Who Wants a State Governed by Jewish Law? (Column 18)
With God's help
All right, I got the hint. Given the number of responses to the last column (hint: zero) as compared to the two that preceded it (hint: about two million), I understand which way the wind is blowing. So we will return to more topical questions, although I really do not promise to persevere in this.
On yes-no questions and a state governed by Jewish law
Yesterday a few friends and I met, and a debate developed between two of them regarding the views of some rabbi. Once they saw that they were repeating themselves and getting nowhere, one of them asked the other: I have a yes-no question: does that rabbi want a state governed by Jewish law or not? He demanded a yes-or-no answer, and saw it as a measure that would immediately settle the argument. Both saw holding such a position as an indictment of that rabbi (benightedness, immorality, irrationality), and so this served as a test question for his views and for the threat he posed.
I remarked to my friend that, contrary to what he thought, in my opinion this is not a yes-no question. I did not have time to explain and clarify my point at that meeting, so with the readers' pardon I allow myself to do so briefly here.
Apocalypse Now
The question of a state governed by Jewish law comes up from time to time, and many people (including me) perceive it as highly threatening. Personally, I would not want what many people regard as a state governed by Jewish law to exist here. See, for example, the apocalypse described here, and consider whether you would want such a model established. But is this really the correct description of a state governed by Jewish law? Or at least, is it a necessary description of it?
It seems to me that there is an unholy coalition here between the Hofesh website, renowned for its enlightenment and its obviously straightforward and utterly non-agenda-driven thinking, and the dark religious fundamentalist forces of which it speaks. Both the freedom fighters who fear a state governed by Jewish law and the religious fundamentalists who aspire to one agree on one thing: that this is indeed the model of the state governed by Jewish law under discussion. What they share is that what is called religion and Jewish law is defined by those dark elements, and the dispute is only over whether that is desirable or not.
But your faithful servant, as usual, disagrees with both sides. Jewish law and religion are not like that, and therefore it is a shame to keep battering each other over our attitude toward them. If this is the model of a state governed by Jewish law, I stand at the head of the opposition. If they were to establish a Sanhedrin today with the current candidates to sit on it (think of those who would be elected to the Chief Rabbinate) and institute such a state governed by Jewish law, I would flee to Australia. Although, thank God, I also consider the odds of establishing such a state to be slim—indeed slimmer than the odds of establishing a genuine state governed by Jewish law, as opposed to the apocalyptic version. Blessed be His name.
The different layers of the question
The question whether one wants a state governed by Jewish law can be examined and interpreted on several different levels, and the answer to each of them does not necessarily depend on the answers to the others. Therefore, it seems to me that this is emphatically not a yes-no question.
For example, the question may be interpreted as asking what the ideal state's character ought to be on the assumption that all its inhabitants are committed to Jewish law (the messianic era). Or perhaps the question is instead asking what the state ought to look like today, with reality as it is. These are two completely different questions, and the answers to them are independent of one another. One can want a state governed by Jewish law in the utopian setting, yet understand that it is not right (and not merely not possible) to implement that today. It seems to me that most of the religious public, together with its rabbis, holds that position, although some of them may not admit it.
One may also ask what, in general, a state governed by Jewish law is. Is it Jewish law as it is seen by the Chief Rabbinate and its religious courts (the apocalypse just described), or rather a more enlightened, liberal, and up-to-date Jewish law? In other words, will the Jewish law by which the state is run be the Shulchan Arukh and its commentaries, or are we talking about a more contemporary rendition, one suited to the realities of our time as well? Will women be appointed to public office there? What will the attitude toward non-Jews be? How will cases of indirect damage be judged? Will there be freedom of worship and freedom of opinion? Will judgments be rendered on the basis of anachronistic presumptions like "It is better to live as two than to live alone." ("better to dwell as two"), as they are today?
The term Jewish law is not unequivocal. Beyond the disputes within Jewish law that exist regarding almost every single rule, and beyond the dispute about methods of legal decision-making, there is a much more basic dispute about the possibility of updating Jewish law and adapting it to our age (even in the messianic era, not only because Israeli society also includes secular people). The basic question is what our relation to the sources of Jewish law should be. Must we implement them according to their literal and plain meaning, or can and/or should we adapt them to the reality of our time? In other words: what is reform, and is it necessarily bad?
This, of course, also depends on who the spiritual leaders (the ayatollahs) of that state governed by Jewish law will be. Will it be the Jerusalem Badatz? Rabbi Kanievsky? Rabbi Shmuel Auerbach (leader of the fanatical Lithuanian faction)? Rabbi Shalom Cohen (that Amalekite from Shas)? Rabbi Tau? the Rebbe of Satmar or of Chabad (who, as is known, did not die)? the council of Hardal (Haredi-nationalist) rabbis? Or perhaps our chief rabbis? Is there even another option? And perhaps the leaders will not be rabbis at all?…
Third, even if we are speaking about a state governed by Jewish law that is supposed to function in our present society, will that state impose its way of life on all citizens, or will it conduct itself according to Jewish law while leaving the private individual the autonomy to live as he sees fit? Even if one dislikes both models, for the sake of discussion one must at least acknowledge the difference between them.
Fourth, will this state be monarchical or democratic? What is the governmental model at issue? Will the Sanhedrin that will presumably stand at the head of that state impose its rulings on all of us, or will it impose only in those respects in which uniformity is important for the sake of the social fabric and the healthy functioning of society? Who will sit on that Sanhedrin—the list above, or a somewhat more reasonable composition? Will the governing model operate as it appears in the Ran's Derashot, where he speaks of two components functioning in parallel: the secular one (royal law) and the religious one (Sanhedrin), each of which, at least in certain areas, has its own legal system? Or are we dealing with a single-headed, one-pole dictatorship?
In addition, one may wonder whether my friend was asking what that rabbi feels and truly wants regarding a state governed by Jewish law, or whether he was asking what that rabbi thinks is correct from an ideological-religious standpoint. That distinction is important, because if the question concerns the degree of danger he poses (dangerous or not) or the degree of his good sense (sensible/rational or not), then ideology is a very important measure. But if the aim is to judge the morality of that rabbi (wicked or righteous), it is no less important to ask what he himself identifies with, beyond what he is compelled to think by virtue of his religious views. A religious outlook sometimes imposes itself on natural feelings (although that should happen much less than people usually think and say).
In short, if there is one thing that can be said with certainty about the issue of a state governed by Jewish law, it is that this is emphatically not a yes-no question.
Can a rabbi fail to want a state governed by Jewish law?
It is hard to avoid the question whether a rabbi can at all fail to want a state governed by Jewish law. After all, the discussion was about a rabbi, and as such it would ostensibly be only expected and natural that he would want such a state. Is there any rabbi who does not? Hence this criticism resembles criticisms of a rabbi who says that homosexuality is forbidden (or a disease), or a rabbi who says that one must refuse an order if it contradicts Jewish law? See on this in the previous column.
But in light of the analysis above, it seems that here the situation is different. We need to examine each of the questions hidden beneath that heading, and then we will see that the answer to all of them does not necessarily follow from the mere fact that the person in question is a rabbi.
So what, then?
I assume that from what I have said so far one can already understand where I stand regarding these questions. If we are indeed talking about Jewish law as it is currently conceived and the leading religious leadership that exists today, I see a state governed by Jewish law as an existential threat to the state, and no less to Judaism. I will fight with all my might against the implementation of such a state even in the utopian situation in which all citizens are already committed to Jewish law (and perhaps even more so in such a situation). If it is the existing ayatollahs who will populate the supreme legal institution that would have—God spare us—coercive and legislative authority, then I would rather flee to some decent pagan temple in the wilds and live there. Incidentally, if I know Him and His views at all, that is probably preferable even in God's own eyes. That, at any rate, is what I hope for His sake.
Before a state governed by Jewish law can be established, an infrastructure is required on two interconnected planes. First, the establishment of contemporary, modern thinking in Jewish law, including a creative interpretive toolbox, and a redefinition of legal obligation and of our relation to the sources of Jewish law. In short: reform now. Second, the building of a cadre of figures who know how, and are willing, to use this toolbox and apply it to the realities of our time. So long as these two do not exist, I very much hope—and also believe, happily—that there will not be a state governed by Jewish law here.
A concluding note
For the sake of fairness, I must note that part of the approach of the halakhic decisors and part of the anachronistic character of Jewish law in our day stems from the fact that it has no real significance in our public life. Rabbi Yitzhak Hutner once spoke about the Chief Rabbinate and said that there are two types of revolutions in the world: the Russian model, in which one seizes the tsar and cuts off his head, and the British model, in which one places the king in a golden cage with lots of money and honor and zero powers. He concluded by saying that the Chief Rabbinate is a revolution on the British model (and look how much damage it manages to do even from inside the cage).
If the jurists of Jewish law—even the current ones—were given authority, and of course also charged with responsibility for running the state and society in present-day Israel, I assume that even the darkest among them would act differently from the way they speak today. It is easy to make pronouncements from the armchair when you bear no responsibility (like me) and when someone else runs things and pulls the chestnuts out of the fire for you. Authority by its nature generates responsibility. The secular framework within which the religious courts and the Rabbinate operate also exerts a threat that forces them to contract into a problematic conservatism. Their free action, with authority and responsibility, is indeed frightening, but I want to assume that in such a situation their policy and approach would improve greatly (about this it was said: Let him come, but may I not see him. ("let it come, but let me not see it")).
The absence of authority is one of the main causes of the ossification and irrelevance of Jewish law. If all women denied a religious divorce obeyed the religious courts and remained in marital limbo—I assume (and hope) that the attitude toward them would be different. Alternatively, if the state did not allow the religious courts to adopt such a conservative and problematic approach, they too would reconsider their course. Either way, they would search much more vigorously for creative solutions to free such women from that limbo. Likewise, if all citizens observed the Sabbath, I assume that the taboo on religious people serving in the police or the Foreign Ministry, and on the possibility of those institutions operating on the Sabbath in ways required by contemporary reality, would likewise disappear—and not necessarily through the use of indirect-action switches from the Tzomet Institute. Today we all rely on the secular public to do it for us. Does anyone really think there is any way to live in a state where the police do not operate on the Sabbath (even when no life-saving emergency is involved)? So what would we do if there were no "Sabbath Gentiles" to do it for us? (See my remarks on this here). One could, of course, continue to many other areas, such as interest and heter iska (a legal device for permitting interest-bearing transactions), and so on, but I think the point is sufficiently clear.
Discussion
Dor:
I know you do not like outcome tests… but still.
We can plainly see that the sector that preserves religion with the greatest devotion is דווקא the one that does not renovate halakhah and adapt it to the present age (at least officially), whereas the sectors (even the religious ones and the Reform) that do this, to a lesser or greater extent, are דווקא less connected to religious life. Both in terms of attrition, and in terms of identifying with religious commitment as an absolute value.
Unless, of course, your view is that religious life does not have to be identified with total commitment to observance of the commandments (regardless of interpretation).
Because if you agree that religious life means absolute commitment, then the outcome test goes with the “simple conservatives.” (Yes, I listen to your lectures. During sports activity…)
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The rabbi:
Hello Dor.
I indeed do not like outcome tests, for several reasons. The main one is that even if the conservative outcome is better, they are devotedly preserving the wrong religion (as in Rabbi Kook’s well-known words about dark fear of Heaven, and about faith that is akin to heresy). In general, sectarians always have impressive commitment and devotion, and I still would not recommend that anyone join a sect. Alternatively, if we had to give up the commandments in order better to preserve religious commitment, would that be the right thing to do?
But even regarding success in the outcome test itself, I disagree with you. In terms of actual results, conservatism led to the massive secularization that is with us to this day. Closed ultra-Orthodox conservative education caused most of the Jewish people to abandon their religious commitment because they found no answer in the religiosity of that time. So even if today the short-term results are better, in the long term it does not necessarily work. We need to learn from history and not repeat the mistakes of the past yet again (and conservatives do this all the time. It is built into the conservative ideology, that we are to repeat what existed in the past, including its mistakes).
Beyond that, some of the good results (if there are such) come because of the gentiles around them, who help the conservatives preserve their results. They fund them, assist them medically and scientifically, protect them, and even answer the ideological questions that they themselves have no ability to cope with. Perplexed Haredim rely on forces from outside the Haredi world that help some of them remain within the framework.
And above all, many of those who, by the outcome test, remain on the path—this is sometimes expressed in a frock coat and gartel—but I do not know whether inwardly and genuinely the results there are better.
And finally, there is no such thing as “simple conservatives.” No conservative today acts the way people acted in the time of the Gemara, or the Rishonim, or Moses our teacher. There is only an ethos of simple conservatism (“we do not change a thing from the ways of our forefathers”). This is yet another aspect in which conservatives lie to themselves.
Benny:
I did not quite understand from what was written what exactly is meant by the halakhic state being discussed. After all, are we speaking about a liberal regime with freedom of worship, with criminal law and civil law according to what fits reality for the sake of a functioning society (the “law of the king” that is spoken of)? Why does the current State of Israel not meet that criterion? Is it because a body with halakhic authority must give halakhic certification to the Israeli law code? Come, let the three of us sit as a court and approve the Israeli law code, and all is well with Israel. Why is the United States not a halakhic state? What Jewish values need to be inserted into the American constitution so that it lines up with halakhah?
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The rabbi:
First of all, who says there is such a thing as a halakhic state? Perhaps a state is an instrument, while halakhah is the obligation of the individual. The question whether the state should enforce observance of halakhah or not is a question that must be discussed.
But all this depends on which halakhic state you are talking about: the utopia in which all citizens are committed to halakhah, or the present situation? In a halakhic state whose citizens are all committed to halakhah, intentional Sabbath desecrators would be stoned if there were witnesses and prior warning (for they are not heretics; a heretic who desecrates Shabbat is of course exempt). Pork eaters and those who eat creeping things would be flogged. Civil law would look very similar, and perhaps even absolutely identical, to Israeli law. I am not aware that in the U.S. they flog pork eaters.
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Benny:
I have no problem assuming that a halakhic state does not exist and everything is the obligation of the individual, but in that case the question posed in the title is meaningless.
But if we assume a halakhic state (whatever halakhah that may be), the only question is: does it allow freedom of worship to citizens who do not want to observe halakhah, or not? If the ideal halakhic state allows freedom of worship to its citizens, then every Western democracy on the face of the globe is a halakhic state. And if the halakhic state does not allow freedom of worship, but rather imposes halakhah on its citizens, then what creative interpretation of the halakhic sources and what establishment of modern halakhic thinking will save that state from being a violent theocracy that forces people to do things against their will?
Bottom line: the creative and modern interpretations will not discuss whether it is permitted nowadays to eat pork or not; they will discuss what attitude we should have toward those who do eat pork. Given that our attitude indeed needs to be different from what is described in the Mishneh Torah, and that present-day halakhah is tolerant toward transgressors, what is left for the halakhic state to be? And again, I have no problem with the declaration that such a thing does not exist—but then we are back to this being a yes-or-no question.
Benny:
You wrote:
“Is a halakhic state the halakhah as seen by the Chief Rabbinate and its rabbinical courts (the above apocalypse), or are we speaking of a more enlightened, liberal, and updated halakhah? In other words, will the halakhah according to which the state is run be the Shulchan Arukh and its commentaries, or are we dealing with a more up-to-date translation that fits present-day reality as well? Will women be appointed there to public office? What will the attitude toward gentiles be? How will they rule on indirect damage? Will there be freedom of worship and freedom of opinion? Will they judge according to anachronistic presumptions like ‘It is better to dwell as two,’ as they do today?”
Where does the confidence come from (after reading “Stable and Not Truth,” I know it is not certainty) that you are right on these questions? That is, it is one thing to argue that your interpretation on these matters is possible, but where does the confidence come from that the other side is completely wrong?
Tomorrow Elijah may come and say that this is the halakhah (like the conservative side)—will you still flee “to some wild and decent house of idol worship and live there”?
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The rabbi:
Absolutely. If Elijah comes and says that, I will reject his words, for a prophet is not permitted from now on to introduce anything new.
Indeed, I do not have certainty, but this is what I think. I cannot understand your question—why do I think that what I think is correct? Because that is what I think. And when I answer that question itself, you can also ask where I get the idea that the answer I gave is correct. If you have a more concrete question, perhaps it will be possible to answer it concretely.
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The rabbi:
Hello Benny. One of my aims in this post is to show that the question was complex (not yes-no), and perhaps in particular entirely lacking in value. This argument is meant to show exactly that: there is also the possibility that maybe there is no such thing as a halakhic state at all. Even a state that allows freedom of worship can be run according to halakhah at the public level. Therefore I do not agree with your claim that, according to my view, every democracy is a halakhic state. By the way, a state that does enforce can still be more enlightened than you describe, and that is exactly what I was talking about. For example, according to my view, one who commits a transgression because he does not believe is not liable to punishment. Punishment is imposed only on an offender driven by his evil inclination. In my understanding, this is the halakhah, and it empties halakhic coercion of immoral content. There you have an example of an interpretation that changes the character of the theocratic halakhic state. See here about this:
https://mikyab.net/כתבים/מאמרים/בעניין-הכשלת-חילוני-בעבירה/
In sum, it seems to me that the logical leaps in your remarks stem from that same yes-no mode of thinking against which I argued in this post. There are quite a few enlightened shades in between darkness and “light” in its liberal-secular-pluralistic sense.
Daniel:
Broadly speaking, what you are saying sounds very pleasing to conservative ears. Even if the conservative will not agree that adjustments need to be made, etc., your argument will help him convince the average secular person, and no less the average religious person, that a halakhic state is not so terrible after all. A typical Israeli fears a halakhic state because for him it is interpreted as something that lies somewhere on the Meah Shearim–Iran axis. A softer option of a halakhic state could definitely be accepted more easily. In short, thank you on behalf of the conservatives 🙂
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The rabbi:
You’re welcome. I am happy to provide a service to every Jew—or really to every human being.
Daniel:
Is there any difference at all between the position you present and a Reform position (not that I have any problem with a Reform position)?
If not, why do you see yourself as committed to correcting halakhah by means of mechanisms from within it? Why don’t you simply change it as you see fit according to your own value system?
If so, I would be glad to know what the difference is—if you see halakhah as such a “flawed” product, what trust in it actually remains for you?
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The rabbi:
I do not see any connection between what I said and a Reform position. I am definitely in favor of changes in halakhah, and not a few of them. In your view, is everyone who supports changes in halakhah Reform? Were Hazal also Reform? They made much bolder changes. The difference is also not connected to the quantity of changes required, but to the type of change and the method of change. See my article here:
mikyab.net/מאמרים/האם-יש-עבודה-זרה-נאורה-על-היחס-לגויים-ו/
The changes I am talking about are made according to accepted halakhah. The discourse according to which every change is Reform stems from an inability to deal with Reform and with the difficulties in the existing halakhah.
Halakhah is not a flawed product. Many of today’s halakhic decisors and rabbinical judges are a flawed product.
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Oren:
A side note: even if halakhah were a “flawed” product, that should not undermine trust in it, because trust in halakhah does not come from within it but from insights external to it. At most, it might raise questions that would be answered with various generic justifications.
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Daniel:
1. I am not saying that every change is Reform. But there is a difference between a change and a revolution, and here the quantity of changes made definitely does matter.
2. Are you really saying that you are faithful to the transmitted halakhah and that you change because circumstances have changed, or is it really that you have no trust in the halakhic decisors of the last two thousand years and want to adapt their words to the reality of our time?
3. According to the method of change you propose, could one not say that had the decisors seen the light that has shone upon us in the Enlightenment and the Haskalah movement, they certainly would not have said what they did (on the face of it, that is obviously true).
4. What will remain of the Oral Torah—perhaps not much:
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The rabbi:
1,4. It is a pity to write the same question twice. You are mixing substantive considerations with policy considerations. One can say that all the changes are desirable, but we will not make them because such a quantity would create a shock. That is a policy consideration. The difference between Reform and Orthodoxy is not connected to policy but to essence.
2. I am entirely faithful to halakhah, and I support changes sometimes because circumstances have changed and sometimes simply because I hold a different view even without changed circumstances. I do not decide halakhah based on trust in someone. I do trust almost all the major decisors, and still I do not see myself as obligated to accept everything said by someone in whom I have trust. A person must decide what is right to do, not search for whom he does or does not trust.
3. Indeed, one can definitely say that about some decisors and some cases. The cynicism is an expression of your personal view, and that is of course legitimate. But what can I do—I think otherwise, and in my opinion this (the Haskalah and the Enlightenment) is a genuine light that has shone upon us.
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Daniel:
1. First, there is a certain problem with writing comments on the site. The comment was sent by mistake while I was still writing, and I had no way to correct it.
2. I do not necessarily disagree with you; I am trying to understand the position you are expressing.
3. I am saying that at a certain quantity of changes, an entirely new face has arrived here, and it becomes hard to continue accepting the thesis that there is continuity here—and continuity is so important to the halakhic tradition. This is not a marginal matter of shocks but a principled question of how much you can see yourself as a continuation.
It seems to me that in such an approach, 90% of the Talmud would find itself going into the recycling bin.
Here are a few examples of areas that need to change completely, which a layman like me can think of in a few minutes:
a. On Shabbat, would anyone today formulate the 39 primary categories of labor, which are irrelevant in today’s world? Would anyone forbid opening a Coke bottle if he were beginning today to formulate the laws of Shabbat?
b. Would anyone with knowledge of statistics formulate the laws of uncertainty in the way they exist in halakhah (double doubt, anything separated is presumed to have come from the majority, and the like)?
c. The laws of tereifot—these need to be rewritten according to modern medicine.
d. The laws of absorption into utensils.
e. Hoshen Mishpat—is it reasonable to learn all civil law by analogizing from “an ox that gored a cow”? Does knowledge of the modern economy have no weight here? Does familiarity with other legal systems not make it possible to learn worthwhile things that have been found to work better?
4. The distinction between principles and applications is very problematic. In halakhah there is no list of principles and then deductions from them. Halakhah is almost never formulated that way. It seems to me that an attempt to create such a distinction (an artificial one?) simply gives me the freedom to read into halakhah whatever I see fit, and it is hard to see this as interpretation of halakhah rather than a new halakhah. Can you not be seen as a religious modernist who wants to justify the Torah with apologetic answers (in the bad sense of the word)?
5. There was a certain cynicism in what I said about the Enlightenment, but it was not directed against the Enlightenment, which I too of course accept as a great light. What is unclear to me is how you try to read it into halakhah and say that reading halakhah in light of the new principles of the Enlightenment constitutes an authentic interpretation of halakhah. Does it not seem to you rather that there is a clash between the two?
6. Are there halakhic sources that you regard as more binding? Talmud? Mishnah? Written Torah?
Do the halakhic midrashim of Hazal, which took things away from their plain meaning (“an eye for an eye” means monetary payment, etc.), seem to you to be interpretation or a form of change? Are you prepared to make changes like those?
7. How do you view laws that are clearly immoral or seem entirely irrelevant, such as:
a. Death penalties for trivial things like lighting a fire on Shabbat.
b. The wiping out of Amalek and the war narratives in the Torah (the war with Midian, etc.).
c. The prohibition of idolatry—which in the Torah appears as a very central prohibition, and today is very hard to understand.
d. The Temple and sacrifices, which occupy such a central place in the Torah and in the 613 commandments, and again seem at the very least puzzling to the modern eye.
e. The creation of classes of priests and Levites who have extra privileges—again, a subject that occupies a central place in the Torah and seems to contain something immoral.
8. Does opposition to a central institution that issues Torah rulings not stem from principled opposition to any institution that would infringe on the autonomy of the individual? Does the very nature of halakhah as binding command not infringe on my autonomy as an individual, and how does that fit with modern sensitivity to individual freedom? The feeling that sometimes arises in me when someone tries to impose certain halakhot on me is: “Even if the Holy One Himself told me, I would not obey Him” (a certain interpretation of “It is not in heaven”).
9. How do you view the prohibition of going to secular courts? As far as I know, there is a halakhic prohibition on litigating before courts that do not operate according to Torah law. But if there are so many problems in halakhic adjudication today, perhaps a civil court can give me a better ruling than a rabbinical court judging according to mistaken Torah law. According to your conception, would going to secular courts be permitted in such a case?
Respectfully, Daniel
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The rabbi:
Hello Daniel.
1. It would be worthwhile to refer the matter to Oren, the site manager. I do not really understand these things.
2. Fine.
3. We will remain in disagreement. All your proofs are irrelevant. It does not bother me in the slightest if the entire Talmud changes from beginning to end. As long as the change is made according to what I described, there is not even a trace of Reform in it.
4. The fact that halakhah is not formulated that way does not mean there is no difference and that one cannot rely on it. Halakhah hardly uses rules and general principles at all. But these are slogans. On the contrary, present an example and we will discuss it.
5. Again, too general. Bring an example and we will discuss it.
6. Midrashim in the aggadah take verses away from their plain meaning; otherwise it would be peshat and not derash. Therefore midrashim are neither interpretation nor a form of change. Peshat is interpretation of the text, whereas derash is a parallel plane of discourse with its own tools (the hermeneutic rules of derash, and so forth).
7. Since I devoted a special column to questions of halakhah and morality, I will refer you to it (column 15). Beyond the general principle presented there, some of the halakhot you mentioned have good specific explanations, but in light of what was said in that column there is no point discussing them here.
8. Where did you see opposition to an institution that teaches halakhah, or Torah? This does indeed infringe on the autonomy of the individual, just like a government, parliament, and court, but autonomy is not the only value in our world. Social order and truth are important too. See my article on the site about tolerance and pluralism:
mikyab.net/כתבים/מאמרים/מחירה-של-הסובלנות/
9. Indeed. See my article on the site:
mikyab.net/כתבים/מאמרים/על-אורתודוכסיה-מודרנית-קריצות-ושימוש/
It is also worth seeing the article by my friend Nadav Shnerb: http://www.bmj.org.il/userfiles/akdamot/26/Shnerb%20.pdf
Oren:
Following what was said here: in your opinion, in that halakhic state would we be obligated to appoint a king? There is a minority view that appointing a king is merely permitted and not obligatory (and that is also the plain meaning of the verse, and seems to emerge from the book of Samuel). The verse also says, “And you shall say, ‘I will set a king over me, like all the nations that are around me.’” Seemingly one could interpret this to mean that the commandment of a king applies only when the custom of the nations is to appoint a king, but nowadays, when that is not the custom, perhaps the obligation has lapsed. Or one could also interpret that the obligation is to establish “kingship” as practiced among the nations, and nowadays the accepted “kingship” is democracy.
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The rabbi:
I agree with both suggestions. It seems obvious to me that there is no obligation specifically to appoint a king. There needs to be a government (= kingship), and it has already been written that it can be democratic. And it seems to me that this is so even according to the views that hold appointing a king is obligatory and not merely optional.
I did not understand this sentence:
“Does anyone really think there is an option of living in a state where the police do not operate on Shabbat (even when it is not a matter of saving life)?”
Surely the rabbi is familiar with the halakhic definition of a “possible danger to life,” which applies even in the remotest doubt, so it is not clear to me what the problem is.
As far as I know, all decisors permit calling the police in the case of a break-in or anything similar.
No. I am not familiar with that definition, and I also do not think it is correct. Only where there is a reasonable probability can one say there is a possible danger to life. You are probably confusing this with the instructions given to the public (such as a hot metal ember in a public domain, at least according to the Geonim who permit even a Torah prohibition), but that itself is what I am saying.
I know very well the trick that bases all the permissions on danger to life, but in my opinion it is a trick. In truth they permit it because they understand that one cannot live otherwise. See my article in Tehumin 27 regarding the permission to kill a thief (there Hazal themselves tied it to danger to life, and still in my opinion that was not the true basis of their permission). It is brought here (I do not know whether this includes the editorial notes that argued with me about it; in print they appear):
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%92%D7%AA-%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%91-%D7%9C%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%9A-%D7%94%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%94-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%A8%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%A9/
Whether it is a trick or not, in practice halakhah permits it. So why write as though halakhah does not allow modern life?
Or perhaps I did not understand the rabbi’s point…
I did not write that halakhah does not allow it. On the contrary, it does allow it. I only recommend using the correct reasons and not foolish tricks that are meant to cover up the real reasons. That also leads to mistakes )such as not operating the police in situations where one cannot hang it on danger to life, and more(
Suppose there are suitable rabbis who would be willing to make the necessary adjustments. Why should there be any interest in a halakhic state at all?
1. From a democratic standpoint, if the public is religious enough, it will be able to promote religious matters in accordance with its views. Since in any case everyone is given freedom for moral reasons, what is the meaning בכלל of a halakhic state? It is simply a state with more religious people, and therefore halakhah is more present.
2. From a halakhic standpoint, is there any halakhic/religious interest at all in the secular government (mundane affairs) being religious? In promoting laws according to religion? As I understand it, that is the role of the Sanhedrin and not of the secular government, which is charged not with religious matters but with civil ones.
Thanks,
Yuval
1. A halakhic state is a state that conducts itself according to halakhah. Clearly there is value in that, since we are supposed to conduct ourselves according to halakhah. You may be talking about coercion, but there is no identity between a halakhic state and coercion.
2. There is value in our conducting ourselves according to halakhah. It is not a matter of so-and-so’s role. At the end of the day, Jews are supposed to conduct themselves according to halakhah. I do not understand the question here.
1. What does it mean for a state to conduct itself according to halakhah? Beyond the official institutions observing halakhah, will there be any effect on the individual? In any case there is no coercion, and you have already written that there is no real interest in Hebrew law, and the only difference is that the judges will wear frock coats instead of robes—so what practical expression will this have? Is this even something one should aspire to as an official religious-Jewish state, or will it happen anyway when there are more religious people?
2. If in 1 I understand that there is meaning to a halakhic state, is there a halakhic requirement for such a thing? There is seemingly only a requirement that the individual be religious, not the state. And is the state supposed to engage in religious legislation? That is seemingly the role of the Sanhedrin, not the state.
1. As I wrote, the state and the citizens should observe halakhah (by the way, there are also halakhot that pertain to the public). I simply do not understand the question. Can you focus what you mean?
2. The Sanhedrin is the state’s Knesset and court. I did not understand the question.
Shimon Yerushalmi:
Greetings and blessings,
Do you think that, in principle, it is possible to carry out the updates in halakhah as you envision them even without a stage of the “return of prophecy / divine inspiration” (in one interpretation or another of these concepts), and that it would be enough to have an authority accepted by a sufficiently large public of Torah-and-mitzvah observant Jews?
Respectfully,
Shimon
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The rabbi:
A very general question, and I will try to answer briefly.
First, leave divine inspiration out of this. I have not seen anywhere that divine inspiration is a condition for determining halakhah or changing it. Moreover, what does it mean that it will “return”? Was it ever here? If it was once here (as the Raavad wrote metaphorically, “divine inspiration appeared in our study hall”), then it exists today as well. As is well known, a prophet is not permitted from now on to introduce anything new, and “it is not in heaven.” Divine inspiration and prophecy are not only unnecessary for halakhic ruling and halakhic change; using them in determining halakhah is actually forbidden.
Within halakhah itself there are rules for making changes. The Gemara says that something established by a formal count requires another formal count to permit it, but as explained by Maimonides at the beginning of chapter 2 of Hilkhot Mamrim, there is a difference between Torah law and rabbinic law: in Torah law, a formal count is enough (that is, there must be a court), whereas in rabbinic law it must also be greater in wisdom and number. Since today we do not have the Great Court, seemingly no change can be made. But beyond the formalism, there are quite a few mechanisms that allow change even today. The fact is that changes, some of them fairly radical, are being made all the time. Sometimes when the rationale has lapsed, and sometimes through other mechanisms.
If there is awareness and people are willing to admit that change is required, it will be done. The main problem is not authority, but the lack of willingness to admit honestly that halakhah in its current form is not perfect.