Two Remarks on Halakhic Decision-Making in Advance of Passover (Column 706)
In the next column I will return to the question of dynamism and statics in Halakhah and their implications. But in the meantime, ahead of Passover, I thought to briefly raise a column with two halakhic points and add holiday wishes. I will touch here, in a nutshell, on two (adjacent) points where in each one it would have been reasonable to think that, according to my approach, I would agree with them, and yet I oppose them. The first concerns the value of autonomy, and the second my opposition to conservatism.
Matzah Ashirah (Rich/Egg Matzah)
When I was a youngster in the illustrious Bnei Brak, I did Passover shopping and, among other things, bought “rich matzah” cookies under a mehadrin certification from Rabbi Ovadia. It did not occur to me that there could be a problem here, since there was no hint of it in the kashrut approval on the package. During the holiday I discovered, to my astonishment, that I was apparently eating full-fledged chametz with Rabbi Ovadia’s approval, and this joined his policy that I saw in other cases as well, where he writes his view decisively and does not bother to qualify it and note that there are other opinions and other customs (such as regarding kitniyot, and the like). I well remember my shock then, and against this background how amazed I was when this year my wife again bought such cookies for Passover, bearing a sharp and unequivocal kashrut approval from the school of Rabbi Ovadia (they write that it is according to Rabbi Ovadia’s rulings).
I will preface by saying that I did not, in fact, check chemically whether there is scientific support for all the theses that will be presented immediately, but the lenient and the stringent themselves do not rely on scientific testing but on the Talmud and the Rishonim, and therefore I too will discuss this within that conceptual framework. See here for a survey by Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu (whose father prohibited matzah ashirah as a serious prohibition, and he follows in his path).
Briefly, matzah ashirah is flour kneaded with fruit juice or wine, and not with water. The Gemara (Pesachim 35a) states that this does not ferment, but several Rishonim wrote that there is nevertheless a biblical prohibition to eat it (albeit without kareit). This appears to be how the Rema ruled in Orach Chayim 462:4 (though his wording implies this is only a custom and not that he rules there is an actual biblical “lo ta’aseh”). In contrast, there are Rishonim who ruled it is completely permitted (and so ruled the author of the Shulchan Aruch there). Yet the Rishonim state that if water is added, matzah ashirah ferments even more than regular dough, and this appears in the halakhah in the Shulchan Aruch itself (there, in §2), even though he permits matzah ashirah. There is a dispute whether we are speaking of water added specifically after the kneading, or water mixed with the fruit juice before it was introduced to the flour. In any case, contemporary poskim have pointed out that in the industrial production process of matzah ashirah cookies it is almost impossible that no water will mix in, and therefore we are dealing with full-fledged chametz (meaning not merely a biblical “lo ta’aseh,” but actual kareit). In the MB (Mishnah Berurah) there on §4 it is written that if leavening/raising agents are mixed in, matzah ashirah is full-fledged chametz. In our cookies, such agents indeed are included.
In my eyes, the kashrut approval by Rabbi Ovadia for matzah ashirah cookies is an outright corrupt scandal. With all due respect to him and his approach, when he grants kashrut certification for the public he is obliged to note that this is according to his position and that there are many poskim who disagree. In granting certification to an industrial product he is not answering a private question addressed to him but providing a service to the general public. The arrogance, brazenness, and typical definitiveness of him and his sons—as if they and no other—should lead us to avoid relying on them in anything whatsoever. In my view, they are not to be trusted in matters of kashrut or in the laws of issur and heter in general.
I have written more than once that a person should decide according to his own judgment and not be overly rattled by the existence of other opinions and precedents. But precisely for that reason it is important to raise here a few limitations:
- We are dealing with a posek, not a dayan. A posek who decides one way or another does not obligate the one who asks him to obey. By contrast, a dayan rules a judgment that obligates the litigants. Therefore, it is reasonable to demand of him to rule for them according to accepted conceptions, or at least to inform them that he has an unusual approach so they will not come before him. This is what is termed in the legal world “legal certainty.” A person who comes to judgment is supposed to know the binding law so that he can act accordingly. If a person acted according to a reasonable halakhic approach, it is not reasonable that he will be brought to judgment and punished for it.
- Even regarding a posek, we are speaking of someone asked a personal question, and in particular he can explain his answer to the questioner. And this too applies because the questioner has the option to examine him and not rely on him (I will not reopen here the rule “a sage who prohibited, his colleague may not permit”). But if he paskens in a way that cannot be examined—him and his reasoning—he cannot do so. Especially a posek who provides a public service, and everyone relies on him to have checked the facts. Relying on him does not constitute acceptance of his halakhic positions, particularly if they are unusual.
- I have written more than once that a posek asked about some law, if he knows there are other views, must present to the questioner all the options, for in my opinion—contrary to the common conception—it is specifically the questioner who must decide in practice, not the posek. See, for example, in my essay on leniency and stringency.
By way of analogy, I will bring what I have cited more than once (see, for example, in Column 21) in the name of the Magen Avraham. He permits saying your words in the name of a great person so that they will be accepted from you. On the face of it, this is an utterly unreasonable permission, for a layman can thus mislead others and cause them to stumble in serious prohibitions. I further challenged this from known forgeries, like the forged Yerushalmi on Kodashim, which the sages of the generation strongly condemned. Seemingly the forger acted well, fulfilling the words of the Magen Avraham. So whence the criticism of him?
I explained there that this ruling applies where a person senses that his arguments are being belittled and not seriously weighed. But the assumption of the Magen Avraham is that even if one says the words in the name of a great person, the listener will not accept them automatically; rather, he will weigh the arguments more seriously before forming his own position. Where there is concern that the listener will accept his words without forming his own view, it is certainly forbidden to lie thus. Therefore it is clear why the sages opposed the forged Yerushalmi, for if there is a Talmudic source, everyone accepts its authority without the possibility of considering disagreement. It is certainly forbidden to speak in the name of a formal authority, or at least before an audience that will accept the words solely because of the speaker. So too regarding an audience of laymen who are not capable of weighing the position of that “great one.”
If so, it seems the same applies in our case. A kashrut approval printed on a product’s wrapper is directed at the general public, who are not capable of forming a position, and naturally will accept that approval automatically. Nor are reasons given there that one can weigh. This is the causing of the many to stumble, and one who grants such certification violates “placing a stumbling block before the blind” for the many, and his iniquity is too great to bear. This is so even if he has a halakhically well-founded position of his own.
It is true that several times in the past (see, for example, this essay) I brought the words of the Ritva (Sukkah 10) who permits Reuven to cause Shimon to stumble in something permitted according to his own approach but prohibited according to Shimon’s. But I noted that the Ritva himself writes there that this is only if the one causing the stumbling informs Shimon and draws his attention to the fact that this is the situation, so that Shimon can form his own position (see there what the novelty is). This, of course, is not done regarding matzah ashirah cookies, especially since the audience is not composed only of Torah scholars who can even weigh the matter. The Ritva explicitly writes that this permission applies only when those “caused to stumble” are Torah scholars.
In such a situation, it would have been appropriate to write on the wrapper that it is kosher according to Rabbi Ovadia’s approach, and to note that many disagree. One could phrase it as “kosher for those who customarily eat matzah ashirah,” or something like that. Again, the brazenness and arrogance of the Yosef family, evident in every lesson and talk, show up here as well. This is aside from their other lofty “virtues,” such as their mafioso conduct—as a crime family that treats the rabbinate and public offices as their personal domain—about which I have written more than once in the past. One can hear the lessons in which Yitzhak Yosef, or another of Rabbi Ovadia’s sons, expresses a view (sometimes entirely unfounded) with complete arrogance, as if the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself is speaking from his throat, while disparaging other opinions, if he even mentions them. It is all the more infuriating when it is directed at a herd of blind followers, as most of their audience, for this audience trails after them like the blind in a chimney and is convinced that all their words are the words of the living God. The problem worsens when we speak of a certification directed at the general public, who are not necessarily bound to the halakhic approach of the Yosef family and innocently rely on the certification. I am sorry for the harsh words, but someone must put an end to the brazen and arrogant stupidity-mafia of this family.
As noted, my autonomist approach would ostensibly have supported such a stance—but it does not. Everything has its place and time. In kashrut certification for the general public there is no room for autonomy, certainly not when one does not bother to note that this is an unusual approach.
The Law of Reclining (Haseivah)
Yinon recently asked me in the Q&A regarding reclining at the Seder night. The claim is that nowadays reclining is not the manner of freedom, and therefore the question arises whether there is an obligation to recline and why. Here, too, this touches my approach advocating changes in Halakhah if circumstances require them, and again my aim here is specifically to qualify that.
I wrote there that the view of the Ra’avyah is known—that in our day one need not recline, for today the manner of freedom is different. He writes almost exactly as the questioner’s approach. The compromise adopted by the Rema is also known, that women do not recline for the Ra’avyah’s reason. On the face of it, this is very puzzling: if we adopt the Ra’avyah’s view—then men too should not recline; and if not—why should women be ruled so? This is especially true of women in our day who are considered “important” (as the Rema writes), and there is no reason to distinguish them from men.
I brought that I once heard from Rabbi Mann of Yeshivat Or Yisrael a nice distinction in this matter. He said there are two reasons to recline on Seder night: 1) to sit in the manner of freedom; 2) as a remembrance of what was done then when they went out to freedom (I am ignoring the fact that this “manner of freedom” was likely more in the Roman period than in Egypt. Thus the Sages saw it, and thus they instituted). It may be that this is the root of the difference in the Rambam’s versions between “a person must see himself” and “show himself.” To “show” is to recall what was then, while to “see himself” is his own manner of freedom now.
The claim is that the second reason is part of the telling of the Exodus and the remembrance of those events, and therefore it does not depend on today’s manner of freedom but on what was customary then. Regarding the second reason, the change in circumstances—namely that today reclining is not a manner of freedom—is irrelevant. For the first reason, of course, it is relevant. His contention was that the Seder leader must also recount the Exodus to the other participants, and therefore he reclines for both reasons. The implication is that he must recline even today, when this is not the manner of freedom, for he must still demonstrate how it was done then. By contrast, the listeners (not necessarily women—but women are usually among the listeners) recline only for the first reason, and since today this is not the manner of freedom they are exempt from reclining. This may be the reason women are exempt from reclining today, even if they are “important.” The implication is that women who lead the Seder will need to recline, and the men there will be exempt. The distinction is not between women and men but between the Seder leader and the listeners.
But one must also discuss the very rationale that exempts listeners from reclining. “Manner of freedom” is not necessarily synonymous with comfort. It may be that even today reclining best expresses freedom, even if it is not the most comfortable posture. Therefore there is logic in reclining even today (for the listeners as well, not only the Seder leader), for when we recline, by changing and deviating from the ordinary way, we are reminded that we must feel freedom—something that will not happen if we sit on the most comfortable chair or armchair. In my eyes, this is a simple and correct rationale. It may be that this is why the Sages instituted according to the manner of reclining of their time, for already then this seemed to them the most fitting way to express freedom, even if in earlier times people did not sit thus.
In conclusion: in my opinion there may be room to be lenient, but it is proper to recline. The Seder leader certainly should, and I think everyone else as well.
Note that here too, according to my “reformist” approach, I would have been expected to support changing the Halakhah in light of changing circumstances—and yet I do not. Before instituting changes, one must examine the “conservative midrash” that underlies them (see the series of columns 475 – 480). Not every rationale and change that appears reasonable on its face is truly reasonable. Sometimes further examination reveals that the argument does not, in fact, hold water.
To sum up: I am entirely in favor of autonomy and entirely in favor of reforms—but everything has its place and time. A bold halakhic position does not mean anything goes and that it lacks constraints and limitations. On the contrary: the more radical the position, the more it requires extra caution and extra critical scrutiny.
On the eve of the Festival of Freedom I will add my hope that our freedom—which includes, among other things, autonomous conduct and a willingness to make changes and to formulate positions independently and in accordance with circumstances—will not make us lose our minds. One must adhere to autonomy and be willing to change, but that too must be done critically and carefully.
I will conclude with wishes for a kosher and happy holiday for us all, and with hope for good tidings whose chances of realization are, sadly, rather slim: the speedy return of the hostages, the restoration of sanity to all sides in our besieged realms, and the swift eradication of Hamas and all that pertains to it, speedily in our days.
Discussion
Regarding “rich matzah” on Passover, the former Sephardic Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron, of blessed memory, already argued like you in Binyan Av, vol. 4, no. 25: even though there are those who permit “rich matzah,” it should be forbidden and one should take the restrictive opinions into account, like the Mishnah Berurah, etc. (He too argues that the view of those who permit it should be written on the rich-matzah packaging.) I noticed that among contemporary Sephardic decisors, the discussion of rich matzah focuses more on the ingredients there. For example, Rabbi Shlomo Amar (Shema Shlomo, vol. 4, no. 13) ruled leniently on the basis of a scientific explanation of the ingredients by the managers of the Papooshado cookie factory. The Kosharot organization (founded by students of Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, may he live long) wrote a long article explaining why those who permit it are mistaken; see here:https://www.kosharot.co.il/index2.php?id=413716&lang=HEB
Also Rabbi Ofir Malka, may he live long, who is a young decisor and very popular among the Sephardic Haredi public, argued that eating rich matzah should be forbidden (which drew fire from Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef).
Thank you for your words, and חג שמח.
You wrote: “Be that as it may, contemporary decisors have pointed out that in the industrial production process of rich-matzah cookies it is almost impossible that water does not get mixed in, and therefore this is full-fledged leaven (that is, not merely a prohibition punishable by lashes, but actual karet). In the Mishnah Berurah there on סעיף ד he wrote that if leavening agents are mixed into it, then rich matzah is indeed full-fledged leaven. In our cookies such substances are in fact also mixed in.”
In light of this, Rabbi, is it correct not to eat them today? (I am Sephardic.)
Do you eat these cookies?
Thank you.
Obviously not. Don’t touch them.
Thanks for the column
A comment on the many who were outraged by the forgery of the Jerusalem Talmud:
That can be rejected, since it did not seem to them that the forger himself held like what he forged.
And there are many other stumbling blocks that come from the forgery, namely deriving halakhic rulings that never even occurred to
the forger.
And furthermore, a temporary ruling
is not comparable to a ruling for future generations.
In any case, a kosher and happy Passover.
I think you’re missing the point when you connect Rabbi Ovadia with Rabbi Ovadia’s students. In other words, the fact that they copied from him, grotesquely, the aggressiveness and the decisiveness does not require comparing him to them. Even if you didn’t mean to, it’s not right to put them in the same boat. As for the claim itself about halakhic communism, that is certainly a problem.
Honorable Rabbi,
I agree with your criticism of Rabbi Ovadia’s family, but I didn’t understand why the uproar was specifically over this issue. After all, the Beit Yosef ruled that rich matzah is permitted. I always knew that among Sephardim they eat rich matzah. Are there some who don’t?
I absolutely did not compare them. Rabbi Ovadia was a true Torah giant, unlike his idiot descendants.
I have no problem with granting kosher certification. The problem is that no reservation is stated. Especially since when water is mixed in, even the Beit Yosef would say it incurs karet.
The notation “according to the ruling of Rabbi Ovadia” is already beyond ordinary kashrut labeling and should have set off a red light for you, or at least that’s probably what the certifying authority thought.
There are plenty of examples of certifications that did not even note that – wine diluted with 5/6 water, meat that is not chalak, food cooked by non-Jews according to the Rema (there are surely also examples that mislead Ashkenazim).
Rabbi Avraham Yosef once claimed that he wanted to refrain, and his father told him, “If you don’t give certification, someone else will make rich matzah and won’t insist on wine only, and then it really will be leaven.”
1. Why don’t you actually bring chemistry into this discussion? In the past there wasn’t precise measurement. Today it’s easy to test everything and see whether rich matzah ferments or not, and what kind. Why settle for a conceptual discussion among halakhic decisors?
2. I don’t really understand the criticism of the Yosef family for not noting on the kashrut certification that there are other opinions. If it says Hechsher Beit Yosef, then it’s kosher according to Rabbi Ovadia’s view. There’s no deception here, and everyone understands that it’s kosher according to his view. It’s like communities that accepted the Rambam’s rulings upon themselves. In the Mishneh Torah, Rambam does not note and warn that there are other approaches; he simply states his opinion.
3. Even if autonomy has value and a decisor is only supposed to lay out the options and let the consumer choose, psychologically most people want to follow an expert who also knows how to integrate everything for them and tell them what the best option is for them (same with doctors). You can’t deny the human need for a guide who relieves them of choosing and taking responsibility for every halakhic discussion. That psychological fact itself justifies presenting a decisor’s position without a disclaimer that others disagree.
1. I’m not bringing in chemistry because I haven’t examined the chemical meaning (of leavening in general). I did not write that chemistry should not be brought in.
2. I know that it’s kosher according to his view, but I did not learn from that that it is not kosher according to other views. I explained this well in my remarks, and if you don’t just insist for the sake of insisting, I’m sure you’ll understand as well. The Rambam did not provide public kashrut-certification services. I explained that too.
3. I most certainly can deny it, and indeed do. Not that it exists, but that it is the decisor’s role to cater to it.
My rabbi once told me that when he was a boy, there was a passing “fad” to wear a cap. My rabbi also wanted to wear one, but his father did not agree. He argued to his father: “But the Chafetz Chaim also wore a cap.” His father answered him: “You don’t start becoming the Chafetz Chaim from the hat.”
The Ovadia family took from the father the hat and the style. The content is less critical to the persona.
2. I don’t see the essential distinction between public kashrut certifications (which plenty of religious communities don’t rely on from the Yosef family anyway) and sweeping, public halakhic rulings without a disclaimer that many eminent authorities disagree (Mishneh Torah).
I’m really trying to understand.
You wrote:
“In such a situation, it would have been appropriate to write on the package that this is kosher according to Rabbi Ovadia’s approach, and to note that many disagree.”
As far as I know, there are many more such situations. Meat under the Rabbinate’s certification, for example – is that something where it would have been appropriate to note that many disagree?
Or meat from the slaughter of X – would it have been appropriate to note that many disagree?
Nice!
I explained this. It has nothing whatsoever to do with religious communities that don’t rely on the Rabbinate. That is exactly the difference. There the issue is known, and whoever wants to be stringent can be and will be. Also, that is not about causing people to violate prohibitions, but mainly about customs or levels of supervision (how sample-based the inspection is). But here we are not talking about stringency or religiosity; we are talking about a different halakhic approach. If you follow a different approach, you must make that clear so as not to cause others to stumble. I explained that you cannot cause a person to stumble when his halakhic approach differs from yours unless you informed him. Factually, at the end of the day, do you agree that many are stumbling into a prohibition punishable by karet because of this policy? That’s the whole point. Would anyone accept such a situation in any other field, aside from this collection of arrogant, insolent idiots? Why do they note “kosher for those who eat legumes”? When it comes to utter nonsense, they do note it. There too they could just write “kosher” and that’s it. And the same for gentile milk. Even the not-so-religious Rabbinate explicitly writes those two. Why don’t they write that there are people stricter than they are, but this they do write?
Substantively regarding rich matzah – do you hold this about all types, or only about the aforementioned cookies? For example, egg matzot of “Matzot Aviv” or “Matzot Rishon,” and additional products (there was a wafer by a well-known candy manufacturer on which it said “for those who eat rich matzah”).
I have no position. I haven’t checked. If and when I need to form a position on these questions, I won’t get into the views of the decisors and not even into the Shulchan Arukh; I’ll try to examine chemically what is happening there. But that is beyond my ability right now, and therefore I follow the decisors. And even when I do that, of course I will not give a vague, general kashrut certification according to my own view without noting that it is only my own view.
Regarding the reason for women, there is another plain explanation from Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. He argues that the reason we recline is that once the Sages enacted reclining, the enactment did not move from its place. But regarding women, there was never a sweeping enactment to begin with, for
in the Gemara it says that only an important woman is obligated to recline, and only in our times did Mordechai write that all women are important. If so, today, when reclining has no significance, women are exempt.
It seems to me you’ve been given a perfect setup…
Why a perfect setup? It’s a fine explanation. Though one could debate whether the enactment was not for women, or whether it was not for unimportant people, and once women are considered important they fall under the enactment from the outset.
Beyond that, according to his view, apparently there would be no need for the Ravyah’s reason. They were not included in the enactment, and therefore they are not obligated. So it does not sound like his view.
It seems to me that he means that for men the enactment was to perform the act of reclining, but for women the enactment was to conduct themselves in a manner of freedom. Therefore, in the time of the Gemara only important women were obligated; in the time of Mordechai all were obligated; and in our time no woman is obligated, because this is not a manner of freedom, as the Ravyah wrote.
I accept the a fortiori argument from legumes and gentile milk, but I do not accept the underlying premise. Regarding legumes, one really could have just written “kosher” and that’s it. After all, it’s nonsense. Why does it seem so terribly insolent to you for someone to think with confidence that anyone who claims rich matzah on Passover is a biblical prohibition is simply mistaken, and to certify it for everyone? Obviously, according to Rabbi Ovadia, who in his own view has the shoulders of Gulliver. I don’t see this as more arrogant than many cases throughout the generations of decisors who were sure enough of themselves to claim that all the others simply did not understand the sugya properly.
As for your question – do I agree that, at the bottom line, many are stumbling into karet because of this policy? No. That depends on who is right in this dispute.
Because if anything, on the merits his position is the nonsense. Certainly the other position is not. Besides, I explained that a kashrut certification is not like expressing a position in a book or in a responsum. There it is clear to everyone that they are reading the author’s position. In kashrut, absolutely not. People rely on him to check kashrut, not to decide for us what is kosher. If we knew that this was his policy, then one should not rely on him even for the checking. He has no credibility in anything.
Gentile milk and legumes are not just a reductio ad absurdum. These examples prove that he himself understands this very well: that his role is to check, not to decide. In addition, those examples themselves cause confusion, because the public understands from them that if there is a reservation, it is written.
And this applies all the more to Rabbi Ovadia, whose method is obviously unprecedented and relies on earlier opinions. Suddenly here there are no opinions and only his own position exists. This is causing the public to stumble on a massive scale, the likes of which there is none greater.
And as for karet, I will repeat once more: it is forbidden to cause a person to stumble in something that is prohibited according to his own view, even if according to your view it is permitted. If according to his view it is karet, then you caused him to stumble in karet. This is not a claim that in practice he will be cut off (because it was unintentional, and also because perhaps you are right that there is no karet here), but a claim about the parameters of causing someone to stumble.
Is there even a clear chemical definition of leavening?
Perhaps it is important to recline so that there remain four questions and not three, which there is no option at all to cancel out (will they change the concept of the Four Questions into three?………)
Good question. There are various claims proposing such a definition (including at least two by two of my colleagues at the Bar-Ilan Institute, Rabbi Rappaport and Rabbi Katz), but I haven’t examined them.
Although in principle there is something to the claim that one should spell out on a kashrut certification that it is only according to so-and-so’s view, etc., it should be noted that in reality all kashrut certifications behave this way and completely ignore the views of dissenters, even when מדובר in great halakhic authorities whom many follow. And this is not in one or two cases, but in dozens of disputes of every kind and every variety, biblical and rabbinic. Anyone who knows the field knows that this is how it is, and all your distinctions and explanations won’t help except for someone who doesn’t know the subject… And there’s no point singling out only the Yosef family…
As for the water, I have no idea whether there really is any; I’ll just note that they insist emphatically, again and again, that there is not a drop of water.
I was not speaking here about concern for the opinion of another contemporary decisor, but about a solid approach found throughout the early and later authorities. In that regard I do not think other certifications ignore it in this way, unless the approach was completely rejected and nobody follows it today. Go and see regarding legumes and gentile milk that everyone notes it.
I see that the rabbi is not responding to the comment,
but the proof from the forgery of the Jerusalem Talmud is very puzzling.
Did that forger intend in order to issue a halakhic ruling, and that is why he published it under other names?
Was that his creative work?
And perhaps, with difficulty, the rabbi means other forgeries in history whose purpose was the observance of halakhah. And even regarding them the sages of Israel did not agree.
And in passing he mentioned the incident of the Jerusalem Talmud.
In any case, I know of no such case.
Interestingly, in recent years more popular Sephardic decisors have forbidden these cookies. See here the latest uproar surrounding the remarks of Rabbi Binyamin Chuta, may he live long, in his halakhah segment on Radio Kol Barama:https://www.inn.co.il/news/665763
The matzah and the bitter herb were accompaniments to the sacrifice in Temple times, but after the destruction they were defined as mitzvot standing on their own. By contrast, dipping (the first course), removing the table, reclining, and the afikoman are part of Hellenistic etiquette at formal banquets.
The Mishnah states that even the poorest Jew may not eat until he reclines. From the fact that it refers specifically to the poor and not to all Israel, one might perhaps get the impression that this is not an essential law of Passover itself, but a practice from which one should not diminish if that is the norm.
To be sure, we see various attempts by the sages to give reasons for it even after the norm changed (the first dipping and removing the table so that the children will wonder, etc.), but perhaps it is equally legitimate to continue viewing the enactment as a norm dependent on place and time rather than an essential law in the core of Passover (as the Ravyah did).
A collection of irrelevant distinctions and baseless assumptions. What exactly am I supposed to answer?
Honorable Rabbi,
You are not supposed to do anything and you owe nothing.
At the same time,
you can explain,
since the rabbis’ anger over the forgery of the Jerusalem Talmud is no contradiction at all to the words of the Magen Avraham.
After all, his words speak of someone who publicizes a correct halakhic ruling so that people will listen to him,
and attributes it to someone else.
That Jerusalem Talmud forgery –
those two conditions were not present; these were not correct halakhic rulings,
from the forger’s perspective, for example the tefillin of Rabbenu Tam.
And that was not even his intention.
I am indeed your student
and far beneath you, yet at the same time
I would have expected you to retract.
I understand that for a giant
it is hard to retract because of the words of a gnat,
but since you are an example
to many, you need to muster lionlike courage. This whole style of mine is not the most respectful,
but I understood from you that you permit speaking this way.
A kosher and happy Passover.
I referred you to my explanation of the Magen Avraham’s words; there you can see that there is no connection at all to whether the halakhah is correct or incorrect. The fact that you, as a layman, think some halakhah is correct cannot permit you to say it in the name of the Chafetz Chaim. That is causing the public to stumble in the worst possible way.
Therefore it is clear that the purpose of this halakhah is not the transmission of the “correct” halakhah, but to lead your colleague into a discussion, to seriously consider arguments he is dismissing.
I would be happy to retract when I see a relevant argument or distinction. So far I have seen none. That is also why I did not understand what explanations you were expecting. I explained in the places to which I referred, and apparently you did not read them.
Beyond the absence of arguments, and beyond the fact that you did not read my reasons and nevertheless expected reasons from me, as I wrote there are also baseless assumptions in your remarks. Here are two: 1. That this is about issuing a correct halakhic ruling. I explained that this is unreasonable on its face. 2. That this was not the forger’s intention. As far as I know, his intention was to present his own arguments in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud, exactly what the Magen Avraham is talking about. And if it is in a non-halakhic area (the laws of sacrificial offerings are also halakhah), then the rationale applies all the more. There it is especially important to weigh all the reasons and arrive at a good scholarly picture. So there it is much more justified to hang one’s words on a great tree. Therefore my puzzlement at the critics of the forger remains in place, and my explanation stands above.
I hope that now I have explained sufficiently for your taste as well.
Oh dear.
I explain that there is no contradiction between the Magen Avraham and the rabbis’ anger at him, which was only a preliminary understanding in interpreting the Magen Avraham,
and you attack the interpretation according to your own conclusion about the words of the Magen Avraham,
which I did not discuss at all;
I only noted that the proof
is not a proof.
The forger merely wanted money,
and even if not, there are still many reasons to be angry with him even before your interpretation
of the Magen Avraham.
If you choose to insist, then so be it. I wrote my arguments, and as usual you did not address them. I’m done.
https://www.kosharot.co.il/index2.php?id=44716&lang=HEB It’s really unbelievable; he writes that according to the other opinions too this is only a lechatchilah issue and that it is only a custom and not halakhah.
*https://www.kosharot.co.il/index2.php?id=44583&lang=HEB my mistake
Somewhat tangentially to the subjects of the column – can one infer from here that in your view, anything with public ramifications must be done by halakhic consensus, for example conversion? (That is, even those who think one may “lower the bar” in order to convert people in practice should refrain from doing so, etc.?)
Another issue – annulment of marriage in extreme cases (in a certain sense one can compare it to kashrut – for example, according to Rabbi Id it is possible, but many disagree, and so he is “causing stumbling” according to their view, etc.).
There is no connection whatsoever between the questions. Here I am speaking about a service to the public that is supposed to be done transparently for the entire public. You can give kashrut certification however you like so long as you write it explicitly.
And indeed, straightforwardly the same applies to conversion and annulment of marriage. Except that there the result is irreversible and has consequences for everyone, so there is even more reason to demand consensus, and transparency alone is not enough.
I note that with invalidating (not annulling) marriage, it is a bit different, because when you invalidate a marriage you are not performing any halakhic act; you are simply informing the woman of her existing status. That is her status, and it does not depend on you.
In your article you presented it as a certain fact that water gets mixed into the production process, and on that basis you sharply criticized granting the certification. But I find it puzzling how you reached such a decisive conclusion, when there are people who testify, out of familiarity with the production process, that there is no possibility whatsoever that water gets mixed into the process.
Moreover, in Rabbi Naki’s booklet Behalakhah UveAggadah (page 129 and onward, and it is recommended to read from the start of the chapter), he testifies and clearly explains how the production process is carried out and why it is impossible that water gets mixed in. If things are indeed as he describes them, then presenting matters as fact could be considered casting aspersions – a serious matter that could also cause significant financial damage to the factory.
We would be glad if you would address this and clarify the sources of information on which you relied, out of fear of Heaven and the caution required in matters that have the potential to harm others.
Here is the link to the aforementioned booklet where these things appear:
https://video.htv.co.il/2017/pesachpdf336.pdf
I did not present it as a certain fact; I raised the claims of those who forbid it. And for the purposes of my arguments, it does not matter at all whether they are right or not. I referred to Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu’s survey, and there is more online.
The wording of the Magen Avraham:
“If he heard a ruling and it seems to him that the halakhah is so, it is permitted to say it in the name of a great man.”
From his wording it does not seem like the rabbi’s interpretation,
for according to the rabbi’s interpretation he should have said, “If he independently thinks of a ruling.”
As for the question of causing stumbling, presumably it speaks of stringency and not leniency, in order to separate someone from prohibition.
And he still qualified his words with “if he heard a ruling.”
And even for leniency, if we are speaking of someone qualified to rule,
and the listener agrees with him, there is no stumbling in it.
And if he does not agree with him,
then there is no reason he should listen to him.
And if he listens because the sage in whose name it was said held כך,
there is no prohibition in that,
because the prohibition is when he eats something that in his own view is forbidden,
and here he changed his mind.
In any event, the main thrust of the Magen Avraham’s words appears to be
permission to lie in order to separate someone from prohibition.
Is there a source that the mitzvah of reclining is in remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt, aside from the idea of a manner of freedom?
Why didn’t you continue responding in the thread you opened above?
As for your remarks themselves, I very much appreciate the persistence and determination, but his words clearly do not support your suggestion. He writes that it seems to him that the law is so, not that an authoritative source told him so. But who is this layman for whom it “seems” that the law is so? How is he allowed to lie and cause others to stumble just because it seems so to him? All sorts of things can seem so to anyone. This permission does not lead to separating people from prohibition but to massive causing of people to stumble in prohibitions. You can of course suggest an okimta that he himself is a great person, but why would a great person hang his ruling on himself? Well, obviously: he is not recognized here as a great person. There is also the okimta you suggested to me in our conversation: for example, that he heard it from a great person who is not recognized here, and therefore attributes it to another great person who is recognized. Now you have added yet another okimta: that this is speaking only of stringency. Fine, after all these bizarre okimtot, you still claim that this is the plain meaning of his words. Good luck with that.
And one more point: what is the difference between “he heard and it seems to him that this is the law” and “he thinks so”? Heard it from whom? The okimtot above? That too is an empty inference.
In short, you are continuing to insist for no reason. I am hereby ending the discussion. Happy holiday.
It’s not “aside from”; that itself is the meaning of a manner of freedom. The law of a manner of freedom has two aspects: to conduct oneself now in a manner of freedom, and to recall the manner of freedom then. I noted that this may be the difference between seeing oneself and showing oneself.
Hello,
for some reason there was a problem responding there.
I do not think the inference is empty at all.
Why does he write, “if he heard a ruling,” for no reason?
The difference between “he heard and it seems to him” and simply “he thinks on his own”
may be that he means to exclude a case where he heard it and that is all the information he has,
in which case there is no reason at all to lie; let him say that so-and-so said it – the listener will listen, and if not, then not.
I don’t know why you assume that this is talking about a layman.
Plainly it is speaking about a person who thinks that this is the law, that is, someone qualified for such a thing.
As for the okimtot,
if it is only to separate someone from prohibition, then that is certainly only one okimta.
In any case, I was amused that you combine an okimta from the phone with a suggestion here.
I propose a new idea:
why am I obligated to stand behind the history of our conversations?
Either the idea is correct or it is not.
In any case, perhaps I am insisting for no reason, perhaps not,
but to write to a person that he is insisting for no reason,
when he is raising new arguments – that is puzzling!
Regarding what you wrote here:
“Contemporary decisors have pointed out that in the industrial production process of rich-matzah cookies it is almost impossible that water does not get mixed in, and therefore this is full-fledged leaven”
I don’t understand why the small quantity of added water matters, if in any case there is a lot of water in the fruit. The concentration of water in the fruit hardly changes percentage-wise.
Also, I don’t understand why one cannot rely on modern scientific knowledge regarding the question of whether there is leavening in flour kneaded with fruit juice.
As I answered above, one certainly can. Of course one first has to define the process of leavening (there are disputes about that). I have not checked, and I have no data from someone who did check, so I discussed it according to the assumptions of the decisors. Their claim is that fruit juice does not leaven, but with the addition of a very small amount of water it leavens even more than ordinary water does.
So for practical purposes, if I could ensure production conditions in which there is not even the slightest addition of water, would you be willing to eat such rich matzah?
There is a siman on this in Rabbi Shmuel Tal’s book Lessons for Passover.
https://asif.co.il/wpfb-file/%d7%9e%d7%94%d7%95%d7%aa-%d7%94%d7%97%d7%99%d7%9e%d7%95%d7%a5/
As for the Yosef family, perhaps the famous statement in Nedarim 81a applies to them.
I wanted to strengthen the rabbi’s hand regarding the distinction between freedom and comfort; there is an important classic message in that.
No, because according to some of the Rishonim there is a negative prohibition even when there is no karet, and that is how the Rema brings it (albeit as a custom, as I noted in the column).
I already wrote in the past about this – that women rely on the Ravyah, and regarding the mima nafshakh question, the answer is simple:
Women did not recline in the past, and to begin obligating them now because they are important – they relied on the Ravyah. Not so the men, who always reclined and did not cancel their law.
I recoiled from your opinion about the family’s behavior. It’s none of my business. Interesting – that’s less the style I thought I would hear. In the name of Rabbi Simcha Cohen (he really did say this before…)
“Don’t say no; say, ‘I’m surprised.’”
(I meant myself.) Happy holiday.
You wrote, “I ignore the fact that this ‘manner of freedom’ was apparently more characteristic of the Roman period than of Egypt. That is how Hazal saw it, and that is how they enacted it.” There are two pulses of conservatism here: Hazal tried to preserve something, and we are trying to preserve Hazal’s enactment, and in both cases one can preserve it literally or midrashically.
If we preserve Hazal’s enactment literally, then the manner of freedom is reclining as in their time. If we preserve Hazal’s enactment midrashically, then if they tried to preserve it literally (because they thought that in Egypt too the manner of freedom was reclining as in their own day), then we should conduct ourselves in a manner of freedom as in Egypt; and if they tried to preserve it midrashically, then we should conduct ourselves in a manner of freedom as in our own day.
That is, from your words it emerges that in your view we should preserve Hazal’s enactment literally, and it seems (from the wording “that is how Hazal saw it”) that in your view Hazal too tried to preserve it literally. Why, in your view, is preservation of the enactment done literally? Is there a connection to the rule, “If the reason lapses, the enactment does not lapse”?
Good question. The discussions about reclining convey that the enactment was specifically about that act, and therefore it seems implausible to me to interpret it midrashically. Clearly, in the background there is the rule that when the reason lapses, the enactment does not lapse. But perhaps you are right. Ultimately, I explained that there are also reasons on the merits (the distinction between showing and seeing, and the distinction between freedom and comfort).
They write, “According to the ruling of Maran, the Rishon LeTzion Rabbi Ovadia, of blessed memory.”
Discussions in the Gemara? (In Berakhot 46b it appears that even in the Amoraic period they reclined as in the Tannaitic period.)
Exactly.
Although you wrote that you are not getting into the question of the chemical process, it seems interesting to me on the margins to see how the process of leavening, which in the time of the Mishnah and Gemara was clearly a factual question examined with plausible empirical tools (such as cracking, locust-horns, water temperature, etc.), underwent a kind of reduction into objective definitions, most of which on their face lack factual significance (such as the difference between fruit juice mixed with water and “pure” fruit juice – which contains water by its very nature). And today nobody is really interested in whether it is leaven or not, but rather whether it fits the definitions that were originally meant to help us decide whether it is leaven or not. It is very clear how this process happens, because one needs to give clear definitions to things in halakhah, and once definitions exist it is much easier to deal with them; but once a definition was given and accepted, it became the generator of the halakhah (like the 18-minute issue, which became sacred and is measured down to the second). Then the absurd result is endless casuistry over whether a certain dough fits definitions that were meant to reflect reality, while completely ignoring the question of reality. Representations of reality become reality; halakhah becomes an almost abstract set of rules even when the leaven itself walks in on its own two feet. It is almost postmodernism. To my mind this is similar to the laws of kashering vessels – something tangible like “taste” underwent a transformation and became more like “impurity,” with different rules for its transfer and nullification that became completely detached from the question of reality. Not that I do anything against these rules, but it is a kind of split that I live with.
As for the matter itself,
thanks to your approach to sugyot, another thought occurred to me. Suppose the interpretation of the Magen Avraham is like yours or like mine –
is the thing itself, conceptually, permitted or forbidden?
Regarding your interpretation, one must discuss:
is it permissible to lie so that people will listen to his reasoning?
And regarding my interpretation: is it permissible to lie in order to separate someone from prohibition?
I will add another point that is somewhat different: some decisors hold that saying an incorrect halakhah is forbidden even in a case of danger to life,
on the grounds that falsifying the Torah is forbidden even in a case of danger to life.
Another matter that touches somewhat on the issue is giving reasons for a halakhah that are not the true reasons when necessary.
Some claimed that the Hazon Ish did this.
I would be glad if the rabbi could expand a bit on the matter.
As I explained, I do not agree with this mechanism, although it is indeed common. As far as I am concerned, reality is what determines. But I do not have the time or ability to examine every matter empirically. And I repeat that the fact that fruit juice contains water does not mean that it actually leavens.
I have written here several times about “holy lies.” The Hazon Ish indeed did this more than once, such as in his remarks about the two thousand years of Torah regarding contradictions between Torah and science, and so on.
Regarding leaven, there is an article by Rabbi Rappaport from Bar-Ilan.
Regarding vessels, to me the most sensible argument is Rabbi Melamed’s soap argument.
As someone who worked in an industrial kitchen and personally washed – the laws of vessels are fairly clear: grease remains on the vessel almost always, unless one makes an exceptional effort.
All the more so if they were not washing with dish soap but with sand and water…
In the home kitchen, with the power of the dishwasher, much less so.
Think about plastic containers that had food with sauce in them; try washing them by hand and you will understand the laws of vessels. Put them in the dishwasher (where the soap is very strong because it is not for skin contact), and you won’t understand the laws of vessels.
When you say that you do not agree with this mechanism, do you mean that you do not justify it, or that you do not think it exists? Because it seems hard to ignore that it exists to some extent or another. It seems to me that the very discussion of the cookies based solely on interpretations of the words of the Rishonim shows this – there is no attention to the fundamental definition of leaven and no attempt to give a precise scientific definition that would serve us, even though that is not impossible in principle. They relate only to definitions given in periods when understanding of chemical processes was tied only to external phenomena, without the ability to know the internal mechanisms driving them, and therefore it is necessarily partial and anecdotal (based on experience alone and not on theory), and therefore one cannot generalize from it to a new reality. As for fruit juice – I did not say that it necessarily leavens; I said I do not think there is any basis for distinguishing between fruit juice into which water has been mixed and fruit juice into which it has not, since in any case it contains water, something Hazal could not have known – from their perspective fruit juice is a liquid that is not water, since it has a different color and taste and comes from a different source and behaves differently, and they had no way of knowing that it is also composed of water.
I agree that plastic containers absorb; one cannot ignore that. But we are talking about metal that absorbs taste and releases it, not grease that remains stuck on. I am not familiar with a laboratory process that can tell you what was cooked in a certain pot after it has been thoroughly cleaned – that is, a process dealing with something absorbed into the wall itself. When you read what was written about this in the past, I at least get the impression that for them “taste” and “smell” are non-material things that can pass from place to place or from one substance to another, and this is a very sensible and reasonable understanding when you know absolutely nothing about chemistry, because you have no way of knowing otherwise. But today we know that this is not so: if one senses the taste or smell of something, it is because some of the thing itself is here, not “its taste.” But perhaps I do not understand this well enough, and maybe it is not so.
I wrote “although it is common,” didn’t I?
It doesn’t seem to me that the elite Ashkenazic Badatz kashrut agencies say in restaurants that it is not for Sephardim who are strict about fish and cheese. And that is not always something one can detect in the food. And even if you distinguish between leaven and the above, or say that in any case this is merely an error or something like that, I think there is a principle here that they also do not care about. And there are more things, but this is not the place to elaborate.
So indeed it really would have been appropriate to write “for those who eat rich matzah,” etc. Still, nobody puts in such qualifications, and to single out Rabbi Ovadia, for whom for some reason it seems you have something personal against him.
I also recall that on the issue of whether the main thing in learning is the halakhah or the study itself, you present it as though this is only the approach of the “Yosef family,” in your words, even though that appears in many, many Rishonim.
“The arrogance, insolence, and decisiveness characteristic of him and his sons” – I regard the rabbi as a thoughtful person, and I assume the rabbi agrees and is aware that Rabbi Ovadia was a Torah scholar. Is it reasonable to speak about him that way? Is there not some formal authority from the Gemara saying to treat a Torah scholar with respect? And please don’t say that this is just how people write on the internet or something like that. And all the more so don’t say that you think he was not a Torah scholar, because I think a bit more highly of you than that.
I don’t understand where there was a manner of freedom then. On the contrary – “your loins girded,” etc.
That is what was then considered a manner of freedom.
What? Eating with your loins girded and a staff in hand (one foot out the door) in haste is not a form of freedom, even if for them it expressed that – just as if someone came out of the camps in the Holocaust and they brought him dry bread to eat without limit, that would not make the eating a manner of freedom.
To the honorable Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham,
Greetings, and may salvation draw near.
I saw your remarks regarding rich matzah and the certification of Rabbi A. Yosef. And I saw a video of the latter claiming that he sacrifices himself over the kashrut of these cookies,
and that he works for several months (of course without receiving pay…) to supervise that the ingredients not come into contact with water, etc., and that anyone who challenges him, Heaven forbid, and his father,
who sent him to do so, cannot be relied upon in anything. What does his honor think of his remarks?
I have no information, so I cannot judge the facts. But the fact is that there are people who checked and claim that contact with a bit of water is unavoidable. Beyond that, the view of several Rishonim, and thus the straightforward meaning of the Gemara, is that rich matzah involves a Torah prohibition that is not karet even if it did not come into contact with water. I explained this in my column.
For these two reasons, there is no problem with writing that in your view it is permitted, but fairness requires noting that it is for those who follow the lenient practice regarding rich matzah. It is no less than legumes, which everyone notes even though it is complete nonsense.
In my view, this is part of the same arrogance and condescension of the Yosef family.
As an aside, I will add that I suspect the self-sacrifice over the issue, even if there really is such a thing (I do not have much trust in the aforementioned fellow), arose after a controversy broke out over the father’s lenient ruling, Rabbi Ovadia’s. So I suspect that from the outset there was in any case a problem. For if not, why would the son need to sacrifice himself over something that had already been arranged and examined by his father?
Therefore, the Mishnah has not moved from its place.
A few comments.
A – What you wrote, that the straightforward meaning of the sugya is that fruit juice causes leavening –
here are the Gemara’s words (copied from Beit Yosef, Orach Chayim 462):
(36a) It was taught: One may not knead dough on Passover with wine, oil, and honey; and if one did knead it, Rabban Gamliel says it must be burned immediately, and the Sages say it may be eaten. Rabbi Akiva said: I spent Shabbat with Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, and I kneaded dough for them with wine, oil, and honey, and they said nothing to me… And the Sages say it may be eaten, for they hold it can be guarded. And we do not read “immediately,” for once it has been baked it will not leaven.
And furthermore – later on it implies that they do not cause leavening, as we say (39b) that vetika is permitted with oil and salt because it is fruit juice.
And similarly we also say (40a) regarding the jar of avishuna,
and likewise regarding the case where it is permitted to scorch two stalks together.
So fruit juice does not cause leavening at all, and even initially it is permitted.
Therefore Rabbenu Tam explained (Tosafot 35b s.v. “umi”) that they do not cause leavening at all on their own, and this is what those later cases permit.
And so too the Rosh wrote (siman 13).
And so too the Maggid Mishneh wrote in chapter 5 (halakhah 2) in the name of most commentators:
B – What you wrote, that some of the Rishonim are stringent, is true – but it is simply puzzling, especially according to your own approach, for the majority of the Rishonim are lenient (see Yabia Omer 9, Orach Chayim 42, who brought further Rishonim), and the straightforward meaning of the sugya is as above.
If your concern is your own custom, then your concern is like the rest of Ashkenazic customs: one who knows halakhically how to be released from them knows; one who does not, does not.
C – Your complaint against Rabbi Ovadia for not stating this (and I am not at all one of his students or the like):
The Badatz also does not state on the meat it sells that according to the Shulchan Arukh and according to the Rema it is trefah, and only according to the leniency of the Pri Toar is it kosher; similarly with other Badatz agencies (from my own experience as a lung inspector, in a place where there are several Badatz agencies).
Is the prohibition of tereifot due to lung adhesions less severe than the Passover leaven issue of rich matzah? Likewise regarding grape juice in the past, they did not note that it was not kosher for those who follow the Shulchan Arukh; on the contrary, they wrote that according to the Beit Yosef too it is kosher, because there are those who interpret the Shulchan Arukh that way, and they ignored many decisors, Ashkenazic and Sephardic alike, who interpret it otherwise, as well as the known Sephardic custom to them (and thereby caused blessings in vain, the nullification of kiddush, and eating without kiddush). And likewise regarding other matters that were mentioned, such as food cooked by non-Jews according to the Shulchan Arukh.
D – Another thing, unrelated to kashrut certifications:
Rabbi Ovadia is the only one who brings in his books the Ashkenazic opinions as well, and from him his sons and other students learned this – unlike Ashkenazic books, even in Israel, such as Shemirat Shabbat Kehilkhatah and other books composed in Israel on the laws of prayer and blessings, all the way through Shabbat, niddah, prohibitions and permissions, and other areas.
E – Regarding the aforementioned cookies, I am surprised at you, for two reasons: A – note that they are not even under the hologram of Badatz Beit Yosef, so already this is not at the Badatz level, and if so there is no complaint at all. B – The controversy over Papooshado cookies is so widespread and well known among the public, from my childhood until now, that simply seeing the name of the cookies with the seal of the aforementioned Rabbinate is quite enough.
F – Regarding the addition of water – so:
1 – First of all, see in the Beit Yosef that in the view of the Rif and Rambam even with water it is permitted.
2 – Even if they put in water, so what? The questions only begin if it sits for a while.
3 – If Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef testified that there is no water there, I would not believe him, just as he testifies that Badatz Beit Yosef is stricter about adhesions than the Eidah Haredit Badatz, “with clear knowledge” (clear knowledge from dreams?), and even if his father, despite his greatness, said so (unless he claimed to have seen it with his own eyes).
But if Rabbi Naki testifies that he saw it with his own eyes and that anyone can go and see, I personally believe him, especially since in his books he does not hide opinions but also brings those whom Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef cannot stand.
A classic case of you, Michi, insisting on nothing. The fact is that the commenters here and others understood that this was kosher according to Rabbi Ovadia’s view and not necessarily according to all views, especially given that his way is to be lenient in halakhah. In other words, from the standpoint of publicizing it to the public, the notice was clear, and the fact is that most people understood it. In my opinion, the problem is with you, and you are projecting that onto Rabbi Ovadia and others. In addition, as has already been pointed out at length, kashrut certifications also give certification in cases where according to another view it is trefah, like non-chalak meat and the like. Whoever wants to be sure asks a halakhic authority he relies on.
Yitzhak Yosef also censors his father in Yalkut Yosef, and does not even bring his father’s opinion in the notes. An example of this can be found in the laws dealing with a daughter saying Kaddish for her father.