On the dictum that the wicked, even in their lifetime, are called dead (Column 205)

So beautiful! No words! We’re waiting for the full pamphlet…

But it’s still difficult. After all, the wicked Haman was an onen and not a mourner!

It requires investigation whether aninut applies to gentiles. And in particular, aninut applies only until sunset of that day, and after sunset he is no longer an onen. אלא דבגויים הלילה הולך אחר היום, ולכן אפשר שבתו נפלה בדיוק בשקיעה והוא הפסיק להיות אונן ונעשה אבל, אבל לדידיה זו אבלות של אותו יום, ופשוט.

I enjoyed it very much! I don’t remember any Purim Torah this successful.
And since it has come into our hands, let us say a word on it, and it seems that the wording of the Gemara should be reversed, and this is its meaning. For the tanna taught: “One who publicly whitens his fellow’s face is as though he shed blood,” and if so Haman was mourning his own death, alas (and one should investigate whether in such a case he is exempt from the commandments like an onen), and “with head covered” because his household was destined to die, as we find with David when he fled from his son Absalom before his death (II Samuel 15:30): “And David went up by the ascent of the Mount of Olives, going up and weeping, and his head was covered, and he went barefoot; and all the people who were with him each covered his head, and they went up, going up and weeping.” And now it is well explained.

However, one can distinguish: although one who whitens his fellow’s face has the status of a murderer and bloodshed with respect to him, still for the one humiliated there is no status of a dead person, for these are two different laws. And with this it will be very well resolved why we do not punish one who whitens another’s face with death by the sword like a murderer, and this is straightforward (all this if we assume that the punishment is determined by the victim and not by the murderer). But regarding the main difficulty, it still requires investigation, and that is obvious.

As for why we do not punish one who whitens another’s face, that is certainly no difficulty at all, for since one who whitens is like a murderer, he thereby becomes a complete wicked person, and his transgression is his death. And with this it is also well explained what was difficult to us concerning the wicked—when is their death? One may say as above: after all, his coming into the world was without sin, and his transgression is his death, as explained.

But it is still difficult: why do we not say regarding a murderer that this transgression itself is his death?

This requires great investigation. And given the force of the difficulty, one may answer with some strain that these are two separate matters: the murderer in deed is judged by the deed, whereas the one who whitens another’s face, who is a murderer in law, is judged by the law of “the wicked, in their lifetime, are called dead.” Alternatively, the murderer has removed himself from Jewish status and is judged as a gentile after the act; but if one who whitens another’s face were to remove himself from Jewish status, then he would no longer be a murderer at all, since all his murder is only in law. Therefore he must necessarily remain Jewish, and so that rule of “the wicked, in their lifetime, are called dead” suffices for him. Examine this well.

One of the most successful Purim Torahs!

What the author abbreviated here—that it requires investigation whether aninut applies to a gentile—can be explained as follows: since an onen is forbidden to partake of sacrificial foods and the second tithe, and is exempt from commandments, these laws do not apply to a gentile, and therefore there is no aninut for a gentile.
And one may further say, according to the Rambam’s view that mourning is biblical and is learned from “Have I eaten the sin-offering today?” which was said concerning aninut, that we see there that the status of mourner takes effect from the time of death, except that the laws of mourning begin from the sealing of the grave. Thus this verse indeed calls him a mourner.

However, regarding the main delightful and excellent pilpul, one must wonder: how could it enter the mind of a diligent scholar engaged in the Torah of Horeb to distinguish in the law of death between death relative to the gentile and relative to the Jew? We hold that we do not split one body, so how could Haman’s body be considered dead with respect to a Jew but not with respect to a gentile?
And even if we say that if women are a nation unto themselves, then all the more so the sons of Noah, whose emission is like the emission of horses, are not considered one body—since he and I cannot dwell together under one canopy—
still one must ask: if with respect to one we consider him dead, why should the other not be drawn after him, as in the principle of the later authorities regarding animal tithes out of concern for a tereifah, and likewise in the rule that we do not follow the multitude in a quorum, where the Shakh explained that one is drawn after the other? So too here we should say that one is drawn after the other.
And with difficulty one may say that since we cannot decide who should be drawn after whom, we leave each one in his own status, in the sense of what Reish Lakish expounded: since they are evenly balanced, let them both come.
But this too requires investigation, for surely Israel is primary, and those who will grasp the corners of their garments in the future are secondary; thus they are not equal—and this is the precise difficulty.

“He bared his arm,” etc. Still, regarding what he said—that we do not split one body—I would say that the Sages made no distinction between one and two, for otherwise you make your words variable. And go tell that to the horses ridden by kings, etc., Heaven forfend. As for what he asked from the matter of being drawn along, there is certainly no difficulty: indeed, he is properly drawn along and is considered dead even relative to the gentile, just as he is considered so relative to the Jew. But for the gentile, the whole notion of “considered” does not count; therefore from his perspective he is not considered dead even though he is drawn along, and this is obvious.

What my brother Yehoshua wrote—that one should not distinguish within one body so as not to make one’s words variable—is not compelling. For it may be that the reason of the one who says we do not split one body is akin to the reason we do not split credibility in a derivative case: because it is impossible to divide it. So too in one body it is impossible to divide. Consequently this reason does not apply to a gentile and a Jew, who from the outset are like oil and water that do not mix. And well known are the words of the grandfather of J.B. that there is a division between sacred and profane, above that a division between light and darkness, and above all these a division between Israel and the nations. Therefore this is not comparable at all to one body, for here it is possible and necessary to divide; and in such a case, which is unlike the principal law, it would seem that the reasoning of “you make your words variable” does not apply.
And as for what he wrote, that “drawn along” is like “considered,” and there is no “considered” by a gentile—this requires examination. הרי הגרש"ש ביאר שממון הוא עניין מציאות ואם כן דמי לגוי דהא מה"ט בגזל גוי לעניין המשפט אין הבדל בין יהודי לגוי כפי שביאר שם ע"פ היראים וממילא אם יסוד האחרונםי בגריר מהני גם בממון אמאי לא יהני גם בגוי דלכאורה שווים הם לפי מה שהשרישנו הגרש"ש

As for the main point of the words of the distinguished author, it is puzzling, for one who throws an infant from a rooftop is not judged according to the initial state.
And although the Ramban in Milchamot, at the end of “How the Foot [Causes Damage],” compared it to a thrown vessel, the early authorities distinguished between them, and the later authorities wrote that with regard to a human being we do not say we follow the initial state (see Naḥalat David, Bava Kamma 17b, and the novellae of R. Shimon Shkop, Bava Kamma sec. 24). If so, according to most of the early authorities, it remains very difficult how she is considered dead. One may answer that Haman held like the Ramban, that regarding a person too we follow the initial state.
And although according to the Ramban Rabbah ruled according to “after the breaking of the vessel,” while Rava was uncertain about this, and there is no one who holds that we follow the initial state—
one may say that what was obvious to Rabbah on one side was obvious to Haman on the other side. Examine this well, and it is straightforward.

May royal apparel be brought to the rabbi, may he live long, for his empty words—“Vanity of vanities, all is vanity”; its beginning is empty words and its end is empty words—and may he merit to add vanity upon vanity, in the aspect of “increasing and going,” and with God’s help may his students go after vanity and become vain.

And “Judah—you, your brothers shall praise you”: I saw fit to note what his holy honor, the Rebbe, author of Divrei Sheker, of blessed memory, wrote. He prefaced with the question: why did that wicked man see fit to weigh out specifically ten thousand talents of silver? Why exactly that, and what brought him to it? Rather, “the daughter of Haman son of Hammedatha” has the numerical value of 999, and obviously his sons were worth more, for “all the women shall give honor to their husbands,” it is written. It follows that each son was worth a thousand; altogether this ketubah and this dowry come to a sum of ten thousand.
Afterward I saw, with God’s help, in the holy book Aḥizat Einayim, that even “Petah Tikva” has the numerical value 999, and he wrote a wondrous novelty—were it not an explicit verse, it could not be said. He prefaced with the fact that we do not find in the Megillah that that wicked man had a daughter, and obviously, had he had one, Scripture would not have omitted it, for the whole Megillah is named after a woman, since “they too were in that miracle”—coffee supreme. Rather, certainly he had no daughter and none was ever created for him, just as in truth there is no place called “Petah Tikva.” And an explicit verse says: “If birds are not seen, death reigns here; it is worth getting out of here quickly; behold, I am going,” etc. (and this is open rebuke to the Zionists, for only the Messiah is destined to turn the Valley of Achor into a door of hope speedily in our days). And what the Sages said in the story of Haman’s daughter was only by way of allegory, and your mnemonic is: “mourning and with head covered” is an acronym for “there is no daughter for Haman.” It follows that his whole dialectic is mere pilpul, vanity with no benefit in it.
With the blessing “man is like vanity,” etc., written in tears.
And so as not to leave the page blank, I will write what I heard from the holy mouth of my teacher, author of Sikhat Ḥullin, who said that anyone who heard his holy father crying out with terrible sobs, “We suspend Torah study for the reading of the Megillah… oyyy,” would immediately be seized by thoughts of repentance. And that suffices for the understanding reader.

To be brief, I will only say that we certainly do split credibility even within one body, for that very case itself is a split credibility. Examine this carefully.

One can certainly distinguish, for although we do not exempt one who breaks a vessel with a stick, the vessel is still considered broken from the outset (as they distinguished between “we follow the initial state” and “he broke an already broken vessel”), and this is not the place to elaborate.

One who whitens another’s face is not a murderer in law but in deed (albeit in a lesser sense), as the Rif wrote regarding muzzling by voice, and that is obvious. In particular according to the reasoning of Kovetz Shiurim on Nazir 11a, which explained that speech with a practical consequence is considered an act and displaces speech; and regarding humiliation, the Gemara and Tosafot in Sotah say that the blood drains from the face, so it has a practical consequence. And though these are astonishing words if one were to classify him on that account as a murderer, still there is certainly a practical consequence here.

Very sharp indeed, though I fear for him because of the ban of our holy master the Rashba, Heaven forfend, against those who turn words of Torah into allegories (what are called the allegorists), God forbid, like Yedaya ha-Penini and his band. Let such things sink and not be said.

Beautiful Purim pilpul!! Has the rabbi written more things like this? Could I please have a link?

I don’t have any online. There used to be a column here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%91%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%90%D7%AA-%D7%9E%D7%92%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%95%D7%93%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%90%D7%A0%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%A9%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%93%D7%97%D7%A7-%D7%98%D7%95/

I trembled when opening my mouth to insert a comment; arise to entreat the Awesome and Fearsome One. My deeds are small, and so I creep forward; I lack understanding—how can I speak? May He accept my whisper as one who drips and threads; may my expressions be sweet as honey from the comb. The heat of my guilt burns in my meditation; it storms within me when I begin. Before uprooters of mountains I open my mouth and howl; to grinders of rocks I make my utterance heard. Who can answer after the lion? Ignorant of knowledge—how can I rage…

There is no cause for wonder here, for who is greater for us than the commander of the Israelite army, David Elazar (Dado), who risked his life in the battles of Israel, especially in the Yom Kippur War, and whose face was publicly whitened by a commission of inquiry (called an “inquisition” in the vernacular), claiming that he had been captive to a conception; his days were shortened and he died in suffering. And also President Johnson of America, whose days were shortened after the humiliations the demonstrators subjected him to during the Vietnam War. And Minister Yaakov נאמן, who suffered a heart attack after they opened a maliciously false investigation against him by the people of the prosecution, and so on and so forth: their days were shortened and they died in suffering after the humiliations they underwent. So it is true that not every insult is public humiliation and they do not die immediately, but there is bloodshed here.

Credit to the author, may he live long, for hinting at the beginning of his composition to the matter of striking that wicked man, in the aspect of “Strike, please, this nation” (II Kings 6:18), and let it pain the listeners.

And one could further say: indeed, in an ordinary case of one who whitens another’s face, his transgression is not his death, but here it is different, because she whitened him with a flowerpot, and it is written that one who causes another to sin is greater than one who kills him. If so, all the more so Haman’s daughter, who hit the bullseye on his forelock, so that certainly his blood was shed, and the slain man came on his own feet, as above.

With God’s help, 29 Av 79

Haman, who was Mordecai’s slave and obligated in commandments like a woman, is certainly judged as a Jew, for with respect to him the law determines and not reality. However, there is a distinction between being “a mourner,” which is a normative status in which halakhah obligates one to mourn, and being “with head covered,” which is a status dependent on factual reality, where in this matter the Sages have no authority to determine.

Haman accepted the normative determination that obligated him to mourn, but did not accept the factual determination that “the wicked, in their lifetimes, are called dead,” a determination that belongs to aggadah, where, as is known, Torah sages have no authority to determine. Therefore he was “a mourner” but not “with head covered,” so long as he was not factually convinced.

With blessings, Shatznimos Halwingardi, endless elephant

🙂 Very sharp indeed.