The Essence of the Prohibition of Chametz (Column 468)
I assume we’ve all grown accustomed to the homilies that treat chametz as a metaphor for flaws of the soul (this already begins with Chazal, and—true to form—the Ḥasidim take it to the limit), and from there interpret the search for chametz as an inner probing and self-correction. The premise of these sermons is that chametz is something loathsome from which the Torah commands us to distance ourselves and eradicate. Seemingly there are several halakhic proofs for this: for example, on Passover chametz is not nullified even in the smallest amount. Beyond that, the Torah itself prohibited it with “it shall not be seen and it shall not be found” (bal yera’eh u-bal yimatzeh) and also commanded us to eliminate it (“tashbitu”), unlike all other prohibitions of eating and deriving benefit. It is cited in the name of the Arizal to be careful about even the tiniest amount of chametz, and more and more. These extra stringencies are taken as indications that this is a particularly repulsive substance from which the Torah commands us to keep far away.
But this common, worn-out picture has no real basis, and the halakhic proofs adduced for it are also dubious. What emerges from the Torah, and likewise from Chazal and the halakhic authorities, regarding the prohibition of chametz is something entirely different, and in a certain sense quite the opposite. My remarks here are based on my article about chametz on Passover and the sciatic nerve (gid ha-nasheh) as historically-grounded prohibitions. There I greatly expanded on the foundation and its halakhic implications; here I will bring only the gist.
First Difficulty: The Source of the Prohibition of Deriving Benefit from Chametz
The Gemara in Pesachim 21b cites a dispute among Amoraim regarding the prohibition of deriving benefit from chametz:
Ḥizkiyah said: From where do we know that chametz on Passover is prohibited for benefit? As it is stated (Exodus 13), “Chametz shall not be eaten”—there shall be no permission for eating it. The reason is that Scripture wrote “shall not be eaten”; had it not written “shall not be eaten,” I would have thought it implies a prohibition of eating but not of benefit. And this disagrees with R. Abbahu, for R. Abbahu said: Wherever it says “it shall not be eaten,” “you shall not eat,” or “you shall not eat (pl.)”—it implies both a prohibition of eating and of benefit, [until] Scripture specifies otherwise as it did regarding a carcass (nevelah). As it was taught: (Deuteronomy 14) “You shall not eat any carcass; you may give it to the stranger within your gates and he shall eat it, or you may sell it to a foreigner,” etc.
R. Abbahu holds that if the Torah formulates a prohibition in terms of eating—such as “you shall not eat,” etc.—this includes a ban on deriving benefit as well, unless there is an explicit verse (as with a carcass, which the Torah permits giving or selling) indicating that benefit is allowed. Ḥizkiyah does not accept this and, in his view, we require an additional source to teach that something is also prohibited for benefit. Regarding chametz, he brings such a source from the passive phrasing “it shall not be eaten” (lo yei’achel), rather than “you shall not eat” (lo tokhlu) or similar. Rashi explains that from the passive wording it follows that the prohibition is that the chametz be eaten by someone, for example, a non-Jew—yet a non-Jew is certainly not prohibited in chametz. It therefore appears that the reason is that the Jew sold him the chametz and profited from its price. That is, the prohibition is on deriving benefit from chametz, not merely on eating it.
It is clear from the sugya that the dispute does not pertain only to chametz, but to all prohibitions of eating in the Torah (although from the sugya there it emerges that there are very few practical differences, because in most cases there are additional sources that equalize the opinions). In that general dispute, Rambam rules like R. Abbahu (Laws of Forbidden Foods 8:15):
Wherever the Torah says “you shall not eat,” “you shall not eat (pl.),” “it shall not be eaten,” or “they shall not eat,” it implies both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of deriving benefit, until Scripture specifies otherwise as it did regarding nevelah—“you may give it to the stranger… or sell it to the foreigner”—or unless it is clarified in the Oral Torah that benefit is permitted, such as creeping things, swarming things, blood, a limb from a live animal, and the sciatic nerve, all of which are permitted for benefit by received tradition even though they are forbidden to eat.
Yet, remarkably, at the beginning of Hilkhot Chametz u-Matzah, Rambam brings Ḥizkiyah’s view as halakhah:
1. Anyone who eats an olive-bulk (kezayit) of chametz on Passover—from the beginning of the night of the 15th until the end of the 21st of Nisan—intentionally is liable to karet, as it says (Exodus 12), “whoever eats chametz shall be cut off.” If unwitting, he must bring a fixed sin-offering. This applies whether he ate it directly or dissolved it and drank.
2. Chametz on Passover is prohibited for benefit, as it says (Exodus 13), “Chametz shall not be eaten”—there shall be no permission for eating it. One who leaves chametz in his possession on Passover, though he did not eat it, transgresses two negative commandments, as it says (Exodus 12), “No leaven shall be seen with you in all your borders,” and “Leaven shall not be found in your houses.” The prohibition of chametz and of se’or (leavening agent) with which dough is leavened are one and the same.
It is indeed a known rule that Rambam does not insist on citing the source that remained the conclusion of the sugya, but the source that seems to him more lucid and compelling (see Kesef Mishneh here on halakhah 2). But here the source of Ḥizkiyah does not seem to have any particular advantage; on the contrary, you can see above that the interpretive derivation is rather convoluted.
Second Difficulty: “Half-Measure” (Chatzi Shiur) in the Prohibition of Chametz
In Yoma 73b, R. Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish dispute the status of a half-measure—i.e., if one consumes (not necessarily eating; this is not the place) less than the requisite quantity of a prohibited item. According to Reish Lakish, he violates only a rabbinic prohibition; according to R. Yoḥanan, a Torah prohibition (though liability to punishment applies only upon consuming a full measure).
And behold, in 1:7 of Hilkhot Chametz u-Matzah, Rambam rules regarding half-measure in chametz as follows:
One who eats from the chametz itself on Passover any amount whatsoever is prohibited by Torah law, as it is stated (Exodus 13), “Chametz shall not be eaten.” Nevertheless, one incurs karet or a sacrifice only for the full measure of an olive-bulk (kezayit). One who deliberately eats less than a kezayit is lashed with disciplinary lashes (makkat mardut).
Rambam learns the prohibition of half-measure in chametz from that same verse, “lo yei’achel” (“shall not be eaten”). Here too, the commentaries have already noted that it is unclear why he needs a special source when there is a general rule that half-measure is biblically prohibited. The Kesef Mishneh leaves this in need of explanation, and the Mishneh La-Melekh cites a resolution from the Maharlanch:
Accordingly, one may wonder about our master (Rambam): Why does he need a verse for chametz on Passover? For in all prohibitions of the Torah, we hold that half-measure is biblically prohibited… Our master, the Kesef Mishneh, already raised this question and left it unresolved.
I saw that R. Maharlanch, Responsa §51, was troubled by this question and answered: The prohibition of chametz is not comparable to chelev (forbidden fat), whence half-measure is learned, because chelev is always forbidden and never had a period of permissibility, whereas chametz is permitted before Passover; therefore, a separate verse was needed to prohibit half-measure of chametz (before Passover)…
Maharlanch explains that where prohibitions are time-dependent (i.e., they have a time of permissibility—what in other contexts is called “a matter that has a permit,” davar she-yesh lo matirin), there is no rule of half-measure; hence Rambam needed a special verse for half-measure in chametz. But this is quite surprising, since the dispute of R. Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in Yoma is stated regarding the eating prohibitions of Yom Kippur—which is certainly a time-dependent prohibition.
To explain this, we must enter a bit into the relationship between the prohibition of chametz and that of se’or (leaven).
The Relationship Between the Prohibition of Chametz and the Prohibition of Se’or
At the end of halakhah 2 cited above, Rambam notes that the prohibitions of chametz and of se’or (the agent that leavens) that both appear in the Torah are one and the same prohibition. The commentaries already note that he is alluding to the sugya at the beginning of tractate Beitzah. The first Mishnah there records a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel:
Beit Shammai say: For se’or the measure is a kezayit (olive-bulk), and for chametz—the measure is like a date’s bulk (k’kotevet). Beit Hillel say: This and that are [both] a kezayit.
Simply read, the dispute concerns the prohibition of eating chametz, and the question is whether the measure for se’or in this regard is the same as or different from the measure for ordinary chametz.
The Gemara there (7b) discusses this dispute:
What is Beit Shammai’s reasoning? If so, let Scripture write only “chametz,” and not “se’or,” and I would have said: If chametz, whose leavening is not strong, is [prohibited] with a kezayit, then se’or, whose leavening is strong, all the more so [should be prohibited]! If so, why did Scripture write “se’or”? To tell you that the measure of this is not the measure of that.
Beit Shammai reason that if the verse had written “chametz” and not “se’or,” we would learn se’or by a fortiori reasoning, since its leavening is harsher than regular chametz. From this they conclude that the appearance of the word “se’or” must teach that the measures differ between chametz and se’or. Why is chametz then a date-bulk and se’or a kezayit, and not the reverse? Apparently because, according to Beit Shammai’s logic, se’or is the more severe prohibition (its leavening is harsher, as the Gemara itself states), so a smaller measure suffices to incur liability for eating it.
Beit Shammai’s words are very puzzling, for se’or is so leavened that it is not fit even for a dog’s consumption (see, for example, the Tosefta brought by the Ra’avad at the beginning of the chapter cited). If so, the very fact that its leavening is harsh is a reason that there should be no prohibition of eating or benefit (as with all items prohibited for benefit in the Torah, which are not prohibited if consumed in an unusual manner or when not edible). Yet Beit Shammai see this as a reason for greater stringency (over regular chametz). Note as well that with the prohibition of chametz, the general halakhic rule applies that if the item is not edible there is no prohibition (see regarding moldy bread in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 442:2).
What do Beit Hillel answer? The Gemara states:
And Beit Hillel: [Both terms are] needed. For if the Torah had written only “se’or,” I would have said: Because its leavening is strong [it alone is prohibited]; but chametz, whose leavening is not strong—say it is not [prohibited]. Therefore “chametz” was necessary. And had the Torah written only “chametz,” I would have said: Because it is edible [it is prohibited]; but se’or, which is not edible—say it is not [prohibited]. Therefore “se’or” was necessary.
Beit Hillel dispute Beit Shammai and argue that there is a refutation to their a fortiori argument from chametz to se’or, because se’or is not edible. Seemingly they accept the very logic I raised above. Thus, in their view, had the Torah not written the prohibition of se’or, I would have thought that only chametz is prohibited to eat, whereas se’or is not, since it is not edible. And still, Beit Shammai’s reasoning requires explanation.
On a second look, we can see that even Beit Hillel do not wholly disagree with this logic. For they add in their “both are needed” that if the verse had written only “se’or,” I would not have known the prohibition of chametz, because se’or’s leavening is strong and perhaps only it is prohibited. That is, they too accept Beit Shammai’s odd a fortiori, except that in their view there is also an inverse relation between chametz and se’or, hence the dual necessity. The upshot is that what we noted about Beit Shammai is equally difficult regarding Beit Hillel: How can one make an a fortiori from chametz to se’or when se’or is not edible?
Note that once the Torah has written that se’or is prohibited, this is not such a difficulty—for that is precisely what is being taught (though there remains to ask why specifically here the Torah innovates a prohibition regarding something inedible). But the Gemara here shows that according to Beit Shammai and on one side of Beit Hillel, the word “se’or” would have been superfluous, since we would have learned it by a fortiori reasoning from chametz even had it not been written. That is indeed very difficult.
For completeness I note that later in the sugya the Gemara understands that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel pertains to bal yera’eh (it shall not be seen) and not to the prohibition of eating and benefit—but that is for a side reason. The questions—how can there be a prohibition of eating/benefit in se’or that is inedible, and why it is more stringent than chametz—do not trouble the Gemara.[1]
The Essence of the Prohibition of Chametz
We have seen that for prohibitions of eating, items that are inedible are not subject to the prohibition. The Gemara explains that such consumption is considered “not in the normal manner of enjoyment.” If, in the case of chametz, the Gemara assumes that se’or would be even more prohibited because its leavening is stronger—and is unbothered by the fact that it is not edible—the implication is that the essence of the prohibition of eating chametz is not about deriving enjoyment from eating chametz. Therefore it does not trouble the Gemara that eating se’or is not the normal manner of enjoyment. What, then, is it? It emerges that the Gemara understands the essence of the prohibition of chametz not as distancing from some loathsome substance (as with other prohibitions of eating/benefit), but as a prohibition on the act of eating chametz as a remembrance of what happened at the Exodus. My claim is that the prohibition of eating chametz—like the story of the Exodus—is a reenactment of what was. It is a historically-grounded prohibition. Just as our ancestors did not eat chametz, so too we are not to eat chametz. Note that the import is that chametz is not intrinsically loathsome. This is not a prohibition on the object (issur ḥeftza) but a prohibition on the act of eating (issur gavra).
If this is the essence of the prohibition, we can now understand why the Torah forbids se’or even though it is inedible. Se’or is certainly chametz. In fact, it is “more chametz” than regular chametz, since its leavening is stronger. When a person eats se’or, he performs the act of eating upon chametz; therefore it is prohibited. The Gemara is untroubled that there is no enjoyment here, since the essence of the ban is not enjoyment from eating chametz but the act of eating performed upon an object that is chametz—and se’or, as noted, is very much chametz. In contrast, moldy bread is not considered chametz at all, and for that there is indeed no prohibition of eating/benefit. Se’or is inedible because of its intense leavening and is used to leaven other doughs; therefore it clearly falls under the category of chametz.
Note that Beitzah says we would know this even without the Torah explicitly prohibiting se’or. That is, this very essence of the prohibition of chametz is clear even prior to the explicit mention of se’or. It follows from the Torah’s own presentation, which forbids chametz because our ancestors’ dough did not have time to leaven. Had our ancestors eaten chametz and not matzah, the Torah would have prohibited matzah for us and required us to eat chametz. There is nothing inherently loathsome or special about chametz per se.
Resolving Rambam: The Relationship Between the Prohibitions of Eating and Benefit in Chametz
We saw above that Rambam rules like R. Abbahu that any prohibition of eating also entails a ban on deriving benefit (unless the Torah permits benefit, as with nevelah). Why, in fact, is that so? Rambam offers an original explanation. In Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Negative Commandment 187, he writes:
Know, O questioner, that the prohibition of deriving benefit is not to be counted as a separate commandment, because it and the prohibition of eating are one matter: eating is a species of benefit. When He, may He be exalted, says regarding something that “it shall not be eaten,” that is one of the forms of speaking about benefit; the intent is that one may not benefit from it—neither by eating nor otherwise. This is what they of blessed memory said (Pesachim 21b and elsewhere): “Wherever it says ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘you shall not eat (pl.),’ ‘it shall not be eaten’—it implies both a prohibition of eating and of benefit—until Scripture specifies otherwise as it did regarding nevelah,” where it clarified the permissibility of utility, as it says (Deut. 14), “You may give it to the stranger…,” etc. According to this principle, it is improper to count the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit as two commandments.
He explains that when the Torah forbids something in terms of eating, its intent is actually to forbid benefit, but it chooses the example of eating because eating is the most common form of benefit. The Torah speaks by way of examples—as with damages: the Torah obligates a person to pay if his ox causes damage, and we understand that this is only an example that extends to any damaging property, and so on.
These words of Rambam sharpen the fact that in ordinary food prohibitions the Torah expects us to distance ourselves from the item and derive no benefit from it whatsoever. The thing itself is loathsome in its eyes, and therefore we must keep away from it in all respects. By contrast, with chametz—as we have seen— the essence of the prohibition is not the loathsomeness of chametz but the obligation to remember what transpired in the Exodus. Therefore, in the prohibition there the Torah forbids the act of eating, not “benefit via eating.” From here you can understand why, in the case of chametz, a ban on eating does not automatically entail a ban on benefit: Rambam’s logic does not apply there. Hence it is clear why Rambam requires a special source to prohibit deriving benefit from chametz, and does not learn it from the mere fact that eating is prohibited.[2]
Once an additional source is brought, it turns out that the Torah does prohibit chametz for benefit as well. Evidently, that source teaches us that just as there is a prohibition to eat chametz because our ancestors did not eat chametz, so too there is a prohibition to derive benefit from chametz because our ancestors did not derive benefit from chametz. The prohibition of benefit, like that of eating, is a remembrance of the Exodus.
Resolving Rambam: Half-Measure in Chametz
From here we can also understand why Rambam needed a special source to prohibit half-measure in chametz. According to most opinions, the rule of half-measure applies to “object-prohibitions” (issurei ḥeftza). Regarding “act-prohibitions” (issurei gavra)—such as carrying or transferring on Shabbat—there is no rule of half-measure (there are several explanations; this is not the place. See for example here). Hence, if the prohibition of chametz is not an object-prohibition but an act-prohibition—i.e., a ban on the act of eating—then the rule of half-measure would not apply.
This also sheds light on Maharlanch’s position cited above. He claimed there is no rule of half-measure in time-dependent prohibitions. Simply read, his intent appears to be that time-dependent prohibitions are issurei gavra (see Etvan De’oraita §10), and therefore they do not have half-measure. But as I noted, taken at face value this cannot be said, for the sugya of half-measure and the dispute of R. Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish concern the eating prohibitions of Yom Kippur, which are also time-dependent and thus (apparently) issurei gavra. According to our approach here we may suggest that this does not apply to every issur gavra. Specifically with chametz, the prohibition is historical—a remembrance of the Exodus—so there it is inappropriate to prohibit half-measure, since the chametz itself is not a loathsome object. But on Yom Kippur we are commanded to distance ourselves from the enjoyments of eating and drinking; therefore, although the prohibition is time-dependent, there the object is deemed “loathsome” (for that day), and thus the rule of half-measure applies there as well.[3]
Alternatively, one can employ here the view of several later authorities who hold that the rule of half-measure applies only to eating prohibitions (see the article cited), whereas the prohibition of chametz is not defined as a “food prohibition” but as a prohibition on the act of eating.
In my article I explained thus as well the words of the Pri Megadim, who wrote that there is no rule of half-measure regarding the sciatic nerve (gid ha-nasheh). The sciatic nerve is also a prohibition grounded in remembrance of a historical event (Jacob’s struggle with the angel); therefore, there too the prohibition is on the act of eating and not on the object (the sciatic nerve is not intrinsically loathsome).[4] To remember Jacob’s struggle with the angel, we were prohibited from eating the sciatic nerve—not because there is something repulsive in it. Consequently, there is no rule of half-measure there either.[5]
Summary
The conclusion from our discussion is that the prohibitions of eating and benefiting from chametz are not based on chametz being something loathsome, but are part of the remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt. One might support this by noting that if it were loathsome, there would be reason to avoid it all year and not only on Passover. But one cannot state this universally, since regarding eating on Yom Kippur we raised the possibility that although it is a temporary prohibition, the object is deemed loathsome for that day (though there is much room to distinguish between these two prohibitions). In any case, this conclusion emerges from the halakhic picture described here, and first and foremost from the plain sense of the Torah. In my article cited above I brought additional indications.
We also find this explicitly in the Passover Haggadah:[6]
This matzah that we eat—what is it for? Because the dough of our ancestors did not have time to leaven before the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He, revealed Himself to them and redeemed them, as it is said: “And they baked the dough that they brought out of Egypt into matzah cakes, for it had not leavened, for they were driven out of Egypt and could not tarry” (Exodus 12:39)…
The proofs I mentioned at the beginning from the extra stringencies that halakhah set regarding chametz are not proofs either. The Torah sternly warns us to be careful regarding the act of eating or deriving benefit from chametz, not about distancing ourselves from the object itself. The added safeguards were instituted to prevent the act of eating, not interaction with the chametz per se. Note that for a kezayit there is the prohibition of “bal yera’eh u-bal yimatzeh,” as well as the obligation of “tashbitu.” But for less than a kezayit—i.e., chasing crumbs—the early authorities already wrote that this is only so that one not come to eat it (since one does not disengage from it during the rest of the year). That is, in the extra stringencies mentioned, the focus is distancing from the act of eating, not from chametz as such. Likewise, the obligation to destroy the chametz (after having nullified it) is only so that one not come to eat it.
Returning to the various homilies that treat chametz as something loathsome from which to distance oneself, I will say what I say about aggadic derashot in general: It is certainly proper to search our ways and examine ourselves, and to refine our character and divine service—but this has no connection whatsoever to the prohibition of chametz. This is precisely what is called “derush” (see in Column 52 on the difference between derush and pilpul). The value of such derashot is chiefly to serve as vortlach for sheva berakhot and festive meals (and one should immediately take care to forget them); if they are written, there is of course the important use of placing them under a wobbly table leg.
A happy and kosher holiday to us all.
[1] In the Shulchan Aruch cited (O.C. 442:2) he writes that for moldy bread unfit even for a dog, there is also no prohibition of bal yera’eh, and one is not obligated to destroy it. But with se’or there is certainly a prohibition of eating and benefit, and also an obligation to destroy it.
[2] In the Gemara in Pesachim, the dispute of R. Abbahu and Ḥizkiyah also pertains to chametz, but it can be shown that Rambam does not rule in accordance with that sugya throughout (there are a number of rulings concluded in that sugya that Rambam does not bring as halakhah. My contention is that the same holds for the dispute of R. Abbahu and Ḥizkiyah: Rambam rules like R. Abbahu, but the sugya in Pesachim thought their dispute applies also to chametz—and Rambam does not rule like it there. Perhaps the basis is the sugya in Beitzah that we saw, which takes a different view, and Rambam assumes there is a conflict of sugyot. See at length in my Pesachim lectures, classes 10–22.)
[3] One may discuss whether the eating prohibition on Yom Kippur is a temporary object-prohibition, or perhaps an act-prohibition (per Etvan De’oraita that temporary prohibitions are always issurei gavra). But since we are commanded to distance ourselves from a loathsome “object” (for that day), we treat it like object-prohibitions for this purpose.
One can also consider whether Maharlanch’s words can be interpreted along the lines I wrote here, even though he stated them generally about time-dependent prohibitions; in any case, the Yom Kippur prohibitions are difficult for him. If we assume the eating prohibitions on Yom Kippur are object-prohibitions, it is easier to explain them as I have suggested.
[4] This is the exact reverse of Yom Kippur (a temporary object-prohibition), for here it is a historical prohibition without a later permit. This sharpens my claim that the main point does not hinge on ḥeftza versus gavra, but on whether the ban concerns a loathsome object or an act (against a historical backdrop).
[5] See there also the apparent contradiction with the conclusion of the sugya in Pesachim; this is an additional support for my claim that Rambam rejected that sugya as halakhah.
[6] But see at the beginning of the article here for his discussion of Ramban’s words.
Discussion
Really? Very interesting. I didn’t know that. Is this accepted? Is there a source?
Hello Rabbi,
What is the idea behind chametz that remained over Pesach, according to your explanation here?
It is only a rabbinic prohibition, and its purpose is to make sure we do not keep chametz with us during Pesach itself.
Who invented bread? Well, nobody really knows, but it is known that at a very early stage in human development, people discovered the various kinds of grain — wheat and barley — which then grew in the wild as wild plants. They also found that these could be used for food, and so they tried, and succeeded, in domesticating them — that is, propagating them artificially by sowing.
The next stage on the way to creating bread was drying the grain kernels in the sun and grinding them by crushing them between stones. Grinding the kernels produced (and still produces today) flour. After that, the flour was mixed with water and a dough was formed, worked into various flat shapes, baked, and thus created the first breads in human history, which were flat and thin.
The ancient Egyptians were in fact the first to discover how to make wheat-flour dough rise (wheat being abundant along the banks of the Nile) and from it make bread in shapes and textures different from those known until then. The Egyptians did not understand how the dough rose and bubbles formed in it, but they understood that mixing a bit of old dough into new dough helped this happen. They may not have known it, but the Egyptians were the ones who discovered “se’or,” or “sourdough starter.” Se’or is a breeding ground for yeast, which is a kind of single-celled organism belonging to the fungus family, and they are found in the air around us and on grape skins.
Much appreciated.
BS”D 10 Nisan 5782
To R. M. A. — greetings,
On leavened bread as a characteristic of Egypt, see the article by Prof. Zohar Amar, “We Don’t Eat Egyptian Bread,” on the Mוסף שבת — Makor Rishon website.
With blessings, Hillel Feiner-Gluskinos
Egypt symbolizes in Scripture unbounded hedonism — “like the practice of the land of Egypt” — and the arrogance of “the great dragon lying in the midst of his rivers, who says: ‘My river is mine, and I made myself.’” Egypt was the source of horses, and that is why the Torah forbade multiplying horses, lest one return to Egypt.
Hedonism and pride are characteristics of a developed civilization. The Torah does not see asceticism as an ideal. On the contrary, it sends the people of Israel to “a land flowing with milk and honey,” where God gives a person “the power to gain wealth.” But enjoyment and the refinement of life must be in proper measure — not boundless permissiveness and not inflated pride.
Thus an Israelite king must sanctify himself even in what is permitted to him: not to multiply wives, not to multiply horses, and not silver and gold; and he must beware lest his heart be lifted above his brethren. Likewise, the Torah permits chametz all year and even commands its use in sacred service, in the thanksgiving offering and the festival offering of Shavuot; but it all begins with seven days of abstaining from chametz, so that we do not become addicted to it.
The days of the Festival of Freedom mark for us, for the whole year, a cautious and thoughtful use of chametz. The “leaven in the dough” will stir us to action and development that contain the repair of the world and its settlement, but we will be careful not to slide into permissiveness and hubris without bounds.
Does this essentially mean that if a person enters a hospital and there is chametz there that belongs to someone else, he is not violating any prohibition of “it shall not be seen”?
Absolutely not. You are allowed to walk in the street even if there is a concern that you may come to eat chametz. Just watch yourself so that this does not happen.
There is a similar idea to the Rabbi’s words (regarding Rambam’s view) elsewhere. There is an initial assumption that the prohibition of selecting on Shabbat does not apply to less than the minimum measure (Shabbat 74a), and Maharal explains there on the spot (not like Tosafot) that the initial assumption is because less than the minimum measure is not considered selecting at all.
There are many examples, and many have noted this. One explanation is that in a partial act, this is not the same act in a smaller quantity, but something else. Not always convincing. In lifting and placing down at the beginning of Shabbat (the Rosh and the Sefat Emet), it seems very correct.
Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun explains the matter of chametz and matzah through a fairly straightforward reading of the verses.
https://www.herzog.ac.il/vtc/0034201.html
You cited Maharalbach that one cannot learn half a measure for chametz from forbidden fat, because one can refute it by saying: what is unique about chametz? It had a time when it was permitted. And you challenged him from the fact that half a measure is prohibited on Yom Kippur without a special verse, even though it too depends on time. Perhaps Maharalbach did not mean the time aspect, but the fermentation aspect — that nothing is chametz from its very creation, but rather fermentation happened to it and rendered it forbidden; and fermentation is like the mixture in meat and milk (a search shows that the Gemara in Pesachim 25 says that meat and milk and chametz had a period of fitness, unlike orlah), and something forbidden because of an event that happened to it is somehow lighter than something forbidden from its very creation, and this is not a matter of time.
I was mistaken. In Maharalbach’s responsum in the Machon Keren Re’em edition (Otzar HaChochma), siman 18, he wrote (as the Mishneh LaMelech quoted in the Tur) that the reason is that chametz was permitted before Pesach, not as I had thought to suggest, that chametz was permitted before it fermented.
Still, the matter remains open for discussion, because it seems quite clear that Maharalbach took this refutation from the Gemara in Pesachim 25 mentioned above, which says that chametz on Pesach had a period of fitness like meat and milk. And seemingly there is no necessity to explain the Gemara there as Maharalbach did — that chametz had a period of fitness before Pesach — rather, it could be explained as having had a period of fitness before it fermented. [And as for half a measure in meat and milk, where presumably at least with eating there is indeed a regular prohibition even for half a measure, even though according to this interpretation it had a period of fitness, one could devise that from now on chametz on Pesach will prove that even though it had a period of fitness, it is nevertheless prohibited.]
Chametz, in relation to matzah, expresses the value of human industriousness. Leavened bread is more worked-on and therefore tastier. It is the fruit of labor.
Just as labor is fitting on weekdays, on which we are commanded “you shall do labor,” yet it requires one cessation each week to remind us of our Maker, who gives us “the power to gain wealth.”
So too leavened bread is pleasant and excellent all year long, as long as we have times and places of refraining from chametz — the days of Pesach and the Festival of Matzot, and the meal-offerings in the Temple — in which we refrain from eating chametz and eat “the bread of affliction,” which reminds us that “all our works too You have wrought for us,” and however much we act and do — we are dependent on God’s help.
The impression of those times of refraining from chametz will accompany us all year, to remember how dependent we are on God’s kindness.
With blessings, Hillel Feiner-Gluskinos
You objected that the Gemara accepts that se’or is prohibited (by an a fortiori argument from chametz) even though it is unfit for eating, while Rambam required special derivations for half a measure and for benefit, even though these are general laws in all eating prohibitions. And you explained that chametz is a special prohibition because of historical memory and is defined as a prohibition on the act of eating, and therefore: (a) it does not depend on being fit to eat in the normal manner of deriving benefit; (b) since it is not due to repulsiveness, it is not obvious that benefit should be prohibited, and a special verse is needed that benefit too is included in the memory, just as it was withheld from our ancestors; (c) since it is a prohibition on an act, there is no general half-measure rule in it, but rather a special novelty in the act-prohibition of chametz that half a measure does apply for some reason.
A. In the end, everything stands on the Gemara in Beitzah, where there is a possibility of learning se’or from chametz even though se’or is unfit for eating. From here you generated the central idea that the prohibition of chametz is not inherently an eating prohibition, and from that Rambam learned, against the sugya in Pesachim that you cited in note 2 (where Rabbi Yosei HaGelili permits deriving benefit from chametz even though it says “it shall not be eaten,” which is difficult for Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu, and the Gemara did not answer that Rabbi Abbahu’s general rule simply does not apply to chametz because it is a special prohibition), but rather that chametz is a special category, and its definition plus the reason for the verse is that it is a prohibition on an act due to historical memory; therefore special derivations are needed in it for half a measure and for the prohibition of benefit, and Rambam in his Mishneh Torah went and found such derivations.
And this rests on your interpreting the Gemara in Beitzah to mean that the Gemara’s words according to Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel regarding se’or and chametz are valid even without Rabbi Zeira’s exposition that there is an eating prohibition regarding se’or — “this is se’or, this is chametz” — and that this exposition, brought later in the sugya (according to the view that there is earlier and later in the Gemara), is only a ‘side reason’ for shifting the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel to the prohibition of bal yera’eh alone.
Is this interpretation of the Gemara in Beitzah an answer about Rambam (what made him invent derivations regarding half a measure and benefit in chametz, seemingly against the sugya in Pesachim), or does it seem to you correct in its own right? I will discuss it on the assumption that it is correct in its own right, because at the very least, according to you Rambam must think that this interpretation is correct in its own right.
The alternative explanation (which seems very simple to me) is that a prohibition of eating se’or always requires a special verse, since it is unfit for eating, and there is no possibility at all of learning a prohibition of eating se’or from chametz, because certainly the a fortiori argument is refutable, as you found very difficult. Rather, only with regard to bal yera’eh did Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel dispute: once se’or is prohibited for eating, and chametz is prohibited both for eating and for bal yera’eh, is there then an a fortiori argument that se’or is prohibited for bal yera’eh (Beit Shammai), or can one still refute it by saying: what is unique about se’or? It is unfit for eating, and perhaps therefore there is no bal yera’eh in it even though it is prohibited for eating (Beit Hillel — perhaps there is less concern that one might eat it by mistake).
Accordingly, it is obvious that moldy bread is permitted for eating even according to Beit Shammai, and they do not learn it from chametz. (According to your interpretation, that they are not interested in the detail of being fit to eat in the normal manner of benefit because the prohibition of chametz is a prohibition on the act of eating and not a prohibition of eating, then why do Beit Shammai not learn moldy bread from se’or? And you explained that se’or, since it causes fermentation, bears the name chametz and the name of its ancestors even though it is unfit for eating, and this is a simple rationale for both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.) Thus this also fits the sugya in Pesachim, which did not even entertain the notion that chametz is an exception to Rabbi Abbahu’s rule (though certainly it is not an exception to Chizkiyah’s derivation, since the Torah used regarding chametz a special passive formulation. Still, the very proof from Pesachim against Beitzah [on your interpretation] can seemingly be rejected, since the question there from Rabbi Yosei HaGelili is only against Chizkiyah and not against Rabbi Abbahu.)
And “only” the difficulties in Rambam remain — that he brought sources of his own — and your rejections of the straightforward answers, that he simply brought a source that seemed more convenient to him since there is apparently no practical difference, are not solid enough to build such a great Roman structure upon them.
B. Is it not very surprising that chametz is a special prohibition unlike all other prohibitions, and yet by a miraculous coincidence all its laws are identical to all eating prohibitions — that what is unfit to eat is permitted, that half a measure is forbidden, that benefit is forbidden — and only se’or has a special prohibition (which in any case you explained on a different basis, something like color, though that comparison is itself seemingly open to discussion). It is nice that there are derivations, and you explained that they still fit even when the main point is historical memory [benefit too was not available to our ancestors; and what is unfit to eat “does not bear the name chametz,” and there is not even any historical memory in it; and half a measure is a special novelty, that even though this is an act-prohibition it is still forbidden, and the reason is unknown and still needs clarification why one does not learn from chametz half a measure in other act-prohibitions]. But it is still a rather astonishing phenomenon to see something whose laws in every respect are like all the others, that quacks like a duck and is eaten in orange sauce like a duck, and yet to say that in truth it is a rooster, and the rooster is crowing from within it.
I would like to clarify whether the Rabbi wrote the article before Silman’s resignation from the government because of the affair of bringing chametz into hospitals; because right now chametz is surely repulsive even to a sheigetz like Minister Horowitz, and perhaps not only on Pesach, in a traumatic way.
(Please take into account that the Hasidim will tell future generations “Hasidic tales” about a rabbi who treated lightly the definition of the “prohibition of chametz,” and in the end came to be lax regarding the “prohibition of kitniyot.”)
[As for what you wrote, that Egypt symbolizes hedonism and arrogance — I will play talebearer and reveal your meaning: Egypt is called “Rahav” in Tanakh in several places, and in Isaiah 30:7: “Egypt’s help is vain and empty; therefore I called this one ‘Rahav — they sit still.’”]
The Radbaz is not a mere lightweight.
BS”D 11 Nisan 5782
To T”G — greetings,
More power to you for pointing out Egypt’s designation as “Rahav” in Scripture. Indeed, that is what I meant.
With blessings for a kosher and joyous Pesach, HFG
The cultivation of humility also finds expression in the story of the Exodus surrounding the “declaration over the first fruits,” in which the farmer presents the fruit of his labor and “recalls forgotten things” — that his ancestors were strangers and slaves, persecuted and oppressed, and therefore in times of success he must recognize the goodness of his Creator and recount His praises.
Is there an ideological connection between chametz/se’or of Pesach and the prohibition of offering it on the altar?
I have seen all sorts of fragments of ideas about idolatry and what was raised here in the comments — arrogance, etc. It is not really clear, this prohibition and its reason, and it is a bit strange to have a prohibition of chametz in two different contexts, as well as the prohibition of honey.
BS”D 11 Nisan 5782
To Pure Offering — greetings,
Maharal says that matzah is “bread of affliction” because of the quality of simplicity, of lack of complexity. Matzah contains no added flavoring ingredients and no processing that adds flavor, but only flour and water. So too is freedom, in which a person is not dependent on others, but is independent and lives with what he has.
In the service of God in the Temple too there is an emphasis on simplicity. There is much splendor and beauty in the Temple, yet the priest serves in simple white garments. Only the High Priest, who represents the entire people, is dressed magnificently; but at the height of his service on Yom Kippur, when he enters the innermost sanctum to seek mercy and atonement, he is dressed in simple white garments.
So too, the meal-offerings brought up to the altar do not include chametz, whose taste is superior, nor the sweetness of honey, but rather fine flour and oil. This teaches us that God has no need of “flavoring ingredients,” but of the simplicity and humility of the person who approaches Him; and precisely his modest offering is acceptable before God, as it is written, “When a soul brings an offering.” The simple sacrifice expresses the quality of “walking humbly with your God,” which God demands of man.
With blessings, Hillel Feiner-Gluskinos
And perhaps the importance of simplicity is also connected to the halakhah that “one does not conclude after the Pesach offering with afikoman,” and on the Seder night the tasty sweets should not overshadow the main point. And perhaps this is why they hint to the wise son, “one does not conclude after the Pesach offering with afikoman,” that he should not take over the family discussion with his brilliant insights and deep analyses, because on this night the goal is to strengthen and internalize the simple foundations of faith.
A. Not everything stands on the Gemara in Beitzah. I wrote that it may perhaps serve as a basis for Rambam’s decision to reject the sugya in Pesachim from practical halakhah. I brought several reasons for my understanding of the prohibition of chametz, including the Torah and rabbinic statements. Therefore there is also no room for proofs from the sugya in Pesachim, since my claim is that according to Rambam it was rejected from practical halakhah. There are many more proofs for this that were not presented here.
You completely ignore the Gemara in Beitzah, which bases this on the eating prohibition. Only in the conclusion does it move to bal yera’eh, and not for that reason. And even with bal yera’eh, it is strange to say this, since plainly it is stated about chametz that is prohibited for eating — certainly according to the views of the Rishonim that it is a Torah-level safeguard for eating.
B. Its laws are not completely identical. There are stringencies regarding se’or, nullification in even the slightest amount, the obligation of destruction, bal yera’eh, and more and more. But as a rule, halakhah follows fixed tracks as much as possible, and that is the way of every normative system.
See the article by Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun that Chayota linked above.
A. Granted, I focused on halakhic arguments as distinct from ‘the Torah’ and rabbinic statements. ‘Rejecting the sugya in Pesachim’ (that is, also the incidental assumptions embedded in it, such as the assumption that the statements of Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu are relevant even with regard to chametz) is not enough to innovate the idea that chametz is a special law in its definition, requiring special derivations for half a measure and for the prohibition of benefit. Therefore, as far as I understand, the halakhic legs supporting the novelty are only the Gemara in Beitzah, which on your interpretation allows one to learn the prohibition of eating se’or from the prohibition of eating chametz by an a fortiori argument even though se’or is unfit for eating — which is a very puzzling thing, as you wrote — and from here follows that eating chametz is a special matter, etc.
[I have nothing to add, but I will write my opinion at length in order to remove from myself the complaint that I ignored the Gemara in Beitzah.]
I say that the Gemara’s give-and-take in explaining the derivations of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel is indeed correct only according to the conclusion (and in accordance with the baraita) that they were dealing with bal yera’eh. But according to the initial assumption, which supposedly thought that the dispute also concerned eating, the derivation from chametz to se’or is not correct at all, because se’or is unfit for eating.
The Gemara asked regarding Beit Shammai: after all, there is a derivation that se’or and chametz are equal, and in particular equal in minimum measure. It answered that the derivation concerns the minimum measure for eating (and from that derivation they apparently also derive the basic prohibition of eating se’or), and it is indeed equal. But Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel were not dealing with eating at all; they were dealing with bal yera’eh, and therefore Beit Shammai do not regard the fact that se’or is unfit for eating as a relevant refutation of their a fortiori argument, since in any case it is prohibited for eating. [Beit Hillel do regard it as a relevant refutation, and I tried above to define briefly the point of dispute in accordance with what you wrote about the views of the Rishonim that this is a Torah safeguard for eating. In any event, this way the words of Beit Shammai are not puzzling at all.]
And on what basis did you reject this interpretation in the column (which was presented only incidentally “to complete the picture”)? On the basis of the order of parts of the sugya in the Gemara — that in the initial assumption that the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerned eating, it silently accepted Beit Shammai’s derivation from chametz to se’or. And on the strength of that tiny difficulty you wrote that I completely ignore the Gemara in Beitzah.
Aside from the fact that it can easily be resolved — granted, the Gemara could have asked this about Beit Shammai’s derivation, but preferred a more important question about the very law of Beit Shammai, namely, how can they distinguish between chametz and se’or when there is a derivation that they are equal, and it explained that the derivation concerns only eating, whereas the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerned removal, and thus the question the Gemara chose not to ask also disappears — furthermore, in general the order between parts of the sugya (as distinct from the order within the same part) does not seem binding to me, since the question from Rabbi Zeira’s statement concerns the very words of Beit Shammai and does not relate to the Gemara’s previous give-and-take. Perhaps the question from Rabbi Zeira (and the support from the baraita) preceded by a long time the give-and-take about the reasoning of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.
And on the other hand, your interpretation has against it the enormous difficulty that you yourself presented in the column — that the words of Beit Shammai (and also the words of Beit Hillel) are “very puzzling,” etc. That itself is the greatest of the proofs that they are not dealing at all with the eating prohibition, and the solution comes only with a serious revolution. Still, I have not added anything of substance.
B. Thank you. Incidentally, I am now entertaining the simple thought that perhaps the prohibition of bal yera’eh is the main root of the idea from Hazal onward that chametz is so disgraceful. From the standpoint of historical memory, what is the meaning of this special prohibition of not letting chametz be seen?
I do not understand what you answered, nor what the difficulty is in my words. After all, what I wrote is difficult in the words of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel — you resolved neatly according to my own principle. So what room is there to object to my interpretation on the grounds that it is difficult? And what did you answer to the proof from the first part of the sugya, which does not fit your words at all? You answered nothing. So to call your proposal the simple interpretation of the sugya?! I am astonished! At most you can suggest, as Tosafot sometimes write, that they indeed could have asked that too, but since in any case it is rejected they did not bother to do so. But that is of course a great stretch. Add to this all the proofs from Rambam, and you will see that my words are the simple and clear interpretation of the sugya.
B. I do not see why historical memory would not fit the stringency of bal yera’eh and the other stringencies on Pesach. Why should an ordinary eating prohibition justify them, while a historical prohibition would not? On the contrary: in eating prohibitions there are ordinary parameters, and if here it is exceptional, then that supports my claim that this is not an ordinary eating prohibition.
A. I am equipped only with flesh-and-blood eyes, and with them I do not see a difficulty (at most a slight textual irritation, and the price that ‘you’ pay to remove it is far greater than its value). I will try to look in the commentators to see treatments of the matter (how they explained the great wonder that, according to your interpretation, in the initial assumption Beit Shammai learn the prohibition of eating se’or by an a fortiori argument from chametz even though se’or is unfit for eating, and what Beit Hillel disagreed with them about).
B. Right.
In the Otzar commentators they brought the Pri Megadim in Rosh Yosef on Beitzah there, https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=15206&st=&pgnum=57&hilite=, who writes that the refutation that se’or is unfit for eating is relevant only to the law of bal yera’eh:
“‘And Beit Hillel need [it], etc.’ At first glance, the reason for their dispute appears to be: according to Beit Shammai, with regard to being seen, this is not a refutation that it is fit for eating; certainly with regard to eating one needs to write ‘any leavening matter’ and ‘shall be cut off,’ lest you say that what is unfit for eating is not like what is fit. But Beit Hillel hold that the main reason the Torah prohibited bal yera’eh is as a distancing measure, so that one not come to eat […]; and if so, with se’or, which is unfit for eating, there is no need to decree lest one come to eat.”
Incidentally, later there he writes (I quote his language in order to discuss it a bit): “And if it is difficult, what practical difference is there [in the minimum amount, whether an olive-bulk or a date-bulk], since there is no flogging and half a measure is prohibited? Therefore one can say that ‘fit to combine to an olive-bulk within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf’ does not apply. (See what I wrote in my Pri to Yoreh De’ah.)” End quote.
This difficulty concerns the prohibition of bal yera’eh, regarding which there are views that one is not flogged, and not the prohibition of eating chametz, for which one is certainly flogged. And as to why there is no half-measure here, one can seemingly interpret the Pri Megadim’s intent in two ways.
Option A: In bal yera’eh there is no law of half a measure because it is not really an eating prohibition, and therefore “fit to combine to an olive-bulk within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf” was not said regarding it. That is, he understands “fit to combine” as a cause and not as a sign.
Option B (which seems correct): In bal yera’eh of se’or, and in eating se’or, there is no “fit to combine,” since it is unfit for eating; and his intent is to what he wrote on the sciatic nerve that you briefly cited in the column (I have not seen it inside), that for things unfit for eating, “fit to combine” does not apply. [And now your words would come and explain why specifically in these two cases there are eating prohibitions even on things generally unfit for eating — because these are due to historical memory.]
Thanks to those who answered, and to Chayota for the article.
Beautiful and clarifying.
Happy holiday.
And perhaps the additional elusive meaning of honey — “Have you found honey? Eat only what you need…” — is also connected to the end of the process proposed in the article.
For the end is not really the end.
In contrast to the Pri Megadim, who as stated interpreted the first part of the sugya (regarding the derivations from chametz to se’or) only according to the conclusion of the second part of the sugya (that the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerns only the prohibition of bal yera’eh), I saw in the Otzar commentators that the Shitah Mekubetzet does indeed interpret it as the column said: the first part of the sugya also proceeds according to the initial assumption in the second part of the sugya (that the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel also concerns the prohibition of eating chametz).
https://mefo.otzar.org/#/t/143409.92281982023/b/173923/p/19/s/638129
BS”D 13 Nisan 5782
If chametz is the ‘Egyptian bread’ symbolizing the culture of hedonism and arrogance of Egypt, then Egypt was praised for the ‘good of Egypt’ that Pharaoh sent to Jacob to entice him to go down to Egypt. “The good of Egypt” was explained by Hazal as “split fava beans.”
If so, one may find a deep meaning in abstaining from kitniyot on the Festival of Freedom, beyond the reasons explained in the words of the halakhic authorities: on the festival of the ‘Exodus from Egypt’ we abstain from those same “split fava beans” that represent the ‘good of Egypt’ which drew our ancestors down there.
With blessings for a kosher and joyful holiday, HFG
The sciatic nerve is prohibited as a remembrance of a historical event. And from here, as with chametz, the object itself is not repulsive; rather one must distance oneself from the act of eating it. And from here, as with chametz, the Torah should have had to teach us from an additional source the prohibition of deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve. So why did Rambam include it among the other prohibitions of benefit, whose basis is the intrinsic repulsiveness of the object rather than distancing oneself from it?
As far as I remember, according to Rambam there is no prohibition of benefit regarding the sciatic nerve.
Ah right, right — my mistake, sorry.
In your opinion, is the prohibition of eating chametz as you explained it (a historical basis) the parallel negative commandment to the positive commandment of eating matzah (like the mitzvah of a parapet, which has a parallel positive and negative commandment)?
There is a similarity. See the series of columns on positive and negative commandments where I discussed this.
If it really is only a historical prohibition and does not stand on its own, then why were they themselves commanded to eat only matzot for seven days? Why were the prohibition of eating chametz and the commandment to eat matzot given even before the Exodus from Egypt altogether — together with the command to offer the lamb, at the beginning of the month?
We also say about Shabbat that it is a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt; does that mean it does not stand on its own?
That is a question not connected to me. I did not invent that matzah is because of the Exodus from Egypt. Without getting into God’s foreknowledge, it seems to me that simply the prior command was about eating the sacrifice with matzah, but the obligation to eat matzah itself is another matter.
As for Shabbat, the fact that it is a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt requires explanation. It has no connection to that. Shabbat is a remembrance of the act of Creation.
Right, but according to your approach the question is much harder, because the prohibition is only historical, and there is nothing intrinsic in matzah. It is as though it would be very puzzling if, say, the Torah had forbidden Jacob our forefather to eat the sciatic nerve even before the struggle, and then wrote that only because of the struggle there is a prohibition to eat it.
I brought Shabbat in order to say that the mere fact that it says eating matzah is a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt does not mean it is only a remembrance of the Exodus, just like Shabbat, where there is both the prohibition in itself and what it reminds us of. I agree that your explanation resolves the difficulties you raised; I am simply claiming that you have replaced one difficulty with another.
I did not replace one difficulty with another. My difficulties lead to my principle. Period. Now you can question it, and one has to look for an answer. I suggested an answer that seems entirely reasonable to me. But if you enjoy remaining with the matter unresolved, suit yourself.
In the Ten Commandments in Parashat Yitro, “Remember the Sabbath day to sanctify it” is given the reason “For in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, the sea and all that is in them, and rested on the seventh day.” But in Parashat Va’etchanan the reason given is: “So that your servant and your maidservant may rest as you do, and you shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt and the Lord your God took you out from there with a strong hand and an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord your God commanded you to observe the Sabbath day.”
That is to say, both are present in Shabbat: both as a remembrance of Creation and of the Exodus from Egypt. This teaches us that God is the God of the whole world and also the God of Israel and its Redeemer — both the Creator of the world and its fixed order, and also the One who always oversees that His world be conducted with justice.
With blessings, Ami’oz Yaron Schnitzler
To add, in ancient Egypt the leavening of dough was invented.