More on Racism – The Barkan Wineries Case (Column 152)

From the middle on, all the paragraphs merged into one block that isn’t so readable (but it’s not terrible, because it’s not as if there are any surprises here, and Shlomi is of course right that the points are pretty predictable [and not only from you, but from anyone willing to use their brain], and of course it would have been preferable to write the promised column about the cat).

You really need to settle this land dispute between yourselves in New Zealand already!
This dispute has already fed two columns.

Here is a somewhat more substantive critique by Rabbi Sherlo; what does the rabbi think of it?
https://www.kipa.co.il/חדשות/הרב-שרלו-נגד-החרפה-הגדולה-של-בדץ/

I think a simpler way to express the position you present in the column is to agree that this is racism and to object to saying that it is an act that is morally wrong.
That way one can dispense with the distinctions between “substantive” and non-substantive considerations, and with the fit between the racist’s position and reality.
All one has to do is declare that there is no moral or other problem whatsoever with racism (also in the broader sense of discrimination on grounds of religion or sex). The moral problem is not the discrimination itself, but discrimination where it runs contrary to morality.

I don’t know if it’s more substantive, but it’s no less mistaken.
If the Badatz think they aren’t Jews, then that is what they should do. He is applying the laws of doubt here, but I don’t know whether the Badatz have a doubt in this matter or not.

If you enjoy a different formulation of the same arguments – good for you.

I’m curious to know whether you think that beyond halakhic formalism there is justification for the prohibition of ordinary gentile wine in an industrial winery. Specifically when the workers whose Jewish status is in doubt are treated as Jews, are observant, and therefore there is no concern that they will pour it as a libation for idolatry, so that the only reason left is “because of their daughters,” which in my humble opinion is not relevant in industrial wine.

That is true of secular Jews as well, and nevertheless ordinary wine is also forbidden when handled by Sabbath-desecrating Jews. True, in the past those who were not committed to halakhah were also usually prone to idolatry, and today that is not so. “Their daughters” need not necessarily be understood as a concern about intermarriage but as a concern about the creation of closeness (marriage is an expression of closeness), and that exists with respect to secular Jews as well.
As for the difference between institutional/industrial wine and private wine, this reasoning certainly has room. Something similar was raised by some decisors regarding the prohibition of interest in banks (I recall that R. Asher Weiss wrote this).

A waste of time and words..
What interests me, as a halakhic Jew (that is, someone subject to the laws of halakhah and therefore to all their implications), is: where does this strong need come from to justify ourselves and explain to Western morality why some act or value is not racist?
There are two sets of values here that are not fighting on the same playing field (Judaism does not recognize the West’s set of values, and vice versa).

I have a side question – why did you write that Rabbi Ovadia Yosef’s ruling is “controversial”? Were the rulings of R. Yohanan ben Zakkai and Resh Lakish (for example) not controversial? So what?

And in general there is not a single halakhah (certainly not in matters between man and God) that, if you take it all the way and roll out all its implications, will not bring you to a state of moral distortion in Western eyes.

Seemingly it follows that the prohibition on marrying Ammon and Moab is racist in your view?

We have a very fundamental disagreement. There are no two horses here. Morality is universal, and everyone is bound by it. There is no need whatsoever to justify oneself, nor is there any self-justification before anyone but myself. If your Judaism does not recognize the moral horse, you are a very dangerous person (see my remarks about fundamentalism in the introduction to Stable and Unstable Truth).

I wrote that it is controversial simply because it was. Indeed there are many other disputes, so what?! There are disputes that have been settled in halakhah, and therefore there is no point in noting this about them. But this dispute was not settled, because today there is no institution that can decide it. Hence Yitzhak Yosef’s declaration as though there is some absolute truth here confronting racism is nonsense.

Even if we assume you are right (and I am not at all sure of that) – so what? The question exists for all cases, and now you can apply these points to all those cases and examine them in this way.

Why? It depends on what his reasons are.

Isn’t claiming that Ethiopians are Jewish enough – as that whole herd screeches – itself bound up with hidden racism? After all, they think the Ethiopians are so pitiable that they deserve preferential treatment to be accepted into Judaism without the stringent threshold requirements applied to other groups. That may indicate a patronizing attitude toward them that leads to the desire to give them affirmative action. But no – it may be that the Badatz is acting substantively and is not at all troubled by the color of their skin, because it would act the same way toward Russian workers as well, and likewise with all liberal conversions that are not accepted by them. In all those cases – even the whitest people imaginable – the Badatz would act equally. Those who are screaming blue murder – aside from their cynical use of Ethiopian pain to leverage their supposedly exalted morality – do not relate to Ethiopians as equals, and do not place upon them the equal responsibility that Judaism places on those entering its gates to convert.

“Seemingly this is not racism because the considerations here are substantive. It is accepted not to let an Arab MK sit on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee for security reasons, just as it is accepted not to take blood donations from immigrants from Africa because of fear of AIDS, or to conduct security screening at the airport on Arab passengers and not on Jewish ones. Cases like these are not discrimination and not racism because there is a substantive consideration here. Discrimination and racism are defined where there is no substantive consideration in the background, and the act is done simply out of a different (and discriminatory) attitude toward people from another group.”

In my view, generalized racism (not necessarily on the basis of race) is discriminatory behavior, or unequal rights on the basis of a generalization. At some level we all sin in this: the first moment we see someone we already have a set of beliefs about his views, education, intentions, etc. All our inferences, when people are probabilistic Bayesians, try to infer the unknown from the known. In law, it is important that there not be discrimination on the basis of generalization, and in personal life too, it is better that we try to shake off very broad statistics and as quickly as possible get a sufficient idea of the person, so that the general statistics are almost irrelevant to our judgment.

With regard to law, I oppose different screening for Arabs at the airport, even though substantively it is efficient. I must admit that different screening of men and women at the entrance to venues for checking for small weapons (from the angle of thuggery rather than terror) does not bother me, although if I were consistent it should, but I suppose discrimination against a minority is more problematic, or perhaps because there is no humiliating element here.

I have now read the rabbi’s words

https://www.kipa.co.il/%D7%97%D7%93%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91-%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%9C%D7%95-%D7%A0%D7%92%D7%93-%D7%94%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%A4%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%92%D7%93%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%94-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%91%D7%93%D7%A5/

At the end Rabbi Sherlo added: “And of course – the words are also directed to the consumer world. The supposedly enhanced ‘Badatz kashrut’ – this is its image, and the responsibility therefore rests chiefly on the consumer world.”

And I keep wondering, again and again: where is the self-righteousness when it is directed toward his Haredi brothers? Must they always be used as a tool for bashing? Why does no one open his mouth and chirp about this?! Did the consideration Rabbi Michi raised – that the Badatz do not see this as a doubt – not occur to him? But beyond that: the Badatz supervisor was racist and behaved improperly; where is the proof that this was an instruction that came from above? Are there not enough scandals that stem from manipulations by a single “rabbinic” supervisor?! Or conversely – after all, they themselves claim they did so in order not to hurt specific workers; their aim was the opposite – not to hurt. What were they supposed to do? Come to one Ethiopian and say, “You are not Jewish enough,” and to the other, “You are”? One may assume they thought – perhaps in their foolishness – that the workers would not notice. None of these points will ever be discussed, and it will always be easy to attack and dismiss (and Rabbi Sherlo is the mildest and most self-aware in this stream, and this year he even published a book on disputes for the sake of Heaven).

Another point that is important to stress: Rabbi Sherlo, and the style of the rest of the liberal rabbis, treat ritual prohibitions simply as matters bearing some sort of meaning, in the spirit of reasons for the commandments or the “hear and obey” layer – commandments for the sake of obedience (in the manner of Saadia Gaon). In this way it is very easy to present the “morality of the prophets” and commandments between man and fellow man as preferable to the ritual commandments (cf. what he wrote there). For human morality rests on a universal consensus, and it has an addressee who is harmed when it is violated. Not so the ritual commandments, which are empty by nature and do not point to any external reality beyond the command.

In complete contrast, however, Haredim in general and consumers of Badatz products in particular believe that food that is not kosher is not a sign but a cause – it dulls the heart, it blemishes the soul. Quite similar to the effect of toxins on the body. It is not a fair comparison to compare physical/spiritual danger to commandments between man and fellow man – which are, precisely they, perceived as far more prosaic. Think about it: every such Badatz member dirties his mouth with gossip several times a day, but truly would not dare put Landa cola in his mouth. This is not incidental. It is not political. They do not even feed their babies formula that is not mehadrin!! One may disagree with this position; one may think it is mistaken and idolatrous (especially if you are a rabbi immersed in the book the Badatz members did not grow up on – the Bible, and from youth you learn to insert prophetic considerations into your rulings. Incidentally, this is yet more support for the need to study Tanakh, as Rabbi Neriya Nahum told me: only from it can halakhah draw values of universal morality, concern for what the nations will say, preferring interpersonal commandments to ritual, and so forth), but not to accept the reality that there are Jews – and most Talmudic Jews from the time of Jesus until today have been like this – who prefer the ritual commandments linked to a magical world and pulling sublime strings in heaven, over commandments between man and fellow man. One who drinks Barkan wine that is not kosher will have his soul dulled and not feel it, whereas one who harms his fellow – especially if his aim is to preserve the halakhah in question – does not become dulled. Who is to decide which is preferable? Is it not racism not to recognize the halakhic worldview of the Badatz members? They did not invent it today. The one inventing things is דווקא the innovative and liberal side.

It seems that these rabbis’ hatred of the blacks (-the Haredim) allows them to claim whatever they like in order to vilify the way of those benighted people. This is a recurring thing in the Rav Kook stream. Love of Israel for everyone except for the one stream that does not advocate love of Israel for everyone. (This was not at all how Rabbi A. I. Kook behaved, for anyone well versed in all his writings.)

Challenge: please find anywhere in the herd – including the rabbis – a supportive article seeking to see the beauty in the Eidah Haredit and to discuss substantively the disagreement of Shalom over this halakhah. (A difficult and strange one in itself.)

P.S. And by the way, Rabbi Michi, surely you know the story about the Hazon Ish, who would host a yeshiva student in his home on Shabbat, and the student would bring wine. Once they spoke about Og king of Bashan, that Moses, whose height was 10 cubits, had to jump 10 cubits with a staff of 10 cubits in order to strike him in the ankle, and the student said that this was surely an exaggeration. The Hazon Ish was shocked and told him: “From now on, do not bring wine.” According to the Hazon Ish’s innocent approach – which the Badatz members presumably also adopt – is there racism in disqualifying educated religious people from touching wine? After all, if Rabbi Michi himself came to work at Barkan, they would disqualify him from working with wine.

I write all this despite my personal view that the behavior toward the religious Jewish Ethiopian immigrants was ugly and corrupt, and also utterly wrong halakhically. Even so, from rabbis who write in public and try to bring good into the world, I would expect a little more than this one-sidedness.

In my opinion, using the term “racism” outside the context of race theory is confusing and distracting (and that is of course the original purpose: to create an association with Nazism and fascism, as you noted).
So why use it and not the precise term “discrimination” (or “unjustified discrimination”)?
Even in your article, despite the clarifying introduction, the use of the wrong term creates lack of clarity and vagueness.
Using the precise terminology would make the article much clearer (though it would require reformulating some of the sentences).

In principle, an Ammonite is forbidden in marriage even though his character may be perfect. That is a sweeping, general racial disqualification without a substantive reason.

Shachar, שלום.
I addressed the element of generalization in previous columns to which I referred. I didn’t get into it here because this is not the case. Here we are dealing with a claim that is true of all Ethiopians, not with a generalization. The question of the Ethiopians’ halakhic status is a general halakhic question.
As for airport screenings, I really do not agree. With all due respect to the sanctity of equality, there is no reason in the world to check someone who need not be checked. Generalizations that have a basis and for which there is no effective way to avoid them present no moral problem in acting accordingly. If it were possible to check only suspicious Arabs, or if there were an expensive but not terribly expensive way to screen them out, I would support that. But if there is no such way, I see no problem at all in checking only them. To me it is ridiculous to check someone who is not suspect just so there won’t be discrimination.
By your approach, the psychometric exam (and really matriculation exams as well) for university admission is also discrimination, for it is common knowledge that these exams are far from airtight. There are people who will not do well on them and will do well in studies, and vice versa. So there is an invalid generalization here, no? And so in every area of our lives. This is excessive self-righteousness devoid of any sense.
As long as it is clear that this is substantive, people should not be insulted, and there is no reason to take their offense into account. Arabs should understand that as long as their brethren produce almost all the terror in the universe, they will have to be checked. And if they do not understand – let them deal with it and get over it. It really does not bother me.
By the way, I am completely in favor of statistical/Bayesian judgment of people when you have no concrete information. That is what statistics are for. Do you know another way to make decisions under uncertainty (partial information)? Someone who does not do this is, in my opinion, stupid. Though someone who uses it as solid information (100%) is also stupid or racist (or both). Incidentally, that is exactly what is done on the psychometric exam, and until an adequately effective alternative is proposed, criticism of it has no justification whatsoever.

I don’t see any connection to racism. There is a religious law here whose purpose is separation from a people that behaved in an ugly way. Perhaps in the background there is a concern about their genetics, or this is an educational sanction to prevent such behavior in the future. If we had a way to see a person’s behavior directly rather than by statistical indicators, perhaps this claim would have some place. See my remarks to Shachar below on generalizations here. Incidentally, when such indicators exist, it may indeed be possible to depart from this halakhic rule and claim that it was stated only as a default.

I raised this argument here in the past regarding the attitude of left-wing people toward Arabs. Nothing is demanded of them, as though they were likened to beasts.

Indeed. I recall that this year R. Asher Weiss, in his weekly shiur, argued and gave examples from the Gemara that when necessary one may belittle commandments between man and his fellow – meaning that they never become a “formal” prohibition and are pretty much guidelines. Therefore it was permitted to seize a field from orphans in order to care for it on their behalf, and one may strike someone who strikes you (seemingly one is violating a Torah prohibition of causing injury), etc.

The story about the Hazon Ish is interesting. In his view, apparently, the Rishonim on the Gemara about Og and Moses are disqualified from touching wine (they say it is an exaggeration).

The wiping out of Amalek is also very racist.

P.S. What I wrote above is hard to explain in light of a single case; this is a recurring phenomenon, and the hidden hostility toward everything represented by the Haredi public among rabbis who are not from that sector (I am not from that sector, and thank God my religious traits are not cut according to any religious-social-national convention, or any other) can be encountered at every turn, perhaps since the days of Joseph and his brothers. I ask this in pain, but without any desire to harm Rabbi Sherlo’s honor (or that of his students), for he is a great Torah scholar and strives for justice. That is all.

Let me sharpen my point: I did not claim that there is no overlap between the values of Western morality and the values of halakhic morality (as reflected in Jewish law).
But the difference is so great that comparing them is pointless.
1. Western morality does not recognize values between man and God, only values between man and his fellow. Whereas in Judaism, the interpersonal part (morality) is only one layer in addition to the layer between man and God.
It follows that every obligation between man and God, or one of its implications, clashes in one way or another with values between man and his fellow.

2. The weight and order of Western moral values is not at all similar to Jewish moral values. As an example, I will cite Kant’s view that the value of truth is higher than the value of human life, and therefore when choosing between them he would prefer to tell the truth and not lie even if human life would thereby be lost. Needless to say, in Judaism the value of human life is almost the highest value of all (after the three transgressions for which one must be killed rather than transgress).

Another thing: the hierarchy of values in Western morality is in many cases ridiculous. Look at the contempt with which abortion is treated, and anyone who opposes abortion is perceived as benighted and primitive, in contrast to the value of animal suffering, which is considered almost as important as the value of human life (to the point that I wonder what Western morality’s stance is on abortion among animals).
Needless to say, in Judaism the value of fetal life is important almost, if not entirely, like the life of a born child, whereas animal life may certainly be slaughtered and eaten (though causing suffering to animals is forbidden).

In sum, there is such a vast gap between the values of Western morality and the values of Judaism (in thousands of variations stemming from the two points above), that trying to examine each case individually to see whether there is correspondence between them is a waste of time.

Kant’s example above really does not represent Western morality. No one thinks like him on this.

David, you are mistaken.
According to morality, if there is a God, taking His words into account is a moral obligation.
Moral people from the West would agree to that, no less than moral people from any other place and culture.
You are also mistaken about the other points.

David,
1. Jewish morality also does not recognize values between man and God. That has nothing to do with morality. See column 15 on this. When there is a clash between a religious value and a moral value, that is another question. But first one must clarify what moral values say, and only then decide. The question whether to take religious values into account or not belongs to the next stage. So this claim is not relevant.
2. Kant exaggerated the value of truth, and as Shimon wrote, no one agrees with him. In any case this is not a dispute between Jewish morality and Western morality. And of course the value of human life is a higher value in Western morality than in Jewish morality (where it is sometimes overridden by other values).
3. The debate about the value of fetal life is irrelevant. My criticism (see column 73) was based on Western values, not on halakhah. There there is a severe deviation from their own values, which of course can happen and does happen among us too. Therefore in my view it is not representative. And again I note that you are not right regarding the value of fetal life. On the contrary, in halakhah it is worth less than in what you called “Western morality.” In halakhah there are permissions to kill it in various situations because the value of its life is lower, whereas in Western morality (=morality. There is no Western morality) there is no source that can justify a lower value for its life (see the aforementioned column).

Generally speaking, I would say that there is no such thing as Western morality and another morality. There is morality. Likewise, deviations from moral values exist both among us and among them. The question is not what people do in practice but what they believe. Therefore such comparisons are called for, since Jewish morality = Western morality = morality.

It seems to me that usually what halakhic Jews are accused of (or, rather, what people want to accuse them of) in their attitude toward gentiles is not racism but nationalism. But that pertains to every people. Usually in every nation there is a part that doesn’t like foreigners (more precisely, feels uncomfortable with a foreign culture), and that is a natural human tendency (and weakness). I also remember in Gush that in first year there was one Shabbat when they asked every Israeli to host in his home the Americans who come for one year, and at first that felt uncomfortable to some people. I don’t think that came from a feeling of essential superiority over the Americans but from natural foreignness. (Though indeed a stranger in another country projects a certain weakness by virtue of being a guest.) Implicitly, according to the way the word racism is used, that very word strangely assumes a racist conception of the world itself. For if a group of blacks or Arabs (say, a country in Africa, or an Arab village in the Galilee) would not accept some white person among them (say, to rent an apartment for reasons of low price), no one would interpret it as racism but as narrow nationalism; and if it were just some community in America it would be seen as communality or primitive tribalism, not because they think the white man is inferior to them. And he too would presumably not be insulted or hurt. He would shrug and leave. But if it were the other way around, a great outcry would arise.

That is, the very term racism assumes a built-in hierarchy of the human races themselves and/or their cultures (white, Arab, black, say). So it is impossible for a person to see racism as something bad and at the same time not be racist himself. But nationalism or tribalism is something else.

Even if I accept what you say, you still do not answer my question: what is the point of dealing with a specific case of a clash between religious values (commandments between man and God) and morality (between man and his fellow), if every religious commandment clashes in one way or another with morality? Violation of a religious command usually entails punishment (death, lashes), at least on the conceptual plane. And with every commandment between man and God I can show you how in some situation it stands in contradiction to morality, aside from the ordering of moral values, which is certainly different between Judaism, whose order is very clear, and the West (which I do not know whether it really has a systematic doctrine, apart from some general principles). So I ask again: what is the point of discussing each case on its own? There are basic contradictions all along the line between Western morality and the commandments of religion (between man and God), and also in the order of importance of moral values.
I am not trying to needle you; I am looking for a clear answer.

With God’s help, Thursday, the portion of “How goodly are your tents, O Jacob,” 5778

To David – greetings,

The laws of proper conduct are an integral part of halakhah, and there are situations in which they even discussed disqualifying the testimony of someone who does not conduct himself with proper manners and eats in the marketplace. All the more so when dealing with matters of “human dignity” and “public humiliation,” which are Torah prohibitions, no less severe than a double doubt concerning the rabbinic prohibition of ordinary gentile wine.

As for the matter itself: one can understand the concern of the Badatz, for R. Moshe Feinstein ruled that there is doubt regarding their Jewishness and that they require conversion out of doubt. And although R. Ovadia Yosef wondered at this, since the Radbaz, who knew them firsthand, determined that they are from the tribe of Dan, one can understand the Badatz’s concern. In particular since R. Avraham Shapira, R. Shaul Yisraeli, and R. Mordechai Eliyahu, although they definitely relied on the Radbaz’s ruling that they are of Israel, nevertheless suspected admixture of gentiles over the generations and required a “conversion for stringency” at least with regard to marriage with them.

But even where there is halakhic concern, it can and should be solved with great sensitivity and tact. After all, even regarding one who sees his fellow committing a definite sin and is obligated to rebuke him, the Torah warns, “and you shall not bear sin because of him,” meaning that one should not humiliate him. One must put a great deal of thought into how to carry out maximal halakhic scrupulousness without causing harm.

The question in this case is what really happened there. If it was as one of the workers described it, that the supervisor grabbed the bottle of wine touched by the Ethiopian worker and smashed it to pieces before his eyes, then this is the complete opposite of halakhic behavior. But if it was as the Badatz spokesman described it, that they asked the factory manager to move the worker to another department without his knowing that his Jewishness was being doubted – this could be a reasonable course halakhically and humanly, except that today “there are no secrets,” and it would have been preferable to clarify that the worker had undergone a “conversion for stringency,” as required by the Chief Rabbinate.

In short: one can and should find the way to be scrupulous both in the laws of kashrut and in “human laws,” and then the product will truly be mehudar “in the eyes of God and man.”

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

On the substance of the matter: if one of the rabbi’s children were to ask to marry an Ethiopian, would the rabbi ask for a conversion for stringency?

​Hello Michi,

First of all, kol hakavod for the blog [in general and in particular]. As always, thought-provoking and fulfilling the verse “Do not be intimidated.”

I could not help thinking of Maimonides’ style when he comes to describe those with whom he disagrees and whose positions he does not esteem.

Regarding the matter you mentioned in passing, I thought you might be interested in what I did on the issue. I mean Rabbi Yosef’s conflict of interest, and I am attaching my letter on the subject and the last response I received [I assume that P. will also be interested in this, so I am copying him for his information]:

Appeal on conflict of interest – Rabbi Yosef 2.18:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1FdMYwv5VCqdbkKHyc9V_5nliBtkZCSQV

Appeal on conflict of interest – Rabbi Yosef – reminder 5.18:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1fCsie4rNbXYV9d_XA_dM9wUQwfEgpPVp

Response to the Hiddush inquiry regarding the Chief Rabbi of Israel, kashrut:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1HlC8Qa83cTnaXeCcyVSRCoZzN_62qspE

Regards,

Uri

Hello Uri.
Many thanks.
Really nice. In the middle of this June (2018), more than four years after he entered office, they write to you that soon (presumably in the coming years) a conflict-of-interest arrangement will be drawn up with him. Let us hope they manage to do it before he finishes his term. Never fear: after him his son, grandson, great-grandson, nephews and their descendants and their descendants’ descendants will probably come, so there is certainly still time.
By the way, I saw on Wikipedia (in his entry) that before his appointment his brother and sister accused him of entering the post in order to advance the interests of Badatz Beit Yosef. Avraham Yosef was removed because of this, and in his case there was not even a conflict-of-interest arrangement (which of course will be worth nothing practically). Truly unbelievable.
With your permission I am uploading this correspondence to the site.

I assume not.

You are looking for a clear answer, but the question is not clear. I answered and will answer again:
First, one must clarify whether there is a halakhah that is racist. Even if there is, that does not automatically mean it should not be observed, and it is still a meaningful inquiry. In particular, one should examine interpretations that would allow us to remove it from that state.
Second, if indeed some halakhah stands in contradiction to a moral rule (contrary to your hasty declaration, in most cases there is no problem at all), one must discuss what to do in such a clash.
And third, when there is a clash, halakhah will not always prevail (contrary to your assumption). Each case on its own merits.
I cannot answer more clearly than that to such an unclear question. If you have a specific case, it can be discussed.

With God’s help, Thursday, the portion of “I have arranged the seven altars,” 5778

The prohibition regarding Ammon and Moab is not on the whole race, but only on the men. This is not racism but “excluding men” 🙂 And who was worse than Balak, who wanted to destroy Israel out of jealousy, and nevertheless merited, through his descendant Ruth, to be among the ancestors of the Davidic monarchy, by virtue of the sacrifices he offered for the sake of Heaven.

As for Amalek and the seven nations, they do have a remedy by accepting the seven Noahide commandments, which in any event every human being is obligated in, and the matter is explained in Scripture. For regarding the seven nations the Torah says: “They shall not dwell in your land, lest they cause you to sin,” which shows that if they abandoned their evil ideology… And concerning Amalek Samuel says: “Go and destroy the sinners, Amalek,” from which it follows that if they ceased being “sinners,” there would be no need to destroy them. And

after all, “From Haman’s descendants they taught Torah to the schoolchildren, and who were they? Rav Shmuel bar Shilat” (Sanhedrin 97; this is the correct version according to R. Aharon Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, entry “Rav Shmuel bar Shilat”). Haman’s zeal, in that he could not bear that even one Jew should remain who did not show him honor, was redirected by his descendant Rav Shmuel bar Shilat into a positive channel in his devotion to his students.

Just as there is heredity in negative traits, so there is heredity in positive traits, and in the end the good wins!

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

There is a lot of naivete in this column, though a beautiful naivete, one that reminds us of a beautiful world that perhaps once existed but whose absence we have long grown accustomed to.
All involved know full well that the Badatz ruled that Ethiopians are not Jews etc. etc.; in the age of PC this is the way to undermine the legitimacy of that ruling and claim that it was decided on racist grounds.

Let me clarify my question. A person who recognizes only moral values as binding certainly sees nothing wrong in eating pork or other forbidden foods, in the various sexual prohibitions (not to mention marriage, divorce, and mamzerut), in not donning tefillin, tzitzit, or desecrating Shabbat, and generally has no connection to any of the religious commandments. From his perspective there is no reason to refrain from violating them, and there is nothing wrong in observing or not observing them. And certainly from his perspective any sanction for violating a religious command (lashes, death, חרם, excommunication, refusal of admission to work, studies, community, marriage, etc.) is immoral, since there is no moral justification for the sanction (because the religious command has no meaning for him). Therefore it necessarily follows that religious commands lead, if not directly then by one turn or another, to a situation in which the transgressor will incur sanctions (= moral wrongs) of one kind or another from those attached to the religious commands – that is, to moral distortion. (I don’t understand what is unclear about this; give me any religious command, and within a second I can show you how a moral ‘wrong’ easily rolls out of it.)
By “moral wrong” I do not necessarily mean racism, but any wrong caused as a direct or indirect result of observing religious commands.

As for your other points: do you really claim that in a conflict between a moral value and a religious command, morality will prevail? Is that because that is how you understand halakhah, or because you accept halakhah only in cases where it does not conflict with your moral values? (At last, real heresy..) Halakhah clarifies, in most cases, how one should act in the event of a contradiction between any commandments that might arise. So I would be glad if you clarified your hints: in your view is there a side that would prefer a moral value over a religious command even if halakhah explicitly instructs us to obey the religious command?

The fact that there is a halakhic dispute does not mean that neither side is right, and as long as the dispute has not been decided, each side is entitled to believe in the justice of its path. Therefore, just as the Badatz is entirely convinced that Ethiopians are doubtful Jews, so Rabbi Yosef, like his father and like Rabbi Amar, is entirely convinced that they are Jews. And just as according to the Badatz they cannot perform their duties and anyone who thinks otherwise compromises the kashrut of the wine, so according to Rabbi Yosef they can perform their duties and anyone who thinks otherwise is wronging them.

Regarding the appeal, as I understand it, the conflict-of-interest arrangement is supposed to apply to the period when Rabbi Yosef will be head of the Chief Rabbinate Council (in the second half of the term). At the moment he is head of the rabbinical court and has no direct authority over the kashrut system.

Mem80,
That is exactly what is written in the article.
Certainly each side may think the other side is mistaken in halakhah and thereby causing an injustice.
It’s just that the accusation of racism – is incorrect.

If one accepts the premise that commandments must be observed, even if the reason for that is not moral but religious, then the punishment for that is also reasonable. Again, this discussion is going nowhere.

Gil,
Excuse me, but the claim that the whole world can go to ruin so long as my private navel is not hurt is exactly what is disgusting about Haredism, and that is what Rabbi Sherlo is warning about (and it seems to me Rabbi Michi as well). I don’t know what happened there and I am not coming to judge anyone, but all this feigned innocence as though no one was trampled has brought the Haredi world to where it is today.

And by the way, the story of the Hazon Ish is not similar at all. There it was about a rabbi and student (or admirer); here it is about employees and employer.

Can’t one say that there is racism in the Badatz’s decision if only because they automatically assume that every Ethiopian is not Jewish? And what if he underwent a conversion for stringency?

Raz, if he underwent a conversion for stringency, he can present a conversion certificate, and if it is accepted by the Badatz, they will approve his work as well.
They have no objection to that.
Their decision is not sweeping, but applies only to someone who did not undergo a conversion for stringency.

With God’s help, 16 Tammuz 5778

To Raz – greetings,

To ask an Ethiopian Jew, “Did you undergo a conversion for stringency?” is one of the greatest insults with which they can be insulted. The trauma of “conversion for stringency” is such that many of the women of the community are afraid to go to the mikveh lest they go and do a “conversion for stringency” to them there. Understand what kind of feeling that is: after being persecuted for centuries over their Judaism and keeping its commandments as they knew them with self-sacrifice, people still cast doubt on their Judaism?

For this reason, R. Ovadia Yosef, of blessed memory, ruled that one may rely completely on the Radbaz’s testimony that they are from the tribe of Dan and on their strictness that even contact with a gentile defiles; and on that basis he ruled that they need not undergo a conversion for stringency, which is “a stringency that leads to leniency.” And R. Shaul Yisraeli, R. Avraham Shapira, and R. Mordechai Eliyahu also relied fundamentally on the Radbaz that the community as a whole has a presumption of Jewishness, and only individual gentiles mixed in over the generations must be suspected. Therefore their “conversion for stringency” did not require symbolic drawing of covenantal blood but immersion alone, and they did not require “immersion for stringency” except for marriage, where lineage is at issue, but they did not prevent integrating them into schools, counting them for a minyan, or fear their touching wine.

The Haredim have a serious problem with Ethiopian immigrants, because R. Moshe Feinstein, of blessed memory, ruled that a “conversion for stringency” is not enough; rather there is a genuine doubt regarding their Judaism. According to him, even “immersion for stringency” is not enough, but a full conversion with all its requirements is needed: symbolic drawing of covenantal blood, immersion, and acceptance of the commandments. And in their view, “there is no counsel and no wisdom” against Rabbi Feinstein’s ruling.

The Badatz tried, so they claimed in their response to the exposé, to get around the problem elegantly by transferring Ethiopian Jewish workers to other departments, and they thought the workers transferred to another department would not think they had been transferred because of halakhic concern about their Jewishness, but simply for manpower considerations.

The problem is that today one cannot do such an end run without its being discovered and causing an uproar. If in the past they could avoid using blood donations from Ethiopian immigrants because of fear of AIDS in their country of origin, and got around the problem by taking blood from community members and, when no one was looking, discarding it – today “there are no secrets,” and everything done or said “behind closed doors” gets publicized “like fire in straw.”

Apparently there is no solution for Haredim who are concerned, except to drink cooked wine. Less tasty, but clean before God and Israel!

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

S.Z. Levinger, “before God and Israel” does not apply if you think there is no doubt in this case. After all, the fact that some people jump up in anger is not a reason to suppress and silence every dispute and disagreement.

To Gil

Quite apart from the discussion here of this specific story (in which I actually justify, or at least understand, the Badatz), I actually understand Rabbi Sherlo even more. He was essentially making a half-halakhic claim in matters of enhancing a mitzvah (which is what characterizes the Badatz). Although substantively it seems to me that he is mistaken, he argued that the enhancement is somehow only in matters of “ritual,” to use your language (what an intolerable word). But commandments between man and fellow man are trampled (which specifically here does not seem to me relevant, because this is a question about the principled decision of how to regard Rabbi Ovadia’s ruling on the Jewishness of Ethiopian Jews. Rabbi Sherlo argued that there is no enhancement here in “love your fellow as yourself” [and oppression of one’s fellow or the stranger or something of that kind], but that pertains to Jews, and here that is exactly the question: are they Jews?). That claim is generally correct. It is indeed something that characterizes the Haredim in general and the Eidah Haredit all the more so. Haredism is built on seriousness in observing mitzvot (as opposed to everyone else. It gave them a feeling of success in something in life – a mentality from the exile, where if you weren’t a rabbi or a merchant, you weren’t successful at anything). What can they do, according to their approach, when commandments between man and fellow man do not have much “meat” to them, and there is also nothing there by which one can make oneself great over one’s fellow? This is one of the strongest motivations of the Haredi way of life. The thing is that one cannot use such motivation in matters of commandments between man and fellow man, because that undermines the conceptual foundation of those commandments (“love your fellow as yourself,” and one cannot love without respecting. And it is a bit hard to feel better than your fellow because of strictness in “love your fellow as yourself”…). And besides, you are mistaken. Rest assured that Rabbi Sherlo too relates to forbidden foods as poison and as dulling of the heart. He is not Leibowitzian.

But he was addressing an internal halakhic matter of enhancing mitzvot. As for your accusing him of self-righteousness, I do not know whether that is correct. It does not seem to me that the liberal rabbis in your sense actually come in the name of “love of Israel” (you are confusing them with Rabbi Kook’s direct students from Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva) but rather in the name of intellect and decency (at least Rabbi Sherlo – he seems to me to be of that sort, though I do not know him deeply). For Haredim, according to his view (and it indeed seems so), have neither decency nor morality nor reason (lack of self-awareness). Consequently there will be reflected a revulsion toward “those blacks.” Not hatred. You would like there to be hatred. That is what they feed themselves to think (that people hate them). What really exists here is revulsion. Hatred is between equals. The Haredim are not equal to the public in which Rabbi Sherlo grew up. It is a public more developed than they are. The Haredim have “earned” this revulsion fairly justly, and no reasonable person can help but feel this revulsion. From the standpoint of mitzvot and “love,” there is nothing to do in this sphere except internalize the fact that they are brothers. Brothers one reviles. One must learn how to conduct oneself in such a reality, and what the right thing to do is in every context, and what of the revulsion to display outwardly and what not. But there is no unfairness here toward the Haredim. Secular people have (generally) decency of that sort, and therefore toward them the commandment of “love” is easier (a commandment of love between brothers who are in dispute over worldview). There cannot be symmetry in this sphere because however much you accuse Rabbi Sherlo regarding his attitude toward them, their attitude toward him (and, as I shall say below, unconsciously) is much, much worse (even just by virtue of his not belonging to their tribe, and even without knowing him at all). And what is worst is that this happens without their awareness of it (and it is known that a wicked person is preferable to a fool). The Haredim have no recognition at all of the existence of anyone outside their own private tribe, and even among themselves. They are like children (that is their mentality, so it really is impossible to be angry at them or even revile them. But for someone who grew up in modern society and is exposed for the first time to their reality and has a preliminary assumption of relating to them as equals – revulsion is the initial reaction that will come when he grasps what they are.)

The discussion here is not at all about commandments between man and fellow man but more about the mindless conduct of the Eidah Haredit, which simply does not understand the sensitivity of the matter and in a coarse, mindless way carries out such moves without even thinking how and in what form to carry them out and without understanding how they are perceived in the modern Israeli public sphere. I am not speaking of morality at all, because here it is not relevant. But even on this matter it would seem fair to say generally that Haredim have no concept of morality at all (at least as a modern person understands the concept – I am not speaking of “Western” or “Jewish” morality, as people tend to do, but of morality in general). If there were no God, they would run wild. It seems (at least outwardly) that if God had not commanded “Do not steal,” they would not understand that it is forbidden to steal (from someone unlike themselves, of course. “To rescue from the lion and the bear.”).

Who is the mara de-atra of the Land of Israel? Rabbi Moshe Feinstein or R. Ovadia Yosef? As long as each community follows its own great rabbi, as though it were still in the exile of Spain or the exile of Ashkenaz, there is no greater racism than that.

With God’s help, ערב שבת קודש, the portion of “He saw Israel dwelling according to its tribes,” 5778

And by your reasoning, when each circle says to the others “Accept my view, because my rabbis are greater than your rabbis” – might that not lead to hostility and arrogance?

Do you think that differences of approach and mentality that crystallized over generations can be solved with a “magic wand”? General agreement does not come in an artificial instant process, but through a process of generations.

Hundreds of years of disputes among the Tannaim were brought to closure by the Mishnah of Rabbenu HaKadosh, in which all the methods were gathered, and in his wisdom and humility he managed to create a partial ruling that created a common basis for later generations; and thus hundreds of years of disputes among the Amoraim were brought to summary and closure in the Talmud of Ravina and Rav Ashi.

About a thousand years of disputes among the Geonim and Rishonim were brought to summary and closure by the Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Arukh of Maran Rabbi Yosef Karo, together with his dear friend and halakhic disputant Rabbi Moshe Isserles, who together created a common basis for all Israel. There is a broad foundation agreed upon by all, and there are things on which “they agreed not to agree.”

The common denominator of those who sealed the eras was the combination of knowledge and depth, humility together with firmness, which led all the house of Israel to rely on their work.

And just as “sealers” were found for the eras of the Tannaim, Amoraim, and Rishonim – so too will the great ones be found who will seal the period of the Acharonim. They will summarize the approaches and understand them in depth, and thus arrive at rulings that will be accepted by most scholars. This may not happen today or tomorrow, but with God’s help it will happen!

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

Paragraph 3, line 2:
…that created a common basis for the coming generations…

Mem80, in the final practical analysis, there is no mara de-atra of the Land of Israel.
Everyone goes according to his own Torah judgment, and if he is not qualified for that, according to the judgment of his rabbis.
There is no racism in that, because it does not stem from racial perceptions but from his or his rabbis’ Torah judgment.

Why is it going nowhere..

You are making an entirely new argument, one that solves everything.. If moral wrongs caused by obeying a religious command are not wrongs even according to the moralist who does not recognize religious commands (and there is no difference whether we are speaking of punishment for one who violates a religious command or sanctions/discrimination by others, so long as they are backed by and caused by the religious command), then there is no blemish whatsoever in the conduct of the Badatz at Barkan wineries, since the racism there (the firing of the workers) stems from obedience to a religious command (gentiles who did not convert, ordinary gentile wine).. And that is exactly what I argued from the outset: what appears to the Western person as moral wrongs receives a completely different perspective the moment one introduces commitment to religious laws into the equation.
And therefore it is pointless to discuss a specific case, because at every step one can encounter such conflicts.
(By the way, according to what has now been published, the Badatz has frozen giving kashrut certification to Barkan, which shows that they are consistent and fair.)

It also follows from this that in every scenario where there is a conflict between a religious command and a moral value (and in my opinion there are millions of such scenarios that are no less plausible and moving than the story of Barkan wineries), commitment to the religious command will tip the scales, because according to what you are now saying, there is no problem with moral wrongs caused by obedience to religious commands.

Mem, your perspective is an anachronism. All the decisors agree that the prohibition of “lo titgodedu” does not have the meaning commonly accepted nowadays, because territory and geography have become virtual. In a world that is a global village, “atra” is no longer a geographic concept. It is a community or an ethnic group. Two synagogues in one city does not mean in the same municipal city but in the same community or ethnic group. And so on.

This is not an entirely new argument but an old one. Moreover, it is what I wrote in the post itself. And there you have why it is worthwhile to “waste time” on what I wrote.

In the days of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the sages of the generation sat together in one study hall, and that is how they reached agreement. In the days of the Amoraim there were few Torah centers and there was scholarly contact among them. The last time a majority in quality and quantity of Israel’s sages sat together was in the time of the Tosafists. The Beit Yosef, for all its virtues, is not the product of a gradual process that lasted generations, but a brilliant and ingenious summary.

After all, according to your approach decisive significance does not attach to “the agreement of most decisors” but to what emerges from the Gemara, and the plain sense of the Gemara is that it requires an actual “court” in an actual “place.” According to Rava there may be two courts in one city, and according to Abaye (whom Rambam followed) in one city there may be only one court. So in the holy community of Barkan one should go by the decisor whom most of the residents accept.

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

By the way, according to the plain sense of Rambam, a person is forbidden to be a “Rambamist,” unless most of his townspeople follow his approach 🙂

S.Z.L.,
Indeed it is not of decisive significance, but it has weight. In particular since even little old me agrees with their reasoning, making two supports for one point.
Moreover, the discussion began from the claim that there is weight to the mara de-atra, that is, on the assumption that there is authority. So according to the one who opened the discussion, certainly there is weight to the agreement of the decisors.

And especially in the site of judgment, where the M.D.A. [mara de-atra] is Rabbi M.D.A. [Michael David Abraham], one may rely on his reasoning that “halakhic autonomy” is a great principle in Torah 🙂

And since I have been given the “autonomy” to hold my opinion, I hereby continue to hold it:

The Torah’s aspiration is that halakhah be a matter of all-Israel decision-making, and even when exile caused an inability to reach an all-Israel decision, authority remained in the hands of the local community. Until the 16th century, the reality was that in most places there was one community in each place, and only in a few places, such as Baghdad at the end of the Geonic era, where the academies of Sura and Pumbedita moved to the capital city, and also Cairo, where alongside the local community there was also an independent community of people from the Land of Israel.

The reality of multiple communities in one city was created in the 16th century in the era of the great expulsions from Spain and Ashkenaz, when entire communities were uprooted from their place and continued to preserve their old character even in the new place and did not agree to be “absorbed” into the local community. At that point decisors indeed began to raise the argument that since the two communities came from different places, the matter is considered “two towns” even according to Rambam (thus wrote, for example, Rabbi Eliyahu Capsali in his book Noam ve-Hovlim, included in Prof. Meir Benayahu’s book Wolves Ravage Benjamin 9.

In the 18th century, with the decline of the status of the community, both for external reasons, as the modern centralized state did not favor a reality of autonomous communities, and for internal reasons of great disputes within Judaism, such as Hasidim versus Mitnagdim, Maskilim versus conservatives, and the like – a situation was created in which the local community was no longer the dominant spiritual center for its individuals, and it became common that even within one family individuals belonged to different schools.

This reality has a not-simple price of a proliferation of disputes and of “making the Torah into a thousand Torahs.” In your view perhaps this is the ideal we dreamed of for two thousand years 🙂 In my view it is a constraint of “there is no choice.” In a reality of opinionated people, we cannot create an artificial unity, because that would lead to much more severe disputes. Even so, I do not think we should lose in advance the hope that one day a general all-Israel halakhic unity will be recreated, within which there will be room for a diversity of personal and communal customs on the common halakhic basis shared by all.

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

S.Z.L.,

Suppose the Ashkenazim are from the tribe of Benjamin, the Sephardim from the tribe of Judah, and the Ethiopians from the tribe of Dan. Does the court of any tribe have the authority to condescendingly rule that members of another tribe are not Jews or that they are Jews? And if there is no overlap between the ethnic communities and the original tribes, then it follows that both the communities and their customs are to a large degree a product of exile. So what is more important: preserving the exilic frameworks, or upholding “love truth and peace” both in Torah study and for the sake of the unity of all Israel?

Mem80, your words in the last comment are simply demagoguery. Indeed, if the Ethiopians are from the tribe of Dan, then Benjamin’s court has no authority to rule that they are not Jews. But Benjamin’s claim is that the Ethiopians are not from the tribe of Dan but are gentiles, and it certainly has authority to rule that. Enough with repeating the empty slogans of “a Jew is a Jew.”

All true; one can understand those who are mistaken logically and halakhically in light of the regrettable fact that Haredi-Ashkenazi society is genuinely racist and sees anyone unlike itself as mentally inferior, sometimes genetically so.

The dispute among the decisors (Radbaz, Tzitz Eliezer, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, R. Ovadia Yosef) is whether Ethiopian Jews are Jews or doubtful Jews.

This is really a complete distortion (if not a gross lie), and since this is not the first time I have encountered this phenomenon אצלך (you receive criticism of things you wrote, and the defense you choose is “that is exactly what I said/wrote”), so I will lay out the discussion here in its stages, so that everyone can judge whether this is indeed what you have been claiming up to now (perhaps you intended that, but you wrote something entirely different).
You opened the post with complaints about the racism of Barkan wineries, which fired Ethiopian workers because of the Badatz’s demands, and you presented the Badatz of the Eidah Haredit as benighted racists..
That is, the claim here concerns a contradiction between morality and a religious law. Moab (whose name suits him and is topical) commented that it is hypocrisy to deal with a specific case, because in his eyes every religious law leads in one way or another to racist/moral wrongs. Which, of course, is correct from his perspective, since he does not recognize the validity of religious laws. If so, then every wrong caused by obeying a religious law (death, lashes, excommunication, sanctions, one sort of discrimination or another) is not moral, because the existence of a religious law does not provide moral justification for the wrong..
There are only two main possibilities for resolving such conflicts: 1. To accept that there is a confrontation between religious law and morality, and choose a side (Moab added that in this conflict he supports being on the side of morality), and this is what I argued all along, though of course I support the supremacy of religious law.
2. To try to reconcile the conflict, either by clarifying the definition of the concept of racism or by changing the wording of the religious law so that there is no conflict between them.
Throughout, you went in the second direction.. First, in the post you go on at length to explain and define what racism is and whether it can be applied to the present case. Also in the comments afterward you write:
“First, one must clarify whether there is a halakhah that is racist. Even if it is, that does not automatically mean it should not be observed, and it is still a meaningful inquiry. In particular, one should examine interpretations that would allow us to remove it from that state.
Second, if indeed some halakhah stands in contradiction to a moral rule, one must discuss what to do in such a clash.
And third, when there is a clash, halakhah will not always prevail; each case on its own merits.”
That is, you continue to adhere to the line that the conflict between morality and religious law must be reconciled, while even hinting that there is a possibility you would prefer to accept morality as binding over religious law. Your other comments, too, reflect the line that advocates reconciling the conflict, not recognizing it – which would force you to decide whether to accept religious law or morality.
And now all of a sudden, in your response to my statement that there is a conflict requiring a decision, you reverse yourself and claim: “If one accepts the premise that commandments must be observed, even if the reason for that is not moral but religious, then the punishment for that is also reasonable,”
That is, you no longer see any need to reconcile clashes between morality and religious laws, because one who accepts the obligation to obey religious laws (and even one who doesn’t accept it) must also bear all their consequences (= punishment, or any wrongs caused by them). That is a simple, short argument that does not require the prolixity and cleverness with which you expanded in the post (because there is no need to reconcile the conflict, only to choose a side).
By the way, a further implication of this approach is that there is no point discussing the matter except the wording and definition of the religious law itself (that is, there is a need for discussion only on the halakhic level), because the moment we have clarified the precise wording of the religious law, it obligates us to obey it and bear all its consequences, even if they appear to someone as immoral.

And now you come back and claim that this is what you argued from the outset..
Forgive me, that is explicitly the opposite of what you argued before (you tried to reconcile the conflict, not choose a side). I hope you will examine what you wrote honestly and say whether you think that is really what emerges from your first comments or not.

With God’s help, 18 Tammuz 5778

To ‘Mem80’ – greetings,

If we desire both truth and peace, it would be best to remove from our “vocabulary” the accusation of “condescension” toward the great Torah sages who rule as their analysis leads them, both the stringent and the lenient. For who should decide grave questions of clarifying Jewish status and lineage if not great Torah authorities? Such is the way of Torah: “Bend your ear like a funnel to hear the words of the stringent and the words of the lenient,” for all have a solid basis in the Talmud and the decisors. And the fact is that R. Moshe Feinstein and R. Isaac Herzog (whose 59th yahrzeit falls tomorrow, 19 Tammuz), although they had “broad shoulders” and freed thousands of agunot – in this case remained in doubt.

The smoothest solution, which would extricate the members of Beta Israel from the thicket of dispute, is a very simple act – symbolic drawing of covenantal blood + immersion (as the Chief Rabbinate instructed from the days of R. Isaac Herzog until the great immigration in 1985), or at the very least immersion for stringency (as per the ruling of R. Shaul Yisraeli, R. Mordechai Eliyahu, and R. Avraham Shapira, who relied on the circumcision done on the eighth day, because fundamentally they followed the Radbaz, that the community as a whole are certainly Jews, except that there is concern for a minute minority of gentiles who may have mixed in over the generations).

The need for a “conversion for stringency” pertains only to marriage, because of the severity of the prohibition, but does not prevent counting them for a minyan, integrating them into society and into the religious educational system, and the like. After all, in any case the groom and bride immerse before marriage (the bride by law and the groom by custom), so by the easy act of immersion, which in any case they do, members of the community are fit to marry according to all opinions. So why not proceed from the outset “by the path agreed upon by most decisors”?

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

Regarding what happened at Barkan wineries – on the face of it, it seems that the Badatz people could have conducted a prior inquiry with the supervisors on behalf of the Chief Rabbinate (particularly in the Shomron religious council, headed by Rabbi Elikim Levanon, who has good working relations with the Badatz במסגרת ‘Kashrut’), and it is very possible they would have discovered that “the problem never existed in the first place,” because the workers from Beta Israel had undergone a “conversion for stringency,” as have most members of the community who marry through the Rabbinate. All the mistakes they made would have been avoided.

In the last paragraph, line 3:
…they would have discovered that “the problem never existed in the first place”…

It may be that the Radbaz’s statement that Ethiopian Jews are from the tribe of Dan is based on the similarity between their customs and the customs described by Eldad the Danite, who came in the Geonic period from “the land of Havilah,” where there was a kingdom of the tribes of Dan, Naphtali, Gad, and Asher. His unique “laws of slaughter” are mentioned in the words of the Geonim and Rishonim.

By contrast, R. Meir Cohen, of blessed memory, who worked as an emissary among the Jews of Ethiopia in 1976 and described their customs in the collection Anthology of the Customs of the Communities of Israel, reports that the tradition of Ethiopian Jews themselves is that they were from the exiles of Judah and came to Ethiopia from Egypt.

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

R. Moshe bar-Yehuda (Kastner), of blessed memory, who was sent to the Jews of Ethiopia in 1957 by the Jewish Agency, with the encouragement and blessing of the Chief Rabbis R. Isaac Herzog and R. Yitzhak Nissim, to strengthen the education of the young, also records a tradition from the elders of the community that their origin was among the people of Judah whom Nebuchadnezzar left in the land under the leadership of Gedaliah son of Ahikam, and after Gedaliah was murdered they fled to Egypt. In the time of one of the kings of the house of Ptolemy there were Jewish fighters who joined the army of one of the king’s rivals, and when Ptolemy won, they fled south from Egypt and reached Ethiopia (see Moshe bar-Yehuda’s article “The Falashas,” on the Da’at website).

Regards, S. Z. Levinger

Now I understand the statement of the Gemara: “From the day the Temple was destroyed, the Holy One, blessed be He, has only the four cubits of halakhah.” To my sorrow, the whole issue of examining the Jewishness of Ethiopian immigrants was handled without the proper judgment. Since they measured them by “dry” halakhic criteria, did not delve into their laws, and ruled that they were gentiles requiring conversion. One rabbi from the Eidah Haredit went further and claimed that the clothes of their spiritual leaders, the priests/kessim, resemble those of Christian priests. He simply did not notice that the garments of the priests of the community are the closest thing to the garments of an ordinary priest in the Temple period (turban, breeches, tunic, white garment, and more). Christianity came many centuries after Judaism; should not the clergy have adopted Jewish priestly garments?! Instead they continued to adopt the garments of the Jewish priests. (Whereas that halakhic authority from the Badatz wears clothes that did not come from Judaism at all.) Ethiopian Jews offered sacrifices in places where fire descended from heaven and consumed the offering; among them were righteous people endowed with the holy spirit who foresaw what was going to happen even in the Holy Land (an example of this is none other than the grandfather of Yosef Baruch – the very worker over whom all the uproar arose). Most if not all those who ruled in favor of their Judaism examined the matter thoroughly and sent emissaries who saw them in Ethiopia observing and keeping the Torah, while around them there was isolation, a hostile environment, and a wide gulf of faith between them and the gentiles. In general, there are today Torah scholars researching the Jewish tradition of Ethiopia (such as Rabbi Yoel Bin-Nun, Dr. Yossi Ziv, and others), who research seriously and without bias and show that most of their customs date from the beginning of the Second Temple period (which matches the version of the tribal elders that they were exiled from Egypt at the beginning of the Second Temple period). This is, in my opinion, the greatest tragedy: when people reduce the Holy One, blessed be He, and the Judaism of Beta Israel to terms such as: did they have a Shulchan Arukh or not? Did they put on tefillin, etc.? and thereby draw conclusions. More than two hundred years ago the Ethiopian Jews beyond the Sambatyon were so enveloped in aura and mystery that the students of the Vilna Gaon went out to look for them in order to renew ordination! More than a hundred years ago the halakhic world was not so opposed to Ethiopian Jews, and letters of encouragement were often sent to them, signed by many of the great sages of Jerusalem. And indeed there is a tragedy! Orthodox Judaism, clinging to “dry” halakhah, that does not trouble to send representatives, that does not see the redemptive, kabbalistic side (which admittedly should not be a central consideration, but does have significance), when the vision of the prophets from Isaiah, Zephaniah, and others is fulfilled, that God will gather the dispersed of Israel from Cush – they busy themselves with the micro level and not the macro! And this is probably, for me, the curse of the destruction of the Temple: they reduce God to the micro level.
By the way, on matters of lineage Ethiopian Jews have an astonishing memory of genealogical trees! They remember branches and sub-branches seven generations back and further in order not to marry relatives. And the concern (raised not unambiguously) of mamzerut that arose from the halakhic ruling was refuted by Rabbi Ovadia, who examined the matter with the elders of the community and found that their betrothals are not valid betrothals, and then there is no concern for a get either. My suggestion is this: just as there is no sweeping halakhic ruling that all Jews from the former Soviet Union who immigrated in recent years are doubtful, and rather each one is examined individually, so too regarding Ethiopian Jewry one should examine each case on its own merits.

Hello,
You wrote in a comment:
“It is also true with regard to secular Jews, and nevertheless ordinary wine is forbidden even when handled by Sabbath-desecrating Jews. True, in the past, those who were not committed to halakhah were usually also prone to idolatry, and today this is not so. ‘Their daughters’ need not necessarily be understood as a concern of intermarriage but as a concern about the creation of closeness (marriage is an expression of closeness), and that exists also in relation to secular Jews.”
I understand the simple logic, but not the principle behind it today.
It sounds as though once someone not committed to halakhah was considered “lost” and prone to idolatry, and therefore people did not want closeness with him.
I find that very hard to accept, especially today – to give up any aspiration for mutual respect, to feel that we belong to the same people even if we do not necessarily express that in the same way.
Is there no drawing hearts closer, no mutual responsibility?
Without going to the extreme and to people who are anti (though when they become religious they usually become the most extreme there too), Sabbath desecrators come in all sorts and levels. What about all those who put on tefillin every morning but desecrate Shabbat, or who light candles and make kiddush every Friday before turning on the television?
And what about all those who define themselves as secular and observe nothing between man and God but do act with kindness and are careful in matters between man and fellow man?
What is the point, regarding such Jews or others, of emphasizing the desire not to draw close to them?

And as a second question: you translate/interpret “Sabbath-desecrator” with the term “committed to halakhah.” Do you think that fits with regard to Judaism today? Or, to put it provocatively: why is a thief or murderer who keeps Shabbat considered “committed to halakhah”? And why is there no problem “drawing close” to him and drinking his wine?

Avraham

First, one must distinguish between halakhah and its reasons. Sometimes even if it is justified, there is still a binding halakhah. Second, even regarding the reasons, I disagree with you. Just as there is value in unity with secular people, there is value in distinguishing oneself from them. Someone who in principle is not committed to mitzvot is not a religious Jew. Someone who is committed to mitzvot but has a different interpretation of them, or who because of weakness does not keep them, all or in part, is something else.
Drawing hearts closer and mutual responsibility have nothing to do with the matter. By that logic one could also drive on Shabbat in order to draw closer to secular people. Let them keep the halakhah in order to draw closer to our hearts.
And finally, indeed a thief and a murderer are religious Jews who sinned, whereas someone who eats non-kosher is not such a person. The reason for this is not the severity of the transgressions in question but their character. Theft and murder are universal obligations, and one who violates them is not not a Jew, but not a human being. The definition of a Jew is according to what uniquely distinguishes him, and that is eating kosher (for example), not refraining from murder or theft. Therefore in conversion too it is right to focus on commandments between man and God and not between man and his fellow.
And someone who keeps commandments between man and his fellow – there is nothing specifically Jewish about that. He is simply a good person. There are many Christians and other gentiles who do that too.

Hello,
Thank you for your answer.
1- You sharpened the issue that bothered me in the distinction you made between someone who does not feel committed to mitzvot and someone who does not do some things because of a different interpretation or weakness. Do you agree that what halakhah calls a “Sabbath-desecrator” is of the first type? The second type is all of us, no?
2- Regarding drawing hearts closer, I did not mean that one should give up certain halakhot for its sake. I meant that it seems to me that when possible it is preferable to give a more inclusive interpretation than a separating one. To connect this to the first point: don’t you think that the definition of “Sabbath-desecrator” could be interpreted differently today – exactly as you wrote: someone who feels committed.
3- I completely understand what you write regarding commandments between man and God, which distinguish the Jew, versus those between man and fellow man, which are universal. From there you arrive at what seems to me a somewhat absurd situation in which there can be a Jew who is not a human being, and a human being who is not a Jew. I have no problem with a human being who is not a Jew, but I find it hard to reduce the definition of a Jew to the part between man and God. You wrote: “Someone who keeps interpersonal commandments – there is nothing Jewish in that.” I disagree. I think it is impossible for a Jew not to be, by definition, also a human being, and if so then in my eyes he is a deficient Jew. He is no worse than someone deficient in something else, but the fact that he keeps commandments between man and God does not define him as a better Jew. It seems to me to be a matter of the source of the command, or why you adopt it as a norm – once you keep interpersonal commandments because the Torah commanded them, that “turns” them into commandments between man and God.

Avraham

Hello Avraham.
First, these long gaps between one message and the next are difficult for me. I am conducting several discussions, and I do not remember the details of each one. It is hard to read the whole thread backwards every time a message arrives. Therefore, if you want to renew an old discussion, please sharpen what claim you are referring to and what you want to say about it.

1- For most contexts, only the first.

2- The question remains what the correct interpretation is. I also suggested that it means someone who feels committed because that is correct, not because it is inclusive. When there are two possible interpretations and we need to decide between them, I am willing to accept inclusiveness as a consideration. But that is usually not the case.

3- There is no problem at all with a Jew who is not a human being under this definition. He is deficient on the human level, not on the Jewish level. Obviously Judaism expects from us the observance of human values as well, and I have already elaborated on this in several places. But when defining something, one chooses the properties that uniquely distinguish it. You would not define a human being by his having legs, even though that is true, because that property is not unique to him. The same applies to moral values in defining a Jew.

And this still requires examination in light of the rabbi’s words here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%98-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%99-%D7%A9%D7%9C-%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%99-%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A8/#comment-17889

If I were to hold a different position from Rabbi Ovadia, and the matter depended on me, then yes.