On Education, Security, and Policy: The Importance of the Middle Way (Column 149)
With God's help
Yesterday I read an article about an IDF response of "escalating intensity" to kite terrorism. It reflects some sort of compromise in the dispute between different parts of the public and the government (and I assume also within the army) over whether to respond forcefully, even to the point of killing those launching the kites, or whether forceful responses would actually drag us into escalation. This reminded me of two current issues, one security-related and one diplomatic, that have been with me for some time, and therefore I will depart from my usual practice and address here actual current-affairs considerations.
When I read what I have written here, I feel great embarrassment. It is so banal that there will surely be readers who ask themselves why this needs to be written at all. But it does need to be, and I ask your forgiveness in advance for that. I have reached the conclusion that I must risk banality and still make these two points. I will begin with the security point.
The dispute over the intensity of the security response
The article itself describes the considerations of the IDF and the government, as we hear time and again. They do not want to inflame the area and cause escalation. In their view, a strong response will not have a beneficial effect and will not prevent terrorism, as has also been proven in the past; on the contrary, it will intensify it by worsening the condition of Gaza's residents. The opponents argue that we have not acted strongly enough. Terrorism, they say, must be met with a strong hand, because only thus will the enemy understand and be affected. And what about experience, which teaches the opposite? The answer is that we did not respond strongly enough, and therefore it did not help. As we used to say in the Armored Corps: what does not work with force works with even more force. Others argue that a disproportionate response is immoral, and besides, the world will not let us respond that forcefully; it will also further increase frustration and escalation, and so on.[1]
At first glance, both sides raise good arguments. Some present this as a dilemma of heart (a strong response) versus head (a measured response), while others reverse the picture (in their view, restraint is precisely the heart and not the head). Fine, then who is actually right? I have already mentioned here more than once that, by the logic of my gut, in almost every public dispute both sides are wrong. So the first thing worth checking is whether there is some third option that has not been seriously discussed. Let this be a rule in your hands: in most cases there is such an option, and usually it is the most reasonable one.
The dichotomy
The right supports a total siege on Gaza in times of tension and in ordinary times as well, at least until they abandon the path of terrorism and make a credible agreement with us (if at all): renouncing the Hamas charter and recognizing Israel as the state of the Jewish people. No less. The left says that in this way we will get nowhere (and experience proves it), and therefore the siege should be removed, or at least loosened, regardless of Hamas's and the Palestinians' behavior. Frustration and misery lead to aggression and violence.
Not for nothing is there a lack of trust between the two sides: the left does not believe that the right is truly prepared to move toward the Palestinians even in a situation where there would be a chance to make progress (Palestinian violence is merely a pretext used by the right to justify what it wants to do anyway), since the right always supports a heavy hand and no concessions. And conversely, the right does not believe that the left is prepared to fight when necessary (because of a lack of belief in the justice of our cause). They always want gestures and compromises, again regardless of what the Palestinians do.
What happens in practice? Nothing. The army and the government are confused and devoid of policy. It is truly pitiful to watch them. They have no idea what to do, and it is clear to them that nothing can have any effect. At most, they are trying to gain a few more days of quiet. This of course arouses criticism from both sides, which again try to pull them either toward firm and consistent intensification or toward consistent gestures and concessions.
The third way
What emerges is that people who are in the middle (in my opinion, the vast majority), that is, those who truly want both peace and security (not those who merely talk about it), do not find expression in this problematic debate. Not the right, not the left, and not the government and the army (who belong to neither side. They are the vacuum in all its wretchedness).
It seems to me that there is one option that has not yet been tried, and it is actually quite simple: when there is violence and a response is required, one should act without hesitation and with great force; and when there is no violence and there is room to move toward them, one should do that with no less vigor. The only way that opens some chance of progress, if one does not believe in eliminating the problem one way or the other, is to adopt a tough and unequivocal path. But toughness does not mean violence and hardening in every situation; on the contrary, it means a combination of stick and carrot: Your deeds will bring you near, and your deeds will distance you. (your deeds will bring you near and your deeds will distance you).
Well, now the reader is surely saying to himself: so, the fellow is reinventing the wheel, or has come to tell us that parallel lines do not meet. Everyone understands that; the question is how to implement it correctly. But actually, no. It is important to understand that, contrary to the prevalent image, we have never acted this way, and certainly not now. Moreover, no one in the political discourse even proposes such a path.
There are indeed responses and there are gestures, but there is no consistency and no initiative. Our wretchedness in the face of the nuclear high-tech kites is truly heartbreaking. Gestures are currently given mainly in response to threats, and that is of course a grave mistake. The bombings too are carried out arbitrarily, not consistently and without any outline or clear policy. The heavy hand exists only in words (Liberman gives Haniyeh two days and eliminates him. Remember?). At the same time, no alternative is offered, no real carrot for the Palestinians. Today they do not believe that their condition will improve if they refrain from violence, and in my opinion they are entirely right. Violence generally improves their situation in the long run, because without violence we would give them nothing (would any Jew today support a Palestinian state if there had been no terrorism? Of course not).
The conclusion is that the policy we currently follow is mistaken in both directions: on the one hand, there is great weakness, and gestures are given in response to threats and violence; on the other hand, when force is used it is not sufficiently unequivocal and not consistent, and therefore it does not make clear to them the difference between the two alternatives. In addition, they are not really being offered a genuine possibility of making progress and improving their situation.
The Palestinians today understand, and with considerable justification, that there is no strong connection between their actions and our response. They receive gestures following violence, and sometimes we harden policy toward them when there is no real need for it (because they are not threatening, so why should we concede). Why should they stop the violence in such a situation? Especially since, as noted, in the long run they only profit from it.
Every child understands that a basic rule in education is that the response must fit the situation and the deed to which it is responding. The stick must come with a carrot at its side, and the use of both must be carried out consistently. But this simple rule is not applied in our relations with the Palestinians. People do not understand that such a consistent policy may be tougher and more frustrating in the short term, but it will yield better fruit (and also reduce casualties and suffering) in the long term. Gestures at the right time are very important, and a harsh response at the right time is no less important. Both the right, which wants hardening in every situation, and the left, which wants gestures in every situation and points to the distress and misery that lead to terrorism, are mistaken. Misery leads to terrorism when one thinks terrorism will improve the situation, and today it does indeed improve their situation in the long run (even if not in the short run). A heavy hand is effective only where it is accompanied by a carrot for different behavior. If that does not exist, no tough response will help and none will deter. Therefore, neither the policy of the left nor that of the right leads or will lead us anywhere. Certainly not the government's and the army's wretched non-policy.
The gestures of supplying water, electricity, and fuel while they are bombarding us with kites and missiles are, of course, folly. We should increase their supply to 24 hours, but when there is violence, reduce it immediately to 0 hours. This strategic folly is done for tactical purposes, and we pay for it in strategic currency. The goal is to prevent escalation in the short term, but the price is the perpetuation of violence in the long term (we all know that their promise to stop the kite terrorism would immediately bring them many benefits that they would not receive otherwise. So why should they not fly kites and then stop in exchange for gestures?). Bombing empty vehicles, as the IDF does today, is nothing but stupidity. Either do not bomb at all, or bomb the hell out of them. What did our idiots think they would achieve by bombing an empty vehicle? Perhaps to satisfy Israeli public opinion…
I have now found the following instructive clip from the film "The President":
Under a dual policy of consistent stick and carrot, the use of force would be much more effective, and so would the gestures. The left is mistaken in opposing force and pushing for unconditional gestures, because it perpetuates the violence. But the right too is mistaken in reversing the matter. One may say that the black-and-white picture is a grave mistake shared by both sides. Neither force works nor do gestures. Both the black and the white are black. Only an intelligent combination of the two, which is not at all what we are doing today and is not even proposed by anyone today, can perhaps advance us. The combination turns the black into black and the white into white, that is, it makes the stick and the carrot effective. Each of them on its own is useless nonsense. I do not know whether this will solve the problem, but it seems strange to me that people continue trying methods that have already been shown to be ineffective and do not try a different way. I do not think there is any especially brilliant idea here. It is very simple, but for some reason, in my view, it was not implemented and is not being implemented.
And what about the "experts"?
Beyond my general skepticism regarding expertise in the realms of security and policy, I really do not buy the learned assessments of the "experts" from the security establishment who recommend a restrained policy and certain kinds of responses that ought to be adopted. These assessments seem blatantly biased to me, since whoever is in charge of the matter naturally prefers to achieve short-term quiet (until his term ends), even if that comes at the expense of perpetuating the problem in the long term. We hear morning and night that the most substantive goal of the governmental and military authorities is to gain days of quiet. This is a proven recipe for perpetuating the problem (exactly as happens in child-rearing under such an inconsistent policy). When governments and army officers are elected and serve for a fixed period of a few years, the horizon they see before their eyes is the end of their term. Therefore I have no confidence at all in the wisdom of their decisions and assessments. So far they really have not proved themselves, and are not proving themselves. Achieving security and diplomatic progress, if they happen after the politician's term, do not really interest him. Hence the hysterical and confused reactions of the State of Israel. When you are trying in the short term to catch your own tail, you react hysterically to local events as they happen, and then of course you do not achieve even that.
With regard to decisions by a minister of education or transportation, we all understand that they are often made in order to achieve gains during the coming term.[2] Therefore nobody places trust in the decisions of our politicians, because it is clear that they are biased by their short range of vision and their desire for immediate achievement (at best). So why do we ignore the same effect in the diplomatic-security context?
And what about the world?
Moreover, if the use of force were truly implemented in this way, there is a chance that the world too would accept it better. In such a situation it would be clear that the responses are the result of actions against us, and not a constant and senseless policy of ours, lacking judgment and driven by an attempt to prevent diplomatic progress. Let us admit the truth: the world is actually right. There is no logic in our current conduct. We are simply abusing them, responding and harming civilians, without achieving anything. So what is the justification for all this? Someone once said (Kissinger) that the State of Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic policy. I think it has neither. Israel has no policy and no plan, and it forever reacts in a kind of infantile vicious circle that has not led, does not lead, and will not lead anywhere. Such abuse really looks bad, and rightly so. If it were clear to us, to the world, and to the Palestinians what the Palestinians' option is for improving their situation alongside our severe responses, the picture might look different. Today it is clear to everyone that we have no intention of improving their situation in the long run, but only of preserving quiet for the coming month. For that, gestures are given and sometimes we act harshly (or bomb empty vehicles and buildings). There is no consistent implementation of stick and carrot, and the Palestinians themselves, as well as the world, do not understand when they get one and when they get the other.
Against this background, it seems very strange to me that elections in Israel revolve mainly around diplomatic and security issues, when in fact no side has any policy on this matter. On one side there is talk of peace, and on the other side of security, but everyone understands that these two come together. Without this you do not get that, and vice versa. Therefore it is clear to any sensible person that neither these nor those will bring peace, nor security. So why talk about it at all? Why invest all the emotions in the policy of Likud or Labor? Is there any difference between them?
And once again, an apology
As stated, I hesitated whether to write these things because of their very simplicity. Moreover, it is clear to me that there will be readers who think that this is exactly the policy currently being followed, or the policy that the right/left proposes as an alternative to what is being done now. What is new in this post at all? But in my opinion that is a mistake. Indeed, there is nothing new here. These are astonishingly simple things that every child understands. The only problem is that this is not what is being done today, and it is also not what either side (right or left) is proposing to do. Think about it for a moment and you will see. Sometimes clarifying a simple idea can be very useful (see the introduction to Mesillat Yesharim).
Since I am already engaged in political criticism and simplistic proposals, here is another one, and this time we will move from security to the diplomatic sphere. And there too we will see a situation completely parallel to what we have seen up to now.
The negotiations
In our diplomatic process with the Palestinians, once again there are two extreme sides: the right explains that there is no one to talk to, and the left argues that the Palestinians have no one to talk to. "If people do not talk and do not give hope, how do they expect achievements?" they ask.
For years I have not understood this debate. If Netanyahu really means seriously that he supports concessions in exchange for genuine peace (nobody believes him, but I actually do), he ought to put forward one basic demand that would change the entire situation (in my opinion). He should declare loudly and clearly that the Government of Israel is not prepared to exchange a single word with the Palestinians or negotiate about a peace agreement until there is before us one agreed representation of the entire Palestinian public. Today they demand that we speak with the Palestinian Authority, and then when an agreement is signed, fire from Gaza will begin, and our response to it (lacking any policy) will return and nullify the agreement with the Authority as well. If we speak with Gaza and sign an agreement with them, then the Authority will torpedo it (as happens today). This is a hopeless situation, yet here people go on arguing all the time over whether there should or should not be negotiations and a diplomatic process.
What could be more called for than a simple declaration, publicly and before all the world, that there will be no more meetings and no more negotiations with any Palestinian whatsoever (including a threat of unilateral decisions on our part, along with steps to implement them), until an agreed representation of the entire Palestinian public is presented before us, one with which business can be done. If they do not place before us a body that can be spoken with, then what is the argument within our own camp and with the world even about? In the current state of affairs, our public debate over negotiations with them is a mere squandering of words.
In my opinion this is a logical and reasonable demand, and the world too would receive it much more understandingly than our evasive and confused positions today. Today nobody believes Bibi, since when the Palestinians united a few years ago he immediately came out against it. Instead of welcoming it and saying that now there was someone to talk to, and announcing the opening of negotiations (which of course would immediately have dismantled that agreement, but then it would have been clear who was to blame and what caused all this), the Israeli government stopped the talks precisely when there began to be someone with whom we could talk. No wonder the world does not buy it, and neither do the Palestinians. It means that in fact they have no one to talk to, and the Israeli declarations are mere lip service. Even as an evasive maneuver for someone who does not want to negotiate, this is the correct and logical maneuver to make. All the more so if there is someone who truly wants to try to advance toward a peace agreement. But logic is not a relevant parameter here. Logic does not exist among hysterical actors devoid of policy.
The similarity between the two discussions
The analogy between the security discussion above and the diplomatic discussion here is almost perfect.
Here too, a message that sets the two alternatives sharply, the stick versus the carrot, would be more effective and more understandable and acceptable in the world and to the other side: either you send an agreed representation to talks, and then we announce that we will agree to compromises under certain conditions and enter serious negotiations (and not merely empty words), or leave us the hell alone. Until then, truly, you have no one to talk to and neither do we, and therefore we will not talk. It is more understandable, more efficient, and more logical, and therefore it has a better chance of succeeding. Ah, and therefore it will also never be carried out.
And again, these things are utterly trivial, and it is really embarrassing for me to write a column about them. But again, neither the right nor the left truly adopts such an approach. The left wants talks at any price and blames us (the Palestinians have no one to talk to), and the right wants to prevent talks at any price (we have no one to talk to). And our hysterical and confused government and army try to maneuver between the two extremes (and the world) and to come through unscathed. The sane center, which does want to try to make progress, is left without political expression, trapped between two options, neither of which truly expresses its positions or advances them.
I will say again that I am not claiming that by this middle way, both diplomatic and security-related, it is clear that we will achieve results. It may be that there is no way to achieve them, whether because of us or because of them. But so long as we do not try the only logical path remaining, the confident assertions in every direction, right or left, will remain baseless emotions, as they are today. Einstein already said that only a fool, or someone who is not sane, thinks that if he repeats again and again methods that failed in the past, he may obtain different results.
[1] Note that for some reason both claims come from one side of the political map, and the other side agrees with neither of them. In my opinion, you will hardly find anyone who agrees with one and opposes the other, or vice versa. But apparent correlations are not our concern here; I have already dealt with that more than once in the past.
[2] On this matter, it is instructive to look at Edmund Burke's book, Reflections on the Revolution in France, which points to the advantages of monarchical rule over elected democracy in terms of its range of vision and horizon.
Discussion
The problem is that the legal system broke the stick. There is no more stick. So what is your solution now?
The world is not just. The rabbi is far too naive. The hypocrisy of the nations of the world is notorious. It would be most convenient for the world if we were in the sea. Everyone loves us when we are suffering and tormented. See, for example, the situation before the Six-Day War, and Kishon’s book Sorry We Won. In matters like these there is no choice but to adopt Ben-Gurion’s saying that what matters is not what the world says but what the Jews do (or in religious language: we will do what is right and just, and God will help us)
It seems to me that Itai’s comment was directed to the rabbi and not to my comment.
This is only a theoretical matter. For almost 18 years now, not a single month has gone by without attempted attacks. So there was no opportunity to use the carrot.
Hello Rabbi,
These are certainly convincing arguments.
But one may still wonder: how can such intelligent and wise people be mistaken about something so simple? Is it not because this is not a mistake at all, but rather that the right does not want peace at all, and the left does not either, though for other reasons?
And my question to you, honorable rabbi:
Most Torah people, at least the nationalist ones among them, hold right-wing views. Is that not because our Torah says that we have no desire for peace, because this land is ours and our neighbors must leave?
And if I am right, then the solution the rabbi proposes is not really feasible—so where are we headed?
With God’s help, 5 Tammuz 5778
The simple way to eliminate the kites is to set up installations on the border with the Strip that will create a constant storm wind toward the west, carrying the kites on its wings and driving them into the sea.
As it is written in the Torah: “And the Lord turned a very strong west wind, which lifted the locusts and drove them into the Red Sea” (Exodus 10:19). And in the Holy Writings it is said: “By the east wind You shatter the ships of Tarshish” (Psalms 48:8), and likewise it says: “And behold, a great wind came from across the wilderness and struck the four corners of the house” (Job 1:19), and through Your servants the prophets it is written, saying: “And behold, a great and strong wind rent the mountains and broke the rocks” (I Kings 19:11).
And if the power of the wind can bring down houses, tear apart mountains and rocks, and break stones – then all the more so it has the power to deflect the course of kites.
Regards, Shams Razael Abu-Tayyara
You are absolutely right. But as I wrote, in my estimation most of the public does want peace, but accompanied by a reasonable degree of security. That part of the public has no real expression in politics precisely because of what you wrote. Once awareness of this develops, the public will begin directing its representatives in other directions, and perhaps then politicians will also emerge who will go in those directions.
Do we really need a carrot? Seemingly, what needs to change is only the gap between the two situations. A person prefers a small stick to a big stick.
The problem with a carrot in our context is that they use economic rehabilitation to build military capability. In long-term wars, economic capacity is of decisive significance, and a faltering economy does not allow the Gazans to build an army.
With God’s help, 6 Tammuz 5775
We are deluding ourselves. Terror does not stem from a desire for independence nor from “Palestinian suffering.” Terror stems from the desire to destroy us. And in principle there is no difference in this between the PLO and Hamas. The difference is that the PLO, which in 1964 (three years before the “occupation”…) declared its aim to eliminate the “Zionist entity” – adopted in 1973, when they “smelled” a “peace” process on the horizon, the “stages strategy”: to accept what the Israelis give while continuing the struggle for the full liberation of Palestine.
That is what they decided in 1973, and they continued with it even after the Oslo Accords – they received rifles and turned them toward terror; they receive humanitarian aid and divert it to terror. On the contrary, the need to intensify hatred and terror grew after they received autonomy, since a corrupt dictatorial regime needs to provide the people with an “enemy” that will distract them from the corruption of the rulers, who do not care at all about the suffering of their people, and whose main concern is to fill their Swiss bank accounts with money.
However, on the merits of the matter, there is logic in the argument raised by experts that one should nevertheless preserve the existing terror regimes – Hamas in the Strip and the PLO in Judea and Samaria – because the collapse of central rule could pave the way for countless small terror organizations that cannot be controlled.
On the other hand, one could say that small and fragmented organizations would have fewer financial resources, and their internal struggles would also weaken their power and enable us to exploit their power struggles in order to eradicate them.
This is the real question that should be discussed: what would make coping easier for us: a centralized terror organization or disintegration? And for this “we need those who are informed,” namely the intelligence people, to express their view—and even then, “perhaps, but who knows”…
Regards, S.Z. Levinger
An important article dealing with what is obvious, and yet this is a voice that is sorely missing in the public sphere. It seems that what is missing today is common sense. I keep eagerly waiting for some response from Netanyahu or Liberman or some army commander, and nothing—not even a little “drink some water.” If only one of them would get up and deliver Churchill’s blood, sweat, and tears speech and promise that we will get through this period and afterward better days will come. Reality truly surpasses imagination: the country is burning—well, not all of it, but much of it—and not a single one of its leaders addresses the people and explains. Not the prime minister, not the defense minister, not the chief of staff. It is so very called for that its absence really testifies to confusion and embarrassment. Indeed, nuclear kites. Which teaches us what the value of endless armament is, and teaches about the famous limits of power. I agreed with every word regarding the stick and the carrot and the need to separate between them. It seems that governments throughout the generations, in their folly, hand out the stick and the carrot on the same day—to be precise, at the same meal. So the Arabs, who are dying to throw us out of here, became terribly confused, and they are burning down the clubhouse. That same clubhouse that supplies them with electricity and water. Yes, that same Beitar clubhouse from the famous sketch. The analogy between security policy and education is excellent. The idea may be banal, and your reservation is clear to me, repeated several times throughout the article, but its importance lies in the ability—or inability—to implement it. I need to make up for several articles I missed—more precisely, I was lazy because of their heavy weight. I’ll scold myself. Not a superfluous article at all. Thank you for the privilege of reading.
With pleasure
“If Netanyahu really seriously intends what he says—that he supports concessions in exchange for genuine peace (nobody believes him, but I actually do)”
Why believe him? He does nothing for peace (for better or worse). It seems to me that part of his policy is specifically to prevent the formation of a single representative body. Better that way—he can claim there is no one to talk to.
In other words—they are intentionally not doing what you propose. Their policy is to do nothing.
The Palestinians, of course, are another issue.
You are too optimistic. The government’s actions do not testify to its intentions. It is just stupidity, not planning or policy. But there is no point arguing about that, because that is not our topic.
Michael, one can be cynical and lavish praise on the innovative and brilliant ideas that appear in this article,
but the truth is, this is an important enough subject to permit saying things that contain no novelty—the main thing is that they be useful.
Your claim:
Come, let us deal with the Palestinians using the stick-and-carrot method.
– The stick-and-carrot method requires several definitions; apparently the lack of definition is the reason for the government leadership’s lack of method, and your article does not present definitions.
A. Defining the entities.
B. The nature of the relationship between the sides.
C. The goal of the method—what do we want to achieve with this policy (what is the vision).
D. Defining the stick and defining the carrot.
A. Defining the entity:
Is the Palestinian people a single entity?
What happens if a lone individual carries out an attack—does the entire people get the stick? Maybe not; and what if it is only one delusional organization that does not represent the people? Who decides who represents the people?
etc., etc.—these are always recurring questions.
One of the reasons for the government’s confusion is the lack of a definition of the Palestinian entity. You do not propose a definition in the article, so what are you complaining about?
B. The type of relationship:
On the one hand, a relationship like parent and child, teacher and student, master and slave, man and beast—a relationship of ruler and ruled, where the will of the ruled is subordinate to the will of the ruler.
On the other hand, a relationship between equals, between two autonomous entities.
Stick and carrot belongs only in a ruler/ruled framework, only when the ruled party accepts and agrees with his state as ruled; within that framework he will want things to be as good as possible for him.
But when the ruled party is unwilling to accept his situation, his lack of independence, the “stick” will only strengthen his sense of inferiority, and the “carrot” does not interest him—he is rebelling against the very relationship in which he is placed.
For some reason you assume that the Palestinians accept their situation, and that the method will work.
C. Defining the vision:
Every educator who adopts stick and carrot defines a goal. What is our goal, what is our vision? Obedient Arabs singing Hatikvah, content with their lot and praising their Jewish masters,
or perhaps Palestinian Arabs with full political independence in parts of the Land of Israel.
Without defining the goal there is no point in adopting a method that has no defined purpose. The failure to define the vision is apparently the main reason for the confusion of our leadership.
D. Defining the stick and defining the carrot:
Is the “stick” to bomb a building with children in it, from a building from which rockets are launched? Yes or no?
Not to supply electricity for a whole month, perhaps a year, perhaps only two days?
The government is confused because it has not defined what is possible and what is not.
And the “carrot” takes us back to section C—what are we willing to give them?
Here too, you did not give definitions.
Your article did not answer foundational questions, and therefore what you propose is not practical.
Dear Yaakov, I do not think there is a single idea in what I wrote here that goes beyond the trivial, and certainly nothing brilliant. I have written that here more than once.
On the other hand, your claims are all blatantly irrelevant to the discussion. Basically you are claiming that I did not submit a detailed position paper covering all the possible options, definitions, and situations. Indeed, that is true. That was not my purpose. I wanted to explain what the general outline should be. Now you are of course welcome to propose definitions for all the points you raised (in my opinion there are several more, and there are also some that are irrelevant, but there is no point dealing with that here), and then turn the general contours I proposed into a concrete idea. Once it becomes an idea, it may perhaps be possible to discuss whether it is practical or not. When there is no idea, there is no point discussing whether it is practical.
Good luck.
Your article presents a position, admittedly in general terms, but it does present a position.
The general outline you present requires your position on the foundational questions above (or on some of them).
I imagine that many of those following your article, myself included, want to know your reasoned position at least regarding the question of the vision.
What is our end-of-days vision for ourselves and for the Arabs living in the Land of Israel, even if that vision has no realistic chance under the current situation?
The Messiah does not seem to be on the horizon in our current reality either, but we are believing Jews who await the Messiah.
Aspirations for the complete and correct state should always exist, even if they are not implementable in our current condition.
The fact that you want to know my position—that is entirely legitimate. But it has absolutely nothing to do with what I wrote and with your critique of it.
As for my general position, I do not think the question is well defined. A utopian vision assumes an ideal reality. How ideal? That the Messiah comes and there is complete redemption? That our hand is mighty? Then my vision is that the Arabs live with us in peace and accept the halakhic and national Jewish rules. Of course, that says nothing and is not important to the discussion, because it is a utopia and there is almost no disagreement about it. You are asking about a non-utopian reality, and at the same time you add that it is not implementable. So to what level of utopia should one relate? You need to define that, and then one can think about a vision. Precisely this question, which ostensibly strives for precision, suffers from vagueness and lack of precision.
I repeat that, to the best of my judgment, my remarks do not require a formulated position regarding those questions. They are correct (in my opinion) regardless of all that. Whatever the vision may be, it is not right to adopt only the stick method or only the carrot method, if only because they are ineffective. Of course, if you favor immediately exterminating all the Arabs or exiling them right now, then indeed there is no point to my discussion. But it seems to me we already agreed that utopias are not our concern here.
Thank you for the comment (your comment is very important; indeed many people try to apply their utopian vision to everyday reality because of a failure to distinguish between types of visions).
For the purpose of defining the question, I would try to distinguish between a human vision and a messianic vision. (This is a preliminary attempt at a definition; I would be happy for your help in making this distinction.)
A human vision: an aspiration to apply just values (in all areas) within a natural physical and human framework.
A messianic vision: a vision within a physical and human framework that is beyond what we know as natural.
For example, democracy is a human vision—even though it is not perfect, it is the most complete thing that exists within the current framework. A king from the house of David is a terrible thing in today’s existing reality, but a perfect thing within a framework of truly upright and wise human beings. (When all shall know and recognize, when the Lord is One and His name One.)
My question regarding your vision refers to your human vision,
within a world where no one has a monopoly on the truth, within a world that requires democracy.
Unfortunately, this still does not tell me much. What does all this have to do with the question of dealing with and relating to the Palestinians, and with what I wrote here? This is not about visions but about common sense. My claim is that only a stick or only a carrot is ineffective.
Of course, for someone whose practical vision is the immediate expulsion or mass extermination of all the Palestinians, this is irrelevant from his point of view. But even according to his view, what is being done today makes no sense. It seems to me that on this there could be a consensus among all vision-holders (because what is being done today is devoid of vision and devoid of a path and purpose).
You are proposing a stick-and-carrot outline; you are not only claiming that only a stick or only a carrot is illogical.
You must have some kind of vision that your outline leads toward.
(I have a feeling that this time too we will not draw water from the rock.)
Against Burke’s argument, Machiavelli argues in the Discourses that republics have an advantage over monarchy דווקא because of flexibility and the ability to change policy quickly. In the French Revolution, about which Burke writes, elections were held once a year. Today we try to hold them once every 4 years in order to prevent that kind of dizziness. In addition, just as there are politicians focused on the present, so too there were kings focused on the present (or worse—on increasing their personal benefit at the public’s expense).
I join Yaakov’s claim that in fact you have not proposed anything here. I look at the situation in the State of Israel and am reminded of the Hundred Years’ War between France and England (Barbara Tuchman described it well in her book The Fourteenth Century). People propose all kinds of suggestions that go nowhere. One can claim that these proposals advance us, since through discussion and trial we may improve the situation. I doubt it.
I have now inserted a wonderful video into the post:
From where shall we bring a carrot, after they burned the field where it grew?
Regards, Grandpa Eliezer
With God’s help, 5 Av 5778
Perhaps it is not for nothing that the post deals with “education, policy, and security,” because if there is any hopeful horizon for peace, it is only through educational influence. Just as the internet and social networks can spread hatred and violence – so they can be used to spread values of morality, love, and peace, which over time may even reach society in countries where the authorities spread the poison of hatred. Obviously such a positive influence will not bear fruit in the near term, but in the long term, “there is a covenant with propaganda that it does not return empty-handed” 🙂
Regards, S.Z. Levinger
In summary:
From the security perspective there is only one way: to deter the terrorist leaders who dispatch the attackers. They are driven by an abysmal hatred that denies the very existence of the Jewish people in its land, and they also need a state of perpetual war in order to distract their own people from the corrupt dictatorship of their leadership – and therefore they have no interest in any political arrangement.
The only opening for hope lies in deep processes that may develop within Palestinian society, which could create a new scale of values or bring disillusionment with the illusions their leadership is “selling.” A personal example on our part of fair moral conduct, alongside suitable public diplomacy directed at the Arab population – perhaps these will bear fruit in the long run, “if not in five years – then in fifty years…” 🙂
Regards, S.Z. Levinger
Since reality consists of a broad scale of possibilities, in order to simplify the dispute each side presents the other as though it supports one extreme of that scale, even though both sides are more complex than they are portrayed. I will apply this to your example: Hamas has developed a habit for itself in which it fights in rounds, between which it signs ceasefire agreements. The ceasefire period is ostensibly the appropriate opportunity for implementing the carrot method. But there will be those who argue that the ceasefire period is really Hamas’s rearmament period in preparation for the next round. It is not that Hamas has internalized the Israeli response; rather, it has moved to the stage of replenishing its ammunition stockpile for the next round. Giving carrots at this stage will only help the terror organization strengthen itself more easily and quickly. Those who support this claim will support carrots only following a policy change on the enemy’s side. By contrast, whoever sees the Israeli response as the factor driving terror will strive to give carrots wherever possible. To sum up: both sides agree that carrots and sticks should be given; the question is about the dosage, and it is influenced by each side’s worldview. Presenting things in binary form is only meant to simplify the discussion, and because of the sorites paradox. So your proposal is accepted by everyone anyway; in fact it is the most basic foundation of a more complex discussion—the discussion about dosage. We are talking about the opinions on the issue; the question whether each political side implements the policy it declares is another question, which I have not discussed here (since you have not either).
You present the stick and carrot in an overly simplistic way. Clearly the intention is not to give them a hudna for rearmament. I wrote that everyone understands this logic, but in practice it does not happen that way.
In light of the massacre that happened on Simchat Torah, would you change anything in this column?
Not at all. On the contrary, perhaps such a sensible policy would have prevented that massacre.
Netanyahu is a devotee of the status quo. What was will be. Any change could lead to unpredictable results and undermine his voters’ sense of security. Time is playing in Israel’s favor. Israel is growing and expanding and achieving more and more successes. True, there is a problem with Gaza, but it is possible to live with problems. And the Gazans would do well to get used to the fact that they are not going anywhere. This is not just talk but deeds. All the major confrontations ended with a return to exactly the same place (Protective Edge, the magnetometers, the settlement freeze, and more). This is what the voters want, and Netanyahu makes sure to deliver the goods.
And what will happen in a few years when the Democrats return to power and eat us alive the way Trump is now eating Iran alive? God is great – either the lord will die or the dog will die, or who knows what will happen.