Dogmatics – Lecture 28

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There were two versions there in the responsum. In any case, so I’ll say it again: this whole blacked-out passage, he goes to great lengths to say that if you accept in principle the holiness of the Torah and that it is from Sinai and from the Holy One, blessed be He, and so on, but you interpret it differently—the Sadducees, according to the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, are not heretics. They accept the holiness of the Torah and that it was given at Sinai. They just do not accept the interpretations of the Oral Torah. So they’re perfectly fine. What does “perfectly fine” mean? They’re mistaken, but they’re not heretics. But if someone says there is one verse that was added later, then he is denying a fundamental principle.

[Speaker C] But Christians are heretics, right? What? But Christians, unlike the Karaites, are heretics, aren’t they?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In my opinion, no as well. Because they accept the Torah, and they accept that it was given at Sinai and that it is holy. The only thing is—there were other things given afterward, and together all of that is sacred scripture. According to the definition that appears here, it seems that Christians aren’t either.

[Speaker G] There’s also the problem of association with Christians. What? There’s also the issue of association.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what is this problem of association? That’s exactly the point. How did you arrive at that conclusion about association? If you arrived at the conclusion that there really is association, then you’re not a heretic.

[Speaker G] No, but even according to the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, that’s one of the principles.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—one of his principles. I’m looking at what he wrote here. According to the definition he writes here, if someone interprets “I am the Lord your God” or “Hear O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is one” differently—he says one who is three, three who are one, okay? That’s how he interprets the verse. According to the definition here, he is not a heretic. Because he accepts the Torah and its holiness; he just interprets it differently. So that’s why I’m saying—we can get to, I mean, you’re talking here about completely different religions and that’s fine. But if someone says that the verse “to this very day” is a later verse, then no, he’s not in the game. That is, he is denying a fundamental principle. It sounds a little strange: if you’re a Christian and you no longer observe anything, that’s fine. But what does “fine” mean? It’s not fine, but you’re not denying a fundamental principle.

[Speaker F] A heretic can only be a Jew in any case. What—why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with anything? Because—

[Speaker F] Someone who is Christian isn’t Jewish, so he’s not in the game at all, so he’s not in the category of heresy at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course he’s in the game—what are you talking about? He has to accept the Torah and he has to understand that in the Torah we were commanded regarding the seven commandments, and from that command also to keep them. The nations of the world are absolutely in the game.

[Speaker F] No, we’re going back to last week’s discussion, but this—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t even remember last week’s discussion anymore, but they are absolutely in the game. When you say that non-Jews are commanded or not commanded about association—I think we talked about that—then you see that they’re in the game. That is, we determine what they are commanded in and what they are not commanded in, and when if they don’t believe something they’re heretics or something like that. They are entirely in the game. They need to believe the right things. Maybe some of those things don’t obligate them—I don’t know exactly—we already talked about this, that if it’s a fact then I don’t understand what the difference is between a Jew and a non-Jew. But fine.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, if a person had grown up in North Tel Aviv and suddenly functioned as part of Hamas—he did what they did, all those atrocities—we would stand there horrified. But when we see someone who grew up in Gaza and that’s his culture and that’s what he was raised on, our attitude is supposed to be different. And that’s exactly what proves that it’s a cultural matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why different? If I arrive at the conclusion that the person—

[Speaker E] The one from Tel Aviv—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —truly and sincerely believes in it, exactly like a Hamasnik, then there is no difference. No difference at all.

[Speaker E] Why is our attitude toward traitors different?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is always a different attitude in every culture. A traitor—the attitude is much harsher, even though he believes—

[Speaker E] Obviously he believes in what he wants.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with anything? If he believes in what he wants, then I have no bad attitude toward him.

[Speaker E] All of human history, including ours, has a different attitude toward a traitor—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —than toward a person who was simply born there. I have no different attitude. That’s all. Other than putting him in prison so that he won’t do harm, won’t reveal secrets—fine—but not as a sanction in the sense of wickedness, yes? Some response to wickedness? No. There’s no wickedness here. If he truly believes in this, then that’s what he believes—what do you want? By the way, I think in a certain sense, specifically the one from Tel Aviv is more righteous in my eyes than the Hamasnik. Because the one from Tel Aviv who went to become a Hamasnik probably really believes in it, otherwise he wouldn’t do it. But the Hamasnik may be doing it because of social pressure, because of all kinds of other things, and it’s not at all certain that he really believes in it. If I were to make a hierarchy here, I’d make the opposite hierarchy. But that’s all—it doesn’t matter.

[Speaker E] Abraham our forefather kept slaves. Right, it says he had slaves. And if today, Rabbi, someone heard that a person was keeping slaves in Lod, in some neighborhood there—it turns out he’s kept a group of slaves for years—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no problem with him. I have no problem with him. It depends what he does with the slaves, what kind of treatment he gives them.

[Speaker E] He keeps them in slavery like Abraham, but this is in the 21st century.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “like Abraham” mean? What did Abraham do? He had workers in the household, he paid them, maintained them, and they worked for him in the house. What’s the problem? The fact that they called it “slave”—that’s just a word. Just a word. The question is what you’re picturing before your eyes. You see Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and you think Abraham whipped Eliezer across the back with a lash.

[Speaker E] No, Heaven forbid, not Eliezer. On the contrary, I know Abraham was—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what’s the problem with keeping slaves?

[Speaker E] No, because it means—no, what I mean is to say there is such a thing that when you read—I, with regard to two people on the level of principle, after all, I don’t really believe so much in—we won’t get into the issue of free choice. Even if you go with the deterministic line, still the attitude toward a person who managed to sink to that level and behave like Hamas from the city of Ramat Aviv says much more about a moral problem in him than someone who grew up out of—but that’s exactly the point, I’m saying the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, we’re going back. I’m claiming the opposite. What is psychologically more irritating is a different discussion. But what is, in terms of values or worldview, worse—definitely the opposite, in my opinion. Anyway, here there is—I’m saying—some point I don’t fully understand. But from his wording it really does seem that he sees someone who removes a verse from the Torah text as a heretic even though he believes sincerely, whereas any interpretation you give to any verse, any fundamental principle however central it may be—if that’s the interpretation you accept, then fine. And this is the opinion of some sages of Israel—what does “fine” mean, again? You’re mistaken, but you’re not a heretic. And this is the opinion of some…

[Speaker G] I didn’t understand, Rabbi, I didn’t understand the claim about coercion and heresy. I don’t understand the relationship. I didn’t understand? I didn’t understand the connection between heresy and coercion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “the relationship between heresy and coercion” mean?

[Speaker G] Heresy—like, whether you’re coerced or not coerced doesn’t seem relevant in matters of heresy.

[Speaker E] He claims—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that if someone reached a conclusion through his own judgment, and that conclusion is heresy, but that’s what he thinks, then he is coerced.

[Speaker G] A coerced heretic, as it were? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. A coerced heretic is not a heretic.

[Speaker G] No, but I didn’t understand how this relates to Christians—that’s what I didn’t understand, the point about association.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same thing. They’re not heretics either.

[Speaker G] They’re heretics under coercion, because they’re mistaken.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A heretic under coercion is not a heretic. Exactly against Rabbi Chaim.

[Speaker G] But why? What’s the logic in that? What does that have to do with anything?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he’s not guilty. “Heretic” is a pejorative term. “Heretic” is not a definition. We talked about this when we discussed Rabbi Chaim. When Rabbi Chaim says that someone is, poor thing, an apikores, he means simply that this is his definition: whoever doesn’t believe the correct thing does not believe the correct thing. That’s a fact. It has nothing to do with intentions or wickedness and the like. Or else you mean that someone who doesn’t believe the correct thing really deserves sanctions, even if it was unintentional. Here, when I speak about a heretic, I mean it in that value-laden sense too, not only as a formal definition.

[Speaker G] Fine, but it’s still true, isn’t it? According to the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, someone who denies one of the three principles has no place, no matter whether it’s pejorative—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nobody is denying the principles. For now I’m reading what I’ve read up to this point. I need to see what he says with his three principles, but at the moment it seems that anyone who reaches some conclusion through his study is not a heretic. If someone removes a particular verse from the text, then yes. I don’t know why, but yes. “And this is the opinion of some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), Rabbi—”

[Speaker G] Isn’t it possible to distinguish, like, if someone errs in analysis regarding the Torah of Moses itself—not like what he writes, where it’s one of the verses—then what’s the difference? There too you could say he’s coerced and not a heretic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you’re just repeating my question. I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] Yes, so I didn’t hear, because I got caught up in it, so I didn’t understand exactly what the Rabbi was saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question. I don’t understand.

[Speaker G] Ah, that’s the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I don’t understand. And this seems to be the approach of the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, except I don’t understand it. I don’t understand the difference between this and that. “And this is the opinion of some of the sages of Israel among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), who say that there was a sequence of times beforehand.” Meaning, they would say that the Torah does not require one to believe that time itself is originated. Yes? There’s no necessity; there was a sequence of times beforehand, and therefore time was not created with the creation of the world. Okay? Which in his eyes is at least contrary to our tradition, though I don’t understand why. “And likewise Rabbi Eliezer the Great in what he said: From where were the heavens created, and from where was the earth created,” and so on. Do you know this midrash? Maimonides brings it in the Guide for the Perplexed and says that in all his life he never heard a midrash as astonishing as this one. “From where were the heavens created, and from where was the earth created”—the meaning is that the creation of the world is really something from something, not something from nothing. Now if you want, I can suggest ten other interpretations, but all right. The interpretation attributed to Nachmanides on Song of Songs really claims that this is a kind of Platonist conception—that there is prime matter, well, maybe not Platonist, maybe yes Platonist—that there is some kind of prime matter and it is eternal, not created, and what the Holy One, blessed be He, did was only shape that prime matter. So this is not creation from nothing; that is what one sees in this midrash. In his commentary on Genesis he writes differently, so there are those who claim that this is not his commentary. In any case, for our purposes, we see here that apparently when he says that time is originated, what he means is that the world is originated—not that time is originated, but that the world is originated. And here, in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer, we indeed see that the world is not originated; it was created here as something from something, not something from nothing. “For even if his words are understood according to their plain sense, and as at first thought they seem to indicate that his opinion is that the world was not created from nothing but from something, namely from an eternal primordial matter—there is no complaint against him for this.” That is, there is no claim against someone who thinks this way. “For his intention is to say that the Torah does not compel one to believe in origination from nothing, but not that he holds an opinion that denies anything that appears in the Torah, Heaven forbid.” So it’s not that he says: the Torah says the world was newly created from nothing, but I don’t accept that—that would be heresy. But if someone says: no, the Torah does not say that; what is written there is not really to be interpreted as creation from nothing, but as creation from something—then he is not a heretic, because he reached the conclusion that this is what he thinks. “And therefore the Rabbi, the author of the Guide, wrote in chapter 25 of part 2, that his belief in creation from nothing was not due to the necessity of the verses,” because the verses can be interpreted—meaning, you can interpret the verses in various ways. “But his belief in creation from nothing was because it is in itself a true opinion.” That is, he reached the philosophical conclusion that the world was created from nothing, not because the verses compelled it. “And therefore it is fitting to interpret the verses in a way that agrees with this.” So according to Maimonides, if you reach some philosophical conclusion and the plain meaning of the verses points the other way, you need to change your interpretation of the verses, not give up your philosophical conclusion. Okay? This—yes—this is an interesting Maimonides, and I’ve used this claim more than once. Because usually you say: if the Torah says such-and-such, and science or philosophy reaches a different conclusion, then apparently they were mistaken. Maimonides says no—apparently you didn’t interpret the Torah correctly, and it needs to be interpreted differently. “And the Rabbi, of blessed memory, explained by this that what is contrary to the verses is not fit to be believed at all.” Yes? Here: “is not fit to be believed at all, provided only that what comes in the verses is not a false opinion whose existence cannot be conceived by the intellect. For what is a false opinion, the Torah will not compel one to believe, because the Torah will not compel one to believe something that is contrary to first intelligibles, nor an invented opinion whose existence cannot be conceived by the intellect.” In other words, like this: if you see something that seems unreasonable but it is written in the Torah, then it is not fit to disbelieve it at all. Yes? No. You have to accept what is written in the Torah. But if what is written in the Torah is false—meaning impossible, “whose existence cannot be conceived by the intellect”—then certainly you have to interpret the Torah differently. It cannot be that the Torah compels us to believe something contrary to first intelligibles, and all the more so if it is an outright logical contradiction. Yes? “However, something whose existence can be conceived by the intellect, even though it is impossible in nature, such as the resurrection of the dead and all the miracles that appear in the Torah, it is proper and obligatory to believe in them. But a false opinion whose existence cannot be conceived by the intellect, even though it appears explicitly in the Torah, such as ‘Circumcise the foreskin of your heart,’ is not fit to be believed according to its plain meaning, and the verses are to be interpreted in a way that accords with truth.” Wait a second—I’m going to mute the audience here. Moti, Dani—good. So notice what he’s really saying here. He’s saying that when something is written in the Torah and it sounds unreasonable to me, then even if it sounds unreasonable to me I still have to accept it, because it’s written in the Torah. But if that thing “cannot be conceived by the intellect,” then I’m not supposed to accept it. Now what does “cannot be conceived” mean? But you see from the example he brings here that that’s not what he means. For example, he says: “Circumcise the foreskin of your heart.” And “circumcise the foreskin of your heart” does not mean that one must literally perform circumcision on our heart. Rather, obviously it is a metaphorical expression—for purification. And the Torah says “circumcise the foreskin of your heart,” and for him this is called a false opinion whose existence cannot be conceived by the intellect. He is not talking about logical contradictions. He is talking about something that is blatantly unreasonable. Something that is blatantly unreasonable is already enough for me to interpret the Torah differently; you don’t need a logical contradiction for that. So what, then? But which things do I still have to subordinate myself to what is written in the Torah? Apparently those things that seem not to fit nature in some sense, but all right—the Holy One, blessed be He, can do things that are beyond nature. He can perform miracles, revive the dead, split the sea, or things of that kind. So there, although I might have said this “cannot be conceived by the intellect”—no, it can be conceived by the intellect. It doesn’t fit within nature, but the Holy One, blessed be He, who is above nature—there is nothing to prevent Him from doing such things. So that, in his view, is something I am supposed to accept. But logical contradictions certainly not, and also something whose existence cannot be conceived by the intellect—not because it is a logical contradiction, but because plain common sense says it cannot be interpreted literally—in such a case too I am supposed to interpret it. And what does it mean to interpret? One second. To interpret means that if someone gives that kind of interpretation, even if he is mistaken—because it goes against our tradition—still, that is fine: he is not a heretic. Notice: the context of this discussion is not interpretive guidelines for someone who comes to study Torah. He is clarifying something else now—not the rules of Torah interpretation. He is clarifying our attitude toward heretics. So what he wants to say is this: in principle, the interpretive guideline is that if something cannot be conceived by the intellect, you have to interpret it. Now it may be that you made a mistake, and really it can be conceived by the intellect, but you think it cannot, and so you interpreted it. So first of all, you are mistaken, because the Torah says otherwise and it can be conceived by the intellect. But on the other hand, you are not a heretic. You are not a heretic because you gave an interpretation here regarding something that, in your opinion, cannot be conceived by the intellect. He is not coming to justify that interpretation; he is coming to give it legitimacy even though it is a mistake. Okay?

[Speaker E] Yes, but isn’t it obvious to him that the moment we open even an opening the size of a needle’s eye for interpretation—which certainly exists—then it has no limit? One person will say this doesn’t seem entirely reasonable to him, another will say it does seem reasonable, another will say it contradicts the first premise, so it must be interpreted. It’s like the Rabbi explains a lot: the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim is drawing imaginary boundaries that won’t hold. How can that be? So what’s the claim? Okay. That how did the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim not understand that if he opens even a needle’s-eye opening for interpretation, then he can no longer set boundaries—everyone will make up his own interpretation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He isn’t setting any boundaries. What’s the problem?

[Speaker E] So far he hasn’t set any boundaries. But the Rabbi said here that there are some things he does have to interpret according to the plain sense, even though it doesn’t seem reasonable to him—miracles and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Granted—that’s the point. So he doesn’t set boundaries. He doesn’t. Because he says: if you interpret in a way that, in your opinion, is required by reason—that is, what is written in the Torah cannot be conceived by the intellect—then that is perfectly fine, you are within the boundary. Meaning, there are no boundaries. The boundaries are only where you are making an interpretation that is not correct even by your own lights, that is not required even by your own position. That is exactly the point. There are no boundaries in the sense that even if you do something that is fine according to your own view, you would still be considered a heretic. That is what I meant when I said there are no boundaries. Any mistake whatsoever—it doesn’t matter—if you think that this is how the Torah should be interpreted, then you are not a heretic. That is what you think; what can be done?

[Speaker E] What I mean is the guidance he gave. After all, he gave guidance that certain things should not be interpreted but rather taken literally.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously—as long as their existence can be conceived by the intellect! Again: if someone comes and says to me, look, in my opinion it can be conceived by the intellect, but I do not accept this verse, then the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim would apparently regard him as a heretic. Because he really demands that a person subordinate his conceptions to the Torah. But if it cannot be conceived by the intellect, then obviously that is not what the Torah is saying.

[Speaker E] The phrase “cannot be conceived” is subjective. Everyone can have a different opinion, so in practice it comes out that there are no boundaries.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s what I’m saying. There are no boundaries.

[Speaker E] Within your own method itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s what I said. The boundaries are only where you go against your own method, or in a way that is not required by your own method. But if you go with your own method, then there really are no boundaries. Whatever your method tells you—that is what you are supposed to think. “And this is the way of Onkelos the convert and Yonatan ben Uziel and the rest of the sages of Israel, who interpreted all the verses in the Torah and the Prophets that imply corporeality in a way fitting to truth, and removed them from their plain meaning, because their plain meaning is a false opinion. And they said: the Torah speaks in human language and in order to make the ear able to hear.” So notice, it is very easy to get confused here. He is not coming to claim that whoever does this is also correct, that this is what one ought to do. Rather, he is coming to claim that whoever thinks this way—that is what he himself ought to do. And although I may think he is mistaken, he is not a heretic. That is his point. The point is not what should be done; the point is how we should relate to someone who does this. That is his focus.

[Speaker G] Can we take the Rabbi a bit backward to where the Rabbi asked the question? It seems there’s a contradiction here even in the author’s own words. He says that people erred in analysis by saying that one of the principles is to be understood in a different way, not according to its accepted meaning. But then he says, someone who upholds the Torah of Moses and believes in its principles, but made a mistake in one of those principles—that is, he believes in the Torah of Moses and also in its principles.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—“and believes in its principles” means according to how he interprets what is a principle in the Torah.

[Speaker G] No, yes, but it sounds as if one must believe in the Torah of Moses and must believe that there are principles, but there is no closed definition of what the principles are.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but how—

[Speaker G] —you interpret the Torah of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —Moses, you will map out what the principles are and what are not principles, and in that you are supposed to believe. Even though he—

[Speaker G] —does not believe in the correct principles. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the meaning is as if—

[Speaker G] He just believes in the Torah of Moses even if he doesn’t believe in specific principles.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that is the meaning in my opinion. That’s what he intends.

[Speaker G] As if. I think so too, that’s what he means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not “its principles” in the sense of Maimonides’ principles. He himself does not believe in Maimonides’ principles. Yes, so—

[Speaker F] Rabbi, what we just read—the last passage reminds me a lot of the Rabbi’s lectures about monism and pluralism. Meaning, there is necessarily someone who is right and someone who is mistaken, but it is still very legitimate to think differently and say what you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly like that, completely. That is exactly the distinction I made there between two kinds of mistakes: a legitimate mistake and an illegitimate mistake. What people usually interpret as pluralism, I interpret as tolerant monism. Meaning: you are mistaken, but it is a legitimate mistake. Not that you are also right like me, as the pluralist would say. I think that here too he means to say the same thing. And his wording is a little confusing, because in the last two passages it sounded as though he was really pushing some kind of pluralism—everyone interprets as he does, and he is right like me. What do you mean? That’s how he interpreted it. So one says to him: no, everyone is supposed to think according to how he interpreted it, because that is autonomy—the value of autonomy, what I spoke about there. But that does not mean that I think he is right. It does mean that I will not treat him as a heretic.

[Speaker F] Yes, so supposedly the value of autonomy here—that is, even though you are mistaken. Exactly. The value of autonomy overrides the supposedly—exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And you are supposed to go according to what you think, not according to what I think.

[Speaker F] Yes—

[Speaker G] But in the end, according to the method of the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim—just generally—according to his method, divine unity is indeed one of the principles.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So when we get to his principles, we’ll have to ask ourselves how this fits with what he said here. We’ll see in a moment, when we get there shortly. “And this is the way that we have written; it is itself the way of some of the later authorities (Acharonim), who interpreted the opening of the donkey’s mouth in a way that does not accord with the view of our Rabbis of blessed memory. Their intention was to say that the ways of the Torah do not require one to believe in that miracle except in the manner they understood it.” He is apparently—I don’t know exactly whom he means—but apparently people who interpreted the opening of the donkey’s mouth in some allegorical or metaphorical way, but not that the donkey literally spoke. Why? Because it cannot be conceived by the intellect that a donkey speaks. Now notice what the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim says: those later authorities are mistaken; it does not accord with the opinion of our Rabbis. That is, clearly they were mistaken, but they are not heretics. Because that is what they think—what can be done? In their view, it cannot be conceived by the intellect, so they felt the need to interpret it differently. “And similarly, according to this, it may be said that one who did not attain by the level of his inquiry to believe the scriptures in a way that accords with truth, and instead believes them according to their plain meaning, and thereby holds a false opinion because he thinks this is the Torah’s view, does not thereby leave the category of those who belong to the Torah, Heaven forbid. Nor is it permitted to speak ill of him and call him one who reveals faces in the Torah, or a heretic, or count him among the sectarians, Heaven forbid.” Here he closes the circle. And I am not coming—I’m not coming to tell you that everyone who does this is right. I’m coming to tell you that he interprets it in a way that does not accord with truth, but all right, he is not a heretic. Here, by the way, he goes in the opposite direction, because here he overturns the bowl twice. He says: Onkelos taught us that the mighty hand of the Holy One, blessed be He, is not literally a hand. And “circumcise the foreskin of your heart” does not mean to literally perform circumcision on the heart. These verses need to be read metaphorically. Now someone may come and say: no, I read them literally. He discusses the question why such a person should not be considered a heretic—which is very strange. Specifically someone who clings to the verses and does not want to interpret them the way Onkelos did. But after Onkelos did that, and the assumption is that Onkelos is probably right by force of the tradition we received, suddenly the whole thing flips. Now whoever clings to the plain meaning of the verses—think of the Sadducees I mentioned earlier—whoever clings to the plain meaning of the verses against the tradition of our Rabbis and against Onkelos is mistaken. But he is not a heretic, because that’s how he interprets the verses—what can be done?

[Speaker F] Also someone who understands “an eye for an eye” as—exactly—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, same thing.

[Speaker F] And he’s also not mistaken?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—he is mistaken, but he is not a heretic.

[Speaker G] Well, according to Maimonides, that too can literally be interpreted in the plain sense—there is such an approach. What? It seems to me that according to Maimonides there is also a way to interpret “an eye for an eye” literally. “An eye for an eye.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, fine, we won’t get into all the interpretations of “an eye for an eye” now, but yes, that is the principle. Only someone who says: look, we received from Sinai thirteen principles, we received a verbal analogy—“under” “under”—and therefore “an eye for an eye” means monetary compensation; that’s how they expounded it in the Talmud. I don’t accept that, even though I know that’s what the Torah says. Only that is called a heretic. Now try to think for a moment how such a thing could even be possible. So someone thinks that we received the Torah from Sinai and that the Torah says such-and-such, and that there are also the thirteen hermeneutic principles, yes? Verbal analogy and the like. And that this verbal analogy says “an eye for an eye” means money, and nevertheless I still do not accept it. Why don’t you accept it? Just because you don’t feel like it? Don’t you have some thesis behind it? Didn’t you reach some conclusion that it isn’t correct? What? Because either way, if you reached that conclusion, then you are simply interpreting the verses differently, so you are not a heretic. So how can you ever be a heretic in this context? It’s not entirely clear here what—how the state of being a heretic is even possible. After all, in the end you must know that this is what the Torah says and still not accept it. Well, if you don’t accept it, then apparently you don’t think this is what the Torah says or what the Holy One, blessed be He, said. So here apparently we need once again to return to the same riddle I posed at the beginning of the chapter. Apparently I reach the conclusion that this is what the Torah says, but in my opinion it is not true; it is not the intention of the Holy One, blessed be He. And for him this is called a heretic, even though he sincerely believes this—exactly like the verse “to this very day,” what I said above. Even though he sincerely believes it, because it is written in the Torah and he does not accept it—he does not accept it because he thinks the Holy One, blessed be He, did not say it; it is not the intention of the Holy One, blessed be He. But if it is written in the Torah, you are supposed to accept it. If you do not accept it even though it is written in the Torah, then you are a heretic. Only if you interpret the Torah differently, and in your opinion it is not written in the Torah—even though you are mistaken—then you are not a heretic. It is very hard to imagine who this heretic is. And this brings us back to a discussion I’ve had more than once in the past—not in this series, but yes—about how to understand idol worshippers, for example. Same thing, but the logic is similar. Today we don’t really succeed in understanding the phenomenon of idol worshippers. What does it mean, idol worshippers? Either way: if he thinks that this stone really is a god and can do all sorts of things and one can pray to it, and so on, then he is coerced—what do you want from him? That’s really what he thinks. And if he doesn’t believe that, then why is he doing it? In other words, how can there be an intentional idol worshipper who is a wrongdoer? How can such a thing exist?

[Speaker G] There is a Talmudic text that says there really was an evil inclination.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So the claim—as I explained—is that apparently, this is the story with Menashe and Rav Ashi, in ancient times there was an inclination to worship idols. We understand that today as, say, sexual desire. So with sexual desire there can be a situation—we all, or I don’t know, I think most people, believe that having relations with another man’s wife is immoral. But I have an inclination, and sometimes the inclination overcomes me and I do it even though I understand that it is immoral. There we have no problem; we understand that phenomenon because we know it. The inclination contends with what I think is right, and sometimes I’m not strong enough and the inclination wins. This is called weakness of will—a philosophical topic in its own right. But with idolatry we fail to understand it. Why not? So what I argued is that it’s really the same thing. We fail to understand it simply because today we no longer have this inclination toward idolatry. But once, there was also an inclination toward idolatry, like toward sexual immorality. That is what the Talmud in Yoma says: that the Men of the Great Assembly prayed and nullified the inclination toward idolatry and the inclination toward sexual immorality. So once there was such an inclination. And then what happened? Someone who thought that this idol was false nevertheless had an evil inclination to worship it. But—

[Speaker E] Wait—so in the end did he believe in it or not believe in it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? He believed in it because of his evil inclination.

[Speaker E] But in the end he believed in it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “believed in it” mean? Did he believe in it deep down inside or not? This is the story of the—

[Speaker E] He is convinced with all his heart that this idol should be worshipped.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Only the inclination. Again.

[Speaker E] But wait—in his mind he understands otherwise? Yes. So then he doesn’t really believe in it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What happens with sexual immorality?

[Speaker E] No, I’m asking—

[Speaker G] The Rabbi spoke about this with regard to the conscious and the subconscious—

[Speaker E] No, this all stems from the whole issue of weakness of will, which brings us to these impossible corners. Right, exactly. But these are impossible corners of self-contradiction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He believes in idolatry and also does not believe in idolatry. No—those impossible corners, that’s the human being. The human being is a complex creature. This is the story of the—after all, I brought in this context the story of the turkey prince.

[Speaker E] It’s a logical contradiction to say that he both believes in idolatry—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —and also does not—

[Speaker E] —believe in idolatry.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. This is the story, the story of the turkey prince: the king’s son went mad, crawled under the table, and began to eat kernels. He took off his clothes and started eating kernels and declared that he was a turkey. So he is eating kernels naked, without clothes, under the table. The wise man comes to heal him. What does the wise man do? He too takes off his clothes and climbs under the table, and he also eats kernels. So the king’s son asks him, yes, what are you doing here with me? What are you doing here? So the wise man says to him: I’m a turkey too, what do you want? Fine. So the two of them are eating kernels. Then he says to him, yes, but you can also wear clothes, right? A turkey with clothes. So they put on clothes. After that, you can also be a turkey who sits on a chair, eats with a knife and fork. He brought him back to behaving like a human being, and from then on they lived happily ever after. Now, in this story there are two difficulties. I’ve already talked about this in the past, so I’ll just say it briefly. In this story there are two difficulties. The first obvious difficulty that everyone notices is: was he really healed in the end? On the face of it, apparently not. He still sees himself as a turkey, just a turkey who behaves like a human being. This is a behaviorist cure. That is, only the behavior changed, but not his inner perception. He still thinks he is a turkey. So in fact he wasn’t healed at all; he is still sick. That’s one question: why is this called that the wise man healed him? The second question is more hidden, and it’s worth paying attention to the story. When the wise man climbs under the table, the king’s son asks him: what are you doing here? What do you mean? You can’t figure that out on your own? There’s another turkey in the world—he came to eat too. What was difficult for you? Where does this question come from—what are you doing here? It is clear that he understood that this person, this wise man who climbed under the table, is a human being, not a turkey. That means he understands that someone who looks like that and acts like that is a human being, not a turkey. Otherwise, why ask him what are you doing here? Because it seemed strange to him what a human being is doing here. So you understand that this is a human being? Fine, then how do you not understand that you too are a human being? The second question really says: wait, he was never sick at all. He always knew he was a human being and not a turkey. He was just talking nonsense. So here we have two opposite questions. One question says: after all, he was never sick. The second question says: if he was sick, then he was never healed. And my claim is that these two questions resolve one another. A person—say someone who is mentally ill—goes to a psychologist, and the psychologist treats him. To treat him does not mean to create him anew. The psychologist does not dismantle the person and build him again from scratch. So what does he do? He uses some healthy point that exists within the psyche and tries to use it as an Archimedean point in order to heal the outer elements, the other parts of the psyche that are sick. After all, if there is a person whose psyche is completely broken through and through, there is nothing to hold onto, there is no Archimedean point, everything is broken—then there is no way to heal him. You can recreate him, but there is no way to heal him. And when a mentally ill person comes to you and you try to heal him—with due respect to psychologists if there are any here, I’m not a psychologist—but my claim is that if a mentally ill person comes to you and you heal him, it has to be that somewhere deep inside him there is a healthy point. Something on the outside has broken in him, and you can use the healthy point in order to leverage the matter and heal the sick parts, the more external layers. But deep inside there is a healthy point. If there is no healthy point inside, then it’s hopeless—simply hopeless. And what does that really mean? How does such a state come about? And now I come to the answer to your question, Shmuel. How does it happen that inside I know I am a human being, but outwardly I am convinced I am a turkey? That is why I bring this whole story. Just like with the idol worshipper. Deep down I understand that there is nothing to idolatry, but in my consciousness I am an idol worshipper, I believe in it. How does that happen? I’ll tell you how it happens. Think about a get-refuser, all right? A man is very angry at his wife and he refuses to give her a divorce document. They beat him, put him in prison—nothing. He refuses to give her a divorce document. Now, the rule is that we coerce him until he says, “I want to.” And Maimonides—it’s a well-known Talmudic text—and Maimonides says that really, deep down inside, he does want to give the divorce document. What does “deep down inside” mean? He tells you that he doesn’t want to—are you reading minds and hearts? The point is as follows.

[Speaker G] We’re talking about a person for whom there is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a Talmudic text like this too—

[Speaker G] There’s also a Talmudic text that says that inside he does want to. Not regarding divorce, I think, but regarding an offering, there where it says “until he says, ‘I want to.’”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Both with an offering and with a divorce document, we coerce him until he says, “I want to.” But the idea that inside he wants to—that’s Maimonides’ interpretation.

[Speaker G] There’s also such a Talmudic text, that he really wanted to do the commandments, but I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think there’s a Talmudic text like that. At least I don’t remember one, I don’t know. I don’t think there is. That’s Maimonides’ interpretation. In any case, for our purposes, how does this happen? Think about a get-refuser, and for the moment think about a person who is in fact committed to Torah and commandments. Completely committed, careful with every minor and major point, everything is fine. At this specific point of the get for his wife, three judges tell him that he is obligated to divorce his wife, and he refuses. The anger, the rage, this impulse that makes him want to screw her over, chain her, make her miserable, says: I won’t give a get even if I suffer, even if I go to prison, even if they beat me, I won’t give it to her. Are there such cases? Yes, there are such cases. We know such cases. I’ve even met several of them. Now, what is the interpretation of such a thing? After all, that person is committed to Torah and commandments. Three expert judges tell you that Jewish law obligates you to divorce your wife, and you’re a God-fearing person, careful with every minor and major matter in every other area. Why not here? Because of the anger. And then what happens? You get angry, and little by little you convince yourself that you’re right, and really the judges didn’t understand, and the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you, and really the Holy One, blessed be He, also doesn’t want you to divorce your wife. The judges are mistaken. And you convince yourself so thoroughly, because of the impulse, this anger inside you, you build this theory for yourself and dig into it and convince yourself, and you’re truly convinced that you’re right. Maimonides’ claim is that deep down inside you still understand that you’re not right. It’s like sleeping with another man’s wife. You know it isn’t right, but your impulse is so strong that you build theories for yourself: no, no, they agree, and the husband agrees too, and everything is wonderful, everything is fine, and you’ve built yourself a theory that it’s really okay. Deep down, you know it isn’t. A moment after you finish that act, immediately you’ll go back to understanding that it wasn’t okay, and you’ll regret it, you’ll want to repent. What happens at the moment of action? At the moment of action you live in split layers. Deep down inside you think it’s not okay, you know it’s not okay, but it isn’t conscious. It’s already inside, it’s wrapped up, it has undergone sublimation. Now, in your conscious awareness, you live within an awareness or a consciousness that it’s perfectly fine. You built a marvelous theory that you’re completely sure the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you. And you’ll screw over that woman and make her miserable, and you won’t listen to the whole world and his wife telling you that you’re behaving wrongly, Jewish law tells you that you’re a criminal, they punish you, it won’t help. You and the Holy One, blessed be He, are on one side and the whole world is on the other. Now, what do you do in a situation like that? Since this theory was built because of impulse, the impulse caused you to build a theory, and now you’ve become convinced by the theory and now you kind of really believe in it. But it all started from impulse. At the foundation, after all, you are God-fearing, you are committed to Torah and commandments. What we will do is the following. I’ll beat you until you give a get to your wife, and you’ll scream in pain. And after you give the get you’ll cry out, yes, but I only gave it because you beat me, I don’t—it’s a coerced get, I have no desire to divorce her. And I tell you: nevertheless, I myself will marry her off to someone else. I regard her as unmarried, and I’ll marry her to someone else. There’s nothing you can do about it. Even though there’s a married woman here, because it’s a coerced get. What will happen in such a situation? What will happen is that the person understands that he can no longer realize his impulse. Meaning, that’s it, he won’t succeed in making her miserable, it’s over. It’s lost. The moment he can’t achieve what he wants to achieve, the theory he built in order to achieve it will dissolve on its own. Meaning, in the end, when for example you get that prince to go back to behaving like a human being—after all, why did he build the theory that he is a turkey? Because he wants to walk around without clothes and not be bound by all the norms of human beings, he’s sick of all those limitations. So he built himself a theory and he believes in it as though it were real. The moment I manage to bring about a behaviorist change in him, that is, a behavioral change, the theory itself will dissolve. Because he built the whole theory in order to allow himself to behave that way. It all starts from impulse. The moment I manage to get him not to behave that way, the theory will dissolve. And therefore, we coerce him until he says, “I am willing”—that is completely logical. There’s nothing mystical here. Completely logical. With one reservation: we’re talking about a person who is genuinely God-fearing. In all other areas he is careful with every minor and major point. In my view, you cannot force a get on a secular person or on someone who is not God-fearing.

[Speaker G] So Rabbi, then the Rabbi is not going with the interpretation that it’s because he wants to, because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I am going with it. I’m claiming that deep down he does want to give the get when Jewish law requires him to give the get. But that is only true of a person who is genuinely God-fearing and wants to do what Jewish law says.

[Speaker G] Fine, but if a person—if a person is not God-fearing not because of intellectual heresy but because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t matter why. But if he doesn’t believe that this is what is right, then deep down he does not want to fulfill what Jewish law says.

[Speaker G] He doesn’t want to fulfill the words of the Sages. Okay, he doesn’t want to in general,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then the Rabbi says you can’t coerce him? You can’t, no. In my opinion, the rule of “we coerce him until he says, ‘I am willing’” does not apply to him.

[Speaker G] So it’s not based on this idea that we say and assume that a Jew wants to fulfill Torah and commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course not. Only if that Jew is actually known to you as someone who wants to fulfill Torah and commandments. It’s not some assumption about every Jew, the inner Jewish point and all the rest of those mystical notions.

[Speaker H] You don’t believe in them, and certainly they’re not relevant to Jewish law. It sounds very easy, as though the moment there’s some dissonance between behavior and what a person supposedly believes, then any such problem can be solved. People who have, for example, opposite inclinations…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not every such problem can be solved, but that is one possible path of solution. Whether it always works or not—you’re the psychologist, I don’t know, you tell me.

[Speaker H] I’m not a psychologist, I’m

[Speaker C] asking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. I’m suggesting a way to explain this treatment method. In my opinion, this treatment method is exactly the behaviorist path, that hearts are drawn after actions. If deep in your heart this is what you really want—yes, as long as deep in your heart, if this is what you want deep down in your heart, and only impulse caused you to develop a theory and cling to it, and now suddenly you’re convinced that you really believe in this theory, but it all started from the fact that this theory allows you to do things—you built it to justify to yourself the things you’re doing. So once I manage to prevent you from doing those things, you’ll have no need to build this theory, and it will dissolve on its own. And that is “we coerce him until he says, ‘I am willing,’” and in my opinion that is also idolatry. The idolatry of old was a situation in which people knew there was nothing real in idolatry deep down inside. But they built themselves a theory because of impulses. They had an impulse, like sexual impulse. They built themselves a theory: no, no, Baal is a god and one must pray to him, he can do all sorts of things. Okay? Deep down inside, in the unconscious, they knew it wasn’t true. But it’s impulse. That’s what Menashe says to Rav Ashi, yes, King Menashe says to Rav Ashi: if you had lived in my time, you would have lifted the hem of your robe and run to worship idols. You don’t know this concept of an impulse to worship idols, like the impulse toward another man’s wife. You build theories that you’re okay because your impulse tells you that you want to do it. Deep down, you know it isn’t okay. It’s the same thing with idolatry.

[Speaker H] It seems to me this is the debate between Plato and Aristotle, no? That Plato basically comes and says that once you know something you’ll do it, whereas Aristotle speaks about akrasia, weakness of will.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Socrates. Oh, by chance I didn’t know this was a dispute between Plato and Aristotle, but yes, it’s the concept of weakness of will, right? Socrates. And this claim, basically what I want to say—how did we get started with all this—basically what I want to say is that apparently the heretic discussed by Sefer Ha-Ikkarim is something like this. It’s someone who deep down knows what the truth is, and builds for himself some interpretive theory because of impulses, not because he really believes in it. Maybe that could be considered a heretic. I’m saying this is one possible avenue for explaining what Sefer Ha-Ikkarim means. Just one sentence so we don’t leave this hanging: I was asked several times over the course of today’s class… what about the three principles that the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim does accept? After all, even according to him there are principles, and if someone does not accept them because his analysis led him to conclude that they aren’t true, then maybe he would regard him as a heretic, because those principles are so necessary and self-evident that if you don’t accept them then clearly it’s the counsel of impulse. Everywhere there is room for the two interpretations, even if one of them is wrong and one is not, then if you don’t accept it, you don’t accept it; you can’t see someone as a heretic. But in those places where it’s so self-evident and impossible to think otherwise—in his view, impossible to think otherwise—maybe there it is possible to relate to someone who does not accept it, even on the basis of his own analysis, as a heretic. Why? The claim is that basically he is doing it because of impulse. He believes it is true, he has an evil impulse like worshipping idols, he has an evil impulse to deny, and because he has an evil impulse to deny he builds himself an interpretive theory that will support that too, and then perhaps there is room to see him as a heretic. But we’ll discuss that next time. Okay.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, Rabbi, Rabbi, Rabbi, yes, that same entity that decides, and according to the Rabbi also chooses, not only decides but also chooses—so who, what happens with it in idolatry or with a get and all these things? Did it want to give the get or not want to give the get? Did it want to worship idols or not want to? I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I spoke about that entity. Inside, it did not want to, and outside, yes.

[Speaker E] Yes, but could it—could it have chosen otherwise? Yes. So what do I care that it had an impulse? True, there was some topographical map there, but it could have chosen not to give it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, could it? Of course it could, but it built itself some theory.

[Speaker E] No, no, but within that theory that it built, does it have free choice to decide otherwise? Then it decided what it decided.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume it has free choice in some sense, it can do something else, but it may be that a reasonable person in such a situation would have done this. The fact is that in the end, after the psychology or after “beat him until he says, ‘I am willing,’” we do return to these inner beliefs that still exist within him. Fine, when we create a different topographical map

[Speaker E] —obviously, all of us—why don’t we say about the good impulse that it too has its own motivation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, a topographical map only influences, it does not determine; we’re back to that discussion.

[Speaker E] So why are beatings here just influencing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, it may be that they are part of the topographical map.

[Speaker E] Exactly, they join this map.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And therefore I claim that the beatings do not cause me to think differently, they only influence, but in the end it’s still my choice. Therefore I claim that I can think differently. Again, you can’t

[Speaker E] derive a sense of will from that. Again, if in the end a person has a topographical map, he has his difficulties, and in general every situation always has difficulties and advantages, but in the end there is some entity that decides, and it includes everything, it factors in this whole topographical map. Okay. So you can’t split it apart and tell him he did it because he didn’t want to and that’s what came out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if that topographical map includes impulses, then that entity that goes by the impulses chose something untrue because of impulses. So for that it is responsible.

[Speaker E] It thought that the impulse was important to it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very good, so what if it was important to it? But it still isn’t right. A person robs because he wants money, but he knows that robbing is wrong, and yet he wants money. What do you mean, wants money? He’s guilty because of that. What do you mean, wants money? Nonsense.

[Speaker E] No, obviously when a person chooses evil he thinks that from his standpoint it’s the right thing to do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, here is our disagreement. No. True, true. When a person chooses evil because he has an interest, even though he understands that it isn’t right to do it.

[Speaker E] And where is the choice there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has choice—that’s exactly the point.

[Speaker E] I’m not removing responsibility from him, I’m saying…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but that was in the first classes.

[Speaker E] But after he took everything into account, I come to that same entity that decided something and I ask it: why did you decide to do it? Why did you choose?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is our disagreement. Yes. No, the question is whether I follow impulse or whether I follow truth, and for that choice I am held accountable.

[Speaker E] Fine, see it as a calculation, and if the impulse overcomes the truth, then what do you want? I’m coerced. No, it’s not a calculation, it’s a choice.

[Speaker E] I’m not saying that’s coercion, I’m saying that a person does what he truly thinks is right; we’re calling the same thing by different language. I’m saying a person decided: I have a situation, I have an impulse, and I have something written on the wall saying it’s forbidden to steal, but I still want to steal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You want to steal, but you understand that it’s forbidden.

[Speaker E] But what does “understand” mean? If in the end I decide to steal, it doesn’t make an impression on me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, you’re taking it somewhere else… You understand that stealing is immoral, but you want to satisfy your interest even at the price of being immoral.

[Speaker E] So what did you prefer? You preferred the interest. Why didn’t you do what morality says if you knew that was right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I preferred the interest and not morality.

[Speaker E] So you think your interest is more important to you? In the end, the interest matters more to you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You decided that it matters more to you.

[Speaker E] You decided—and for that you are held accountable. You stand behind that, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You stand behind it, and afterward we’ll hang you and you’ll stand above it.

[Speaker E] Right, but don’t come and say, “the evil impulse pulled me, I didn’t do it.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The evil impulse—the evil impulse doesn’t determine.

[Speaker E] It’s a label we attached to it. Evil impulse—I’m not saying I think it’s good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ve returned to that same ancient debate about free choice. Fine, apparently we’re not going to settle it this time either. Anyone else?

[Speaker D] No, in the first classes, when you talked about intellectual foolishness, you mentioned the Talmudic text regarding idolatry, that the Jewish people knew there was nothing real in it, but only did it in order to permit themselves forbidden sexual relations in public. So yes, that also expresses more strongly this awareness, this interest. And the second thing I wanted to note is that the way you explain Maimonides, “we coerce him until he says, ‘I am willing,’” your friend Nadav Shnerb also talks about this. He says that he infers from Maimonides’ wording, “since he wants to be part of Israel,” that since he wants to belong to such a system, this only applies to someone who actually accepts the system, as you say. And he brought there a responsum of the Maharik, I think, which says that if we’re talking about an apostate or something like that, as you say, then it won’t help, because he doesn’t want to belong to that system, so there is no “I am willing.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I also brought that Maharik; I was asked about it on the website. I didn’t know that—does he write that in Keren Zavit?

[Speaker D] Yes, yes, yes, on the issue at the beginning of Exodus about choice, the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Okay, good, maybe we talked about it once and I don’t remember, I don’t know. Okay, that’s it then—good night, good tidings, goodbye.

[Speaker B] Thank you.