On Intellectualism, Greatness in Torah, and Wisdom (Column 655)
“Any Torah scholar who lacks discernment—a carcass is better than he.”
(Vayikra Rabbah 1:15)
“The sharper the mind, the bigger the blunder.”
(lefûm ḥurfa shibsh’tâ; Bava Metzia 92b)
In the previous column I discussed the virtues and shortcomings of intellectuality. I analyzed it through paradoxical situations in which an intuitive claim stands opposite a logical argument. I noted there that intellectuals tend to dismiss intuition and common sense and to give great weight to logical and philosophical arguments, whereas ordinary people tend to weight intuition and common sense more heavily. Hence George Orwell’s remark that there are ideas so foolish that only intellectuals could believe in them, and in the Sages’ phrase cited above: “The sharper the mind, the bigger the blunder.” I explained there that the proper path is the middle way, in which both sides are taken into account and a decision between them is made according to a second-order intuition (what strikes us as more convincing). It is not right to grant a sweeping a priori preference to either side.
I concluded the previous column with an implication concerning the rabbinic distinction between lamdanim (analytical scholars) and poskim (decisors), and explained that the lamdanim are intellectuals whereas the poskim are balebatim (practical laypeople). Here too the proper path is the middle way: do not grant an a priori preference to either side; in each case, discuss the matter on its merits. In this column I will try, using that distinction, to explain several pathologies in Haredi modes of thought and conduct. My basic claim is that Haredi thinking is “intellectualist.” Do not be misled by this: I do not mean that Haredi thinkers/publicists/rabbis are intellectuals. Far from it. An intellectual—apart from sometimes having childish modes of thought as I described in the previous column—is also equipped with broad knowledge, a wide education, and open-mindedness. None of these exist in Haredi thinking. What we have here is not intellectuality but intellectualism—intellectuality only in its shortcomings (like the difference between science and scientism). Gabriel already noted this in a comment to the previous column, and I replied that I agree and would explain it more here.
I will preface by saying that the description presented here is, of course, generalizing and broad-brush, as is the way of any theoretical analysis. Yet I think it captures a very essential component of Haredi conduct and thinking. So as you read, don’t immediately hang on to counterexamples. Of course you will find some. I suggest you try to consider whether the features I describe here are in fact typical of Haredi conduct. I am convinced they are.
Haredi intellectualism: the relationship between “the people in the fields” and the beit midrash
I have brought here in the past (see columns 277, 422, 501, 565 and others) my interpretation of the halachic rule that a decree which does not spread among the majority of the public is nullified. My claim was that this is not a compromise with reality but a criterion for truth. The fact that most of the public does not adopt such a decree indicates that something is wrong with it—that it is not halachically correct. The assumption is that what is decided in the beit midrash must receive feedback from the street, from “the people in the fields.” Why? Because the determinations of the beit midrash are intellectual and thus sometimes detached from common sense and intuition. They can be the product of a brilliant, consistent logical structure—very reasonable and persuasive—but not necessarily correct in the real world. In order to determine that the beit-midrash determination is correct for practical reality (and the assumption is that Torah is meant to be applied in the world—“the Torah was not given to the ministering angels”), it must be passed through the crucible of the balebos, the simple person. He can tell us whether the intellectual determination “makes sense,” or whether it is a brilliant idea with no connection to reality and truth.
In those columns I cited Rabbi Beni Lau’s claim that in recent generations religious leadership is generally given to yeshivah heads rather than to rabbis of communities. He argues that roshei yeshivah are accustomed to building magnificent logical edifices, and their young and talented students evaluate them by consistency, originality, and intellectual sparkle. That is the way of the young. But community rabbis speak before a more mature public, and there if they say something implausible—even if it is consistent, brilliant, and very logical—they immediately receive feedback that it does not “make sense.” Therefore, the thinking of a rabbi is more appropriate than that of a rosh yeshivah for halachic ruling and for making decisions about the practical world.
From here we can understand the pathologies in Haredi society’s conduct. New norms are periodically generated in various batei midrash. They descend to the street, where they are supposed to be tested in the balebatish crucible. But in the Haredi world, one who does not accept the new norm is a balebos, and therefore his opinion is discounted (“the view of balebatim is the opposite of daas Torah”). Thus everyone clings to these new stringencies, and there is no feedback from “the people in the fields” back into the beit midrash to balance them. This is a process of positive feedback: every stringency is adopted without the simple folk’s screening and control. The stringencies and new norms pile up without filtration, and matters reach an absurd explosion. Haredi intellectuality, in effect, makes decisions for the public unilaterally, top-down. More precisely: the entire Haredi world becomes one big beit midrash. Everyone there thinks like intellectuals and does not let common sense and reality interfere. What is sorely lacking is the balance that the Sages insisted on when they formulated the rule that a decree which does not spread among the majority of the public is voided.[1]
No wonder that in the Haredi world the assumption is that everyone should sit in the beit midrash, and going out is only bediavad. For them there is no world outside the beit midrash. The surrounding reality is the flood, and we must all shelter in Noah’s Ark inside the batei midrash to protect us from the threatening world. As I have shown, this outlook radiates into their modes of conduct and decision-making.
Haredi intellectuality: the character of the arguments
I think anyone can notice this strange phenomenon when discussing current issues with Haredim. One hears the most bizarre arguments—perhaps logically consistent within their own frame—but barely connected to the world. In column 629 I brought several examples of such arguments regarding conscription and sharing the defense and economic burden; they reflect this phenomenon well. These are preposterous, utterly detached arguments, and often they are advanced as if they were a trump card pulled from the sleeve guaranteeing a crushing victory over all opponents. You can see such arguments and their refutations also in column 649. These arguments recur among rabbis, politicians, and ordinary kollel men and yeshivah bochurim. You can encounter them frequently on this site as well (more than once I have reached saturation with this propaganda and with the smugness and certainty with which these ridiculous arguments are repeated again and again under the pretense that they have not been answered. When they overdo it, I am forced to delete them as trolling, despite my well-known loathing for censorship).
Not infrequently I feel embarrassed in the face of such childish arguments, especially given the smugness, the triumphal crowing, and the absolute confidence of those who present them (“Look, I’ve found an argument no one has thought of—knockout!”). It is hard to know where even to begin to address them. Try to think of arguments that would persuade Zeno that there really is motion in the world. Does anyone have a way to argue this and convince him? He experiences what I experience, but he is an intellectual, and as such he presents a brilliant logical argument and is sure that reality is an illusion. With his crushing, brilliant, consistent arguments he wins the debate by knockout (he adopts “Way A” of dealing with paradoxes from the previous column: the argument trumps common sense and intuition). It does not occur to him that someone (a balebos) might reject his brilliant arguments even if he cannot put a finger on the flaw in them (“Way C” there). And certainly he does not imagine that many can explicitly point out the flaws and show that the arguments really don’t hold water (“Way B” there).
For intellectuals, analytic ability is everything. Some are endowed with dazzling analytic ability, and they are captivated by it. But intellectuality is precisely what trips them up. In the Sages’ phrase: “The sharper the mind, the bigger the blunder” (see the column’s motto), which is the Talmudic counterpart to Orwell’s dictum cited there. Haredi leadership—political, journalistic-publicistic, and rabbinic—leads Haredi society down this crooked path on the basis of these outlandish arguments. They make decisions detached from common sense and from the grassroots, present biased and/or false facts and absurd premises, and cause their flock to march after them and accept the conclusions as if they were pearls of wondrous wisdom. Everything is very consistent, but completely detached from reality and plain reason.
Moreover, the more outlandish and disconnected the claim, the more exalted and sublime it appears; then it is even easier to hang it on “daas Torah” and the profound wisdom of the gedolei hador, whose minds no mere mortal can fathom, and “one who seeks their counsel will never stumble.” This reminds me of the Rambam’s words (Guide III:31) about those who refuse to give reasons for the commandments in order to magnify God and the Torah, but in fact debase them:
Among people are those for whom giving a reason for a commandment is onerous; the best, in their view, is that no meaning at all be intelligible for a commandment or prohibition. What brings them to this is an illness they find in their souls, which they cannot articulate, namely, that if these laws have benefits in this world and therefore we were commanded concerning them, they would be as if derived from human reasoning. But when something has no intelligible meaning and brings no benefit, it must surely be from God, for human thought would never produce such a thing.
So too with us: the sense that logical reasoning is a human affair accessible to all leads to the expectation that the gedolei hador will specifically say things detached from common sense; the greater the detachment, the greater their greatness. But, continues the Rambam, the opposite is true:
It is as if, in the eyes of these feeble-minded, man is more perfect than his Maker. For man says and does what leads to an end, but God, they think, does not act so. Rather, He commands what will not benefit us and warns against what will not harm us.
Such a thought is that of the feeble-minded. Acting without reason is a deficiency, not a virtue. Decisions detached from common sense are, in many cases, mistaken decisions (though not always—sometimes the argument overcomes the intuition).
Childish thinking and conduct
We have seen that young yeshivah students evaluate ideas by their brilliance and consistency, whereas older people evaluate them by looking at reality (common sense and intuitions). Following arguments detached from common sense and reality characterizes those who have not matured (the Rambam’s “feeble-minded”). Note that a deaf-mute, an insane person, and a minor are exempt from commandments—all due to lack of daas. What does “lack of daas” mean? Does a minor lack intelligence? And what of a very smart minor who advances brilliant arguments, has completed Shas, studies mathematics at university, and understands things in depth? Beyond intelligence, mitzvah-obligation requires maturity. A minor is exempt not because he is stupid or does not understand, but mainly because he is not yet mature. Even if he understands something, he lacks the responsibility to understand its implications, what will happen if he does not do it, and to act responsibly accordingly. A child will also follow a logical argument without noticing that it is detached from common sense and reality. He is captivated by the charm of logic and not really aware that there is reality in the world.
There is another feature of childish thinking: egocentrism. A child sees mainly himself. For him, his entire environment is merely a collection of mannequin-like targets that form the backdrop for his own conduct. His father and mother are meant to serve him; their entire concern is to care for him and supply his needs. He cannot grasp that they have lives of their own unrelated to him. More generally, a child evaluates every action and thought by its consequences for him, and analyzes everything someone does as if everything relates to him. It is hard for him to step into another’s shoes and see things from a different point of view. Therefore, it is also hard for him to display true empathy. Empathy entails understanding the other’s perspective and stepping into his shoes—very difficult for a child. Part of a child’s education is to bring him to understand the other and internalize that there even is an “other” with thoughts and desires of his own. He does not understand that not every time he is hurt was it done in order to hurt him; sometimes people act due to their own considerations and interests, unrelated to him. Not everything in the world relates to him.
A clever child will also develop all sorts of theories that explain why people acted as they did—all centered on his own point of view. He is the center of the world and everything revolves around him. He cannot understand that other people have worlds of their own and considerations not necessarily connected to him. His theories can be coherent and—so it seems to him—persuasive, and it is hard for him to see that this is very detached from what is actually happening in the world around him. His bubble is very intellectualist, coherent, and persuasive—but very detached from reality. Reality is complicated, and when one is aware of how it works, it is hard to reach a coherent understanding, for perhaps there simply is none. But for the child everything is coherent and clear; everything that is done is either for him or against him.
The childishness of Haredi thinking
It seems to me the description of childishness above can help explain Haredi modes of thought and conduct. I have already written in the past about Rabbi Kanievsky’s decisions during Corona (see column 305). We are dealing with a person who had no clue how epidemics spread or what an exponential process is (see column 290 and more). Add to that the notion that Torah study protects instead of natural measures (medicine, the army, etc.), and you have irresponsible, negligent conduct suited to children who have not yet matured. He relied on a dubious Talmudic passage and on slogans about Torah study, and that sufficed for him to make life-and-death decisions—contrary to what reality indicated and to the opinion of experts in the field. No wonder that much blood is on his hands.
I am sure that now the familiar excuses will arrive: in the end it turned out they were right and saw far ahead (to my understanding, absolutely not), and the experts were wrong (oh, and they did it intentionally to kill us all), for by definition one who seeks the elders’ counsel never stumbles. Again, this is intellectualism that maintains that theory trumps facts and reality. I see no point in entering the question of whether the directives at that time made sense and were reasonable in hindsight. It is enough for me that they were the best that could be done given the state of knowledge at the time, and that is what the experts determined (even though, as usual, there were disagreements among them). In such a situation, that is what we should have done. To ignore this and instruct the public otherwise—that is childish irresponsibility. You have some detached arguments that seem to you very persuasive, and on that basis you allow yourself to ignore reality entirely with some blind confidence in your own rightness. And when an entire society follows ninety-year-old “children” who issue directives on the basis of detached intellectualism—this is a recipe for disaster.
Or take another example, from just these days: the Haredi rabbis’ crusade led by Rabbi Dov Landau in the U.S. They go from place to place and cynically, absurdly, and detachedly slander the government and society in Israel, claiming they act out of hatred of Torah and of Haredim and merely persecute them. Thus they call on donors to save them with cries of gevald. Pogroms in the Land of Israel—truly! Persecution of Torah in the streets. I am not speaking of the slander and falsehood in this. Nor am I speaking of the distorted, delusional, baseless conceptions they express concerning the meaning of Torah study, the army, the economy, etc. Their conception regarding conscription has no foundation—neither in sources nor in logic and facts (see column 649). I am also not speaking of their refusal to allow even those who do not study to be drafted (the cat is finally out of the bag)—even less justifiable and even less reflective of “persecution of Torah” by secular people and by the Supreme Court. Let us say I am prepared to accept all this nonsense and rubbish. What is inconceivable to me is the inability of those rabbis to step into the other’s shoes—just like newborn infants.
Assuming my readers have already passed the age of two, try to look at the situation through the eyes of a reasonable person who understands reality. The facts are that from the secular perspective, Haredim constitute a growing percentage of the population, most of whom eat and do not do—i.e., do not bear the burden. They do not carry the defense burden, nor the economic burden, and they demand significant resources that do not return to the market nor contribute anything to it. No wonder that in their “heretical fleshly eyes” it appears that within not many years this will constitute an existential threat to the state, and it must be stopped now. All this while Haredim participate in government, make decisions, and of course demand more and more resources—ignoring the cruel war currently underway, which may expand and truly endangers us existentially—and in which they have no share. That is the secular point of view, even if you as a Haredi do not accept any of it. Agreed? Then how can someone who successfully completed kindergarten fail to understand the secular (and religious-Zionist) reaction, and attribute it to hatred of Haredim and persecution of Torah? Again, I am not speaking of the substantive disagreement—on which Rabbi Landau expresses a delusional position—but of his childishness, chiefly his inability to step into the other’s shoes. If a four-year-old child did not understand this, I would suspect a serious developmental delay. And a towering Torah scholar (I know this firsthand) over ninety, like Rabbi Landau, is unable to understand it? How does he not see that in non-Haredi eyes this is the inevitable way to view Haredi conduct—even if he himself disagrees with that view? His assertion that this is persecution testifies, a thousand testimonies over, that we are dealing with a person who thinks and behaves like a nursery-school child. And this is a leader of a public that follows him like a blind man in a chimney—after him and his detached slogans—leading us all to ruin.
This “secular” view of Haredism produced the controversial “caricature” by Shay Charka about Haredim:

I assume you remember the uproar, the offense, and the apologies. The Haredim of course accused him of antisemitism and whatnot. Offense and victimhood have always been the favorite weapons of Haredim when substantive arguments run out (and they always run out, because they have none). I must say that, to my judgment, this is not a caricature at all. A caricature is usually defined as a disproportionate exaggeration of reality. But this image is nothing but a simple snapshot of reality. Even if Rabbi Landau thinks this is not reality, I would at least expect him to be able to understand that others see it this way. This is basic empathy required even of a child.
The conclusion is that we are dealing with a man who is a brilliant lamdan, but whose grasp of reality is childish. This is a live example of the lack of correlation between maturity and intellectual sparkle. We are dealing with a person whose faith in nonsense likely stems from his being an intellectual. I can attempt to reconstruct his detached train of thought. For him there is a crushing logical argument that proves he is right:
- Of course the Torah is true.
- Moreover, every Jew—indeed every person—understands this within himself, for it is a simple truth (he has of course never read my arguments against this, for that is forbidden under “lo taturu”).
- Therefore it is clear that every secular person certainly knows that Torah study (and wearing a suit, even if one is not studying) is what protects the state and brings economic prosperity.
- Moreover, everyone also “knows” that only Haredi Torah study does this, whereas someone who is not Haredi, even if he studies Torah—and especially if he serves in the army, God forbid (even if he belongs to that small percentage who did not go there to apostatize)—contributes nothing to our protection.
- And from here the conclusion immediately follows: if a person or institution nevertheless expects us to take part in the defense and economic burden and makes decisions accordingly, he is presumably driven by hatred of Haredim and persecution of Torah (“the hatred of the am ha’aretz for the talmid ḥacham”).
- Q.E.D.
Admit it: this is a crushing, consistent, and wonderfully intellectualist argument. It rests on premises as solid as rock, and no wonder it is presented as if it were Sinai-given Torah. Who can argue with logic? For the intellectual, all reality is subordinated to this logical frame. Therefore there is no need to look around and try to understand what secular people actually think and why they actually object. We have a proof—so why would we need observation?! No need to think about the constraints within which the Supreme Court operates and what led it to its decision. No need to notice the unimaginable patience of the Court and of the entire public toward Haredi draft-dodging, which for many decades up to this very day has not really been stopped (the Court merely expressed an opinion about the current legal situation and said nothing about a draft law). Observation, common sense, and attention to reality are the paradox’s other side. But the Haredim have a splendid argument, which proves that all of these are wrong—end of story. From here follows the conclusion that the Court and anyone non-Haredi are simply antisemites who hate Torah and hate Haredim.
But it is not just Rabbi Landau and the colleagues in his delirious tour to spy out the lands and spread an evil report about all of us worldwide (which these days does not exactly love us). It turns out that donors abroad are indeed persuaded and donate generously (see here; since then, there has been further “progress”). How can one stand idly by when the wicked here persecute your poor brothers and stage pogroms against them for no wrongdoing?! So too with Haredi society as a whole. It conducts itself childishly and “intellectualistically,” for it chooses such a person to lead it and make decisions for it, and marches by his “ruach ha-kodesh-infused” directives completely detached from common sense. The average Haredi repeats these slogans again and again as if they were knockout arguments. The fervor in their words indicates that many of them even believe this. Fear not: after Rabbi Landau’s 120 years, there will be volumes of wonders proving how he was right about everything and understood everything better than all of us.
Note that all this describes the “moderate” part of the Haredim. The wild Jerusalem Faction that blocks our roads (with no fear of bitul Torah or of the theft involved—“It is time to act for the Lord!”) is utterly certain we are in the midst of the decrees of 1648–49. They demonstrate with great fervor (and courage—without fear of those murderous Zionists, may their name be blotted out) on the basis of complete detachment from reality. They throw out outlandish slogans about being ready to die and go to prison (of course as long as there isn’t a whiff of real danger). I long ago stopped expecting anything of that group; it is a sect whose proximity to Judaism is tenuous. But now it turns out that the differences between the two sects are not so great. The mainstream Haredi camp thinks and speaks in a very similar way. The goals and perception of reality are the same. The difference is mainly tactical: whether one may cooperate with the wicked, accursed Zionists to exploit them optimally, and how loudly to say what every yeshivah bochur knows inside the Haredi batei midrash and only occasionally slips out by mistake (see, for example, here, and more). That is the difference between the two sects, akin in my eyes to the difference between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
Nor have I yet spoken about their childish religious conceptions: starting with taking every source literally, just like children. It is reported in the name of the Brisker Rav that if the Sages said Mashiach will come on a white donkey, he will not come in a Mercedes or a helicopter but on a donkey—and that donkey will not be black or brown but white. The holy words of the Sages, all spoken with divine inspiration, are absolutely true; one may not budge from them. Someone decided that the Amoraim had ruach ha-kodesh—therefore one may not doubt it. From here, of course, follows that in the world of halachah and Talmud there are no disputes about reality (for if so, one side errs—God forbid). Oh, but there are such disputes? Do not bother me with facts and reality. There was also someone who decided one must wear a suit and gartel, and that becomes an article of faith (preferably with a midrash: “they did not change their dress”). Another tells us that thus our ancestors dressed in Egypt—of course, otherwise someone must have changed in the middle; let it not be spoken or mentioned. The theories are piled one atop another, creating a delusional but very tight and coherent structure. It is not tested by its connection to logic and reality. No one there is bothered by how childish such a conception of continuity and commitment to tradition is. Thus they have created a theological halachic system in which “lo tasur” applies to every rabbi in every place and time, certainly to the gedolei hador. It is clear that working for a living or engaging in other fields of knowledge is strictly forbidden (except bediavad for the weak who need livelihoods and do not understand that everything is in Heaven’s hands), and this is exactly as it has always been (for we are continuing our ancestors’ tradition). There prevail there bizarre religious metrics by which one may violate every halachic and moral prohibition in the world—but not Haredi social taboos—all with deep conviction that this sect is authentic Judaism from time immemorial. There is not a drop of critical thinking about their own principles, but a great deal of criticism of others. Thus we arrive at draft-dodging as a value and parasitism as a moral pinnacle, just as Orwell wrote: “Ignorance is strength; slavery is freedom,” etc. Sectarian attitudes like this characterize children’s thinking; they fall for any nonsense that goes in—and then it does not come out (“once it goes up, it won’t come down”). And of course anyone who dares deny these “principles of faith” is immediately excommunicated as a heretic and an apostate—as befits any self-respecting kindergarten. That is how children usually treat those who look or think differently: they ostracize them.
Now I will allow myself to enter another, particularly outlandish example: the issue of bitachon (trust in God) and hishtadlut (human effort).
More on detached conceptions: the question of bitachon and hishtadlut
I have addressed hishtadlut more than once in the past (see columns 279, 280, 281, 305, 575 and more). I return to it here because it is an excellent example of detached Haredi intellectualism. I have explained my “radical” view on the matter many times, and clarified why the slogan about divine involvement “within nature” is empty. There is no such thing, for any divine involvement is by definition a departure from nature. I further argue that since there is no indication of deviations from the laws of nature, it is reasonable, in my opinion, that there is no divine involvement (perhaps only in sporadic cases). But this is only my view; I will not insist on it here. Many have responded that I am attacking a straw man. No one, they say, truly believes our actions have no effect and that everything is in God’s hands. The common claim, they tell me, is that divine involvement also has an effect—at least in some cases—and that is what I must address. I have dealt with this more than once, but now I will ignore that discussion, for I wish to present a selection of quotations from leading Haredi thinkers on the matter, and you can judge how much they recognize our influence on reality—and thus how connected to reality they are.
We are dealing with a collection of categorical assertions that faith means treating reality as an illusion. Believers are to be “intellectuals” and ignore their intuitions and experiences. We must focus on the logical and theological argument (“there is none besides Him,” “everything is in His hands,” etc.), and common-sense conceptions are the counsel of the evil inclination. This is the posture of a mystical sect that sees reality as a challenge—an illusion to be overcome—nothing more. This is an exalted expression of the Haredi intellectualism I described. The following quotations are taken from an article by my friend Rabbi Yehoshua Pfeffer, editor of the journal “Tzarikh Iyun”. Here is the first:
Rabbi Aharon Schwab, mashgiach of Yeshivat Beit Meir, published several volumes of va’adim and lectures given to his students. In one volume (“Sha’arei HaAliyah,” p. 157), he writes that when we pray “we must clarify to ourselves that all the practical actions we perform do not bring us any result; at most they are a form of ‘labor’ decreed upon us as a duty of hishtadlut following Adam’s sin. There is no connection between the ‘labor’ and actions and the outcomes brought about by the Blessed Creator.”
“There is no connection.” Meaning: if you take acetaminophen, don’t think the fever’s drop is thanks to the pill. Taking the pill is merely a religious duty. The fever goes down—or not—only by a direct divine decision (for some reason He always decides the fever should drop). No wonder there is no point in studying chemistry or medicine. Even if they give you cough syrup, your fever will drop only if God decides (“He who told vinegar to burn…”). You have fulfilled your duty of hishtadlut even with cough syrup.
Rabbi Pfeffer writes of this:
[…] It seems that R. Schwab saw nothing explosive (or even new) in his words. The premise that earthly action does not affect the outcome he received from his own teachers, and it became accepted and widespread in Haredi education. It is very likely he never questioned it.
And here is another—this time R. Chaim Shmuelevitz and the Chafetz Chaim:
In the book “Sichot Mussar” (1971), recording the talks of R. Chaim Shmuelevitz ztz”l, it is stated: “Quantity is nothing at all; each person receives what he is to receive and what has been decreed for me to receive.” In the name of the Chafetz Chaim he even compared one who toils for his livelihood to a person hurrying on his way and pushing with his hands against the walls of the train car in which he rides. To think there is a causal link between them is absolute folly.
“Absolute folly”—no less. This strongly recalls David Hume’s analysis of causality: that the principle of causation has no empirical source, and the link between cause and effect is merely a hypothesis (true or not) of the intellect. Let us continue.
If R. Chaim Shmuelevitz and the Chafetz Chaim are not enough for you—here is R. Dessler:
R. Eliyahu Eliezer Dessler ztz”l, the first mashgiach of Ponovezh, expanded this approach, decrying excessive hishtadlut and stating there is no benefit in it: “A person will never gain more because he exerts himself more” (“Mikhtav Me’Eliyahu,” vol. I, essay on Bitachon and Hishtadlut). Nature, he writes, is not a real thing; its entire purpose is to mislead man and distance him from his trust in God: “There is no substance in nature at all; it is only a test, for it is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, alone that acts.” That is, although it seems that hishtadlut helps, the truth is it has no substance. However, a person may not rely on a miracle; he must make minimal effort—“the least effort”—to ensure that his sustenance does not arrive miraculously. As an example, he cites R. Zundel of Salant, who contented himself with buying a lottery ticket only, “for if I win, it can be attributed to the way of nature.”
Want more? Here is the Steipler:
“The rule,” the Steipler wrote similarly, “is that all human actions and stratagems will not help even the slightest to add or detract from what was decreed upon him on Rosh Hashanah” (“Birkat Peretz,” Parashat Shemot). R. Reuven Melamed, a leading student of R. Yechezkel Levenstein ztz”l, summarized: “The falsehood of hishtadlut—besides not helping, it also harms” (“Melitz Yosher,” Parashat Vayishlach).
All existence, R. Dessler emphasizes, is a constant product of God’s will. He, and none besides Him. The result of his approach—and of the other gedolei Torah above—is an ideology that utterly empties action in the secular sphere of value. All “hishtadlut,” all action within the secular realm, is merely a “fine,” in the Ramchal’s language in “Mesillat Yesharim”—a consequence of Adam’s sin that we are forced to pay. In inner truth it has no benefit or meaning.
In the next section, Rabbi Pfeffer sums up what follows from these quotations and writes:
The approach above—certainly when it becomes widespread and accepted, as has happened in Haredi education—is quite new. One can indeed find sources decrying excessive hishtadlut insofar as it reflects diminished faith in God, like Chazal’s critique of Joseph’s efforts in prison (“Because Joseph relied on the butler to remember him, he was required to remain imprisoned two more years”). But it will be very hard to find assertions that hishtadlut changes nothing; that it is merely a fine renewed with Adam’s sin; that it has no substance. To the best of my study, such an approach is absent entirely from Chazal and the Rishonim; to the contrary, many sources and the whole thrust of Chazal indicate the very opposite.
Despite the lack of foundation and the blatant lack of logic, this monstrous theological chimera has taken root in Haredi thought—and in the religious world more generally—and today one who deviates from it must answer for his “weak faith.”[2] Well, it is understandable that these arguments are bizarre and detached enough to be considered the deep daas Torah of gedolei hador. No wonder they are indeed taken as such.
In his article, Rabbi Pfeffer—characteristically gently—points to the need to “update” the conception of hishtadlut and bitachon due to “the thought of our generation” (not, God forbid, because these are nonsense that never had any place). The outlandish bundle of quotations presented here—like those you can hear and read from almost any Haredi mashgiach—shows you the nature of the prevailing conception. It looks like a mystical sect of children who follow a pack of Pied Pipers; instead of flutes they hold a theological Mishnah composed of a bundle of detached and bizarre logical arguments (in this case not even consistent), by virtue of which they instruct their flock to ignore reality. To consider reality, in their eyes, is merely the counsel of the evil inclination. In the Haredi world, everyone is an “intellectual,” a denizen of the beit midrash, and therefore they do not let reality confuse them. As befits true intellectuals—already described by George Orwell (cited in the previous column’s motto)—in a conflict between theory/arguments and reality/intuition, the upper hand goes to the arguments. And reality? Let it go to hell.
Note that solipsism—a philosophical view that does not accept the world’s existence—is considered in philosophy an anecdote, a kind of intellectual pastime. It is a hypothetical possibility whose value lies mainly in its very existence and inner consistency, but it has no real significance relative to the world. In the Haredi world, by contrast—as you can see from the quotations above—solipsism is the plain reality. Realism is heresy and the counsel of the evil inclination—not to mention science, as Rabbi Wolff (of the well-known seminary) writes at the beginning of his book: “Science is false and our Torah is true.” Once upon a time the Misnagdim (Lithuanians) held that tzimtzum is literal and only the Chassidim opposed it; today everyone is a Chassid (though not exactly men of action). This is a clear example of Haredi intellectualism: the hypothetical logical argument is reality, and there is none besides it. Direct observation of reality—even when it ostensibly contradicts the logical argument—is not to be mentioned. Only a heretic like me dares pay attention to reality. In his article, Rabbi Pfeffer offers Haredim a revolutionary possibility: the courage to recognize that there is also reality in the world. Lo, what a thing!
Incidentally, note that this outlandish conception, in Rabbi Landau’s eyes, is so simple and self-evident that every person—Haredi or not—is expected to understand and accept it. And if, perchance, I do not think that Torah study and wearing black protect us, but rather the army and the economy—and especially if I even suggest limiting them for the sake of army service and contribution to the economy—then clearly I am merely a vile antisemite driven by hatred of Torah and of Haredim (synonymous terms, of course).
Can one truly aspire to a covenant or partnership with such a delusional group?! If so, then only because it seems they themselves do not really believe it, for none of them actually act that way (see my columns above; see also column 649 about how people actually behave—despite “Torah protects and saves”—when it concerns the individual). In their inner consciousness, they delude themselves that they do believe it and, at most, occasionally suffer from a weakness of faith—God have mercy—that brings them to recognize that reality exists. Truly a worrisome weakness. This is the phenomenon of “the heart does not reveal to the mouth,” for who wants to consider himself a heretic?! And certainly the Chafetz Chaim should not say it aloud (see column 575 on suppressed beliefs).
This tension between suppressed beliefs (that our actions are decisive) and conscious, official beliefs (that God does everything and we have no influence) is not apparent in people’s daily conduct. Haredi people act entirely like secular people, solving problems in the usual way (hishtadlut may be false, but if it won’t help, it won’t harm). There the suppressed belief rules; therefore one goes to the doctor and chases after the best physician to the ends of the earth, and seeks to obtain funds and financing by any means—to sustain this exalted “trust” (certainly not to go to work). I once heard of a Chassidic group that requires every bochur to raise money, under the rubric “A man is obligated to teach his son a trade” (Kiddushin 30b). That is in the individual’s daily life. But in the big decisions touching directly on ideology and on Haredi society—conscription, education, joining the workforce—there decisions are made according to the conscious (illusory) beliefs: diligence is false and our Torah is true; whoever thinks our actions have any causal link to outcomes is a despicable heretic. The reason for this difference is that in the big cases, decisions are made publicly; thus they are made with awareness and accountability to ideological and theological principles. When Haredi individuals or a Haredi group act consciously, they will not dare say aloud that hishtadlut is what determines.
On the conscious level, hishtadlut is false—a punishment imposed upon us since Adam’s sin—and of course it has no causal effect on what will happen to us. In life itself, of course, it is another matter. There one winks and moves on—stringent indeed about the “duty” of hishtadlut and pursuing the best doctor, despite the fact that all this has no effect on our fate, of course. Living by an ideology one does not really believe is childish. Children think they will run their lives by pure, logical principles; they do not understand that life is stronger than all ideologies.
And perhaps all these are “holy lies”?
At some point it occurred to me that perhaps all these Jews are simply lying. As intelligent people they surely know this is nonsense, but they write and say it to educate the public to trust in God. Perhaps they wish to balance a public error (no trust in God) by its opposite (absolute trust), hoping the public will arrive at the middle way. On this proposal, all these are “holy lies” rather than the true beliefs of those thinkers. This might save these statements from the bleak conclusion that emerges from the picture I have described—but I doubt it is true. In fact, if I wish to judge them favorably, I am torn: should I present them as childish “intellectuals” detached from reality and common sense, or as liars for a good cause? I do not know which is better.
As for me, I am principledly opposed to holy lies (see column 21). But in any case, even if this is holy deceit, it amazes me that these lies work on the public. The Haredi public buys them and lets itself be led astray—and drags all of us with it to the brink. Thanks to these lies, Haredi leaders travel the world and spread an evil report about the land, and even merit generous donations from naïve people. Thanks to them people go out to hysterical demonstrations and cry out detached slogans as if a sword were at their throats. Even if it is only holy deceit, it seems these figures fell into the pit they themselves dug.
Note: between Haredim and Hardalim
We have seen that one Haredi hallmark is ignoring reality and clinging to detached theoretical arguments and structures. This is Haredi intellectualism, which also has a childish dimension. I will now briefly note where and how the national-religious ḥarda”l stream fits this picture.
Unlike Haredim, they ostensibly do look at reality and attend to it. On the contrary: their entire concern is to examine it and explain it using theological models. Is this redemption? At what stage are we? How should we relate to everything that happens, to every person, idea, or movement? Yet regardless of what happens, they will never draw any conclusion leading to a change in their basic conceptions. They will always explain reality in terms of their theory, and never consider switching paradigms when reality does not fit. It always fits; and if not—they force it a bit. In their view the Third Temple cannot be destroyed; redemption is on the way; everything follows the deterministic path ascending to the House of God; the rest are mere perturbations of this foreknown process. Even if we sink into the abyss, they will explain it as a local dip for the sake of ascent. If President Katsav is convicted of rape, they send him a letter of encouragement. His conviction is part of the divine plan, or the work of the Sitra Achra (the counter-revolutionary forces—in communist terms—or the Antichrist, in Christian terms), but it cannot erode their full confidence in him. On the contrary: the court that convicted him is an arm of the demonic forces of darkness (the New Israel Fund, the EU, LGBTQ organizations, and the Council of Elders of Global Progressivism). If there is an agreement with Egypt under which Sinai is to be handed over—so what? “It shall not be!” It simply will not happen, for it contradicts the theory—that is, what must occur. Reality is wholly subordinated to theory, as befits intellectualists.
This means that, unlike Haredim, the Hardalim indeed attend to reality in a very particular and intensive way—but they never learn from it. It does not change their conceptions one whit. In this sense we are dealing with the same childish intellectualism I described among Haredim. The difference is that Haredim ignore reality whereas Hardalim obsessively explain it. The common denominator is that the reverse process never occurs: from reality to theory. Between the two sides of the paradox, in both camps the theoretical argument always trumps reality and common sense.
Who is a gadol baTorah?
After writing these things, it occurred to me that I do not recall statements by Torah scholars from the non-Hardali religious-Zionist camp that struck me as such outlandish, detached nonsense. There are certainly many statements one can argue about. Some will see them as heresy, lack of faith in sages, lack of commitment to Torah, and so on—lavish compliments. But nonsense of this magnitude I truly do not recall. When you compare this with so many outlandish, detached statements from the Haredi (and Hardali) side, it raises questions.
Naturally this arouses the question: who deserves the title “great in Torah”? Who is a talmid ḥacham? As in the childish arguments over “who has more Torah scholars and who is greater”—Haredim or religious-Zionists? Hardalim or non-Hardalim? It is quite clear that Haredim have many more certified Ketzot reciters. There are people there with broad Torah knowledge, and some have excellent analytic ability. But I think there are few rabbis in the Haredi world whom I would regard as great in Torah. To be great in Torah, knowledge is not enough—not even analytic ability. One also needs common sense and sound reasoning. One must be attentive to reality and to life and understand them well—and perhaps it is better not to be cloistered within the four cubits of halachah.
I have written more than once that there is great value in figures who are cloistered in their rooms and devote themselves entirely to Torah and its study (“everyone needs those who sin inadvertently”—see Horayot 14a and parallels)—but only so long as they and we know their place and do not let them make decisions, issue halachic rulings, or lead the public. When they themselves do not understand that they must not engage in such domains, and enter arenas where they have not a whit of understanding, their value as Torah scholars greatly diminishes. When they express ideas in matters of thought at the level of small children—ideas that receive an aura of holiness via the speakers’ authority—when they make outlandish, irresponsible decisions and grasp their surroundings with shocking childishness—they demean themselves, their Torah, and all of us. This is a terrible chillul Hashem—precisely “a Torah scholar who lacks discernment” (see the motto of this column). In short, what is written here should provoke new (and gloomy) thoughts regarding what Torah greatness is and who are gedolei Torah.
[1] I do not mean to say that all Haredim are intellectuals. There are very few of those among them. But they conduct themselves in an intellectualist manner.
[2] In the second book of my trilogy I cited an article by Rabbi Shmuel Ariel, “Is Every Event Directed from Heaven?”, which aims to show that Chazal and the commentators also include views that not everything is in God’s hands—only some things. Several of the sources in Chazal and the Rishonim are cited later in Rabbi Pfeffer’s article. If one needs an article to make this point, you can understand what the prevailing view is.