Dogmatics – Lesson 29
This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Opening of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim and the boundaries of heresy
- Comparison to Maimonides in Laws of Kings and the meaning of “their pious ones”
- Heresy about the Torah versus heresy about God and the paradoxical claim
- There is no authority over facts, and the possibility of error without the guilt of heresy
- How a heretic is possible: belief as a complex mechanism and self-justification
- Fate, divine providence, and simple faith
- The Raavad on God’s corporeality and the definition of a “sectarian”
- Elisha ben Avuyah: “he knows his Creator and intends to rebel against Him,” and the distinction between interpretation and denial
- Facts, reinterpretations, Popper, and Thomas Kuhn: how do we deal with conflicting cases
- Jeremiah, the complaints of the prophets, and Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin
- Karet, lashes, and the renewal of ordination in Safed
- Beliefs versus actions: the Torah’s domains and its concern with what a person does with himself
- The dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides about resurrection and reward and punishment as an error that is not heresy
- Freedom of inquiry, lightweight people, and the number of principles
- The definition of a “principle” and a necessary condition for a divine religion
- The religious value of commandments as dependent on belief: Ahad Ha’am, Rabbi Amit Kula, and Chabad tefillin
Summary
General Overview
The lecture sums up the opening discussion of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim and establishes a principle according to which someone who holds by the Torah of Moses and believes in its principles, but through his own inquiry reached mistaken conclusions about principles, about the interpretation of verses, or about the status of various beliefs, is not a heretic but someone who erred unintentionally and needs atonement; he still remains among the sages of Israel and their pious ones. By contrast, someone who denies that the Torah was given from Heaven, or claims that a specific verse was not given at Sinai, is considered a heretic, and the framework that emerges creates a tension in which heresy about the Torah is treated as more severe than heresy in understanding God’s will. Along the way, the lecture sharpens the point that there is no “authority over facts,” and therefore one cannot demand that a person believe something he thinks is untrue, and it explores how, nevertheless, the concept of heresy can be understood as a complex mental state of inner knowledge versus self-justification. Later, the Raavad’s comments are brought regarding the definition of a “sectarian,” the model of Elisha ben Avuyah is discussed as someone who knows the truth and intends to rebel, and examples are brought from disputes between Maimonides and Nachmanides about resurrection and reward and punishment as legitimate error rather than heresy. Finally, the lecture opens a discussion of the definition of a “principle” as a necessary condition for the existence of religion, and emphasizes that the existence of God is a principle without which one cannot even conceive of a divine Torah, connecting this to the religious value of commandment observance as dependent on belief and commitment to the command.
Opening of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim and the boundaries of heresy
The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim determines that someone who believes in the Torah of Moses and its principles but erred in his inquiry into rational interpretation and the verses, denied a principle because he thought it was not obligatory, defined something non-essential as a principle, or thought that a certain miracle was not obligatory as a matter of belief, is not a heretic. The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim places such a person among the sages of Israel and their pious ones, even though he sinned unintentionally and needs atonement. The lecturer emphasizes that the person remains within the framework, and the debate is between legitimate and illegitimate mistakes without leaving the fold.
Comparison to Maimonides in Laws of Kings and the meaning of “their pious ones”
The lecturer compares the phrase “the sages of Israel and their pious ones” to the language of Maimonides at the end of chapter 8 of Laws of Kings, about one who acts on the basis of rational conviction, who is among the sages of the nations of the world but not among their pious ones. Maimonides, according to the explanation in the lecture, distinguishes between doing the correct act and having religious value, which depends on serving God and commitment to His command. The lecturer suggests that the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim grants even the mistaken thinker within faith in the Torah a status of piety, in contrast to the model of correct action without command.
Heresy about the Torah versus heresy about God and the paradoxical claim
The lecturer points to a conclusion according to which, on this reading of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, one may err regarding God or God’s will without being considered a heretic if that is the result of sincere inquiry, whereas claiming that a certain verse was not given from above or is not part of the Torah turns a person into a heretic. From this the lecturer formulates that one who denies the Torah is treated as a full heretic, while one who denies God out of intellectual error can remain within the framework, and he presents this as a tension that seems absurd. The lecturer connects this to criticism of those who worship the Shulchan Arukh instead of the Holy One, blessed be He, and argues that in a certain sense the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim turns the priority of the Torah into a binding ideology.
There is no authority over facts, and the possibility of error without the guilt of heresy
The lecturer formulates the principle that there is no “authority over facts,” and therefore one cannot demand that a person accept something he believes is untrue, because accepting it means believing it is true. The lecturer defines beliefs such as the coming of the Messiah or the truth of the principles of faith as factual claims in the sense of truth or falsehood, even if they cannot be tested in a laboratory. He explains that one may persuade a person, but a demand based on authority to think otherwise is impossible to fulfill, and therefore intellectual error does not place one outside the fold.
How a heretic is possible: belief as a complex mechanism and self-justification
The lecturer asks that if intellectual error is not heresy, it would seem that no heretic is possible, and suggests that the concept of belief includes a complexity in which a person can convince himself of a view that is not true even though deep inside he has a different point of knowledge. The lecturer mentions the example of “we compel him until he says, ‘I want to,’” and Rabbi Nachman’s story of the turkey-prince to illustrate the possibility of consciously living within a mistaken theory alongside inner knowledge. He presents heresy as the sin of holding mistaken conceptions, driven by a desire to justify transgressions, and distinguishes between the motivation and the intrinsic problem in the false conception itself.
Fate, divine providence, and simple faith
During the interruption related to Parashat Mishpatim, it is said that above the social order there is the governance of fate, as we find in the division of the Land by lot. These words indicate that each person receives what is fitting for him from Heaven regardless of his understanding. The emphasis is on simple faith, knowing that even what seems incomprehensible and disordered also comes from God’s governance, and everything is for the good.
The Raavad on God’s corporeality and the definition of a “sectarian”
The Raavad’s comments are brought from his glosses on Maimonides regarding someone who says that the blessed Name is a body. The Raavad writes that although the principle of faith is not so, one who believes in corporeality because he understands the language of the verses and the midrashim literally should not be called a sectarian. This is brought as an expansion of the same rule, according to which an interpretive mistake arising from inquiry or plain meaning does not turn a person into a sectarian.
Elisha ben Avuyah: “he knows his Creator and intends to rebel against Him,” and the distinction between interpretation and denial
The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim brings the rabbinic statement about Elisha ben Avuyah: “Return, wayward children—except for Elisha Acher,” and interprets this as one who knows the truth and intends to deny it, and therefore belongs to the class of the wicked, whom it is not proper to accept in repentance. The lecturer sharpens the subtlety in “he knows his Creator” and suggests that the model of heresy focuses on someone who knows what the Torah says and does not offer an alternative interpretation, but rather rejects the content of the Torah. Here the lecturer portrays the heretic as someone who concludes from the facts that the verses are not true, not as someone seeking an explanation within the interpretive framework.
Facts, reinterpretations, Popper, and Thomas Kuhn: how do we deal with conflicting cases
The lecturer argues that the question is what one concludes from the facts, not whether the facts are agreed upon, and he brings an analogy from alternative medicine to distinguish between accepting a story and drawing a causal conclusion. It is said that a general principle does not collapse because of one particular example, and criticism of Popper as opposed to Thomas Kuhn is mentioned in that context. Words of Rabbi Elchanan are brought about “one who recites havdalah over a cup of wine will have sons,” as an illustration that rules can clash and other considerations can alter an outcome without disproving the rule.
Jeremiah, the complaints of the prophets, and Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin
The lecturer brings Jeremiah’s question, “Why does the way of the wicked prosper?” and argues that the question itself is not heresy but a request for explanation, while heresy depends on the conclusion and on the absence of a reconciling interpretation. Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin is cited as bringing King David’s request that Psalms be considered like the tractates Nega’im and Ohalot, and noting that it does not say that he was answered, in order to stress that proof is not built from the request itself. The suggested framework is that the question remains legitimate, and the decision depends on how a person reconciles it with faith in the Torah.
Karet, lashes, and the renewal of ordination in Safed
Maimonides’ objection is brought from the roots of his count of the commandments against the Halakhot Gedolot, which counted karet as a commandment, and it is explained that knowledge of karet affects the way one behaves and relates to the act. The principle is brought that those liable to karet who received lashes are exempted from their karet, and the controversy over renewing ordination in sixteenth-century Safed is mentioned, since it stemmed from the desire to administer lashes in order to save people from karet. These points show a practical consequence of the question of punishment and the definition of the act.
Beliefs versus actions: the Torah’s domains and its concern with what a person does with himself
The lecturer argues that the Torah is also concerned with what a person does with himself, not only with public relations, and distinguishes between legal systems that do not enter a person’s “plate” and the Shulchan Arukh, where Orach Chayim and Yoreh Deah deal extensively with the individual. He argues that there is no reason the Torah cannot also require beliefs, just as it requires refraining from prohibitions that are not externally visible. The discussion returns to the point that Maimonides derives the truth of the principles from the Torah, and the normativity of the obligation to hold them is discussed as an additional plane.
The dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides about resurrection and reward and punishment as an error that is not heresy
The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim determines that one who believes in resurrection in such a way that the living will eventually return to dust, following Maimonides in the Treatise on Resurrection, even though this is “contrary to the truth” according to Nachmanides’ view, is not a heretic with respect to the principle of resurrection. The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim adds that one who believes that the main reward in the World to Come is for body and soul together and that the soul alone has no reward, following Nachmanides and some sages of Kabbalah, even though this is “contrary to the truth” according to Maimonides, is not a heretic concerning spiritual reward and punishment. The distinction remains between error in interpretation and in the structure of belief, and conscious denial of what the Torah says without offering an alternative interpretation.
Freedom of inquiry, lightweight people, and the number of principles
The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim writes that he was compelled to elaborate because he saw “some lightweight people, wise in their own eyes,” who speak expansively against the greats of the world without knowledge or understanding. He permits every wise-hearted scholar to investigate the principles of religion and to interpret verses in a way that accords with the truth as he sees it, and explains that if every true belief or miracle were turned into a principle, then the number of principles would equal the number of miracles and promises in the Torah, something that never entered anyone’s mind. The lecturer points to an internal difficulty in this passage regarding whether the inquiry is only about what counts as a principle or also about the truth of the beliefs themselves, and says that the matter remains problematic for him.
The definition of a “principle” and a necessary condition for a divine religion
The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim defines a “principle” as something upon which the existence of something else depends, and without which it cannot exist, like the root of a tree on which its existence depends. It is said that the Sages use the expression “something that has a basis in the Torah” or “has no basis,” and the name “principle” applies to roots and foundations upon which the existence of religion depends. The existence of God is defined as a principle whose belief is necessary for a divine Torah, because one cannot conceive of the existence of a divine Torah without it.
The religious value of commandments as dependent on belief: Ahad Ha’am, Rabbi Amit Kula, and Chabad tefillin
The lecturer argues that commandments have no religious value without belief in God and commitment to His command, and presents this against an approach associated with Ahad Ha’am regarding Sabbath observance for national reasons. Rabbi Amit Kula’s book Existence or It Never Was is mentioned as arguing that religious commitment need not depend on factual claims, and the lecturer qualifies this with the existence of God and the giving of the Torah as necessary factual standings. A debate is mentioned between Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner and the Lubavitcher Rebbe about putting tefillin on people in the street, and the lecturer argues that the act of tefillin without belief and commitment to the command is not fulfillment of a commandment, whereas if there is inner faith then the act has value even without coercion.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The camera was partially covered. We began Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, we’re already getting close to the end of the series, and I only want the opening chapters of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, which overall give us a view of most of what we’ve gone through. So we started with chapter 1, and there basically the claim is—wait, I’ll share for a second. Okay, here he sums up the claim. “But one who holds by the Torah of Moses and believes in its principles, and when he comes to investigate them on the basis of reason and understanding of the verses, his inquiry misled him to say that one of the principles is in a different way and not as it first appears to the mind, or inquiry misled him to deny that principle because he thought that sound reasoning does not require the Torah to obligate belief in it, or he thinks that something that is not a principle is a principle and believes it like the other beliefs that came in the Torah that are not principles”—meaning, it’s true, but it isn’t a principle—“or he believes some belief regarding a miracle among the miracles of the Torah because he thinks that in this he is not denying any of the beliefs that one is obligated to believe on the basis of the Torah—such a person is not a heretic. But he is among the sages of Israel and their pious ones, even though he errs in his inquiry and sins unintentionally and needs atonement.”
Wait, and now suddenly I’m thinking about it: “among the sages of Israel and their pious ones” reminds me of Maimonides’ language at the end of chapter 8 in Laws of Kings, where Maimonides says that someone who does things because of rational necessity is among the sages of the nations of the world but not among their pious ones. Right, he’s speaking there about a resident alien, but the principle is that if you do the right thing, you fulfill Jewish law, but you do it because of rational necessity, not because of the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, and your commitment to the command, but simply because you concluded that this is the right way to behave—then Maimonides says: he is among the sages of the nations of the world, but not among their pious ones. And I explained that the meaning is that this is someone who does the right thing—he’s among the sages of the nations of the world—but his act has no religious value; he is not “pious” in the sense that there is no service of God here. There is the correct act, but not for the correct reasons; he is not serving God.
So I’m thinking—just now it suddenly occurred to me—that the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim writes here: yes, but he is among the sages of Israel and their pious ones. It seems to me this is a pretty clear link to Maimonides’ wording, except that here it says he is among the sages of Israel and also among their pious ones, and there it says he is among the sages of the nations of the world and not among their pious ones. Right, here it says he is among the sages of Israel and their pious ones. What does that mean? That his views are indeed incorrect, as he says, but if he himself truly believes those views, then he is not a heretic. He is even an unintentional sinner and needs atonement, in some sense—that’s what he writes at the end of the paragraph—but he is not a heretic. He is among the sages of Israel and believes in the Torah and everything is fine; he is a perfectly kosher Jew in every respect. He does not undermine the framework, he doesn’t step outside the framework. Inside the framework there are still those who err and those who are right, and we spoke about legitimate and illegitimate errors—but he remains within the framework.
By contrast, by contrast, if he thinks that one of the verses is not from above—right, it’s not from the Torah, it was not given at Sinai—then there he does regard him as a heretic. And the definition that basically comes out of this is—here: “And likewise it follows from this, that one whose level of inquiry did not reach the point of believing the Scriptures in a way that accords with the truth, and he believes them according to their plain meaning, and from this he arrives at a false opinion because he thinks that this is the Torah’s view—he does not thereby leave the community of those who hold the Torah, Heaven forbid, and it is not permitted to speak derogatorily of him and call him one who reveals false faces in the Torah, or a heretic.” He is a perfectly kosher Jew, because that is what his inquiry led him to. It’s not that he’s right—he’s mistaken—and he even needs atonement for… he errs unintentionally, okay, that can happen.
But here, unlike what Maimonides writes about a gentile who acts correctly but from his own rational necessity, who is among the sages of the nations of the world and that’s it—here it says that he is among the sages of the nations of the world and also—sorry—among the sages of Israel and also among their pious ones. He is a completely kosher Jew. He has some kind of unintentional sin. What?
[Speaker B] Sorry, one second, let’s go back. I’m in the middle of the lecture.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By contrast, by contrast, we saw in the previous chapter that a person who thinks a certain verse was not given from above is indeed a heretic—even though he too reached that conclusion through his inquiry, that this verse was added later. So it seems that according to the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, you can deny the Holy One, blessed be He, but you can’t deny the Torah. That sounds a little absurd. “Would that they abandoned Me but kept My Torah,” as the Talmud says. Meaning, the claim is that if you go against God’s will, you’re not a heretic, because you think that’s God’s will. You’re going against God’s will, you just don’t know it; you think it really is God’s will. But if you go against the Torah, even with the claim that this verse in the Torah was not given by the Holy One, blessed be He—you’re not denying the Holy One, blessed be He, you’re denying the Torah—that is heresy. So what comes out here is that one who denies the Torah is a heretic in every sense.
[Speaker C] The one who denies the Holy One, blessed be He, no—if he reaches the conclusion that it really wasn’t the Holy One, blessed be He, who said it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though in truth He did say it—then that’s fine. But with the Torah, even if through inquiry he reaches the conclusion that this verse is a later addition, he is called a heretic. That’s a bit strange. In other words, there’s some kind of—very often people accuse halakhic Jews—
[Speaker D] those who are committed to Jewish law—of worshipping the Shulchan Arukh instead of worshipping the Holy One, blessed be He. In a certain sense, the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim here turns that into an ideology. You see? He holds that basically we cannot deny the Torah, but denying the Holy One, blessed be He—that’s possible. Or denying the will of the Holy One, blessed be He—that’s possible. But that’s seemingly what comes out here. Sorry, sorry—for him the authority of the Sages doesn’t… it doesn’t interest him. It doesn’t interest him. I mean, someone who errs in his interpretation won’t relate at all to the interpretation of the Sages, and that’s not a problem?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the point. Not only is he among the sages of Israel, he is also among their pious ones. Meaning there is no principled religious problem with what he is doing. Unlike those gentiles who act from rational necessity. Why? Because, as I said—and we expanded on this at the beginning of the series—there is no such thing as authority over facts. There is no such thing as authority over facts. If I have reached the conclusion that something is incorrect, then that’s what I think. What do you want me to do? Accept it because the Sages said so, even though I think it’s not true? If I think it’s not true, I cannot accept it. To accept it means to think it is true. That’s what acceptance means. You can’t demand of a person that he accept something he thinks is false. That is a demand that is impossible to fulfill.
[Speaker D] It’s not about facts. Right, you distinguished between facts and formal authority. But here too we’re talking about things that concern understanding.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Facts. Everything here is facts. If you reached the conclusion that one of the principles of faith is not true—the Messiah will not come—that is a factual claim. Whether the Messiah will come or not is a factual claim. “Factual” doesn’t mean it has to be measurable in a laboratory. It means there is some truth of the matter, whether it’s true or false. There is no third option. With norms, you can say maybe it’s possible to behave according to two contradictory norms—this can be possible and that can be possible, there may be two correct answers. With facts, it cannot be that two answers are both correct. Therefore in this context you cannot demand that a person think something that he does not think. You can persuade him to think differently. If you didn’t persuade him, then to demand by authority—to demand by authority that he think differently from what he really thinks—that just doesn’t… there’s talking all the time here, I’m going to mute. Shh…
So I think what is written here in Sefer Ha-Ikkarim is something that I invested several lectures trying to explain or convince you is the case. And from his perspective it is presented as some kind of simple, trivial claim. And in fact he is right—it really is a trivial claim. The only reason one has to invest effort and arguments and sources and all kinds of things of that sort is simply because people don’t think that way. I think I once mentioned that Maimonides, in the roots—he has fourteen roots for the counting of the commandments—he writes there in some note in the first or second root, I don’t remember which, one of those two, I think in the first, he writes that he brought this root even though it is simple, because the Halakhot Gedolot erred in it. Whenever he says there “others erred,” he always means the Halakhot Gedolot. Because the Halakhot Gedolot erred in it—yes, by counting rabbinic commandments. What do we learn from this? Which roots did Maimonides bring? In principle there are many more rules governing the counting of the commandments, many more than fourteen. Why did he bring fourteen? One of two possibilities: either they are novel, meaning they need to be stated because without his explaining them people wouldn’t realize they are true, or although they are simple, if someone disputes them then they still need to be brought in order to show that he is wrong. Right? Even though the root in itself is completely simple.
So that’s what Maimonides says, for example, about the first root and some others, but he brings things even if they are simple so long as someone disagrees with them. Here too, in this context, the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim writes this as something simple. I’m sweating over it to explain it and defend it and argue for this thesis, simply because many people disagree—or almost everyone disagrees—but it really is simple. Meaning, you can’t say otherwise; it isn’t especially novel.
Anyway, we also discussed last time the question of how a heretic is possible after all. Meaning, if someone reaches a certain conclusion that is heresy, meaning it doesn’t fit the principles we received in tradition—right—then he isn’t a heretic. So who is a heretic? Someone who knows that these principles are true and nevertheless denies them? Meaning, he didn’t reach that conclusion through his inquiry, but still holds it? But then he doesn’t hold it if he doesn’t… that’s the other side of the coin. After all, we said: belief concerns facts. So if you truly don’t believe the heretical principle, meaning the anti-principle, then what does it mean to say that you hold it? So you don’t hold it if you don’t believe it. So how can there be a heretic according to this definition?
So for that I brought the turkey-prince and that whole story there—how can a person think something he doesn’t really think? Right? It sounds a bit oxymoronic. But yes, we are complex creatures, and sometimes a person—even when deep inside he knows something is not true—the impulses and all the twists of our psyche can sometimes create a situation, and I described this at length last time, in which I convince myself that it is true and I really live that way, even though deep inside there is still some point at which I know it is not true. And apparently that is the model that can explain the phenomenon of heresy even according to Sefer Ha-Ikkarim; otherwise there simply is no heresy. Either you genuinely believe it, in which case you are not a heretic, as he says here, and if you don’t genuinely believe it, then again you are not a heretic, because you do not believe the false principle—right—that there is no Messiah. Okay? So whichever way you take it, you’re not a heretic; whether you do believe it or don’t believe it, you are not a heretic. So there is no heretic.
So that’s why I say that the concept of belief itself probably involves a more complex state here—not the content of belief, but the mechanism of belief itself. There can be a situation where deep inside I know something is true, but I will still be defined as someone who does not believe it, because I built for myself some theory, convinced myself of it for all sorts of reasons, that this thing is not true, even though deep inside I know that it is. And for this I brought Maimonides’ case of “we compel him until he says, ‘I want to,’” and Rabbi Nachman’s turkey-prince story and so on. Anyway, that’s what we saw last time. Deep down, he believes?
[Speaker F] Deep down he believes? Yes. No, so he has a desire for something, so he invented some theory—but he doesn’t really believe it. So in what sense is he such a heretic? What’s so terrible about it? He sins like all sinners.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean that he doesn’t really believe it? He really does believe it—outwardly, in his conscious mind.
[Speaker F] No, but at the root of his soul he doesn’t believe it. Fine. So why is it so terrible? All in all he sins because he craves to eat non-kosher food, forbidden foods.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so he made an even greater mistake by constructing a theory that justifies it. Yes, correct. What’s the problem?
[Speaker F] What’s such a disaster about that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s disastrous about justifying an incorrect view in general? That’s what you’re asking.
[Speaker F] No, there are two people standing here who want to eat non-kosher food. If—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If deep down he also doesn’t believe it—do you understand why that’s so terrible? No—if deep down he also doesn’t believe, then he’s not a total heretic down to the root. So that you do understand why it’s terrible?
[Speaker F] No. Because if what Rabbi Yehuda said comes from humility?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what do you want from me? I didn’t understand you. You’re asking: what, Rabbi Yehuda is a heretic? Fine, excellent question.
[Speaker F] We’ll talk about that. No, of course not. No, no, the Rabbi explained to us: we’re not talking about someone who is truly mistaken and coerced and believes because he has no choice, because that is where his whole soul-intellect leads him. We know that such a person is coerced and there’s nothing to do. We’re talking about a person who at the root of his soul believes, but he wants to eat non-kosher, and next to him there is another person who also wants to eat non-kosher and both of them eat non-kosher. One says: I know what’s written, I understand, I don’t care. The other finds it harder just to shrug it off—it’s uncomfortable for him, difficult in the face of all the heritage, the tradition, Jewish law—so he invents some theory for himself and mixes up the faith. Now he suddenly becomes the great heretic? Why is he more severe? The second one seems less severe to me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, I understand—that’s what you asked before too. So I’ll answer what I answered before. If there were someone who down to the root of his soul believed nothing at all—do you understand why that is so terrible? Yes or no?
[Speaker F] I’m saying he’s coerced, there’s nothing I can do.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand that it’s terrible.
[Speaker F] Terrible? Certainly it’s terrible.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s terrible? Why is it terrible? What is bad about holding incorrect opinions?
[Speaker F] Again, if it has significance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, no significance at all. I’m asking: what is bad about holding incorrect opinions? Once you answer me that, I’ll answer your question with the same answer.
[Speaker F] No, but here again, at the root of his soul he does believe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s even worse. So what didn’t I understand? Then it’s even worse. At the root of his soul he believes, and nevertheless he builds himself a theory and lives by a theory that is false—worse than someone who even at the root of his soul doesn’t believe. His deep flaw is that he wants to permit to himself—
[Speaker F] sexual prohibitions—that’s the story here. No, that’s the reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s the reason. The deep flaw is that he holds false conceptions. The reason he holds those conceptions is in order to justify those traits to himself. But he doesn’t hold them, Rabbi—he doesn’t hold them.
[Speaker F] He can’t both hold them and not hold them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He can.
[Speaker F] How can he?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here we are returning again to last time’s argument. Yes, he can. Yes, that’s exactly the turkey-prince. Yes, he does hold it, he believes it, unequivocally. I gave an example for this: an atheist who is committed to morality, who demands moral behavior from everyone—we discussed this last time, I think. He is committed to morality, he demands moral behavior from everyone, and so on. Can you hear? There’s expected to be a siren here, so I may have to be a loyal citizen and you’ll forgive me.
[Speaker C] Herzliya, Petach Tikva, Jerusalem.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Herzliya, Petach Tikva, Jerusalem—there’s an early warning here from Home Front Command. Fine, if something happens then we’ll have to stop; we need to be disciplined. So the desire to commit transgressions is the motivation for why I develop this mistaken thesis or theory. The problem is the holding of the mistaken theory, not the consequences. The consequences are separate; that too is a transgression, but a transgression in itself. The conception, the mistaken conceptions—those are the transgression. Now if you’re not willing to accept that false conceptions are a transgression, that’s okay, I can understand your claim—but then your claim isn’t against me. It’s against the whole concept of heresy in general. I’m only explaining where the concept of heresy lies, that’s all.
[Speaker F] But if the religious court would take that heretic too and beat him until he said, “I return to the faith that I really do believe in at the level of my soul,” then everything would be fine, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Rabbi would say that—and then he also wouldn’t live by that mistaken opinion.
[Speaker F] That’s in Hasidism.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he wouldn’t live by that mistaken opinion. Obviously that would be completely fine. What’s the problem? He repented. There—the siren is coming, so if you’ll allow me, the categorical imperative…
[Speaker G] Even in the lecture they’re all going.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. We’ll come back in about ten minutes or whatever we need to wait. In Parashat Mishpatim we learn about the order of the world, how people are supposed to behave one—
[Speaker H] with another,
[Speaker E] but above everything there is the governance of fate. As we find in the division of the Land, which was by lot, showing that each person gets what is fitting for him from Heaven regardless of his understanding. It’s a matter of simple faith, to know that even what seems to us incomprehensible and disordered also comes from God’s governance, and everything is for the good. What—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is everyone alive? Good, let’s continue. “And greater than this, the Raavad of blessed memory wrote, that even one who understands one of the principles of the Torah contrary to the truth because he errs in his inquiry—it is not proper to call him a sectarian. For thus he wrote in the Book of Glosses on what Maimonides of blessed memory wrote, that one who says that the blessed Name is a body is a sectarian. And the Raavad of blessed memory wrote on this: ‘Said Abraham: although the principle of faith is indeed so, one who believes Him to be corporeal because he understands the language of the verses and the midrashim literally—it is not proper to call him a sectarian,’ end quote.”
Right—again, I don’t know why this is called “greater than this”; it’s just another illustration of what the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim wrote above. “And this path appears true and correct from what we find that our Sages of blessed memory said about Elisha ben Avuyah: ‘Return, wayward children—except for Elisha Acher,’ for he knows his Creator and intends to rebel against Him. Thus they explicitly clarified that one who knows the truth and intends to deny it belongs to the class of the wicked, whom it is not proper to accept in repentance. But one who does not intend to rebel or to deviate from the path of truth or to deny what came in the Torah or to deny the tradition, but only to interpret the verses according to his view—even though he interprets them contrary to the truth—he is not a sectarian and not a heretic, Heaven forbid.”
Here, by the way, this relates to what we discussed before: Elisha ben Avuyah is the ideal model of the heretic—he knows his Creator and intends to rebel against Him. Now what does it mean that he knows his Creator and intends to rebel against Him? If he knows his Creator, then in what sense is he rebelling? You could say that he doesn’t do what the Holy One, blessed be He, says. But that isn’t heresy. That’s someone who doesn’t do what the Holy One, blessed be He, says. What Elisha ben Avuyah denied, at least in the Talmudic portrayal, was the prolonging of days promised to one who honors parents and one who sends away the mother bird and so on, where he basically says: where is the prolonging of days for this person, and so forth? In other words, he doesn’t believe what is written in the Torah.
Now what does that mean—that he doesn’t believe what is written in the Torah? So that is indeed his intellectual conclusion. So what do you want from him? No—but he doesn’t believe what is written in the Torah, while understanding that that is what the Torah says. It’s not that he is offering a different interpretation of what is written in the Torah. He says: no, no, the Torah says that one who sends away the mother bird and honors parents will have long life. I have no other interpretation of the verses. Therefore these verses are not true, because I factually see that this does not happen. And he is not offering an alternative interpretation of the verses. If he were offering an alternative interpretation of the verses, he would not be a heretic. Only because he does not offer an alternative interpretation of the verses, but rather goes against what is written in them—that is why he is a heretic.
Now here too there is room to discuss. So what does it mean, “he knows his Master and rebels against Him”? Does he know it’s true? He does not know it’s true. He knows that this is what the verses say—not that he knows it is true. Do you understand? This point is still a bit subtle. Meaning, if “he knows his Master and intends to rebel against Him” is read literally, then the meaning would be that he actually knows there is prolonging of days and nevertheless says there is no prolonging of days. And in his heart he knows there is. That is the simple application of “he knows his Creator and intends to rebel against Him.” But plainly that is not the situation. The situation is that he knows that’s what the verses say, he doesn’t offer an alternative interpretation, but he doesn’t accept it, even though that is what the verses say. Okay? So yes, that is a heretic. Even though, again, he sincerely does not accept it. He has reached the conclusion that, from his standpoint, it is an empirical fact that it doesn’t happen. Okay? So what can he do if the verses say it and I don’t accept it? Again: he is denying the Torah, not the Holy One, blessed be He; he is denying the Torah.
Right? So true, this is his philosophical conclusion. He reached that conclusion and really believes it. But the Torah says otherwise, and as long as you haven’t offered another interpretation, this is indeed called heresy. That is exactly parallel to what I said above, that the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim sees as more severe one who denies the Torah than one who denies the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, if he had said: look, what is written in the Torah—meaning, if he had interpreted differently what is written in the Torah—then he would basically be mistaken, he would be acting against what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants, but he would not be denying the Torah, because from his perspective the Torah says something else; he has offered another interpretation. Okay? But if he doesn’t offer another interpretation, then he is essentially saying: the Torah really does say this, but I do not accept it. Why don’t I accept it? Two possibilities. Either I don’t accept it, despite the Torah saying it, because I don’t accept the Torah. Okay? That’s one kind of heretic. Second possibility: I don’t accept it because I have a theory, like I said before with the turkey-prince. Meaning I know deep inside that it is true—not only that the Torah says it, I also know it is true. But I built myself a theory that justifies my desire to sin, to do various things I am not supposed to do, and I internalized it, and now I live by that mistaken theory. But deep inside it may be that it isn’t true. And that too is called heresy.
Meaning, those are the two possibilities I can see here for how this points to heresy. Because if he offers another interpretation, as I said before, then according to Sefer Ha-Ikkarim he is not a heretic. Okay? “And this path appears true and correct from what we find that our Sages of blessed memory say about Elisha ben Avuyah: ‘Return, wayward children—except for Elisha…’” wait, we read that. “For he knows his Creator and intends to rebel against Him.” Yes, he knows his Creator and intends to rebel against Him. But if he does not know his Creator—right? Here: “Thus they explicitly clarified that one who knows the truth and intends to deny it belongs to the class of the wicked, whom it is not proper to accept in repentance. But one who does not intend to rebel or to deviate from the path of truth or to deny what came in the Torah or to deny the tradition, but only to interpret the verses according to his view—even though he interprets them contrary to the truth—he is not a sectarian and not a heretic, Heaven forbid.”
Right? This is in connection with Rabbi Chaim, whom we discussed, who says that a heretic under coercion is still a heretic—even though it is under coercion. Right? So if you want to make a factual claim—factually, he is a heretic because he believes something false—okay. But if you mean “heretic” in the normative sense, which also bears on how we should relate to him, then the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim rejects that outright.
[Speaker I] Meaning he doesn’t accept it. I didn’t understand what Elisha sinned more than the Sages. The Sages too interpret the Torah as saying that honoring father and mother is supposed to lead to long life, and they also don’t dispute that in the end he died. They don’t dispute the story of Elisha ben Avuyah—so what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right,
[Speaker I] but not—what were his conclusions exactly?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker I] What do you mean? What were his conclusions?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That what is written in the Torah is not true.
[Speaker I] But they also interpret the Torah that way, and they don’t deny that reality contradicted it. So what difference does it make? It’s just that someone… but in the equation they aren’t arguing. They’re not arguing about the equation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean they’re not arguing? Of course they’re arguing. About the fact? In alternative medicine, someone will come tell me: listen, my grandmother said abracadabra three times every morning and was cured of cancer after the doctors had given up on her.
[Speaker I] So they’ll give a different interpretation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I, the— no, I’m not going to give a different interpretation. I accept that fact; it’s a completely correct fact. Now the question is what I do with it. Do I claim, okay, saying “abracadabra” three times every morning cures cancer? Or do I say no, there was some kind of placebo healing here, spontaneous remission, whatever it may be. Those are two approaches. I accept the facts; the question is what I do with the facts. Okay, here too, same thing. The fact that someone went, sent away the mother bird and honored his parents and then died—okay, that’s a fact. I assume other sages accepted that too. But they say, okay, that can happen, but generally speaking it does bring long life. And what help is “generally speaking”? Like the Chazon Ish says—actually not the Chazon Ish, Rabbi Elchanan, sorry. Rabbi Elchanan says it says there, “Whoever recites havdalah over a cup of wine will have male children.” Right? Why did I think of the Chazon Ish? Because the Chazon Ish probably did recite havdalah over a cup properly. But he didn’t have male children. So what do you do with that? So Rabbi Elchanan says: what do you mean? Havdalah over a cup causes you to have male children, but there are other considerations that can counteract that. Right? “One who is not careful with vows—his children die because of the sin of vows.” Okay, so if there’s someone who recites havdalah over a cup but isn’t careful with vows, what do we do with him? So he’s supposed to receive children and kill them, right? That’s what should happen. So instead, the Holy One, blessed be He, already says—why reverse the whole package?—the Holy One, blessed be He, says okay, then we just won’t give him children in the first place.
[Speaker I] But it doesn’t say he won’t have them. If I’m not mistaken, it says he’ll have them and they’ll die.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What didn’t you understand?
[Speaker I] That the Talmud there in Nedarim also establishes from the Torah that he’ll have them and they’ll die young.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, I said that. But still, what happens if someone recites havdalah over a cup, fine, and has the sin of vows? It’s entirely possible that the punishment will be given by reversing the result. Right? Meaning, why do you need all that? Just don’t give him children at all instead of giving them and then killing them. Okay, fine. So what does that mean? I spoke about this when we discussed ukimtot—not in this series, in others. The claim is that a principle, whether a scientific principle or, if you like, a theological principle in the Sages, is a general principle. A particular example never refutes a general principle. Popper thought it did, but Thomas Kuhn corrected him. A particular example does not refute a general principle, certainly not if it’s a statistical principle, but not even if it’s a deterministic principle. Rather, what? There may be certain cases in which there are other influences that offset this influence, and therefore I do not conclude from here that the Sages were wrong when they said that one who recites havdalah over a cup will have male children. They are completely right; it’s one hundred percent true, one hundred percent. Okay? It’s a law of nature. Okay? And still there can be cases where you won’t have children because there are other laws of nature that are also one hundred percent true. And what happens when the two clash? Then you have to arrive at some result that somehow obeys both of them. So why can one override? I can’t hear. I’m saying one can also—
[Speaker I] —override the other, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t have to be that both of them in the end—
[Speaker I] —are both fulfilled. I can’t hear well. Right, that’s what I’m saying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning somehow you have to sustain both, so either one will override the other, or you’ll find some compromise between them, or I don’t know, something will happen that doesn’t completely fit either of the two rules, or at least one of the two rules. Okay? And that doesn’t refute the rule. Now the same thing here. So it says, “so that your days may be lengthened.” What do I say? Like Rabbi Elchanan. I say, true, it causes long life, but there are other considerations because of which the Holy One, blessed be He, may still decide to kill someone even though he deserves long life for sending away the mother bird and honoring parents, because for other reasons—who knows—maybe he killed someone unintentionally. Fine? He killed unintentionally, and therefore he deserves—it needs to happen that he be brought to a certain inn, as the Talmud says in Makkot, and he has to die. Okay? So what do you do with the fact that he sent away the mother bird and honored parents? Nothing to do—it clashes. But that doesn’t mean those rules aren’t true. I’m not denying the Talmud because of that. Not for that reason do I deny the Talmud—because of other things—but not because of this. Not because of these statements of the Talmud, right? Rather, I simply say all the statements are true, and precisely because of that they can’t all be fulfilled simultaneously, right? On the other hand, someone else will come and say no, for me, if it failed even once—he’s Popperian, not Kuhnian, he’s Popper. Meaning if there’s one counterexample, the theory has been refuted. If a person sent away the mother bird and honored parents and then fell and died, that means it isn’t true. Meaning his philosophy of science isn’t sophisticated enough. He’s Popperian. Okay?
[Speaker I] Actually, in the Talmud it sounds more emotional too. Can’t hear? Actually, from the way the Talmud there is understood, it sounds like what bothered him was more emotional.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, in the case of Elisha ben Avuyah? Sure, yes. Fine, we’re not going to go now into the depths of Elisha ben Avuyah’s psyche, but that was the claim. So basically the same thing happens here too. You can say, “Look, I know the claim, I see that this thing doesn’t happen, and so I draw a conclusion: okay then, if so, it isn’t true.” That’s it. Someone else can say, “No, it’s true, but there are other rules that can sometimes disrupt the operation of this rule.” The first will be a heretic and the second won’t be a heretic, even though they both agree on the facts. Earlier they asked me, “But other sages also agree on the facts.” Of course. The only question is what conclusion I draw from those facts. Yes.
[Speaker J] But the prophets of Israel, the prophets of Israel are constantly coming with complaints to God. Jeremiah says, “Why does the way of the wicked prosper?” So he goes in the opposite direction and says to God, “Listen, You promise all kinds of promises to the righteous, and in the end You give success to the wicked.” So what, is Jeremiah a heretic?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite. What did the Holy One, blessed be He, answer him? So it’s like Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin. Yes, Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin brings proof for this—meaning he makes the claim that studying Jewish law is more important than saying Psalms and so on, even though Psalms brings cleaving to God—against the Hasidim. And his proof is from King David, who asked the Holy One, blessed be He, that Psalms should be considered in His eyes like engagement in the laws of leprosy and tents. So he said: we see that the laws of leprosy and tents are the main thing, and Psalms are not. And then he adds another amusing yeshiva-style quip: he says, besides, it also doesn’t say that the Holy One, blessed be He, agreed. The fact that King David asked is nice, but who says the Holy One, blessed be He, accepted the request? Meaning, the proof is not only from David’s initial assumption, but also from the lack of an answer. Right? Meaning, that’s basically what I want to claim here too. The prophets ask the Holy One, blessed be He, “Why does the way of the wicked prosper?” but it doesn’t say what His answer was. His answer was exactly this: the way of the wicked prospers because I have other considerations. Therefore the question is what conclusion you draw, not what question you ask. Everyone asks the question. The question is what answer you give yourself, or in the absence of an answer, what you do.
[Speaker J] But the very question shows that I cast doubt—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —on the idea that it goes well for the righteous. You’re not casting doubt; you’re asking for an explanation. You told me that it goes well for the righteous. Okay, how can it be that the way of the wicked prospers? Give me an explanation. And the explanation He gave him was the explanation of Nachmanides, for the sake of discussion, yes?
[Speaker J] Just in general, for the whole discussion, I’m not now entering the question of what punishment a heretic gets or doesn’t get. I’m asking: why is it even important what a person thinks in the depths of his soul? Look at him—does he keep commandments, does he not keep commandments, how does he behave. But why is keeping commandments important? Why is keeping commandments important? No, someone who believes this is the Torah—then I look at his observance of the commandments.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And from the Torah, correct beliefs are also part of it. What do you mean?
[Speaker J] But beliefs are your story with yourself. It’s not a story of outward behavior.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I eat is my story with myself too. Why is it anyone’s business what I eat?
[Speaker J] Fine, I really am not going to inspect what you do inside your house, what you eat and when you eat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem—not you. I’m asking about the Holy One, blessed be He. I’m not going to inspect anyone, but why does the Holy One, blessed be He, inspect?
[Speaker J] So if it’s the Holy One, blessed be He, then I don’t need to start giving definitions of heresy. I’ll leave it to the Holy One, blessed be He. He’ll know exactly what Elisha ben Avuyah thought and what Elisha ben Avuyah meant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I want to know what is good in His eyes and what is not good in His eyes—
[Speaker J] —for what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I can know what to do.
[Speaker J] Fine, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only out of fear of a religious court. I want to know what is right to do, what is expected of me. So I want to know. We clarify this—there’s an interesting question in Root 14, where Maimonides argues against the Behag, because the Behag counts punishments. So among other things he also counts excision among the 613 commandments. And Maimonides asks him: what kind of commandment is excision? The Holy One, blessed be He, cuts off someone who deserves excision. What does that have to do with us? How is that a commandment? Fine, punishments administered by a religious court—capital punishment by a religious court, lashes, things like that—okay, there is a commandment there because the religious court has to do something. But in the matter of excision, what meaning of commandment is there here? What is the commandment? The Holy One, blessed be He, cuts someone off or doesn’t cut him off. The simple answer to this, in my opinion, is first of all that we need to know how to behave in light of the Holy One’s view of different actions. If we understand that this is an act that incurs excision, then we will behave in a certain way that follows from that. And therefore, for our purposes, it matters. That still doesn’t say why it is a commandment. It only says why it is important to know this. The question why it is a commandment is another question. It could be because those liable to excision who received lashes are exempted from their excision. So there is a point in flogging him in order to exempt him from excision. Right? The ordination controversy in Safed in the 16th century basically revolved around this point. They wanted to renew ordination in order to flog those liable to excision—forced converts and people like that—to flog them so as to save them from excision. That was basically the motivation for renewing ordination. So we see that it has major practical implications whether someone is liable to excision or not. The religious court has to know whether to flog him in order to exempt him from excision. Okay, so there’s even a practical consequence here. So that explains not only why it’s important to know this, but also why it can be a commandment. Fine. But for our purposes, I see no difference between requirements to hold correct beliefs and requirements not to eat pork or to observe the Sabbath. I don’t understand why either of those is important, but if I had to bet, correct beliefs seem to me much more important than not eating pork.
[Speaker J] Yes, but correct beliefs are a discussion a person has with himself. Why pork? Pork is because you go to a restaurant with friends—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —and you eat pork or don’t eat pork. I eat pork at home. So then prohibit pork in restaurants. What? No, it’s my own private matter. There are many prohibitions that are my own private matter. Whether I separate tithes or don’t separate tithes—that’s my own private matter. Certainly today, unless you give it to the Levite or the priest perhaps. Things like that. Purity and impurity—these are all matters between me and myself. What, why is it anyone’s business? The Torah also cares about what a person does with himself. By the way, that’s a difference from legal systems, for example. Legal systems aren’t supposed to get into my plate. They aren’t concerned with the question of what I do or don’t do in my private domain. They speak about what happens in the public domain, about relations between different people. They don’t deal with what’s on my plate. But the Shulchan Arukh has four sections. Two of them are legal sections, Even HaEzer and Choshen Mishpat, which are fields every legal system deals with, and two of them are fields that no legal system touches: Orach Chayim and Yoreh Deah. In a large part, Orach Chayim and Yoreh Deah are a matter of the person with himself.
[Speaker J] And the Torah is very interested also in the person with himself. Right, but the person with himself in light of the requirement to keep commandments and not violate prohibitions. But on this matter of heresy, it’s no longer a matter where someone tells you it’s forbidden to be a heretic or permitted to be a heretic, because nobody knows what “heresy with yourself” even means here, because you’re arguing with yourself. You can even deceive yourself and nobody knows about it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re mixing up two things. I can also eat pork and nobody will know about it. What does that have to do with anything? If in the end the Torah is interested in whether I eat pork or don’t eat pork, I see no reason the Torah shouldn’t be interested in what I think.
[Speaker J] Okay, and regarding heresy, where does the Torah care about that? Where do you see anything—other than Maimonides’ thirteen principles—where in the Torah is there something that says what you do with yourself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that’s what we’re talking about. We’re talking about Maimonides’ thirteen principles. What do you mean? Yes, but in each of Maimonides’ thirteen principles we saw where it is supposed to be written in the Torah—whether he convinced us or not, that’s beside the point. But Maimonides derives it from the Torah.
[Speaker J] Fine, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, at least he derived the truth of these principles from the Torah. The question whether it is a problem not to hold them—that is already a normative claim. Okay? So there’s still a little room to argue here. Fine. In any case.
[Speaker K] Rabbi, Rabbi, Elchanan’s difficulty that the Rabbi brought isn’t so clear from the Talmud. Because if Rabbi Akiva didn’t know until he said, “‘So that it will be good for you and you will lengthen your days’—that means in the World to Come,” why did Rabbi Akiva have to arrive at a very, very difficult interpretation? Such a very difficult interpretation, to say that long life means in the World to Come. We won’t go into it, but it’s really hard to interpret it that way. And nevertheless Rabbi Akiva did it. He could have taken Elchanan’s difficulty and said that if it doesn’t happen, that’s because there are other considerations—one of two possibilities.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So one of two possibilities. One possibility is that he made the same mistake as Elisha ben Avuyah. Why didn’t Elisha ben Avuyah understand that there’s a simple answer? So Rabbi Akiva also made the same mistake. That’s one. Second, it could be that Rabbi Akiva had a more complex consideration. He said, fine, I understand why he died, but long life still has to be fulfilled. In the end, in the end, he is supposed to receive the reward for sending away the mother bird and honoring parents. The other consideration because of which he died—fine, very good—but what about the promise of long life? So he says: that will be paid to him in the World to Come.
[Speaker K] No, but why? The simplest interpretation would be: he was only supposed to live one year, and now he’ll live a year and a half and die. What’s my difficulty with Rabbi Elchanan? If you’re already answering with that kind of answer, then instead of long life—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The claim is that he will have long life, not that another half-year will be added. Long life—he will reach a long life. That’s the idea.
[Speaker K] No, but Rabbi Elchanan explained to us that you make calculations like that. But the result is—no, what does that have to do with Rabbi Elchanan?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The calculation, the calculation—I’m asking about Rabbi Elchanan—
[Speaker K] My question is about Rabbi Elchanan. The Rabbi just said that Rabbi Elchanan’s interpretation brings us to one possibility: to say that Rabbi Akiva made the same mistake. Meaning, Rabbi Elchanan was right and Rabbi Akiva just didn’t think of Rabbi Elchanan. That’s a bit—doesn’t that bother the Rabbi? Isn’t that a difficulty for Rabbi Elchanan? If you asked Rabbi Elchanan, say, the interpretation you’re giving right now—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you asked Rabbi Elchanan—then I’m answering you: if you’re asking me, if you ask Rabbi Elchanan, then ask him. If you’re asking me, I see no problem with that whatsoever. Let’s say Rabbi Elchanan was right and Rabbi Akiva was wrong. Obviously. There are many things I think I’m right about and Rabbi Akiva was wrong about—so what?
[Speaker K] But doesn’t that make—doesn’t that require Rabbi Elchanan to think further? The interpretation I’m giving to the Talmud is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If Rabbi Elchanan had thought further, then I would represent him. He would retract, and I would say what he says. Fine? So now I’m saying it in my own name, not in Rabbi Elchanan’s. Okay. What, fine, he’s conservative, he wouldn’t come out against Rabbi Akiva.
[Speaker K] Really? Rabbi Akiva, he couldn’t—it doesn’t sound to me that deep—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —to understand Rabbi Elchanan’s explanation. As I said earlier, Rabbi Akiva just didn’t think of it. Again, I answered that earlier and I’ll answer again: there is no contradiction between Rabbi—
[Speaker K] —Akiva and Rabbi Elchanan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no contradiction at all. But that’s what the Rabbi said, that there was. He said a first option that there was. No, I said a first option that even if there is a contradiction—even if you’re right and there is a contradiction—it doesn’t bother me to say that Rabbi—
[Speaker K] —Elchanan was right and Rabbi Akiva was wrong. Option two: there is no contradiction at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then we don’t need option one. There is no contradiction. Why? Because “so that your days may be lengthened” means objective long life, so to speak.
[Speaker K] “Long life” means that when you send away the mother bird or honor parents, you deserve long life. Period. More than what was there before?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—long life. You need to reach age seventy at least, fine?
[Speaker K] Seventy compared to Adam is nothing. What is seventy?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is objective long life. We’re talking about long life in our terms. Ninety, fine, it doesn’t matter right now. A hundred?
[Speaker K] One hundred and twenty-one or one hundred and four?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Samuel, you’re just arguing for the sake of argument. No, but—choose whatever number you want, whatever would be called long life. A hundred and seventeen years, fine? That’s what he deserves. Okay? Now, you interpret it this way and Rabbi Akiva didn’t understand it that way. And now I’m saying: since he didn’t understand it that way and Elisha ben Avuyah didn’t understand it that way either, I still claim there is no contradiction to Rabbi Elchanan. No contradiction. Why? Because the claim is that you deserve long life, but there is another consideration because of which you are liable for death now, because you killed unintentionally. So they kill you because you killed unintentionally, but your entitlement to long life still stands. In the final accounting, long life is credited to you. So what do you do with that, says Rabbi Akiva? Okay, in this world it didn’t work out; you’ll get it in the World to Come.
[Speaker K] No, but why? Wait, but why? Why can’t it be, according to Rabbi Akiva—according to Rabbi Elchanan it should have— they made the calculation in this world. He doesn’t say the World to Come. He says to make the balance in this world. So why suddenly bring in the World to Come?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Elchanan doesn’t say anything except that there is a balance, that’s all. I don’t understand.
[Speaker K] Well, if there’s a balance, then lengthening of days means longer than what he could have had.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again, you can make whatever suggestions you want, interpret the Torah in a thousand ways, everything’s fine. I’m telling you how Rabbi Akiva interpreted it, and I’m claiming that it doesn’t contradict Rabbi Elchanan. You’re offering another possible interpretation—that’s perfectly fine, then that will be your interpretation. It has nothing to do with me. The question isn’t why your interpretation is wrong. I’m answering a different question: what Rabbi Akiva meant, and why that doesn’t contradict Rabbi Elchanan. That’s all.
[Speaker K] Again, the Torah says that someone who—about whom did the Rabbi say he’d have rebellious children? Someone who—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Nedarim, someone who isn’t careful with vows.
[Speaker K] No, they’ll die, he won’t have—who will have rebellious children?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One who sanctifies the Sabbath or holiday over a cup.
[Speaker K] Right, so if one who sanctifies over a cup—“will have sons,” right. So now the Rabbi says that Rabbi Elchanan says that “he’ll have sons and they’ll die” is fine, that works out perfectly. He’ll have them and they’ll die. But long life—if he lives ten years instead of twenty, or ten years instead of one—that doesn’t work out.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, how many times do I have to repeat it? I’ll say it again: you’re offering a different interpretation. Fine, I accepted it, I understood it, I wrote down your interpretation. Rabbi Akiva did not interpret it that way, okay? Right? That’s clear—Rabbi Akiva did not interpret it that way. Now you’re telling me, yes, but what Rabbi Akiva didn’t interpret contradicts Rabbi Elchanan. Not true, it doesn’t contradict. Now you’re offering a third interpretation—everything’s fine, wonderful interpretation—but Rabbi Akiva does not contradict Rabbi Elchanan, and he interpreted it differently from you.
[Speaker K] No, what I wanted to argue was that Rabbi Akiva came on a more principled level. Obviously you could come up with some interpretation like Rabbi Elchanan or many others besides. Whoever invents—this is the plain simple meaning. Whoever says otherwise is inventing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine—
[Speaker K] But the fact is that Rabbi Akiva could have explained it, and he didn’t explain it even though it’s very simple, because he wanted to say something more principled.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he couldn’t have explained it that way. I’m saying again, for heaven’s sake, he could not have explained Rabbi Elchanan. Rabbi Elchanan explains to you why the children died. Rabbi Akiva isn’t asking why the children died. Rabbi Akiva is asking: where is the long life? So he says: the promise of long life will be fulfilled. The children will die because of what Rabbi Elchanan said, despite the promise of long life. Where is the promise of long life fulfilled? Different question: in the World to Come. That’s all. He’s asking a different question.
[Speaker K] So the Rabbi actually explained Rabbi—very nicely. The Rabbi brought Rabbi Elchanan on this, on this Talmudic passage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I brought Rabbi Elchanan to explain why the children die despite the promise of long life. I’m now asking the opposite question: okay, the children died—what about the promise of long life? Answer: that will be fulfilled in the World to Come. It’s like those who solve the problem of divine foreknowledge and free choice by saying: no, the Holy One, blessed be He, is above time. He is above time, so He can know today what will happen tomorrow. So my claim is that they answer a different question. They answer the question how the Holy One, blessed be He, gets information from the future. I don’t know how to get that, so the Holy One, blessed be He, is above time and He knows how to get information from the future. But that’s not the question of foreknowledge and free choice. The question of foreknowledge and free choice is: if the Holy One, blessed be He, knows today, how can it be that I have free choice tomorrow? So saying the Holy One, blessed be He, is above time doesn’t answer that.
[Speaker K] To say that “you will lengthen your days” refers to the World to Come is to say: you’ll get reward in the World to Come, don’t worry, everything is accounted for. But that’s true of all commandments. So why is it written specifically about these two commandments, sending away the mother bird and honoring father and mother, that “you will lengthen your days”? They’re talking about something beyond just receiving reward. If we’re just talking about generic reward in the World to Come, that’s true for all commandments.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll answer, I’ll answer one more time and let’s stop here. It says “you will lengthen your days” here because on these you receive long life and not on any other commandment, only on these two. Except that, in these specific commandments where there is a promise of long life, sometimes it wasn’t realized in practice. So Rabbi Akiva asked: but still, there’s a promise, right? He says: that’s in the World to Come. Why is it written only here? Because in the other things you do not get long life even without other considerations. Only here are you promised long life. So he transfers it—what’s the problem? It’s so simple.
[Speaker I] The truth is there’s another problem in Rabbi Elchanan’s argument—it’s very problematic. Because if it really did cause something, even though there are a thousand other things that could cause opposite results, we should still have to see that too, just as today we manage to identify phenomena that cause even a one-percent increase in causes of death.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, you’re bringing me back to my previous point. I said I don’t accept these things, not because of the contradiction.
[Speaker I] No, no, not about that. I don’t accept them because of what you’re saying. No, I’m talking about honoring parents, not about—about honoring parents?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about that too.
[Speaker I] So then how do you explain it? Then we’re in the same frustration as Elisha ben Avuyah with the same result.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. I said, I don’t—I also don’t accept it, just as Elisha ben Avuyah didn’t accept it, not necessarily because of these contradictions, but I also don’t accept it, at least for today. I don’t know what was once the case. As for today, I don’t see any indication of such a connection between our actions and the results the Torah says, or the Sages say, or whatever.
[Speaker I] Elisha ben Avuyah also wasn’t talking about the past, he was talking about—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Tithe so that you will become rich.” I don’t see that those who tithe are specifically the ones who get rich. Again, I haven’t done statistics.
[Speaker I] I said that to the Rabbi today on the forum. What did you say? I answered the Rabbi on the forum today that nobody tithes today.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean nobody tithes today? Why don’t people tithe?
[Speaker I] Show me someone who gives the first tithe to a Levite today. Nobody gives. The first tithe to a Levite? They say we have doubt; they say, “the burden of proof is on the one who seeks to extract property.” Well, then why not give to a Levite? You should give to a Levite—there’s a commandment. Oh come on, you can’t give to a Levite today—what does that have to do with it? The commandment of the blessing—of course you can. The Levite just can’t compel me to give him, because he’s only doubtfully a Levite; “the burden of proof is on the one who seeks to extract property.” But if you give, then according to the laws of presumption you are fulfilling a full commandment. So what’s the problem? But you do separate the tithe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not to mention interpretations of tithing money, fine, but let’s leave it—we’re really getting into other territories, let’s leave it for another time.
[Speaker I] But honoring parents, yes—honoring parents is a good example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: honoring father and mother—if I see around me that honoring father and mother does not lead to long life, then I don’t accept it. How to interpret the Torah? I don’t know. In the World to Come?
[Speaker I] I have no idea. So according to the categories of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, we really are in Elisha ben Avuyah’s camp.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, I’m not committed to Sefer Ha-Ikkarim. I’m studying it; I’m not saying I accept it. I’m only trying to understand what it says, that’s all. Fine then. “And because of this, one who believes in the resurrection of the dead, but not that the people who will live will remain forever as soul in body and soul, but rather that they will return to their dust—as is the opinion of Maimonides, of blessed memory, in his Epistle on the Resurrection of the Dead—even though this is contrary to the truth according to the view of Nachmanides, of blessed memory, he is not, Heaven forbid, a denier of the principle of resurrection of the dead. And similarly, one who believes that the main reward in the World to Come is for body and soul together, and that the soul alone has no reward apart from the body—as is the opinion of Nachmanides, of blessed memory, and some of the sages of Kabbalah—even though this is contrary to the truth according to the view of Maimonides, of blessed memory, he is not, Heaven forbid, a denier of spiritual reward and punishment.” Right? So this is basically an application. He says: if I do not accept Maimonides’ or Nachmanides’ principles because I came to the conclusion that they are wrong, I am not called a denier of the principle of resurrection of the dead, even though in fact I don’t really accept resurrection of the dead and I’m also mistaken. Let’s assume for the sake of discussion that I’m mistaken too. That still isn’t called denying the principle of resurrection of the dead, because that is my conclusion. Okay? If I reached the conclusion that the Torah says resurrection of the dead and nevertheless I didn’t accept it, then I would be a denier. Okay? And I would be a denier even if I reached the conclusion that the Torah isn’t true. Meaning, it’s not that I’m knowingly denying it because of temptation. I reached the conclusion that the Torah isn’t true, but it’s clear to me that the interpretation of the Torah says this. That is indeed called denial according to the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, because in his view denying the Torah is worse than denying the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, even if by your own intellect you reached the conclusion that the Torah is mistaken, if your conclusion is that the Torah is mistaken, then you are a denier, even if you got there intellectually. “And I needed to write all this because I saw some frivolous people, wise in their own eyes, broadening and prolonging their speech against great men of the world without knowledge and without understanding.” And that is why I wrote all this in the first place. Otherwise it’s obvious and I wouldn’t even have needed to write it. “And from here permission is given to every wise-hearted sage to investigate the principles of religion and to interpret the verses in a way that accords with the truth as he sees it, even though he may believe in some things that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) called principles, such as the coming of the Messiah and creation ex nihilo and the like, which are not principles, but rather true beliefs which one who believes in the Torah is obligated to believe—just as he believes in the opening of the earth’s mouth in the rebellion of Korach, in fire descending from heaven, and the like among the miracles, or among the promises mentioned in the Torah which are true, though they are not principles of the Torah—this does not make him, Heaven forbid, a denier of the Torah or of its principles. For if this were denial, then the number of principles of the Torah of Moses would equal the number of miracles and promises that appear in the Torah, and this has never entered anyone’s mind.”
Now here I don’t completely understand this passage. It’s again that tension we saw also in the previous chapter. Because here he’s really speaking about someone who accepts the correct beliefs. He only argues that they are not principles. Meaning, they are not binding foundational doctrines, but yes, I reached the conclusion that this is true, just not because it’s foundational, but because in fact that’s my conclusion. Okay? So here he means to say that therefore every wise-hearted sage is permitted to investigate the principles of religion, because even if you believe these things are true but they are not principles, it’s no big deal, nothing happened. What happens if I reach the conclusion that they are not true at all? Not that they are true but not principles—I reached the conclusion that they are not true at all. From his words here it sounds like that would indeed be a problem. Right? Reaching the conclusion that they are not true at all. The only thing you shouldn’t worry about is reaching the conclusion that they are not fundamental principles—they are true but not principles. Don’t worry about that; it’s no big deal. But what about the possibility that I may reach the conclusion that the whole thing simply isn’t true at all, not merely that it isn’t a principle? So from here it somehow seems that that is something I should worry about. Only this one I shouldn’t. But then, by the same token, I don’t understand: if that really is something I should worry about, then why is investigation permitted? The result of the investigation may bring me to a state where I don’t accept the matter at all, not merely that I don’t decide whether it is a principle or not. It may be that when he says, “from here permission is given to every wise-hearted sage to investigate the principles of religion and interpret the verses,” he means only to investigate the question of what is a principle and what is not a principle, not to investigate the very question of whether it is true or not, but rather you are permitted to deal with the question of what is a principle and what is not a principle—and that is the subject of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim. Okay? Not the question of what is true and what is not true. Sefer Ha—Sefer Ha-Ikkarim does not deal with the question of what is true and what is not true. It only argues with Maimonides about what is called a principle and what is not called a principle. So maybe that means: from here one is permitted to deal with that question. But what about dealing with the question of what is true and what is not true? Meaning reaching the conclusion that it simply isn’t true. After all, above he said that even this can happen among the sages of Israel and their pious ones—even if he reaches an incorrect conclusion, not merely that he declares a non-principle to be a principle. No, here he writes differently. So I don’t quite understand what follows from what he writes here. There is still something problematic here.
Okay, maybe we can start the next chapter and continue it next week. I want to get to the end of chapter 4; that’s basically the end of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim. After that maybe a few more points that will conclude the series, meaning chapters 3 and 4. “A principle is a term applied to something upon which the standing and existence of another thing depends, and without which it has no existence. Just as the root is something upon which the existence of the tree depends, and the tree’s existence and persistence cannot be imagined without it.” Yes, so what are principles? Principles are things that are a necessary condition for the existence of the thing, okay? Without them, the existence of the thing cannot be conceived. By the way, it seems this is a necessary condition and not necessarily a sufficient condition, okay? So for something to be a principle it has to be a necessary condition; it doesn’t have to be a sufficient condition. It’s enough that it be a necessary condition. Right, it doesn’t have to be sufficient; it’s enough that it be necessary, okay? “And our Sages, of blessed memory, used this expression frequently, saying of something whether it has a basis in the Torah or has no basis.” Right, it has some point from which it emerges, on which it depends. “And in this respect this name applies to the roots and foundations upon which the standing and existence of religion depend, such as the existence of God, for it is clear from its nature that it is a principle, since belief in it is necessary for a divine religion, because it is impossible to conceive of the existence of a divine religion without it.” Yes, the existence of God is a principle not because it is written somewhere in the Torah, not because it says “I am the Lord your God.” We spoke about that strange commandment, “I am the Lord your God,” and here the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim is basically referring to it. He says: the existence of God is not a principle because it says “I am the Lord your God.” The existence of God is a principle because it is self-evident why it is a principle: without it, the whole story doesn’t exist. Right? Unlike Ahad Ha’am, and maybe also unlike Shalom Tzadik, who basically want—if I understand correctly, I haven’t read his words inside, but that’s how he is quoted—as if the main thing is just to do what is right, okay? And what the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim says here is that this is not enough. If you do what is right, that is not sufficient. You have to do it because there is God, and because the Holy One, blessed be He, commands you to do it. Without the existence of God, your actions are worth nothing. Meaning, without that there is no divine religion. Right, Ahad Ha’am, who said that one should observe the Sabbath because more than Israel kept the Sabbath, the Sabbath kept Israel—right?—he is mistaken. That is not true. Meaning, the commandment of Sabbath has value only if you do it out of faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, and commitment to His command—out of faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, and commitment to His command. Apropos the earlier questions: why are beliefs important, and why aren’t actions enough? There you have it. Ezra, I think, asked that, right? There you have it: even the importance of the actions does not exist unless in the background there are the correct beliefs. Meaning, not only are beliefs important just like actions; the importance of the actions depends on their being based on the correct beliefs. Otherwise the actions themselves have no value. Meaning, beliefs are even more fundamental than actions. Not only do beliefs need no more explanation than actions, okay?
So this claim about the existence of—yes, there is a book by Rabbi Amit Kula, the rabbi of Kibbutz Alumim, called Being or Not Was, that’s the title of the book, and his goal there is to argue that basically service of God or religious commitment does not require any factual claim. You can give up every factual claim about the universe and still be a kosher Jew. So I told him that I’m willing to accept almost all of that statement except for the revelation at Mount Sinai and of course the existence of God. The existence of God is a factual claim, and the giving of the Torah is a factual claim. Meaning, if I do not accept those two, then even if I keep everything required for all kinds of other reasons, it’s exactly like the Maimonides I mentioned earlier, that a resident alien who keeps all the commandments because his reason compels him and not because of the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, at Sinai—then he is among the wise of the nations of the world and not among their pious ones. It has no religious value. These are not commandments. We spoke about this. Maybe at the end of the series I’ll speak about this importance of faith and commitment at the foundation of commandment observance, but since I already mentioned it here—so the dispute, I’ve already mentioned it several times, the dispute between Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner and the Lubavitcher Rebbe—there is a dispute there about laying tefillin. About laying tefillin, what Chabad people do when they put tefillin on people in the street. The question is whether that has value. And again, if someone believes in God and is committed to His commandments, he just slacked off in the morning and didn’t put on tefillin, or didn’t have time, then of course it has value. But usually such a person puts on tefillin; he doesn’t need the Chabad people for this. Meaning, a person who doesn’t believe—then even if you put tefillin on him at a booth in the street, it has no value. Meaning, he certainly has not fulfilled a commandment. He is a “skull that did not put on tefillin.” Meaning, if he repents at noon, let’s say, then he will have to put on tefillin in the afternoon. Meaning, he did not put on tefillin that day, even though in the morning he put on tefillin at a Chabad booth. He did not fulfill the commandment of putting on tefillin, because commandments without faith are not commandments. And faith, as Maimonides says there, is not only faith in God; it is also faith in God’s command, or commitment to God’s command. Without those two beliefs, it’s like “they coerce him until—” Can’t hear?
[Speaker I] Can’t hear?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s supposed to be like “they coerce him until—”
[Speaker I] —he says, “I want to.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If inside, inwardly, he has the faith.
[Speaker I] There are many people like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Really? People like that—granted. For such people, this does have value even if you don’t coerce them. After all, Chabad people don’t force someone to put on tefillin. Obviously, if he has faith inside, then it does have value. What I’m saying is that if it is a person who has no faith, not even in the revelation at Mount Sinai, not in the Holy One, blessed be He, then it is not a commandment-act. Whether it has educational value or not, you can debate, but there is no commandment-act here. That is basically the claim. But again, I’ll come back to that point later. We’ll continue next time. Any comments or questions? Okay then, good tidings, Sabbath peace.