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Did We Invent Everything? (Column 250)

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

With God's help

On the Sabbath a few weeks ago, we studied in class a passage from Ein Aya by Rabbi Kook that stirred in me melancholy thoughts about a failure in the analysis of the history of culture and ideas, and about a common demagoguery in our circles. Here I want to focus on the failure and the demagoguery.

Reproof and flogging

This is a passage from the Talmud, Berakhot 7a:

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Yosi: A single rebuke in a person's heart is better than several lashes, as it is said, "And she shall pursue her lovers… and say: I will go and return to my first husband, for then it was better for me than now." And Reish Lakish said: Better than a hundred lashes, as it is said, "A rebuke enters deeper into a person of understanding than a hundred blows into a fool."

Rashi there explains that the meaning is that it is preferable for a person to arrive on his own at the conclusion that he erred than to bring him to that point through flogging. Sounds a bit trivial, doesn't it? But perhaps what enters through the legs is internalized more deeply (in the spirit of "I learned Torah in hardship, and that is what stood by me.", and perhaps also "A person does not fully grasp the words of Torah until he has stumbled over them.").

Rabbi Kook in Ein Aya there (section ayin) writes the following:

Here our Sages taught us the pleasant way of education: a person is not educated by blows, but rather by ways of pleasantness. True fear is awe of exaltedness that comes from the refinement of faithful love. Until recent times, the scholars of pedagogy had not attained this, and their educational method was only the rod of chastisement, until these days, when many experiences proved to them the wisdom of what our Sages taught us through their holy spirit.

He explains that the Sages taught us here an educational method: it is preferable to educate by pleasant ways rather than with a rod of chastisement, something that scholars of pedagogy understood only in recent times, when experience taught them what the Sages had long known through their holy spirit.

Several points I will not address

There is in his words a claim that the Sages possessed the holy spirit, and that they learned from it things beyond what any person could have known. Many think so, and therefore attribute to the information of the Sages the force of absolute truth, as though no error could occur in their case. I do not mean their authority in Jewish law, but the view that their factual claims are free of any possibility of error. On this view, it is not really clear why they needed to rely on experience and on expert knowledge in various subjects, for there are several Talmudic passages that explicitly say they relied on experts and on their experience (which of course is entirely obvious even without those passages). The Sages erred quite a bit in matters bearing on the perception of reality and nature, and I therefore see no reason to assume that they had some exalted sources of information. But perhaps the term 'holy spirit' here means especially deep natural insight and a profound grasp of reality, not some supernal source. Some have explained in this way the Ra'avad's expression "The holy spirit appeared in our study hall." (Laws of Lulav 8:5).[1]

There is another claim in his words, namely, that the Sages had a clear and unequivocal educational conception in this area. For some reason he does not address a number of rabbinic and biblical sources that teach us, apparently out of that same holy spirit, that it is highly desirable and strongly recommended for a person to beat his sons and students. Did the holy spirit get confused? Or perhaps those sources did not possess the holy spirit as did the sages of the Berakhot passage? First and foremost, we have an explicit verse in Proverbs (13:24):

He who withholds his rod hates his son, but he who loves him seeks discipline early.

It is worth remembering that the term 'musar' here means chastisement, that is, beating. Ibn Ezra on that verse goes even further and writes that "He seeks discipline early." means that one should chastise his son every dawn (every morning). These things are of course also brought in Jewish law in several contexts, and I will not go into them in detail. See here, for example, a short piece by Rabbi Ovadia with a few sources, and note that even when they oppose beating children and students, it is only because it causes them to stumble in "Do not place a stumbling block before the blind." (do not place a stumbling block), not because of pedagogical or educational considerations.[2]

Another assumption he makes is that the conception of education in the ancient world was different from that of the Sages. I am inclined to think that indeed, from the ancient world down to our own day, many have thought that beating is a good and effective educational tool, but I do not think that in our case the situation was different from what it was in our surroundings. I only want to remind you that beating students was, and perhaps still is, especially common precisely in Haredi institutions. When the well-known High Court ruling was handed down[3], it was, to my impression, mainly the religious and Haredi public that rose up against it.

But in this column I intend to focus on a more general view of the matter. Many of us have a tendency to think that we (the Jews) invented everything good in the world. In this column I want to examine this from two angles: 1. Is it really so? Even in matters regarding which it seems that we have priority, the situation turns out not to be simple at all. 2. Why, if at all, do people assume that this is indeed the case? But before approaching those points themselves, I must preface them with a general discussion of the historical development of ideas and approaches.

History of ideas

Many intellectuals take delight in the study of the history of ideas. From where did a given idea grow, what is its source, who has title to it, under what influences was it formed, and the like. Such study looks for connections between ideas in different places and times, and for their transformations from one another, and therefore it contains an inherent and very problematic point that people are not always aware of (I touched on this briefly here, regarding Yuval Noah Harari's claims about Judaism's influence on the world, and at greater length in column 230).

At a conference held a few years ago at Bar-Ilan University on the Pnei Yehoshua, I spoke about Brisker elements in his method of study. At first glance, the Pnei Yehoshua was an old-school talmudist, and his mode of thought and analysis was not analytical in what is now called the yeshiva-Brisker sense. But as I showed there, there are several topics in which it clearly seems that he is conducting a Brisker analysis of 'two laws' and the like. Before entering the subject itself, I devoted time to an introduction about the study of the history of ideas, and I argued that it contains an inherent problem. Suppose we found a Brisker way of thinking in the writings of the Pnei Yehoshua. Does that mean that he invented Brisker thinking? Does it follow that the copyright on the 'two laws' technique is no longer Rabbi Chaim's? It is worth recalling that the cheftza-gavra distinction already appears in the Talmud in Nedarim (see column 230). Does that mean that Rabbi Chaim does not hold the copyright on the analytical method that divides laws into laws of the object and laws of the person?

It is quite clear that in both of these cases Rabbi Chaim certainly deserves the credit. He was the one who conceptualized this analysis and turned it into a tool that could be used in many different topics. He placed it in the halakhic toolbox, thereby making it available to all learners. Clearly, even before him, had we asked some Torah scholar a question about a certain topic, he could have used this form of analysis and answered us. There were people who did this from time to time (like the Pnei Yehoshua). So it is clear that Rabbi Chaim did not invent it, but he was the one who conceptualized it. He was the one who understood that here there was a general technique and not a specific solution to a local problem.

The meaning of conceptualization

This is very similar to what Aristotle did for logic. Aristotle is considered the founding father of logic, in his book Organon. But it is quite clear that even before him, people knew that if all tables have four legs and the object before me is a table, then it has four legs. So what did Aristotle innovate? He was the one who noticed that this was a general pattern and not a specific inference about tables and legs. The general pattern can be formalized as follows: if every X is Y and a is X, then a is Y. Now one can substitute any concept one wishes into the variables and obtain a valid argument. This is a conceptualization of an inferential rule that had already been in use earlier, but it was the conceptualization that turned it into a rule, and thereby enabled every person to use this rule in many different places (rather than thinking anew each time how to answer one or another specific question that came before him). Incidentally, it is only thanks to this conceptualization that we have computers today. If we had continued to use logical inference sporadically and intuitively, as was done before Aristotle, we would not have understood that here there is a general mode of thought that can be mechanized, and that can be divided into several basic rules by means of which any conclusion whatsoever can be derived.

Thus, the conceptualization did not invent logical inference, but it enabled us to make uses of it that had not been imagined before it. That is the value of conceptualization, and that is what Rabbi Chaim did for the Brisker methods of analysis. He placed them in the analytical toolbox, thereby making them available to every learner. Now, when we encounter an analytic problem, all we need do is open the toolbox and look for the appropriate analytic tool with which to address it (of course, this is an exaggerated and simplistic description).[4]

Back to the history of ideas

It is very difficult to define, and therefore also to point out, a connection between ideas and relations of influence among them. Regarding any idea, one can point to earlier appearances of it in different places and different forms, and to various strange and varied influences that led to its creation. I can point to a relation between Newton's mother and his mechanics, or between Judaism and Einstein's physics (as is well known, the Nazis called it 'Jewish physics,' which would have delighted a number of apologists in the Hidabroot organization). I can always find some kind of connection between things, and it is very difficult to determine and define when the connection is significant and when it suffices to say that the idea is already present in the earlier source and is not an invention of the person under discussion.

A similar phenomenon arises regarding the question of copyright, for example with respect to a melody or a work of art, especially when it is not copied as is, but only something similar is created. For example, Naomi Shemer was accused of stealing the melody of 'Jerusalem of Gold' from some Basque melody. I, as someone who is not a music expert, heard the original and the 'copy,' and in my opinion the resemblance was slight. Music experts are apparently more sensitive to the matter, and in the end I believe it was determined that there had indeed been some theft there. Beyond that, there is of course the question whether this is theft or unconscious influence (which is of course legitimate, and always exists). The boundaries are very blurred, and therefore it is hard to determine whether Naomi Shemer created the melody of the song under Basque influence, or whether this is already a Basque melody (in some arrangement. And in general, when is it no longer an arrangement but a new work?).

But after describing the inherent problematic in the study of the history of ideas, it is no less important to me to note the other side of the coin: despite the ambiguity, in at least some cases it is nevertheless possible to determine the source of an idea or a creation. A blurred boundary is still a boundary. And even if there is a gray area, there can certainly be black and white areas on either side of it. The question of intellectual and cultural influence is a complex one, but I do not agree that it is devoid of content.

In my aforementioned reply, I was asked about Yuval Noah Harari, who claimed in an article that Judaism invented almost nothing and did not significantly influence the world. The basis of his claim is, of course, the ambiguity in the question of the influence of ideas, as I described above. I argued against him there that at the level of flexibility he allows himself, one could claim that nothing has any influence on anything, that is, that the concept of influence on his view becomes empty of content and undefined. On his view, Christianity and Islam, which spread the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), did not influence the world any more than the people who printed and bound it, or who invented printing. They merely brought the Tanakh to various places, but those others decided to adopt it. So why is there influence here? It is like Newton's mother, isn't it? And likewise the printer or the inventor of ink. I said that if those who wrote and conceived the Tanakh (= all Jews, to the best of my knowledge) are not considered to have influenced those who implement it and the cultures that adopted it as a foundational text, then I do not know what influence is. If one empties the concepts of influence of all content through a postmodern argument of Harari's sort, no meaning remains in them at all. On his view, one cannot speak of influences at all, not only in the context of Judaism. This failure is highly characteristic of postmodern vacuity, and it expresses the characteristic lack of awareness on the part of its proponents that they are sawing off the branch on which they themselves sit.

To conclude, let me mention a personal aspect of this matter. After I published my first book, Shtei Agalot, I received quite a few responses along the lines of: well, everything is already found in Rabbi Kook/Rabbi Tzadok/Rabbi Nachman/Maharal/Ramchal, etc. (Usually the thinker in question is broad and eclectic enough, that is, unsystematic enough, that one can find everything in him. These are the thinkers most popular in our existentialist and lazy age, when feeling replaces intellect and logic.) Every such claim contains something, because in all these thinkers one really can find a great many ideas, some of them contradictory, of every possible kind. But even so, a blurred boundary is still a boundary. An idea belongs to the one who conceptualized and formulated it and placed it in the disciplinary toolbox. There are, of course, various influences on what I write, as on everyone, and of course every idea can be found in one form or another in earlier sources as well; and yet an idea belongs to the one who conceptualized and formulated it. Even if you later find it implicit in another book or article, the birth of the idea, from the standpoint of the history of ideas, is with the conceptualizer and formulator who placed it in the toolbox and made it available for public consideration and use.

This failure is the other side of Harari's failure, for here too the basis of the failure is the inability to identify relations of influence between ideas. In short, the ambiguity inherent in this field can lead to two kinds of anarchy: either one sees no influence and no connection between anything and anything (under-connectivity), or one sees connections even where they are not significant (over-connectivity).

This is also the answer to the various suggestions that reach me day after day, when all sorts of people find sources for relativity in the Zohar or in the Sages, just as they find the foundations of quantum theory in the writings of the Ari, or the theory of evolution in the author of Ikkarim, and the like. Usually the connection is extremely tenuous, and certainly far from the scientific conceptualization we have today. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this is a completely trivial statement that has almost no connection to these complex modern topics (apart from banal and insignificant connections). But even when there is some meaningful connection, that is still far from being a full anticipation of the modern scientific idea.

Did we invent everything?

Now we are ready to return to the original discussion. Did we invent pedagogy? Absolutely not. I think we did not even invent the approach that opposes beating. The Talmud is eclectic and unsystematic enough, no less than Rabbi Tzadok or Rabbi Kook, that one can draw from it almost anything. But if we are honest, it is very difficult to see in the Talmud a clear source for Dorit Beinisch's High Court ruling that forbids beating children. If anything, I would find in the Talmud a source for the opposite approach.

Many more examples could be brought to illustrate this matter, but here I will make do with one more that has already been discussed on our site in the past (see column 66). There I cited historian Yitzhak Baer's claim that the democratic mode of decision-making in the Jewish community was borrowed from Roman law. Professor Haym Soloveitchik strongly disagreed with him, arguing that we invented this, for after all it is already written in the Torah "Follow the majority." (follow the majority), and this ancient rule was also codified in the Talmud and the decisors. I explained there that in my view Baer was actually right in this debate (I do not know whether it was borrowed from Roman law, but it was not taken from the Torah). The majority in a religious court serves as a criterion for approaching the correct decision, and that is what is learned from the verse "Follow the majority.". That is why one also derives from it the rule of following the majority, which also serves as a criterion of truth. By contrast, a majority in communal decision-making is a democratic majority, whose concern is not truth but the exposure of a collective will (even if it is mistaken). In the aforementioned columns I showed that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who dealt with communal decision-making already felt this distinction keenly, and therefore even those among them who cited the verse "Follow the majority." as a source were careful to add the reasoning that if we do not follow the majority there will be anarchy. It was clear to them that the verse by itself could not serve as a source for democratic majority rule.

This is another example of a topic that, on its face, appears to be drawn from our sources, but whose truth is far more complex. I am not claiming that there is no influence at all between a majority in a religious court and a democratic majority, only that one cannot categorically determine that the former is the source of the latter. Perhaps Torah law had some influence on the formation of democracy and majority rule within it, but that is certainly not an obvious conclusion, and it does not arise directly from the rule of "Follow the majority.".

Why assume this at all? "Turn it over and turn it over, for everything is in it." (Turn it over and over, for everything is in it)

As I noted above, the question that lies in the background of the discussion is why people are at all inclined to think this way and to say such things. What causes people to think that everything was invented by us? Moreover, Rav Kook's statement above about beating students, precisely because it is so far-fetched and precisely because I regard him as an intelligent and honest person, leads me to understand that this motivation is probably very strong. Where is it rooted?

There is, of course, the matter of national pride. It is very pleasant and agreeable for us to think that we are the source of everything good and wise in the world. But that is excessive self-deception. Other nations as well are endowed with national pride, and yet it seems to me that among them you will find fewer such arguments.[5]

One could argue that this tendency stems from the fact that we are an ancient civilization compared to the cultures around us. But that is a rather weak argument, since there is no small amount of seepage of ideas between civilizations, and it is entirely possible that an idea was invented in a civilization that was destroyed and disappeared and passed on to other civilizations. Our antiquity is not a sufficiently good reason to assume such a thing.

Another possibility is the theological assumption that if the approach under discussion is indeed upright and good, it cannot be that in earlier generations people did not act in accordance with it. After all, the Torah, and even the Sages, surely did not err. Well, perhaps the Torah; but the Sages most certainly did make mistakes.

Which brings me to another possibility, based on the assumption that everything is contained in the Torah. After all, the world was created by the Holy One, blessed be He, and He is the One who gave us the Torah. From this one might perhaps derive the conclusion that the rules and values by which one ought to live should be found in the Torah. In this context some cite the Mishnah in Avot (5:22), "Turn it over and turn it over, for everything is in it.", or the midrash (in the Zohar, Parashat Terumah, and similarly in the midrash Bereishit Rabbah 1:1), "He looked into the Torah and created the world.", which seemingly say this explicitly. This is also what leads people to search in the Written and Oral Torah for the ideal economic-social model, and for solutions to all the maladies of the world.

But to the best of my understanding, these are interpretations far removed from the intent of those sayings, and to me they even seem a bit childish. Moreover, even if we were to find a Talmudic source that interprets these midrashim this way, the question would still remain: how did the Talmud itself know this? At most, this is the conclusion of one person or another, and certainly not a binding claim. But if we return to those midrashim, it seems more likely that the intention is not to say that all the sciences and values are encrypted in the Torah, but rather that it is desirable to have recourse to it when one comes to decide various questions.

Beyond that, even if everything really were encrypted in the Torah, it is still quite clear that we as human beings cannot in fact extract it from there (I already noted that the sages of the Talmud, like Torah scholars in every generation, learned from experience and from various experts, and did not extract everything from the Torah or from the holy spirit). Here is an anecdote from my own life. When I studied at the 'Netivot Olam' yeshiva in Bnei Brak, every afternoon I would travel to Bar-Ilan University to study physics. My friends in the yeshiva asked me: why do you travel there, when everything is already in the Torah? I answered them that if everything is in the Torah, then presumably my university studies are also Torah study, and so I see no problem in going there. And beyond that, I added, if everything is in the Torah, can you locate for me (perhaps by means of equidistant letter sequences?) the solution to Schrödinger's equation for a rotating potential well (which was what I was working on at the time), and spare me the trip and the work? That would surely leave me more time for Torah study in the yeshiva. Needless to say, in the meantime none of them has found the requested solution (I actually did, though to my shame I made use of primitive mathematical and scientific means rather than letter-skipping), but I am still waiting. I have not lost hope (if only because I never had any).

As I have already mentioned, these things are certainly true regarding the sciences, but what is more surprising is that in my opinion this is true with respect to values as well. The answers to our moral questions and dilemmas also generally cannot be found in the Torah (and perhaps they are not in it at all). I have already pointed out several times that the Torah's commandments do not look like means intended to create a model moral society. A substantial portion of the commandments does not seem related to morality at all, and from this I infer that even the part that does appear to concern moral values in fact does not come to command morality, but to add another religious layer on top of it (see column 15 and much else). The point is put even more sharply by the author of Derashot HaRan in the eleventh discourse, where he deals with the duplication between the king's law and the Torah's halakhic law, and among other things he writes:

And for this reason it is possible that in some of the laws and legal systems of the aforementioned nations, there may be something closer to the proper ordering of political society than is found in some of the laws of the Torah. And we lose nothing by this, for whatever is lacking in the aforementioned order was completed by the king. But we had a great advantage over them, because insofar as they are intrinsically just—that is, the law of the Torah, as Scripture says, "And they shall judge the people with righteous judgment"—it follows that the divine influx cleaves to us.

That is, halakhic law sometimes causes our legal system to be less moral than legal systems among other nations.

When the Torah commands us "And you shall do what is right and good." (do what is right and good), it does not specify what that right and good is, and it appears to rely on the conscience implanted within us. It does not teach us morality; rather, it commands us to act in accordance with the morality already present within us. My conclusion is that the Torah did not come to teach morality but primarily Jewish law (this is the basis for Rabbi Yitzhak's question, brought by Rashi at the beginning of the Torah: why did the Torah not begin with "This month shall be for you." (this month shall be for you), which is the first commandment). We understand morality through our reason and conscience, not through interpretation of the Torah. On the contrary, we interpret the Torah in light of our moral principles. If we are honest, we really do not seek there the answers and guidance to these questions. On the contrary, when there is a contradiction between a passage in the Torah and a moral value as we understand it, we define it as a problem of Torah and morality that requires resolution. What is usually done in such a situation is to explain that it was a temporary command, or that we erred in the moral judgment in those circumstances; in other words, an interpretive move is made regarding the Torah, but our moral principles are not changed. But if we do not reject our moral understanding because of a passage in the Torah, but the reverse, then it is difficult to say that we find our morality in the Torah and learn it from there.[6] All this is with respect to the Torah itself. But the Sages certainly do deal with morality and ostensibly constitute a source for moral values. Yet even with regard to them, the clear impression is that they draw on their conscience and not on novelties newly revealed to them in the Torah. Moreover, from the Sages too we will not accept principles that seem to us blatantly immoral.

Back to beating children

This brings me back to the point with which I opened. It is worth looking at the surveys linked in note 2 above regarding the beating of children according to Jewish law and the Torah. See there how, lo and behold, we move from "He who withholds his rod hates his son." and the Talmudic instructions that urge us to rain blows upon them, to the conclusion that in fact the High Court ruling and the new educational approach have been practiced among us from time immemorial (according to Rabbi Kook, we actually invented it). The more honest among us will admit that Talmudic policy really is not like that, but will say that today none of this is relevant (and will quietly breathe a sigh of relief, of course).

So we must acknowledge the regrettable facts: apparently we did not, after all, invent everything…

[1] See on this, for example, Rabbi Margaliot's introduction to the book Responsa Min HaShamayim in his edition.

[2] See also a survey by Rabbi Neria Gutel and by Professor Aviad Hacohen, and much more.

[3] CrimA 4596/98 – Anonymous v. State of Israel [4.2.99, 25.1.00], on appeal from the judgment of Judge S. Rotlevy, CrimC 511/95, which was heard in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court. The main part of the ruling was written by Justice D. Beinisch, joined by President A. Barak, and even Justice Y. Englard, who dissented, did so only with respect to the margins of the ruling – the definition of 'abuse' – not with respect to its main point relevant to our issue. [The note is taken from Rabbi Neria Gutel's above-mentioned article.]

[4] Clear examples of such a form of conceptualization can be found in the age of pilpul (Europe at the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era). There, each type of answer or distinction was given a name, and when learners encountered a problem of a certain kind, it was enough for one of them to say: this is a 'Regensburger,' and nothing more had to be added. The difficulty was solved. See Dov Rafel's short book, HaViku'ah al HaPilpul.

[5] As I write these lines I recall that when I returned home from my studies at the university and told my late father that we had learned Shannon's theorem (the sampling theorem), he told me that in Hungary (communist Hungary) they learned it as Kolmogorov's theorem. Almost every theorem invented or discovered in the West had a communist counterpart invented there (incidentally, sometimes that really was true, and the results were found independently in both places, without any connection).

[6] In this connection it is interesting to cite the saying of the Sages in Eruvin 100b:

Rabbi Yohanan said: Had the Torah not been given, we would have learned modesty from the cat, theft from the ant, and sexual propriety from the dove; proper conduct from the rooster…

At first glance, it seems that this is only had the Torah not been given; but once the Torah was given, we no longer need these teachers. Yet it is still clear that one can learn these things from them as well. Moreover, what is learned from the Torah can also be learned from them, meaning that the Torah will not introduce to us a moral value that stands in contradiction to natural morality (there are laws that stand in contradiction to it, but moral values are moral values. There is no Jewish morality and some other morality).

Discussion

A. (2019-10-27)

A nice column, simple and correct.

I would say that in my opinion, in this column you really didn’t invent anything; everything is simply correct and fairly clear. It’s hard for me to think of anyone who would disagree. But perhaps you did at least invent the conceptualization in the column—that is, it’s nice that you devoted a column to the matter in its own right. So maybe you did invent something after all ;-)…

Yehuda (2019-10-27)

You didn’t really write about rejecting the claim “He looked into the Torah and created the world” – could you expand? And I’m just curious how the early commentators understood this?

Michi (2019-10-27)

The main point of the column is not the fallacy in the history of ideas, which has already been described in the past, but examining the claim that we didn’t invent everything and rejecting the reasons given for it. And indeed, even there there is no great novelty, but it is still worth sharpening the point.

Michi (2019-10-27)

I don’t think much elaboration is needed. To derive the far-reaching conclusion that everything is contained in the Torah from the statement “He looked into the Torah and created the world,” which is a vague aggadic claim, is ridiculous. At most, what one can learn from this is that the world was intended for purposes that appear in the Torah. That does not mean that the Torah contains all the facts and scientific theories, and as stated, not even all moral values (which are only the basis for Torah values – that is, halakha).

Yesples (2019-10-27)

Perhaps one could say that the Holy Spirit did rest upon the Sages, but not everything they said was said through the Holy Spirit.
True, such an explanation still leaves us with the difficulty of knowing what was said through the Holy Spirit and what was not, but at least it helps make the above claim not false.

Roni (2019-10-27)

As for the Ein Ayah passage you cited, it is quite clear that Rav Kook would agree with most of what was said.
He knew very well that in the period of the Sages people educated by means of rod and strap. These are things that anyone who has studied a little knows, and all the more so someone who has studied a great deal.
Rather, he wrote that in the above midrash in tractate Berakhot there flashed in their minds an ideal illumination, which today we know just how correct it is—not that they thought it was possible or necessary in their time to implement it fully and abandon forceful education.

Michi (2019-10-27)

Perhaps. But notice that the decision that this pedagogical method is a product of the Holy Spirit is actually based on Rav Kook’s recognition that it is correct. Does he have the Holy Spirit? How does he know? As you noted, this drains the matter of content.

Michi (2019-10-27)

Well, who am I to argue with flashes of illumination?! It is similar to what I wrote—that in any sufficiently complex and eclectic body of writing you can find plenty of such flashes. Therefore I wouldn’t attribute this to the Holy Spirit but to statistics: when you write everything and its opposite, it’s no wonder that in one of the passages you also hit upon the truth. 🙂

Roni (2019-10-27)

🙂 Obviously, R. Yosei’s words are not really the opposite of “He who spares his rod hates his son”; rather, they are more like ideal versus practice. Recognition that what comes through a person’s understanding is stronger than what comes through the rod, alongside the understanding that one cannot wait for him to understand on his own.
Whether to see a correct ideal—and especially an ideal so far from practical implementation in their time, and one that would not have been obvious to everyone—as an illumination of the Holy Spirit, is already a question in itself (which also depends on whether you define “an especially deep grasp of reality” as the Holy Spirit, as you wrote above).

Michi (2019-10-27)

And this ideal is so exalted that none of the nations of the world grasped it. That is, for them beating was not merely a practical necessity but an ideal. Sure, sure…

A (2019-10-27)

Has the rabbi not fallen into the very same fallacy he is talking about?
From the fact that one cannot clearly derive an answer to some of our value judgments, the rabbi infers that one cannot derive any value/moral judgment from the Torah?
Even if not everything is clear and absolute, one can certainly find things about which there is broad agreement regarding the Torah’s view.
Precisely the example of modesty that the rabbi brings is a wonderful example of a value that unquestionably exists in the Torah, and someone who comes and tells me that he does not believe in modesty as a value and interprets the Torah otherwise would, in my eyes, be considered one who distorts the Torah improperly.

Hayota (2019-10-27)

The migration of ideas is a fascinating research topic. A nice example of something we nevertheless “invented” is the story of the scout knot. Lord Baden-Powell, founder of the Scout movement, was a devout Christian and well versed in the Bible. He said that he learned the idea of the scout knot, which the scout is supposed to tie in his neckerchief, from the passage of tzitzit. The role of the scout knot is to remind the scout to do one good scouting deed each day. (Nehama Leibowitz told this story and was very impressed by it.)

Tuvia (2019-10-27)

I am not familiar with Rav Kook’s words, and I am addressing their content as quoted here.
It seems to me that the inference itself from the Gemara is mistaken. It is quite possible that all ancient pedagogical sages understood that it is preferable for a person to reach the conclusion on his own that he erred, rather than to bring him to that point through flogging—and yet, since they had no guarantee of succeeding by pleasant means in bringing him to this conclusion, they used the less preferred option.
The whole difference between the earlier times and the later ones is the delegitimization carried out by pedagogical experts—through many experiments—of violence directed toward pupils; something which, as you explained so well, has no source at all in the words of the Sages generally, and in my opinion not even in the saying mentioned.

Shlomi (2019-10-27)

More from the same author on whether everything is found in the Torah:

The Holy One, blessed be He, did an act of kindness with His world in not placing all the talents in one place—not in one person and not in one nation, not in one land, not in one generation, and not in one world. Rather, the talents are scattered, and the necessity of perfection—which is the most ideal attracting force—is what causes the movement toward the exalted unity that must come into the world: “On that day the Lord shall be One and His name One.” The treasure of the world’s distinctive treasure is hidden in Israel. But in order that the world too be united with them in a general sense, certain special talents had to be lacking in Israel, so that they would be completed by the world and all the nobles of the peoples. Thus there is room for receptivity—for Israel to receive from the world—and consequently the path is open for influence in the other direction. Except that the receiving is from outside and the influencing is from within; that is, the inner life is complete in Israel, with no need to be aided by any foreign power in the world, and every governing power within Israel that derives from the inner life flows forth from there: “from among your brethren” – from the best of your brethren. But for the external side of life, it may happen that completion is needed דווקא from outside: “May the beauty of Japheth dwell in the tents of Shem,” “You shall consume the wealth of nations and glory in their honor.” And from the abundance of inner life, the congregation of Israel only bestows and does not receive: “The Lord alone did lead him, and there was no strange god with him.” (Orot Yisrael)

When Israel’s strength is great and its soul shines within it in manifestation, and its practical branches are ordered in full arrangement, in holiness, uniqueness, and blessing—in Temple and government, in prophecy and wisdom—then expansion toward the secular side, toward the delights of the spiritual and physical senses, toward penetrating and inward insight into the lives of many nations and peoples, their enterprises and their libraries, and the strengthening of the vigor of natural life—all these are good and capable of broadening the light of goodness, and the boundary is broad: twelve mil, like the whole camp of Israel, which in truth doubles the whole world in its quality: “He fixed the borders of the peoples according to the number of the children of Israel.” Once the light darkened, once the Shekhinah went into exile, once the feet of the nation were uprooted from the house of its life, constriction began to be required. Any secular boldness may become harmful; any natural beauty and desire may darken the light of holiness and the integrity of purity and modesty; any thought that has not grown entirely within the camp of Israel can destroy the order of faith and Jewish life; any little fatness leads to kicking. From here came sadness and affliction, gloom and timidity. And even more than these affected physical life, they affected spiritual life—the breadth of thought, the flight of feeling—until the end shall awaken, when a voice calls with might: “Enlarge the place of your tent, and let the curtains of your habitations be stretched out; do not spare; lengthen your cords and strengthen your stakes. For you shall break forth to the right and to the left, and your seed shall inherit nations and make desolate cities inhabited.” And the short boundary of two thousand cubits keeps broadening according to the measure of Israel’s salvation, which goes forth and shines little by little. (Orot HaTechiyah)

Gil (2019-10-27)

Hayota, thank you.

Where can one read about this?

Hayota (2019-10-27)

In my book, Nehama – The Life Story of Nehama Leibowitz (Yedioth Books, 2008). His niece’s wife told me this. Nehama read the story in Baden-Powell’s biography.

Michi (2019-10-27)

I didn’t say that nothing can be derived from the Torah in the sense that we cannot know what its view is. It is obvious that its view is that one should keep the commandments and that it is important to be humble and hospitable. But all of these are not innovations. And if they were innovations (that is, if they contradicted my own view), I would not accept them.

Michi (2019-10-27)

Hayota, I assume a bit of research might show that even this we didn’t really invent. If there were cultures that used symbols and various incentives to do good deeds. And perhaps there were even some that used knots for certain purposes (beyond tying things). Now combine those two and you get tzitzit and the scout knot. Besides, the tzitzit are meant to remind us of the heavens through the combination of blue and white. The role of the knot there is unclear (and most of them are not indispensable).

Michi (2019-10-27)

Indeed. That was already written above by Roni, and in my response to him.

Michi (2019-10-27)

So here we have yet another example of how a sufficiently broad and eclectic body of writings contains everything. Now go and determine what counts as “inner” and thus cannot come from outside, and what counts as “outer,” and how one knows.

Hayota (2019-10-27)

As I wrote to Gil, the man himself spoke about that influence. Knot or thread—what difference does it make. For him, a good scouting deed is heaven.

Michi (2019-10-27)

What I argued is that this may be an example of the migration of ideas, but not necessarily of something that we invented.

Shlomi (2019-10-27)

Indeed. And this is one of the reasons for the importance of the Torah being transmitted from student to rabbi.

Michi (2019-10-28)

If the rabbi himself knew, he could teach the student. It’s like saying that I will write every possible thing and its opposite in a thick book, and now someone will come and draw some conclusion from it. When I ask him how he derived דווקא that conclusion when the opposite is also there, he will tell me that that is what rabbi and student are for. My claim is that the ambiguity of the text shows either that the conclusion is not in it, or alternatively that no person can extract it from within it. Not merely that we cannot extract it from it.

Eliezer (2019-10-28)

Peace to you, Michael.
– Have you elaborated elsewhere on the meaning of conceptualization? [In my poor understanding it seems to me a very great matter, and it appears that the definition of the human species as “speaking” stems from this.]
– Also regarding the relation of ideas to their context, I would be glad to know references. (I have already been pondering this for some time, and for example whether it is correct to attribute to Rabbi Meir a certain ideological perspective—“hearts are drawn after actions” and the like—because he is a symbol of greatness at a young age; and to Rabbi Akiva the opposite perspective, because he is a symbol of the opposite (perhaps except for Abraham according to the view that this too was at a late age), and similarly in other matters.
Thanks.

Michi (2019-10-28)

I don’t recall writing about that.

Yossi (2019-10-28)

As for the self-importance that characterizes our people and the attempt to prove that the source of all wisdom is with us, there is some basis for it. Whether it is the well-known and worn-out statistic about Nobel winners, or the control over many centers of power in many countries throughout history. The impression is that the Jewish people possess talent and wisdom in significant percentages compared to the rest, and that is why we appropriate many inventions to ourselves. That’s how it is when you have a real advantage—you tend to inflate it and show it off…

Michi (2019-10-28)

That I agree with.

Dudi (2019-10-28)

Fascinating article. Thank you.

In my opinion this is also connected more generally to the cultivation of the super-heroism of Hazal in the Talmud and the midrashim.
After all, if it is said about the tannaim that “the least among you revives the dead” (along with other stories about miracles or curses coming true), then of course from that same power and that same vision they also know scientific truths about the world. That is, one can see how the ideas connect. I can understand a line of reasoning that makes such a connection.

A Jew from Argentina (2019-10-28)

Seemingly there is a completely opposite source, apparently, to what our master Rav Kook of blessed memory writes, and it is really support for the words of Rabbi Michael Abraham, may he live long.

“Ravina raised an objection to Rava: [What of] a father who strikes his son, and a teacher who disciplines his student, and an agent of the court? Let us say that since if he had already learned, it would not be a commandment, now too it is not a commandment. There, even though he has learned, it is still a commandment, as it is written: ‘Discipline your son, and he will give you rest; he will give delights to your soul’ (Proverbs 29:17)” (Babylonian Talmud, Makkot 8a).

It is explained here that Hazal had an approach completely opposite to Rav Kook’s words: even if the son or the student behaves properly and studies well, one should still discipline him, and this is considered in the category of a commandment!

Michi (2019-10-28)

Obviously. This is one of several sources I had in mind.

Yaakov (2019-10-28)

I think you somewhat distorted Rav Kook’s words. He does not say that we “invented” the moderate educational approach that does not involve beating. He is speaking only at the principled level: that Hazal said that the better moral discipline for a person is moderate discipline by pleasant means, and yet they did not rule out harsher discipline when it was needed, and therefore they too recommended it, as was accepted in the ancient world in their time. In Rav Kook’s time, world pedagogy had also begun to advocate this method on the practical level—they stopped beating students—and he pointed out that Hazal had already identified this conceptually before them. So what exactly is the problem? It is well known that Hazal generally speak about values and ideas, and they do not mean the concrete things they are speaking about. Just as Ramchal explains (Essay on Aggadot) that wherever Hazal speak about the seven planets in the solar system, they do not mean those same physical celestial bodies but the seven lower sefirot of our firmament, which are represented by the planets (each planet corresponding to a different sefirah), and the movement among the planets expresses the mutual influence among those sefirot and has an effect on events here on earth. (This is Ramchal’s view, and I brought this up as an example—apply it carefully to the rest of Hazal’s aggadot.)

Michi (2019-10-28)

I didn’t understand the claim. He writes that Hazal, through their Holy Spirit, anticipated their own time while the nations erred about this. My claim was that Hazal also supported beating, as stated explicitly in several places, and there is no reason to assume that their approach was different from what was accepted. So what are you claiming?

Avishai (2019-10-28)

After Tanakh was removed from the curriculum, now Gemara too… According to your approach, the halakhic side is also full of contradictions, so it too is an eclectic source not worth taking seriously.
The claim that “one rebuke is better” contradicts “He who spares his rod” is ridiculous—find me one source in the Gemara that says beating is preferable to verbal correction, or alternatively a source that says it is forbidden to beat, and then say that the Gemara says a thing and its opposite.
By the way, anyone who studies Tanakh knows the continuation of the verse “He who spares his rod” and sees that even for Solomon the contradiction didn’t bother him so much.
In my opinion, the explanation of why Hazal adopted a line of beating even though they knew that one rebuke is better, etc., is not connected to an ideal method, etc., as Roni wrote in the comments, but it is stated explicitly in the Gemara elsewhere—a Torah scholar like you will surely find it easily.

With the blessing: “To the wise, a hint suffices; to the fool, a kick.”

Avishai (2019-10-28)

And as for the interpretation of the word musar in Proverbs—not necessarily beating; for example Proverbs 13:1:
“A wise son accepts a father’s discipline, but a scoffer does not heed rebuke.”
To discipline is not necessarily to beat.

Avishai (2019-10-28)

Besides, you also did not read Rav Kook correctly.
He was referring to a pedagogical method based solely on the staff of chastisement, and argued that Hazal were opposed to it; he was not for a moment saying that one must never beat.
As he presents it, the discussion was not whether beating is permitted or whether it has value, but whether there is any point at all in trying other methods, and in this, according to him, Hazal were ahead of their time.
I do not know whether the reality really was that the approach in the Middle Ages was based only on beating, as Rav Kook says, but the whole idea that beating is illegitimate is a new idea, and neither Rav Kook nor Hazal addressed it.

Moshe G. (2019-10-29)

1. Inspired by the article, a question—there were many smart people who said such things. Why did they say this? Is there an explanation?

2. Did Hazal themselves think this way about themselves or about the generations that preceded them?

Michi (2019-10-29)

Moshe, are you too joining the riddle-writing over here? Explain what you mean.

Moshe G. (2019-10-29)

1. Take Rav Kook for example. An intelligent and thoughtful person. And yet, assuming the article analyzes his words correctly, he suffers from a serious logical and educational fallacy. We are not talking here about a third-rate preacher in a neighborhood synagogue between Mincha and Ma’ariv. We are talking about a person of stature. And he was not the first. Over generations no one noticed this? (I can accept the answer “No, they didn’t notice,” but still it’s strange—an ad hominem in the positive direction.)

2. Did Hazal themselves think that “we invented everything”? Did they think they were wiser than the gentiles (there are sources saying not—“their words appear more correct than ours,” “Believe that there is wisdom among the nations”—but perhaps there was another view; and parenthetically, is Rabbenu Tam’s interpretation that “their words appear more correct than ours, but we are right” a return to the claim that “we invented everything” or just a specific opinion)?
Did Rambam think this? Did Rashi think this? Did Ezra the Scribe and the Men of the Great Assembly, Jeremiah and Hezekiah and Solomon think this?

Michi (2019-10-29)

1. In my opinion this is an explanatory fallacy. Clearly he was smart, and clearly he knew the contrary sources very well. But people have a tendency to present the Torah as something exalted and as the source of everything. Otherwise it really is hard to understand. Even today you can see intelligent and thoughtful people saying similar things (in the past I quoted on the site, for example, statements by Rabbi Arousi—a similar fallacy).
I didn’t understand what you wrote that “he was not the first.” Not the first in what? What exactly were they supposed to notice?
2. The saying “Believe that there is wisdom among the nations” does not mean that we are not smarter or that we did not invent everything. Some forms of wisdom came from us to the nations, and others did not reach them. I definitely get the impression that at least in general Hazal also thought this way. What you brought from Rabbenu Tam is itself evidence: there is wisdom among the nations, but the truth is with us (including on the question whether the sphere stands still and the constellations move, or the opposite). He assumes that every factual claim of Hazal is true and that they cannot err, even if their reasoning was not complete. Apparently, in his view there is some background assistance, either from tradition or from providence.
The fact is that the overwhelming majority of halakhic authorities, down to our own day, assume that factual and scientific error in the Talmud is impossible.
As for specific sages, I have no idea. One would have to conduct research on each one and see what he wrote, if anything.

Moshe G. (2019-10-29)

(“He was not the first” – because if I made a mistake, it is hard for me to identify it. But if many generations made a mistake, I would expect someone to stop the chain.)
And according to the answer to question 2, the article is basically presenting a claim that runs contrary to the view of most of our rabbis throughout the generations, and theirs is the opinion that was accepted in halakha (for example, on the question of whether the waters of the Euphrates rise, if I remember correctly, which was ruled in halakha in the laws of mikvaot; as opposed to the above opinion of Rabbenu Tam, which did serve as an explanation for the law of mayim shelanu, but the official reasoning was empirical).
So now there is a confrontation between the accepted halakha and the opinion of the majority of the sages—Hazal and others—on the one hand, and the critique of reason in this article on the other, and the reader will have to choose one of the two?

M80 (2019-10-29)

Nice article. More power to you. Comments:

A. Rav Kook used the plural: Hazal, the sages of pedagogy. Does he mean that the statements in the Gemara, by Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Yosei and by Resh Lakish, reflect a consensus view among the amoraim, as distinct from the pedagogical sages of the nations of the world, who agreed with this view only in recent generations?

B. Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish were sages of the Land of Israel (pleasantness). Was their view accepted by the sages of Babylonia (those who wound)?

C. Quintilian, a Roman educator and rhetorician, and Plutarch, a Greco-Roman philosopher and historian, lived before Rabbi Yosei, and strongly opposed educating children by means of beatings. During the Renaissance, Quintilian’s writings were rediscovered in Italy, and following him Italian humanist educators advocated education by pleasant means. Erasmus and Montaigne followed him as well (“care should be taken to educate gently, and not as is customary”), among the most influential thinkers in Europe in the modern era.

D. During the Reformation, almost all Protestant religious leaders, who regarded the Bible as absolute and unquestionable authority, advocated beating children for educational purposes.

E. The attitude toward children began to change significantly for the better only from the second half of the 18th century onward, when the Romantic poets and writers related to children not as small beings lacking judgment, as people had tended to relate to them throughout the generations, but as creatures in their own right, with a unique worldview of dewy lights and pristine worlds, without the rationalization and cynicism of adult society. Bialik wrote in Sefi’ah: “They spoke the truth indeed: a person sees and apprehends only once—in childhood. The first sights, while still in their virginity, as on the day they came forth from the hand of the Creator, are the things themselves, their essential core; and those that come afterward are only their second, defective editions. At most, faint hints of the first, but not the thing itself.” And similarly Resh Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’ah: “The world endures only for the sake of the breath of schoolchildren.”

Michi (2019-10-29)

This belongs to a previous thread. Why didn’t you continue it there?
As for your point, I still didn’t understand. Who was not the first, and in what matter?
This has nothing to do with halakha. We are dealing here with thought or history, not halakha. And even in halakha, when there is a factual discussion, there is no authority and no significance to authority. What determines it is factual truth.

Michi (2019-10-29)

Nice. Many thanks.

Even the sages of Babylonia thought so (2019-10-29)

With God’s help, 1 Heshvan 5780

In Rav’s instruction to his student Rav Shmuel bar Shilat, it is explained that even when there is a need to strike a child, the blow should be minimal—“with a shoelace” (Bava Batra 21a). Rav goes on to instruct Rav Shmuel bar Shilat to be patient with a student who has no desire to study: “If he does not read, let him keep company with his friend,” and time and the influence of his friends will do their work. Rav Shmuel bar Shilat had a method of awakening in his students the desire to learn by “bribing” them with little fish.

That is to say: the sages of Babylonia too preferred to arouse in the student the desire to study, and even when they needed to discipline—they did so in a minimal way.

With blessings, S.Tz.

M80 (2019-10-29)

Rav Kook wrote:
“All the irascibility in the world that comes in the context of moral guidance, in faith, opinions, and deeds, and all the inevitable deficiencies that impatience and zealotry produce in the world—even though many parts of them are filled with great holiness and also come from important piety and purity of heart—nevertheless this does not prevent us from reckoning with the deficient side in them. Ultimately, the matter must be corrected, and all that is sought by the highest holiness will come into the world by way of peace, and guidance full of gentleness, tranquility, and honor. The root of all this is the sin of the Waters of Merivah, and Moses’ anger, the saying ‘Hear now, you rebels,’ which led to striking the rock, when what was fitting should have been willingness, conciliation, and speech. Because of this, within the manifestation of guidance in faith and in the precisions of Torah there became mixed in a force of strictness, until father and son, teacher and student, who sit in one gate and occupy themselves with Torah, become like enemies to one another. And although in the end it is written ‘and they were beloved in the end,’ and there is love in the end, still the impression of the temporary enmity does not pass entirely without some loss. A Torah of kindness is the Torah above, the Torah of the secret, revealed to the upright through Elijah at its foundation, now that he has already become sweetened and is ready for his mission to proclaim peace, to make peace in the world, to equalize dispute, to bring near and not to push away. And this itself is the content of the opening of the mouth of Moses our teacher, that he will return to speaking to the rock instead of the striking that occurred in the past.”

Ancient educational tradition (2019-10-29)

Regarding the source of Hazal’s educational insights—it should be remembered that in the people of Israel the notion that education should belong to everyone is very ancient.

If the modern world began to think about “compulsory education for all” in the 18th–19th centuries, then already in the Torah every father was commanded to repeat the words of Torah to his son, and the prophets envisioned: “All your children shall be taught of the Lord, and great shall be the peace of your children.” The Men of the Great Assembly instructed: “Raise up many disciples.”

Joshua ben Gamla ordained that teachers of children be appointed everywhere, and this enactment was kept in all generations and in all places. Parents paid from the best of their money so that their children would study Torah, and every community saw to it that even a child whose parents could not afford it would not remain without Torah.

That is to say: Hazal based their educational guidance on a tradition and experience of thousands of years!

With blessings, S.Tz.

The combination in education (2019-10-29)

The combination of authority and gentleness begins already in education at home, as Rabbi Judah the Prince says (in the Mekhilta on the verse “Honor your father and your mother”): that the child tends to fear his father, “who teaches him Torah,” and to honor his mother, “who persuades him with words,” and therefore Scripture teaches that the honor and fear due to father and mother are equal, for both directions are needed—the father to develop fear and authority, and the mother to cultivate love and desire.

Likewise in the leadership of Israel, one needs both Moses’ firm leadership and alongside it Aaron’s patience—“who loves people and draws them near to Torah.”

With blessings, S.Tz.

Fish for improving attention and concentration? (2019-10-30)

I mentioned above the practice of Rav Shmuel bar Shilat to “bribe” students with small fish in order to arouse in them the desire to study. Simply speaking, the small fish served as a reward and incentive for the child. But perhaps there was another factor here, since fish contain omega-3, which prevents problems of attention and concentration. See, for example, Guy Ben-Tzvi’s article, “Omega-3 and Attention and Concentration,” and Dr. Goldschmid’s article, “Fish and Omega-3.”

With blessings, S.Tz.

Corrections (2019-10-30)

Line 3
… which prevents problems of attention…

Line 4
And in Dr. Goldshmid’s article…

M80 (2019-10-30)

Hazal relied on an educational tradition thousands of years old, and were humble enough to keep correcting its shortcomings throughout the generations.

At first, one who had a father would be taught Torah by him; one who had no father would not study Torah. What verse did they expound? “You shall teach them”—you yourselves shall teach them. They instituted that teachers of children should be appointed in Jerusalem. What verse did they expound? “For out of Zion shall go forth Torah.” Still, one who had a father would bring him up and teach him; one who had no father would not go up and would not study. They instituted that teachers be appointed in every district and district, and they would bring them in at about age sixteen or seventeen; and if his teacher grew angry with him, he would kick him and leave. Until Joshua ben Gamla came and instituted that teachers of children should be appointed in every province and every city, and that children should be brought in at about age six or seven. (Bava Batra 21a)

Rabban Gamliel would proclaim and say: Any student whose inside is not like his outside may not enter the study hall. On that day many benches were added. Rabbi Yohanan said: Abba Yosef ben Dostai and the Rabbis disagreed about it; one said four hundred benches were added and one said seven hundred benches. Rabban Gamliel became distressed and said: Perhaps, God forbid, I have withheld Torah from Israel. (Berakhot 28a)

Rav Kook continues and writes:
“The revelation of the Torah of kindness, as it is being spread broadly by Torah scholars in the later generations—those who come from the side of Moses—and through it the light of the canopy of peace will begin to spread over Israel and Jerusalem, and over the multitude of nations who will come from afar, from the ends of the earth, to the name of the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel, the King whose is peace. And all that depth and precision, that fire of the soul, which came forth to illuminate and warm through the power of the joining of the fervor of Torah, of ‘Is not My word like fire, says the Lord,’ will come to actuality, after all those good results that emerged from this path have already been used, and have been absorbed in the nation in the depth of its soul, and it and the whole world have already suffered much from this boiling fire of holiness. In the end of days it will come with even greater force through the spread of a supreme spiritual heroism full of the gentleness of peace and the tranquility of stillness. ‘And he shall speak peace unto the nations, and shall judge with equity for the meek of the earth.’ And this spark of the light of peace is going and must come together with that spark of the revealed end which belongs to the return to Zion and its rebuilding.”

David (2019-10-30)

I think as follows.
It is clear that the outlook in the past was very dictatorial toward women and children, and in general.
Accordingly, children’s opinions were generally not heard; rather, until they matured they were educated in the way the father wanted, without moving right or left.
And they were given almost no freedom of choice at all.
And this is what the Gemara comes to say: that there is value in the child forming his own path to some degree, and not going in his father’s way like a blind man in darkness.

On the other hand..
This is not a contradiction to “He who spares his rod hates his son,” whose abstract meaning is: do not spoil the child, and do not let him do whatever his heart desires at any time. For that will drag him down into the depths.
Rather, it is possible and perhaps necessary also to strike in certain cases—that is, to tap him on the head and tell him: this is how one should act, not that.
And I start from the assumption that in our day the intention is not actual beating, but rather directing the child toward a certain form of growth, which in our culture is a substitute for beating.
And in their day, beatings were part of the culture, and therefore it was entirely legitimate.

And apparently Rav Kook saw in this passage of the Gemara great wisdom, because apparently to say in their time that it is preferable for the child to learn on his own rather than to beat him was probably a pedagogical innovation…

And so King Solomon said (to David) (2019-10-30)

With God’s help, 1 Heshvan 5780

The insight that one must tailor the educational path to the character of the student, so that he will do things out of inner conviction, was already expressed by King Solomon when he said: “Train a child according to his way; even when he grows old he will not depart from it.” The preference of speech over beating was also expressed by Solomon when he said: “A rebuke enters deeper into a man of understanding than a hundred blows into a fool,” and this is the verse on which Resh Lakish relied.

Even in the verse “He who spares his rod hates his son,” in which Solomon expresses the need for punishment, Solomon says: “But he who loves him disciplines him early”—one who loves his son does not wait until the son sins and then punish him, but rather “early” precedes it by instructing and guiding him with words of discipline, just as Scripture criticizes David regarding his way of educating Adonijah: “And his father had never grieved him at any time by saying, Why have you done so?” (I Kings 1:6)

That is to say: education is mainly through guidance, direction, and criticism, and punishment is “a regrettable necessity,” but not the main thing (and even regarding it Rav instructed his student Rav Shmuel bar Shilat (Bava Batra 21a) that it should be as minimal as possible—just “with a shoelace,” and no more!).

And as Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar explained (Sanhedrin 107b), education must proceed by “the left hand pushes away and the right hand draws near”—a combination of criticism with much encouragement and love.

With blessings, S.Tz.

And likewise in marriage (2019-10-30)

A man’s attitude toward his wife, too, is not “dictatorial.” A Jew is required to love his wife as himself and honor her more than himself (Yevamot 63a), to consult with her in household matters and, according to some, also in worldly matters (Bava Metzia 59a). So too Jacob, even when an angel of the Lord commanded him to return to his land, did not simply “drop” this on Rachel and Leah, but consulted with them.

With blessings, S.Tz.

“According to his way” (2019-10-30)

On adapting education to the character of the student, see Rabbi Zamir Cohen’s article, “The Foundation of Foundations in Education: ‘According to His Way,’” on the Hidabroot website.

With blessings, S.Tz.

Seeking Truth (2019-10-30)

A rational proof for Israel’s chosenness

Does not the very fact that Israel is commanded regarding 613 commandments, whereas the gentiles only regarding 7, constitute proof of Israel’s chosenness? For if we start from the assumption that the purpose of man is to fulfill commandments for the sake of Heaven—and Israel has obligations, while the gentiles by contrast have only basic prohibitions—is this not proof that the people of Israel (and, if we are fully rational, including converts who joined it) possess a special quality? Because in practice this means that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not interested in the prayers and commandments of the gentiles—and in effect sees them as pointless—and from here, the fact that He sees only the deeds of the people of Israel as significant is proof that He granted them a special quality. And the early authorities already wrote that the purpose of the 613 commandments is love of the Holy One, blessed be He, while the purpose of the 7 commandments is preservation of the world. And if the Holy One, blessed be He, excluded the gentiles from Torah and commandments, that is a sign that He gave them a different soul from the Jew—because the Jew must keep 613 commandments and the gentile does not.

And if we claim otherwise—why then was the Torah not given to all the nations of the world?

I am not at all entering here into the question of whether there is a Garden of Eden and who merits it, but rather into the simple rational proof—that the Holy One, blessed be He, apparently gave the Jews a special soul or spirit.

This is an argument I once heard from a friend for why the approach of R. Yehuda HaLevi, Rav Kook, Ramchal, and many others regarding Israel’s chosenness is correct—why does the rabbi reject this approach? It seems logical to me (and again, I am not entering here into other questions and beliefs that follow from it, such as the holiness of the nation and the holiness of Jewish souls—after all, if the Holy One, blessed be He, commands me to bear so many obligations, while the gentile is commanded in nothing, it follows that I have some special spiritual quality that he does not, a special reward, and so forth, no?)

I am asking this question in order to have a dialogue with the rabbi on the subject, and to say that in my opinion, even from a completely rational point of view—and not a point of view of national feeling—the Jewish nation must have a special quality, otherwise the Torah would have been given to everyone.

I know this is not directly related to the topic of the column, but from this I would also get to the following claim: if we indeed assume that Judaism (even in your thinnest version—that one is committed to halakha out of the belief that the Holy One, blessed be He, gave some Torah at Sinai, which the sages later interpreted in part and gave us a halakha that we all undertook to keep) is true—then is it not possible, along with this, to assume not that Hazal had the Holy Spirit, but that the Holy One, blessed be He, intervened in history and inserted into it all the parts that are true and reasonable (for example on the subject of Israel’s chosenness, where one can certainly find logic, and matters such as reward and punishment, which are reasonable, the survival of the soul, which is reasonable, the coming of the Messiah, the theory of the divine and animal souls in the Tanya, and the like), and removed from it irrational parts such as the Sabbatean movement?

For if the Holy One, blessed be He, is compassionate and gracious, why not say that He intervenes in reality and directs it in order to give a more or less faithful reflection of a Jewish-Orthodox mainstream, so that we will know how to identify truth from falsehood? (That is, ideas like Israel’s chosenness and the coming of the Messiah are part of the mainstream of all the great sages of Israel, and they are rational—why not assume that the Holy One, blessed be He, made life easier for us? Whereas totally bizarre ideas that found their way into Judaism, like Hasidic prayer in which people drink alcohol and then dance and pray, are not part of the mainstream, and every average rabbi would oppose that.)

Rabbi Michi, it is important to me to clarify that I am a rational person who has been researching this topic for many years. I am not coming with the claim that our sages had prophecy and the Holy Spirit, but with another claim: the Holy One, blessed be He, arranged reality so that every sensible Jew could see the truth.

Michi (2019-10-30)

Indeed, it is not really related to the topic of the column. First, the concept of Israel’s chosenness itself is not well defined (because every people differs from every other people). Second, the difference in commandments certainly does not force us to conclude that there is an essential difference: the Talmud itself describes that the Holy One, blessed be He, went around to the nations to give them the Torah, and they did not want it. This implies that it does belong to them. Beyond that, it may be that the world needs one people to observe everything and the rest only the seven commandments. One people was chosen, but other peoples could also have been chosen. Therefore there is no proof from the difference in commandments to essential chosenness.
I do not see why the mainstream must be logical. The hypothesis that there is divine providence ensuring that what is accepted is true (something I myself once wrote) seems implausible to me for several reasons. For example, otherwise we would have to adopt a halakhic ruling based on how widely it was accepted, regardless of the arguments. There are other arguments against it. In general, I also do not see a reason to assume it, so why assume it?

“Let him keep company with his friend” — the ‘strong’ student as mentor to his fellow (and limiting class size) (2019-10-30)

With God’s help, 2 Heshvan 5780

Another instruction of Hazal, explained in chapter 2 of Bava Batra and codified in Rambam and the Shulchan Arukh, is to limit the number of students in a class to 25. Beyond this number, an assistant teacher, a “reish dukhna,” should be appointed; and when the number of students reaches 40, another teacher should be appointed and the class split in two.
When an educator does not stand alone before a class of 30–35 students, his ability to give attention and personal regard to students who need it like air to breathe is increased.

Likewise, Rav’s instruction to Rav Shmuel bar Shilat, “If he does not read, let him keep company with his friend,” turns the “strong” students into the teacher’s assistants, helping him advance the weaker ones. Whether according to Rashi and the Tur, by creating an atmosphere of study, or according to Dr. Mordechai Margaliot (in the Encyclopedia of the History of the Sages of the Talmud and the Geonim, s.v. “Rav Shmuel bar Shilat”), whereby the strong students serve as “mentors” helping the weaker ones in their studies.

When a “strong” student takes it upon himself to help those weaker than he is, he contributes to himself as well—both by being educated toward social responsibility, and because the need to explain to his fellow brings him himself to a clearer understanding of the material studied, in the sense of “From my students more than from all of them.”

The method of “group work,” which places upon the “strong” students the role of being “mentors” to their friends, was practiced in the traditional heder. Several examples of this are cited in the book by Rabbi Professor Simcha Assaf, Sources for the History of Jewish Education 0and I mentioned them in one of my comments on Professor Nadav Shnerb’s article, “To Impart Knowledge – Not to Educate,” on the “Mussaf Shabbat – Makor Rishon” website.

Rabbi Hiyya said that this is the method he would use if Torah were to be forgotten from Israel: he would take five children and teach each one one of the Five Books, and another six children, to each of whom he would teach one of the Orders of the Mishnah, and thus each child would become a teacher to his fellows regarding the part of Torah he had learned.

In our generation as well, modern educational experts have begun to discover the advantages of “group work” and of giving “a role to every student.” No wonder that in a nation that regarded education for all as a sacred value, these directions arose already hundreds of years ago. “Believe that there is wisdom among the Jews” 🙂

With blessings, S.Tz.

Correction and note (2019-10-30)

In the last paragraph, line 2
… no wonder that in a nation in which education for all was considered a sacred value – these directions arose…

[This comment belongs to the next thread, continuing the comment “Even the sages of Babylonia thought so”]

With blessings, S.Tz.

A. (2019-10-31)

What other arguments against it are there? I’d be glad to hear. But I certainly agree that there is no reason to assume it (and to my mind that is a strong argument).

And by the way, I think that a ruling that has been accepted is indeed much harder to change. Of course, that is a matter of appointments. And one should also invoke “If they are not prophets, they are the sons of prophets,” etc.

Michi (2019-10-31)

Mainly evidence of things that were accepted and yet were mistaken. In addition, there are disputes, and then the question is what God wants and why He does not cause the truth to be accepted. Beyond that, what we accept is the result of our own judgment, not His decision; otherwise one could simply draw lots and rely on the fact that He would ensure that the correct thing is accepted.

Follow the majority (2019-10-31)

With God’s help, 2 Heshvan 5780

A position accepted by all the sages of the generations—Hazal, the early authorities, and the later ones—or by almost all of them, is binding משום “follow the majority”; here there is a majority both in wisdom and in number.

With blessings, S.Tz.

A. (2019-10-31)

S.Tz., as usual you are writing nonsense (and unlike usual, at least there is a connection between your comment and the one above it). Check your words.

Correction (to the comment “Even the sages of Babylonia thought so”) (2019-10-31)

In line 4, instead of “Rav Shmuel bar Shilat”
… a teacher from Rav’s time (Ta’anit 24) had a method…

In conclusion (2019-10-31)

And in conclusion:

The people of Israel were the first in human history to set forth the vision of “All your children shall be taught of the Lord.” The Torah commanded every father to teach the words of Torah repeatedly to his children, and the Sages ordained that teachers be appointed everywhere and that every child from the age of six or seven be in an educational framework. Some 1,800 years before the whole world, we already had a “compulsory education law.”

Educational tradition and the experience of many generations led to a balanced educational guidance, which combined on the one hand the imposition of discipline and the use of punishment, while insisting that even when it was necessary to strike, the blow be given moderately and cautiously—only with a shoelace and no more (as Rav instructed, Bava Batra 21a).

And on the other hand, different methods were developed to increase the student’s desire to learn—whether through the influence and help of his peers (Bava Batra 21a), or through appeasement and the giving of rewards for encouragement (Ta’anit 24a). Likewise, the insistence on small classes of no more than 20–25 students enabled teachers to give attention and personal regard to every student.

The combination of moderate punishment with investment in cultivating motivation instilled in the students’ hearts a love for Torah study and diligence in it, and even when they grew up and most of them went out into ordinary life—the students continued to be lovers of Torah who set fixed times for its study.

With blessings, S.Tz.

Correction (2019-10-31)

In paragraph 1, line 3
… approximately 1,800 years before the world…

Moish (2019-11-03)

Amazing to see a fool being judged by a hint.

Seeking Truth (2019-11-03)

Rabbi Michi, sorry again for the questions and the bother,
but is not the question, for example, of the chosenness of the people of Israel also directly connected to the question whether we accept the Zohar as true or not—for if the Zohar is true (after all, the original claim is that the Zohar is from Heaven), then certainly there is a difference between Israel and the nations, since the Zohar says that gentiles and Jews are completely different in their inner nature—
and is there not proof of this from the fact that God is called the God of Israel? I do think the question is related to the column, because if we indeed assume that only Jews have a communication channel to the Holy One, blessed be He, and they are different creatures—then in the moral teachings and knowledge of Hazal and the sages of the generations there is indeed truth, because only we received the power to discover the truth… and perhaps from there also the attitude to the issue of conversion and to Jewish identity should be different—because we arrive at the conclusion that what defines a Jew as a Jew is his soul, and therefore every person born to a Jewish mother should be regarded as a Jew, and every descendant of Israel should be drawn near. I’m sorry if I sound like a 14-year-old in a religious high school—I simply have a very strong feeling that behind the whole idea of the special quality of the Israelite nation there is truth, and that R. Yehuda HaLevi, Ramchal, Rav Kook, the whole world of Kabbalah—they all erred and did not understand the Torah correctly? And why did the Holy One, blessed be He, decree upon me to keep 613 commandments while a gentile can freely do whatever he wants and reach the same level?

Michi (2019-11-03)

Anything is possible. But to the best of my understanding there is no indication that this is true. And as I noted, the discussion is not even well defined (for every nation has some uniqueness in relation to all the others). If from this you infer that the Zohar did not come from above—so be it. If from this you infer conclusions regarding the conversion of descendants of Israel—you are entirely right (another speculation that has no halakhic basis whatsoever).
The claim that we were singled out by receiving commandments does not really lead to the conclusion that we have an inherent special quality. It is equally possible that we were chosen for this task because there needed to be one people that would do it.

And for further study (2019-11-03)

And for further study, see the articles by Rabbi Dr. Reuven Mamo, “Educational Corporal Punishment in Jewish Law”; Rabbi Professor Neria Gutel, “He Who Spares His Rod Hates His Son” (on the Da’at website).

With blessings, S.Tz.

Dvir (2019-11-18)

Interestingly, in his (positive) attitude toward the findings of Assyriological research and the possibility of ancient influence on the beliefs and laws of the Bible, Rav Kook also writes things that are completely opposite (being, as you noted, an unsystematic thinker):

“Israel does not pride itself at all on being inventors of the laws of morality and uprightness in the world, nor even on having invented the principle of the unity of God, blessed be He.”
LeNevukhei HaDor, chapter 32

Shared values and unique values (2019-12-04)

With God’s help, 6 Kislev 5780

To Dvir—greetings,

In the source you cited, Rav Kook is not speaking about the influence of the nations of the world on the values and beliefs of the Bible, but about the possibility that other peoples too had laws of morality and uprightness, since these are things required by reason, and without a basic system of moral values and social norms—people would swallow one another alive.

At the same time, one can see values unique to Israel and its Torah beyond what was accepted among the nations. For example, Professor Daniel Friedman noted (in his article “And You Shall Remember That You Were a Slave,” on the Da’at website) the uniqueness of the Bible among the other cultures of the ancient Near East: both in that the Bible subjects even its heroes to criticism, and in that the laws of the Torah are the only ones that made helping the weak into a full legal obligation.

And this is especially true in the field of education, where the Torah was the first to set forth the vision of “All your children shall be taught of the Lord” and commanded every father to teach the Torah repeatedly to his children. And some 1,800 years before the modern world began to speak about “compulsory education for all,” Joshua ben Gamla had already ordained that teachers of children should be appointed in every city and village so that no child would remain without learning Torah.

Indeed, there was no Jewish community, even under the harshest conditions of exile, that did not maintain a public system of mutual assistance and compulsory education for all children.

With blessings, S.Tz.

Dvir (2019-12-17)

Hello S.Tz.

I think you are mistaken here about Rav Kook’s words.

Rav Kook explicitly raises there the possibility of direct influence:
“And from this it follows that many things said in the Torah, whether in commandments or in narratives, must certainly have parallels already among the teachings of the great and pious ones of the ancient nations, except that the divine light that penetrates to the end of all generations through the prophecy of Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, selected and refined them from the confusion and error that had entered into them. And whatever enduring benefit was found in doing or recounting them was brought near by the supreme will that includes everything together. And Israel does not pride itself at all on being inventors of the laws of morality and uprightness in the world, nor even on having invented the principle of the unity of God, may He be blessed” (LeNevukhei HaDor 32).

He writes similar things in Adderet HaYakar 4:
“All the things that, from the standpoint of education prior to the giving of the Torah, found a place among the nations of the world—provided only that they had a moral foundation, and could be elevated to a higher moral level, eternal and progressive—the divine Torah retained them.”

Obviously the Bible introduced substantial innovations on top of what preceded it (see for example “The laws of the Torah and the Code of Hammurabi” on Wikipedia). I did not claim otherwise, and certainly did not attribute such a claim to Rav Kook.

Dvir (2019-12-17)

*Rav

And the Rav is consistent (to Dvir (2019-12-31)

With God’s help, 3 Tevet 5780

To Dvir—greetings,

The Rav’s words here, that “the divine light that penetrates to the end of the generations through the prophecy of Moses our teacher” refines and clarifies from confusion and error what the sages of the nations reached through their reason and experience, accord with his words in Ein Ayah about the Holy Spirit of Hazal that brought them to insights which preceded what the sages of pedagogy among the nations reached through experience. In both places, the Rav expresses the same idea: that even in matters where there is agreement in principle with the sages of the nations—here with regard to morality and here with regard to education—the guidance of the Torah and of Hazal clarifies, refines, and adds foundations that human reasoning and experience are not sufficient to attain.

With blessings, S.Tz.

Yosef (2020-07-29)

Hello Rabbi,
If from this sugya—where the Talmudic discussion is based on the verse that one should strike one’s son—and today we find that this is something that actually has a harmful effect, can we infer that Hazal’s words were said only for their own time, and from here prove that in many other places as well Hazal’s words are time-bound and not relevant to us?
If so, how do we explain the verse itself? Shall we say that it does not mean striking but something else?
Thanks in advance.

Michi (2020-07-29)

Indeed. I have elaborated on this in my trilogy and elsewhere. The verse says that one should strike when necessary, which can certainly be correct. Beyond that, “rod” can also be a metaphor for other kinds of chastisement.

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