On Haredi Racism (Column 206)

With God's help

Several times in the past I have already addressed the subject of racism (see, for example, here, here, here, here, here, here and here). This is a sensitive and emotionally charged subject, and therefore it is hard for people to discuss it in a balanced way. In many cases, people raise substantive arguments and are met with hurt indignation and the label 'racist' instead of a substantive response. My impression is that in many cases these reactions arise when those on the defensive have no substantive arguments, and so they prefer to be offended. That is easier, and it exempts you from addressing the arguments and confronting your sorry state.

A few days ago someone posted to the site an article by Rabbi Moshe Yitzhak Farkash that was published in the journal Tzarikh Iyun (as a response to an earlier article by Eliyahu Levi), dealing with the question of the attitude of Ashkenazi Haredim toward Sephardim and also touching directly on the form and character of the discourse on these issues. The article is written in a way that does not pay much heed to political correctness (although he prefaces it with too many introductions, reservations, and apologies), and in that sense I liked it. You can read the comments there, and you probably will not be surprised. Few arguments and much offense-taking and mudslinging (though there are several very good ones). The article gave me quite a bit to think about, and I thought I would lay out some of those thoughts here. Let me say at the outset that this is not racism in its original sense, since the comparison here is made mainly between cultures and less between races. But for the sake of discussion I will adopt the irritating yet accepted term 'racism'.

Preliminaries

The author actually begins with a routine opening paragraph recounting an incident:

I was riding a bus from Bayit VeGan and wanted to sit in the seats facing opposite the direction of travel. Across from me sat two yeshiva students, with rather refined appearances, their legs stretched out over the seats in front of them. When I sat down, I said to them with a smile that I didn't know "whom to stick with it" (that is, which of them would have to fold his legs). The Ashkenazi of the two answered me: "Sit opposite him, he's Sephardi!", while pointing to his friend. I was appalled by the response and immediately protested. The fellow brushed me off, insisting that it was just a joke. What astonished me even more was seeing that the Sephardi fellow took the remark with complete equanimity and was not offended at all, and even tried to minimize the wrong with platitudes, saying that he was already used to it, and that it was like jokes from his brothers. I told them that this was a shocking story, and that I would write an article about it. And here I am keeping my word.

I told the young passengers that every joke conveys a certain message, and the message of this joke is the dehumanization of the Sephardi. In contrast to the Ashkenazi, the Sephardi is not a human being whose inconvenience matters. More than that, he is so little of a human being that one can say this to his face. I explained to the Sephardi fellow that the reason he was not hurt by the joke was even sadder, since he already sees his dehumanization as something so obvious that he is no longer hurt by it. I added that the fact that he has trained himself not to be hurt by such jokes is a survival mechanism within a society in which jokes of this sort are common.

I must say that what he writes here is very puzzling. True, I did not see the speaker's body language, but as far as I understand the situation there is not the slightest trace of racism here—no dehumanization and nothing of the sort. Just a bit of humor (and even self-directed humor about the Ashkenazi attitude toward Sephardim). The Sephardi fellow took the remark with equanimity, exactly as a rational person should (yes, there are rational Sephardim too. Not all of them are occupied only with taking offense). Incidentally, excessive solicitude for the honor of Sephardim sometimes points to latent racism (the assumption being that these primitives must not be upset, even in jest). Admittedly, the automatic offense-taking common in such discussions actually justifies this racism (and therefore it is not racism). We have grown accustomed to the fact that one must not say the truth, and certainly not joke, otherwise the other person is offended; and therefore the assumption that he will be offended upon hearing the truth has some basis.[1]

After that Farkash adds two more preliminaries. First, he says that one should not sweep the problem under the rug, and if there is a certain attitude of Ashkenazim toward Sephardim, it is proper to put it on the table and discuss it. By 'discuss' I do not mean merely to be offended, denounce, and look for ways to address it, as is customary in our circles, but to examine its roots and ask whether there is anything to it, to what extent, and where it comes from. Second, he prefaces that such a discussion naturally deals in generalizations, but one should not avoid that. When dealing with group characteristics, one essentially must generalize, and that is of course entirely correct. A generalization as such is not racism, so long as one is aware that it is a generalization. A generalization should be evaluated through the prism of truth—whether it is correct or not—and not by asking whether it is insulting and whether it is racism.

The outline

In the body of his article, Farkash states in advance that he intends to make three claims:

• The gap in mentality between Ashkenazim and Sephardim is very large; obviously it arouses emotions and feelings, and there is no reason for surprise—the real surprise would have been had these gaps not produced the prevalent sentiments.
• One must pay attention to two particular issues raised in Levi's article that did not receive treatment commensurate with their complexity: school admissions and marriage.
• This does not mean that racism is not a problem; it most certainly is a problem, and serious thought is required as to how to eradicate it and promote more egalitarian attitudes and policies.

The first claim is factual, and as such it should be examined in terms of truth or falsehood. The second claim is normative: whether it is proper to derive conclusions from the differences (school admissions and marriage).

At first glance, the question of racism pertains only to the second plane, but that is not precise. Racism can also find expression on the first plane, for example if one presents distinctions between the two groups that have no basis in reality. When a person assumes factual differences between groups despite there being no basis for them, that itself may stem from racism (that is, from the a priori assumption that the other is inferior in one respect or another). However, if there is a reasonable basis for this mistake, then even if it is a mistake, this is not necessarily racism. It is a mistake like any other.

Beyond that, throughout his discussion Farkash assumes that if the factual and mental differences are indeed real, then there is justification for discrimination in school admissions and in matchmaking, since these are done on a substantive basis. But here too I disagree with him, for racism has another common expression: sweeping use of correct characteristics without taking into account that they are only generalizations. For example, even if it is true that television viewing is more common in Sephardi homes, one can still examine this on its own merits before deciding not to admit a Sephardi student to a yeshiva or a cheder (traditional boys' school). There are, of course, places where it is difficult, costly, or impossible to examine matters case by case, and this is especially so when the generalization is accurate at very high percentages. In such situations, the use of generalizations does not express racism. For example, there is no reason at all to conduct security screening at the airport or in a shopping mall for Jews and Arabs alike. The security danger comes almost exclusively from Arabs (in very high percentages), and the effort and hassle imposed on the general public by equal screening for everyone are unreasonable and disproportionate. Therefore there is no racist dimension whatsoever in the decision to screen only Arabs, and if Arabs are offended, then they have a problem either understanding reality, or not caring about dangers (or perhaps an interest in avoiding the hassle)—so let them deal with it.

To sum up, wherever it is reasonably possible to conduct a substantive inquiry, deciding a particular case by stereotypes—even if the stereotypes are correct—carries a whiff of racism. Sometimes this is mere laziness, because the person in charge cannot be bothered to examine the situation on its own merits and prefers to make assumptions based on general (correct) characteristics. But that very laziness is blameworthy, for the duty to give equal treatment to all populations should lead us not to lapse into laziness in these matters. Therefore laziness too may express latent racism, since the lazy person does not insist on giving equal treatment to every individual and every group.[2]

The factual characteristics

Further on, Farkash courageously puts on the table quite a few factual differences between Ashkenazim and Sephardim. Throughout, he twists and turns between evaluative claims and apologies that he has no intention of judging and determining who is right and who is not, who is better and who is worse, but only of describing. In the end, his main concern is to explain why the Ashkenazi attitude toward Sephardim is as it is, and to show that there is no racism here even if the differences are not perceived as evaluative. To that I say that it seems to me that almost all of these characteristics are plainly evaluative, despite his unconvincing denials, though it is true that at least some of them are correct.

Naturally, as is customary in our comments sections, he is met with torrents of abuse that reflect an unwillingness to examine substantively the characteristics he enumerates. I am sure many readers immediately think of counterexamples that would refute his factual claims ('my modest, intellectual grandmother from Casablanca… and in general, what exactly counts as being intellectual? who appointed you to decide?…'), but counterexamples are irrelevant when one is dealing with generalizations. As for me, I think some of the characteristics he adduces are correct (as generalizations, of course), but there are others that in my view have no real basis. In light of the preliminaries I gave above, you can understand that my criticism is directed at the part that is untrue, and especially at the normative conclusions he draws from those characteristics.

I will give two examples here:

• Intellectual gaps. Farkash claims that there is a marked intellectual gap between Sephardim and Ashkenazim. At first I thought this was a baseless claim unsupported by any data. In his explanation, Farkash brings data—for example, the percentage of Jews from Eastern communities who have won Nobel Prizes,[3] or the number of Mizrahi Supreme Court justices, and the like. He attributes this to an Ashkenazi mentality that aspires to intellectualism and values it, for better or for worse (there are of course other reasons as well). In other words, he does not mean intelligence but rather the cultural attitude toward intellectual achievements. Under that definition I tend to agree with his generalization (at least regarding the Jewish public in Israel. And here too, of course, it has been steadily diminishing over the years, including within Haredi society). I too arrived at this conclusion many years ago, though of course there are other reasons as well. Just to take predictable objections off the table, specific stories neither add nor detract from this point. This is a generalization, and as such, in my view, it has real substance.

But this distinction does not lead where Farkash takes it. Even if it is correct, it does not justify any discrimination, neither in school admissions nor in matters of marriage. If you truly care about improvement, then by all means examine the candidates carefully—for cheder, for yeshiva, or for the court—and screen them by relevant criteria rather than by origin. After all, it is obvious that there are Sephardim with a distinctly intellectual culture, and there are others who, despite the cultural background described, have advanced and achieved. Each of them deserves equal treatment. That is precisely how one advances toward making the best possible use of all our potential.

• Modesty. Farkash claims that Ashkenazi notions of modesty differ greatly from Sephardi notions of modesty (apart from Jewish law). He mentions that the Ben Ish Hai rules that the nursing area is not among the parts of the body considered covered, because all women nurse openly. Likewise, among Sephardi communities abroad it was customary that after the wedding the groom would spreads out the garment (literally, publicly display the sheet), before the parents and witnesses. Both of these behaviors are unthinkable in Ashkenazi Haredi society. He notes that he has no intention of determining which behavior is correct and proper, but only to point out that in Ashkenazi eyes this is considered barbaric, and that it is wrong to ignore that.

Indeed, that is true with respect to a certain percentage of the Sephardi public (it seems to me that most Haredi Sephardim are not like this, and in particular the two customs described above are almost nonexistent today). In any event, this consideration may be relevant to matchmaking. So once again, the groom in question should examine his prospective bride specifically and her habits, but I do not see a reason to disqualify her a priori because of her origin. The question is whether one is willing to make a substantive inquiry. If not, then as I wrote above there may be racism at the base of this approach. Moreover, if there really is here a characteristic regarded as improper, the right thing would be to try to change the situation and raise the bar among Sephardim. And if, as he claims, there is no judgment here of right and wrong, then it would be proper to work specifically to change the Ashkenazi attitude, so that unnecessary barriers are not created between groups in society.

He goes on to discuss several more characteristics that I will not enter into here (folksiness, extroversion, lack of boundaries and hierarchy, initiative and whininess, crime and dropping out, and receptiveness to criticism). Some of these are correct as generalizations, but regarding some of the others (the last one, for example) I am not at all sure. In any case, even if everything is correct, my comments above stand.

Conclusions

As I wrote above, the very description of the differences—some of which I think are incorrect—may already conceal behind it a whiff of racism, and that is already on the factual plane. When you take a few examples and build from them a picture (especially if it is inaccurate) of an entire culture, that itself is a generalization with a whiff of racism. The overwhelming majority of women (especially Haredi women) from Eastern communities do not nurse their babies in public. But to my taste, the discussion of factual characteristics leads us to the less important part of the discussion. That belongs mainly to the genre of taking offense. The more important question is not on the descriptive plane but on the normative one: should these differences, even if they are correct, affect the Ashkenazi attitude toward Sephardim?

In my opinion, certainly not. If it is impossible to examine the specific case individually, or if such examination demands disproportionate effort and cost, perhaps one can see some measure of justification in that. But the unwillingness of an entire society, down to all its particulars, to conduct substantive inquiries and to make blanket decisions about every individual on the basis of stereotype has no justification whatsoever.

Farkash writes:

These differences in mentality, as they are perceived by many Ashkenazim, create an attitude of 'otherness' toward the Mizrahi community. This attitude is entirely natural. It is natural that a society that values diligence should feel otherness toward a group that is not diligent; natural that a society that values heroism should feel similar feelings toward a passive group; and natural that the Ashkenazi community, which values traits like intellectualism, initiative, etc., should feel a certain otherness toward the Sephardi community insofar as it does not represent those same values.

Quite apart from the fact that some of the characteristics he listed are incorrect, and apart from his ignoring the fact that he himself emphasizes that these are generalizations while at the same time using them to justify an attitude toward specific individuals, there is in these words a fatalistic justification of the given social and cultural situation (assuming that this indeed is the situation). But are these characteristics and this feeling of otherness a basis that cannot be changed? After all, one can change the Sephardi characteristics or the Ashkenazi attitude toward them. For some reason Farkash ignores the question whether it is legitimate to act on the basis of these things and thus perpetuate them, or whether it would be preferable to try to change them. There is in his words a fatalism, an acceptance of the situation as it is as a decree of fate imposed on all of us, without the all-important trait of initiative (which he attributes to Ashkenazim). So if Ashkenazi Haredim are such good initiators, let them take initiative and work to change the situation. Has he no interest in contributing to a reality in which there are more Sephardim on the Supreme Court or among Nobel Prize winners?

Accepting the situation as a necessary decree of fate is, in my eyes, a very problematic conception. In fact, it too contains a racist element, since it sees all these characteristics as essentialist and therefore unchangeable, and of course there is no logical or empirical basis for that. Later he deals with the problem of those who 'Ashkenazify' themselves, who are also rejected both in school admissions and in marriage. The astonishing explanation he offers in this matter is nothing other than the ingrained (essentialist) influences from which one cannot free oneself despite the desire to 'become Ashkenazi.' Things stamped into us from the home, from which we will not succeed in escaping. Incidentally, it is true that there are things from which it is hard to free oneself, but his description here is essentialist and fatalistic in a very troubling way.

'Natural' is not a sacred word. Slanderous speech is also natural, and so too are the desire for revenge and the bearing of grudges, and still we are supposed to try to overcome these natural tendencies. The desire to rest is also natural, but an athlete who wants to achieve must overcome that desire. One can understand someone who fails in revenge, laziness, or slanderous speech, but it is not right to justify him.

A natural state in which there is nothing bad requires no change, and therefore it can justify a policy of passive omission. But if you regard such a state as problematic, then the fact that it is natural should lead not to justification but to thinking about ways to change it. It is hard for me to accept that Farkash sees nothing problematic in such a situation (especially in light of the fact that I mentioned that most of these differences are indeed evaluative, contrary to what may emerge from his words). And if there is something problematic in the existing situation, why is the fact that it is natural perceived by him as so important and decisive?! I was surprised to see how completely absent from his words is the dimension of public and personal character refinement.

Beyond that, it seems to me that Farkash fails here by not distinguishing between these two planes, that is, between understanding and justification. He declares that his intention is only to explain and describe the situation and not necessarily to justify it, but in practice he completely justifies it, at least de facto. At the root of the matter lies, to my taste, a very problematic approach, and as stated, in my view it is not lacking a racist dimension either.

And finally: humane treatment and dehumanization

Farkash concludes his article by saying that Ashkenazim are obligated to give humane treatment to their Sephardi brothers. Even if one accepts all these differences, he argues, they do not justify dehumanization.

To tell the truth, my feeling on reading these words was somewhere between laughter and tears, because of the tone, which was so condescending. And again, I am speaking about the tune and not the content. One could read all this as a genuine and sincere exhortation to the Ashkenazi public, and I am even inclined to think that this was the writer's intention. But in the subtext, after he presents a list of characteristics that he describes as not evaluative but merely descriptive, though they are plainly evaluative (are initiative or intellectual aspiration neutral traits? Is whininess a neutral trait?), it is no wonder that what follows—which ostensibly also speaks in neutral language about the duty to give humane treatment—is perceived as condescension as well (after all, one must take the Indians into consideration and treat them like human beings. Otherwise how will they progress?!). Exactly like the leftists who explain to us our duty to treat Palestinians and other disadvantaged people humanely, which contains within it blatant racist condescension.

To sum up, it is specifically Farkash's candid words, spoken courageously and clearly written with the intention of contributing to the discussion, that bear overwhelming witness to the deep problem of racism in the Haredi world. It seems that life inside a Haredi bubble, cut off from other publics (both the Sephardi-Haredi one and the secular one, where one can see the stereotypes breaking down), does not allow a person to emerge from his shell and see the world with a more balanced eye. This is a positive feedback loop, within which racism builds and entrenches itself.

[1] This is the root of the common left-wing racism, according to which one must make no demands of the Palestinians, or of any other 'disadvantaged' group, for they are not human beings possessed of human responsibility as we are. The task of solving the problem is laid only at the door of the enlightened and progressive (= us). Therefore, if Jews hold a demonstration in Umm al-Fahm or on the Temple Mount and Arabs go wild with violence and even murder, the blame is always on the 'provocateur.' This, of course, unlike women who dress immodestly or participants in a Pride march, where if they are attacked the blame lies solely with the attacker.

[2] This is an appropriate ethical place to raise questions about the KABA score commonly used in the army. It is determined on the basis of stereotypical characteristics (such as place of residence, parents' education, their occupations, etc.), and I am not sure there is really any need for it. They perform enough case-specific examinations there, and I see no need to use such generalizations.

[3] See the interesting response there by the commenter 'Hasidsher' (which, despite the anger, is written substantively and supported by arguments and data), who brings a very interesting datum according to which the percentage of Mizrahi Nobel Prize winners is similar to that of Ashkenazim (when one looks worldwide, relative to their proportion in the overall Jewish population. People are not aware that Sephardim were less than ten percent of the entire Jewish population). It is also worth seeing there a breakdown of different Mizrahi and Ashkenazi populations, through which he shows that these differences are rooted in overly crude generalizations. Part of this is the phenomenon of secularization, which was more widespread in the West than in the East (Nobel Prize winners were not yeshiva students). See here for an interesting analysis of these phenomena (with which I do not entirely agree).