contexts, four of them aggadic midrashim and seven halakhic midrashim. Five of them begin with an opening formula declaring that this is one of Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen hermeneutical principles. This opening formula appears in both halakhic and aggadic midrashim. We cite the sources for the reader’s consideration:

1. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 61a-b²

“Rather, then, why do I need the term ‘robbery’? For one who withholds a laborer’s wages. But withholding a laborer’s wages is explicitly written: ‘You shall not oppress a hired servant who is poor and needy’! To make him liable for two negative commandments. Then let it be applied to interest and overcharging as well, so as to make him liable there for two negative commandments! A matter learned from its context: the verse is written in the context of a laborer.”

2. Babylonian Talmud, Keritot 4a-b³

“What did you say? That the verse wrote ‘ox, sheep, and goat’ in order to permit the fat of wild animals? But when Scripture wrote this, it did so in the context of consecrated animals, and a matter is learned from its context. Does that imply that the Rabbis hold that we do not learn a matter from its context? No; all agree that we do learn a matter from its context.”

3. Midrash Tannaim to Deuteronomy 5:17⁴

“Do you say that it speaks of kidnapping, or perhaps of theft of money? You must say: go out and learn from the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded — a matter learned from its context. What is Scripture speaking about there? Human persons; so here too, human persons.”

4. Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 63a⁵

“Our Rabbis taught: the word in question appears here among the birds. Do you say it belongs among the seven birds, or perhaps among the creeping creatures? You must say: go out and learn from the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded, a matter learned from its context. What is Scripture speaking about there? Birds; so here too, birds.”

5. Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 115a⁶

“Rabbi Yohanan said to him: Did Rabbi really teach this awkward formulation: ‘You shall not eat it’ — Scripture is speaking of meat cooked in milk? Do you say Scripture is speaking of meat cooked in milk, or perhaps of one among all the Torah’s prohibitions? You must say: go out and learn from the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded, a matter learned from its context. What is Scripture speaking about there? Two different kinds; so here too, two different kinds. Had we learned it only from there, I would have said that this applies only to eating, but not to deriving benefit. Therefore he teaches us otherwise.”

6. Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 140a

“Then let us establish it in the case of a torn animal, so that one would transgress both a positive and a negative commandment! A matter learned from its context: it is written in the context of a properly slaughtered animal.”

7. Sifra, Baraita of Rabbi Ishmael, parashah 1, chapter 1⁷

“How does ‘a matter learned from its context’ work? ‘If a man loses the hair of his head, he is bald; he is pure.’ One might think he is pure from every sort of impurity. Scripture therefore says: ‘But if in the bald area or in the receding hairline there is a white-reddish plague.’ A matter is learned from its context: he is not pure from every kind of impurity, but only from the impurity of scalp eruptions.”

8. Pesikta Zutrata (Lekah Tov), Exodus 8, s.v. “And I shall set apart on that day”⁸

“Since the Torah is expounded by thirteen principles, as Rabbi Ishmael taught in Sifra, and this is one of them — a matter learned from its context — so too here: ‘that you may know.’ As I have written in two or three places, in every rebuke Scripture mentions the sinner’s offense: he had said, ‘I do not know the Lord’; therefore it says, ‘that you may know.’ Yet the wording turns against him in different ways: at one time, ‘that there is none like the Lord our God’; at another, ‘that Egypt may know that I am the Lord’; and again, ‘that I am the Lord in the midst of the land.’”

9. Pesikta Zutrata (Lekah Tov), Deuteronomy, portion Ekev, p. 13a

“‘Do not be terrified of them.’ Although language of terror can denote might, you also find it in the sense of breaking, as in Job 31: ‘because I would be shattered before the great multitude.’ For in Scripture there are words pronounced alike whose meanings are not the same. Thus in Genesis 13: ‘Abram pitched his tent’; and it says, ‘he pitched as far as Sodom’ — meaning that Lot moved his tent and did not pitch it until he reached Sodom. There are many such cases. And they belong to the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded, as Rabbi Ishmael said: a matter learned from its context.”

10. Yalkut Shimoni, Torah, portion Naso, sec. 712⁹

“Rabbi Ishmael says: a matter learned from its context, as it is said, ‘and they died before the Lord’ — their death was before the Lord, but their collapse occurred outside.”

11. Genesis Rabbah (Vilna), parashah 15, s.v. “What was that tree?”¹⁰

“Rabbi Yose says: They were figs, a matter learned from its context. It is like a prince who behaved corruptly with one of the maidservants. When the minister heard, he drove him out and expelled him from the palace. The prince went around to the doors of the maidservants, but they would not receive him; only the one with whom he had sinned opened her door and received him. So too, when Adam ate from that tree, the Holy One, blessed be He, drove him out and expelled him from the Garden of Eden. He went around among all the trees, and they would not receive him. What did they say to him? Rabbi Berekhiah said: ‘Here is the thief who deceived his Creator,’ as it is written: ‘Let not the foot of pride come against me’ — the foot that exalted itself against its Creator; ‘and let not the hand of the wicked drive me away’ — do not take a leaf from me. But the fig, from whose fruit he had eaten, opened its door and received him, as it is written: ‘and they sewed fig leaves.’”

“Let the Obscure Be Learned from the Explicit”

We now turn to the rule “let the obscure be learned from the explicit.” A computerized search in the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project shows that this consideration appears in the Talmuds only three times in all:

1. Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 66b-67a¹¹

We will not quote this passage because of its length and complexity.

2. Babylonian Talmud, Temurah 16a¹²

“You cannot say that a sin-offering whose owners died applies in the case of a communal offering, for the community does not die. As for cases in which its owners achieved atonement through another offering, or it passed its first year, we have no explicit ruling. One might think these laws apply both to an individual and to the community. You must say: let the obscure be learned from the explicit. Just as the explicit case speaks of an individual and not of the community, so too in the cases where its owners achieved atonement and where it passed its year, the rule applies to an individual and not to the community.”

3. Mekhilta of Rabbi Ishmael, Beshalach, Tractate Shirah, parashah 2¹³

“Isi ben Shammai says: Here the term ‘horse’ is obscure, and elsewhere ‘horse’ is explicit, as it says: ‘On that day, says the Lord, I will strike every horse with bewilderment and its rider with madness; and over the house of Judah I will open My eyes, and every horse of the peoples I will strike with blindness.’ And it also says: ‘And this shall be the plague with which the Lord will strike…’; and again: ‘So shall be the plague of the horse, the mule, the camel, and the donkey.’ The explicit text comes and teaches about the obscure one: just as the explicit case involves fifty blows, so too the obscure case involves fifty blows.”

Preliminary Conclusions

From these data it emerges that this hermeneutical rule is found in both halakhic and aggadic midrashim. In a large proportion of them there appears an opening formula declaring that this consideration belongs to Rabbi Ishmael’s hermeneutical principles — which, to the best of our knowledge, is not characteristic of expositions based on any other rule. In the midrashim that use “let the obscure be learned from the explicit,” by contrast, we did not find such an opening formula.

Above we suggested that this opening formula stems from the fact that such a consideration is also used in plain-sense interpretation, and that it is therefore necessary to declare that we are using it at the level of exposition. Below we will spell this out further.

Use of “A Matter Learned from Its Context” in Non-Biblical Contexts

It appears that such a consideration is also used in non-biblical interpretive contexts, and without any connection to the hermeneutical principles given at Sinai. In a computerized survey we found the expression “a matter learned from its context” 26 times among the early authorities, aside from Rashi and Tosafot, who are simply explaining the passages cited above. In every case, it does not introduce a new midrash on Scripture, but rather serves as a consideration aimed at understanding the meaning and scope of a Talmudic expression from the context in which it appears. Interestingly, such a consideration is characteristic only of the school of Nahmanides and his students. Among the early authorities included in the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project, it appears 7 times in Nahmanides’ novellae, 21 times in Rashba’s novellae, and 9 times in Ritva’s novellae, and in none of the other early authorities.

We should also note that Radak explains four places in Scripture by means of this rule without any rabbinic source for it. These are cases in which he uses this terminology explicitly. Presumably there are additional places in his commentary where the terminology does not appear explicitly.

This phenomenon appears to indicate that these are indeed ordinary plain-sense interpretive considerations, relevant to any text and not only to Scripture. That explains the opening formula emphasizing that this consideration is part of the hermeneutical principles.

Admittedly, in the article on the portion Vayishlah, 5766, we cited an application of the hermeneutical principles in non-biblical contexts — an exposition of ordinary language — such as the interpretive argument of Maharai Mintz in responsum 7 regarding a responsum of Maharam of Rothenburg. On its face, this suggests that the application of the hermeneutical principles may be based on a Torah mode of thought that affects the very form of writing. If that is true with respect to Maharam of Rothenburg, it can certainly be applied to Talmudic texts. If so, the approach of Nahmanides, Rashba, and Ritva is not necessarily valid for every text whatsoever.

However, the extent of the phenomenon of using this rule in non-biblical contexts indicates that this is not a case of applying a hermeneutical principle as a general interpretive method. The situation is clearly the reverse: although the hermeneutical principles are generally not used for ordinary language, this rule is used for that purpose, and quite extensively. The reason is that “a matter learned from its context” is a logical rule that also functions in ordinary plain-sense interpretation.

“Let the Obscure Be Learned from the Explicit”

What, then, of the rule “let the obscure be learned from the explicit”? Here we find many more occurrences among the early authorities. In the early sources included in the Bar-Ilan Responsa Project, we found approximately seventy occurrences that explicitly use the phrase “let the obscure be learned from the explicit,” and the range of authors is broader as well.

Still, the uses of this term among the early authorities are divided into two types: one, as an interpretive consideration for Talmudic texts; and the other, as a hermeneutical principle. We find quite a few places where the early authorities themselves use the consideration “let the obscure be learned from the explicit” in order to interpret Scripture, even without any rabbinic source doing so. From this it follows that this consideration is certainly a technique of plain-sense interpretation, one that does not require validation by a Sinaitic tradition, since the independent use of hermeneutical principles by the early authorities is extremely rare, if it exists at all.

One should note, however, that in Ba’al Ha-Ittur we found an understanding according to which there is a tannaitic dispute regarding use of this rule. He writes as follows in Laws of Tzitzit, folio 70b:

“He holds like the Rabbis, who disagree with him and do not accept the rule that the obscure is learned from the explicit, as is evident at the beginning of Yevamot. For there the Gemara asks: this works well according to Rabbi Yehudah; but what can the Rabbis say? Hence the Rabbis disagree with him.”¹⁴

If there is indeed a dispute about this rule, it would seem that it is not a simple interpretive rule, but one dependent on certain reasonings or traditions. Yet it is entirely possible that Ba’al Ha-Ittur’s words do not concern the rule as such, but only the application of learning the obscure from the explicit in the particular case discussed there.

First, in the Talmud we have not found an explicit dispute about this rule. Second, the rule is not mentioned at all in the Yevamot passage in question, so how can one infer from there the existence of a general dispute about it? Third, the rule “a matter learned from its context” appears to be an agreed rule, as may be inferred from Keritot 4a,¹⁵ and there is no evident reason to suppose that disputes arose specifically with regard to “let the obscure be learned from the explicit.”

And Once Again on the Relation Between “Let the Obscure Be Learned from the Explicit” and “A Matter Learned from Its Context”

However, when one examines the relation between “let the obscure be learned from the explicit” and “a matter learned from its context,” one quickly discovers that these are two different rules. “A matter learned from its context” is interpretation in light of context. By contrast, the rule “let the obscure be learned from the explicit” is not said specifically of the same context. Sometimes it is merely a clarification: when the Torah specifies in one place what a “garment” means, one may learn from there to the other places in the Torah where the word “garment” appears.

Accordingly, the statement of the author of Middot Aharon, chapter 14, that this rule is what the Talmud usually calls “let the obscure be learned from the explicit,” should be understood as a general claim: the consideration of “a matter learned from its context” is one type of learning about an obscure passage from an explicit source. In this particular case, the learning is from a source found in the same context.

Expositions Based on Juxtaposition

The rule that seems more similar to “a matter learned from its context” is juxtaposition. There we expound and interpret biblical passages in light of textual adjacency. Yet the rule of exposition from juxtaposition is indeed disputed in the Talmud.

In Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 10a, the view that one does not expound juxtapositions is presented as the view of heretics. There too we find a biblical source for the idea that juxtapositions are to be expounded, and the same appears in Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 4a:

“A certain heretic said to Rabbi Abbahu: It is written, ‘A psalm of David, when he fled from Absalom his son,’ and it is written, ‘Of David, when he fled from Saul into the cave.’ Which event came first? Since the episode of Saul came first, let it be written first. He said to him: For you, who do not expound juxtapositions, this is a difficulty. For us, who do expound juxtapositions, it is not a difficulty. For Rabbi Yohanan said: From where in the Torah do we know that juxtapositions are meaningful? As it is said: ‘They are fixed forever and ever, performed in truth and uprightness.’ Why was the section of Absalom placed next to the section of Gog and Magog? So that if a person says to you, ‘Can a servant rebel against his master?’ you may say to him, ‘Can a son rebel against his father?’ But in fact it happened; so here too, it can happen.”

At first glance, this suggests that exposition from juxtaposition is part of belief in the perfection of Scripture. Here the discussion concerns not the Torah but the broader biblical canon. Whoever does not expound in this way is portrayed as a heretic.¹⁶ The prooftext brought for the rule likewise speaks about the uprightness of the Torah: a text made “in truth and uprightness” should be expounded through juxtapositions. The linking of nearby contexts is part of the upright structure of a text in general, and of Scripture in particular.

From this a double conclusion emerges. On the one hand, there is a source indicating that we must expound juxtapositions. That is, this is not a mere interpretive intuition; it requires a source. On the other hand, the content and character of the source point in precisely the opposite direction: the reason one expounds juxtapositions is not a formal scriptural decree, but rather that any text made “in truth and uprightness” should be built in such a way that neighboring contexts are related, and therefore illuminate one another.

And yet, despite all this, in various Talmudic passages there appears an explicit tannaitic dispute regarding expositions based on juxtaposition. For example, in Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 28a:

“As it was taught: Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: From where do we know that the Passover in Egypt was subject to the prohibition of leaven for only one day? Scripture says, ‘No leaven shall be eaten,’ and next to it, ‘Today you are going out.’ And Rabbi Yehudah — from where does he derive it? From the fact that the Merciful One wrote the term ‘leavened matter.’ And Rabbi Yose the Galilean — from where does he derive it? If you wish, say from the fact that ‘today’ is adjacent to it; if you wish, say that he does not expound juxtapositions.”

Likewise, in Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 21a — and see also Yevamot 4a — this dispute is cited, and there it is explained that even one who does not expound juxtapositions elsewhere in the Torah nevertheless does expound them in Deuteronomy:

“Does this mean that Rabbi Yehudah holds that one who has had a seminal emission is permitted to study words of Torah? But Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: From where do we know that one who has had a seminal emission is forbidden to study words of Torah? As it is said, ‘And you shall make them known to your children and your children’s children,’ and next to it: ‘the day you stood…’ Just as there those with seminal impurity were forbidden, so here too they are forbidden.”

“And if you say that Rabbi Yehudah does not expound juxtapositions — did not Rav Yosef say: even one who does not expound juxtapositions in the entire Torah does expound them in Deuteronomy? For Rabbi Yehudah does not expound juxtapositions in the whole Torah, but he does expound them in Deuteronomy. And from where do we know that he does not expound them in the whole Torah? As it was taught: Ben Azzai says, It says, ‘You shall not allow a sorceress to live,’ and it says, ‘Whoever lies with an animal shall surely be put to death’; one subject was placed next to the other, to say: just as one who lies with an animal is punished by stoning, so too a sorceress is punished by stoning. Rabbi Yehudah said to him: Is someone to be taken out for stoning merely because one subject was placed next to another? Rather, the necromancer and the medium were included among all sorcerers. Why were they singled out? To establish an analogy to them, and to teach you: just as the necromancer and the medium are punished by stoning, so too a sorceress is punished by stoning.”

“And from where do we know that in Deuteronomy he does expound juxtapositions? As it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says, A man may marry a woman raped by his father or seduced by his father, and a woman raped by his son or seduced by his son. Rabbi Yehudah forbids a woman raped by his father and a woman seduced by his father. Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: What is Rabbi Yehudah’s reason? Because it is written: ‘A man shall not take his father’s wife, nor uncover his father’s skirt’ — the skirt that his father saw he may not uncover. And from where do we know that the verse speaks of a woman raped by his father? Because next to it it says: ‘And the man who lay with her shall give…’ They answered: Yes, in Deuteronomy he does expound juxtapositions. Yet that juxtaposition is needed for the other teaching of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi…”

How can this be reconciled with the principle that exposition from juxtaposition is part of belief in the sanctity and perfection of Scripture? Are there Tannaitic sages who do not accept this?[^^17]

Juxtapositions in Halakhic and Aggadic Midrash

We must note that the midrash in Berakhot 10a is aggadic. By contrast, all the disputes regarding expositions based on juxtaposition appear in relation to halakhic midrashim. It may be that adjacency with respect to law is not an agreed hermeneutical rule, and is not entailed by the perfection of the text. Therefore, in the context of halakhic midrashim, there is room for dispute over whether juxtapositions may be expounded.

Admittedly, in Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 107a, there appears at first glance to be a dispute with respect to an aggadic midrash:

“Hushai the Archite said to David: Why did you marry a beautiful captive woman? He said to him: The Merciful One permitted a beautiful captive woman. He said to him: You did not expound juxtapositions, for next to that section it says, ‘If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son.’ Whoever marries a beautiful captive woman will have a stubborn and rebellious son.”

This seems to show that King David did not expound juxtapositions even in aggadic midrash. But it is entirely reasonable to interpret this dialogue as a rebuke. Hushai the Archite is reproaching David for ignoring the exposition from juxtaposition, precisely because it is obvious that he should have expounded it. If so, this midrash actually strengthens our claim that in aggadic midrash there is no place for dispute regarding exposition from juxtaposition; the dispute was stated only with respect to halakhic midrashim.

Deuteronomy

Why, in the book of Deuteronomy, do all agree that juxtapositions are to be expounded? It is quite possible that a more far-reaching assumption is hidden here: even in halakhic midrashim, uprightness requires that juxtapositions be expounded. But this applies only to a text written by a human being and according to human considerations. Deuteronomy was formulated by Moses our Teacher, even though its content was conveyed to him from above, and therefore its internal uprightness requires that juxtapositions be expounded. By contrast, at least according to Rabbi Yehudah, a text formulated by the Holy One, blessed be He, is not expounded on the basis of adjacency. The reason is that the Holy One has additional editorial considerations, and these may depart from what human textual uprightness would dictate.¹⁷

Ravan, sec. 34, writes as follows:

“Even one who does not expound juxtapositions in the whole Torah does expound them in Deuteronomy. The reason is that the whole Torah was spoken by the Almighty, and there is no strict earlier and later in the Torah. But Moses, who arranged Deuteronomy passage after passage, arranged it only so that it be expounded.”

This is precisely our point.¹⁸

Back to the Expositions Using “A Matter Learned from Its Context”

Last year we cited the explanation of the author of Yavin Shemu’ah, principle 147, that exposition from juxtaposition is an exposition that transfers a law from one context to another, whereas “a matter learned from its context” is a linguistic-interpretive clarification. In other words, the rule “a matter learned from its context” teaches us what a given passage is about, whether with respect to the scope of a law or with respect to the meaning of some obscure term, as may be seen in all the examples cited above.¹⁹ If so, the rule of juxtaposition is an exposition that innovates law, whereas “a matter learned from its context” is linguistic-contextual interpretation.

We may now perhaps understand why the rule “a matter learned from its context” is accepted — as is implied by the passage in Keritot 4a cited above — whereas juxtaposition is disputed. As we have seen, juxtaposition in aggadah follows from the uprightness of the text. There, the tool of juxtaposition is a tool for interpreting the text, and if the text is upright one ought to use it. With respect to law, however, this tool is itself not interpretive but rather a formal exposition, like a verbal analogy. The adjacency of two laws is not necessarily connected to any substantive relation between them; rather, it is a formal tool for generating new laws. The rule “a matter learned from its context,” even with respect to law, is an interpretive rule, and therefore it resembles expositions from juxtaposition specifically in their aggadic use. For this reason it is accepted, since it too apparently follows from the uprightness and truth of the text. A text that is properly constructed and complete should explain its words and concepts consistently when the same context is in view.

The Expositions Using “A Matter Learned from Its Context”

We now return to our point of departure. If the consideration that learns from the subject matter at hand is indeed a plain-sense interpretive consideration, then it is clear why the opening formula is needed to inform us that we are dealing with a hermeneutical exposition. On the other hand, it is not really clear why this should count as a hermeneutical principle at all. On its face, it is simply plain-sense interpretation.

To understand this, we must examine every source that uses this rule, and ask whether it admits other plain-sense interpretations while the text still remains “truthful and upright.” If so, one may still say that we are dealing here with a hermeneutical principle and not with plain-sense interpretation. Within that framework, it may be necessary to distinguish between sources in which the opening formula appears — where this consideration really functions as an exposition — and sources in which the opening formula does not appear, where it may be that we are dealing with a plain-sense consideration rather than with a hermeneutical principle, and the phrase “a matter learned from its context” serves only as a conventional turn of phrase, as we saw in Nahmanides, Rashba, and Ritva.²⁰

Footnotes