On Secrecy, Ambiguity, and Equality Before the Law (Column 125)
With God's help
Yesterday, following the publication of Ehud Olmert's book, may he live long, a media carnival began around the bombing of the Syrian reactor in 2007. I cannot stop getting angry about it, and not only because Ehud Barak crawled out of his hole and began chattering and glorifying himself, as is his way, and not only because this is an ugly war over credit and a carnival around the released prisoner Olmert, who has now enjoyed a media and public revival. What angers me mainly is the hypocrisy of the authorities and the military regarding the secrecy of information and documents (apropos Salah, Here Is the Land of Israel, and the secret archives kept classified for thirty years), and the preference given to personal interest and power over the public interest. So for the time being I have frozen the columns I had planned and decided to write about this today.
The policy of ambiguity: the bombing in Syria and the Israeli nuclear program
Everyone understands that this was a very sensitive event. As they keep telling us all day long (as if anyone did not know this on his own, even without being a general or a government minister), one of the main considerations surrounding the operation, beyond the fear of failure that would leave Syria with a nuclear capability, was the fear of a Syrian response and of a war that might break out between us and the Syrians, who could not allow themselves to ignore an injury to their sovereignty. Therefore a decision was made to carry out the operation and maintain ambiguity, similar to the policy of ambiguity regarding our own nuclear capabilities.
The policy of ambiguity is built on a play between two components: on the one hand, to make the truth clear in an obvious way (or at least to create a sufficiently significant fear that this is the truth). On the other hand, not to admit it openly. You have to release enough reliable information to convince the other side that it is true, but at the same time do so without admitting that it is indeed the truth. This is a very delicate line, and not at all easy to maintain without deviating to either side (that is, either admitting that it was us, or alternatively leaving things in a state in which the information is not sufficiently unequivocal).
The role of the first component is to create deterrence. If the enemy knows—or at least strongly suspects—that we have nuclear capabilities, he is sufficiently afraid even if we have not admitted it outright. If the enemy knows that we do not hesitate to act when necessary, he understands his limitations. The second component is meant to ensure that we do not have to bear responsibility for the situation or the act. Thus, if we have not admitted that we possess nuclear capability, one cannot demand that we join the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and agree to inspection. In a situation of ambiguity one cannot argue against us that if we have such capabilities, then it is legitimate for our enemy to have them as well (for who says we have them?! We deny it). One must understand that in international discourse one cannot demand such a right for us while at the same time denying the right of the Iranians, Syrians, and Egyptians to do the same. I will note here that Egypt does not sign treaties on this matter because Israel has not signed them (see, for example, here). It seems to me that Egypt is the primary force in condemning Israel and demanding that it disclose this information and dismantle its nuclear capabilities. The same applies to the strike in Syria. If we did not admit that it was our doing, Syria would not be obliged to respond in order to preserve its sovereignty and deterrence. That way there is no international condemnation and no price we have to pay for carrying out actions that violate another state's sovereignty without a justified legal basis.
Except that it isn't
That indeed was the case until yesterday (more or less). But yesterday it all broke down. Since yesterday everyone knows that we did it. Everyone knows who supported and who opposed, who proposed X and who proposed Y, what the options on the table were, who voted for and who against, who initiated and who was dragged along, who deserves credit for the operation and who is merely a charlatan and a consummate thief of credit (each one says it is, of course, the other). And I, insignificant as I am, wonder what happened to the policy of ambiguity. Who allowed all these people to place this sensitive information in the public domain at the expense of all our security? Where did the security considerations and the immense sensitivity that almost prevented this operation disappear to? What about the fear of war with Syria or other acts of retaliation on its part?
All that is nonsense. Yesterday, as if by magic, all the fears vanished. The restraints were removed and everyone is talking his head off. This is done, of course, while explaining that this cannot be revealed, that is secret, the other thing is classified, and for that the time has not yet come, and so on and so forth. Hush-hush. Safeguarding secrecy is uppermost in our minds. Only one detail has ceased to be secret: that the operation was carried out by the State of Israel (along with various other details listed above). Ambiguity is dead. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that of the policy of ambiguity only the first component remains, and in full force: today everyone officially knows that we did it. But its second component has dissipated into smoke. Dead. And what about bearing responsibility, and the expected consequences due to the absence of the second component? Assad is still here, after all (unfortunately). Only ten years have passed since the operation, and all the actors are still among us (except for about a million souls whom those very actors slaughtered, and a few million more whom those merciful souls expelled to the ends of the earth and who are no longer among us).
The puzzle
Has the danger now passed? I assume it is less than it was then, and even so, who decided that precisely now was the time to let go? How was it determined that specifically now the danger is at a low enough level? Why not two years ago, or two years from now? And what about the nuclear issue? Why do they not reveal the truth to us there (and who decided and who deserves credit? Well, everyone already knows that. Perhaps that is the secret behind the preservation of secrecy on the nuclear issue).
But the difficulty goes far beyond that. Why is much less secret information (such as the archives of the Jewish Agency and government institutions that dealt with the absorption of Moroccan Jews in the 1950s) carefully kept from prying eyes for decades? Why do other military operations remain shrouded forever? They are not disclosed even many decades after the event, and no one knows that they were carried out, who carried them out, and certainly not that we carried them out.
Are all of these more secret than the bombing in Syria? Are the concerns that created the policy of ambiguity regarding the bombing less significant than the fear of a leak of bureaucratic information from the 1950s, or of old military information leaking from the Sinai Campaign or even from the 1970s and 1980s? After all, that information has long since ceased to be relevant. The units have changed, the technology is different, the people are no longer the same people, and yet much information on these matters is carefully guarded lest it leak.
And the answer…
So what happened here? Why has the information about the bombing of the Syrian reactor been spread far and wide since yesterday? Very simple: the released prisoner Ehud Olmert has finished writing his book, which deals, among other things, with the bombing in Syria. Olmert takes credit for himself (which may indeed be due him), and apparently also wants public rehabilitation. Beyond that, he also wants publicity for the book, which will surely now become a hysterical best-seller. There is no person in the world whose head has not been pounded with this subject over the past two days. Who could hope for such publicity for his book? (By the way, I am considering revealing to you the considerations that led me to write Shtei Agalot. Surely here too the entire media will burst into a carnival of discussions and interviews, and the great buzz that will arise will turn the book into an international best-seller. How did I not think of this earlier?!).
Olmert again
When Olmert was caught smuggling secret materials out of prison, and also in the very possession of them (and in an unsecured place at that), we were blandly told that this was not so terrible. True, he is a convicted criminal, but one should not suspect him of harming state security. After all, this is a former prime minister who naturally holds quite a bit of sensitive information. He did take bribes (and apparently did many other things, only some of which were proved in court), but state security is his guiding light. He may have committed crimes for the sake of money, but harming state security for the sake of money—that is unthinkable. The Jewish people were not suspected of this (the Jewish people are not suspected of such a thing).
Jewish law teaches us that a a wicked person guilty of robbery (a wicked person suspected of offenses motivated by greed for money, such as a robber) is, according to all opinions, disqualified from testimony (Abaye and Rava disputed the case of a a wicked person who is not guilty of robbery, but there it apparently was not a question of suspected falsehood, but of a social sanction). If he is prepared to desecrate the Sabbath and to rob in order to make money, then he should also be suspected of false testimony in exchange for money. Fine, but that is only our dark and fossilized Jewish law. The noble Olmert is above all this.
But now it turns out, to no one's great surprise, that he does indeed do exactly that. The carnival that he himself caused apparently harms state security and endangers each one of us. The fact is that until now no one published these materials and no one admitted that the operation was our doing. So why exactly now? Because Olmert wants to publish a book and boost its sales. This particular released prisoner is once again behaving criminally in order to make money. a wicked person guilty of robbery, as we already said?
Equality before the law
So why is no one doing anything? Where is equality before the law? After all, Olmert is no longer prime minister and the power is no longer in his hands. Where are the governmental and security authorities charged with preserving secrecy and protecting our security? Did they fall asleep on guard? Well, this is Olmert we are talking about—his money (corrupt, at least in part), his spokesmen, and his expensive and successful lawyers. Equality before the law is dead. If Mas'uda from Sderot had done such a thing, she would have spent the rest of her life in prison. When Yona and Berel Katznelson, Yemenite immigrants from Rosh HaAyin, demand that archives be opened so they can see where the son who disappeared from them went, the whole state rises on its hind legs. Why, that is harm to state security, isn't it? The sanctity of archival secrecy is our supreme concern. But Olmert is permitted everything. Otherwise, how will he sell the book? How will he be forgiven for his crimes? How will he be remembered favorably in history without the current carnival?
But on second thought, perhaps there really is no need to keep these things secret. Perhaps the secrecy with which they stuff us day and night is all pure nonsense. In light of what is described here, can we have any trust in the judgments of the institutions of the state regarding information and its exposure? Perhaps there really is nothing secret in anything they hide from us? Regarding some things, I have long thought that this was the case, but now the question arises in full force even with regard to sensitive military and political information. I no longer believe these guys about anything…
Discussion
I find it hard to understand why every media/police outlet in the country is interested in anything that scoundrel has to say.
Including this post.
Why is this a matter of public concern, why do him a favor with all this buzz, let him rot and that's it.
I'll just note that sometimes there is an interest in maintaining secrecy or ambiguity, and over time that interest changes, and explicit assumption of responsibility דווקא serves the security goals.
One may assume the matter was discussed from all sides when the decision was made to go public.
I’m not familiar with all the details. From a quick look at the Wikipedia link, I saw that the censorship was lifted בעקבות a petition to the High Court of Justice. That is, the decision to remove the ambiguity was discussed in various legal forums and not behind closed doors. Are you claiming that Olmert or his agents are pulling the strings, and that the legal system is sitting in their pocket?
On the substance of the matter, I pretty much agree with Meir. It seems to me that Assad cannot respond to the strike now, and when he recovers and the situation in his country returns to normal, he will not be forced to take revenge to prove his sovereignty, after the statute of limitations, and after everything his country has been through.
So the danger seems small to me.
It should be remembered that besides the two variables you mentioned, there is another motive in favor of publication, namely the value of ‘freedom of information.’ Therefore, insofar as there is no convincing reason for censorship, in a democratic system the balance tilts in favor of publication.
So if we compare this story to other affairs on which secrecy was imposed, like the archives dealing with the absorption of immigration, it seems to me that the decision to hide that information is what should be complained about, not the decision to publish the current information.
A bit tangential, but the archives of the Jewish Agency executive were not closed to inspection, and in fact their contents were already researched decades ago. The claims of concealment were a spin by the creators of the series, which some populists in the political echelon latched onto, but even they have already admitted they were misled.
https://www.facebook.com/ayelet.benshaul.shaked/posts/1566745953443825
The archive files of the Kedmi Commission were closed (like all archival material) by default for any archival material that might contain information violating privacy, and indeed their expedited exposure following public pressure led to several serious cases of violation of privacy (the exposure of the identities of adoptees, not necessarily connected to the affair, due to errors in the process of redacting private information in the files). It is also worth noting that opening the files in question did not lead to any new discovery strengthening the claims of the blood libel in question; on the contrary – the information helped expose some of the frauds of those making the claims.
http://www.carmel.ac.il/pages/show/219
For some reason, the new security objectives crystallized precisely together with the publication of Olmert’s book… Or perhaps he too acts according to the General Staff’s instructions?
I criticized both sides in the piece.
I definitely think that the legal forums and the censor do not stand firmly against people with power and expensive lawyers. If you think the decisions there are completely objective, then in my opinion you are mistaken. The timing, together with the publication of the book, is highly suspicious.
The files are classified regardless of privacy concerns. Otherwise they could apply censorship, and besides, even after 30 years they are not to be opened. Security classification is 70 years and civilian classification 30 years.
As for the dramatization of the film and the series, Avi Pikard (the historian who accompanied the film) already addressed that in his comments here on the site on my post 103. What passed the thirty-year mark is indeed not classified, and that was what the dramatization revolved around. But the archives are indeed classified for 30 years. And, as stated, for security reasons for 70 years. I don’t buy the idea that the bombing of the Syrian reactor is less classified than all the other things that are sitting there under the same cover.
After watching parts of Roni Daniel’s film about the bombing of the reactor in Syria, it is clear to everyone that the media is trying to manufacture an alternative to Netanyahu and put in his place anyone possible, even raising Olmert, Barak, or Tzipi Livni from the dead.
I heard on the news here (Channel 1) several reasons for the timing of publication of the affair:
1. The fear of Assad’s anti-aircraft fire has already materialized.
2. According to the head of Military Intelligence and the chief censor: publication can help Israeli deterrence.
3. Israel wants to signal to another actor in the region.
There are always explanations, and sometimes they are even correct. But the question of timing (together with Olmert’s book) raises a heavy suspicion that this is not what it is about.
Here is someone else (Tamir Pardo, former head of the Mossad) who does not understand why there was a need to publish:
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3144398
It could be that the direction of causality is the opposite: Olmert knew that the censor intended to lift the publication ban on date X, and he timed the publication of his book specifically for that date so that he could benefit from the media resonance.
Rabbi Levi Yitzhak, defender of Israel. Fortunate are you. From prison Olmert received classified information about when the classification would be lifted? And this when it was actually reported that it was a threat of a High Court petition that persuaded Lieberman to allow it.
I agree that one should wonder about the strange coincidence and the close timing of the publication of Olmert’s book and the publication of the bombing of the reactor.
At the same time, I do not think the degree of outrage and drama (mine at least) crossed a new threshold.
I live among my people; we know our leaders. They have supplied abundant opportunities, in every field, for us to recognize the motivations that drive them. And this is just one more example.
I am still inclined to give credit and trust the censor and the legal system that they carefully weighed the significance of publication at the present timing.
I could not discern, among all the idle chatter that revolved mainly, of course, around “ego” battles, any leak about methods of operation, technological means, or other sensitive matters.
Let’s admit the truth. Most or all of what has been told in recent days was already published in the foreign media in the past.
Moreover, Assad, Nasrallah and the like already know the mindset, the players involved, and the decision-making in the cabinet from previous operations (see Operation Protective Edge).
What we mostly heard and saw here were idle chatter and pretty pointless prattle from the leaders (that is what they call them, though like you I have my doubts), lacking significance or sensitive security implications.
This too is not really new to us.
I would have preferred to leave this operation under ambiguity, in the drawer where it belongs.
It is a shame that base motives expose it even in this sphere.
At the same time, as has already been written here, one can also find diplomatic, security, and other benefits in the publication.
There is no room for drama about the very fact of its publication, neither in terms of the praise it contains nor in terms of the dangers involved.
Hello Erez.
You missed the core of what I said. Not for nothing did I focus on the policy of ambiguity and not on the classification of the information. The details that were revealed are not the important thing (though in my opinion problematic things were indeed revealed. By the way, I say this from information. I checked with several knowledgeable people who know the system and the considerations very well, and you can also hear it in interviews with various security figures in the media). My claim is that ambiguity has value in and of itself, even if abroad they already knew everything. On the contrary, passing the information through abroad is an inherent part of the policy of ambiguity, since as I explained, it is important that they know very well that it was us. Ambiguity means not hiding the information but, on the contrary, revealing it, only not admitting it. I explained this in the post, and now I thought of a way to sharpen the point, through an example I mentioned briefly in the post itself.
I mentioned that Egypt and Iran constantly claim that they are not prepared to give up their right to develop nuclear capabilities and to sign treaties in this field. To the claim against them that this is forbidden to all states (except the great powers, for the balance of terror and because of power), they answer that Israel also does not comply and no one comes to it with complaints. Equality before international law.
Seemingly a good argument. Is there one law for Israel and another for Iran? This is discrimination and exclusion of Mizrahim. But the point is that everyone knows the difference. Everyone knows that with Israel there is no fear whatsoever that it will make rash use of it, or use it at all, and it is clear to everyone that this is only deterrence against existential threats that everyone knows exist against it. By contrast, in non-democratic states like Iran or Egypt you really cannot trust them not to make rash use of it (if the Muslim Brotherhood were to rise to power in Egypt and have nuclear weapons at their disposal to realize the vision of the great caliphate. Think of ISIS with nuclear weapons). But of course you cannot say this explicitly, because it sounds very bad. It is against the rules of politically correct discourse. The law is supposed to be equal for everyone.
The policy of ambiguity allows the world to claim that Israel has no nuclear weapons, since it denies it. If you say that everyone knows it does, that is of course true. But everyone can use the ambiguity to deny it. When the real truth is that they are not really in favor of equality, and they have no problem with the inequality between Israel and Iran for the above reasons. But this cannot be said explicitly, and therefore ambiguity is important.
Note well: there is no concealment of information here, only a policy that enables international discourse that will lead to the goals desirable for us. On the contrary, it is important to make it clearly known to everyone that we have nuclear weapons in order to deter various threats, and at the same time it is important to deny all the information in order not to bear responsibility and to allow the world not to agree to the nuclearization of Iran and Egypt. This is an example of the importance of ambiguity with no connection at all to concealing information. That is what I was trying to explain in the post. Mark this well.
Thank you for the sharpening and clarification. I agree with your words.
Ambiguity in the nuclear context is clear.
To the best of my understanding, ambiguity has different purposes. It depends on the event or situation it is meant to obscure.
As you wrote, in the nuclear issue there are many benefits on the international-diplomatic plane.
In this case, I think the main benefit of ambiguity is to allow Assad room for containment, which will translate into a policy of restraint.
Both sides are playing “make-believe” in order not to escalate the situation and throw the region into a whirlpool.
That was true of the situation 11 years ago.
Since then, a lot of water has flowed under the bridge. The Syrian regime’s capacity to respond is poor and limited (if it exists at all).
Israel attacks weapons depots, warehouses, and whatever it wants, whenever it wants.
Seemingly, now, the bombing of the building that concealed a nuclear reactor looks like just one more among the bombings we hear about almost every other day.
When I think about it, precisely the latest case in which our plane was shot down removed the cloak of ambiguity, and it seems to me to have made it entirely superfluous.
In the new situation that has arisen, and because of Syria’s new status as an Iranian client state, with all that implies,
Israel is forced to act (and this is indeed what Israel is doing) not “by implication” or under ambiguity.
It seems to me that the rules of the game have changed.
In my opinion the matter is this:
Lieberman is a “soldier” of Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Noni Mozes (as is known from testimony, for example https://www.themarker.com/advertising/1.5807072 , and proven in analyses by media critics).
Olmert’s book is published by “Yedioth Books,” and Olmert himself, like Lieberman, is on Yedioth Ahronoth’s list of favorites.
Lieberman pushed to allow the publication for his master Mozes.
That’s all
A few comments:
1. It was not Olmert who decided on the publication, but merely took advantage of the permission that those who decided to remove the classification gave him (and in this case – lawfully). The claims should be directed at them.
2. I have no idea why it was decided to remove the classification. But I find it hard to believe that the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Justice Minister (it seems to me they are the ones who decided to allow publication) did so because of a desire to glorify the names of Olmert and/or Barak.
3. As for the claim that the classification was lifted because of the High Court. I do not know whether this is true, but even if so, with all my lack of trust in the High Court I find it hard to believe that it would compel publication if the security agencies declared before it that this endangered state security. You do not need a degree in game theory to understand the considerations behind the policy of ambiguity.
4. It follows that the publication probably had another motivation. I have no idea what it is, so all that remains is to guess. In about two months President Trump is supposed to decide whether he approves the nuclear agreement with Iran or cancels it. It may be that the publication was meant to signal to Trump, to the Iranians, and really to the whole world that it is preferable to fix the agreement, because otherwise…
Indeed, this is only a guess. Time will tell (or not).
Yay
I already explained that this may be true, but the correlation with the publication of the book raises heavy suspicion, and the ambiguity that remains around other operations no less secretive raises the same suspicion. The fact is that the decision to publish is meeting opposition from many directions among security people.
I, on the contrary, do not find it hard to believe, but as stated it is all speculation. My bet is that if it were not for Olmert’s book, the matter would have remained classified until the coming of the righteous redeemer, or at least until they remove the cloak of ambiguity from a thousand other operations no less secret than this one.
I remind you that my claim was a kind of either way argument: if this can be published (and perhaps that is true), then many other things can be published too, including things that do not serve the interests of Olmert and Yedioth.
Just now I suddenly saw what Amir Oren wrote:
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3144228