A Broad View of the Conversion Controversies (Column 469)
In recent months, following a ruling by Rabbi Melamed on the subject, the discussion about conversion has been renewed, particularly regarding the acceptance of commandments (kabbalat mitzvot) in conversion. I was asked here for my opinion, and I said I would respond in a column dedicated to the topic of conversion. In the discussion that followed that question, various sources were brought that seemingly waive acceptance of commandments in conversion. In my view, there is no such source, and I will clarify this below.
Background
On Shabbat Parashat Vayikra, Rabbi Melamed published a halakhic ruling in which he argued that conversion should not be ruled out in the absence of acceptance of commandments (i.e., that a conversion should be allowed when, in the court’s assessment, the convert is expected from the outset to live as a “traditional” Jew). He writes that although most decisors oppose this, there are quite a few who support it (at least claim it is valid post facto), and therefore, in his opinion, the state may recognize such conversions, certainly in exigent circumstances.
As expected (and he certainly anticipated this), those who have been criticizing him in recent months immediately pounced and used these remarks to prove their claims about him. Against the detractors rose the defenders, demonstrating with “signs and wonders” that he is correct and that this is simply part of a broader persecution against him. I have already written on the site (see column 410) that although in most of the questions under debate with him I tend to Rabbi Melamed’s side, I do not at all agree that most of the critiques are illegitimate or that they amount to bans and ostracism. In my eyes, most are reasonable and substantive—even though I disagree with most of them.
Even in the latest debate about conversion, amid the heated rhetoric one can indeed find substantive treatments. See, for example, the critique of Rabbi Tavdi here and the defense by Rabbi Schatz here, who go through the sources Rabbi Melamed cited one by one and analyze them. Each one’s starting point is clear, but neither of them rants; rather, they present interpretive arguments to support their position. Nevertheless, despite the substantive nature of these two responses, I cannot avoid pointing out a hidden one-sidedness. Note that the debate rages over each and every source Rabbi Melamed brought. Rabbi Tavdi criticizes Rabbi Melamed and shows that he erred in his interpretation of every source he cited, while Rabbi Schatz, by contrast, explains that he was right in each of them. How does a debate arise over every single source, with each side enlisting all of them to its side? In an ordinary case I would expect each to lean on certain sources, say that others are debatable, and still others run against his view, and in the end decide, with reasons, how to rule among the sources. A pattern in which all sources point my way smells tendentious. However, as I will explain below, there is a possibility that this reflects not partisanship but simply misunderstanding and confusion.
General Direction
I was asked what I think of Rabbi Melamed’s ruling on conversion. People wondered whether the “persecution” is justified or not. You all surely know the claim that just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not after you. But note that, to the same extent, the claim that people tend to persecute you does not mean such persecutions are never justified. On my first reading, I thought that here Rabbi Melamed missed by a wide margin. Later I realized things are more complicated. He likely missed, but perhaps not by quite so much.
In my opinion, Rabbi Melamed’s remarks—as well as the critique and defense of him, detractors and defenders alike—suffer from several conceptual confusions that greatly impede the discussion. No wonder both sides read the same sources and understand them (as I noted, each one of them) in opposite ways. I think the concepts are not clearly distinguished for the disputants, and that is the main cause of the confusion. My view of Rabbi Melamed’s position on the conversion issue depends on what he himself meant, and that is hard to understand from his words. The question that arose on the site on this matter and the brief discussion after it clarified for me that the matter indeed requires sharpening and organization.
In this column I wanted to disperse the fog a bit and present my principled position on conversion. I presented it at length in my essay “Gates of Conversion: On Coercion and Good Intentions,” and here I will focus mainly on two points from it. In my assessment, once the fog is dispersed it is likely that both sides will be able to agree to this thesis, at least to some extent. If the debate was born of confusion, perhaps removing the confusion can remove the debate.
A Principled Stance and Methodological Rules
To set the framework, I will begin at the end. My position consists of two claims, one stringent and the other lenient:
- Stringency — In my view there is no room whatsoever to compromise on acceptance of commandments in conversion. One who calls to abolish it, or claims it is unnecessary, is plainly mistaken. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge there is no source that says so—but that is not very important. Even if such a source existed, it would be wrong.
- Leniency — The content of that acceptance of commandments is minimal. It is very different from what people usually sketch.
Before getting into details, I will preface that this double picture is very typical. I once heard from Rabbi Blumenzweig (formerly head of the Hesder Yeshiva in Yeruham) that one who is very stringent in a given matter will usually be very lenient in it from other angles. The example he gave was the Chazon Ish’s approach to the sabbatical year (shemittah). He was very stringent about the heter mechirah, but that forced him to adopt far-reaching halakhic leniencies so that people could actually live according to his stringent approach (something not typical of other decisors who do not trouble themselves to check whether their stringencies are practically implementable). Regarding conversion, since that essay I have been considered very stringent because of the first claim. But I do not state the second claim (the lenient one) merely for reasons of feasibility and practicality. I truly believe both claims are correct as a matter of law. I am, in principle, opposed to changing halakhah in exigent circumstances, except where there exists, in principle, a halakhic path that allows it—and then one should point to it also in non-exigent circumstances (there are rare exceptions, not for now).
I will close the introduction with another methodological rule. As is known, in my eyes precedents carry very little weight. Building a halakhic discussion on citations of the Rishonim and Aharonim, and certainly of contemporary decisors, is second-order decision-making, which I strongly oppose. The matter should be discussed from primary sources (which have formal authority) and through conceptual analysis. Only then may one bring sources from great decisors and evaluate them on their merits. A discussion that suffices with citing so-and-so’s view, especially if he is a contemporary scholar, is of encyclopedic value, not halakhic discussion. If I have my own position, then with all due respect to contemporary scholars and scholars of previous generations, I am supposed to adhere to it. Of course I will take their words into account and examine them seriously before forming a stance, but in the end what matters is my conclusion.
Still, I will qualify this approach in the case of conversion. My essay bore the subtitle “On Coercion and Good Intentions,” and I argued there that although the intentions of Rabbi Druckman’s conversion apparatus were likely positive, their actions were coercive. A person who has his own halakhic approach can and should act according to it. But in conversion, which has ramifications for the entire public, the situation is different. One who has a lenient approach to conversion that is not accepted by the vast majority of decisors cannot convert people according to his view, for he thereby turns them into Jews and imposes his stance on the entire public. In such a matter, a relatively broad consensus is required (even if not wall-to-wall agreement—that would be “law for the messianic era”). These remarks, of course, apply also to my own position, and I think that the position I present here in fact enjoys a very broad consensus. The conceptual analysis I will present can lead one who discusses the matter to realize that he is mixing layers of discourse and that his true position resembles mine. But of course, if I fail to convince a broad group of decisors, then those who hold this view must not act coercively and convert people according to it.
Is Acceptance of Commandments in Conversion Necessary—and Why?
The Talmud in Bekhorot 30b states:
“Our Rabbis taught: One who comes to accept the matters of fellowship except for one matter—we do not accept him. A gentile who comes to accept the words of Torah except for one matter—we do not accept him. R. Yose b. R. Yehudah says: even [if he rejects] one fine point of the words of the Scribes.”
That is, one who comes to convert must accept the system in its entirety. If he accepts it except for one matter, he is not a convert. From the Talmud’s language one might understand that we do not accept him ab initio but post facto he is a convert; however, the accepted understanding among decisors and commentators is that he is not a convert at all. It seems to me that this is also the plain meaning of the Talmud. “We do not accept him” means we do not treat him as a fellow or a Jew (see Rashi there, s.v. mekablin, and Maimonides, Hilkhot Metamei Mishkav 10:2).
Here an important point arises regarding the omission by the decisors. Both Maimonides and the Shulchan Aruch present a conversion process comprising three components: circumcision (for a man), immersion, and the offering of blood (a sacrifice, when the Temple stood). Both omit the dictum we saw about one who accepts “except for one matter.” Maimonides is all the more puzzling, since he brings the law about acceptance into the fellowship but omits the law about acceptance for a convert. Seemingly, for some hidden reason the decisors understood that this dictum is not the halakhic ruling, and from here some have questioned the need for acceptance of commandments in conversion. Indeed, in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De’ah 268:1, in describing the process of conversion, the author mentions circumcision and immersion but not acceptance of commandments. So too Maimonides, Hilkhot Issurei Bi’ah 13:1:
“Through three things Israel entered the covenant: circumcision, immersion, and an offering.”
Further on there he deals with the order between circumcision and immersion and which of them is indispensable, but there is no reference to acceptance of commandments. However, in 13:17 he writes:
“A convert whom they did not investigate, or to whom they did not inform the commandments and their punishments, and he was circumcised and immersed before three laymen—he is a convert; even if it was known that he converted for some [ulterior] matter—since he was circumcised and immersed, he has left the category of gentiles. We are suspicious of him until his righteousness becomes clear. And even if he reverted and worshiped idols, he is like a sinning Israelite—his betrothal is valid, and one must return his lost property. Since he immersed he became like an Israelite; therefore Samson and Solomon maintained their wives, even though their secret was revealed.”
Here mention is made of informing him of the commandments and their punishments—but this is not indispensable.
By contrast, in the Shulchan Aruch 268:2–3, the author does speak of informing him of certain commandments:
“2. When someone comes to convert, we say to him: ‘What did you see that you came to convert? Do you not know that Israel at this time are afflicted, oppressed, and harried, and that troubles come upon them?’ If he says: ‘I know, and I am unworthy to join them,’ we accept him immediately, and we inform him of the fundamentals of the religion—that God is one and the prohibition of idolatry—and we elaborate with him on this matter. And we inform him of some of the lighter commandments and some of the more stringent ones, and we inform him of some of the punishments for the commandments, and we say to him: ‘Before you came to this state, if you ate forbidden fat you were not liable to karet; if you desecrated the Sabbath you were not liable to stoning; but now, if you eat forbidden fat you are liable to karet; if you desecrate the Sabbath you are liable to stoning.’ We do not overburden him nor are we exacting with him. And just as we inform him of the punishments, so we inform him of the reward of the commandments, and we tell him that by performing these commandments he merits the life of the World to Come, and that there is no perfectly righteous person except one who is wise and performs these commandments and knows them. And we say to him: ‘Know that the World to Come is reserved only for the righteous, and they are Israel; and that what you see—that Israel are in distress in this world—is for their good, for they cannot receive an abundance of good in this world like idolaters, lest their hearts become haughty and they go astray and lose the reward of the World to Come; and the Holy One, blessed be He, does not bring upon them an abundance of calamities so that they not be lost. Rather, all the idolaters will perish, and they stand.’ And we elaborate on this to endear [the commandments] to him. If he accepts, we circumcise him immediately and wait until he heals completely; afterwards we immerse him in a proper immersion without any interposition… and three [scholars] stand over him and inform him of some of the lighter commandments and some of the more stringent ones a second time, while he is standing in the water… and he recites the blessing over the immersion after he rises from the water, and once he immerses he is like an Israelite; if he reverts to his old ways, he is a sinning Israelite, and if he betroths, his betrothal is valid.”
“3. All the matters of the convert—whether informing him of the commandments (to accept them), or the circumcision, or the immersion—must be in the presence of three who are qualified to judge, and by day… This is only ab initio; but post facto, if he was not circumcised or immersed except before two [or relatives], or at night, even if he did not immerse for the sake of conversion (e.g., a man immersed because of a seminal emission or a woman immersed for menstruation), he is a convert and is permitted to marry an Israelite woman—except for acceptance of the commandments, which is indispensable if it was not by day and before three. According to the Rif and the Rambam, even post facto if he circumcised or immersed before two or at night, it is indispensable and he is forbidden to an Israelite woman; but if he married an Israelite woman and had a son from her, we do not invalidate him.”
That is, there is a process of clarifying why the person has come to convert; there is also informing him of some commandments and the fundamentals of the religion, and reward and punishment (even twice); and the convert himself is meant to accept this (“if he accepts, we circumcise him immediately…”). Moreover, at the start of §3 it is brought that informing him of the commandments must also be done before a court qualified to judge (and unlike circumcision and immersion, here it is even indispensable), meaning that in the author’s view this is an essential and indispensable part of conversion. True, this is “some commandments” and not all, and it does not state here that if he fails to accept one matter the conversion is void. Thus there is a requirement of informing him of commandments and accepting them; the only question is the required scope.
The Meaning of Omitting Acceptance of Commandments
Let us assume for the discussion that acceptance of commandments was entirely omitted by these decisors, or at most mentioned by them in passing. What does that mean? Can we infer from this that it is not an essential part of conversion? In my view, certainly not. On the contrary: the omission stems from the opposite reason—acceptance of commandments is the essence of conversion, not one more detail in the procedure.
For example, in the laws of acquisition in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat) you will not find a rule that one must intend to acquire. You will find the rules and details of acts of acquisition and their precise intentions, but not the very need for an intent to acquire. Why? Because the intent to acquire is not part of the procedure of acquisition; it is the essence of the transactional act. One who wants to acquire consults the Shulchan Aruch for how to do so. Therefore the author speaks to someone who wants to acquire and guides him how to do it. One who does not want to acquire is not addressed by these rules. There is no need to say that if you lifted some object without intent to acquire it, you did not acquire it. Hence there is no point or need to write in the Shulchan Aruch a legal requirement that a person must want to acquire, because this is not actually needed. If you do not want—don’t. But then, if you do not want it, you will of course not acquire.
The same applies to conversion. The laws of conversion address one who wants to convert and prescribe what he must do for his conversion to be valid. One who does not want to convert has violated nothing—but he is not a convert. The assumption is that the desire to convert means a desire to join the servants of God who are obligated in His commandments, in the well-known words of Rav Saadiah Gaon: “Our nation is a nation only by virtue of its Torahs.” Therefore acceptance of commandments need not be mentioned as one more detail in the conversion procedure. It is the essence of conversion, and one who lacks it is not performing conversion at all. These laws do not speak to him. He is like one who picks up an object in his yard without intending to acquire it.
Indeed, this is explicit in Maimonides’ language. After he describes that Israel in the wilderness underwent circumcision, immersion, and sacrifice as a process of conversion, in 13:4 he writes about future generations:
“Likewise for future generations: when a gentile wishes to enter the covenant and to seek shelter under the wings of the Divine Presence and accepts upon himself the yoke of the Torah, he needs circumcision, immersion, and an offering; and if she is a woman—immersion and offering, as it is said, ‘As you, so the stranger.’ Just as you [entered] with circumcision, immersion, and offering, so too the convert for future generations with circumcision, immersion, and offering.”
Here “and accepts upon himself the yoke of the Torah” suddenly appears—but then he immediately reverts to describing the process with only three components: circumcision, immersion, and offering. What does this mean? His words are clear: when a gentile wishes to enter the covenant, i.e., to seek shelter under the wings of the Divine Presence and to accept the yoke of the Torah and commandments, the way to do so is by circumcision, immersion, and offering. Acceptance of the yoke of the Torah is not part of the procedure of conversion but the intention that animates the entire matter. If the gentile wants to accept the yoke of the Torah, the conversion procedure is what he must do. From here, conversion means acceptance of the yoke of the Torah. This is likely also the meaning of Maimonides at the beginning of these laws: “Through three things Israel entered the covenant,” and he specifies: circumcision, immersion, and offering. Entry into the covenant with the Almighty is a commitment to the yoke of Torah and commandments, and the way to perform it is by the conversion procedure.
It is therefore no wonder that Maimonides and the Shulchan Aruch omit the law of a convert who accepts “except for one matter.” If he is not accepting the yoke of the Torah but choosing for himself what to take and what to leave, he is not accepting a yoke—so he is not a convert. Not because a required element in the procedure is missing, but simply because he does not want to convert. Exactly as with one who picks up an object without intending to acquire it. Therefore, in describing the conversion process there is no need or point in including acceptance of the yoke of the Torah and commandments. One possible consequence is that if the convert does not accept one matter because he believes that this is not the correct interpretation of the Torah, he is still a convert. Only if excluding that one matter amounts, in principle, to not accepting the yoke of the Torah, is his conversion invalid.
A Conceptual Consideration
This conclusion also follows clearly from conceptual analysis—from logic. What, exactly, defines the process of conversion if not acceptance of commandments? What should the convert want? To suffer together with us? That is mere masochism. Conversion is not entry into a masochistic sect. If he is ready to suffer with us because he believes what we believe and identifies with the reason for the suffering—then he wants to convert. If he merely wants to speak Hebrew instead of Swedish—that is not conversion. I have written more than once (see, for example, my essay here and columns 336–337) that there is no Judaism apart from obligation in the commandments. This is a necessary and sufficient condition.
If someone wishes to define a “conversion” that is national-civic (joining the Jewish people in an ethno-cultural sense), I have nothing to say to him. That is no different from joining the Belgian or Tanzanian nation, and the gates of definitions are certainly not closed. Nation and peoplehood are very open and amorphous concepts, and each group defines them as it wishes. But that is not conversion, and it has no religious or halakhic significance. It is a decision by a society, a people, or a state, not a halakhic decision. Therefore rabbis and dayanim should not be engaged with it, but rather civil servants or judges.
We may now understand the Talmud in Bekhorot itself. If the decisors omitted the rule about acceptance “except for one matter” because it is obvious, then why did the Talmud bring it? Note that the Talmud presents the rule for conversion together with the same rule for acceptance into the fellowship. In acceptance into the fellowship, there was certainly room to say that even if a person accepts it except for one matter, he is still a fellow, for there we are not discussing a principled acceptance of an entire comprehensive system. At most he would be a fellow for eating non-sacred food in purity but not for some other matter. Therefore, regarding fellowship the Talmud had to teach that acceptance except for one matter is not valid; we would not have known this without its novelty. In contrast, with respect to conversion there is no novelty here, for as we saw this follows from conceptual analysis alone. It may be that the Talmud mentions it merely to draw an analogy to acceptance of fellowship. In effect, it is saying: just as acceptance of Judaism except for one matter is invalid (which is obvious and need not be stated), so acceptance of fellowship except for one matter is invalid.[1]
The Dispute about Acceptance of Commandments: Two Meanings of the Term
In these debates, various sources were cited that seem ready to waive acceptance of commandments in the conversion process (see also the discussion on the question raised on the site). This is a conceptual confusion. The term “acceptance of commandments” appears in the conversion discourse with two different meanings: (1) acceptance of commandments as the essence of conversion—this is what I have discussed until now—the acceptance in the convert’s heart: his motivation to enter this process and his understanding of it; and (2) “acceptance of commandments” as a formal act within the conversion procedure—an entirely different meaning.
When we inform the convert of the commandments and hear from him that he accepts them upon himself, that is a formal act that is part of the procedure. Regarding that act, one can debate whether it is rabbinic or biblical, whether it is indispensable, and perhaps even whether it is necessary at all. But one must not confuse this with the convert’s fundamental motivation and intention, where it is agreed by all, without dissent, that we are speaking about acceptance of the yoke of the Torah.
Indeed, there are opinions that the need to articulate that intention at the moment of conversion is unnecessary or not indispensable, or is needed only rabbinically, etc., but this has nothing to do with the court’s need to assess what is in the convert’s heart—why he has come and what he understands. The court must assess whether this convert is coming because he wants to fulfill commandments, and whether he understands that he is becoming obligated in them and that he will be punished or rewarded for his deeds—for without this the conversion is invalid. That is certainly indispensable. If the court can assess this without a formal act of acceptance, the conversion may perhaps be valid (although the Shulchan Aruch implies otherwise, since it requires this to be done before three, indispensably), and the disputes among the decisors revolve about this—and only this. Therefore these disputes have nothing to do with my principled claim about acceptance of commandments as the essence of conversion.
So much for the stringent claim: acceptance of commandments certainly makes or breaks the conversion. Now I will move to the lenient claim: the content of that acceptance.
The Content of Acceptance of Commandments
Most of the disputes around acceptance of commandments in conversion are not about its necessity but about its scope. Rabbi Melamed speaks of acceptance of commandments at the level of “traditionalism.” Others quote Maimonides about “some commandments” and “fundamentals of the faith,” to show there is no need to commit to all the commandments. Unlike the earlier debate (on which I also have a clear stance), these disputes seem to me rather empty.
No one disputes that the convert is not meant to finish the Talmud during the conversion process. He is not meant to know all halakhah in detail—hardly any born Jew does. Moreover, he is not meant to commit to doing everything and never failing—no born Jew manages that either. Up to here, all agree. So what remains? It turns out that “acceptance of commandments” means that he commits in principle to the yoke of the commandments, meaning he understands that from the moment of conversion this entire system obligates him, and that he will be rewarded and punished for his deeds. Note well: this is not an academic learning that “Jews think one must keep Shabbat and not eat pork.” That is academic knowledge. Acceptance of commandments means that he understands that from now on this obligates him. Not that “Jews think it obligates him,” but that he himself understands and agrees.
Nothing beyond that is required. It is reasonable that he knows in advance he will not live up to it (if he is a realistic person). It is reasonable that he knows that not always will his effort be maximal (if he is realistic). He may even think that there are particular laws that he will, from the outset, not even strive to keep—and that too is perfectly fine as far as the validity of the conversion goes (of course it is not fine halakhically). All that is required is only his understanding that the thing obligates him and that he will be punished, and that he accepts this upon himself at the moment of conversion.
One may wonder: how can someone understand that this obligates him and that he will be punished, and yet plan in advance to violate some law? This wonder may sound very reasonable—to a Martian. But we, who dwell in houses of clay, know full well that people are complex creatures. Faithful Jews and great righteous people cut corners in this or that law even though they know they will be punished. Drives, biases, interests, social pressures, psychological difficulties, and more—all of these often lead us to do something that, even in our own view, is not right. To expand on this, I can only refer you to columns 172–173 on weakness of will. This is roughly like a penitent who accepts upon himself “never to return to this sin” (see Maimonides, Hilkhot Teshuvah 2:2) when it is clear to him even at that moment that, in practice, this will not happen. And yet such acceptance is valid repentance, for we are all human; if at that moment we genuinely want it—even if later we will not strive enough—that is repentance (see the commentaries to Maimonides there).
Returning to the content of acceptance of commandments: the conclusion is that there is no need to commit to actually keeping commandments, and the court does not even need an assessment that the convert will do so. What is needed is an assessment that the convert understands the implications of his conversion (obligation, reward and punishment) and that he accepts them upon himself. If the court is persuaded that this is the situation—the conversion is entirely valid, even if from that moment onward the convert does not keep anything at all.
Note that I am not saying merely that if the convert sins after converting this does not invalidate the conversion and he is a sinning Israelite. That is obvious and accepted and needs no elaboration. Clearly, what determines validity is only what was in the convert’s heart at that moment. What he does afterwards changes nothing. Here I wish to say more: even if at the moment of conversion the convert had in his heart no intention to keep any commandment, as long as he understands the implications and accepts them upon himself, the conversion is valid. The content of acceptance of commandments is extremely minimal—far below the view of the “lenient” side in the debate with Rabbi Melamed.
Let me take an example I heard from my friend Rabbi Aharon Katz, may he live long, former head of the Institute for Advanced Torah Studies, when he served as a conversion judge. He told me that a convert appeared before them on Friday, and afterward it became known that that evening (Friday night) he married his chosen one in a large hall with a band, desecrating Shabbat publicly. The court annulled his conversion, for it was clear to them that the event had been organized before the conversion. This was not a sin that occurred after conversion (in which case he is a sinning Israelite). Such a case reveals, retroactively, that at the moment of conversion he did not intend to accept the commandments. On the face of it, the analysis sounds very persuasive. But in light of what I described above, I am not sure they were right. If that convert did not intend to keep Shabbat at the moment of conversion, but he understood the significance of his actions and accepted the implications, he is still a convert in the strictest sense. Admittedly, the court’s decision there is not necessarily mistaken, for it may be that when they heard of his actions they reassessed that from the outset he did not truly intend to accept, and he did not really believe that this obligates him and that his actions would have consequences (otherwise, why not marry on Sunday? And why marry without a rabbi, not “according to the law of Moses and Israel”?). If that was their assessment, their decision was correct.
My intention here is merely to sharpen my distinction, not to set down definitive rulings about that particular case. What is decisive is the assessment of the court that sat in judgment. If the court concludes that there was no acceptance of commandments (in the minimal sense I described) at the moment of conversion, the conversion is invalid. It is hard to lay down rules that will apply to all cases, but it is very important to understand the framework. The court must understand what it needs to assess in order to determine the validity of a conversion, but the assessment itself is entrusted solely to them. Such an assessment is, of course, very complex, and we can never have certainty, but that is the reality. There are other cases in halakhah (not only in conversion) where a court must assess what is in a person’s heart—with all the human difficulty that entails.
No wonder people try to bypass the need for such an amorphous assessment by claiming that actual observance is the indicator by which we gauge the prior intention. That allows us to discuss easier, decisive questions, like how many laws must be kept to provide such an indicator—and all the debates revolve around this. But I do not think there is a general answer; hence, the discussion about the scope of observance is, in my eyes, nonsense. The relevant question is the assessment in the specific case before us—not general criteria. In any case, it is crucial to understand that actual observance is, at most, an indicator (if at all), not a self-standing requirement. Therefore the debate about the required scope of acceptance is pointless and meaningless. Acceptance must be comprehensive and complete, covering the whole of halakhah, but its practical manifestations may—at least in principle—be nil, and the conversion can still be valid.
If we accept the framework I have outlined—and it seems to me that everyone can and should agree to it (it is practically necessary; I do not see a logical, plausible alternative halakhic position)—we find that all these disputes arise from conceptual confusion and are, in part, simply empty.
Conversion to “Traditionalism”
Returning to the question of conversion to “traditionalism” that Rabbi Melamed proposed and that sparked the current debate—we must examine precisely what he means. If he means that practical observance is not what matters, I agree. But then even if the convert will not keep anything—not even at a traditionalist level—the conversion can be valid (as long as the court assesses that there was acceptance of commandments in the sense I described), unless we decide that behavior below “traditionalism” expresses a lack of acceptance from the outset, which I rather doubt (but, of course, every case stands on its own).
I will note that I have written here more than once (see, for example, here and many more) that in my eyes “traditionalists” are halakhically worse than atheists. The latter are coerced in the sense that they believe in nothing (like infants taken captive). But many traditionalists know and recognize halakhah and are, on a principled level, committed to it (their ideal model is one who does keep it), and yet they cut corners. Unlike atheists, such traditionalists are full-fledged transgressors. And nevertheless, I will now say that although a traditionalist Jew is a greater sinner than an atheist, conversion to traditionalism is preferable to conversion to atheism (which is not conversion at all). Conversion to traditionalism, in this sense, entails full acceptance of commandments. As I explained, practical observance is not essential to the validity of the conversion.
Since I expect comments on this point, I will add that here I mean traditionalists who believe in everything but cut corners in observance. There are also the opposite kind of traditionalists—those who keep some things despite believing in nothing (they are committed to the tradition of “father’s house,” like Ahad Ha’am). These are secular in the strictest sense; their commandments are worthless, and one who “converts” to that sort of traditionalism is a very great gentile indeed.
Since the start of the debate, Rabbi Melamed has published several columns in B’Sheva in which he tries to explain his position (the latest I saw was this). I think I read them all, and I still have not found a satisfactory explanation of his claim. There are conflicting notes in his words. In some places it seems he means what I have said here; in others he enters the pointless debates about the scope of observance itself. It is quite clear to me that he is not aware of the distinctions I have made here, for if he were, he could present his position more clearly and convincingly—to himself and certainly to others. The same holds for his opponents. Even if one of them disagrees with something I said, it would be easier for him to address the arguments and ground his position within the framework I proposed. As conducted, the debate is practically a dialogue of the deaf. It rages about the extent of observance meant to be performed; one says thus and the other thus, with no substantive arguments apart from citing and cataloging sources and precedents, and the question becomes how many sources support each side.
Interpretations of Precedents
You can now go through all the debates on the site here and in the articles surrounding Rabbi Melamed’s words, and you will see that in most cases this is a dialogue of the deaf. Sometimes people explain that there is no need for acceptance of commandments when the source says there is no need for the act of acceptance. Sometimes people speak of conversions for the sake of marriage or conversions for side reasons, but these precedents are utterly irrelevant. In earlier periods it was obvious to people that conversion obligates them in commandments and brings punishment, even if they did it only to marry. Therefore there is full, valid acceptance of commandments there. In many cases a gentile understood that the Jewish God punishes Jews, and he understood that when he converts he joins those who are obligated by Jewish law (in the ancient world, a plurality of gods was normal). Thus it is not necessarily a case of someone who does not believe at all in the truth of the system. There are cases where it is clear that the convert will not keep commandments and nevertheless he was converted—but as I explained, it may be that the assessment was that he understands and accepts upon himself the implications, and then practical observance has no bearing on the conversion.
In light of the analysis I have presented, both Rabbi Melamed’s words and those of his opponents—and especially the relevance of the precedents that each side brings and their analysis—become very obscure and, usually, not very relevant. Are we dealing with observance in practice? An assessment of observance at the moment of conversion? Understanding and acceptance of the meaning even without intent to observe? The content of the formal act of acceptance in the conversion procedure? And so on. There is no point now in going peddler-like through all the arguments, but whoever reviews them will see that almost all of these discussions become unnecessary.
First-Order and Second-Order Decision-Making
The picture I have drawn regarding acceptance of commandments in conversion seems to me self-evident and very logical, and I find it hard to see how anyone could disagree. At most, one can argue that in a given situation there is or is not an indicator of the convert’s intentions; but I do not see anything else to debate. Therefore, each side should first state whether he accepts this general picture, and then add the nuance within it over which he wishes to argue. After all, when reading the sides’ claims it is not clear at all what the debate is about, and even less clear where—if anywhere—each speaker departs from the picture I have sketched. I can interpret all sides so that they all agree to the picture described here and are only caught up in different words born of conceptual mixing.
The reliance on precedents and their analysis in this debate is a hallmark of second-order decision-making, which unfortunately characterizes most halakhic debates today (and not only today). In this column one can clearly see the drawbacks of such decision-making and such modes of discussion. By contrast, I have proposed here first-order analysis and decision-making, which comprises conceptual analysis, basic definitions, and constructing a general picture as it emerges from authoritative sources and from reason. Note that all this was done without recourse to any later decisor—and certainly no contemporary one—and even the few early sources are brought here merely as illustration.
I think that, upon reading the column, you will see two clear advantages of first-order halakhic analysis: it renders much of the second-order discussion (and the discussion of precedents) superfluous; and even if one accepts the importance of precedents, such analysis sheds a different light on the content of those precedents and their relevance to the debate.
In this context, it is worth seeing my remark here in the debate about the philological-historical approach in the humanities (in the discussion of R. David Zvi Hoffmann’s position on conversion).
[1] I do not know whether those decisors had a different textual reading, or they read the existing text as I have. In the text before us it does not look merely like an analogy (especially since the law of acceptance into fellowship is brought before acceptance of commandments).
Discussion
Does the convert need to understand that he is obligated even without making an inner decision that he is deciding to obey this obligation? What if the convert thinks and understands that from now on there is some probability that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands him through the system of commandments, but he does not think that the commands of the Holy One, blessed be He, are "binding" (that is, whether after filtering all the facts of every kind there is also a normative determination here or not).
1. The rabbi wrote that it is obvious that the essence of conversion is accepting the yoke of the commandments, because "our nation is a nation only through its laws," etc., but that seems anachronistic to me. It is quite possible that in the eyes of the ancient world the essence of conversion was the agreement to worship only the God of Israel and not turn to other gods, and that was the core of the covenant. A hint of this can be seen in the expression, "Your people shall be my people, and your God my God."
2. Precisely because one can wonder about the essence of conversion, one cannot suffice with a first-order discussion in the absence of sources. A conceptual clarification of "it cannot be that x is meant" is playing logic games with yourself without any external anchor for examination. Therefore it is also hard to accept the argument that "if there are rabbinic quotations for or against this interpretation, that neither adds nor detracts."
3. The matter of punishment and divine judgment sounds strange. If a person does not believe there is any external punishment and reward for his deeds, can he not convert? Or be a servant of God?
4. Do the series of stories of prospective converts before Shammai and Hillel not raise a question about the whole thesis written here? A minimal essence of conversion, the ability to force a community of sages to admit a convert into the Jewish people against their opinion, and the need to cling to precedents and to the interpretations of the sages of the generations, otherwise we will lose our way?
The argument, "acceptance of the commandments is the essence of conversion and not one of the details of the procedure," is very difficult.
This is an apparently paradoxical argument, and grounding it in the laws of transactions is nowhere near sufficient. Let me explain:
One must distinguish between a concept that has meaning "plainly" and a concept that has no plain meaning (that is, outside the context of Jewish law). When a concept has a plain meaning—say, acquisition—one can omit its meaning and assume people will use its known meaning*. By contrast, when it is a new concept—say, tefillin—there is no choice but to begin the discussion by explaining "what are tefillin"—"These four passages… are called tefillin."
If you say that conversion is a concept that exists plainly (like acquisition), then conversion to the Jewish people is identical to conversion to the Swedish people except for the things halakhah added, namely circumcision, immersion, and a sacrifice.
If you say that conversion is a concept that does not exist plainly (like tefillin), then conversion is what halakhah explains it to be, and therefore if halakhah omits acceptance of the commandments (as you agreed to assume at the beginning of one of the paragraphs), then acceptance of the commandments is not part of conversion.
You cannot add essential meaning to a concept by pure reasoning.
With respect to the main point of the discussion (the 'leniency'), the analysis is excellent, but it is not clear what that 'inner indication' is that the court is supposed to decide on the basis of. An indication that the convert intends to observe commandments—certainly not. An indication that he is aware of the system of obligation—there is no need, since that is obvious from the process (except in extreme cases such as a minor or someone mentally incompetent).
Practically speaking, the concept of 'acceptance of the commandments' is almost meaningless:
All it requires is that the convert not be coerced, and that he know that 'halakhah' exists**. Beyond that, his very agreement to continue the process constitutes 'acceptance of the commandments,' whether he intends to observe them in a secular, traditional, Reform, or Haredi way.
In order to clarify the point of dispute, one must explicitly define when a conversion is valid and when it is not:
The strict view requires an attempt to observe commandments as a religious Jew—belief in God and halakhah, and observance as a religious person.
Rabbi Melamed requires an attempt to observe commandments as a traditional Jew—belief in God and halakhah and some sort of observance.
From the column I understood that the rabbi's requirement is that the court be impressed that the convert understands that he will receive reward and punishment in relation to his observance of halakhah. Does this necessarily mean that a convert must believe in God, the World to Come, divine providence, reward and punishment?
(In my uninteresting opinion—none of this is required. The whole point of 'acceptance of the commandments' is only to avoid misleading a gentile who comes to convert without knowing about halakhah and who will afterwards be disappointed to learn that he will apparently go to Gehenna; a kind of improper transaction under false pretenses מצד בית הדין. After the fact, in any case, the conversion is valid.)
*Of course this will create questions in the future when the meaning changes, but that is a different problem.
**Even about that one can argue, especially regarding an atheist convert.
P.S. Of course, in all cases we are speaking only about whether the conversion is valid. Whether one should convert such a person in the first place is a completely different question (driven mainly by religious-political-sociological considerations, that is, how much we want to strengthen the correlation between 'Jew' and 'one who observes Shabbat according to halakhah').
The distinction does not really exist. 'As much as he succeeds in overcoming his inclination and weaknesses' de facto includes everything.
"That he show us that he has decided to observe everything in every respect unless his inclination overcomes him" is a definition that belongs in a Hasidic vort, not in a halakhic definition.
A lot of traditional people really think that you don't have to keep everything and that God shouldn't care if I remove a stain from my shirt on Shabbat—if someone converts with that kind of acceptance of the commandments, does it take effect?
With
Uri, that seems very unlikely to me. "Trying" is something that cannot be defined. A person says מראש that he will not try to observe because it is difficult for him. So here too, one should see this as failure and not necessarily as a lack of trying. Just like with all of us. After all, if he truly believes and feels obligated, why would he not observe when there is no price to pay? Unless you see his behavior as a symptom of lack of belief/commitment, in which case the conversion is indeed invalid, as I wrote.
Nadav, I didn't understand your comment.
I'm not sure I understood the point. If he is obligated, then when there is no price to pay he will certainly observe. Therefore, it is one of two things: either he is obligated but cannot bear the price or the difficulty, or he is not obligated. If he is not obligated, then this is indeed not a conversion.
If he does not think that the commands of the Holy One, blessed be He, are binding, then of course he is not Jewish. That is the meaning of not being obligated.
1. Saadia Gaon's expression is not my proof. It is an illustration. The proof is that there is no other criterion for Jewishness, and I referred to my discussions of this. And of course this also emerges from the statement in Bekhorot.
2. And what do those rabbis who wrote the precedents rely on? In the end, everything begins and ends with the first-order level.
3. Punishment is only an indication of obligation. If a person does not believe in reward and punishment, in my opinion that is not a flaw in the conversion. Admittedly, Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh may have thought that it is indeed an essential binding principle. I don't know.
I don't see why. If you have a concrete question, go ahead and raise it.
I explained everything in the column. If that person accepts the yoke of the commandments, he is a valid convert, even if his interpretation of the commandments differs from the accepted one.
I did not base this on the laws of transactions. The basis is reasoning (that there is no other definition of Jewishness), the Gemara in Bekhorot, and the language of the halakhic decisors. The laws of transactions were brought only as an example to answer the difficulty raised as to why the decisors do not mention this requirement.
I do not see a difference between a concept that is clear in a general context and one that is clear in a Jewish context, so long as it is clear. Everyone is supposed to understand what and who a Jew is. By the way, this understanding may be considered universal. Gentiles too are supposed to understand that a Jew means someone who is obligated by halakhah.
I have no way to provide unequivocal tools for assessing what is in a person's heart. But that is the role of the court, and although they can of course make mistakes, we have no better method than impression. That is how a court is supposed to decide who is a penitent returnee (to restore him to halakhic reliability), or to assess intentions in transactions and betrothal, and the like.
It is not true that it is enough that the convert is not coerced. There are interests involved (such as the Law of Return and rights and refuge in the land, and so on). Indeed, as I also wrote, once upon a time that really was the situation, and therefore they also accepted marriage-motivated converts. But today there are interests, and today even the public definition of Jewishness is not necessarily halakhah (rather, some amorphous national Jewish identity). Therefore nowadays the absence of coercion is certainly not enough.
My definition is not related to reward and punishment but to obligation. Reward and punishment are only an indication of obligation. Of course, obligation means obligation to God and His commandments, and therefore faith is a fundamental condition that goes without saying. Commandment-observance in the style of Ahad Ha'am is worthless. Someone who converts on the understanding that he will observe halakhah in every detail, lenient and strict alike, with all the subparagraphs of the Mishnah Berurah, for Ahad Ha'am's reasons, is a complete gentile.
From the wording, "acceptance of the commandments means that he understands that from now on this obligates him," it sounds like we are talking about an "understanding" of a fact and not a normative decision. Perhaps he thinks he is 'obligated' in every factual sense, and yet even without any cost he does not wish to observe (free choice).
It seems to me there is an essential question arising here.
If a convert converts מתוך faith and wants to enter a system of reward and punishment for observing the 613 commandments, but for various reasons he knows that he is going to sin and be punished—and nevertheless wants to undergo conversion, for various reasons, apparently because of personal weakness—on the one hand he believes in Judaism, and he was also born and raised here and has no other way to establish his life except through conversion in order to marry and raise a family; and on the other hand he is a willful sinner out of appetite and does not intend, or is unable, to change this situation—then from an ideological perspective, and not merely dry halakhics, is it even worthwhile to convert such a person? Does the Holy One, blessed be He, desire the joining of such a convert to the people of Israel? Is it about him that the verse says, "You shall love the convert"? Am I, as a Jew, obligated to return a lost object to a complete wicked person of this type, to bestow kindness upon him, to treat him fraternally? Here too it seems to me that the obvious answer is no. For from examining the sources and on the conceptual level, the Holy One, blessed be He, does not desire at all the entry into Israel of gentiles who do not observe the 613 commandments. And perhaps this is also the basis of the halakhot that a gentile who keeps Shabbat, studies Torah, or performs a religious commandment while still a gentile is liable to death. All that is expected of him in order to reach wholeness and be considered desirable before God is the seven Noahide commandments, upright and ethical behavior, and rejection of idolatry through belief in the Torah of Moses.
The fact that something can technically and formally count as a conversion does not mean that it is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, or the spirit of the Torah, or fitting to the principles of the Torah and the principles of the sages. And perhaps this is what all the critics are crying out about. For such a convert is in some respect worse than the traditional Jewish sinners of Israel, who admittedly are aware of their obligation and do not observe it, but most of whom also never seriously studied religion, do not understand the magnitude of the obligation to observe commandments, or the severity of sin, but were born into a slapdash environment and observe what they think they are expected to observe.
And I do not understand what problem such a conversion can solve with respect to assimilation at all. Previously we regretted the loss involved in intermarriage, and now we are to regret the loss involved in bringing a new Jewish sinner into the nation. That sinner will establish a home in marriages that are indeed valid, but with a lifestyle that in all likelihood is highly transgressive.
Why should we not give gentiles—if our desire is to prevent sins and intermarriage—the status of resident alien, a righteous gentile who has a share in the World to Come, and for whose support and preservation we are all obligated?
Normative claims are prescriptive claims, not descriptive ones. When I say that someone understands that murder is forbidden, that means he is also obligated by it (otherwise he does not really understand that claim, except in a descriptive sense: there are people who live with the feeling that murder is forbidden).
Similarly, I have written in the past that obligation to God's commandments follows from the very concept of God. This is unlike recognizing the existence of some other object or some event, which obligates me to nothing. God is a value-laden entity, not a neutral one.
I am not writing my remarks in order to solve any problem, so it does not matter whether such a problem exists or not.
I did not discuss here the question of conversion policy ab initio, only the validity of the conversion. Policy is a different matter, and here I tend to agree with your remarks. In halakhah itself one finds this distinction, for example with marriage-motivated conversions. As a matter of policy it is not recommended to accept such a convert, but after the fact his conversion is valid (that is the accepted view. Today, in my opinion, this is not correct. Even after the fact, today such a conversion is not valid).
The simple intuition is that joining the Jewish people is similar to joining the Swedish people.
Halakhah then comes and innovates—no, here you need circumcision, immersion, and a sacrifice, all before a court.
Halakhah comes and does *not* innovate (according to one opinion) that 'acceptance of the commandments' is required.
Just to make sure I understood correctly—a conversion is valid in terms of acceptance of the commandments if the court believes the convert who says:
"I am joining the Jewish people and therefore becoming obligated in the system of laws with which the Holy One, blessed be He, obligated the people of Israel."
I understand this as a matter of reasoning, but I cannot read it in the sources:
"…If they did not inform him of the reward for the commandments and their punishment, and he was circumcised and immersed before three ordinary men—he is a convert, even if it became known that he converted for some ulterior matter, since once he was circumcised and immersed he has departed from the category of idolaters." One can of course disagree with Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh (certainly when the beginning of the Shulchan Arukh implies otherwise), but the plain sense of this halakhah is that the whole story of the commandments is only for the ideal case.
I clarified the difference between acceptance of the commandments and informing him of the commandments.
My emphasis is on "since once he was circumcised and immersed." Not "since once he accepted the commandments," not "since once he was informed of the commandments."
(And in any case, the plain sense seems to be that he does not even know there is such a thing as commandments at all.)
I explained that too: one who wants to convert (= to accept the commandments)—once he was circumcised and immersed, he is a Jew.
Surely you have not overlooked the Gemara about a convert who converted among the gentiles and knew nothing of the whole Torah, yet is liable for a single sin-offering for everything. This implies he is already Jewish. It implies he converted merely by calling himself a Jew or an Israeli, without anyone teaching him anything at all. The desire (sincerely) to be counted among the Jewish people is the essence of conversion. The practical details depend on the Jewish people, and we all know that halakhic practice is not a consensus throughout the people, even though in the past it was. Therefore any side that takes action not accepted by the whole is acting violently, whether it is the Chief Rabbinate or a private court. And it is preferable that this be privatized and that the political reality decide.
I certainly have not overlooked it, and I do not understand how it is related to our discussion. Such a convert accepted halakhic obligation upon himself; he simply does not know what it includes. But it is clear to him that there is halakhah and that it obligates him.
To be counted among the Jewish people is not a defined matter. To speak Hebrew? To read David Grossman? To serve in the army? All of that can be done without being Jewish, and indeed many do it.
To Avi:
That is really not the plain meaning of the Gemara. Tosafot there comment that the conversion was carried out by three Jews, except that they did not inform him of the commandments of Shabbat. But if he converted by himself, conversion does not take effect.
There is no such thing as converting to Israeliness. That is nonsense. One converts by accepting the yoke of the commandments and by the court's assessment of the sincerity of the convert's intention. After that, it does not matter what he does (it matters very much, just that he remains within Judaism).
And of course the Shulchan Arukh explicitly writes that even informing him of the commandments is indispensable, not only accepting them. So I do not understand how you put into his mouth things he never said.
"Even if at the moment of conversion the convert has in his heart not to observe even one commandment, so long as he understands the consequences and accepts them upon himself, this conversion is valid."
I do not understand how one can say that a person who is thinking not to observe even one commandment intended to accept upon himself the yoke of Torah. Either he did not really intend it, or he did not understand the meaning. One can understand that a person stumbles sometimes like everyone else, or even after some time returns to his old ways—but if he will not keep anything at all, is that called having undertaken the commandments?
This is a principled statement. My claim is that one need not intend to observe the commandments. Such an intention is, at most, an indication that he has accepted the principled obligation. In practice, if he does not observe, it is because there is a price he is unwilling to pay, or because he is not obligated. The court is supposed to decide which of the two it is.
First of all, many thanks; this is definitely thought-provoking.
Let me preface by saying that, in my humble opinion, no one disputes that actual observance of the commandments is an indication of acceptance of the commandments, which is the heart of conversion. Now, with the rabbi's permission, I would like to make two comments on the substance of the matter.
A. Regarding the 'stringency': forgive me, but in my humble opinion I find the argument hard to accept. Especially since one can certainly think of another definition of conversion. A person, for example, may want the result of conversion, the formal definition as a Jew, without undertaking the commandments. For example, the ability to marry a Jewish woman, the obligation to return his lost property, and so on. Given that such a definition, or such a desire, exists, I would have expected the duty of accepting the commandments to be written explicitly. That is, one cannot be a Jew (and in the analogy from civil law, acquire the object) without accepting the yoke of the commandments (and in the analogy, without acquiring it or wanting to acquire it).
B. Regarding the 'leniency': in the end, the question whether a person will commit a transgression depends on several components: the strength of his certainty about the prohibition and its punishment, his fear of the implications and consequences of the prohibition, his desire to commit that prohibition, and his ability to cope with desires in general (what we call delaying gratification, or more precisely foregoing gratification). In other words, the fact that a person does not keep commandments in practice, even after he has 'accepted' the yoke of the commandments, is connected to the relationship among these factors. What interests us, of course, is the first part—perhaps even only the first part of the first part—that he understands he is obligated to do certain acts and forbidden from doing others. In effect, your claim, if I understand correctly, is that when a person does not observe Torah and commandments after accepting the commandments, this does not necessarily stem from the first point, but from the other components. I very much understand, identify with, and agree with this in principle, except that on the practical level it seems there is no other way to ascertain the nature of the first and significant component of sincere acceptance of the commandments. So how can one nevertheless know whether the person has accepted the commandments?
To my mind, all this comes back to the psychology of the 'traditional Jew.' Does the traditional Jew (the one you spoke about, not the atheist) really think that the commandments obligate him? That is, does he really understand the meaning of the obligation of the commandments, and is his whole life nothing but repeated failure in the face of his desires, or a general lack of ability to delay gratification, or any of the other factors I mentioned? Or is the picture a bit more complex, and this whole system of factors feeds itself? That is, the fact that a person finds it hard to keep a certain commandment is fed by the fact that he does not really understand the meaning of the prohibition, or that the strength and degree of certainty are not clear to him. Consequently, since I understand that the variable we are interested in examining—acceptance of the commandments—is not binary but a continuous concept, I think your 'test' of the quality of the conversion (as several commenters have already written) is a bit naive.
Therefore, willy-nilly, we are forced to rely on the indication of actual observance of the commandments. Although we all understand that it may not reflect the fundamental and essential component underlying the conversion, it seems to be the only indication that exists. All this, of course, without even entering the question of what level of observance is expected. For example, we may reach the conclusion that, unlike the past, all the other factors listed above have changed significantly, and thus the practical forecast for observance can be lower without lowering the threshold of certainty regarding acceptance of the commandments, which, as stated, lies at the heart of conversion.
In defining conversion, and precisely in Maimonides and others, you followed the Rebbe of Lubavitch. See Likkutei Sichot, vol. 33, Shavuot, no. 2.
Even if the principle is understandable, it is hard to see how someone who knows what Shabbat is and does not intend to keep it ab initio (as proven by the fact that he violated it a few hours later) can be considered someone who accepted upon himself the yoke of the commandments (that is, who believes in God and His Torah and sees himself as under a real obligation).
Can it really be imagined that if someone comes to convert and says: I accept upon myself the yoke of all the commandments, but I hereby give notice that I intend to desecrate Shabbat, engage in forbidden sexual relations, and stuff myself on Yom Kippur—we would accept him?
In such a case we would always assess that his words about accepting the yoke were empty words, and the court did well to void his conversion, which was null from the outset (and this is not comparable to prohibitions of evil speech or neglect of Torah study, which every person stumbles over at one stage or another, or to the general knowledge that he is destined to sin, because there is no righteous person, etc.).
Hello,
The rabbi's interpretation of Maimonides' words—that he did not write the Gemara in Bekhorot—
is not clear to me, since in the Gemara there is a powerful novelty about one who did not accept one particular halakhah,
and this is certainly a major novelty, because this convert accepts the yoke of the whole Torah; he only does not accept one commandment. That is not at all similar to someone who accepts nothing, so omitting it because there is no need to write the law of acceptance of the commandments is strange.
Let me preface by saying that no one disputes this except all the halakhic decisors. After all, it is agreed that if the convert does not keep commandments in practice, his conversion is not void. The discussion is about what his view and intentions were at the moment of conversion.
A. Once Jewishness is defined on the basis of halakhah, then even if he wants the ability to marry a Jewish woman, he understands that he must observe commandments. That is exactly how I explained the law of marriage-motivated conversion.
B. You described my position very well. I clarified it further in the comments. The indications are what the convert says and how he conducts himself during the conversion process. How interested he is, whether he is moved by the whole story, knowledge of his motives and background, and so on. I have already said that in other halakhic contexts as well, the court has a role in understanding what is in a person's heart.
I did not understand your description regarding continuity. In section B you explained it better, but there you spoke not of continuity but of a set of factors. That is not at all the same thing. In acceptance of the commandments there is no continuity at all. Either he accepts or he does not. Other factors can indeed affect actual observance, as you wrote.
As for actual observance, see my preface. That is precisely the indication that everyone agrees is irrelevant.
As they say: "Even a stopped clock…"
🙂
I did not understand what is new here beyond what I already wrote. Indeed, it certainly can be imagined. Observance of the commandments is an indication of acceptance of the commandments, but not necessarily. See Moishe's comment above, section B:
https://mikyab.net/posts/75802#comment-61060
If you assess that these were empty words, then his conversion is invalid, as I wrote. But not because he does not observe, rather because he did not accept. I do not agree that this would necessarily be the assessment.
Whether we would accept him or not—in the first instance I agree that it is proper not to accept him, but if they did accept him, he is a valid convert.
That seems plausible to me. There is no acceptance of the yoke here, because he himself is deciding what his "yoke" is. Maimonides presents acceptance of the yoke as the motivation for conversion.
Maimonides also did not write the law that someone who converts like Ahad Ha'am is not a convert. He did not need to write it. That is not acceptance of the yoke of the commandments but folklore.
If I understood correctly, your claim is that one certainly does not need actual acceptance of the commandments, because after all it is clear and known to all of us that there are commandments he will be lax about and he will not keep every jot and tittle, and therefore it is enough to assess that the convert is aware of the implications of conversion (obligation, reward, and punishment).
But from where is the leap to say that no actual acceptance of the commandments is needed at all? At most, this proves that one does not need actual acceptance of the commandments in every last detail, but it is very possible that one still does need actual acceptance of the commandments at some level or another.
Rabbi Michi, thank you for your remarks (it seems to me that Rabbi Feinstein wrote similar things). The question is: is the level of actual observance in close proximity to the conversion not a reasonable indication of the convert's level of belief in reward and punishment for the commandments? A typical religious person believes that the punishment for eating leaven on Passover is karet, and therefore is more careful about that than about evil speech, for example. If the convert truly accepts upon himself the reward and punishment of the commandments and believes in their existence, then he will genuinely try to observe them. Therefore a convert who holds a wedding on Shabbat without a rabbi less than a day after the conversion reveals to the judges that even in real time he did not think he would be punished for desecrating Shabbat. Let me sharpen this further. Acceptance of the commandments includes belief in two things: a. There is reward and punishment for the commandments, b. I, the convert, am obligated by them. A prime minister who an hour after taking the oath of office passed classified material to the enemy—it is quite reasonable to assume that the oath was lip service. He admittedly knew there were consequences to his actions (he was aware of a'), but he did not really intend to undertake loyalty to the state (he did not undertake b'). The same applies to the Shabbat-desecrating convert you described. Either he does not believe in reward and punishment, or he does not intend to be obligated. Acceptance of the commandments requires both, and if one is missing, he is not a convert.
Are you sure this is written in Hebrew? I could not understand it. I wrote that acceptance of the commandments is required, but actual observance is not required. And what does "acceptance of the commandments at some level or another" even mean? To keep thirty commandments? Four hundred and fifty? Tossing out empty slogans is easy.
You are repeating my points. Is there a question here?
Does the rabbi agree that acceptance of the commandments includes belief in reward and punishment? If not, what is the content of the undertaking to observe them? After all, there is no undertaking without sanctions for failing to fulfill it.
Regarding the beginning of my remarks, I did not formulate myself properly, so what was understood was the opposite of what I meant to argue. My intention was that, in my humble opinion, the overwhelming majority of halakhic decisors understand that the question of actual observance of the commandments, or the assessment that a person will observe commandments, is 'only' an indication that the conversion process is valid, and no more. I did not mean to claim that everyone agrees that if a convert committed a transgression, his conversion is void, which is of course not true, as you yourself wrote.
A. I am not sure I understand. Is the argument based on an estimate of the mindset of the average gentile in the period of the Shulchan Arukh or Maimonides (I am asking seriously)? One could certainly have thought that there exists a possibility of joining the Jewish nation, and that halakhah recognizes this. That is, a person can be part of the Jewish people, and this will have halakhic significance—for example, as I noted above, he would be able to marry a Jewish woman and people would be obligated to return his lost object. On condition, of course, that he complete the 'conversion practice' of circumcision, immersion, and bringing a sacrifice. By the way, on the substance of the matter, it must be said that the duty of accepting the commandments in the conversion process is explicitly written in the words of the Mechaber, and he explicitly rules that it is indispensable. In Maimonides (13:4), indeed, this does not appear as part of the conversion process but as what motivates or enables the process in the first instance, as you yourself noted.
B. Acceptance of the commandments itself, just like any contract, is not continuous; that is of course true. But the question is what underlies the acceptance. After all, the person has accepted upon himself entering a legal system that in practice no one enforces (at least not openly). And one cannot ignore the fact that this point is a significant contributing factor to the fact that today there are many Jews who do not keep Torah and commandments at all.
Therefore, when that convert is about to desecrate Shabbat, is he desecrating Shabbat with awareness that he is thereby incurring karet? Or is part of what enables him to commit the transgression the fact that alongside his absoluteness in accepting the yoke of the commandments, there stands a significant doubt regarding their certainty? And regarding the question of belief in the system's existence, one can certainly ask, in my opinion, to what extent does he believe in the system? What price is he willing to pay for his belief in the system?
In practice, regarding the court's assessment, I believe that in most cases there will not be a significant gap. The court examines the person's seriousness in the process, and as such this usually comes with a sincere desire, in principle, to keep the commandments and to live a religious life.
That is a strange argument. Whichever way you take it—if you ask this because you have outside knowledge that I do not believe in reward and punishment, then you can see for yourself that I do not accept your premise that there are no valid norms without reward and punishment. And if you are speaking based on what I wrote here, I do not understand where you saw any such statement. On the contrary, I wrote that the convert must accept reward and punishment upon himself (although I really wrote that only as an indication that he accepts the obligation. Regarding reward and punishment, I do not have a clear position).
If that is what you meant to say, then you are simply repeating my remarks.
As for everything else, I already answered, and you are repeating the same questions again. I do not know what to do with that. I will briefly repeat myself.
A. I already answered this. There is no such creature as a Jew without halakhah. Does he want to join Hebrew speakers? That does not require conversion, and it should not justify permission to marry him. There are many Druze or Russian gentiles who speak Hebrew.
B. I explained that the issue is not lack of continuity but complexity. You keep returning to discontinuity without explaining anything. It is unrelated to the question whether he is one hundred percent convinced. Nobody is one hundred percent convinced, but everyone is supposed to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. There is no discontinuity in that at all.
That is exactly what is unclear: how do you know that actual observance of the commandments is not required, and that it is enough for him to be aware of the implications? The fact that he is sure to be lax does not mean that actual observance of the commandments is not required—at most it means he will not be perfect.
For example, it is much more plausible that what is required is actual observance on the level of a reasonable, average Jew, but conversion with the knowledge that he will eat forbidden meat and carrion, etc.—that has no meaning at all as conversion and joining the people of Israel.
I explained what I had to explain. If you do not accept it, then you do not. I do not see what can be added here. To me it seems self-evident, and in fact necessary.
Perhaps one can define this general acceptance of the commandments by asking the gentile something like this: "If we assume that keeping the whole Torah would require no effort from you and there were no difficulty or trial at all, and you could manage to keep everything with no problem, would you keep it?"
Because in my view, if something seems like nonsense to me or I do not believe in it, then I do not do it just because "if it doesn't help, it can't hurt." If someone were to tell me that I now have a commandment to jump three times, I would not do it even if it were easy. So if he says yes, there is here in effect an indication of general obligation—whether he sees the Torah as something empty and meaningless, or as something important on the principled level, just that it is hard for him, etc.
I completely agree.
The definition, "I accepted upon myself that this obligates me without undertaking actual observance," does not withstand criticism. After all, in the Gemara there a similar sentence is said regarding acceptance into the fellowship. Can one really imagine considering as a "chaver"—trusted regarding purity laws and tithes—someone who only "undertakes in principle but does not promise to observe"?
Does a chaver also need to be circumcised and immersed? When making a comparison, one must understand that it is made with respect to a certain aspect and is not complete. And in talmudic language: derive from it and from itself, but set it in its own place. "Except for one matter" means: I accept upon myself the obligation except for one matter.
The wording of the baraita you quoted above is: "Our Rabbis taught: If one comes to accept the terms of fellowship except for one matter, he is not accepted; if a gentile comes to accept the words of Torah except for one matter, he is not accepted." No mention is made of circumcision and immersion. But the acceptance is the same acceptance. What could be plainer than that?
Indeed, in both cases it means that he accepts obligation upon himself except for one matter. I explained why an undertaking of actual observance is not plausible, and I have nothing to add.
Let the readers judge.
Additional proof:
Babylonian Talmud, tractate Yevamot 47b
He immersed and came up—he is like an Israelite in all respects. For what halakhic purpose? That if he goes back on it and betroths a Jewish woman, we call him an apostate Jew, and his betrothal is valid.
Maimonides, Laws of Forbidden Intercourse 13:17
And even if he reverted and worshipped idolatry, he is like an apostate Jew whose betrothal is valid.
If "he goes back on it" means: he went back on his principled commitment, but practical commitment is not a condition of conversion, why did Maimonides omit the main novelty and suffice with the practical "he reverted and worshipped idolatry"?
This discussion really is bizarre. He went back on his commitment, and therefore committed transgressions. Usually, someone who is obligated does not commit transgressions.
Maimonides does not say "he went back on it" but "he reverted and worshipped." You are loading onto this the interpretation that he went back on his commitment, because indeed that is usually the case—but it is only "usually," and it runs against what you innovated, namely that the main thing is the principled obligation and practical backsliding does not necessarily cancel it. If so, this is not fitting as an "even if," the clearest example of his having gone back on his acceptance.
There is a claim one hears often—that it is preferable that they convert rather than marry us while they are gentiles. After all, marriages with them, when they grow up among us from childhood and serve with us in the army, are unavoidable. It happens and it will happen. Therefore one must push for conversion, encourage it, and be lenient. This is also, apparently, the mode of operation of "Nativ" in the army.
(It sounds roughly like this—if your child meets, God forbid, a smart and wonderful gentile girl in the army and falls in love with her, wouldn't you prefer that she already be a convert? Therefore one has to push them to convert from the outset.)
I heard this argument, in these very words, from a serious rabbi as well, and I was very surprised.
I have not managed to understand whether there is any halakhic logic to this claim. To me it sounds absurd.
I would be glad to hear your opinion.
There is some logic to this claim (in my view highly questionable) if we are speaking of someone whom we do not accept for conversion due to policy considerations (like the marriage-motivated conversions of old, or someone whom we assess will not in practice observe commandments). Here the conversion is valid in principle, but the policy is not to convert. Policy considerations are subject to consequentialism and updating according to circumstances. But a conversion that is invalid certainly should not be done for such a reason.
Even if he worshipped idolatry—which is the supreme expression of going back on the very obligation, and not merely a practical transgression.
It seems to me we have exhausted this.
According to our local master, there is a difference between acceptance and observance. In this Gemara we are speaking about equality in acceptance between accepting fellowship and accepting conversion. But we are not speaking about equality in the observance required.
So could it be that there is justification for changing today's policy considerations regarding those who live among us, for that reason, and encouraging people to take an interest in conversion?
That is certainly possible. Those are already policy considerations. Though in my opinion the state should not be dealing with conversion matters at all—not to encourage, not to recognize, and not to obstruct. It's none of its damned business.
A. He decided to buy the draft
B. He decided not to buy the draft
C. He did not decide on the matter at all.
A. He decided to observe commandments
B. He decided not to observe commandments
C. He did not decide on the matter at all.
Many traditional Jews are in C.
What is wrong with a convert who is in C?
Why does the rabbi say either yes or no, when there is also the person who has not delved into it and has not decided, but will just go with the flow?
On the lenient side, the rabbi's words make sense.
On the stringent side, the rabbi does not manage to convince, and does not manage to push the understanding that this is the essence of conversion (?) into Maimonides' words and beyond.
The essence of conversion is simply the desire to join the people of Israel, full stop.
The rabbi wants to load more onto this?
Fine—he who seeks to extract from another bears the burden of proof.
And to write "even"? Sometimes something is simple and that is its essence (without proof, not even one proof, not even incidental…), because otherwise this is just a Hebrew-speaking gentile, etc.—that may indicate the rabbi's general understanding and his conception of the concept of the people of Israel, etc., but of course it is neither proof nor evidence nor anything like that.
Interesting.
Especially after Saadia Gaon explicitly wrote that conversion is joining the people of Israel, namely: to be integrated into the people of Israel, and not acceptance of the commandments.
Maimonides, who came after him—had he thought like Rabbi Michi, he surely would have written: no, Saadia Gaon is mistaken. The essence of conversion is observance of the 613. And since he did not write that, and in general omitted acceptance of the 613, clearly he was not concerned with Rabbi Michi's understanding.
Please do not write to me in riddles. If you have a comment or a question, please write it clearly. I do not know what "draft" means or what it is doing here.
If the convert did not decide, then he did not accept the commandments upon himself and therefore he is not a convert. That is all.
And perhaps one can learn from Yevamot 48 today—they do not circumcise a slave against his will, apparently because if he himself does not wish to accept the yoke of the commandments, there is no point in converting him. That is, the essence of conversion is acceptance of the yoke of the commandments.
It is not enough that he wanted to live with us, work for us, and enjoy what we have to offer. He must convert. He must be circumcised. He must accept the yoke of the commandments.
If he was not interested, they did not keep him; they sold him.
?
With God's help, 24 Nisan 5782
Saadia Gaon defined that "our nation is a nation only through its laws," and therefore in his view there is no other meaning to joining the people of Israel except through accepting the yoke of the Torah, as Maimonides defined it: "to enter under the wings of the Divine Presence and accept upon himself the yoke of Torah."
Best regards, Hillel Feiner-Gluskinos
Regarding the reasoning that 'acceptance of the commandments' means 'acceptance of the obligation of the commandments'—that the convert believes with complete faith in their validity and in his obligation to them, even if in practice he will not manage to fulfill all of them—this was proposed by some of the decisors (Rabbi Uziel, the Achiezer, and others). It can help in certain cases where the court is impressed that the candidate for conversion believes with complete faith in his obligation to halakhah, but there are constraints that he fears he will not withstand.
Such a situation was common in certain places in the Diaspora, where believing Jews were forced for livelihood reasons to work on Shabbat because all workplaces were open on Shabbat, and in this terrible situation there were Jews who rose early for an early minyan on Shabbat and afterwards had to go to work with a heavy heart. Jews in this situation, even if they desecrated Shabbat, tried to keep kosher, pray, and keep every commandment they could. So in such a case there is logic to the argument that a convert joining such a community holds a complete faith-based outlook, and will only sin in practice because of severe constraint, doing so with a heavy heart.
But what has this to do with the case before us, where they want to convert hundreds of thousands, some of whom do not believe at all in Torah and halakhah and of their own choice live an entirely secular lifestyle? Does making Kiddush as folklore and a nice popular custom indicate acceptance of the binding obligation of halakhah?
And therefore the Achiezer also required, even from someone suspected of being constrained in actual observance of core commandments such as kashrut and Shabbat, and Rabbi Uziel likewise was not lenient regarding conversions in the Land of Israel. On the contrary, he enacted (together with Rabbi Herzog) a requirement to wait a year in order to test the sincerity of the convert's acceptance of the commandments. Even the Council of the Chief Rabbinate, which canceled the one-year waiting requirement with respect to immigrants from the former Soviet Union, emphasized in its decision (dated 8 Adar 5731) that the leniency was in procedure, not in the halakhic requirement of accepting the yoke of the commandments.
Thank God, we live in a free Jewish state, where most of the economy is shut down on Shabbat, kosher food is easily obtained, synagogues, mikva'ot, and religious schools are readily available. And a convert who has come to believe in the binding validity of the Torah and its commandments can also find the proper conditions to live out his faith and live a fully religious life.
Best regards, H.F.G.
Regarding the words of the Achiezer, see the article by Rabbi Shlomo Dichovsky (formerly a member of the Great Rabbinical Court), "Acceptance of the Convert and Acceptance of the Commandments," on the "Shabbat Supplement – Makor Rishon" website.
He decided to go with the flow.
That is the state of many among the people.
Does that seem sufficient to you?
And the one who wrote "our nation is a nation only through its laws" decided that being a convert implies wanting to be part of the nation and its history, not observance of the commandments.
And Maimonides knew Saadia Gaon.
And if he had wanted to disagree, he would have written so explicitly…
*sufficient
*its history
These words are not defined. Did he accept the commandments but go with the flow regarding observance, or is he going with the flow regarding acceptance (what does that even mean?)? I explained everything, and I do not see any situation that was not covered by what I wrote in the article. Therefore there is no point in using undefined words that supposedly express some third state.
He decided to go with the flow regarding the commandments and observe whichever ones suit him, like many traditional Jews…
He thought less deeply about whether he accepts the 'yoke' upon himself or not…
This is an existing reality among a large part of traditional Jews.
Flowing, not defining obligation.
Though when he does observe what he observes, he does think it is required because of the obligation.
Definitely a third state, and perhaps they are the largest group among traditional Jews.
Then he is not accepting it upon himself. That is exactly the one who excluded one matter and is not a convert.
Some explain that "he excluded one matter" means that it is not part of the deal at all.
That is, he agrees/wants to be a Jew, provided that shatnez does not apply to him and he not be punished for it (because he has a nice shatnez sweater from grandma). That is someone who cannot be converted—that is, to be Jewish from the outset only in part, and especially with part excluded.
But that does not prove that one must in general accept actually observing the commandments; rather, only that he knows this is the deal and that he will receive reward if he observes and punishment if he whistles at it…
And there are no exceptional commandments.
But he need not undertake to observe, and certainly there is no need for some estimation of his seriousness about observing even anything at all.
Only that he knows this is a deal that includes all the commandments.
For clarification of the positions of the Achiezer and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who discussed being lenient in certain situations where there is concern that one will be forced to violate certain commandments because of constraint, see the article by conversion judge Rabbi Tzvi Lipschitz, "The Definition of Acceptance of the Commandments in Conversion," on the "Lema'aseh" site of the Torah and the Land Institute.
Best regards, H.F.G.
Up to this point you have repeated exactly what I wrote. I am done.
For some reason it looks like the rabbi is trying to push a camel through the eye of a needle
and is trying to draw a line between the psychological process the convert goes through when accepting the yoke of the commandments and the halakhic requirement.
Suppose I am a clerk for municipal tax discounts.
'Nakhum' comes to me and asks for a discount on municipal tax, presenting all the documents as required.
Only I happen to know that same Nakhum from the neighborhood and know that the man is well-off and not entitled to a discount at all.
So what should I do???
There are two options:
A. Stick to the law, and as long as he meets the legal criteria, he gets the discount.
B. Go to the head of the municipal tax department and hint that the person requires thorough checking.
I do not know what the law says to do in such a situation, but presumably absent another instruction the clerk is not obligated to report anything.
Let's try to transfer this to conversion. Someone comes with some kind of interests and understands that in order to realize them he has to go through some process.
So one thing is clear: his acceptance of the yoke of the commandments is completely fake (not from the standpoint of halakhah, but from our perspective), exactly like that person who came to ask for a municipal tax discount, whose documents are worth nothing…
Only in many cases the judges do not know his intentions.
And here the question is what is incumbent upon the judges.
A. As long as the person goes through the official process included in conversion, the person is a convert.
B. We must ascertain with a reasonable level of certainty that the person indeed has the proper intentions.
And apparently the halakhic requirement is like option B.
Only that in mass conversion it is difficult to fulfill this condition.
Meaning, the problem is not in the halakhic/official conversion process,
but only in the sefat nishma decree—whether we may allow such a situation or not…
There is not the slightest connection between the analogy and the case at hand. The analogy deals with formalism versus essence, whereas in the case at hand it is clear that essence is required. In any event, it has nothing to do with my discussion in any way, because I was not dealing with the question of formalism.
Both Saadia Gaon and Maimonides see entry into the people of Israel and acceptance of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven and the yoke of Torah as two sides of the same coin. The joining of the people of Israel of which Saadia Gaon speaks includes acceptance of the Torah, for in his words "our nation is a nation only through its laws."
And likewise, the "acceptance of the yoke of Torah" of which Maimonides speaks also includes joining the people of Israel, for those who "separate themselves from the ways of the community," even if they keep commandments and do not commit transgressions, but are not partners with the community in the service of God and do not rejoice in their joy or share in their distress—according to Maimonides they are like heretics and apostates, and as the Haggadah says, "because he excluded himself from the collective, he thereby denied the essence." And thus Ruth converts by saying, "Your people shall be my people, and your God my God."
Best regards, Ami'uz Yaron Schnitzler
The distinction between accepting the obligation of the commandments and accepting to actually keep them does indeed sound sensible on the theoretical level. But its practical expression in the most extreme example is simply not reasonable.
For one would have to assume that on the one hand the convert truly and wholeheartedly believes that from now on he will incur many severe punishments, prohibitions, extirpations, court-imposed deaths, and earn severe torments in Gehenna; and on the other hand he does not resolve in his soul to keep even one of these things. What kind of person would place himself in such a situation? As you noted, Judaism is not a masochistic religion, but this is a convert who is a "spiritual masochist."
Therefore it is more plausible that in such a case the fact that he does not intend to keep anything indicates that he probably does not truly believe, and consequently one cannot say that he intends to accept the punishments and obligations upon himself.
Theoretically you are certainly right. In practice you are not. Many Jews who are obligated by halakhah commit transgressions.
Rabbi,
Thank you very much for the detailed explanation; it definitely clarified for me several points that arise from reading the recent discussions on this issue.
I would appreciate your thoughts on a few additional points in the area of conversion:
1. Today, in the conversion process, they teach the convert certain things about Judaism (worldviews such as thought and ethics, folklore such as Bible stories, and holidays and laws such as laying tefillin, and the like). As I understand from your words, none of this is required. A person can come before a court without knowing any of these topics, having learned no halakhah (apart from circumcision and immersion), and knowing nothing about Judaism, and still convert fully so long as the court is convinced that he understands the definition of a commandment and accepts upon himself that he will be obligated by the commandments at the end of the process. Does the rabbi think there is no place at all in the conversion process for the other topics I mentioned (which in any case already happen today)?
2. I would have expected that if the main reason for omitting acceptance of the commandments in Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh was that this is the very process and its whole essence, then we would see much more insistence and precision about additional guidelines for the court as to how to check that the convert indeed understands and accepts upon himself observance of the commandments. In the sources the rabbi mentioned, this does not seem to be part of the procedure, and certainly it would be required that the court be convinced of it in order for the conversion to be valid (after all, this is its main essence). To my mind it is forced to say that this is the reason they require circumcision and immersion, and perhaps one could say that informing him of some commandments is connected to this (though in the sources cited it does not seem to be a significant portion, and the Gemara also does not seem to devote much importance to it). Does the rabbi think the reason for this is giving freedom to the judges, or perhaps some other reason?
Thank you
1. Perhaps there is a place for it, but there is no obligation.
2. The explanation is very simple. Someone who comes to convert wants to convert. Otherwise why do such a crazy thing? Only in rare cases, such as marriage-motivated conversions where there is an indication of an ulterior motive, do we suspect this is the case (and even there the conversion is valid after the fact, so the checking is not critical). It is only in our times, when there are benefits of naturalization and rights, that the phenomenon has arisen that one must examine the seriousness of a convert's intentions.
With God's help, 25 Nisan 5782
To Rabbi Michael Abraham—greetings,
It is interesting to hear that "only in rare cases such as marriage-motivated conversions do we suspect this is the case." For it is obvious and well known that most people who seek conversion do so because they want to marry a Jew/Jewess, and the family of the Jewish-born partner demands that they convert. Even so, the gate is opened to them and efforts are made to convert them in the hope that, although the initial reason is not one hundred percent "for the sake of Heaven," study of the foundations of Judaism and its way of life will bring the convert to actual observance.
The simple logic is that someone who truly wishes to accept upon himself the yoke of Torah and commandments should enter a course that will give him basic knowledge of the foundations of Judaism and the way of life of a believing Jew. Is there anyone who would agree to accept halakhic obligation without knowing and understanding what it is all about? Is there any serious person who would accept halakhic obligation as though buying a pig in a poke? Someone who studied the basics in an intensive course and was accompanied and hosted in religious homes in order to get to know in practice the way of life of people of faith—there is a good chance that his 'acceptance of the Torah' will be sincere and genuine.
Problems arose in the conversion courts because of the absence of a uniform curriculum, so that candidates were asked questions that were not in the material they had prepared. Indeed, I saw that a few months ago the Conversion Authority issued a tender to prepare a uniform curriculum for the 'conversion ulpanim,' and if the plan is implemented, the problem of mismatched expectations between the judges and the converts will be solved.
Best regards, Hillel Feiner-Gluskinos
The leading spokesman for 'traditional conversion,' Rabbi Chaim Amsalem, (Shabbat Supplement – Makor Rishon, responses to earlier issues 827) supported his position with the words of Maimonides that a convert who converted without proper examination of his acceptance of the commandments—"we are suspicious of him until his righteousness becomes clear"; on the one hand, if he betrothed a woman we are concerned for the validity of his betrothal, and on the other hand we refrain from marrying him and are even concerned about his wine until the sincerity of his acceptance of the commandments becomes clear.
So what did the sages accomplish with their enactment? If after receiving the 'conversion certificate' the convert's halakhic status remains in doubt, what did the convert gain from this?
By contrast, in the state conversion system, where the convert comes to a serious study and acquaintance with Judaism, its beliefs and ways of life, and the court is impressed by the sincerity of his acceptance of the Torah and its commandments—the 'conversion certificate' is a strong indication that he is a righteous convert in the full sense of the term, for the holder of the certificate who invested in studying Judaism and passed tests and interviews does indeed desire the Torah of God and His commandments.
Best regards, H.F.G.
Thank you for the answer,
If so, following the change in circumstances (that in our day there are additional motivations), should additional actions be added to circumcision and immersion that are intended to test his intention?
I explained. This is not a formal requirement of the halakhic process (beyond informing him of the commandments, which itself is disputed). But it is clear that the court must make sure that he is indeed coming to convert.
Who Is a Jew, a reply letter to David Ben-Gurion
(6th day of Hanukkah, 5719)
To the minister of ministers, Prime Minister His Excellency David Ben-Gurion, may his Rock and Redeemer preserve him, strength and blessing,
Your humility has caused me to be asked what the law is regarding the children of mixed marriages, whose parents, both the father and the mother, wish to register their children as Jews. I am of those faithful ones of Israel who are whole and loyal to the Torah as our sages interpreted it and as their words were established in the Shulchan Arukh. I have neither to add to their words nor to subtract from them anything. May God increase your peace, strengthen your power, and exalt your honor by virtue of your faithful deeds, which will never be forgotten by our people.
Your admirer in strength,
S.Y. Agnon
So as not to leave the paper blank, forty-nine years ago I spent the days of Passover in Sejera, and I heard there in the name of an elderly righteous convert who said approximately as follows: You, who have ancestral merit, when you transgress the religion of the Torah, the Holy One, blessed be He, is not so exacting with you; but we, who do not have the merit of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and whose whole merit is only the observance of the commandments and preserving the faith, the Holy One, blessed be He, judges us for every light transgression as for a severe one.
With your permission I will add something I was not asked about. Religion and state are, for the time being, like two neighbors who are not comfortable with one another. And you, upon whom the peace of the state and the welfare of the state depend, would do well to refrain from judging matters of religion, whether for better or for worse, so that your mind may be free for matters of state.
May you not see in my words any trace of rebuke or the like. Only because I value and honor you and desire your welfare did I allow myself to write what I wrote.
And peace to you and to all that is yours.
(S.Y. Agnon, From Myself to Myself)
Regarding the proof the rabbi brought, from the fact that we too sin, that understanding the meaning of an act does not necessarily prevent doing it—I would like to sharpen a certain point.
When we (God-fearing Jews) sin, even if in active commission, this is not done through an active choice; on the contrary,
it is done out of an uncontrollable urge, when the choice to submit to the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, is not strong enough to stand against it.
And all this happens at the critical moment when the desire to sin stands before our eyes.
But someone who chooses in advance not to keep one commandment—even something that everyone stumbles in—explicitly is not subordinating his will to the will of the Creator, which is the most basic definition of accepting the yoke of the commandments.
That is simply not true. If that were the description, we would all be exempt from punishment as ones under duress. See my columns on weakness of will, 172-3.
My intention was not that we are unable to control the urge and lack free choice,
but rather that our "falls" do not express our true will; rather, they constitute a "surrender" to our urges and desires.
And they are done in a more impulsive way.
And of course we are punished for that surrender,
but someone who from the outset makes an intelligent and considered choice not to enter this struggle between will and urges
undoubtedly expresses an unwillingness to subordinate himself to a new system of rules,
and certainly does not properly grasp the meaning of reward and punishment.
There is no difference. If that person estimates that he will transgress because of his inclination, that is exactly like us. It does not contradict acceptance of the commandments. Of course, if in the court's assessment there is no acceptance of the commandments here, then he is not a convert. I am only arguing that this is not necessary, and the assessment of what will happen is at most an indication and not an essential defect in the conversion.
"Perhaps he even thinks from the outset that there are certain halakhot he will not even try to observe, and that too is perfectly fine as far as the validity of the conversion is concerned (of course, halakhically that is not okay). All that is required is that he understand that this obligates him and that he will be punished, and that he accepts this upon himself at the time of conversion."
Less precise.
If this interests anyone here, look at comment no. 3 below,
where I responded to Rabbi Melamed, may he live long, on the above matter in Parashat Shemini,
in the third of the seven explanatory articles he has published so far on conversion:
https://yhb.org.il/shiurim/revivim988/
Here are more confusions of the sort I was talking about in the column: https://mobile.srugim.co.il/article/674513
With God's help, Lag BaOmer 32, 5782
The reasoning advanced by some of the later authorities—that a convert who accepts upon himself obligation for all the commandments, their reward and punishment, even though he will not keep all the commandments, still has full acceptance of the commandments—can help in a case where one may assume that the convert's belief in the validity of halakhah is complete, and only constraint leads him to violate some of the commandments.
This situation was common in places where one could not find work without desecrating Shabbat, and there were entire communities in which everyone were believers, but the pressure of livelihood led them to desecrate Shabbat with a heavy heart. In such a community there was room to argue in favor of the convert that his acceptance of the commandments was complete, and only because of financial pressure and the like would he transgress them.
In our land, where most of the economy rests on Shabbat, it is hard to assume that someone who does not keep Shabbat believes in the binding validity of the commandment of Shabbat and is driven to violate it only by necessity. Usually we are dealing with someone of a secular worldview who does not accept the validity of halakhah, and in such a case what good does it do if he lights candles and makes Kiddush as folklore without belief in the binding validity of halakhah?
When a person goes through a basic course in the conversion ulpan to become acquainted with Judaism, its foundations and its ways of life, and is hosted in homes of Torah- and commandment-observant Jews in order to get to know the life of an observant Jew up close, there is more indication of the sincerity of his acceptance of the commandments at the time. But when it is clear מראש to the court that the convert is not going to keep Shabbat and kashrut, it is very hard to seriously assume that he believes in their binding validity.
Best regards, Eliam Fish"l Workheimer
I learned this distinction from the writings of Rabbi Eliezer Melamed himself years ago, when he distinguished between an individual joining a traditional community, in which some of the later authorities were lenient, and converting many who view themselves as 'secular' and do not accept halakhah as binding law. I do not know what brought about his change of mind?
I.A. wrote:
Honorable Rabbi, hello,
I read the rabbi's column about Rabbi Melamed's traditional conversion, and I must tell you that this Shabbat I was learning Responsa Yabia Omer, vol. 11, siman 29, sec. 13. There Rabbi Ovadia explicitly brings a position in favor of traditional conversion like the rabbi's words in the column—that he accepts upon himself that this is forbidden and that is permitted, even though he himself does not have the strength to fulfill the commandments—and he does not reject the idea, but toward the end writes, "and further consideration is needed in this," end quote. Interesting that Rabbi Y. Yosef did not remember his father's responsum (this part of the responsum is on page
Forgot—and perhaps that is why he forgot? )
With God's help, 28 Sivan 5782
To I.A.—greetings,
The difference is clear: a person who accepts that he is obligated in all the halakhot but lacks the strength to keep all the commandments does believe 100% in the binding validity of halakhah, but transgresses some of its commandments under compulsion. One cannot infer from this that we should accept people of a secular outlook who do not believe in the binding validity of the Torah, for even if they are willing to observe some customs as nice folklore, there is no acceptance here of the binding validity of halakhah.
Moreover, the phenomenon of people of the sort Rabbi Uziel spoke about—those who believe with complete faith in the validity of halakhah even if they do not fully keep commandments—was common in the Diaspora, where the entire economy was open on Shabbat and it was very hard to find work without desecrating Shabbat, so that there were many Jews who rose early for synagogue and had to go to work on Shabbat with a heavy heart. In our land, such a compulsion hardly exists, and one who desecrates Shabbat does so because he does not believe in the Torah.
Best regards, Yaron Fish"l Ordner
In my opinion, you skipped over another option, which is more plausible.
You wrote: "Perhaps he even thinks from the outset that there are certain halakhot he will not even try to observe, and that too is perfectly fine as far as the validity of the conversion is concerned (of course, halakhically that is not okay). All that is required is that he understand that this obligates him and that he will be punished, and that he accepts this upon himself at the time of conversion."
It seems more plausible to me that if from the outset he thinks there are halakhot he will not even try to observe, then there is no acceptance of the yoke of the commandments here at all, and this is simply a convert who excludes one particular matter. Conversion takes effect only if he makes a clear decision to try to observe every commandment and law. He certainly knows that he will sin—whether inadvertently or because of the evil inclination, like any Jew—but his plan, his general decision, is to observe each and every thing to the fullest extent—as much as he succeeds in overcoming his inclination and weaknesses. Of course he does not need to know whether it is permitted to drink between the cups or whether one dips the bitter herb of the korekh sandwich into haroset, but he must show us that he has decided to observe everything in every respect—unless his inclination overcomes him.
The major practical difference is that, according to what I am saying, one also cannot convert into traditionalism that believes in absolute obligation, because acceptance of the commandments is still lacking when from the outset he decides he will be lax however he feels like it, and not only if his inclination overcomes him.