On Gypsies and Thieves (Column 61)

With God's help

On the Sabbath I read the book by the Spanish author Ildefonso Falcones (author of The Cathedral of the Sea and others), The Barefoot Queen (translated by Amalia Ran). It is a historical novel about Gypsies in eighteenth-century Spain, describing the fortunes of one Gypsy family amid persecution, humiliation, and severe discrimination, harsh laws and wars between families within Gypsy society, disgraceful class differences—socially and legally—and a degrading and shocking attitude toward women. The book is very long and very slow, and therefore somewhat difficult to read; it is one of those books for which you need to be in the right mood in order to enjoy them. Fortunately, I was in the right mood and enjoyed it very much (as I did its predecessor). Here I would like to raise a few brief reflections following some remarks the author adds in the book's afterword, where he tells a bit more about the Gypsies in that period and in general.

The passage in question

Ildefonso writes there as follows:

The spirit of the Enlightenment, which led to the decree of 1783 [the repeal of some of the persecution of the Gypsies, including the "Gypsy Law," by Carlos III, king of Spain — M.A.], relied on several reports from the courtrooms, which testified to the ongoing discrimination, humiliation, and injustice suffered by the Gypsies at the hands of the populace, and especially of legal officials and clergy, because of their way of life and their distinctness from the rest of the population.

It is enough to cite the following passage from Cervantes' novella, The Little Gypsy Girl:

And it seems that Gypsies and Gypsy women came into the world in order to be thieves. They are born to thief fathers, educated to be thieves, trained to be thieves, and in the end become outright thieves in every possible way. And the urge to steal, and theft itself, are an inseparable part of them, cured only by death.

According to the reports from the courtrooms, the Gypsies preferred to live in solitude and isolation rather than among those who treated them so badly.

Nevertheless, it is true that Gypsy society is ethnocentric. This community has no written traditions, but many writers agree on several shared values that characterize this people: racial pride and certain guiding principles in their lives. "The freedom to act according to their own free will and choice," "nothing belongs to anyone and everything belongs to everyone"—these are principles that do not coexist peacefully with ordinary social norms.

I would like to comment on two aspects, and in the end point to the connection between them.

A. The "racism" toward Gypsies

From these remarks one could understand that Gypsies are treated discriminatorily, humiliatingly, and unjustly only because of their ethnic affiliation and way of life. The passage from Cervantes is brought as clear evidence of this attitude. But as he himself describes in his book, the Gypsies really are thieves. This is an accepted practice among them, and even those who make their living from various trades tend to engage in theft and fraud. It is presented there as one of the characteristics of Gypsy thinking and values. He himself, after quoting Cervantes, writes that in their culture "nothing belongs to anyone and everything belongs to everyone." That is, theft is an accepted norm there.

That is indeed the reputation that has attached itself to the Gypsies and their culture, and I do not know enough Gypsies to confirm or deny it (though when my wife and I were in Paris we did in fact encounter several Gypsy women who tried to swindle us in the street, and it turns out this is a very well-known phenomenon there around the museum district). But it seems strange to me that he himself holds these positions and accepts them, and at the same time determines that the attitude toward Gypsies stems only from their difference and separateness. What is society supposed to do when a group lives within it whose accepted norm is systematic and ongoing theft and fraud? How is one supposed to relate to them? Is it not reasonable and natural to persecute them and try to curtail their freedom of action? In light of what appears in the book, it seems to me that Cervantes' description reads almost like an encyclopedia entry on Gypsies. So what does the author want from him? What is untrue or improper in what he wrote?

As the sages already said, just because you are paranoid does not mean they are not after you. Likewise, the fact that people treat you in a discriminatory and humiliating way does not mean you do not deserve it.

Again, political correctness

Politically correct discourse requires equal treatment of every population group, but there is a very problematic distortion in this. There are groups within the population that really do stand out in characteristics different from everyone else. Some are more or less talented, some are more or less athletic, some are better or worse in combat, some are more or less rational, and so on. Erasing distinctive characteristics helps no one in any way. On the contrary, anyone who wants to advance the group in question must address its characteristics honestly. Speak about them and do not conceal them.

Beyond honestly putting the factual characteristics on the table, one may even judge them (Heaven forfend). If there is a population in which theft and fraud are the norm, one may and should judge it negatively. There is not the slightest trace of racism in this.

When is it correct to speak of racism? When a Gypsy comes and asks to be admitted to a club and they refuse him because he is a thief. In that case they must investigate as far as possible, if possible, whether that is indeed the case, and judge him according to what they discover about him specifically, not according to the stereotype (even if it is correct). Thus, for example, it is forbidden to reject a candidate for studies merely because of his origin, sex, or religious affiliation—not because these say nothing about his abilities and talents. Sometimes they do. But every person has the right to be treated on his own merits, according to who he is, and not according to the group to which he belongs.

The attempt to deal with such discrimination by blurring the differences and making baseless claims about sweeping equality among all people and societies in the world does an injustice to the truth, but it also undermines the effort. Such a description removes blame and responsibility from the "victims" (=the Gypsies) and places it on the "oppressors" (=the whites). The Gypsies do not need to stop stealing. On the contrary, we are obliged to respect their culture of theft, not judge it, and in fact not even speak about it or note its very existence. In order to advance the populations in question, it is proper and necessary honestly to put the differences on the table, to judge them, but at the same time also to make clear that these are statistical characteristics that of course have exceptions (sometimes many), and therefore to insist that every individual be treated on his own merits and not according to his affiliations.

But from here it follows that when there is no possibility of examining each person on his own merits, then there is indeed justification for acting according to stereotypes. There is nothing wrong with that. If the club cannot examine the Gypsy applicant, it seems reasonable to me not to admit him because there is a fair chance that he is a thief. Likewise, when one must decide on sample security checks at airports, the attempt to do so equally for Jews and Arabs in the name of sacred equality is idiotic folly. There is no reason whatsoever to check a Jew, and there is certainly reason to check Arabs. This does not mean that all of them are terrorists, and it also does not mean that there is any justification for humiliating them or judging them without evidence. But when it is a matter of suspicion, and when there is no possibility of assessing it specifically in every individual case, there is no escape from acting on the basis of statistical assessments, and there is nothing wrong with that. And whoever is offended by this can take a chill pill.

As far as I know (perhaps this has changed in the meantime?), the army also determines candidates' KABA score (its initial quality classification) according to parameters of background, parents' occupation and education, and even city of residence. My children, as residents of Lod, will apparently receive a lower KABA score (relative to residents of Ramat Gan or Ra'anana) a priori, without being examined on their own merits. Incidentally, here I really do think this is unjustified, since to the best of my understanding there is an opportunity to examine and form an impression of each person during all the hassles and nonsense everyone is put through before induction.

A note on women in Torah study

If I return for a moment to the example of women in Torah study discussed in previous columns (56,57,58), when I dared, in my article in Makor Rishon to describe the situation (quite correctly) that women, at present, have not yet reached a good level of Talmudic scholarship (I wrote that the best among them, a few isolated cases, have reached the level of a good kollel scholar), almost everyone who spoke to me expressed deep offense. What is there here to be offended by? We all know that this is in fact the case.

Nor did I claim that they are incapable, though I did say that the burden of proof is on them. That is indeed the situation. Is it obvious to everyone that there is no statistical difference between the abilities of women and men in Talmudic scholarship? From where can one infer this without any examination? Must I decide, without evidence, that women are like men? On what basis? Is political correctness sufficient grounds for drawing factual conclusions? In my view, no. In any event, what I said was that factually we are not there yet, and that the burden of proof for the sacred equality rests on the women. They have not yet discharged it. I very much hope that they will, and that they will break the glass ceiling, but hopes are not facts. I even believe, and am fairly convinced, that this will happen, for at least statistically, out of 50% of the population it seems unlikely to me that there are no talented women there, even if on average there is a difference between them and men. And still, beliefs and conjectures are not facts either.

Many men and women explained to me that my words impede progress and create a stereotype. In my view, it is exactly the opposite. The stereotype already exists, and so long as the contrary has not been proven, it will not disappear on its own. And if one is not permitted to speak of it openly, it will continue circulating in hiding as jokes.

Here too, it is precisely offense and political correctness that prevent progress on the issue. This offense is nothing but placing responsibility and blame on society and everyone and his wife—except, of course, their own wife (that is, except themselves). There is no doubt that there are many barriers to the progress of women in Torah study in general and in Talmudic analysis in particular. There is no doubt that the male world has a substantial role in creating those barriers and in the fact that they are not being removed with proper speed (and I wrote that), but obscuring and silencing the situation does not contribute to improving it.

Over the last few weeks I have not stopped hearing all sorts of strange excuses (many of them correct) for why there is no analytical writing and no women's Talmudic scholarship (and this is already among those willing to admit the truth—after we have gotten past the barrier of recognizing the factual truth itself). I am trying to say that the excuses are not really convincing to me, at least not sufficient. But beyond that, you cannot buy groceries with excuses. However much we complain and bewail our bitter fate, until we take our fate into our own hands we will not make progress. Until we are prepared to hear the truth from whoever says it, we will not make progress.

On Palestinians, Mizrahim, and the other professional victims, who are unwilling to hear anything about the situation as it really is and want to hear only about the guilt of everyone and his wife for their condition, I will not elaborate here. These are exactly the same phenomena. Again, not because their claims contain nothing real, but because wailing and political correctness are not constructive mechanisms of progress.

B. Judging a society and an individual within a society

If we return to the Gypsies, let us assume that they really do have a culture that does not recognize ownership and property as values to be respected. Does it follow that there is no possibility of judging them as a society, or the individuals within that society? The answer here is complex.

A society's values and culture are the result of long-term processes. For an individual born and raised within that society, it is very difficult to cope with them, critique them, and certainly to change them. If any one of us had been born a Gypsy, it is highly doubtful that he would behave differently (there you have a politically correct assumption of sweeping equality among human beings). Society too is difficult to judge, since society is a collection of its individuals. If no individual can reasonably be expected to change these values, then it is also unreasonable to expect society to do so.

This does not mean that one need not defend oneself against such a society of thieves, but I am speaking here about judgment, not necessary self-defense. Judgment of such a phenomenon can also be made on two levels: 1. Such values are reprehensible, even—and perhaps especially—if they are deeply embedded in the culture under discussion. 2. But the people, and perhaps even society as a whole, are not to blame for this. Therefore one may defend oneself, and it is proper to judge at the principled level, but in relation to individuals there is indeed room for an understanding and accepting attitude.

These matters have implications in various and diverse contexts. When a religious person judges secular people, or vice versa, there too he must take into account the social influence and the depth to which the values he is judging are embedded. This does not mean that all values are legitimate and that there is no right and wrong. But it does mean that judging people or a society is not necessarily identical with judging their values.

A note on collective guilt

One might have tied the question of collective responsibility to Maimonides' well-known words (Laws of Kings 9:14) about the people of Shechem, who were killed by Shimon and Levi because they did not fulfill the commandment to establish a legal system.[1] They did not set up a judicial system that would have prevented their king from abducting Dinah from her home. And commentators have already asked what grounds there are to judge an ordinary citizen who did not bring his king to justice. Can such a citizen do anything on the collective plane? Maimonides apparently thinks so. When a society is in bad shape, there is a certain blame on each of its members. If none of the individuals is to blame, then society too cannot be blamed. Every individual in a society bears responsibility to act together with the others to change what is wrong in their society, and therefore it is incorrect to view this only on the individual plane.

But our case is different. In the case of the people of Shechem, it was clear to them that what their king had done was immoral and improper, and they did not act against him (apparently out of fear). For that, there is room to impose responsibility on each of them. But in the case of the Gypsies, the people think that this is the proper and correct way to act. This is not a question of inability but of lack of understanding. This is truly a situation of compulsion, and therefore here there is room to argue that neither on the individual nor on the societal level should even collective blame be imposed.

But despite everything, I am not entirely sure that there is no room to judge the society as a whole. After all, other societies reached the conclusion that private property has importance and created mechanisms to ensure that it is respected. The Gypsies did not do this. One can of course ascribe it to nothing more than a fortunate accident, but it is more reasonable that this difference stemmed from people's thinking and choices, and above all from action to implement those conclusions. If so, "white" society succeeded in advancing from its starting point toward a more advanced value system (yes, there is more and less advanced. Sorry for the modernist chauvinism). So if one society ("white") succeeded and another (Gypsy) did not, that means the other society is more backward, and it is reasonable to attribute to them, as a society and as individuals, some dimension of collective guilt.

The connection between the levels

So what does one do? If one cannot condemn and judge the people, then apparently only force remains. The required conclusion would seem to be that there is no escape but to use force against them in order to defend ourselves, and it seems there is no chance of progress on the substantive plane. But on this point I am actually optimistic. One can try to explain, or perhaps to let them look at the issue from an angle they have not examined. If we take a Gypsy and ask him whether, in his opinion, a society that respects property would not look better than a society that does not respect property (the gist of Kant's categorical imperative, in a nutshell and without foreign words), I assume many of them could agree with us. Values are not imposed on us deterministically. At least in some sense, we choose them.

But this must of course come together with providing economic and social opportunities for advancement and giving proper treatment. Discrimination and humiliation, even if they have some justification, will not make progress possible. Without proper treatment, they will never see things from our point of view. Feelings of persecution and deprivation prevent people from identifying with their surroundings and therefore from changing as well. In this sense, the question of judgment and empathy discussed here is important also on the plane of the remedy discussed in the first part of my remarks.

[1] See on this my article in Tzohar 14, on the problem of the collective and the individual and the dilemma of 'Defensive Shield'.