On Religious Courts and Their Conduct—Then and Now (Column 224)
With God's help
Several months ago, an unpleasant affair exploded regarding Rabbi Shmuel Tal, head of the Torat HaChaim yeshiva. It turns out that he conducted himself as though "divine inspiration" were revealed to him, and he distributed instructions and guidance to those around him in its name. More than that, in one of the cases the instruction concerned a woman with whom he was romantically involved, and he told her that divine inspiration had told him his wife was destined to die and that he was supposed to marry her. He therefore instructed her to divorce her husband, and that is what she did. It turns out that the divine inspiration missed the mark a bit on this matter, and unfortunately Rabbi Tal's wife did not die (and as is well known, the Vilna Gaon already wrote that the words of maggidim (mystical heavenly voices) are always mixed with a bit of chaff among the grain, although he was speaking about maggidim abroad). The woman, as noted, had already divorced her husband, and now it became clear to her that it had been for nothing. She blew the affair open, and the rest is history.
Over the course of the affair, other additional unpleasant suspicions also arose, such as pornographic material being found on Rabbi Tal's computer, questionable relationships with other women, further uses of "divine inspiration," and more. Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu went to the media and claimed that he had checked these facts and that there was indeed substance to the allegations. Following the affair, an investigative report by Yehuda Yifrah was also published in Makor Rishon that likewise describes very problematic conduct within a community under a charismatic rabbi.
At some point it was decided to convene a special religious court that would decide what to do about this claimant to divine inspiration. They turned to Rabbi Asher Weiss, and he appointed three judges to hear the matter. A few days ago their decision was published: Rabbi Tal, who according to them has repented, may continue to serve as head of the yeshiva and all of his institutions, although it is stated there that he indeed had an inappropriate relationship with a married woman. They forbid him from making use of divine inspiration (though I do find it difficult: ""When the words of the master and the words of the disciple conflict, whose words are obeyed?!"" ("when the words of the master and the disciple conflict, to whom does one listen?!")) and from counseling women at all, and they add that they found no evidence of relationships with other women, nor of pornographic images on his computer. I must say that this decision seems very problematic from several standpoints.
Throughout the process, rumors began to circulate that Rabbi Weiss himself was in close contact with Rabbi Tal, and therefore questions were raised about the appointment of the religious court and its objectivity. These concerns are strengthened by the decision, which, as noted, seems very problematic. Yesterday they sent me a report by Yair Cherki that deals with Rabbi Asher Weiss's conduct regarding the Rabbi Tal affair, and includes recordings indicating that Rabbi Weiss did not conduct himself honestly in this matter.
This affair has several aspects that are worth thinking about and drawing lessons from: the reservation that all of us should feel toward an overly charismatic rabbi; our attitude toward people's "divine inspiration" and the instructions issued in its name; the maxim There is no guardian against sexual impropriety. ("there is no guardian against sexual transgression"); the problematic attraction to mysticism; whether greatness in Torah scholarship is not a guarantee of exemplary conduct, and what remains of that greatness once it becomes clear that the conduct is not such; and more. But here I wanted to touch on an aspect focused on the religious court, its appointment, and its conduct.
What emerges from the recordings
When they sent me the article, including the recordings, the WhatsApp headline was: "Rabbi Weiss lied brazenly." I listened to the recording, and to tell the truth, that is not my conclusion from the material. Quite apart from the fact that I have not heard Rabbi Weiss's response to the claims, and the information in the article is partial and not necessarily reliable. But even if, for the sake of discussion, we assume that this is reliable and complete information, the required conclusion is still not so unequivocal.
At the beginning, the article cites remarks Rabbi Weiss made as part of a fundraising campaign for the Torat HaChaim yeshiva. There are no statements there about Rabbi Tal, so I am not sure one can derive from there any bias on Rabbi Weiss's part regarding the case and the person (Rabbi Tal). After that, a recording is presented of a telephone conversation that the aggrieved woman conducts with Rabbi Weiss, in which she tells him that in light of his participation in the fundraising campaign it is not fitting for him to appoint the religious court, because there is concern about bias. Rabbi Weiss reassures the woman and tells her that he is not sitting on the panel, and that the judges are experts and experienced and that she has nothing to worry about. Finally, a recording is played in which Rabbi Weiss says that the decisions of the religious court are definitely influenced by his positions, that the judges are his students and consult with him, and that they will not depart from his view, though it is possible they may convince him that he is mistaken (to a limited degree—15%, in his words).
This article suffers from two main flaws: first, Rabbi Weiss did not lie. When an agitated woman turns to him, he reassures her that the religious court will rule properly. That is natural and to be expected. He tells her that he is not sitting on the panel, and that too is true. The concern that stems from his own participation in the campaign has no basis, as noted. Later he says in another forum that the judges are indeed influenced by him, and that he guides them, as is customary between students and their rabbi. That may look a little bad, but it is far from being a brazen lie. At most, these are calming words that do not insist on perfect precision (but that is how one speaks when calming a distressed person). There is no indication here of judicial bias.
Beyond all this, I must say that throughout the process I have been accompanied by a hard feeling regarding the woman. The public projects a great deal of indulgence toward her, as though she were a victim of a charismatic rabbi and his "divine inspiration." I have not met the woman, and the decision of the religious court states that she too is involved in "spiritual energies" (a New Age term meaning complete nonsense. A cousin of divine inspiration). In any case, from my perspective the presumption is that she was a partner in the offense. She is a grown woman and not a child, who conducted an inappropriate relationship with a married rabbi. She agreed to divorce her husband in order to marry him. In short, this is an affair like any other affair. The excuse that all this was done under his mystical influence, because of excessive trust in divine inspiration and irresistible influences, requires proof. For me, the presumption is that she is an offender just like he is. And in general, a woman who conducts an affair is presumptively guilty, and I do not take very seriously the excuses she raises after the fact. It is very convenient to place all the blame on him, especially after her hope of marrying him was disappointed.
Moreover, the conversation she conducts with Rabbi Weiss is recorded. That means she had already prepared claims in advance against the religious court whose appointment she herself had agreed to. There she raises claims because of the campaign, which in my view is not a sufficient reason to cast doubt on the integrity of Rabbi Weiss and his court. What I smell here is a woman who conducts an affair and, when it does not materialize, becomes enraged and uses manipulations to take revenge on the partner who disappointed her, all under the guise of a poor woman who was betrayed. To that I say: "Have you murdered and also inherited?!" ("Have you murdered and also inherited?!") I do not really understand the sympathy she is receiving. Either she is a fool who behaves like a little girl, or she is simply manipulative. She does not come off well here in any case.
Incidentally, this is a paradigm for all kinds of women in similar situations (as with Ezra Scheinberg, or Goel Ratzon). I do not automatically accept the claim that all of these women were led astray. These are adult women who are responsible for their actions. Of course, none of this exonerates Rabbi Tal, but it does raise difficult question marks regarding the claims of his partner.
The conduct of rabbis and religious courts
But as noted, here I wanted to address another aspect, namely Rabbi Weiss's conduct. True, in light of the data I have seen here I do not find a lie in his words, but there is problematic conduct here, at least on the level of appearances. I understand that there was a good relationship between him and Rabbi Tal, and that he has considerable influence on the religious court and its decisions (85%, by his own definition). The fact is that these problematic decisions look even more problematic in light of that relationship. Bottom line: it does not look good.
My feeling is that Rabbi Weiss acted with good intentions. A rabbi who guides his students is something accepted, and rightly so. He will make sure that no mistakes are made there and that various aspects liable to be missed are taken into account, especially in light of the public pile-on that accompanied the affair. But there was no caution here regarding how it looks, and perhaps there was also a substantive problem (of judicial bias). In our era a great awareness has developed of the need for such caution, and among religious courts and rabbis it seems not to have penetrated. Apparently this is because in earlier generations of the rabbinic tradition there was no awareness of the required probity.
For example, in Jewish law positions, rabbinic and others, are inherited, whereas in our world that is out of the question. In rabbinic positions this still exists even in our day (including the Chief Rabbi of Israel, as is well known), and people do not feel the problem in it. Some see this as self-interested manipulation (nepotism), that is, disregard for proper administration because of self-serving bias. But there are cases in which I specifically see this as nothing more than innocent anachronism. Rabbis live within the rabbinic culture of previous generations and are unwilling to accept (or are unaware of) the new culture and the norms customary within it. They think to themselves: Are we more righteous than Rashba, Maimonides, or the Hatam Sofer?! It may be that this was also the case with Rabbi Weiss. What he did is accepted in the rabbinic world across the generations, and so he does not see anything wrong with it, even though to our modern eyes it looks bad.
But now I will go one step further, and argue that such a situation is not even necessarily bad.
Rules of evidence in monetary cases
At the beginning of chapter 20 of the Laws of the Sanhedrin, Maimonides writes as follows:
A court does not punish on the basis of conjecture, but only on the basis of witnesses and clear evidence. Even if the witnesses saw him chasing another person, warned him, then looked away—or they entered after him into a ruin and found the victim slain and convulsing, with the sword dripping blood in the murderer’s hand—since they did not see him at the moment he struck, the court does not execute on the basis of such testimony. About this and similar cases it is said: "Do not kill the innocent and the righteous." Likewise, if two testified about him that he worshipped idolatry—this one saw him worship the sun and warned him, and that one saw him worship the moon and warned him—they do not combine, as it is said: "Do not kill the innocent and the righteous"; since there is some basis to clear him and deem him righteous, do not put him to death.
That is, in criminal law a person's fate is decided only on the basis of two witnesses, and not on the basis of any circumstantial evidence, however compelling.
But in monetary cases, according to Maimonides, the situation is different. Thus he writes at the beginning of chapter 24 there:
A judge may decide monetary cases according to those matters toward which his mind inclines as being true, and the matter is firmly fixed in his heart as such, even though there is no clear evidence there. Needless to say, if he knows with certainty that the matter is so, he judges according to what he knows. How so? If a person became liable to take an oath in court, and someone who is trusted by the judge and on whose words he relies tells the judge that this person is suspect with regard to oaths, the judge may reverse the oath onto the other litigant, who will swear and collect, since the judge relies on this person’s words. Even if it were a woman or a slave who was trusted by him, since the matter appears strong and correct in his heart, he relies on it and judges accordingly. Needless to say, this is so if he himself knows that the person is suspect. Likewise, if a promissory note is brought before him, and someone on whom he relies—even a woman or a relative—tells him, "This note has been paid," then if he relies on that person’s words he may tell the holder, "You may collect only with an oath." Or if there is another promissory note against him, he may give payment to the one whose note has not been impaired at all, and leave aside the one whose note has been impaired by that single person’s statement; or he may cast the note aside before him and not rule on it, according to what appears proper to him. Likewise, if someone comes and claims that he had a deposit with a certain person who died without leaving instructions, and he gives clear identifying marks, and this claimant was not accustomed to entering that deceased person’s house—if the judge knows that the deceased was not of the sort to possess such an item, and he is persuaded that this item did not belong to the deceased, he removes it from the heirs and gives it to the one for whom possession of it is plausible and who provided identifying marks. So too in every similar case, where the matter is entrusted only to the judge’s heart according to what appears to him to be true justice. If so, why did the Torah require two witnesses? So that when two witnesses come before the judge, he should rule on the basis of their testimony even though he does not know whether they truly testified or falsely.
Strictly speaking, the rules of evidence in monetary cases are only a recommendation. In principle, a judge is supposed to rule according to where his mind inclines, regardless of the evidence. Only if he has no position of his own must he rule on the basis of witnesses. The rules of evidence are binding only in a situation where the judge has no position of his own.
To complete the picture, I will bring here his words in section 2 there:
All these matters are the strict law. But once courts that were not fit became numerous—and even when they were upright in their conduct, they were not sufficiently wise and discerning—the majority of the courts of Israel agreed that they should not reverse an oath except on the basis of clear evidence, nor impair a document and weaken its presumption by the testimony of a woman or of one disqualified from testimony, and likewise in all other laws. A judge should not rule on the basis of his own inclination or personal knowledge, so that no ordinary person will say, "My heart believes this one, and my mind relies on that one." Likewise, property is not taken from orphans except on the basis of clear evidence, not on the judge’s opinion or on an assessment regarding the deceased or the claimant. Even so, if a trustworthy person testified about one of these matters and the judge was inclined to think that he was telling the truth, he delays the judgment and does not dismiss the testimony, but discusses the matter with the litigants until they admit the witness’s words, or reach a compromise, or the judge withdraws from the case.
That is, in our time, because of the decline of the generations, we accepted upon ourselves not to do this. In section 3 there he brings the law of a deceptive case (withdrawing from judgment when the judge has the sense that something there is not right), which is relevant in our own time as well.
All this originates in the Rif in Ketubbot, and was also codified as Jewish law in the Shulchan Arukh (Hoshen Mishpat sec. 15, par. 5). It is worth adding that it seems to me that since the Shulchan Arukh brings only laws that applied in his time, presumably in his view the rule that gives a judge authority to rule as he sees fit, without subordination to the rules of evidence, is still relevant even nowadays, although it was ostensibly abolished. A judge today should try not to do this, but when circumstances require it, a religious court can do so. This needs to stand in the background of the discussion, even if one does not make use of it. It is not right to ignore common sense and proceed blindly after the formal rules of evidence. It seems to me that these words are directed against approaches that hold that one should simply follow Torah law, and even if a distortion is created, that is Torah law. The Holy One, blessed be He, will already correct it in His own ways, in the spirit of "Why involve yourself in the hidden decrees of the Merciful One?" ("what have you to do with the Merciful One's hidden plans?"). I think the message of the Shulchan Arukh is precisely that one must not act that way. A judge must act as though everything depends on him.
The case of Rava
The source of this rule is in the Talmud itself, in the passage in Ketubbot 85a:
There was a certain woman who became liable to take an oath in the court of Rava. She said to him, "The daughter of Rav Hisda is known to me to be suspect with regard to oaths." Rava reversed the oath onto the opposing party.
A woman became obligated to take an oath in Rava's court. Rava's wife (the daughter of Rav Hisda) entered the religious court and whispered in her husband's ear that this woman was suspect with respect to oaths and that he should not have her swear. Following what she said, Rava decided to reverse the oath—that is, to let the plaintiff swear and collect the money from her.
It must be understood that such a decision is in fact the extraction of money from the current possessor contrary to the ordinary law. Under Torah law, the oath is the defendant's right. He can swear and be exempt. Usually he is also exempt on the merits, and the oath only comes to reinforce the matter. To let the plaintiff swear and collect is essentially to transfer the power into his hands. If he is willing to swear falsely, he will win the money and succeed in extracting it from the current possessor. This is a very far from simple decision.
Just to complete the picture, I will bring another case that is cited there immediately afterward in the passage:
At times they were sitting before Rav Pappa and Rav Adda bar Mattana, and a certain promissory note was brought before him. Rav Pappa said to him, "I know about this note that it has been paid." He said to him, "Is there another person together with the master?" He said to him, "No." He said to him, "Even though the master is here, one witness is nothing." Rav Adda bar Mattana said to him, "Should Rav Pappa be no better than the daughter of Rav Hisda? The daughter of Rav Hisda—I am certain about her; is the master not certain about him?" Rav Pappa said: "Now that the master says, 'I am certain about him,' that is indeed significant. For example, Abba Mar my son, about whom I am certain—on his word I would tear up a note." Tear it up, could that enter your mind? Rather, I would weaken the force of the note on his word.
That is, Rav Pappa does not receive the same treatment as Rava's wife, because Rava did not know him well enough to rely on him. Rav Pappa, one of the greatest Amoraic sages and an accomplished judge, does not receive the same trust accorded to Rava's wife, even though as a woman she is disqualified from judging and testifying.
A debate with contemporary legal professionals
Quite a few years ago, Nahum Rakover invited me to lead a seminar for legal professionals (judges and lawyers) on Jewish law. We studied this passage together, and the listeners were shocked. Is the court really the private property of Rava and his family? How can it be that his wife enters and whispers in his ear, and he changes the ruling accordingly? This opens the door to terrible miscarriages of justice. And if Rava believes her and not Rav Pappa, then this is preference on the basis of family ties. They were not prepared to accept such an approach under any circumstances.
I suggested that they try to put themselves in Rava's shoes as he now sits in judgment. A woman defendant comes before him. Let us imagine a situation in which one witness testifies that she stole the object from the plaintiff. She is now obligated to take the oath of a single witness in order to be exempt (as noted, the oath only assists, since money is extracted only on the basis of two witnesses)[1]. Rava's wife tells him that she knows this woman and that she is a pathological liar; that is, if he lets her swear, he is probably causing the stolen object to remain in her hands while its owner goes home empty-handed. Rava now makes his own judgment: he knows his wife well, and it is clear to him that she is not lying (we perhaps do not know her, but he does). Therefore it is clear to him that if he maintains outward propriety and the proper procedures and does not take his wife's whisper into account, he is perverting justice, because in effect he is leaving money in the hands of a thief—that is, helping her rob the plaintiff. On the other hand, if he does not adhere to the procedures and reverses the oath, that is, lets the plaintiff swear and prevail, then the plaintiff enjoys a presumption of integrity, and therefore if he swears, then presumably the money really was his and was stolen from him. As noted, in the end Rava decides to listen to his wife and allow the plaintiff to prevail by means of an oath.
At that point I asked them: what would you recommend that he do? Follow the procedures and appear clean outwardly, but know that as a judge he has lent his hand to theft? Or rule according to what, to the best of his understanding, is the legal and factual truth? The people there fell silent and thought for a bit, but after some time they said that it was better not to listen to his wife, because this opens the door to corruption and manipulations, and may lead to the corruption of the judicial system as a whole.
Pledging a certain present for an uncertain future
I told them that in my view they were judging Rava anachronistically. Let us imagine a situation in which we have complete trust in our judges (as noted, there were judges in the audience). People of integrity, elevated above the ordinary, perfectly righteous, about whom we do not have even the slightest suspicion that they would do anything improper. In such a completely hypothetical situation, would you agree that Rava should heed his wife's voice and reverse the oath? At least some of them said yes. I then said to them: today we no longer think that way. We understand that judges are human beings like us, and we suspect that they may pervert justice and engage in manipulations. Therefore today it seems to us out of the question to behave as Rava did. But in a world in which we trust the judges, logic says to act the opposite way. After all, Rava did what truth and justice required; at most, his actions look problematic to us and perhaps may lead to problematic consequences in other cases in the future. Was he necessarily required to pledge the property of the victim of theft in the present for the sake of preventing uncertain problems in the future? I am not sure.
And in general, if we were to allow judges even today to behave this way, I am not sure that it would worsen the situation. Because of the concerns, and the desire to appear clean and prevent future problems, we bend ourselves to burdensome procedures that are not necessarily justified, and often arrive at miscarriages of justice. We judge not always according to justice but according to procedure, and we pay for that in the currency of truth and justice. As an example, in criminal law it is accepted that absolute evidence is required (beyond reasonable doubt. As we saw above as well in Maimonides at the beginning of chapter 20)[2]. Suppose we did not require that. It is clear that the number of miscarriages of justice would go down. When there is evidence at the 70% level against the defendant, then there is a 70% chance that he is guilty. If so, acquitting him (because there is still reasonable doubt) produces a miscarriage of justice with a 70% probability. True, in that way a future miscarriage of justice is prevented (there is a 30% chance that we would convict an innocent person), but here we are pledging a certain present for the sake of an uncertain future. It is customary today in law to say (and this too following Maimonides) that it is better to acquit a thousand guilty people than to convict one innocent person. Personally, I am not entirely sure that this is correct, but in any case one must understand that adherence to procedure carries a heavy price in terms of truth and justice. In the present case we are certainly perverting the law, out of concern lest in the future there be miscarriages of justice. This is in effect the pledging of a certain present for the sake of an uncertain future.
And yet, adherence to procedure
One can now ask what is actually correct to do in practice. Notice that Maimonides, the Rif, and the Shulchan Arukh already write that in our time this approach in Jewish law was abolished. Today a judge must adhere more closely to the rules of evidence and not follow the inclinations of his heart. That is, a judge today is not supposed to behave as Rava did. They attribute this to the decline of the generations, but I am not sure that this is really what they mean. It is quite possible that what they mean is that today we are more aware of the importance of acting according to fixed procedure, and at least the public no longer gives full trust to its judges (whether justifiably or not). Therefore today it is not correct to act that way, at least for reasons of appearance. On the other hand, we have seen that the Shulchan Arukh does indeed bring this rule, which means that he holds it to be relevant even in our day. A judge today needs to understand that he must not clearly pervert justice even if procedure requires it.
It seems to me that there is room to distinguish between different situations. If a certain case comes before us and there is a clash between truth and procedure, it may be that one must take truth into account as well and not only procedure. But it is clear that when one establishes general procedures, there is no real conflict there. For example, when one establishes a prohibition on nepotism in rabbinic appointments, this involves no conflict whatsoever. There is no sacrifice of truth here for the sake of procedure; rather, this is a procedure meant to prevent various problems and the corruption of the system, and it has no present cost. No price is paid here in terms of legal truth, and therefore this is certainly a procedure worth adopting.
Back to Rabbi Weiss
With respect to Rabbi Weiss's case, it is not simple to determine how one ought to act there. On the face of it, considerations of propriety require him to recuse himself from the case. Another religious court would act more objectively, and so there is no cost here in terms of truth and it is proper to preserve the procedure. On the other hand, perhaps he knew that the public uproar might lead to a distortion of justice (I mentioned that there were rabbis and judges who came out against Rabbi Tal), and perhaps for that reason he decided to appoint judges whom he could assist with advice in order to prevent such influences. In such a case, it may be that he wanted to gain truth even at the expense of procedure and the appearance of probity. As I said, it still looks bad, and it seems to me that it really would have been proper for him to recuse himself from the case. One must trust the judges before whom the case comes to judge it with clean hands, for they enjoy a presumption of integrity.
Only as a marginal note, I would remark that even in the ordinary legal system this appearance is not always observed. There too judges do not so quickly recuse themselves from cases in which they ostensibly have some stake,[3] and there, it seems to me, there is no justification for this. But the threshold of criticism that many of us apply to rabbis and religious judges is sometimes higher than the one we apply to the legal system.
After the publication of the column, Yair Cherki, the author of the article, sent me a detailed response and asked that it appear alongside my remarks for the sake of balance. I appended it below here as a comment, and I also replied to him in a comment here (and by email). This is the link to his remarks.
[1] Some attribute this to different understandings of the rule "Since he cannot take the oath, he must pay." ("since he cannot swear, he pays"), but this is not the place for it.
[2] Although one should know that circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker than two witnesses. It is not clear that Maimonides' distinction is based on the force of the evidence.
[3] Libskind brought quite a few examples of such cases. See, for example, here and here.
Discussion
Very nice.
So according to the Bahag, do we no longer have the Talmudic rule of “shuda de-dayyanei” today? Ruling based on intuition?
In halakhah 2
Bahag = in halakhah 3.
Shuda de-dayyanei is not a general rule; it is stated in the Gemara only for very specific cases. See Tosafot at the beginning of Bava Metzia (2a) and elsewhere. There is no general instruction there to rule on the basis of intuition.
Don’t you think there is such a thing as relations of authority? A relationship characterized by inequality and exploitation? Say, an officer with a female soldier under his command, or in our case a rabbi with a charismatic personality and a woman who is one of his followers. I think that although one cannot draw a complete comparison between the cases, there is still a certain dimension of exploitation here.
With God’s help, 9 Tammuz 5779
To R. M. A. — greetings,
I do not know where you got the idea that Rava’s wife “whispered in his ear” her testimony. From other incidents mentioned in the Gemara, it appears that she was not embarrassed to express her firm position, and one may assume that here too she testified openly. Rava too declares openly that she is as credible to him as two witnesses, something even his student Rav Pappa did not merit. Is there any greater “appearance” and transparency than that?
And the logic that a judge would rely on his wife’s testimony more than on someone else’s is that he sees his wife day after day in situations of pressure and difficult trials, where the public does not see, and in such situations a person’s fear of Heaven and reliability are truly tested. The credibility of a valid witness is a “Scriptural decree,” whereas the credibility of one whose trustworthiness has been tested “face to face” is absolute and complete certainty.
With blessing, Sh. Tz.
I heard from an important rabbinical judge who explained the virtue of the wives of Torah scholars, “for they wait for their husbands until they come back from the study hall,” that the waiting is not only in order to prepare dinner for her husband, but also to advise him in “worldly matters,” for in order to render a true judgment one needs not only knowledge of Torah but also knowledge and understanding of reality, and in this women often understand more, as the sages instructed a man to consult his wife “in household matters, and some say even in worldly matters” (Bava Metzia 59).
In paragraph 1, line 3
…something that not even his student…
The woman who was involved with Rabbi Tal is an adult.
That said, we have to take into account how charisma affects us and can make us passive in our judgment. That is a natural tendency.
As for charismatic people, a greater responsibility rests on them because they are in the stronger position that usually initiates and exploits figures who come from a place of seeking guidance and presenting themselves in vulnerability.
Therefore Tal, Alon, and the others are 85% responsible…
The definition of “kim li begavei” is unclear to me.
After all, there is never 100% certainty in any case, even regarding his wife. Near certainty exists regarding Rav Pappa too. Maybe it is the other way around — in terms of appearances, precisely with regard to his wife people will say, “of course he knows her.”
With God’s help, 9 Tammuz 5779
Were Rabbi Asher Weiss’s words — that the judges of the court are his students and act in accordance with his agreement — also said about this panel and about this hearing? Are Rabbi Michael Bleicher and Rabbi Zvi Gartner students of R. A. Weiss or his contemporaries? And would they seek his agreement on a matter from which he disqualified himself from intervening?
With blessing, Shatz Levinger
Of course there is. Who said there isn’t? I only remarked that it isn’t right to automatically cleanse the woman of responsibility.
I completely agree.
Quite right. I didn’t say otherwise.
That is what it says in the Gemara.
I understood from the recording that it was said about them. And there is no impediment whatsoever to consulting someone who has recused himself from judging.
Just a note regarding Rabbi Tal. It sounds like there was no “romantic relationship” at all. Only a “spiritual” relationship based on the idea that the right thing for them to do (for a spiritual reason) was to get married, etc. etc. But not a personal-romantic relationship.
At least that is how it seems, and enough that he has already been convicted in the public sphere; that is certainly bad enough.
The acts are clearly invalid, etc., but it doesn’t sound like an affair.
If something is green on the outside and red on the inside and has watermelon seeds, it isn’t a tomato.
1. I can understand that Rabbi Weiss intervened in the question of what Rabbi Tal’s restrictions would be and in allowing him to remain at the head of the institutions. But does anyone imagine that he huddled together with the three judges and they jointly decided to conceal pornographic pictures and further involvement with additional women whom, according to Rabbi Eliyahu, Rabbi Tal was involved with? In other words, the factual gap between what Rabbi Eliyahu claimed and what the court ruled is inconceivable, regarding the pornographic pictures and the “additional women.”
Also, can anyone say that Rabbi Tal instructed him in some matter based on divine inspiration against halakhah or common sense?
And in addition, from what Rabbi Michi notes it sounds as though only because of Rabbi Tal that woman divorced her husband, because she was waiting for him. I’m not sure that was really the situation with that couple.
I met Rabbi Michael Bleicher many years ago in the library of the “Harry Fischel Institute,” and from my impression he is much older than I am, and I am 61, so it does not seem to me that he is a “student” of Rabbi Asher Weiss, who is 66. From attempts to glean information about Rabbi Michael Bleicher, I saw that he served as Av Beit Din at the Rabbinical Court in Haifa in 5771–72, a position generally given to veteran judges. It seems to me that he came to Rabbi Asher Weiss’s court after retiring from the rabbinical court.
As for Rabbi Zvi Gartner, I found that he was a rabbinical judge in Monsey and asked Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv about compelling a divorce, a subject on which Rabbi Gartner wrote an entire book. It appears he too is a veteran judge and not a “student” of Rabbi Asher Weiss. Therefore I wondered whether Rabbi Weiss’s statement that the judges of his court are his students was indeed said about this panel.
With blessing, Shatz
Sorry for mixing topics, but since the story came up here I’ll allow myself to ask a side question: in what sense are the three important Jews who sat and decided what they decided a “court”? Where did they get that legal force from? Was there a claim here by Reuven against Shimon?
If I understand the story correctly, there were people who demanded that Rabbi Tal resign in light of the allegations against him, and he did not want to do so. Is there any claim here with halakhic “substance”? After all, they were not arguing over who owns the yeshiva buildings, lands, and properties. If I think that the grocer in my community is too irritable and should let someone else run the store, whereas he wants to continue — let us even say we went to arbitration over that — is that a Torah adjudication?
The judges “ruled” that Rabbi Tal had repented. What practical difference does that make? Even according to what was told about him, he is not disqualified from testimony as a wicked person, so repentance in the sense discussed in the chapter Zeh Borer is irrelevant here. On the other hand, there is no prohibition on a sinner being a rosh yeshiva. So what exactly was the Torah adjudication about? Which clause in the Shulchan Arukh or the Rambam served the judges as the source for their ruling? I really do not understand.
Why can’t they be a court?
After all, only recently, three “rabbis” for charity and salvations became a “court” to decree salvations for anyone who donates to a certain fund…
Have we not already learned in the Gemara: “Harlots adorn one another — all the more so Torah scholars”??
For some reason, I find it hard to look surprised. The whole purpose of this “court” is to serve as a fig leaf for their colleague in the profession, and to fulfill the Gemara’s words, “Cover him like the night.”
Indeed the treatment is meager in the extreme, compared to the things published in Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu’s letter, and especially in Yehuda Yifrach’s article, but there has to be a “cover-up by night,” to obscure it in the face of all the wicked of the land who mock the messengers of God — for who can come after the king, and there is nothing after the act of the court, and other such chatter.
In practice, this “court” finished its work quickly as frying the sea, and from what it looks like they rushed because of Yifrach’s article, lest they have to investigate further and reach different conclusions. And leaving him in place proves it.
And now we are already being informed about yet another “court” concerning that elder Berland, which decrees that one may not speak ill of him at all, and any complaint must be submitted to the court secretary (which, some claim, no one even bothers to answer at that number).
Indeed, the verse is fulfilled in us: “The priests did not say, ‘Where is the Lord?’; those who handle the Torah did not know Me, the shepherds rebelled against Me, and the prophets prophesied by Baal, and went after things that do not profit.” And many thanks to the rabbi for the ability to discuss this.
“Your rulers are rebels and companions of thieves; every one loves bribes and pursues payments. They judge not the orphan, neither does the widow’s cause come unto them. Ah sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evildoers, children who act corruptly; they have forsaken the Lord, they have spurned the Holy One of Israel, they have turned backward. And My anger shall blaze, and I will kill you with the sword, and your wives shall be widows and your children orphans.”
Good question.
First, the yeshiva and his other institutions are a public institution and not entirely private (Registrar of Non-Profits, etc.); I’m not sure the public lacks standing.
Second, I understand that the woman who was harmed appealed to them (even if it now turns out she has no trust in the court). She demands that the truth be clarified, and removing him from the headship of the yeshiva is only a resulting consequence.
Because of all this, since Rabbi Tal accepted their ruling, for better or worse, their decision that he may remain in his position carries weight.
It reminds me of a comment I received after I took part in a panel that annulled a woman’s kiddushin, according to which nullifying kiddushin does not require a court at all and a rabbi (halakhic decisor) is enough. After all, this is not expropriation but finding a defect in the kiddushin (such as an invalid witness, or the claim that she did not consent under such circumstances, etc.). That is true, and nevertheless it is accepted that there are things done in a court, and only their decision has force. This is also because there are three of them, and because of their expertise, and because when acting as a court the rules differ from those of a rabbi. A court must examine matters itself and hear both sides, because it does not merely issue a ruling to the one who comes before it but gives a decision that binds the public. If so, the same applies here. When one wants to decide a question of public significance in which other parties are harmed (and it does not concern only the person being judged himself), one seats a court.
Think of a court that expropriates kiddushin (not merely annuls them), as in the case of canceling an agent or one who betroths a woman against her will. There too there is no defined petitioner. It is a public question requiring a ruling, and presumably a lone rabbi would not suffice to determine that the kiddushin are expropriated even though by Talmudic law the kiddushin of one who does this are expropriated. This reminds me of Rashi in Bava Metzia 96 (“Who committed the sacrilege,” I think), who determines that the court that renders property ownerless by force of the Talmudic enactment is the current court, not those who enacted it in the past. Mark this well.
As I wrote, this looks quite bad, but I would not rush to form an opinion about those judges without solid information about what they did.
1. Relations of authority and charisma — has anyone ever cleared a murder suspect because of such reasoning? And what about the Germans of the Third Reich?
2. What does this have to do with a court? Is everything justiciable? Whoever wants can study with him, and whoever does not — need not. Tomorrow will they also rule whether I may or may not raise my children?
So in conclusion, which consideration prevails? That R. Asher wanted there to be a judgment that, in his view, would represent the truth in the best possible way, or your reasoning that “it seems to me that it would indeed have been proper for him to remove his hands from the case. One must trust the judges before whom the case comes to judge it with clean hands, for they have a presumption of fitness.”
Why should this reasoning obligate R. Asher? And in addition, why should I trust the judges? In practice, the very distrust represented by those who do not believe this court’s ruling means there is reason not to trust the judges — think carefully.
Beyond that, these two considerations are apparently two different qualitative categories; for an outside observer there is no way to decide between them.
From what I understood, the excessive involvement in practical mysticism by Rabbi Tal is different from that of Sheinberg and from Alon’s charisma.
It seems to me there is even room to say that one should blame the victims more in the case of people like R. Tal, who ran a place more akin to a cult and acted like a guru, and the people who came to him should in any case have known what sort of “divine inspiration” they were dealing with, more than with the others.
Rabbi Tal’s strangeness makes me more lenient in my attitude toward him.
In addition, there were no actual transgressions as with the others mentioned (as indicated in the ruling), so it seems to me that one cannot compare them.
I think that precisely because this was not necessarily a matter that needed a court, and also because there was no necessity whatsoever to go to this particular court (are there no rabbinical courts in Israel?), this raises a deep suspicion that the game was rigged from the start. Add to that the court’s decision that a rabbi to whom the holy spirit was revealed is fit to continue in his position, and you’ve got one huge farce.
I didn’t understand the question. I wrote that in my opinion it would have been proper for him to withdraw his hand. That is my reasoning, and it obligates only me.
Should read: farce. 🙂
Indeed, it turned into a farce.
So 1. you admit that it does not obligate R. Asher, and moreover 2. you admit that your claim — that there should be trust in the court — is not stronger than what was said above.
So how do you still think that another court should have been allowed to judge?
Matan, everything is written in my column. I don’t understand what you want from me. I’m admitting nothing and denying nothing.
1. Anyone familiar with the legal system and possessing a bit of integrity knows that the system does not operate according to the law, certainly in the family sphere. And this relates to the next point I’ll explain.
2. You seem to be complaining that women are absolved of responsibility, but treating women as lacking responsibility or obligation is common in law, welfare, society, the media, the courts and rabbinical courts, the police, and all the other establishment systems (and you can see the difference between men and women in the severity of sentencing, not as a result of the severity of the offense).
3. You seem alarmed by the concept of divine inspiration; does the concept of intuition frighten you as well? If you had studied the subject, you would see that divine inspiration is very closely related to the concept of intuition… unlike the mysticism in which the woman is engaged, whom society regards as lacking responsibility for her actions.
4. Rabbi Weiss did not declare this demonstratively, and therefore the example you mentioned is not similar, except perhaps for the example of Rav Pappa’s wife — and even there I wonder whether the judges know Rabbi Weiss as they know their own wives.
It seems the pseudo-puritanical approach has won, at least in our generation.
My mistake. I thought you were conceding partially?
At any rate, the court headed by Rabbi M. Bleicher did not declare Rabbi Tal “pure as snow.”
Even though regarding the allegations of additional incidents and materials on the computer the court found no support for the accusations, with respect to the first case it determined that there was an “improper relationship” and placed full responsibility on the rabbi. It required the rabbi to refrain from public leadership and from counseling in matters of family, marriage, and medicine, and gave the force of a ruling to what the rabbi had already undertaken not to advise women. The court also required Rabbi Tal publicly to renounce the “holy spirit” on which he had relied, and the court defined it as a “spirit of folly.” After the rabbi’s admission and acceptance of the severe restrictions imposed on him, the yeshiva may continue to receive from him lessons in Torah and fear of Heaven, and it goes without saying that anyone who does not want to accept him as a rabbi is under no obligation to continue studying with him.
The court’s decision received the backing of Rabbi A. Nebenzahl and Rabbi Z. N. Goldberg. No response from other rabbis to the decision has yet been published. Rabbi Tal carried out the court’s instruction and publicly stated that his reliance on the “holy spirit” was a mistake, and that one must proceed according to intellectual inquiry and explain the Torah “with internal tools” and not “external” ones. It seems that the saying was fulfilled in him: “A person does not stand firm in Torah matters unless he has stumbled in them.” When Torah is less charismatic and self-assured, and more cautious and humble — it is better and truer.
And we should apply an a fortiori argument to ourselves: “If a flame has fallen among the cedars,” all the more so it is incumbent upon us to be careful not to come into temptation…
With blessing, Shatz Levinger
It seems that there is much more here than a problem of appearances. R. Asher teaches regularly [for pay] at Torat HaChaim. And he defines Rabbi Tal as his friend. The video in which he calls on people to rally for the yeshiva came out a few weeks ago while the hearing in his court was taking place [the court is defined as his court and we are not speaking of his colleagues but of his appointees]. He himself praises Rabbi Tal and testifies about him as one who knows him.
Here is the video in question, which as noted came out about a month before the ruling:
https://youtu.be/cAuTR1pDjSQ?t=3
This is not to say anything about the fitness of the judges or about Rabbi Tal’s right or obligation [unlike many of those before him, he actually came out publicly and explicitly admitted his “mistake”…]
I discussed the matter in light of the data in the article. If there is additional relevant information, of course that too should be taken into account.
That is why I attached for you the video, which is unequivocal, and the facts (a quick YouTube search can show how many lessons Rabbi Weiss gives at Torat HaChaim). It seems to me that from the standpoint of “placing a stumbling block before the blind,” you should correct the facts in the body of the text you wrote, because although your intention was principled and conceptual, since this is a matter of life and death it is important that there be no factual distortions.
With God’s help, 8 Tammuz 5779
To Boaz — greetings,
It appears they approached Rabbi Asher Weiss because the discussion is taking place within Yeshivat Torat HaChaim on the question whether Rabbi Tal should continue serving as head of the yeshiva or not, and Rabbi Weiss, who has been connected to the yeshiva for many years, is accepted by its rabbis (Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu too agreed to the appeal to his court).
Rabbi Weiss recused himself from judging the matter because of his friendship with Rabbi Tal, and handed the discussion over to a panel headed by Rabbi Michael Bleicher, who had been Av Beit Din at the rabbinical court in Haifa, together with Rabbi Zvi Gartner, author of the book Compelling a Get, also a veteran and experienced judge, and they were joined by the younger Rabbi Ovadia Yosef Toledano.
The court rejected the claims regarding relationships with additional women and obscene material on the computer, but sharply criticized Rabbi Tal’s conduct in maintaining an “improper relationship” with a married woman and defined the “holy spirit” he imagined he had as a “spirit of folly.” But since Rabbi Tal himself admitted his error and had already previously undertaken not to advise women, the court found that he could continue teaching Torah and fear of Heaven, while forbidding him to engage in public leadership and to give advice in matters of family, marriage, and medicine, and requiring him to renounce publicly the “holy spirit” according to which he had acted — and Rabbi Tal indeed publicly admitted that he had erred in this.
The ruling was agreed to by the great sages Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl and Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg, among the leading halakhic decisors of our generation.
With blessing, Shatz Levinger
I don’t really see what factual distortions you found in my words, or why this is a matter of life and death. I wrote that I am not addressing anything beyond the recordings and the article. In any event, your clarifications are written here for the benefit of the readers.
An examination of the website of the “Darkei Torah” court under the presidency of Rabbi A. Weiss teaches that there are two levels of panels: ordinary panels for relatively simple matters, and a special panel headed by Rabbi A. Weiss that handles complex cases.
It seems almost certain that the Rabbi Tal affair was assigned to the senior panel because of its sensitivity and explosiveness, except that because of Rabbi Weiss’s decision to recuse himself, the younger judge Rabbi O. Y. Toledano was called in to fill his place and sit on the senior panel together with the veteran judges Rabbi M. Bleicher and Rabbi Z. Gartner.
With blessing, Shatzal
The difference in appearances is not limited only to procedure but also to the substantive law of the role of a rosh yeshiva after the watermelon-or-tomato issue.
The court determined by decision that Rabbi Tal had repented and therefore could continue in the role of rosh yeshiva. It should be noted that they did not obligate him to any follow-up step on this matter as they did regarding decisions made according to divine inspiration.
If we compare this to a chief of staff who was in the same kind of situation vis-à-vis his subordinate, even if she was a civilian employee of the army, and he claimed to have repented — certainly he could not have continued in the role on the claim “I have repented.”
There is certainly also a difference in the practical steps that were called for, some of them perhaps because of the perception of the man’s responsibility in such a case.
With God’s help, eve of the holy Sabbath, “How goodly are your tents, O Jacob,” 5779
Meanwhile two rabbinic responses on the subject have been published on the Srugim website. Rabbi Weiss’s son states that his father’s words were taken out of context in bad faith. And Rabbi Ratzon Arusi says that after reading the original ruling and receiving additional material, he thinks the matter should no longer be pursued. May it be His will that we merit to be among those “whose entrances are not aligned opposite one another,” and that we look upon one another with a “good eye.”
With Sabbath blessings, Shatz Levinger
The factual distortions are in your words that “rumors began that Rabbi Weiss himself has close ties with Rabbi Tal, …”
Are these “rumors” concerning someone who repeatedly calls Rabbi Tal “my friend of many years” and teaches in his yeshiva regularly and for pay?
Likewise you wrote regarding R. Weiss’s remarks in the fundraising campaign: “… there are no statements there about Rabbi Tal, …”
— but the situation is actually the exact opposite! At the very start of the recording Rabbi Weiss says, “I have known my friend Rabbi Tal for years…” and especially toward the end (after about a minute): “My blessing to the dear rosh yeshiva, that he merit for many more years, with his special talents, to magnify Torah and glorify it…” And in another video from a few years ago: “my soul’s friend, the rosh yeshiva.”
I understand the desire [interesting in itself] to engage in pilpul about the difference between our modern conception of “interested party” and the classic halakhic conception. But it seems to me that this is not the peg on which these matters should be hung, especially when this concerns matters of life and death [is separating a woman from her husband not a matter of life and death? even though of course responsibility rests on her as well]?
It seems to me that such statements are not nuances that can be expounded this way or that, and this is not merely an issue of appearances.
It is inconceivable that a person who makes declarations of this type and receives pay from the litigant himself should establish and guide “his” court [as he himself defines it].
Hello Udi.
This is really a hysterical response, if you’ll pardon me.
First, the degree of connection that disqualifies involvement by way of establishing a court is by no means unequivocal (and I am not speaking about halakhah. Where did you see that in my words? Go and see in the courts of law, for which I mentioned examples in my note at the end of the column). Therefore it is justified to speak about rumors.
Second, I said that my remarks are based on the information before me and not on familiarity with all the relevant materials.
Third, and most importantly (this is the aspect that makes your remarks hysterical), none of the “factual distortions” in my words has anything to do with matters of life and death. The woman was separated from her husband by Rabbi Tal, not because I spoke of rumors instead of saying that there is a video. A very marginal nuance, even if you were right.
And fourth, as emerged here, these are veteran and experienced judges who are very much not his students. So I doubt in my mind whether there is any disqualification here.
In the end, it does indeed look bad, and that is what I wrote. The basic point remains where it was.
Shatzal, the published ruling contains something like 3–4 pages, and I read it too. It does not say much. It is not clear what inquiries they made and how regarding the rest of the facts. The whole business looks very flimsy.
R. Michi,
with all due respect, I do not understand how your explicit statement that “rumors began that Rabbi Weiss himself has close ties with Rabbi Tal” squares with the unequivocal proofs I brought that these are not rumors of close ties but Rabbi Weiss’s own repeated self-testimony, in addition to paid work for him.
And as for the independence of the judges — it seems to me that anyone who listens carefully to what Rabbi Weiss says about his influence on the judges regarding the expected outcome of their ruling, and especially to the “music” of his words, would not have arrived at your conclusion regarding their independence.
In any case, is there not here the category of expected benefit to them if they rule in favor of the friend of the one who appointed them [and who presumably is supposed to decide whether to appoint them again], and conversely if they rule against him?
If this were a purely factual inquiry — fine. One may assume that God-fearing judges will not distort the facts. But the main part of the ruling concerns “soft” questions of what is fitting, etc. [whether he is fit to continue leading the community, etc.], and here biases have much greater significance.
There is more to add regarding the value of halakhah etc., but those are marginal, as you say.
And the main loaded point that you call “hysterical” — namely my claim about matters of life and death.
Of course what you wrote does not deal directly with matters of life and death, and that was not my accusation against you.
But the story itself does deal with matters of life and death (the destruction of a family), and therefore I argued that discussion around it requires much greater caution. If this were merely a theoretical issue, fine — but when there is a bleeding family here, every statement, even if at the margins of the “legal” issues, has the potential to harm those who deserve a more compassionate attitude [even if the woman is certainly also responsible for her misery and especially for her family’s misery].
Udi
P.S. In any case, it seems to me that in respectful interpersonal discourse the use of the term “hysterical” is inappropriate.]
Sorry, I do not agree, and I also explained why. These ties are not unequivocal even in light of the proofs you brought. Both because Rabbi Weiss himself is not part of the court and because the nature of those ties is not entirely clear. I brought examples from the judicial system.
When someone says that Rabbi Tal is his dear friend and that he has an important yeshiva in the context of a fundraising campaign, that really does not mean that they are indeed dear friends (and not necessarily that the yeshiva is important either). I won’t use the term hysterical, but the discussion is completely exaggerated in my opinion.
With God’s help, 13 Tammuz 5779
Rabbi Asher Weiss’s ties with the yeshiva and with Rabbi Tal are well known to everyone in the yeshiva and the community. That is the reason he recused himself and handed the matter over to veteran and renowned judges — Rabbi Michael Bleicher, who had been Av Beit Din at the rabbinical court in Haifa, and Rabbi Zvi Gartner, who had been a judge in Monsey and is the author of a book on “Compelling a Get” (and because Rabbi Weiss recused himself, they were joined by the younger judge Rabbi Ovadia Yosef Toledano). And their ruling was endorsed by the great sages Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl and Rabbi Zalman Nechemia Goldberg.
Rabbi Weiss’s words about judges who are his students and were ordained by him to give halakhic rulings and therefore are subordinate to him were almost certainly said in connection with hearings in the ordinary panels of Rabbi Weiss’s court, and not about the senior panel that deals with complicated cases (which ordinarily convenes under Rabbi Weiss’s own leadership, as explained on the court website, and here Rabbi Weiss was replaced by another judge).
It seems that someone handed the journalist a recording of Rabbi Weiss’s words that was not said at all about the hearing in Rabbi Tal’s case, and “a mixing of recordings they have taught here.”
With blessing, Shatz Levinger
Rabbi Zvi Gartner’s book Coercion in a Get was published in 5758 by Otzar HaPoskim. Four of his articles appear on the Din website: three on “there are no conditions in marriage,” and one from 5762 on having couples sign an undertaking for arbitration according to secular courts, in which he comments on remarks of Rabbi Z. N. Goldberg, who in his responsum calls him “my friend Rabbi Zvi Gartner.”
Rabbi Michael Bleicher’s article on magnetic writing on Shabbat was printed in Techumin 4 (5743), and at that time he served as a lecturer at the Jerusalem College of Technology (Machon Lev). Another of his articles on the laws of eruv under special conditions appeared in Techumin 7 (5746). His rulings as a judge in the regional court in Haifa appear on the Daat website between 5765 and 5772 (from 5771 he is described as Av Beit Din). A will document he drew up appears in Shurat HaDin, volume 2.
In short: these are not “students debating before their master” 🙂 but veteran and well-known judges.
With blessing, Shatz Levinger
In Yair Cherki’s article “The Rabbi of Divorces and the Holy Spirit,” it was said that the court confirmed the fact that Rabbi Tal persuaded the complainant to divorce her husband. But the ruling states that there was an “improper relationship,” while saying that a significant portion of the rumors that spread are untrue. The ruling contains no confirmation whatsoever that the rabbi persuaded the complainant to divorce.
Another distortion in the article is that it mentioned that the court permitted Rabbi Tal to continue serving as rosh yeshiva, but did not mention that the court imposed severe restrictions on Rabbi Tal: to refrain from public leadership and from counseling in matters of family, medicine, and marriage. In addition to affirming Rabbi Tal’s prior acceptance not to counsel women, the court added that he should not give any counseling at all in matters of family, marriage, and medicine, nor intervene in public leadership. And they required him publicly to renounce the “holy spirit” he imagined he had.
It seems the makers of the article relied on listeners not bothering to read the ruling and see that it is far from one-sided; and not bothering to investigate who the judges are, in which case they would discover that they are veteran and renowned judges, not “students” dependent on their teacher. Journalism at its best 🙂
In pain, Shatz Levinger
Regarding the Torah journalist Yair Cherki, it would be fitting to apply the following verse in Isaiah 7: “And it shall come to pass in that day, that the Lord shall whistle for the fly that is in the uttermost part of the rivers of Egypt.” Like a fly chasing after a wound, the little whistler enjoys licking the wounds of great Torah scholars, especially if they are from the sector that competes with his rabbi Manitou. Investigate and you will forget that among his students here in the land, and this subject deserves research in its own right.
However, Rabbi Dov Lior writes following the ruling:
“We have read the severe facts emerging from the ruling of Rabbi Weiss’s court in the matter of Rabbi Tal… sadly, in light of the facts, Rabbi Tal is not fit to teach and educate the children, youths, yeshiva students, and married students of Israel, and he cannot be an educational figure in our camp. Although the court’s ruling, puzzlingly, permitted Rabbi Tal to continue in his role, it certainly did not obligate anyone to study in his institutions and accept his conduct, which desecrates God’s name and degrades the Torah of Israel and its God.”
(The full letter was published in Srugim, 12 Tammuz 5779)
Is mortgaging a certain present for the sake of an uncertain future not precisely the sacrifice required in quite a few cases in order to carry out the categorical imperative? And it seems to me that all halakhah is built this way: things are forbidden lest one come to desecrate Shabbat (for example), and even if in the specific situation you encounter there really is no concern, you are still bound by the prohibition [because of the categorical imperative. In my humble opinion there is a direct connection between it and the logic behind a variety of halakhic rulings (I vaguely recall that you too wrote something about this, no?! Could you refer me to it?)]. And this is likewise explained in Bava Batra: “Are Moses and Aaron [unfit to testify] for their father-in-law because they are not trustworthy? Rather, it is a decree of the King that they may not testify for him.” It seems to me this is the only page in the Talmud where the term “decree of the King” appears. And it comes to teach us that a king must legislate laws for the whole community, and everyone must abide by them even if in the specific case they may not fit — so too are the decrees of halakhah. So it seems there is no choice but at times to mortgage the present for an uncertain future. (Returning to the example — after all, Shabbat desecrations that have already been done are done and cannot be changed. In your specific case, in the present you certainly will not desecrate Shabbat, and the future is uncertain. And nevertheless — you must indeed mortgage the present.)
With God’s help, 13 Tammuz 5779
The letter of Rabbis D. Lior and H. Druckman also appears in the article “Dozens of Rabbis Against Rabbi Tal: Not Fit to Teach,” on the Arutz 7 website. It also includes a video clip in which Rabbi Lior says that an educator must be an educational figure, as the sages said, “If the rabbi is like an angel of the Lord of Hosts, seek Torah from his mouth,” and after the court also determined that Rabbi Tal had maintained an “improper relationship” with a married woman, he is not an “educational figure” fit to teach and educate. He recommends that Rabbi Tal enter a “cooling-off period” of two or three years in which he disengages from the educational institutions he heads, and during this “cooling-off period” they will help him free himself from what he imagines to be “the holy spirit” and return to the way of Torah.
In summary:
Opinions among the leading halakhic authorities are divided. Rabbi A. Nebenzahl and Rabbi Z. N. Goldberg accept the ruling that allowed Rabbi Tal to return to teaching in the yeshiva, under stringent restrictions: not to advise in matters of family, marriage, and medicine, not to advise women, not to intervene in public leadership, and also to renounce publicly the holy spirit he attributed to himself. Whereas Rabbi D. Lior thinks that after such a failure, he must withdraw from education and enter a “cooling-off period” during which they will help him free himself from the holy spirit he imagined he possessed and return to “the way of Torah.”
With blessing, Shatz Levinger
Yair Cherki contacted me by email and sent a detailed response to my remarks. I am bringing it here verbatim so that readers can form their own impression. After that I will bring what I answered him.
To Rabbi Michael Abraham,
I am writing to you following your column regarding the Rabbi Tal affair, in which there is also reference to me and to the article I published regarding the conduct of the court.
Although about a week has passed since you published your remarks, and initially I thought to suffice with what I had published and not add fuel to this fire, since I received comments and questions from several directions following your remarks, I would like to respond mainly on their factual side:
First, at the opening of your remarks you contend with a claim that did not arise in the article at all. The quote from that WhatsApp message, which I do not know who formulated, according to which “Rabbi Weiss lies brazenly,” does not appear in the article, nor in any of the publications signed by me or by Channel 12 News. Therefore I do not think the article “suffers” from this, as you wrote, because we did not try to argue that at all, but only to raise questions about the conduct and conflicts of interest of the court, at least in terms of appearance.
As to the nature of the connection between Rabbi Tal and Rabbi Weiss:
In that same recording (which because of its length and the limits of the medium, as well as protection of the source, preservation of the privacy of some of those involved in the conversation and some of those mentioned in it by name, was not published in full), Rabbi Weiss himself describes the nature of the relationship between them. He taught in Rabbi Tal’s yeshiva for pay for 15 years, regularly. His lectures are prominently displayed on the website of the Torat HaChaim institutions; these are not occasional random lectures and this is not a superficial acquaintance but a deep connection. You can also see in the fundraising campaign for the institutions that Rabbi Tal approaches Rabbi Weiss as a student to his rabbi and blesses him with God’s name, “Who has shared of His wisdom with those who fear Him,” and likewise in numerous publications online. It seems to me that even a simple inquiry among members of the community in Yad Binyamin would yield no dispute about the close relationship between them, to the point that in certain respects Rabbi Weiss is a kind of mentor for Rabbi Tal.
In the fundraising video for the Torat HaChaim institutions, part of which was shown in the article, Rabbi Weiss mentions “my friend Rabbi Tal,” and blesses him, in the midst of the court’s examination of whether Rabbi Tal is fit to continue serving, “my blessing to the dear rosh yeshiva, that he merit for many more years with his blessed talents to magnify Torah and glorify it.” This is a direct reference to Rabbi Tal, contrary to what Rabbi Weiss says to the woman who approaches him.
Moreover, the insistence on publishing the video — which presumably made no significant difference to the amount of money raised — despite the pleas of the weeping woman (not everyone who cries is right, but still, at least in terms of appearance), in the midst of the court hearing of which Rabbi Weiss is president, testifies to how much the closeness between them had already distorted the line.
(As for the claim that Rabbi Weiss was recorded in bad faith: as one who heard the full conversation, difficult though it was to listen to throughout, words of truth are evident, and in her appeal she sounds as if she is turning to the rabbi in good faith and not in any attempt “to entrap him.” About the circumstances of the recording and how it reached me, I cannot elaborate because of source confidentiality, but I will note generally that in my experience with many recordings as a journalist, in our world where many people record conversations automatically, especially someone dealing with a case like this simultaneously with many parties, a recording is not some far-fetched act requiring sophistication and malicious intent.)
Regarding the question of the court’s independence and the contradiction in Rabbi Weiss’s words:
In the recording of the conversation with that woman (who, even if she bears contributory blame as you wrote — and I am not entering that issue at length because I do have information about it but not fully — certainly given the gap in status, ages, and power between them, the main weight tilts toward Rabbi Tal. The sacrifice demanded of him in the “natural death” of his wife in accordance with what was promised by “the holy spirit” is lesser compared to the active act of divorce demanded of her. The court too ruled that “upon him, and upon him alone, rests the greater weight of responsibility in this matter”), the emphasis in Rabbi Weiss’s words is that the court is “independent,” and the judges “completely independent.”
This stands in explicit contradiction to the second recording, in which Rabbi Weiss says that the judges consult with him but are “not a rubber stamp.” And in answer to the direct question whether they can rule contrary to his opinion, his sharp answer is: “No, no, that cannot be. But it can be that they persuade me, let us say, by 15 percent this way or that, and I will respect them. There is no such thing as their deciding completely against my opinion, because they know who ordained them and they are my students.”
Meaning, in the end the final verdict will not stand in contradiction to Rabbi Weiss’s position.
It seems to me that his words in the two recordings are in clear contradiction to one another.
Regarding the authenticity of the recording and its context:
As for the claim raised, as I recall, in the comments — and later echoed by you — that the recording does not refer to the panel in Rabbi Tal’s case: as the one who published the recording and heard it in full in the original, I testify that the conversation is unequivocally, unmistakably about this court (in the continuation he even refers to Rabbi Bleicher: “even though he is older than I am, for thirty years he has attended my classes… what can I do”). If you trust me, all the better. If not, unfortunately I am prevented from passing it on because of source confidentiality, but I can let you hear it privately if you wish, in a way that will satisfy you regarding its reliability and context.
In addition, I note that Rabbi Weiss’s court did not make this claim at any stage, and not by accident. They had two whole days to respond, petition against the broadcast of the report, etc., and they refrained from doing so, in my assessment because they knew the context in which the words were said.
Was the opinion of the judges, or of the court president, already fixed in advance?
In retrospect perhaps none of this is novel, for one clear reason: even before the court was established, Rabbi Weiss had already expressed his opinion (in a letter dated 26 Nisan and another letter of 1 Iyar) that “after exhaustive clarification of matters and after a long conversation with Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu in which I heard the allegations raised against Rabbi Tal, I see no grounds or reason to prevent the rosh yeshiva from continuing in his position with greater force and vigor.” Rabbi Weiss also writes that the entire establishment of the court was at Rabbi Tal’s request.
If this is the state of affairs, then indeed the difficulty stands as against those who agreed to litigate before this court (especially since there were no “plaintiffs,” and this was not an arbitration between him and the woman), but it does not remove the heartache that the court’s mind was already locked from the outset.
And perhaps this prior expression of opinion by Rabbi Weiss, even before the hearings began, explains the strange contradiction between the first part of the ruling, which states that there was an “improper relationship, flawed at its foundation… stemming from the holy spirit that guided Rabbi Tal in many matters concerning the leadership of the public and the individual… and who can guarantee us that tomorrow or the next day that spirit will not return to trouble him,” and the second, practical part, which allows Rabbi Tal to continue in his positions (as defined in the rabbis’ letter by Rabbis Druckman and Lior from today, “puzzlingly”) under vague restrictions.
Or, as the PR office hired by Rabbi Tal branded it in the notice distributed to the press: “Rabbi Shmuel Tal is acquitted and will continue to lead the Torat HaChaim institutions.” And if that is how his agent publicizes it, one can learn something about the depth of the repentance that took place there.
If these remarks have settled on your heart, perhaps it would be appropriate to publish them in the same format and distribution in which the original remarks were published, so that the readership exposed to the first remarks will also be exposed to the responses to them.
Yair Cherki
As for your remarks, they will be published on my site as a response to the column, and because you are the author of the article I will also add a reference to them at the end of the column, so that every reader can form an impression.
Let me preface with a clarification. The purpose of the column was not to clarify the case, nor even the question whether Rabbi Weiss acted properly. I had a twofold purpose: the main purpose was to show that the discourse is tainted and biased, and that people jump to unwarranted conclusions. The secondary purpose was to point to changing norms and to the fact that judges and rabbis are not always aware that norms that once seemed reasonable are no longer accepted today (and rightly so), and that this mainly concerns the difference between appearances and a substantive legal defect. Some of the responses illustrate these claims of mine, since people come to defend the woman and attack Rabbi Weiss, whereas my remarks about both arose as a possible interpretation that should be taken into account (and the failure to take it into account points to bias), not as a definite claim.
Now to your remarks.
Indeed, that was the WhatsApp heading I received, that Rabbi Weiss lied brazenly. I did not present that as your statement. On the contrary, I explicitly wrote that it did not belong to the article itself. You are right that later in the column there was one sentence from which one might perhaps understand that this is a flaw from which the article suffers. But I think you will agree that the article does indeed give rise to the impression that Rabbi Weiss lied (you also write that here), and therefore this is one of the conclusions naturally suggested by it even if not stated explicitly. I explained that in my opinion there is no unequivocal lie here (and I will return to that below). In any event, I apologize for not being precise here in distinguishing between the WhatsApp heading and the article itself.
As to the nature of the connection:
In my sins, I was not granted the holy spirit, so I do not know what is in the rest of the recording. I explicitly wrote that my remarks deal with the question of what emerges from the article and the recordings that appear in it. That and no more. Afterwards others also raised on my site additional sources about the nature of the connection between Rabbis Weiss and Tal, but they were not the subject of my discussion. By the way, as I replied to them too, despite those additional sources, in my opinion this still does not necessarily amount to completely improper conduct, but rather mainly a problem of appearances (as I explicitly wrote in the column).
The fact that Rabbi Tal blesses Rabbi Weiss with “Who has shared of His wisdom with those who fear Him” and approaches him as a student does not disqualify Rabbi Weiss from involvement in the case. On the contrary, it appears that he is sufficiently authoritative for Rabbi Tal (= a mentor, in your words), and that actually strengthens the logic of letting him handle the matter so that Rabbi Tal will accept the judgment upon himself and not see it as persecution (although the result — the ruling — is problematic, as I also wrote in the column itself). Especially when the case was handed over to others and not to Rabbi Weiss himself.
The claims about the superlatives Rabbi Weiss uses in the report have already been raised, and I have already answered them. In my opinion, what is said in the framework of a fundraising campaign is simply not a factual statement. We live among our people. When an important rabbi enlists in a campaign on behalf of a yeshiva, naturally he says good things about it and about the person heading it. That does not necessarily say what his real attitude toward these matters is. At the end of the column I included links with rather similar examples from the world of law (the Supreme Court).
Even joining the video while the examination is underway is, in my view, no more than problematic appearance. The yeshiva exists, and even if Rabbi Tal is found guilty and removed, it need not be closed. If it has needs and plans, there is no impediment to continuing to deal with them. And of course there is no impediment to wishing those involved, so long as their case has not been decided, that they emerge vindicated and continue teaching Torah.
True, this is contrary to what Rabbi Tal told the woman, that there was no personal reference to Rabbi Tal in his words, but his words were said in the framework of trying to calm a distressed woman, and his intention can certainly have been that he was enlisting for the campaign and not for Rabbi Tal as I have just described. I wrote about this in my column: in such a framework (calming agitation) a person can “change” things a bit, and many do so. Again, one can perhaps speak of problematic appearance, but I would not make it into a lie. The same applies to his words to the woman that the court is independent. This is what one naturally answers a distressed woman (meaning to tell her that the court is not tainted and that you will not act to skew it). Again, at most appearance.
You wrote that the hearing is taking place in a court of which Rabbi Weiss is president. Indeed, on the informal plane. But he does not sit on the panel. Again, this is mainly appearance. A Supreme Court justice (or the President of the Supreme Court) who removes himself from a hearing because of personal involvement is not thereby prevented from continuing to deal with subjects with which he was involved beforehand, nor are the judges prevented from dealing with the case.
Regarding the recording, you have an advantage over me because you heard it all and know its sources. I wrote about interpretive possibilities that arise from hearing the excerpts presented there (for my part, I am far from convinced that it is so clear there is no manipulation here by a betrayed woman). I also do not know whether you have evidence for your interpretation beyond tone (which may indicate emotional turmoil and a sense of betrayal, not necessarily deep inner truth). Entire novels have been written on the theme that “Satan did not create the revenge of a betrayed lover.” But as stated, I cannot address information that was not before me.
Regarding responsibility, I said she has contributory blame. I did not say it equals that of Rabbi Tal or differs from it. I only said that from the totality of things I do not see clear evidence for the interpretation that everyone automatically adopts (including you) — that the woman is an innocent victim led astray and Rabbi Tal is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. In my view, an interpretation no less reasonable is that this is an affair, which sometimes disguises itself in various forms (what couple does not find excuses for the affairs it conducts?). Therefore viewing the woman as an innocent lamb, which for some reason is adopted by all sides in this discussion, seems dubious to me, or at least unsupported. I am rather tired of presenting women as ultimate victims in acts for which they too bear blame (at least on the face of it). Especially in light of her rapid disillusionment after Rabbi Tal’s wife survived the death that had supposedly awaited her. If she is such an innocent believer, how is it that now she suddenly knows it was all a lie and goes out on a crusade? (By the way, I am not at all sure of that. It may be that Rabbi Tal himself believed in his “holy spirit,” especially if it was mixed with an affair. I have no idea.) Could it not be that the holy spirit erred, or that Rabbi Tal erred? Why divorce before the whole story unfolds? Does that not mean that the affair simply broke up her relationship with her husband (she fell in love with Rabbi Tal)? They say that she herself is involved in energy healing and other postmodern foolishness. Has it never happened to her that the energies disappointed and the patient did not survive? I find that hard to believe. Therefore I raised the possibility that she too may not be quite so innocent in this matter.
Rabbi Weiss’s remarks about the judges (that they will not deviate from his views because they are his students and he appointed them) do indeed sound problematic. But from information brought in the talkbacks on the site, it emerges that it is hard to view these veteran and experienced judges as his students subject to him. Nor are they dependent on him, since their status is clear and well known (perhaps with the exception of Rabbi Yosef). Maybe there is some arrogance here, or something else. And even if, as you now write, one of them attends Rabbi Weiss’s classes. That still does not make him a student subordinate to his rabbi.
Parenthetically, I will comment on other things brought up in the discussion after my column, which Rabbi Weiss allegedly said. It was brought in his name that if anyone in this generation should have the holy spirit, it is he himself (Rabbi Weiss), and if he himself does not have the holy spirit then apparently no one does. This was brought as evidence of his arrogance. Perhaps that is true (see previous point). But on second thought, here too there is not necessarily arrogance. It is an argument meant to show that there is no holy spirit in this generation, and that one should not assume every famous Torah lecturer has the holy spirit. I did not come to discuss that issue, but this does show the biases present in the discussion.
The recordings:
Your words are credible to me, certainly in light of the additional information you have. Therefore I only noted the doubts that arise from hearing the recording. The judges are not young students subordinate to him, and it is unlikely that they depend on him and his positions in such a way. Until I hear the rest of the recording it is hard for me to comment, but there is always the possibility that it can be interpreted differently. In any event, for purposes of the discussion, I certainly accept the information that you say is in your possession. I wrote nothing to the contrary.
Was the judges’ opinion already fixed:
Indeed, what you brought here shows that Rabbi Weiss’s opinion was formed. But that is information that was not brought in the article, which was the subject of my discussion. Beyond that, I remind you again that Rabbi Weiss himself does not sit on the panel. We are speaking of veteran and experienced judges who have a presumption in their favor that they will form a position in light of the arguments and facts presented before them. Even Rabbi Weiss says in the recording that they can persuade him that he is mistaken (the percentages come later as a clarification; see my remarks about them above).
I draw your attention to the Talmudic case I brought in the last part of the column, in which Rava, the head of the court, had a position from his own personal sources (his wife) and decided the case on that basis. By analogy, Rabbi Weiss could take the inquiries he had already made and sit in judgment himself. The fact that he knows the truth does not disqualify him; if anything, the opposite. Note that this very issue was the main subject of my column. The subject was not the case itself but the question of appearance and the application of ancient norms to our own times. Therefore the discussion is not whether Rabbi Weiss acted correctly, but mainly whether such problematic norms ought to appear among us today even though in the past there apparently was indeed no disqualification in them. I remind you that my conclusion was no, so there is no need to persuade me of this. On the contrary, the purpose of the column was to show that although there is no clear halakhic-legal disqualification here, these are norms that are not fitting, at least in our day. On the other hand, as I wrote there, the dogmatism common among us regarding these norms is itself not free of problems (as I explained, there is a demand there that a judge not rule according to the truth merely because of appearances and formal procedures). Therefore what you call “closed-mindedness” can be interpreted as an advantage. Do you think that a judge who witnessed a murder must necessarily disqualify himself from sitting in judgment? After all, he knows the truth firsthand! Again, there is a dilemma here and the answer is not so simple, and that is exactly what I explained in my column.
By the way, I myself noted that the ruling is very puzzling and problematic in my eyes. I even explained that this itself raises questions regarding bias in the judgment. My discussion was whether the factual data presented in the article necessarily imply such bias — and I must say that even now I hold to my view that they do not. Appearance — yes; bias — not necessarily. On the contrary, the discussion points to no small biases on the part of the participants in the public discourse around the case. I think I have demonstrated that again here.
All the best
https://www.makorrishon.co.il/news/yoman/153709/
Here there is a longer transcript of R. Asher Weiss’s words.
He lays out his considerations here in more detail, and in my opinion it is very interesting.
With God’s help, 13 Tammuz 5779
To Yair — greetings,
I am glad to see that you are making a bit of progress. After your article did not mention at all that the court imposed restrictions on Rabbi Tal, you now “admit part of the claim” and speak of “vague restrictions.”
As a reminder: the court not only ruled that Rabbi Tal “maintained an improper relationship with a married woman” and defined his holy spirit as a “spirit of folly” — it also forbade him to be involved in public leadership and to advise in matters of marriage, family, and medicine, even for men (and for women he may not advise on any matter), and permitted him only to teach Torah and fear of Heaven to those interested in learning from him. They also required him publicly to renounce the holy spirit he imagined he possessed (a requirement fulfilled by Rabbi Tal).
There was no trace of any of these facts in the article, just as there was no trace in the article of the fact that Rabbi Bleicher and Rabbi Gartner are veteran and renowned judges, not students whom Rabbi Weiss ordained and who are therefore subordinate to him. You knew, after all, that Rabbi Bleicher is older than Rabbi Weiss, and further inquiry would have revealed that Rabbi Gartner published his foundational book on Compelling a Get at the same period when Rabbi Weiss was only beginning his path as head of a kollel for rabbinical judges.
At any rate, it is still not too late. If you wish to assume the role of an “appellate court” over the rulings of expert judges — you are still young. Sit, like your father may he live, twenty years in the beit midrash. Study diligently the Talmuds and their commentators, the decisors and those who explicate them, and then you can express an opinion in the dispute between Rabbi A. Nebenzahl and Rabbi Z. N. Goldberg, who accepted the ruling, and Rabbi D. Lior, who was puzzled by it and thought Rabbi Tal needed a “cooling-off period” before he would be fit to teach. With the experience you have developed in investigations — you will certainly be considered one of the great judges.
With blessings for success, Shatz Levinger
And I hereby thank you, for thanks to the inquiry you forced me to make regarding the judges, I became aware of Rabbi Gartner’s monumental book Compelling a Get, which, God willing and without making a vow, I will try to acquire for the library of Yad HaRav Nissim.
In the line before the last:
thanks to the inquiry you caused me to undertake…
With God’s help, 14 Tammuz 5779
On the practical level, expelling Rabbi Tal and separating him from the yeshiva would only intensify the potential danger in his path. For if he is removed from the yeshiva, he could find himself a corner in some remote community, and from there manage his students and followers without any supervision.
It would have been wiser to leave him within the framework of the yeshiva, at whose head Rabbi Ariel Fargun has already been placed (more a “friend” than a student), and to use the anxiety of Rabbi Tal and his students lest they be separated, to ensure effective enforcement of the limiting conditions imposed on him by the court — conditions that block any possibility of further entanglement.
The restrictions imposed on him — to deal only in teaching Torah and not in any practical counseling — make superfluous his need for the “holy spirit,” a need that arose in him following the helplessness during the expulsion from Gush Katif (a fact testified to by the sage Rabbi Meir Mazuz, who recounted in one of his lectures that after the expulsion Rabbi Tal approached him and asked him to guide him how to attain the holy spirit, and he tried to dissuade him by saying: “What will that give you?”)
When a Torah scholar focuses only on theoretical analysis in Torah without the need to guide people in coping with life’s problems, he has no need either for “the holy spirit” or for the insights of various alternative therapists and communicators…. Let Rabbi Tal return to his youth in the yeshiva, where we saw him diligently studying Torah without any “matters,” renewing insights and writing books that will “pour a dew of life” on their learners, and the saying of the wise man will be fulfilled in him: “Let the work [the toil of Torah] be heavy upon the men… and let them not pay heed to false words.” And the toil of Torah joined with humility and proper conduct has the power to heal and repair, and in him may be fulfilled: “And she shall respond there as in the days of her youth.”
In pain and in hope, Shatz Levinger
Besides this, the bond between a rabbi and his students is a matter of life for both, as the sages taught that “if the rabbi is exiled, his students are exiled with him,” because even regarding an inadvertent manslayer who flees to a city of refuge it is said, “and he shall live there,” and without the students his life is no life.
2. Ezekiel 14 —
“And if the prophet is deceived and speaks a word, I the Lord have deceived that prophet; and I will stretch out My hand upon him, and will destroy him from among My people Israel.”
From one matter to another on the same matter. I would be glad for a response from one of the readers, and for references on the subject.
With the publication of the Rabbi Tal affair, the mass of rabbis who have sinned over the last half-century keeps growing, and these are the well-known names (at least): 1. the Milkman? 2. Carlebach (+ David the best one), 3. Yinon Yonah, 4. Deutsch, 5. Maklev, 6. Tal, 7. Alon, 8. Berland, 9. Sheinberg, 10. Mintzberg.
An attempt to understand the Torah-related cause of their downfall may be aided by a process of elimination — that is, to say that a rabbi sinned because in his Torah there was factor x (resentment in his heart / ulterior motives, etc.). But the diversity of the rabbis above prevents the ability to pinpoint a certain characteristic, because among them there are also: mystics (the Milkman, Sheinberg, Tal, Berland), “fallers” (Alon), frauds (Deutsch, Maklev, Yinon), or Haredim (Maklev, Yinon, Mintzberg), Hasidic figures (Berland), Hardalim (Alon, Tal, Sheinberg), liberals (Carlebach).
There are several questions these affairs raise:
A. Does Torah have the power to improve character traits? If it is not effective in something as basic as that — something that systems of ethics and self-improvement, as well as Eastern teachings, pride themselves on — if it does not improve a person, then what is its greatness and power? Must we abandon sayings like “he merits many things,” “it protects and saves,” “the light within it returns them to the good”? Further questions: what is the meaning of “his inclination is greater than his”? Does the inclination become more refined, in ways beyond our concepts, and the point of free choice shifts (so that the greater a person is, the more objectively corrected he is), or on the contrary, do the drives simply darken and intensify (as in the example of Abaye in the Gemara, who would not even be alone with animals and watched an innocent couple on the road)? If so, why do we need any of this? And is it not pathological? Perhaps Torah intensifies only the sexual urge (because of abstinence from it), or also anger and the urges to pride and murder in Torah scholars? What is the difference?
Another question: what is the meaning of “there is no guardian against sexual impropriety”? Is it literal — that one does not appoint as guardian over orphans someone liable to sexual impropriety with them — or is the statement defining the sexual realm as something that can never truly be controlled, such that a person can never rely on himself, even if he is a great rabbi in his own right? And furthermore, how are we to know in advance how to distinguish between a rabbi who is “like an angel of the Lord of Hosts” and one who is not? More generally, why should we trust the sages and the great figures of Israel in the past, when there was no way to expose their sins as there is today? Is there any reason to assume that divine providence would not allow a sinful rabbi to enter the pantheon? If not, is there no way to find somewhat pathological hints in teachings of the past and assume that behind them stood a diseased personality? (As Rabbi Levinstein said that his teacher the Brisker Rav had nerves, and therefore insisted on hearing countless shofar blasts during the day)… Could it be that many of the great ones of Israel were frauds and their sins simply never became public? And finally, can one use elimination to identify the cause of the sin? A Kabbalistic rabbi specifically / mystic / a position of power / a peripheral rabbi / one of ours or not of ours — a Zionist rabbi or a Hasidic or Lithuanian or Sephardi rabbi? Something??
…This also touches on deep questions of why one should study Torah at all and what the correlation is between it and the improvement of character.
With God’s help, 14 Tammuz 5779
To Gil — greetings,
And thus writes Rabbi Yuval Cherlow:
“Are Torah students and those engaged in Torah protected from falling? Absolutely not. But somewhat more.
Somewhat more, because part of the culture of life of Torah students is the refinement of character and the adjustment of one’s actions; because Torah guides a person in choosing the good and rejecting evil; because the realization of the yearning for holiness and closeness to God requires clean hands and a pure heart; because the barriers the Torah places before deterioration stand far from the deep abyss; because the light of Torah shines in the soul; and so on.
But not [absolutely] — because a framework never guarantees anything, it only enables; because Torah can become a deadly poison and is not always an elixir of life; because arrogance causes a person to stumble both in relation to other people (‘How ugly’) and in relation to Torah (‘I will have many wives and will not turn aside’); because Torah can actually intensify a person’s flaws; and so on.
So can one no longer trust? One can — but cautiously. One can — because the overwhelming majority of Torah students are blessed by it. But cautiously — because one must always keep one’s eyes open, and if something looks off, and smells off, and sounds off — it is off. A thousand justifications do not stand up to the simple test of being careful not to become a scoundrel with the Torah’s permission.”
(“The Rabbi Tal Affair: Despite Everything, Torah Students Are More Protected Against Falling,” on the Srugim website)
With blessing, Shatz
Gil, the relation between Torah study and the refinement of character is a big question.
It is said at the beginning of Tractate Avot: Moses received the Torah from Sinai — that is, from the trait of humility, which is the foundation of all good traits.
Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: If there is no Torah, there is no proper conduct [good character traits]; if there is no proper conduct, there is no Torah. The Rambam explained: each of the two helps bring about the existence of the other and completes its counterpart.
Rabbi Yose says: Let your fellow’s property be as dear to you as your own; prepare yourself to study Torah, for it is not your inheritance; and let all your deeds be for the sake of Heaven. “Let your fellow’s property be as dear to you as your own” — the Meiri explains that this is the trait that indicates a good heart. “Prepare yourself to study Torah, for it is not your inheritance” — that there is no Torah without toil in Torah study. When the character traits are good and Torah study is for its own sake, then indeed all deeds will be for the sake of Heaven.
Rabbi Meir Mazuz’s remarks are quoted in the article “Rabbi Mazuz Reveals the Request Rabbi Tal Made of Him,” on the Srugim website. Rabbi Mazuz’s stance on the ruling is quoted in the article “Following the Rabbis’ Attack: Haredi Rabbis Support Rabbi Tal,” on the same site.
With blessing, Shatz
http://din.org.il/2019/07/10/233156/
There is a lot of information here from the court regarding the recording of Rabbi Weiss.
Hello Rabbi Michael Abraham!
A question regarding the first point you raised (although it is not the main point of the post):
What is the status of the “Sheinberg victims”? Ostensibly they should be forbidden to their husbands by the rule of “just as she is forbidden to the husband…”? Quite some time ago I saw in Techumin the leniencies, and there (I do not remember who wrote the article) he wanted to argue that they have the status of coerced women, but this reasoning is very difficult, because they are adult and sane women, and presumably they know the severity of the prohibition (and even if not, one could discuss it in light of the Maharit’s innovation, but that would take us too far afield). Now that I saw you refer to it in half a word, it stirred me to think again about the issue, and I would be glad for the rabbi’s response. (Also, is there a distinction between wives of priests and ordinary Israelites?)
Thank you very much!
P. Rotenstein.
Of course one must distinguish between wives of priests and ordinary Israelites, for the wife of a priest becomes forbidden to her husband even through coercion.
Rabbi Daichovsky has an article explaining why they do not become forbidden. Although on the face of it, in my opinion they are forbidden to their husbands, especially in light of the distinction of the Maharik (brought also in the Shulchan Arukh, not the Maharit) between an error about the facts and an error about the law. As I recall, Rabbi Daichovsky wanted to argue that here this is an error about the facts and not only about the law. But I do not remember his reasons (other than that I did not agree).
With God’s help, 20 Tammuz 5779
I am no expert in these laws, but it seems to me that in principle a woman is not believed to forbid herself to her husband, and here there are no witnesses that she was forbidden. And even if you were to say that the husband believes his wife, according to what was described in the article in Besheva, the “therapist” threatened the “patient” that if she did not obey the “treatment instructions” her life would be in danger — and if so, the “patient” obeyed him out of fear and threat to her life.
In any event, I do not understand why we should poke around in this miserable affair and rub salt into the wounds of these unfortunate women by raising conjectures to forbid them. The matter has been discussed from all sides by qualified judges who know the subject in all its details and minutiae. Why should we seek stringencies in a matter that does not concern us and about which we were not even asked?
With blessing,, Shatz
Rabbi Michael Abraham,
Someone passed along to me for reading a post you published on the matter at hand.
Since the affair of Rabbi Weiss’s court touched my heart deeply, and for days I have been in severe shock because of it, I saw it as my duty to share with you a few comments I have on your post.
1. It seems to me that in your article you ignore several points that could affect the mode of analysis and the conclusions. In this response I ask to emphasize them.
The woman’s responsibility
2. Let us remember the basic facts: Shmuel Tal, also called “the rabbi,” presented himself as one of the righteous pillars of the world, an expert in marital counseling. A miserable woman who had problems came to him in good faith in order to receive advice and guidance. The basic disposition is one of therapist-patient relations. Such relations create a priori inequality. Such relations impose strict ethical rules on Shmuel Tal, rules that do not apply to the woman. Therefore any attempt to create an equivalence between them is mistaken.
According to what has been published, that lady did not try to harm Shmuel Tal’s family unit. She did not seek to persuade him to divorce his wife, nor did she ask him to maintain a framework of double life. Shmuel Tal was the one who presented himself as a potential widower. He was the one who said that on a specified date his wife was going to pass away (and this was a secret from Heaven and not wishful thinking, as though there had been divine revelation on the matter), and on that basis he convinced her into what he convinced her. In other words, he did harm her family unit, and he did what she did not do.
Also in terms of the personalities of the parties: he is a man of status, power, and influence, with a charisma that deceives her, while she is a broken and exhausted simpleton who believes what comes out of his mouth.
The break is not that he did not keep his word, but that it turned out that his word was false and that he mocked her!
Therefore, the attempt to cast suspicion on her is like trying to cast suspicion on a rape victim.
I do not presume to say that her part in the affair would leave her on the list of Jerusalem’s pure-minded. But in overall judgment and relative judgment there is no room to assign blame to her, and her part shrinks to infinitesimal values relative to his.
The fundraising campaign for the institutions
3. The claim that there is supposedly no personal reference to Shmuel Tal in Rabbi Weiss’s support film is incorrect.
Let us remember what the subject of the arbitration was and what relief was requested. The claim was that Shmuel Tal is unfit to serve as a rabbi, unfit to teach Torah, and should be removed from all his positions.
And behold, in the midst of the arbitration, suddenly a video is published in which Rabbi Weiss stands and describes Shmuel Tal warmly as his dear friend and companion, and wishes him — and this is the heart of the matter — that he continue for many years to teach Torah.
This is like Reuven suing Shimon before an arbitrator for trademark infringement, in arbitration where an injunction is sought to forbid Shimon from continuing to use the trademarks. Then the arbitrator appears in a support or image video for Shimon’s corporation, and in it wishes Shimon many more years of continuing to use the trademarks…
Therefore, factually, Rabbi Weiss’s very participation in the campaign, given that he was connected to the arbitration taking place in his court, and especially the things he said — constitute an unequivocal expression of position relating personally to Shmuel Tal and to the fate of the arbitration.
The recording of the conversation with Rabbi Weiss
4. That poor, broken woman, forced to place her trust in Rabbi Weiss’s arbitration (because Shmuel Tal would not agree to another arbitrator!), suddenly sees this campaign video. Any sensible person understands that she found herself in a terrible, Kafkaesque reality. I guess and assume that she rushed to Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu to consult him what to do, and that he or someone close to him advised her to speak about it directly with Rabbi Weiss but to record the conversation.
That is what I as her lawyer would also have advised her.
This was a situation in which she had to protect herself and cooperated with a professional and correct idea, and no blame should be assigned to her in this matter!
Her appeal to Rabbi Weiss was made in proper language, correctly, and while presenting the acute problem that had been created.
The false answer of Rabbi Weiss
5. Rabbi Weiss gave two answers: the first — that he had stood by the institutions and had not expressed any position personally regarding Shmuel Tal. We have already seen that this was an incorrect answer.
The second — that he is not the arbitrator and only appointed the panel. Here he added substantive things to which your article did not refer. He emphasized that this is a completely independent panel. This is the grossest lie in the affair and the most serious one.
In your article you tried to give this conversation the character of a consoling conversation in which one tries to comfort another and for that purpose allows himself to alter things out of a desire to comfort. That would have been correct if she had called to cry that her son was very ill and he had invented a story that he knows the illness and many recover from it. But in the present case she did not come to tell him troubles unrelated to him; she came to complain about him and his actions. Here he should have given a true answer.
When one compares this recording, in which he speaks of a completely independent panel, with the other recording according to which the panel is doing his bidding, there is here a blunt and severe lie head-on.
I know very well Rabbi Weiss’s many talents (and precisely because of that I am disappointed in him to the depths of my soul). Had he had a true answer that could reconcile the recordings, he would already have made sure that answer was publicized. Instead, his son issued a stammering and pathetic letter that gives no answer whatsoever but claims the remarks were taken out of context, without any detail as to what the context was and what was taken out of context. It was a frighteningly empty statement. In this letter the son again described his father as a giant of the world known for his great humility (and to that humility I shall return), and therefore wanted the public to deal with the recordings by upholding his father’s presumption of fitness while ignoring the fact that a grave defect has arisen in that presumption.
From the absence of any substantive answer to the unequivocal recordings, I conclude there is no answer and see this as an admission against interest.
On the holy spirit and the ruling
6. How did the judges know that Shmuel Tal had no holy spirit?
This Sabbath Yifrach published in Makor Rishon another excerpt from a recording with Rabbi Weiss, in which Rabbi Weiss explains the proof that Shmuel Tal did not have the holy spirit. Rabbi Weiss explains that if there is anyone in this generation worthy of the holy spirit, it is only he (Rabbi Asher Weiss). And he explains: he says of himself that he has learned the most Torah and also taught the most, and therefore if anyone were worthy of the holy spirit, it would be only he. And now by way of elimination, Rabbi Weiss explains, if I myself do not have the holy spirit then no one in this generation has the holy spirit, including Shmuel Tal (see the son’s publication about his father’s great humility).
7. From published material it emerged that Shmuel Tal did not immediately hand over his computer to the panel for examination of its contents, but did so after a delay. In a secular court, that fact in itself has evidentiary value strengthening the claim regarding the computer’s contents. The ruling ignored this fact and gave it no weight.
8. No one disputes that for years Shmuel Tal claimed to possess the holy spirit and to conduct himself according to the holy spirit. I went through the Rambam’s laws of repentance again and did not find laws of repentance for using the holy spirit. If Shmuel Tal indeed possessed the holy spirit, then what is wrong with that (except perhaps the need for intensive care for a holy spirit that missed the date of his wife’s death)? And if he did not have the holy spirit, then one of two things follows: either he lied and deceived all his flock, including the miserable woman (which is where reason tends), or he needs hospitalization (and that too cannot be ruled out). In either case, the ruling given does not hold water, and making do with a demand that he say he was wrong is nothing but a cover-up.
9. The end result is that one who reads the facts adopted by the court cannot understand the operative outcome of the ruling. If Rabbi Weiss’s son spoke of things being taken out of context, then this entire ruling is taking things out of context.
10. The totality of the facts and the operative outcome of the ruling (of which at least 85% is Rabbi Weiss’s) cannot leave Rabbi Weiss where you place him in your judgment (to my great sorrow!).
I have no information beyond what has been published in the media, and I do not presume to claim facts; everything is based on my analysis of what was published as I understand it.
If I have gone on at length, I can only use your quote from another article… “for lack of time.”
With blessing and esteem,
Hello D.,
I do not agree with most of what you say.
The woman’s guilt.
I did not compare the woman’s share to Rabbi Tal’s. I said she is far from clean and blameless. An adult is not supposed to go captive after possessors of the holy spirit. This is not a question of ethics rules but of common sense. Nor did I argue that Rabbi Tal is blameless because of this, but that she is not blameless. To me it looks like an affair between two people, and when it failed she took revenge. With all due respect, if it became clear to her that she divorced and the holy spirit had erred or misled him, why is she now coming out against him? What can one do?! He missed. Therefore it seems more plausible to me that this is a disappointed love affair.
Even if she did not ask him to divorce his wife (and I do not know this), that is probably because she thought she would die on her own and there would be no need for it.
By the way, I am indeed willing to cast suspicion even on rape victims in cases where they bear contributory blame. I refuse to surrender to political correctness. And here too I should clarify that contributory blame does not mean that the rapist is not guilty, but that sometimes the woman (and the society in which she lives) has some contribution to what happened. And it is my impression that this is the case in quite a few instances.
To say that she is not among Jerusalem’s pure-minded sounds to me like one of the biggest understatements I have heard lately.
Rabbi Weiss.
The fundraising campaign — after all, we live among our people. When a person participates in a fundraising campaign, he naturally says that the rosh yeshiva is his dear friend and that the yeshiva is the best in the world. Does that necessarily indicate closeness of mind? Absolutely not. Certainly you cannot infer from this a closeness that disqualifies Rabbi Weiss from dealing with the matter. Beyond that, he really did not deal with it but appointed another court to deal with it. If you read Shatzal’s responses on my site, you can see that these were veteran and experienced judges, elderly and learned men who were definitely not his students, and therefore Shatzal quite rightly wrote that it is rather hard to believe that the recording in question (which is the main determinant) refers to them. It may refer to judges in his ordinary court. I was not convinced that this recording was not taken out of context.
The ruling.
As for the ruling, I already wrote that it seems problematic to me, although in order to determine that one also needs to hear the judges themselves. By the way, from what I have seen, Rabbi Eliyahu does not attack it and does not claim that he has information they did not examine. On the contrary, from the tone of his statements it sounds as though he is somewhat walking things back. But that is only my impression.
As for the woman’s blame, my remarks stand. I do not know where you derive your information about relations of authority. Aside from the fact that I agree that Rabbi Tal here was guilty of exploiting authority relations, and I have nothing whatsoever to say in his favor. Sorry, but I do not buy this innocence. Unless that woman is mentally impaired, and I have not heard anyone claim that.
How does she know now that it was all lies? Could there not have been a mistake? Is it not possible that Heaven pardoned Rabbi Tal’s wife and left her alive? Suddenly the whole truth has become clear to her? Sorry, but that sounds very suspicious.
By the way, I am also not convinced that Rabbi Tal is a liar. It is entirely possible that he himself believed in this “holy spirit.” I do not know on what basis this accusation of yours rests either.
I really do not take this with equanimity. I do not know where you get that from. I did not have a good word to say about Rabbi Tal. I certainly did have bad words about her. To claim that she is insane requires evidence. The reasonable person, in my eyes, has the presumption of being sane. That answers your question why I assume there was an affair and that she entered into the relationship on that basis. A sane woman does not believe such nonsense. Beyond that, even if in her opinion Rabbi Tal’s wife was about to die, why did she divorce her own husband? Is that not an affair? Did she do it for the sake of Heaven (to repair the eternal within splendor)? Such folly requires evidence.
In my remarks to you I did not raise any speculation about her intentions. What I said is that you claim she did not incite Rabbi Tal to divorce and put words in my mouth as if I accuse her of inciting him to divorce and then being disappointed. I did not write that. What I wrote is that she expected to marry him and was disappointed. To your claim I replied that the claim that she did not incite him to divorce (as evidence against me) is absurd, because according to her own position she had no need to incite him, since she thought his wife would die anyway. That is what she herself claimed, so where did you see my speculations here? My words here were not an accusation against her but a refutation of your own proof.
As for him (Shmuel Tal), it was determined in the ruling that he can continue in sacred work and be rosh yeshiva and stand at the head of his institutions — while about her we are debating whether the expression that she is not among the pure-minded is too weak…
I completely agree. Nor did I write otherwise.
Rabbi Weiss.
What I wrote in the column was in light of the article, and I wrote that this is what emerges from the article. It was a criticism of the article, not a defense of Rabbi Weiss. If there are additional facts that he received a salary and had a special friendship with him, that can certainly change the picture a bit (though not entirely). The question whether to participate in the campaign or not is a question of taste, and not what I was dealing with here. I was dealing with the question whether Rabbi Weiss suffered from a conflict of interest (in my opinion yes) and to what degree (in my opinion not dramatic).
I did not ignore your remarks, and I too heard the recording and addressed it. In my remarks to you (not in the column) I presented several doubts regarding the content of the recording in light of the data from Shatzal. With all due respect, these are certainly not his students or his obedient instruments. The recording sounds very problematic to me, and if it concerns this court it is hard to accept it (perhaps this is just more boasting by Rabbi Weiss).
There is a difference between the woman and Rabbi Weiss, though in my opinion I did not treat them unequally. She took part in a very problematic act, and that is clear and agreed upon, and by that she lost, in my eyes, the presumption of innocence. He is now accused of certain acts or others, and he has a presumption of innocence. Though, as stated, I did not come to defend him but mainly to criticize the discussion.
I did not study under Rabbi Weiss and have no interest in defending him. I wrote that he conducted himself problematically. What I tried to show is that the discussion on the subject is not being conducted properly, and in my opinion that is indeed the case.
To Rabbi Michael Abraham,
In the article in Makor Rishon she herself admits that she loved him, so it is clear that this is disappointed love.
I want to add that logic says her husband too is gripped by a desire for revenge against Rabbi Tal, whom his wife loved, and that is why it turned into a whole mess of a revenge campaign.
That adult woman is supposed to be responsible for her actions, married, supposed to be faithful to her husband.
She had many, many problems in that marriage and came to consult Rabbi Tal of her own free will.
Many other people also told her to divorce, and in the end it was her decision because of an unhappy married life.
The matter is not being handled properly. Rabbi Tal stumbled, admitted it, and repented.
The lady divorced of her own free will, made herself, her husband, and her children miserable, and now sees fit to embark on a public, media-covered revenge campaign. Sad.
Who is beh"b?