A Chosen People – A Look at Racism (Column 445)

With God’s help

I’m surprised, because at first glance it seems to me that the discussion here is entirely a discussion of definitions. That is, it seems the rabbi assumes that:

A. “Racism” does not mean a factual claim, whether true or false.
B. “Racism” is not the taking of discriminatory actions, or at least one cannot criticize actions on the basis of the word “racism.”
C. “Racism” is something people see as a bad thing, and if we combine the previous assumptions it follows that this is unjustified.

But if the whole discussion is about definitions, then what room is there for criticism? One may call a person who makes mistaken assumptions about different groups out of laziness or simply a distorted worldview, or alternatively who discriminates on such a basis, a “racist,” a “Moshiko,” a “Timbuktu,” or a “Cock-a-doodle-doo” (the word the rabbi likes so much). What sense is there in criticizing someone who calls such a person a racist on the basis of a different definition of the concept “racist,” according to which racism is דווקא ethically just fine?

Unless the intention is only to refine the problematic point and say that it is not really in the assumption that a difference exists, but in the practical consequences or in the laziness involved in arriving at such a mistaken assumption—but I don’t know whether there is anyone who disagrees with that, and even if there is, I didn’t understand why the rabbi claims there isn’t one (one can recognize, as a value, the value of “not thinking nonsense about another person.” For example, halakhah recognizes the value of judging others favorably, and this is not the place to elaborate).

By the way, regarding the rabbi’s claim that if we assume all women (or even most of them) are different from men in learning ability, there is still no basis for forbidding them to study—I am puzzled. After all, the opponents rely on the words of Hazal and Maimonides, according to whom a woman is not only “less talented” in Torah because of her character and so on, but the combination of that character with Torah creates (at least in most cases) actual harm: “it is as if he taught her frivolity,” “they turn words of Torah into trivialities because of their limited understanding,” and so on. One can agree, disagree, or not even understand the initial assumption at all, but it is hard to fault someone who assumes this claim is true from the angle of “why not?”

Or perhaps I didn’t understand?

Well, this is what happens when people disparage psychology.. 🙂 Not a word or reference to the human being’s instinctive aversion to the other, to people’s tendency to project onto that other all the bad traits they imagine (and in most cases, their own), and the attempt to destroy that other as part of the pathetic attempt to cope with the evil within ourselves by erasing it. All these things, which have been discussed quite a bit and which have a great deal of meaning, content, and logic, are lost in the cloud of definitions. The fact that we can define things does not mean we have understood the phenomenon. The moment you define the map as you see fit and classify everything according to the definitions, an illusion is created that the whole problem is clear and solved, when in fact all you’ve done is describe it in different words and the question remains exactly where it was. Think of a Brisker analysis of a sugya—I’m no expert in that, but from my experience, there are situations where all the analysis does is draw distinctions, without explaining why that distinction matters or even what it means, and so the whole “analysis” is no more than a new way to describe the question without advancing a millimeter toward its solution. So you distinguished between different behaviors (fact-finding, discrimination, and the like) and ostensibly covered the whole field, but in practice you completely ignored the psychological movement that stems from racism, is created by it, and feeds it: the fear, the hatred, the disgust, the contempt—the things that bring about all the ethical failures you described, and likely are their foundation. So let us define this psychological movement as racism—you can call it something else too if you really insist that “racism” is an empty concept (I’m not responsible for Shahav’s definitions, for that matter)—but it is the main thing, it is the heart of the matter, and you didn’t say a word about it. I assume you may tell me I have no proof that the mechanisms I describe exist—but I can honestly tell you that I know them, first of all from within myself, and also from the reasonable assumption that they exist in other people, because they explain so much. The assumption that all people are simply rational creatures from the planet Vulcan who can at most make mistakes in analyzing reality—that is what requires proof, in my opinion.

You are conflating a discussion of definitions with an analytical analysis of a sugya. What I am showing here is that from conceptual analysis it emerges that racism in its evaluative sense is almost empty of content. If you define racism in a factual sense—fine by me. That’s semantics. And if you think that is agreed upon by everyone—excellent. For some reason I constantly hear accusations of racism all around me, but perhaps you live on a different planet.

And regarding women’s Torah study, there are also men who turn Torah into trivialities (some of them are considered great Torah scholars). Is that enough to forbid them to study? Let them do so, and we will correct them or not accept what they say.

I have no quarrel whatsoever with the psychological claims you presented, except that they are irrelevant to the discussion.
I did not come to solve the problem of racism, and so the claim that I solved nothing is irrelevant. I came to define the concept and make several fundamental distinctions from which it emerges that it has no evaluative content (which in my opinion is important when we come to solve the problem as well. First of all, it is important to define it).
In everything you wrote I did not find even one argument against anything I said. You pointed to problematic traits of human character, and that is certainly worth discussing and sounds very plausible. But what does that have to do with my point? What exactly are you disputing? I get the impression there is one point of contact with what I wrote, but you can see that in my discussion of the Chosen People I point to racism in a psychological sense close to what you described (although there it has traditional causes, Torah sources, and so on, beyond psychology). There I would be willing to speak of a smell of racism, but even there it is not racism in the full sense. Of course, any similar attitude like those you described deserves the same characterization (a smell of racism).
And in particular I do not understand what any of this has to do with my disparagement of psychology. I am not dealing here with psychology, and it is not relevant to the discussion in any way. Except for one aspect I noted: that factual racism can form a basis that leads to discrimination and exclusion.
Of course I also do not assume that people are completely rational, and that can be seen in every section of this site. On the contrary, I usually lament the lack of rationality. Among other things, that lack of rationality expresses itself in a tendency toward emotionalism in a conceptual discussion, and in mixing levels of discourse (in particular between psychology and essence).
As for your lack of skill in learned analysis, I take that as a personal insult (and I also disagree) 🙂

In a peaceful country two races live comfortably side by side. All members of one race, the round race, are endowed with every talent, while all members of the second race, the triangular race, are not (except perhaps for the talent for war, at which the triangles are very gifted). All the rules of the game are completely fair, and in the end one race occupies all positions of power and wealth. Is this the optimal state of affairs from a utilitarian perspective? Would this produce a stable society? Does it *pay* for the triangular race to live in such a country rather than separate and establish another state (or, in fact, push the round race out into another state, or another world)? Are such questions relevant in your view?

“I assume we would agree that the statement that black people on average play basketball better than whites, or the statement that LeBron James plays basketball better than I do (not on average), pale little me, are not racist statements. These are factual descriptions.”

Absolutely not true. That is a racist statement.
Out of all the possible distinguishing parameters (and there are many), you chose a race-based parameter. That is a racist statement arising from a racist worldview. Even if it is true, it is still racist.

And of course the most common racism is a parent’s love for his own offspring.

I think this is relevant only indirectly. For me morality is not consequentialist (except in the Kantian sense, as a hypothetical consequence), and therefore such a consideration does not bear on the question whether this is moral or not. But sometimes a consequentialist consideration can determine policy even in the absence of moral considerations, and so I would certainly understand triangles who would not agree to such a policy. By the way, there may of course also be triangles who would agree that this is indeed the best state of affairs even for them.
But beyond all that, even if I accept your consequentialist claim in the evaluative dimension (for example, according to the categorical imperative, a state in which all the roles are in the hands of the triangles is not an ideal state, and therefore it is not right to act this way), then the conclusion is that it is not right to assign all the roles to the rounds. Why does that have anything to do with the question of racism?

The post about Immanuel appears in some online journal of Modern Haredim. I read it there.

It was a response column to someone who tried to explain there the differences between Ashkenazi and Sephardi culture in order to justify the discrimination, and also argued that part of the Sephardi mentality is whining. And you pointed out there that this is an evaluative characteristic (he tried to present it as a purely factual one).

One more preliminary question, if I may. Two people on a deserted island each keep a finger plugged into a dam, such that if one of them removes his finger they will both suffer greatly. One of them is tall and picks tasty fruit from the nearby trees, while the other is short and makes do with gathering grasses and the fruit that fell from the tree. The short one is of course permitted and welcome to send his cubit to take from the ownerless fruit (if his cubit grows longer, he too will succeed). What does the magical deontological morality say in such a case? That is, what is the tall one obligated to do, and what is the short one (who is very strong, by the way) permitted to do? And what if the tall one is not picking ownerless fruit, but actually planted the tree as well (the short one does not know how or cannot manage to plant short trees, or there are none).

I think racism is expressed when one ethnic group is understood to have an advantage/disadvantage relative to another.
One must distinguish between preference, which is indeed a subjective feeling of an individual toward his country, his people, his culture, his language, the food of his home; and a sense of superiority that an individual holds in relation to someone from another ethnic group.
For example: I love the State of Israel and the Jewish people very much, because I was born into it. Had I been born in Zimbabwe or Finland, I would probably feel more connected to those peoples. Even so, as a member of the Jewish people I do not see myself as superior or as having an inherent advantage over a member of another culture. I love the State of Israel and the Jewish people very much, but I do not think that the State of Israel is the best country in the world. Israel is the country to which I am most emotionally attached simply because it is my homeland, but I am aware that factually it is not the most successful and advanced country in the world, and there are countries that are probably better to live in.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between a personal preference by virtue of belonging and a sense of superiority by virtue of belonging. The latter, in my opinion, is the expression of racism.

Hi

On the one hand it says:
“defining the concept ‘Chosen People’ is a very difficult matter, and in my opinion almost impossible”

On the other hand it says:
“ In my understanding, as I explained there, the meaning of the Chosen People is a people chosen by the Holy One, blessed be He, and given a mission, and not a people possessing essential qualities different from the rest of the nations and human beings”

So I went to the dictionary and saw that one of the meanings of the word “definition” is:
“giving an explanation or interpretation for a term or concept”

On the one hand you said it is not simple to define the concept of the Chosen People, indeed almost impossible.
On the other hand you defined/interpreted it easily, in one line, and quite correctly in my humble opinion

So it is almost impossible, and yet you did it in one line?

Thank you, rabbi, I think I understand better now. But I assume that the attack on the “factual” planes within racism stems from the fact that they tend to lead to discrimination and the like (because if they are true, then why not really discriminate), and therefore society wants to suppress that, and not the very ability to discriminate, which is sometimes necessary. That is: even if the problem is in the result, one must deal with the problematic cause, namely giving justification for discrimination, and not with the derivative, namely discrimination itself, in a sweeping way.

And regarding women—again I am puzzled. After all, men are obligated, so what if they turn words of Torah into nonsense? And besides, one could argue (in principle) that women have a greater tendency toward this, and therefore it is proper to prevent it because the risk is greater. It doesn’t matter whether I agree or not—but the claim is not logically absurd, only at most factually mistaken.

I understood nothing. Above all, I did not understand why this is connected to this post.

Thinking your country is the best is racism? Strange. Whether that is true or not, there is not a shred of racism in it.

You don’t need a full school day for this. At first I was talking about the essentialist interpretation, and for that in my opinion there is no good definition, and it is doubtful how much content it has at all. Afterward I presented my view that this is not an essentialist virtue but rather a selection for a mission. Not very complicated—neither the definition nor the resolution of the contradiction.

It is not logically absurd, but it is unreasonable and unethical.

The connection is that complaints about racism *always* concern the fact that as a result a certain group ends up in a worse position relative to others (and perhaps in principle has better alternatives than continuing to be a quiet and convenient partner in the society. Or it has the ability to drill a hole in the shared ship). Now someone comes and explains to that group that everything is justified according to the laws of morality, and directs its attention to the fact that the ‘rules of the game’ are fair. In my opinion, such an explanation (a kind of discussion of a collection of principles that you and others call morality) simply does not touch the point at issue. Though of course everyone has the right to decide to discuss something irrelevant for his own enjoyment.

So that I may understand you, please give two examples:
of something that has an interpretation, but whose “essentialist interpretation” (that is, the definition) cannot be given.

And something that has both an interpretation and an “essentialist interpretation” (definition).

I didn’t quite understand why the rabbi says that if it is factual then it is not racism.
True, it is factual, but that still does not contradict the idea that the dispute is in the evaluative sphere.
If we take, for example, the shoe-size example, let us assume studies say that on average people with larger shoe sizes are more stupid. Even so, that would hardly cause anyone to discriminate against people with large shoe sizes, and people would continue to look at them individually and not collectively, simply because people would not perceive this as a cause, but as some correlation they do not know how to explain.
By contrast, in checking Arabs at an airport and being suspicious of them because the statistics say there is a higher chance of terrorism, something additional is at work here: the assumption that the very fact that they are Arabs is also a cause of their being terrorists (because they are educated into such a culture, or for various theological reasons, because Ishmael lives by his sword, etc.).
So overall, the anti-racists’ claim against racists is that just as there are all kinds of things where you will agree that we are dealing only with a correlation, even if you cannot explain it, and even so that will not lead you to discriminate against them—so too you should assume about everything that it is not causal. And if you discriminate against Arabs, that is a sign that from the outset you already assumed that his being Arab is a reason he will be a terrorist, and therefore the extra screening at the airport stems from evaluative racism and not from a factual claim.

Okay, I wrote that in the middle of the night, so indeed I was not clear. What I meant was that I don’t really have claims against your analysis here—so your response was justified—the analysis is perfectly fine. But in my opinion, if one contents oneself with this analysis when discussing the issue of racism, one misses the main thing, the heart of the matter: the psychological mechanisms that create this phenomenon—and it matters less to me what we call this phenomenon. But in my opinion, when people express revulsion toward racism, what stands in the background is not the concepts you described, which indeed are empty of evaluative content, but precisely those psychological mechanisms. It is clear to me that in your view psychology is irrelevant to the discussion, but that was exactly my point: ignoring psychology in this issue truly empties the discussion of much of its content, and so it is no wonder this is the conclusion. Because racism in its objectionable sense is first and foremost a *psychological* phenomenon with evaluative consequences, not a philosophical phenomenon with evaluative consequences.
And regarding my lack of skill in learned analysis—thank you, and truly most of the little I have came from you and Rabbi Blumentzweig, but it is still little:-)

I am not sure you understood the rabbi’s words.
The rabbi’s intention is not that there are two kinds of definitions (essentialist and non-essentialist), one easier to give than the other, but that in interpreting the specific term segulah there are two different directions of understanding on the most basic level: an understanding that this is about an essential difference or some metaphysical charge, or alternatively that it is about purpose or mission. As I understand it, the rabbi argued that interpretations in the first direction are harder to define clearly, since by their nature they are more vague and abstract. In other words: the claim is not that every concept has two levels of definition, but that in interpreting the concept of segulah there are two possible directions, not two levels but two options on the same “level”—except that one of them is harder to define sharply than the other.

It seems this was already written before, but perhaps it is worthwhile to formulate it in my own words as well.

I would like to suggest that racism is not the factual claim that there is a difference between different populations, but the moral claim that this difference should be preserved.

“So what, then, is racism? Assigning an attitude toward group X on the basis of characteristic A, when characteristic A is irrelevant to the attitude in question.”

Although I tend not to agree with the determination that arbitrary discrimination is not usually covert profiling (when a person says he is simply discriminating because he doesn’t feel like it, that makes one suspect he doesn’t feel like stating the basis for the profiling), the decision to focus so heavily on the micro-characteristic seems mistaken to me.

Your claim is that they choose a characteristic that in their opinion is relevant to the attitude in question, so since they claim it is a relevant characteristic, then this is not racism but an ethical failure.
But for every racist example one can find a second-order reason that is not such. Let us take your example: “racism is when I do not allow black people into the swimming pool, although their skin color has no connection to the activity that takes place there.” But if a pool owner claims that it drives away his clientele—is that racism?

Moreover, one can always claim that blacks have trait X that is indeed relevant (say, violent, and that harms the activity), and then you would say this is not racism. The trouble is that attaching negative traits to a racial group without cause will usually include enough general negative traits that something can indeed have an effect, given an interaction that is not completely sterile.

And I wanted to add two more points for now:

A. Nazism:
The comparison between racial theory and murder on the basis of shoe size is demagogic. Good luck getting people to murder on the basis of shoe size (although women in ancient China might perhaps have been willing…). But even today, if you prove beyond a doubt that the existence of a certain public will cause all of us to die in a painful and terrible way, I am fairly sure that in a broad survey there will be quite a few supporters of eliminating that public.
To say that the problem is the murder and not the racial theory, while ignoring the fact that the racial theory itself is a call to murder, is absurd—is the problem not that they held the ideology, but that they acted on it? An ideology without a call to action is a collection of meaningless data points.

And the conclusion regarding racism is the same: to say there is no problem in holding mistaken conceptions but only in acting on them artificially severs the ideology from the call to action, when the conception itself often includes a call to action.

B. The Haredi public:
In addition to the above, regarding the approach of the Haredi public, I do not understand why it can be defended even on your own view.
In the Haredi public, the attitude changes when appearance changes (Sephardim who look Ashkenazi)—which shows that the characteristic (skin color) really is not relevant to the attitude, because it is not about all those concerns you mentioned (for example, “the Lithuanian ethos and voting for the Agudat Yisrael party and not another, no television and Western culture, Hasidic songs and not Mizrahi ones”), because those concerns should not disappear between siblings in the same family where one is darker and the other lighter. More detail in Maayan David’s article:
https://iyun.org.il/article/haredi-discrimination/white-privilege/

Thank you for the explanation; הדברים are much clearer now.
As for an essentialist definition—why not say that it means that for the people of Israel it is easier to cleave to God?
All in all, that is fairly clear, and that is the metaphysical charge.

Secondly, if it is only a mission/purpose, then presumably those stem from some other advantage.
Just as one chooses who goes to officers’ course on the basis of certain advantages, or chooses
who works as a pilot on the basis of certain advantages.

That is to say, if the people of Israel were chosen to lead, that also means they have an essentialist advantage, does it not?

Presumably both. The racist thinks factually that there is an essential difference between what he identifies as “races” (meaning both physical and spiritual differences), and therefore there is a moral obligation to create a policy that distinguishes between or discriminates among the races.

You are attributing a fallacy to the racist. For as is well known, one cannot derive from the fact that there is a difference the claim that there ought to be a difference.

Beyond that, the factual claim of racists is certainly true—there are differences between different races; one can argue only about what the differences are, what causes them, and whether they can be eliminated.
Therefore, the point of dispute with them can only be over the evaluative claim they make—namely their claim that these differences should be preserved and not eliminated.

Even the thing you wrote that is closest to racism (“a smell of racism”) is not racism at all. Not in taste and not in smell. It is simply condescension (which I have no problem with if it is true. And I do indeed believe that it is so [except for pride, as explained below]). That is, people think they are better than others (which ostensibly is no problem if it is really true. The only thing that feels bad about it is that exaltedness belongs only to the Holy One, blessed be He, and pride is a reprehensible trait). And again, this is condescension on a national background. But all condescension is on some background, so what difference is there between condescension on grounds of race or nationality and condescension on any other grounds? In short, the concept of racism is completely empty. Not almost empty—completely empty. There is a problem with discrimination or with condescension. But racism is simply something that does not exist

And I also believe in the words of the author of the Tanya about the meaning of the deeds of the nations and their outer and inner dimensions. This is testimony for us from kabbalists who see deeply into the human heart and know its intentions (which a person is generally not aware of at all). And experience also proves much of this (although from the standpoint of experience, most of the Jewish people too are gentiles today according to this. But the minority that is inwardly good is all Jewish). In short, the overwhelming majority of human beings are egoists, and all the good they do usually stems from self-interest, mostly unconsciously (and at the decisive moment the evil in them will come out, and it will become clear that neither their good nor their evil was genuine). There are a few people of truth (people of spiritual stature) who indeed act well because it is good, but these are special people. And all of them are Jews.

Phil, in my opinion you are mistaken even regarding the factual level underlying the racist position. A true racist is not satisfied with the trivial claim that there are observable differences between races, but rather, as I already wrote, these differences are also spiritual. In his view, his race is “better” than other races in character traits, religious ability, morality, etc. Therefore he can justify his normative position demanding a different attitude toward other races.

It really makes no difference whether we are dealing with spiritual differences or not. The claim that there is a spiritual difference between races is still a factual claim.

The claims that one should derive from this spiritual difference a discriminatory attitude, or that one should act to preserve these differences, are moral claims that do not follow from that fact. And only on this moral plane is the dispute between racists and their opponents waged.

We have returned to the discussion about consequentialism. We have already conducted it more than once. The fact that I think something is justified and that this fails to persuade someone else is admittedly regrettable, but in my eyes it does not mean much.

Yuda answered nicely

Yes, but within a society that benefits from all its parts, I thought even strict deontologists would agree that “fair” rules are not enough. That is what the example of the short and the tall man was for.

You are repeating what I wrote: that racism can indeed cause discrimination and ethical problems, but in and of itself it is not a problem.

Everything you wrote here and before falls under my remark that racism can lead to various ethical problems. That is indeed true, and the mechanisms you described are part of the matter. I think we have no disagreement, except that in my opinion psychology is irrelevant to the discussion.

I am not familiar with a claim that there is an obligation to preserve these differences.

One can claim anything. The question is whether it is true. In my opinion it is not. There are differences between any two groups, of course; the essentialist question is whether the difference between the people of Israel and everyone else is different in kind from the differences between any two peoples. Beyond that, God’s choice can be completely arbitrary (what would you do if all the candidates for officers’ course had the same abilities?) or it may depend on non-essentialist characteristics (rather cultural and other ones, which are also subject to change).

If the rules are fair, then they are certainly enough

Usually it is not stated explicitly, but if one wants to interpret the racist position generously, this is the way, in my opinion.

Precisely regarding the last two examples you mentioned in the post—gender roles and the people of Israel as the Chosen People—the claim is indeed stated explicitly.

Opponents of women’s Torah study argue that it is not proper to eliminate the differences between men and women, and similarly believers in the thesis of the Chosen People usually also hold the traditional Jewish stance against missionizing, and oppose converting all the gentiles even if that were possible.

Could you please address directly the above example of the short and the tall one, and confirm that in your view both will keep a finger in the dam, the tall one will eat the fruit and the short one will not, because that is proper and fitting?

[Personally, I do not understand where the idea comes from that a person’s body or his tools of thought—things that “nature” granted to his “soul”—belong to him “in principle” more than to others. To me this is a clear naturalistic fallacy (though of course one can bridge it with a principle). The same goes for things a person created with talent and effort. But I did not need that here.]

Regarding the pool owner—this is definitely not racism. Perhaps it is not proper to do so, but what does that have to do with racism?!
I am not talking about liars who pin traits on groups just to justify discriminatory treatment. I am talking about people who truly believe these are their traits (whether rightly or mistakenly).

Regarding the Nazis, I answered that in my remarks. There is no principled difference between shoeism and racism. You can claim that in practice racism more easily leads to discrimination and murder than shoeism. I of course agree, and still it is not racism that is the offense but murder.

Regarding the Haredim, you state that appearance matters there. I really do not think so. In any case, if appearance is what determines things, then clearly I have no defense for it—unless someone argues that appearance expresses essential traits (there is correlation, even if not causation).

I will try to respond if you explain the question. I did not understand it.

It is clear that the claim regarding spiritual differences is a factual claim. Who said otherwise? But already here the dispute begins between the racist and his opponents. He sees the spiritual difference as a necessary condition (even if not sufficient) for discrimination, and they do not. That is, the dispute begins already at the level of facts

I am trying to ask about the case even before we arrive at a principled analysis of it. I could not identify what was deficient in the way I formulated it. In the above case (or perhaps I wrote the case itself unclearly too?) is the tall one, who benefits from his height, entitled to take all the fruit for himself, or is he obligated to share with the short one?

I did not understand the case or the dilemma. Could you describe it again clearly?

Two people live together somewhere. The prosperity of both depends on the efforts of both, meaning that if one of them stops making an effort then both will lose a great deal. One of them has a natural advantage that enables him to produce more when the rules are equal and justified. [A short and a tall man live on a deserted island. Both keep a finger in a dam, and if one removes his finger they will both be flooded and suffer. One of them is taller and therefore only he can reach the fruit, while the short one manages to reach only the fallen fruit, which is sparse and poor. The equal and justified rules are that each person is entitled to take ownerless fruit as he wishes].
The dilemma is whether the tall one, since he needs the short one’s efforts to hold back the flood, even though the short one will certainly keep making the effort because it is critical for his own sake as well, ought to share with the short one everything he obtains. Or whether, since the principled starting conditions are equal, and only the natural initial conditions are different (one happened to receive a tall body and the other did not), the inequality in outcome is of no significance, and the tall one is morally entitled to take all the fruit, while the short one is forbidden to beat him in order to take fruit.

For the purpose of the discussion, let us indeed assume that a person’s body (and his powers of thought and diligence, etc.) “belongs” specifically to him and not to others.

I am not at all sure this is a moral question. It is a property question and a question of negotiation. Does the short one have bargaining power? If he can threaten to remove his finger, then of course he will get half. But if not—then not. Beyond bargaining and negotiation, I do not think there is a moral obligation here, and each person will keep what is his. If the short one is poor, he can ask for charity, and there is an obligation to give him. But if not—then why should he demand equal division? Communism?

Because the tall one manages to obtain fruit thanks to the effort of the woodcutters and water-drawers. The short one has no bargaining power because removing his finger is worse than not getting fruit

This is essentially the communist claim. Tycoons should share with the public, because it provides them with security services, garbage collection, workers for factories, etc. In my opinion there is no such moral claim. It is only a question of bargaining (game theory).

So any “racism” that causes no harm but merely refrains from giving is in your opinion perfectly fine morally? Then what was the point from the outset of the discussion in the post about discrimination—did someone actually take something from someone?

Wow. This is a major challenge for me. Not necessarily to answer, but to understand how you inferred that from what I wrote. I cannot see even a hint of it in my words.

Exactly. Morality means not causing harm to another. Not giving him something is not “immoral.” And indeed if there is no issue of harm then there is not really discrimination either. (The assumption is that governmental institutions or public institutions generally belong to society as a whole and not only to those staffing them, and therefore it is indeed relevant there). And certainly one cannot come with demands regarding giving. That was evil and corrupt communism. And if this seems problematic to you, it is not because of anything connected to morality. It is because of aesthetics. In the specific case of the people of Israel there is a covenant (whose fulfillment the Holy One, blessed be He, is responsible for) of mutual responsibility, and then there is a problem with the trait of Sodom, because there are commandments of charity; but then the rich should have no problem giving, because charity is a kind of investment that the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to return to the giver. In any event, it is not a concession but an investment (the God-fearing conception that Israel is an organism, and one who gives charity is a cell investing in the body to which it belongs, and therefore will receive it back from the body), and everyone profits. But even charity cannot be demanded by force (although this is a claim on the part of the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore a rabbinical court can in principle compel it, like any other positive commandment)

Then explain it to me. The tall one took all the fruit for himself, and gave some to his friend, and to the short one he gave nothing. What is the problem? These people do not want to teach women Torah or publish their articles; those people do not want to accept Sephardim; suppose there is no reason whatsoever. Why is this not game theory, etc.?

But how were the Sephardim and the women essential to the Ashkenazim’s and the men’s Torah study? If so, they can bargain and will get a share

(Immanuel, I am asking Rabbi Michi according to his own view, according to which even to someone essential you need not give anything if he has no bargaining power. If so, all the more so for those who are nonessential, like women and Sephardim, etc. And if so, what is the whole discussion about whether there is objectionable racism here? After all, nobody took anything from anyone; they merely refrained from enabling or giving him something. If I am entitled to prefer myself, why should I not be entitled to prefer whomever I please?)

If they have no bargaining power, that is a sign they have nothing to give. We are not talking about exploitation (he gave me something, and because I am strong I prevented him from getting his share. We are talking from the outset about assessing how much he deserves—how much his contribution is worth—and that is determined by bargaining). I am not obligated to give someone something if he gives me nothing, or if I can manage without him.

He will answer you whatever he answers according to his own view, but in my opinion indeed I do not think one is obligated to teach Torah to women. One may not prevent them from learning on their own from books if they wish, but one is not obligated to teach them. And in this case I also do not know how worthwhile it is. Indeed, women who are educated in the other disciplines ought to have an equivalent Torah education (it cannot be that they have academic education but are ignorant and boors in the Torah sphere). But still, from my experience women turn Torah into trivialities (and indeed their minds are light, but that is not related). And the nonsense that Rabbi Michi thinks the great Torah sages say is not turning Torah into trivialities, but something else. We can see with our own eyes that the overwhelming majority of women Torah-learners of various kinds occupy themselves all day with feminism and women’s halakhot, and you will not find one woman dealing with the laws of firstborn animals or with the case of “the priest seized it.” And they also reveal ignorance (not to say infantilism) in what they do deal with.

And Sephardim too are not necessarily obligated in principle. But Sephardim are another story (although there is again no racism in not accepting them if one wants a yeshivah with an Ashkenazi character; after all, they too want an Ashkenazi yeshivah), because there is a commandment to teach Torah to men, and if a Sephardi wants to grow in Torah it is in our interest to teach him. Indeed, in order to preserve the European Ashkenazi character of a yeshivah there is logic in limiting the number of Sephardim if they are not willing (or are not able) to become Ashkenazified. There is also the issue of public funding here, and the matter is complicated

If the funder conditions the funding on a requirement (for example, not to discriminate) and they violate the requirement (they discriminate), then that is a problem even if the discrimination is completely justified, and the post is not dealing with that (as I understood it).
In any case, I will now wait for Rabbi Michi’s response, from which it will apparently become clear that I made wild logical leaps, etc.

Immanuel.
Are even the righteous among the nations inwardly evil? And not דווקא in the halakhic definition. The righteous among the nations who saved Jews in the Holocaust, say. Or even people who saved other people, from a foreign nation, from a massacre? Are they too inwardly evil? And what about historical figures who were halakhically righteous among the nations, like Naaman the commander of Aram?

Not that if you claim so it would be such a terrible claim. But if that is the case, and a gentile in the depths of his heart was always wicked in a deterministic sense and has no ability to change it, the practical upshot is that all gentiles are exempt from any moral claim and moral obligation—they can never behave differently. And therefore perhaps even to define them as evil is paradoxical, because they have no ability to choose between good and evil—they are merely like predatory lions or wolves.

No one is obligated to teach women Torah or to teach anyone Torah. What I said is that one has no right to prevent them or forbid them to do so. Don’t you see the difference between the two? If you do not want to teach, then do not teach. Everything is fine. But to fight against it and boycott those who do it, and to preach to women that they are forbidden to study (when they have not been given the tools to understand that this is nonsense, because they were not taught), that is certainly discrimination and exclusion.
Beyond that, assuming there is an obligation (by reason and by command) to study and teach Torah, then refraining from teaching someone is also not okay. And refraining from teaching women because they are women is even less okay.
This is not like simply not giving someone something of mine that he is not entitled to and that there is no obligation to give him, as in the example you brought. I really do not understand this strange discussion.

I really do not see the difference in your view. Boycotting means not giving fruit, and you explained in the best of your knowledge that forever and ever that is permitted even with no reason at all (so long as the rules of conduct are fair and all differences arise naturally). Preaching is problematic only if it causes a problematic boycott, and since the boycott is not problematic, the preaching is not either.

Therefore I understand that your claim is actually that a person has a moral duty to act equally toward others, even when he gives charity or chooses from whom to buy at the grocery, so long as he does not thereby lose out or has no ‘justified’ reason. But to my astonishment you do not write this (and nevertheless that is how I understand you at the moment).

To my astonishment, I write clear things and they are not understood. My claim is that when there is no obligation (moral, religious, or legal) to give, then I can choose to give to whomever I want. And certainly this is up to me, and one need not divide everything equally. Boycott and preaching are the use of illegitimate tools, because you are exploiting power improperly. Of course, if you believe in a certain direction, you may preach in its favor. The question is whether that direction is truly worthy.
Again, this seems to me mere stubbornness. I do not see any point worth discussing here.

Because if so, then I did not understand the initial thought to discuss opposition to discrimination against Sephardim and to the non-publication of women’s articles. [And in my opinion, if his honored Torah would look into it more, he would see that the matter depends on mighty trees, and ממנו יתד. In any case, so it seems to me].

I would add, by way of an aside to the rabbi’s words, that if there were only no reason to assume there is a difference, that would still be one thing. But I am amazed at the great sages of Israel over so many generations who adhered to this matter, for the Torah explains exactly why the people of Israel were chosen, and there is not a single word there about uniqueness: “because of the Lord’s love for you, and because He keeps the oath which He swore to your fathers.” Even according to the rabbi’s own view, that one cannot draw clear conclusions from Tanakh because of the multiplicity of interpretations, I, in my smallness, do not see how one can explain this otherwise without significant forcing (although Hazal made a nice midrash on these verses, that Israel is a humble people, from the words “not because you were more numerous”—but I have come for the plain meaning of Scripture).

Please delete my last comment after reading it

Let me sharpen the two points you responded to:

1) My claim was that not only is it possible to lie and attach traits, but that racism automatically attaches negative traits that in the end are indeed relevant to the treatment.

It surprises me that this is clear to you regarding the issue of the Chosen People, where you wrote, “I certainly think that the difficulty in arguing with it (again, from experience) stems from built-in racism. That racism causes people to see and interpret the facts in the world selectively and tendentiously”—but you are not willing to accept this regarding the other examples, just because they are practical examples and not a theoretical example.
I think that precisely in practical examples it is easier to see that this is distorted perception from the outset.

2) I do not understand where in your words or your response you addressed the fact that Nazism (and other racist views, say the KKK) are not only a claim about differences between races but also a call to active action that stems from them.
My claim is that just as I see contributory guilt in incitement to murder, I also see contributory guilt in the Nazi worldview. When there is a doctrine that calls for the murder of those who wear a spodik, I will also argue that it is morally wrong and worthy of condemnation—not only the murder itself.

And let us quote from your own golden tongue:
“…what we have seen so far did not deal with the question of causal contribution. There is no claim here that the inciter has no causal part in the result. On the contrary, it is quite likely that causally he does bear some responsibility. Suppose Reuven incites a thousand times; certainly there is some chance that one of the incited will do the deed. To sharpen the point, think of a controlled experiment: we take a group of a thousand incited people and a control group of another thousand people. I would guess there is a higher probability that one of the thousand incited people will do the deed than one of the thousand people in a normal state. That is, it is hard to deny that the inciter bears some degree of causal responsibility for the result…” (Post 43, more on incitement)

Since you agree that there is moral significance to a call for murder and not only to the murder itself (and of course the murder is more severe), I do not understand why Nazism is different in your eyes.
(And from this I infer also to racism: there is moral wrong not only in the act of discrimination, but also in the call to discriminate. And a racist worldview is certainly a call to action)

The halakhic concept of the righteous among the nations is actually very relevant here. In any case, to your question: this is a very good question, and I have wrestled with it greatly, but the author of the Tanya presumably also knew such gentiles in his generation, and despite that he said what he said. An Arab once innocently picked me up when I was hitchhiking and gave me a ride, or an Arab bus driver who stopped for me at the station even though I was not there and was running toward it, even though he was not obligated and wanted to benefit me (and afterward drove like a madman), and all the more so those who saved Jews in the Holocaust. There is a real question here of gratitude and of not being ungrateful. But still, truth does not move from its place, and this too accords with my experience. I would not hesitate to bomb the village of an Arab who had done me good if he did not flee that village and that village, say, is hiding a murderer who murdered one of my people and protects him (and here enters the issue of environmental influence, as follows)

It is simply a matter of human nature. It is not that they are utterly wicked like Hitler. Rather, human beings are like animals (including most Jews today)—and that, by the way, is worse than wickedness. A wicked person has the choice to repent. An animal does not even know it is not okay (which is fine for animals, but not for human beings who are like animals). But in truth all human beings have the potential to be human, and good deeds do indeed show its existence, but it is still only potential, and at the decisive moment, when it clashes with the ego—the average person has no chance (not even free choice) to act otherwise than what the animal inside him dictates. Here enters the Kabbalistic teaching that I preach here morning and evening (and thus look a bit crazy), which is connected to correcting the ego, and through it one brings the potential into actuality. In any case, there is a difference—at the level and resolution of the collective—between the Jewish collective and the other nations. This is the story of inwardness and outwardness. The individual draws his inwardness from the collective to which he belongs. The influence of the environment is immense. Most of our behavior comes from the subconscious, and this is shaped by the society in which a person lives. In fact, the only free choice a person has (at the level of behavior; not a specific act, and perhaps that too) is in choosing the environment in which he lives. After that he will draw from it his desires, aspirations, thoughts, and worldview (even if he is a philosopher). It is not that the gentiles are a flaw in creation. It is a matter called in Kabbalah GE (Galgalta ve-Einayim) versus AHP (Awzen, Hotem, Peh). It is a kind of inwardness versus outwardness. Israel are the GE and the nations of the world are the AHP. The correction of the GE precedes the correction of the AHP. And the AHP draw their correction from the GE. This is what is meant by Israel being meant to be a light unto the nations, and in the future they will teach the nations the way of truth (“For out of Zion shall go forth Torah,” etc.)
And by the way, even within Israel there are those who are GE and those who are AHP.

In short, what I am telling you is that one has to look generally and also toward the future (which interprets the past). At the end of the day, you do not want to live under the kindness of such gentiles. And if they belong to evil peoples and do not want to separate from them, you cannot ignore this when you fight that collective. All their kindnesses will blow up in your face and they will turn against you. That is not exactly righteous among the nations, is it?

Corrections:

“In any case, your question”
“or an Arab bus driver…” (and afterward drove like a madman).

“and all the more so”

“In fact, the only free choice a person has (at the level of behavior; not a specific act, and perhaps that too) is in choosing the environment in which he lives”

“(Galgalta ve-Einayim)”

“belong to evil peoples…. when you fight one of the peoples to which some gentile righteous-among-the-nations type belongs.”

In addition, the usual Israeli approach to this subject is really infantile, emotional, sentimental, and childish. I am really ashamed at the sight of all the politicians gushing over those righteous among the nations. There is gratitude, and there is flattery. They are not the same thing. We need to get used to not accepting favors from outsiders except when it is absolutely necessary and there is no alternative

I deleted it as you requested. I am only debating whether to make use of inside information and reveal to my son—who also takes part in chess and rating matters—that it would be worthwhile for him to rack up points against you… 🙂
In any case, I wish that what follows will be more enjoyable and useful, and best of luck in everything.

I do not know how to write again what I wrote in large bold letters in the post itself, and you claim not to have seen it. So I will stop here.

🙂
Thank you

If he’s into fast games (bullet and the like): once I tried using chess rating to estimate for myself the times of day when thinking is sharper, if such times exist. I played morning, noon, evening, and night, then downloaded all the data and tried to analyze it with various tools I work with. I got a weak indication that nighttime is most successful. I don’t know whether that is really relevant (maybe chess is different from thinking through an idea, and maybe fast chess tests only the efficiency of instinctive thinking), but it’s an interesting curiosity

I can’t help thinking of the story “A Flat for Rent.”
In the story, each time a different animal comes and insults one of the tenants on the basis of facts (the squirrel cracks nuts noisily, the cuckoo abandons her children, and so on). Only when the pig arrives does he choose not an insult based on facts but racism: “How can I, white son of whites, live under one roof with a black cat? It does not suit me and is not fitting for me.” This time the author did not write that the cat was insulted (because there is no reason to be insulted when there is no fact at the basis), but rather all the neighbors together answer the pig: “Go away from here, pig! It is neither nice nor fitting for us either.”
In fact the pig is racist in the ethical sense, because he does not want to live with the black tenant solely because she is such (perhaps psychologically this comes from fear of the other and the unfamiliar; in this way he thinks he is protecting himself and his children).

With God’s help, 24 Shevat 5782

Raising the argument of “racism” against God’s choosing the people of Israel is baseless from the outset. After all, every human being who is truly willing to take upon himself the 613 commandments by which Israel is bound is invited to join and become an inseparable part of the “Chosen People,” about whom it is said: “The nobles of the peoples are gathered together, the people of the God of Abraham.” And indeed King Messiah descends from Tamar and Ruth, who said, “Your people shall be my people, and your God my God.”

And not only that: even Israel’s enemies and greatest haters, and their descendants, were accepted as righteous converts. Nebuzaradan and Nero Caesar, who destroyed the Temple and killed myriads of Israelites, converted. Indeed, among the descendants of Sisera there were those who taught Torah in Bnei Brak, namely Rabbi Akiva; and among the descendants of Sennacherib there were those who taught Torah in Jerusalem, namely Shemaya and Avtalyon; and among the descendants of Haman there were those who taught children in school, namely Rav Shmuel bar Shilat (Sanhedrin 97, according to the version of R. Aharon Hyman, author of Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim). Last but not least, from the descendants of Balak, who called Balaam to curse Israel, there arose the dynasty of the House of David down to King Messiah..

Forces of evil and hatred can be transformed into forces of goodness and love.

With blessings, Ami’oz Yaron Schnitzler

The concept of ‘segulah’ can be interpreted as ‘capability,’ potential. One who was privileged to have forefathers such as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and was privileged to receive the Torah of God and the guidance of prophets, sages, righteous people, and their disciples over dozens of generations—has an extra preparation for high spiritual qualities. And accordingly, the demand upon him is greater to realize the capacities latent within him.

Prof. Benjamin Oppenheimer showed, on the basis of a Ugaritic source, that ‘sgl’ means ‘vassal,’ a representative of the king. This fits well with the Torah’s definition in continuation of the statement “and you shall be My treasured possession from among all the peoples.” “And you shall be to Me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.” The people of Israel has a unique mission: to be “the priests of the Lord,” bringing faith in God and His values to all humanity.

And Onkelos translated “and you shall be My treasured possession” as “a beloved people,” and as Hazal explained, that although every human being is beloved, having been created in the image, Israel was made known with an extra affection, “for they are called children of the Omnipresent.” This extra affection of a son to his father does not lapse, as it was ruled in halakhah that “whether this way or that way, they are called children,” and because of this the Father will not give up on any one of His children, but will do everything to bring him to his complete rectification, as befits the son of the King of kings of kings.

With blessings, see there