Re’eh (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help. Midah Tovah — Friday eve of Parashat Re’eh, 5765

Questions:

1. On the two different types of the principles of “general and particular.”
2. How should we interpret a case in which the particular requires the general, or vice versa?
3. What is the difference between the ordinary principle of “general and particular” and the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization”?
4. Does the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization” function specifically as a sub-principle of “general and particular”?
5. What is a “generality,” and what is a “particularization”?
6. Does the rule concerning a distant generality and particularization apply to these principles as well?

The principles:

• A generality that requires a particularization.
• A particularization that requires a generality.
• General and particular.
• Particular and general.

Sanctify to Me every firstborn, whatever opens the womb among the children of Israel, among man and among beast; it is Mine.

(Exodus 13:2)

You shall set apart to the Lord whatever opens the womb, and every first issue of the offspring of a beast that you have; the males belong to the Lord.

(Exodus 13:12)

Every male firstborn that is born of your herd and of your flock you shall sanctify to the Lord your God; you shall do no work with the firstborn of your ox, nor shear the firstborn of your flock.

(Deuteronomy 15:19)

“From a generality that requires a particularization and from a particularization that requires a generality—how so? ‘Sanctify to Me every firstborn’: one might think that even a female is included; Scripture therefore says, ‘male.’ If ‘male,’ one might think even if a female emerged before it; Scripture therefore says, ‘whatever opens the womb.’ If ‘whatever opens the womb,’ one might think even if it follows a Caesarean birth; Scripture therefore says, ‘firstborn.’ This is a generality that requires a particularization and a particularization that requires a generality.”

(Baraita of Examples at the beginning of Sifra; Babylonian Talmud, Bekhorot 19a)

“‘Sanctify to Me… every firstborn.’ This is a generality that requires a particularization, for I might have understood every firstborn, whether male or female; Scripture therefore says, ‘the males are the Lord’s,’ and similarly Scripture says, ‘Every firstborn that is born of your herd and of your flock, the male’ (Deuteronomy 15:19). The particularization came and taught regarding the generality: male and not female. And the particularization requires the generality, so that you should not say every male, even one that is not the opener of the womb; Scripture therefore says, ‘every firstborn, opener of the womb.’”

(Pesiqta Zutarta [Lekah Tov], on Exodus 13, s.v. “Sanctify to Me”)

The Principles of “A Generality That Requires a Particularization” and “A Particularization That Requires a Generality”

Introduction

On this page we will deal with the only principle from the baraita (tannaitic teaching) of Rabbi Ishmael with which we have not yet dealt, and thereby we will conclude a first—and preliminary—survey of the hermeneutical principles. This is a rare principle in rabbinic literature, and as far as we have found it appears only twice: in the passages in Babylonian Talmud, Bekhorot 19a and Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 88b. The canonical example of this principle, which is brought in the Baraita of Examples and in Bekhorot 19a above, is not from our parashah but from a verse in Parashat Bo, also cited above. However, the Raavad, in his commentary on the baraita, raises the possibility—though he ultimately rejects it—that the midrash (rabbinic interpretation) in the Baraita of Examples intends to expound the verse from Parashat Re’eh cited above, and not the verse from Parashat Bo. Indeed, in a parallel midrash in Pesiqta Zutarta, also cited above, we find that the derivation by means of “a generality that requires a particularization” is explicitly attributed to this source. This also seems to follow from Rashi’s commentary on the Bekhorot passage, in his comment on the words “every firstborn.” In the end, however, the Raavad himself rejects this possibility, because he finds in the Bekhorot passage that the verse being expounded is indeed the one in Parashat Bo.

We cannot deal here with these principles in the detail they deserve, especially regarding their relation to the principles of “general and particular,” for lack of space. We will try to discuss some of the main points that arise with respect to them.

Dividing the Principles of “General and Particular” into Two Types

The principles of general and particular can be divided into two types: principles of linguistic formulation and principles of content. The principles “general and particular,” “particular and general,” and “general and particular and general” are based on biblical formulations that employ language of inclusion, exclusion, and inclusion again. So too Rabbi Akiva’s school describes these principles; see, for example, the page on Parashat Vayikra and elsewhere. This is a linguistic phenomenon: a change in biblical diction gives rise to the derivation. By contrast, principles such as “a matter that went out from the general rule,” and the like, deal with a particular case that departed from the general rule and was specified independently. This is a substantive phenomenon rather than a linguistic one, since the derivation here is not based on a stylistic shift in Scripture but on repetition and redundancy of content; see the pages on Parashot Tzav, Tazria, and Metzora.

The two principles with which we are dealing here belong to those based on a linguistic occurrence of particular and general. In fact, these principles function as a limitation on the ordinary principles of general and particular. When the generality requires the particularization, we do not interpret by means of “general and particular”; and when the particularization requires the generality, we do not interpret by means of “particular and general.”

The author of Midot Aharon, in his discussion of this principle, notes that the commentators were puzzled about the difference between these principles and the ordinary principles of “general and particular”: when do we expound by means of “general and particular,” and when do we decide that this is a particularization that requires a generality, or vice versa? It is also unclear what exactly we are to do when the generality requires the particularization, or the reverse. In his commentary on the Baraita of Examples as well, at the end of the section called Midot Aharon, he discusses this principle at greater length than any of the others in order to clarify this puzzle.

A Description of the Midrash in the Baraita of Examples

The midrash brought in the Baraita of Examples deals with the redemption of the firstborn. The command “Sanctify to Me every firstborn” instructs us to sanctify every firstborn, male and female alike. Against this, the word “male” appears to teach that only males are intended. The midrash then raises the possibility that every first male would require redemption, even if a female had emerged before him. For this it cites the words “whatever opens the womb.” At this point the question arises: what about one that opens the womb but is not the firstborn—for example, when a Caesarean birth preceded it, which did not “open” the womb, since it did not emerge from there? At that point the derivation returns to the word “firstborn,” which teaches that it must be the first child.

Simply put, the generality is “every firstborn” and the particularization is “whatever opens the womb.” The particularization can be interpreted as the first to emerge from the womb even if it is not firstborn, and therefore the particularization requires the generality in order for its meaning to be understood. This is a “particularization that requires a generality.”

From the concluding language of the midrash, however, it appears that there is also an application here of the principle “a generality that requires a particularization.” It is not entirely clear what is meant, since the particularization “whatever opens the womb” does not teach anything about the generality. In the midrash, the words “whatever opens the womb” teach about the particular “male,” whose meaning is relevant only if it is first, and not if a female emerged before it. Seemingly, this is one particular revealing something about another particular, not a “generality that requires a particularization.”

One could understand that after the particular “male” has revealed something about the generality, we would then think that we now have a new generality: “every firstborn that is male.” This generality would be interpreted as meaning every first among the males, even if a female emerged before it. Then the particular “whatever opens the womb” comes back and reveals that when a male emerges after a female, he is not subject to redemption.¹

Where Is “Male” Written?

The first question that arises upon reading the derivation is: where, exactly, is the word “male” written in the verse? The verse in question is the verse from Parashat Bo quoted above, and the word “male” is not mentioned there at all. From the parallel midrash in Pesiqta Zutarta, it appears that the intention is to the word “the males,” taken from verse 12 of the same chapter.

But here the Raavad already comments in his explanation of the Baraita of Examples: how can we derive a “general and particular” when the two are separated by ten verses? See the page on Parashat Ki Tissa for that issue. Beyond that, it is not clear why the midrash does not simply use verse 12 directly and take both the generality and the particularization from there. True, the words “every firstborn” are not there, but another generality does appear there: “whatever opens the womb.”

It is also difficult to understand why the baraita does not use the verse from our parashah, in which both the generality “every firstborn” and the particularization “male” appear. True, here the particularization “whatever opens the womb” does not appear, and therefore only the derivation of “a generality that requires a particularization” can be performed here, whereas the derivation in terms of “a particularization that requires a generality” would still have to be made from the original verse. We would then arrive at a structure like that of the Pesiqta Zutarta, as described below.

The Raavad raises the possibility that the baraita intends the verse in our parashah. He does not mention the Pesiqta Zutarta, which makes this connection explicitly, though only as a supplement to the derivation on our verse. Rashi’s words in the Bekhorot passage also seem to point in that direction, since in his comment on the words “every firstborn” he writes that the particularization is “that is born of your herd and of your flock, the male.” That is exactly the verse in our parashah.

But this, too, is difficult: how can one explain the baraita this way when the particularization “whatever opens the womb” does not appear at all in the verse in our parashah? And furthermore, why does the Raavad not offer an interpretation according to which the source is only verse 12, which contains all the components of the derivation?

The Midrash in Pesiqta Zutarta

From the parallel midrash in Pesiqta Zutarta it emerges that there are two different particulars here, and two different derivations. The derivation of “a particularization that requires a generality” is as in the Baraita of Examples: the generality “every firstborn” reveals that the particularization “whatever opens the womb” does not mean the first to emerge from the womb even if it is not firstborn. But the derivation of “a generality that requires a particularization” is different; it is based on a different particular, namely “male” and not “whatever opens the womb.” From the generality “every firstborn” we would have thought that both male and female require redemption, and the particular “male” teaches that only a male is included.²

It should be noted that the structure of this midrash is not clear. The derivation by means of “a generality that requires a particularization” is made from two verses in Parashat Bo, verses 2 and 12. After that there appears an unclear addition from the verse in our parashah, which apparently offers either an example or an additional source for the same derivation. At the end, the midrash brings a derivation by means of “a particularization that requires a generality,” but it is not clear to which verse this applies. Is it a continuation of the derivation from the verse in our parashah? If so, it is unclear where the expression “whatever opens the womb” comes from, since it does not appear in that verse at all. It seems more likely that at this point the author of the midrash returns to the verses in Parashat Bo, and from them derives “a particularization that requires a generality,” to exclude the case where a female emerged before it. It should be noted that the expression “every firstborn, whatever opens the womb” appears in neither of the two verses. The word “firstborn” suggests that the intention is probably to verse 2, in which case the correct reading should be “every firstborn, opener of every womb.”

Can Everything Be Derived from Verse 12?

We have seen that the baraita, and after it the Raavad, are unwilling to use verse 12 as the sole source for the derivation, despite the fact that it contains both a generality—“whatever opens the womb”—and a particularization—“the males.” Let us examine whether these derivations could in fact have been made from that verse, under which of the two principles, and for which laws.

In these derivations, the firstborn that requires redemption is characterized by three properties: it must be firstborn, that is, born first in any manner; it must be male; and it must be born through the womb and not by Caesarean section. These are the three properties that define the group of infants subject to redemption.³

The generality in this verse is “whatever opens the womb.” One might then think that both male and female are included, but Scripture says “the males.” If so, the derivation of “a generality that requires a particularization” can certainly be made here. By contrast, the possibility that one who opens the womb after a prior Caesarean birth is liable for redemption cannot be excluded here, since the verse does not mention “firstborn.” However, another derivation by means of “a particularization that requires a generality” is apparently possible here, since the possibility of understanding the particular “the males” to mean that even a male preceded by a female is subject to redemption is excluded by the phrase “whatever opens the womb.”

So there is a possibility of deriving this verse by means of both principles, and in that case the same particular would serve for both. Still, not all the relevant laws can be derived from here, because the case in which a Caesarean birth preceded the opener of the womb is not excluded by this verse.

Conclusions: Is This One Principle or Two?

The only reason that the Sages, and following them the Raavad, do not apply the derivation to verse 12 is that not all the laws can be derived from it. But this is not clear. Why must all the laws be derived from one verse? Why should we not learn the exclusion of a Caesarean birth preceding the opener of the womb from another verse—for example, by applying the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality” to verse 2?

It seems that because we are dealing here with the definition of the group to which the law of redemption of the firstborn applies, the entire characterization must be learned from one and the same verse. This is also evident from the very fact that the derivations by means of the two principles are applied to the same verse itself. We have seen that these are extraordinarily rare derivations in rabbinic literature, and their canonical occurrence uses both of them together. The Baraita of Examples also opens with the question: “From a particularization that requires a generality and from a generality that requires a particularization—how so?” This suggests that the whole matter is one structure.⁴

It therefore seems that our structure, in which the generality requires the particularization and the particularization requires the generality, is one structure, entirely designed to teach about the nature of the generality in question. For that reason, when one of the defining features is missing, the derivation is incomplete; and therefore the Sages do not use verse 12 for this purpose.

It should be noted that this claim applies to our derivation, but it is not necessarily true of every midrashic use of these principles. The second use in the Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 88b, mentions only the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization,” and not the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality.”

To be sure, according to this there would have been an advantage in deriving from verse 12, because there the particular serving the two derivations would be the same particular. The midrash did not use this verse because of what is lacking in it, but that itself points to the plausibility of our earlier suggestion that in our midrash the same particular serves both derivations. We should note again that in Pesiqta Zutarta this is clearly not the case.

Rashi’s Approach in Bekhorot

Rashi in Bekhorot takes a different route. In his view, the first derivation is an ordinary derivation of “general and particular,” which narrows the generality “every firstborn” by the rule of “only what is in the particular,” restricting it to males alone. In his view, the next two derivations in the baraita are the ones that use the two principles illustrated here.

According to this, the problem of where “male” appears is solved, since it indeed appears in the verse from our parashah. On the other hand, the expression “whatever opens the womb” does not appear in our parashah, and it is therefore unclear how it is learned from there. In addition, it is clear from the Bekhorot passage itself that the derivation is from the verse in Parashat Bo, as the Raavad already noted.

It appears that Rashi means something else. The first derivation in the baraita is based on the verse from our parashah, and it is an ordinary derivation of “general and particular.” After that come the two derivations of “a generality that requires a particularization” and “a particularization that requires a generality,” both based on verse 2 in Parashat Bo. According to Rashi, there is no need at all for verse 12, since the particular “male” is taken from our parashah and plays no role in the derivations of “a particularization that requires a generality” and “a generality that requires a particularization.”⁵

In these two derivations, the particular is “whatever opens the womb” and the generality is “every firstborn.” The generality needs the particular in order to exclude from the generality “male firstborn”—exactly as we suggested above in explaining the baraita—a case in which a female is born before him, in which case he is first among the males but not the firstborn. The particular “whatever opens the womb” needs the generality “firstborn” in order to exclude a Caesarean birth that preceded the opener of the womb.

According to Rashi, there is first a derivation of “general and particular,” whose result defines the generality as “male firstborn.” It is with respect to this generality that the two derivations by means of “a generality that requires a particularization” and “a particularization that requires a generality” are then carried out. Here one sees much more sharply the requirement that both derivations under these two principles be performed on the same verse, as though they were one structure. On the other hand, according to Rashi, part of the definition of the generality is itself produced by a derivation from a different verse.⁶

Comparison to the Principles of “General and Particular” and “Particular and General”: When the Generality Does Not Need the Particularization

We have already mentioned the uncertainty of the early authorities regarding the application of these principles, and now we can understand it better.

From what we have said so far, it emerges that these two principles function as reservations upon the ordinary principles of “general and particular.” When there is dependence between the generality and the particularization, we do not apply the ordinary principles of general and particular but these principles instead. From this we can also understand the Raavad’s comment, where he asks how we can apply these principles to a situation in which the particularization is distant from the generality. The principle that one does not derive general and particular when the particularization is distant was stated with regard to the principles of general and particular. The Raavad assumes that it applies also to the principles under discussion. Presumably this is based on the conception that these two principles are merely reservations upon the ordinary principles of “general and particular,” something like their sub-principles.⁷

Suppose we were to relate to the verse in our parashah by way of the principle of “general and particular.” The generality would be “every firstborn,” and the particularization “the males.”⁸ The rule we have is that in an occurrence of “general and particular,” one judges “only what is in the particular.” That is, one narrows the generality of firstborns to the group of males. But that is exactly what we are doing here as well: narrowing firstborns to males alone.

Two questions arise here, both discussed by the early authorities and commentators. The author of Midot Aharon, at the beginning of chapter 8, brings both:

1. At the level of application: it is not clear what the difference is between what we are supposed to do when the generality requires the particularization and a case in which it does not.
2. At the level of identifying the relevant principle for a given biblical occurrence—and this is merely the other side of the same coin—how do we know when to apply the principle of “general and particular” and not the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization”? After all, in the principle of “general and particular” we always restrict the generality to the sub-group represented by the particularization. If so, we exclude part of what would have been included without that restriction, and therefore the generality needs the refinement effected by the particularization. Without the particularization it would have been understood more broadly.

For comparison, let us briefly consider the principle of “particular and general.” In a case where the particular does not require the general, we use the principle of “particular and general,” and that leads us to broaden the particular. But in the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality,” the particular is narrowed by the generality rather than broadened by it. For example, the particular “whatever opens the womb” is narrowed by the generality “every firstborn” in order to exclude a case in which a Caesarean birth preceded the opener of the womb. Which of the two questions above is answered by this principle?

Question 1 certainly poses no difficulty here, because the difference in application is clear: in “particular and general” we broaden the particular, whereas in “a particularization that requires a generality” we narrow the particular.

With respect to question 2, however, the matter is more complex. One might say that when the general broadens the particular we should apply the principle of “particular and general,” whereas when it narrows it we should use the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality.” But that merely identifies the two questions with one another. We still lack a clear criterion for deciding when to apply which principle.

Are the Principles Divided in Parallel?

Another question that arises here is the following: what happens in a biblical occurrence of a generality followed by a particularization, where it is not the generality that needs the particularization but rather the particularization that needs the generality? Should we treat this by means of the principle of “general and particular,” or by means of the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality”?

In other words: does the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization” always refer to a generality that appears before the particularization, or not necessarily? And similarly for its counterpart. Or, alternatively: does the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization” always qualify the use of “general and particular,” or can it qualify either of the two sister principles?

If we consider the examples before us, as well as the passage in Hullin 88b, it appears that the parallelism is, at least at first glance, preserved. The principle of “a generality that requires a particularization” always relates to an occurrence of “general and particular.” So too it seems from the words of the commentators, who treated these principles as parallel, each one qualifying only one of the two ordinary principles.⁹

However, in the examples we have brought, the derivation of “a particularization that requires a generality” does not preserve that structure. It too is applied to a structure of “general and particular,” in which the particular appears in the verse after the generality. Thus, the derivations by means of both principles relate to a structure of “general and particular.” Does that mean that there is no parallelism between the two sides? Or perhaps there is an asymmetry: the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization” is applied only to occurrences of “general and particular,” but the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality” does not require any directionality? Or perhaps both principles are applied only to a structure of “general and particular,” whereas “particular and general” is always applied, regardless of the relation between the particularization and the generality?

Above, in discussing the difficulties arising from comparison to the principles of “general and particular,” we assumed that the principles were divided in parallel—that is, that the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality” is applied to an occurrence of “particular and general.” But now we see that this is not correct. In our derivations, this principle too is applied to a structure of “general and particular.” The comparison between “a particularization that requires a generality” and “general and particular” does not materially change the picture. Here too the questions do not arise, and it seems that they pose a difficulty only for the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization,” and not for “a particularization that requires a generality.”

The Approach of the Author of Midot Aharon

The author of Midot Aharon, at the beginning of chapter 9, claims that the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality” qualifies the principle of “particular and general.” Yet he himself brings the example from the Baraita of Examples, which shows the opposite, and this requires further clarification.

The Logic of These Principles

The logic behind the use of these principles also requires explanation. Does the existence of a connection—or dependence—between the particular and the general prevent us from treating them as structures of “particular and general” or “general and particular”? If so, is direction important? Why, if that is indeed correct—as the commentators seem to imply—does a generality that requires a particularization prevent only a derivation of “general and particular,” and not a derivation of “particular and general”? We have already seen that directionality is extremely important in the ordinary derivations of “general and particular.” Here we see that it is apparently important also in relation to our principles—that is, in relation to the connections between the particular and the general that qualify the ordinary principles of “general and particular.”

An explanation of this phenomenon requires us to understand the rationale behind the derivations of “general and particular.” If we understand the logic of those derivations, we may then be able to understand the qualifications on their operation.

Rashi’s Approach in Bekhorot Regarding the Distinction Between the Pairs of Principles

Rashi, in the Babylonian Talmud passage in Bekhorot, elaborates on the distinction between the principle of “general and particular” and the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization,” while also mentioning the difficulties raised above.

Rashi explains that in a case of “general and particular,” the meaning of the generality—that is, the class of entities to which it refers—is clear. The particular that follows narrows it to a smaller subset that is contained within it. By contrast, “a generality that requires a particularization” is a case of ambiguity in the meaning of the generality itself. The generality admits two different interpretations, and the particular determines which of them we must choose. This is not necessarily a narrowing of one class, but the selection of one of two classes.¹⁰

In our example, the term “firstborn” refers to males and females alike, and therefore restricting it to males is an ordinary case of “general and particular.” There is no possibility of interpreting “firstborn” as applying only to males. It clearly includes both males and females, and the particular narrows it beyond its basic meaning. By contrast, with respect to the parameters that arise in the derivation of “a generality that requires a particularization,” the term “male firstborn”—the result of the earlier derivation of “general and particular,” which according to Rashi supplies the generality for what follows—can bear either of two interpretations: “first among the males,” meaning even if a female preceded it; or “a male who is also first,” meaning a male preceded by no one at all.¹¹ Here the particular “whatever opens the womb” chooses for the generality the meaning “a male who is first.”

Rashi does not explicitly address the parallel pair, “particular and general” and “a particularization that requires a generality,” but his language suggests that he sees matters symmetrically. The need of the particular for the general is understood in the same way: the general chooses among possible meanings, rather than narrowing or broadening the meaning.

Resolving the Above Difficulties According to Rashi’s Proposal

From Rashi’s explanation, it seems that the two difficulties we raised are very well resolved. We saw that with respect to “a particularization that requires a generality” no real difficulty arose, and therefore there is no need to examine Rashi’s words on that point. But with respect to “a generality that requires a particularization,” the difference between the two principles in actual application is now quite clear: one narrows the meaning to a subset, whereas the other chooses among meanings. The question of how to identify the relevant principle is likewise tied to the first question: if there is ambiguity between two possible interpretations of the generality, then we should use the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization”; and if the term is clear and the particular narrows it, then the ordinary principle of “general and particular” is called for.

A Note from the Example in Hullin

Rashi there explains accordingly the second example in the Talmud of the principle “a generality that requires a particularization,” in Babylonian Talmud, Hullin 88b. The Gemara there discusses the command to cover the blood, based on the verse “and he shall cover it with dust.” The generality is “and he shall cover it,” and the particularization is “with dust.” Rashi explains that the term “covering” can mean either covering by placing a vessel over the item, or covering with something that disperses. Therefore the particular reveals that the intention is the meaning involving something that disperses. A derivation by means of “general and particular” would have led to the exclusion of ground stones, lime, and the like—“only what is in the particular,” that is, only dust.

It should be noted that here the two meanings look like alternatives that do not exclude one another. The phrase could mean covering with a vessel, or with dust, or with both, and the particular excludes covering with a vessel and leaves only covering with dust. If so, this would seem to be narrowing, not choosing between two meanings. Why, then, is this not an ordinary derivation of “general and particular”?

It appears that the difference lies in the fact that the term “covering” can also be interpreted as meaning only covering with dust, and not covering with a vessel. This differs from “firstborn,” which cannot at all be interpreted as meaning only a male, and therefore clearly involves a narrowing of the meaning. Here, by contrast, there is not necessarily a narrowing from the full meaning; rather, there is a selection of one meaning from two.

Two comments should be made on this:

1. It is not clear why Rashi’s proposed interpretation of the term “covering” is in fact correct. We have seen that according to Rashi, “covering” can be interpreted only as covering with dust. But can “covering” really be understood as covering only with dust and not with a vessel? It would seem that here too we have narrowing rather than a choice between alternatives.
2. Even if Rashi’s interpretation of the term “covering” is possible, it may still be a narrowing, only not necessarily so. In other words: according to Rashi, the Gemara’s decision that this is a matter of choosing rather than narrowing is possible, but not necessary. After all, the term “covering” may indeed be interpreted as meaning only covering with dust, in which case we have a choice between meanings; but it may also be interpreted as covering with anything, in which case what occurs here is a narrowing of the meaning.

The first question concerns literal interpretation of biblical language, and we will not enter into it here. For the sake of the present discussion, let us accept Rashi’s claim that this is a possible interpretation. But in light of this, the second question seems to imply that it is enough for the final interpretation to be a possible interpretation of the generality, and not necessarily the only one, in order for us to conclude that the principle to be used here is “a generality that requires a particularization” rather than “general and particular.” It is hard to assume that Rashi thought this to be the only possible interpretation of the term “covering.”¹² This still requires further study.

The Raavad’s Note from the Hullin Passage

The Raavad, in his commentary on the Baraita of Examples, explains the need of the generality and the particular in a manner similar to Rashi’s, though there may be some difference between them, and this is not the place to elaborate. At the end of his remarks there, he notes that the derivation in Hullin is not only an instance of “a generality that requires a particularization,” as the Gemara states, but that the principle of “a particularization that requires a generality” is also operating there. We have already seen that the generality requires the particular because the particular chooses for us the meaning of the generality. The Raavad adds that the particular likewise requires the generality, because if it had said only “and he shall pour out its blood with dust” without “and he shall cover it,” we would not know that the blood must be covered.

This comment raises the question why “and he shall cover it” is considered a generality at all. In the example we discussed above, the generality is “every firstborn,” and the word “every” indicates that we are dealing with a generality. But it is not clear why “and he shall cover it” should count as a generality. Seemingly, “and he shall cover it” is the required action, while “with dust” is the means by which the action is performed. Why should the relation between them be analogous to that between particular and general? It should be noted that this difficulty applies to the Gemara in Hullin itself, independently of the Raavad’s remark, which only sharpens the problem.

It seems that the basis of the matter also lies in the relation between the two interpretations from which we are choosing. The words “and he shall cover it” count as a generality precisely because they bear two different interpretations. There is thus ambiguity here, and for that reason it counts as a generality. The words “with dust” count as a particular because they isolate only one of those interpretations. We should note that the term “generality” in the hermeneutical principles of “general and particular” and “particular and general” cannot bear such a meaning, because there there is no ambiguity in the interpretation of the general term. Therefore, in those cases the generality will always appear as a matter of quantitative inclusiveness, and not as a multiplicity of meanings as in our case here.

Thus, the ambiguity in the meaning of the generality appears in two contexts. First, it helps us characterize a given biblical occurrence as a kind of “generality.” Second, it tells us that here we must apply the principle of “a generality that requires a particularization” and not the principle of “general and particular.” For that reason, such a word can also function as a general term here, something that is impossible in the ordinary principles of “general and particular.”

This distinction suggests yet another difference between the principles of “general and particular” and “a generality that requires a particularization”: the “generality” in the two cases may itself be different. What counts as a generality for derivations by means of “a generality that requires a particularization” will not count as a generality for ordinary derivations of “general and particular.”

Explaining the Relation Between the Principles

We still need to explain why, when the generality requires the particularization, we do not derive by means of “general and particular” but rather by means of “a generality that requires a particularization.” We noted above that to do so we must understand why the sequence of generality and particularization is ordinarily expounded at all. Once we understand that, perhaps we can also understand why that principle must be qualified when there is dependence between the generality and the particularization.

In light of the relation between these principles, it appears that the derivation of “general and particular” is based on redundancy, or on some other anomaly, in biblical language. When we encounter a structure of “general and particular,” there is a biblical phenomenon here that calls for explanation. That explanation is supplied by the derivation of “general and particular,” whose purpose is to clarify why the Torah uses such a puzzling formulation. If so, the conclusion is that the derivation of “general and particular” is indeed a textual principle, but one based on a difficulty in the plain sense. Not all the principles are of this type; see, for example, the page on Parashat Pinhas.

The difficulty on which the derivation of “general and particular” is based may be redundancy: the particular is specified where the law has already been stated regarding the whole generality. Or it may be a stylistic shift: Scripture moves from plural to singular language within the same verse, or it uses an expansive term such as “every” where, on the plain sense, it is unnecessary.¹³

If that is the root of the derivation of “general and particular,” then when the particular is needed in order to clarify the generality, there is no redundancy here that demands explanation, and therefore one does not derive by means of “general and particular.”

In such a case, we are in fact not deriving anything from Scripture at all. There is no need for a derivation, because there is no difficulty to solve. The principle of “a generality that requires a particularization” instructs us to leave the plain meaning of the verse in place and not to expound it. As we have already noted, these principles are limitations, or sub-principles, of the ordinary principles of “general and particular.”

Footnotes