Dogmatics – Lecture 30

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so as we said, we’re getting close to the end of the series. We saw Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, which really touched on a few of the points we discussed over the course of the series—how you determine the principles, what the meaning of a principle is, what happens when there’s a dispute about principles, the source of the principles, all kinds of things of that sort, what the law is regarding someone who denies the principles, whether these are facts or not facts. In other words, quite a bit—most of the issues we talked about during the series basically come up here at the beginning of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim. I still want to complete a bit more; we were in chapter 3. So here we started, yes: “The term ikkar is applied to something on which the standing and existence of something else depend, and without which it has no existence—just as the root is that on which the tree’s existence depends, and the existence and persistence of the tree cannot be conceived without it. And our Sages of blessed memory often used this language; they said of something that it has a Torah-level basis, or that it has no Torah-level basis. In this sense the term applies to the roots and foundations on which the standing and existence of religion depend, such as the existence of God, which from its very nature is clearly a principle whose belief is necessary for a divine Torah, because it is impossible to conceive of a divine Torah without it. Accordingly, we should investigate which things are fit to be posited as principles in divine religion.” Right, so basically after he defined the concept of a principle, now he tries to look for—okay, so how do we get from that to a list like the one Maimonides gave, for example? So he says: “Now Maimonides of blessed memory set them at thirteen principles, namely: God’s existence, unity, removal of corporeality, that He is eternal, that He alone is worthy of worship and nothing else, prophecy, the prophecy of our teacher Moses peace be upon him, Torah from Heaven, that the Torah will not be changed, God’s knowledge, reward and punishment, Messiah, and resurrection of the dead.” These are the principles that the Rabbi of blessed memory counted in chapter Helek of his commentary on the Mishnah. We went over them.

“And first we may ask concerning these principles that Maimonides posited: why did he put them at that number and say that they are thirteen?” Of course, he isn’t asking why there are specifically thirteen; he’s asking why he counted these thirteen—why this is Maimonides’ list of principles. “For if they are posited in that number according to the meaning of the term ‘principle,’ then how good and pleasant it would be to posit as principles God’s existence, prophecy, Torah from Heaven, and the knowledge of God, may He be blessed, together with providence to give reward and punishment, because these are principles necessary for a divine Torah, and its existence cannot be conceived without any one of them.” So he says: principles—first he defined what a principle is, and after we define what a principle is, that may give us a tool to try to understand: who specifically, based on the definition of principles, are the principles of faith? So he says, from that definition he would count the following: God’s existence, prophecy, Torah from Heaven, and God’s knowledge and providence in giving reward and punishment. These are the principles that seem to him to fit the definition he gave above. Why? Because these are principles necessary for a divine Torah; its existence cannot be conceived without any one of them. Meaning, if any one of them falls, it basically brings down the faith—yes, Jewish faith or faith in general, we’ll see that in a moment—and therefore it’s justified to call those principles.

“And it is not far-fetched according to this approach to posit the prophecy of Moses and the eternity of the Torah as principles as well, since they are particular principles necessary for the Torah of Moses, whose existence cannot be conceived without them. For if it were possible to imagine a prophet greater than Moses, then the Torah of Moses could already be nullified, because the words of a prophet greater in rank than another ought to be believed more than the words of one lower than him in the rank of prophecy, as will be explained. And likewise, if we do not believe in the eternity of the Torah, then the nullification of the Torah of Moses could already be conceived after Israel was exiled from its land.” So basically he says that the principles—say, God’s existence, prophecy, Torah from Heaven, God’s knowledge and providence to give reward and punishment—those are principles necessary for divine religion; its existence cannot be conceived without any one of them. So the first five are principles for divine religion in general, not specifically for the Torah of Moses. We already talked about this: for the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim there are really three kinds of principles, and the third kind itself is divided into a few subtypes. There’s natural religion, conventional religion, and divine religion. We discussed this in one of the previous lectures; I’ll come back to it later. And divine religion still doesn’t mean the Torah of Moses. Divine religion also includes Christianity. Divine religion means a religion that believes in God in some religious sense, and the religion of Moses is one of the divine religions. Okay? He later talks about this too: the religion of Abraham, the religion of Noah, the religion of Adam—meaning, from his point of view, every stage in the Bible is some kind of religion.

So in effect the first principles, the first five principles, are principles of divine religion in a general sense. Right? Without them there is no belief in God—religious belief, not philosophical belief. After that he says: “And it is not far-fetched according to this approach, the prophecy of Moses and the eternity of the Torah.” Those are already principles of the religion of Moses. They are no longer principles of every divine religion. For example, Christianity does not believe in the eternity of the Torah. It does accept the prophecy of Moses, but not the eternity of the Torah. So in that sense, the principles he adds in the second stage are principles specific to the religion of Moses. Meaning, Maimonides’ thirteen principles—or the list of principles he’s aiming at—are the principles of the religion of Moses, but they are really made up of principles for divine religion in general and principles specific to the religion of Moses. In other words, that’s the structure he continues with later too.

And then he goes on and says: “Nevertheless, one may still ask why unity and removal of corporeality are counted among the principles.” Okay? According to the criterion he gave above, that a principle is something without which faith cannot stand. Right? Principles of faith are things without which faith cannot stand. So after he counted the principles of divine religion in general and of the religion of Moses, unity and removal of corporeality are principles of neither divine religion in general nor the religion of Moses. So why are they included too? “For even if they are true beliefs, and it is fitting that every follower of Moses’ Torah believe them, one could still say that they are not fit to be counted as principles, because divine religion as a whole does not collapse if one believes the opposite.” Okay? In other words, this is not a necessary condition for divine religion, even though these are true beliefs. And once again, his question is classificatory. He isn’t arguing about whether these principles are true; he’s only asking why these are called principles. And we talked about that quite a bit previously. So his claim is that it’s not clear to him at all why God’s unity and incorporeality are included in Maimonides’ list of principles, given the definition of a principle as something without which faith cannot stand. Right? This is the famous Ra’avad we saw; that’s why everything we saw earlier is really groundwork. The Ra’avad says, yes, many and better people than he believed that the Holy One, blessed be He, was corporeal, and therefore the Ra’avad does not see removal of corporeality as a principle—yes, a binding principle—even though he too agrees that it is true. But he doesn’t see it as a principle, and in that sense the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim follows him. And even more difficult than that—one second, can I ask something?

[Speaker B] Yes, yes. What about unity? Isn’t that a principle in Abraham’s religion according to everyone?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean by Abraham’s religion?

[Speaker B] The way Maimonides describes it, that’s what Abraham basically discovered.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, Maimonides also describes him as discovering incorporeality. From Maimonides’ perspective, Abraham discovered the Holy One, blessed be He, as Maimonides describes Him.

[Speaker B] So what distinguished Abraham’s religion from the other religions? So what’s the difference with unity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not unity, no—

[Speaker B] Corporeality—I’m not talking about corporeality, I’m talking about unity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but I’m saying that also… also removal of corporeality was basically something that distinguished Abraham from other beliefs, which were idolatrous beliefs. Meaning, you could also see in that a distinguishing principle.

[Speaker B] Fine, but if there isn’t the principle of unity here, then what exactly did Abraham—what did the religion of Israel innovate here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if there isn’t incorporeality, then what did he innovate?

[Speaker B] Okay, if there’s no corporeality and no unity, then it’s like the idol worship found everywhere. Why is that called Abraham’s religion?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, what do you have in unity more than in incorporeality? No—

[Speaker B] There has to be something that distinguishes Abraham’s religion, something that distinguishes it. If it’s Sinai—if there’s no unity and no incorporeality, then it’s idol worship.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, so you’re asking about unity and corporeality together. You’re not asking only about unity. There’s nothing in unity more than in corporeality.

[Speaker B] At least there has to be something that distinguishes Abraham.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so the point is that unity—we talked about this—has two meanings. It carries two meanings. One meaning is that God is one. The second meaning is that God is simple, not composite. Okay? Now I don’t know what he means here when he says unity. If he means that God is one, then I understand your question. That would seem to be Abraham’s innovation. But if he means that God is simple, then I’m less sure. Meaning, Abraham may have discovered that there is one God who is not absolutely simple in the fullest philosophical sense, and that would still differ from what came before him. Okay? Okay. So once again, I don’t know, because the author here really writes rather obscurely, but maybe when he talks about unity he means that. Okay.

[Speaker C] But what does unity even mean if we’re not making Him corporeal? I didn’t understand. Is the concept of unity relevant at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We talked about this when we discussed this principle in Maimonides. I said that unity in both its meanings—unity in both its meanings—I’m not entirely sure it’s even well defined. I mean, a completely abstract being—how can I determine whether it is one or two? Or whether it is composite or simple? Composite or simple I think I can discuss somewhat more. But one or many—what does one or many even mean? So these many—what are they? They’re the one God that exists, the totality of these many. I mean, in what sense? I’m not at all sure these concepts are fully defined.

[Speaker C] What do simplicity and unity mean—or simplicity in this sense?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] What does simplicity mean in relation to complexity—the thing the Rabbi says he understands better?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, that I understand better. I understand it better because one can say that it has some kind of parts. Take our soul, for example, okay? Let’s look at our soul, as the Talmud says in Berakhot, that one can learn from the soul about the Holy One, blessed be He, right? There are five things in which they are alike. So let’s look at our soul. To say that our soul is simple or has multiplicity—that is, composite or simple—I think that I am prepared to understand. Because I can see that our soul has parts, different faculties, or all kinds of things of that sort, even though the soul is something abstract. So I think that even with something abstract I can distinguish between simple and composite. But the question whether it is one or two—what is called one or two? In what sense is my soul specifically one and not two? I don’t know. I don’t really see what… Let’s put it this way: if I had two souls inside me, what would be the difference between that and saying I have one soul that is not simple, but composed of two things, two faculties, two—I don’t know what?

[Speaker C] When Maimonides says one, he doesn’t mean simplicity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, one second.

[Speaker C] When Maimonides says one, he doesn’t mean simplicity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: he means both things. First, that He is one, and second, that He is simple. And I already noted then that I don’t know to what extent these concepts are really fully defined.

[Speaker C] What, so “two” doesn’t mean two entities in the simple sense?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does two entities mean? Define entity.

[Speaker C] Like with the soul, as the Rabbi says—two souls.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, with two souls I don’t know how to define it. What’s the difference between two souls and one soul composed of two things, two faculties, two—I don’t know what?

[Speaker C] Ah, so the Rabbi just doesn’t understand the difference between them, simply. Ah—

[Speaker D] Doesn’t understand? The Rabbi is telling us right now that from his perspective, it wouldn’t be a problem to understand also that a person is built out of several souls, several different psychic forces operating…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s just a question of definition. What do you mean, “it wouldn’t be a problem for me”?

[Speaker D] It’s a question of what you call it. In terms of responsibility—what do you mean? If there’s a world war going on between different factors there, then what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case there is responsibility for the whole of that aggregate. What’s the problem?

[Speaker D] Why? Why? But they’re not—the Rabbi says they’re separate, they’re not one entity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does separate mean? Just as there is responsibility for a group of people for something it does. What’s the problem? I don’t understand. There is responsibility for a state even though there are different parties in it that fight and argue with each other; still there is responsibility of the state for what it does.

[Speaker D] No, no, each one is responsible for his own. Of course. What do I have to do with the state? How are you bringing me into the state? There’s my contribution—if I contributed to the outcome of what the state did, each person bears his own sin, but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here we have a disagreement; maybe we argued about it before, I don’t remember. I don’t agree. Regarding Maimonides, for example—I think I spoke about this once—about Maimonides in the laws of repentance, where he says that on Rosh Hashanah each person is judged: intermediate, righteous, or wicked. And the city is judged, and the state, and the whole world. And his commentators ask: if every individual was judged separately, then what remains to judge in the city or the state? Meaning, that’s it—each person already has his judgment and that’s that. And I said that when a person is judged, he is judged in several different judgments, in each of which he stands with a different hat on. He is judged as a private individual, and there he can come out righteous, intermediate, or wicked. Beyond that, the city is judged, including all the individuals who make up the city, and there once again you can be righteous, intermediate, or wicked. Righteous, intermediate, or wicked in two senses: first, in your contribution to the general situation; and second, in your responsibility for the fact that this is the situation. When the city is judged, the city is nothing other than the collection of people. So what does it mean to judge the city and say the city is wicked? It means that the collection of people who make up the city is a wicked collection. So it could be that I come out righteous in my individual judgment but wicked in the collective judgment.

[Speaker D] Right, but on the existential level, why is it really important to the Rabbi that there is one God and not some kind of family of…? I could accept—would it not bother the Rabbi if, say, God in Judaism were made up of a father, mother, and a family that’s an exemplary family? Wonderful. Would it bother the Rabbi if that were what we knew? Not at all? No?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? Why shouldn’t there be a family of gods? Why not?

[Speaker D] The feeling is that this is something very basic. If this is Abraham’s message, the message of monotheism however we understand it, then apparently there’s great importance

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in this—

[Speaker D] in there being one God as opposed to the idolatry where there were many different ones and different families.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not disputing the historical fact. As a historical fact, people certainly saw great importance in this. I’m only asking, wondering, whether there really is a well-defined claim here. So I’m saying, I don’t know. But clearly people saw importance in it—that I agree with. Maybe you’re even right that it ought to be important because apparently that’s what Abraham innovated. Fine, “ought to” is nice—but the question is whether you can define it well, and I’m not sure you can.

[Speaker E] And if there are other gods—if there are other gods—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be there are.

[Speaker E] would they have other religions? I can’t hear. For example, if there are other gods, it could be they have other religions. Even one God can give them several religions, so what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but one God gave us one Torah.

[Speaker E] He gave us—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] one Torah. The many also gave us one Torah in practice. They can give several—what’s the problem? It’s the same thing.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, maybe this only comes to exclude corporeal understanding? Because anyway, attributes in relation to Him—even in Maimonides—it’s all a bit strange. Even saying “one” in Maimonides is pretty hard, because he also says there’s nothing to describe there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s probably a negative attribute or something like that according to the thesis of negative attributes.

[Speaker C] Right, so maybe it only comes to negate what people imagine, not to say something positive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but I’m saying, fine, do whatever you want. I don’t really get along with Maimonides’ negative attributes anyway on the logical level. I wrote a column about this not long ago and tried to offer some explanation after all, but on the face of it this really is something very, very strange to me, and also completely undefined. So I’m not sure that even if I accept what you’re saying—that we interpret this negatively and not positively—it will help me. In the end I still don’t really manage—

[Speaker C] Right, the Rabbi wrote that in the trilogy too, I think, in the first book. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in the trilogy I don’t think I laid out the explanation in detail. I noted that there might be such an explanation. In the column I wrote recently, I laid it out more fully. Anyway, okay, let’s return to our matter. “And even harder than this is that the Rabbi of blessed memory counted as a principle that He is worthy of worship and nothing else. For even though this is one of the Torah’s commandments, as it says, ‘You shall have no other gods before Me; you shall not bow down to them nor serve them,’ nevertheless it is not a principle on which the Torah as a whole depends. For one who believes that God is true and His Torah is true, but inserts an intermediary between himself and God—he thereby violates ‘You shall have no other gods,’ but it is not a principle such that the Torah as a whole falls.” Meaning, yes, there is a prohibition here—it’s not right to worship God’s attendants, so to speak—but this is not a principle without which the Torah does not exist. “And why did the Rabbi of blessed memory count as a principle as well one who believes in reward and punishment, but believes that recompense is for souls and in the World to Come, and that there is no resurrection of bodies after death? Why should the Torah as a whole fall, such that one would be obliged to count resurrection of the dead as one of the principles of the divine Torah, like the existence of God?” So he has all sorts of questions; he can’t understand why we count—why Maimonides counts—these principles.

By the way, here he has already imported a Maimonidean assumption again. Of course, when it says, “You shall have no other gods before Me,” the intention includes even the attendants or servants of the Holy One, blessed be He. That’s Maimonides’ innovation at the beginning of the laws of idol worship, where he describes how this whole matter of idolatry developed. It began with worshipping the heavenly bodies—they saw them as attendants of the Holy One, blessed be He. And on that he says, basically—so what’s the problem? You worship the Holy One through the attendants. To that extent, it really doesn’t sound so severe. I might not even have seen an actual prohibition in it at all. What’s the problem? You worship the Holy One through the attendants rather than directly—so what? You’re still worshipping Him, not someone else. Maimonides says that it’s forbidden. The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim says: I understand that it’s forbidden, okay, that I do accept—but why is it a principle?

[Speaker C] Why is it a principle—not why is it forbidden, but why is it a principle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, even Maimonides describes it only as a prohibition.

[Speaker C] Because, in retrospect, right? So the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim claims this is a principle and he doesn’t understand why.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, I’m saying—even Maimonides himself, on this point, when he’s in the chapter on idol worship, he kind of almost praises the idol worshippers there at first. He isn’t talking there about what is and isn’t a principle, he’s listing the laws. So that’s not a proof—no, but—

[Speaker C] He does say that at the beginning they really worshipped idols only in order to worship Him, right? So that makes the Rabbi’s question even harder. No, I mean—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My question is really a question about Sefer Ha-Ikkarim, because Sefer Ha-Ikkarim is trying to show that idol worship should not have to be a principle either. And how does it show that? By saying: what difference does it make if you worship the Holy One through attendants? But that’s Maimonides’ expansion of idol worship. Standard idol worship is not worshipping God through attendants, but worshipping somebody else. Now—what, that’s not a principle? But still, it’s not the kind of thing you’d necessarily classify as a principle. So you could say, fine, worship through attendants is not a principle, it’s only a prohibition. But worship of somebody else sounds to me like something that absolutely ought to be a principle. He immediately shifts to means, to intermediaries, but that isn’t the essence of idol worship; that’s an expansion Maimonides made. Idol worship in itself is worshipping someone else. So what is he saying? Maybe what he means is: even if I worship somebody else, but I worship him in partnership—that is, I worship the Holy One and also worship that other thing—still that doesn’t prevent, doesn’t collapse, divine religion. And indeed I mentioned, I think, one of the previous times, that halakhic decisors disagreed about whether non-Jews were prohibited from partnership worship. It could be that for a non-Jew it is permitted to worship in partnership; there is no prohibition. Now obviously, if partnership worship is false, then it is false for non-Jews too. Meaning, if there aren’t two gods, then a non-Jew who believes in two gods is certainly believing something untrue. Okay? Because a fact is a fact; it doesn’t matter whether you’re a non-Jew or a Jew. It’s just that they were not warned against partnership. So if you believe—or worship, and probably there the point is worship—worship of two gods in partnership, that is not a prohibition for a non-Jew, even though it’s mistaken. But it’s not a prohibition. Now if that’s so, then maybe this is what Sefer Ha-Ikkarim means when it says that worship of something other than Him—not only intermediaries, but even truly something else—also does not collapse divine religion. Because it could be that someone worships in partnership. Maybe it’s forbidden, maybe it’s not correct, but it doesn’t collapse the value of his religious worship. Okay? And then I really can understand his more general question about Maimonides.

[Speaker C] Fine, but Rabbi, you can understand that even without this. If he understands “You shall have no other gods before Me” as also said about an intermediary and not only if you really treat it as divine—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or you could say that the principle applies only if it’s somebody else, while the intermediary is not a principle, only a prohibition. What’s the problem? Principles don’t have to overlap completely with everything. Principles are not a list of commandments. The content doesn’t have to overlap with the content of a commandment. The decision is not whether this commandment is a principle or not. There may be one detail in that commandment that is a principle and other details that aren’t. “Likewise one who believes in reward and punishment, but believes that recompense is for souls and in the World to Come, and that there is no resurrection of bodies after death—why should the Torah as a whole fall, such that resurrection of the dead must be counted as one of the principles of the divine Torah like the existence of God?” What’s written here in the subtext? That one who does not believe in recompense at all—not in this world and not in the World to Come—that really does collapse divine religion. Now that’s not just an inference; he says it explicitly later. But already here you can see that this is his position. He’s only saying: if you believe that it’s only recompense for souls and not in this world, or there is no resurrection of the dead—so what’s wrong with that? Why is resurrection of the dead a principle? The principle is that you believe there is recompense. What kind of recompense? That’s another discussion. But if you deny the very existence of recompense, that seems to him obviously to be denial of a principle.

[Speaker D] Why is that so important?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, better that “Do not be like servants—”

[Speaker D] “who serve the master in order to receive a reward; rather, be like servants who serve the master not in order to receive a reward.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree completely. That is exactly my point. And I really don’t understand why, in his view—true, he questions the details of recompense—but belief in recompense itself seems obvious to him as a principle. And I’m wondering why. Why recompense? On the contrary—exactly everything Maimonides writes in chapter 10, we saw it in the laws of repentance, Maimonides says there that on the contrary, it is not fitting to serve God this way; that’s the way of women and children, to serve God for reward. We ought to serve God because it is doing the truth because it is true.

[Speaker C] No, maybe that’s what he means too—that reward and punishment mean the very good and evil of the commandments and transgressions themselves.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so actually when we studied these principles in Maimonides, I noted there that I’m not sure all of these principles are part of the doctrine of reward and punishment from Maimonides’ perspective. For example, the resurrection of the dead, or for that matter the World to Come, or whatever it may be—it could very well be that this is simply the realization of the Holy One blessed be He’s plan. Meaning, when He created the world, He had a plan, and the plan is that the world should reach some state, some final state at the end—the resurrection of the dead, the World to Come, whatever it is. Now for us, that is depicted as reward. Meaning, whoever behaves properly will merit reaching that perfected state that will happen here at the end of history. But from the perspective of the Holy One blessed be He, this isn’t a question of reward. It’s a question of the realization of the plan. Meaning, His plan in creating the world was to get to that state. So that has nothing to do with reward at all. And if that’s so, then I can better understand the assumption of the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim that faith in reward itself is indeed important. It’s important not as motivation for me, to spur me to serve God, but rather to understand that this whole story is aimed at some purpose—that the Holy One blessed be He is really directing us toward some need, that there is a purpose to all this work and it’s not just some kind of game. If so, that strengthens a bit what I said there, because there I made a close reading of Maimonides and said that I think at least one of the two principles connected to this issue does not belong to reward and punishment. Yes, that is: the Messiah, resurrection of the dead, and the World to Come. There are three principles: Messiah, resurrection of the dead, and the World to Come. And I said there that I’m not at all sure these principles are part of Maimonides’ doctrine of reward. And this difficulty raised by the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim once again strengthens that even more. Because if I understand that it’s not part of the doctrine of reward, then I can answer. Meaning, I can say that’s why it really is so important. It’s so important because you need to understand, yes, where you came from and where you’re going—meaning, what the purpose of this whole story is, that we are here for some need, for some purpose. All our work is really meant to get there. “Women and children,” what Maimonides writes in chapter 10 of the Laws of Repentance, are those who don’t understand this idea, and instead they simply serve in order to receive reward. The Holy One blessed be He does this so that in the end we will reach the goal, but from their standpoint it’s not a matter of reaching the goal—they do not do the truth because it is truth, but because they want to get the candy. So that really is the mode of service of what he calls there “women and children.” But the alternative is not that there is no reward; the alternative is that reward—what we call reward—is not reward but purpose. And if we say that the Rabbi, of blessed memory, did not list principles according to the plain meaning of the term “principle,” but rather listed among the principles the true beliefs that every adherent of the Torah of Moses ought to believe—yes—then he says, fine, that doesn’t work out. At first he began a priori, top-down: what do you mean—let’s define the concept of “principle” and derive from that definition what should be included in the list of principles. It doesn’t work. Meaning, Maimonides’ list of principles does not seem to reflect this definition of the concept “principle.” Fine, so let’s go from below, let’s take everything true and everything that ought to be believed—everything true is what’s called a principle. You understand, of course, that this can’t be. He says: if so, why didn’t he count as a principle that the Divine Presence rests among Israel by means of the Torah, as it says, “And I will dwell among the children of Israel”? And why didn’t he count creation ex nihilo, which is a belief that every adherent of a divine religion ought to believe, as he himself explained in chapter 25 of part 2 of the Guide? And just as he counted the belief that God is eternal, why didn’t he count that one ought to believe in all the miracles that appear in the Torah according to their plain sense, and other particular beliefs that every adherent of the Torah of Moses ought to believe, just as he counted belief in the coming of the Messiah? In short, it doesn’t work, neither top-down nor bottom-up. Meaning, according to the definition of principles, we can’t understand the list, and from below too, if you take all the true beliefs, that also won’t explain the list to me. Yes, and if we say that he counted principles alone and not true beliefs, then once again we return, as it were, to and fro. Fine, so it can’t be true beliefs, because there are many of those, not just thirteen. He says, but if we say that he counted only principles and not true beliefs, why didn’t he count tradition—by “tradition” he means transmitted tradition—that a person ought to follow the tradition of the fathers, which is a general principle for all divine religions, without which their existence cannot be conceived. By the way, that’s a very interesting remark: why is tradition really so essential to every divine religion as such? For us it’s obvious that it’s essential, but why is it a principle that is true not only for the religion of Moses but for any divine religion whatsoever? Say, the religion of Adam—why is it important that it be a tradition? What does it feed on from tradition? Why is it so essential to a divine religion to believe in received tradition, in the authority of tradition? For those

[Speaker C] who come after him, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, meaning it will apparently be relevant to those who come after, but again here too there’s some assumption that the Holy One blessed be He reveals Himself only once, and the rest passes on through tradition. But there could be a divine religion that says no, there is revelation all the time; He accompanies them constantly. Fine, again, here too I can’t explain with certainty why tradition seems to him not only a true belief but also a principle for all divine religions. For the religion of Moses, that’s obvious—that’s not the question. And behold, he did not count free choice—yes, another question.

[Speaker C] A true belief and also a principle, but also—what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In reality there is no such thing, right, factually there is no such religion, but on the theoretical level I’m not sure it’s really necessary. And why didn’t he count free choice? Since it is a true belief, it is also a principle. Meaning, with free choice you can’t even tell me that it’s a true belief but not a principle; clearly it’s not only a true belief but also a principle. For it is clear from its very nature that no religion can exist without it. First of all, on the level of reasoning: clearly, without human free choice there is no meaning to religion. Religion demands that a person do something; if he has no free choice he can’t decide whether to do it or not, and then the whole story is emptied of content. That’s on the explanatory level. And then he continues: furthermore, he himself—yes, Maimonides himself—wrote in Sefer Ha-Madda, in chapter 5 of the Laws of Repentance: “Permission is granted to every person: if he wishes to incline himself to the good path and be righteous, the choice is in his hand,” and afterward he wrote: “And this principle is a great principle, and it is the pillar of Torah and commandment,” as it says, “See, I have set before you today life and good,” and so on, “and choose life.” And he elaborated in that chapter to explain this principle. And it is a great wonder why he did not count it among the principles in his commentary to the Mishnah on the chapter Chelek, where he counted thirteen principles. In the end, this number that the Rabbi, of blessed memory, posited for the principles leaves very strong doubts. Meaning, I cannot understand how Maimonides arrives at his thirteen principles. Now regarding free choice, he says later—and I’ll get a bit ahead of myself here—regarding free choice he says later that it could be that free choice is a foundation for natural religion and not only for divine religion. Natural religion, as we’ll see later, is morality. And free choice is of course a principle without which natural religion also does not exist, not only divine religion. So if that’s the case, there is no point in listing it as one of the principles of divine religion, and it could be that this is why Maimonides did not list free choice as a principle, because it is not a principle of the religion of Moses or of religion in general; it is a principle of morality. Meaning, it is a more basic foundation than religious belief. I said it could be

[Speaker C] that Maimonides says it’s a principle of Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? He says it’s a principle of Torah in the sense that of course—you have to be a human being in order to receive the Torah, and this is a more basic foundation than the Torah; it comes even earlier. I mentioned that I saw all sorts of people raising objections about the conversion process, and they say: why in conversion is the emphasis placed on ritual commandments—eating kosher, observing family purity, Sabbath, and so on—and not on moral commandments: honoring parents, do not murder, do not steal, and things of that sort? Meaning, when someone is converting and they want to test whether he is faithful to Torah and commandments, they will test him on ritual commandments and not on moral commandments. Meaning, if he doesn’t eat kosher, then he isn’t a convert, but if he murders, not so terrible—then he’s still a convert, just, say, a wicked convert, but still a convert. And the question is, what do you mean? After all, murder is a far more severe prohibition than, say, forbidden foods. So how can it be that the emphasis is specifically on ritual commandments and not on moral commandments? And from here, of course, people move on to criticism about how the religious are indifferent to morality and so on—maybe there’s even something to that—but it doesn’t follow from here. Meaning, even if that criticism is true, this argument is an invalid argument. Why? Because the conversion process is supposed to examine the convert’s relation to the religion of Moses, to Jewish faith, to Jewish obligation. Now if I test whether he doesn’t steal and doesn’t murder, that is a very bad criterion for testing whether he is Jewish; it’s a criterion that can test whether he is a human being. I’d actually be offended by this rebuke they make in conversion processes even as a non-Jew. What do you mean—the criterion for whether you’re Jewish or not is whether you don’t steal and don’t murder? Meaning, the assumption is that non-Jews steal and murder and aren’t committed to morality? Meaning, testing a convert as to whether he is faithful to the faith of Israel, to the Torah of Israel, should be based not necessarily on the most important things—that’s not the point—but on the things that most distinctly characterize the religion of Israel. You want to test whether he is Jewish? Then test him on those things that truly distinguish the Jew. Don’t test him on things that are very important to a Jew too, but important to him not as a Jew but as a human being. And therefore there’s no point, for example—I wouldn’t test a person based on whether he breathes, even though if he doesn’t breathe he isn’t a human being. Why? Because breathing is not what distinguishes the human species; all animals, or most mammals, all breathe, so that’s not a good definition of a human being, even though it may be the most important thing—far more important than food, and certainly more important than all sorts of other things. The most basic thing for a human being is to breathe, but precisely because of its basic nature there is no point in defining the human species based on breathing. In the same way, you can’t define a Jew on the basis of morality. Okay?

[Speaker C] Even though there is such an assumption in Hazal. Can’t hear? Even though there is such an assumption in Hazal regarding the non-Jews.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay, non-Jews—yes, what Meiri says is that that refers to the non-Jews of their time and not the non-Jews of our time. But yes, Hazal really did see it that way, though they saw it as an artifact; they did not see it as an essential characteristic of non-Jews. In Bava Kamma 113b, “He stood and saw and released their property,” “He stood and released the nations,” something from Ha’azinu there. So they expound there that He saw that the nations had abandoned the seven Noahide commandments, and therefore He stood and permitted their property to Israel. There they permitted robbing a non-Jew. And you see that basically, certainly non-Jews are also obligated in morality; only they were criminals and did not fulfill their obligation. So you can’t define a Jew or Jewish obligation based on moral obligations. It’s simply the wrong definition. So likewise here he says: you can’t define divine religion on the basis of free choice. Free choice is not what defines divine religion. Free choice also belongs to natural religion, also to morality; it is the more basic foundation. Even someone who does not believe in divine religion is still supposed to be obligated to morality, and therefore perhaps the principle of free choice cannot enter Maimonides’ list of principles, even though Maimonides himself writes that it is a very great principle and the pillar of Torah and commandment. It is the pillar of Torah and commandment just as food or breathing is for a human being—it is the pillar of life, food and breathing. Would someone define a living human being by the fact that he breathes and eats? No. Life is when you find meaning in it, when you do the right things, good things, and so on. Eating and breathing are the ABCs of life, and precisely because of that they are not a good definition of life. They’re basic; they are important, but basic and not distinctive. Okay. I saw someone who wrote that the Rabbi, of blessed memory, intended this number because it corresponds to the thirteen attributes of the Holy One blessed be He. Fine, these are clever little tricks that he himself rejects, so there’s no point dwelling on them. Some have said that the principles are twenty-six, and included among them—I don’t know who this is—and included everything that came into his mind, such as eternity and wisdom and life and power and will of the Holy One blessed be He, yes, all that, and other such attributes ascribed to the blessed Name. And he counted the Garden of Eden as one principle and Gehinnom as one principle, and other things full of nonsense. For this person paid no attention to understanding the word “principle” and what this term applies to. Yes, it doesn’t fit the definition of principle we discussed above. Yes, now he counted the Garden of Eden and Gehinnom as two principles. This goes back to what I said earlier: how can you define abstract things as one or two? I would say the World to Come is one thing, and the World to Come includes both the Garden of Eden and Gehinnom; both are components of the World to Come. Okay? But here this fellow who counted twenty-six principles actually counted the Garden of Eden separately and Gehinnom separately—you have to believe that there is a Garden of Eden and you have to believe that there is a Gehinnom. Who says this is one thing and not two? We talked similarly once in the eighth root—the eighth root, sorry. In the eighth root Maimonides speaks about prohibitions and positive commandments. And he says that in Hebrew, in the holy tongue—wait, no—in Arabic, in Arabic there is no separate term at all for positive commandments and prohibitions, nor is there a shared term that includes both positive commandments and prohibitions in one expression. Therefore we use the term “commandment” only by extension. But really “commandment” means a positive commandment, not a prohibition. We use the term “commandment” because we have no common term that would contain these two kinds, positive commandments and prohibitions. By contrast, in the holy tongue, Maimonides says, there is such a term, and it is called “decree.” That’s what Maimonides claims. I’m not sure he’s right linguistically, but that’s what he claims: that the term “decree” is the genus divided into two species, positive commandments and prohibitions, or positive decrees and negative decrees. A positive decree is a commandment, and a negative decree is a prohibition. Okay? But the term “decree” is basically the shared term. And by the way, when we today use “commandments,” and speak of the 613 commandments, positive and negative commandments, it seems in the plain sense that this is actually borrowed from Arabic, because in Hebrew we should have said “decrees” and not “commandments.” Okay? It seems to me that the term “commandments” does appear even regarding prohibitions, also in Hazal, even before the Arabs.

[Speaker C] Or in the Torah, no? “My commandments, My statutes.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but there you could say “My commandments” means the positive commandments. But “613 commandments were told to Moses at Sinai,” in Makkot there on page 23, right? So the term “commandments” is mentioned there, I think. “613 commandments were told to Moses at Sinai,” so yes, you do see that all 613, both positive and negative, are called commandments. In short, I don’t know—Maimonides builds quite a tall structure there on that linguistic point, but for our purposes I’m not sure he’s right. For our purposes, what I want to say is that… he claims that as far as the Muslim Arabs are concerned, positive commandments and prohibitions are not seen as connected at all. They are two concepts with no connection whatsoever. They are not two species belonging to one genus. No—they’re simply two things. Just as, say, furniture and living creatures. So too there are positive commandments and prohibitions. Just two things. There’s no relation between them. They have no common genus, nothing. And the Hebrew language saved us from that mistake, or helped us see that in fact these are two species of one genus. But you see that the definition of abstract things like commandments and such—the definition of whether it’s two or one—is very, very far from unambiguous. A lot of it also depends on language, though in my opinion language always expresses some understanding. It can’t be that language develops with no connection to understanding. We once discussed that when I spoke about Whorf and linguistics and things like that. But for our purposes I’m just using this as an example to show that the distinction, with abstract things, whether it is one or two, composite or not composite, is not defined in a very convincing way. Fine, in any case, so here too with the Garden of Eden and Gehinnom—is it two things or one? Two principles: to believe in the Garden of Eden and to believe in Gehinnom; or to believe in reward in the World to Come, bad reward and good reward, exactly like positive commandments and prohibitions. And among the later authorities there was someone who was precise about the word “principle” and added and subtracted from Maimonides’ principles, and said that the principles of divine religion are six: knowledge of God, providence, power, prophecy, free choice, and purpose. Now what “purpose” is I don’t know exactly—maybe it is our purpose to keep commandments, I don’t know exactly what he means. In addition to the three for which the Rabbi, of blessed memory, brought philosophical proof—namely the existence of God, His unity, and that He is not a body nor a force in a body. And he says that these six are clearly, by their nature, necessary for divine religion, such that its existence cannot be conceived without them, and together with the other three for which there is proof, the principles of divine religion are completed. Six he does top-down, and three bottom-up, and in practice he has nine, basically. Okay. But again, now he starts splitting hairs about this matter and says there are objections to this. Yes, because even if these principles are inclusive for divine religion such that its existence cannot be conceived without them, he still should have counted with them other particular principles as well, just as Maimonides counted things that are particular principles for the Torah of Moses. He should not have counted some general principle by which one can distinguish true divine religion from counterfeit and pseudo-divine religion, because all the religions found in the world today admit these six principles, and according to this they would all be divine religions—true divine religions, yes. And there is yet another objection to this number he counted. In short, he also does not accept this count. And then he says: what about Torah from Heaven and all kinds of things like that? You know what, there’s actually something here worth seeing. And there is yet another objection to this number he counted: even if no divine Torah can be found without them, it does not follow that wherever they are found, divine Torah is found. A necessary condition, but not sufficient, for divine Torah. What does that mean? If the Torah is divine, then it includes these principles, but if someone holds these principles that still doesn’t mean he holds a divine Torah. All right? And he should have added with them one more principle, namely Torah from Heaven, because otherwise it is like someone saying that where nourishment and sensation are found, a human being is found. Exactly what I was saying earlier: you are nourished and you feel—meaning I eat and I feel, and perhaps also breathe. Fine? Does that sufficiently define the concept “human being”? Since wherever a human being is found, nourishment and sensation are found. Yes, every human being is nourished and senses; there is no such thing as a human being who is not nourished and does not sense. But clearly, if he is nourished and senses, that still does not mean he is human. Animals do that too. This is certainly not correct, because even if no human could be found without these, and they are necessary for the existence of a human being, it still does not follow that wherever they are found, a human being is found. Meaning, it is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Unless he adds to this speech, and says that where body, nourishment, sensation, and speech are found, a human being is found. And here too he should have counted with them Torah from Heaven, because where knowledge of God, providence, power, prophecy, free choice, and purpose are found, it does not follow that Torah from Heaven is found. It is a necessary condition but not sufficient. In order to decide—to give a list that will constitute a sufficient condition for divine religion—you also need to add the principles of the religion of Moses, Torah from Heaven. All right? So in fact the definition he is offering here now is that the principles have to satisfy a list of conditions. First, each principle has to be a necessary condition, and second, the overall list of principles has to be sufficient. Meaning, not each principle by itself—each principle by itself is necessary but not sufficient. But all the principles together also constitute a sufficient condition. So the whole set is both necessary and sufficient. Okay? Because each one separately is necessary, and together they are sufficient; so all together they are necessary and sufficient. And therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition is a univocal definition of the concept. And that is what he expects from the list. Okay? But still, of course, here he has given us the logical scheme for how to arrive at the list, but he doesn’t really succeed in building on the basis of this logical scheme and arriving at some list he is satisfied with, a list of principles. And therefore his inclusion of free choice and purpose among the principles of divine religion is incorrect. That’s what I said earlier, right? “And therefore his inclusion of free choice and purpose among the principles of divine religion is incorrect,” because even if they are necessary for it, they are not principles and starting points of divine religion insofar as it is divine. Rather, they are also starting points of political religion, as will be explained—that is morality, what I mentioned above. And purpose in the sending is also not a starting point of divine religion but a particular purpose. By “sending,” I assume he means the messengers of the Holy One blessed be He—the prophets or Moses our teacher. Here words fail: knowing the number of principles necessary for divine religion is very difficult. And even more difficult is that our Sages, of blessed memory, did not discuss this explicitly. They should have spoken about the principles, which are roots and foundations of divine Torah, since the essence of human success and the reward of souls depends on them, just as they spoke about other forms of human damage and monetary law, which concern only the conduct of the body and the ordering of social society—social, yes. Meaning, he is basically saying this: it is very strange that Hazal did not engage this subject, even though it is so foundational for the perfection of the soul. And notice, the whole discussion of which principles to count and which not to count is not connected to the question of what is true and what is not true. Because we are clearly talking about principles that are true; the whole question is which among the true principles, and how many true principles, should constitute the list of principles. So really a question arises here: why is it important to deal with this at all? Why is it interesting? What matters is what is true and what is not true. Why do I care how you classify them into principles and non-principles? What difference does it make? And then he argues that the essence of human success and the reward of souls depends on them. Now it’s not entirely clear to me what “depends on them” means. Does it depend on our believing in these principles, or on the clarification we make of what counts as a principle and what does not among the true beliefs? Meaning, does this clarification itself have some spiritual or intellectual value—I don’t know exactly what religious value—and therefore it is worth doing? In short, this whole story is very vague and unclear. I just want to do the next chapter quickly and finish this story. One more time?

[Speaker C] Does the Rabbi see value in this? Does the Rabbi understand the value of it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. No. Actually, when I summarize this series, I’ll come back to this issue. Meaning, what is the significance of dogmatics? Is there dogmatics? And is it important to engage in dogmatics? Those are really the two questions. So in the summary I’m supposed to return to this. The correct method, as it seems to me, for counting the principles that are roots and foundations of divine Torah is that the general and necessary principles of divine religion are three, and they are: the existence of God, providence for reward and punishment, and Torah from Heaven. Okay? Here he’s already saying: until now these were questions and reflections. Okay? From here he begins to lay out his own view, and that’s why I wanted to reach this chapter, because in this chapter he actually presents the conclusions from all the questions he laid out in the previous chapters. And here he says: in my opinion there are three principles of divine religion, three—the existence of God, providence for reward and punishment, and Torah from Heaven—and not thirteen like Maimonides. And again, not because Maimonides’ thirteen are false, but because they are not principles. Okay? Now here of course one can ask on what basis he determines this. He says that these three are the parent categories for all the principles that belong to divine religions, such as the religion of Adam, the religion of Noah, the religion of Abraham, and the religion of Moses, and other divine religions besides these—if it is possible that more than one should exist at the same time and in this order. And under each of these principles there are roots and branches that spread and branch out from that principle. For under the existence of God is the root that He is primordial and eternal, and the like. And included in Torah from Heaven are knowledge of God and prophecy and the like. And included in providence are reward and punishment in this world for the body and in the World to Come for the soul. Yes, knowledge of God—I would actually have associated with the third, with providence. I don’t know why he associates it with Torah from Heaven. In any case, he says the rest are details that fall under these principles, but they are not principles in their own right. And again, you see this is all a matter of classification. Meaning, he is not arguing with Maimonides that these things are true. He is arguing over how to classify them: whether there are thirteen principles or three principles, and offspring under each principle. We already spoke about the relation of parent categories and derivatives, or about commandments and the counting of commandments and the like. And from these three general principles there branch out derivatives and offshoots for divine religions and those that resemble divine religion, in this way. For under these three lie the foundations of divine religion in general, not only the Torah of Moses. Divine religion in general. And then there are branches for the particular divine religions or pseudo-divine religions, in this way. For under the principle of the existence of God is the rejection of corporeality, which is a particular principle of the Torah of Moses. Rejection of corporeality, as he said in the previous chapter, is not necessary for every divine religion, but it is a principle in the Torah of Moses. Now on that, of course, the Raavad disagrees and says: not true—even in the Torah of Moses it is not a principle. Many greater and better than Maimonides erred on this point and they are still fully kosher Jews; they are not deniers of a principle. So even in the Torah of Moses, the rejection of corporeality is not really a principle. That is his assumption later as well: that of course one who believes in the Torah of Moses must reject corporeality. Meaning, that is clear. Divine religions in general can exist even if you think God is corporeal. Okay? The pre-Abrahamic religions, let’s call them that, can still be divine religions according to his definition. And again, reward and punishment too—it’s still not clear why he sees this as a principle, but notice, this is what I emphasized in the previous chapter when he challenged Maimonides. He challenged Maimonides and said: why do you determine that resurrection of the dead or reward in the World to Come is the principle? If I believe in reward in a different form, not with the details you described, that too is fine. So I inferred from this that the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim also says that belief in reward itself is a binding principle. Only the details—whether it is in the World to Come, in this world, with a body, without a body—those are debatable. But belief in reward itself is certainly a principle. Here we see it explicitly. Right? Reward, punishment, reward and punishment—for him this is one of the principles. To me that is really strange, especially since he adds reward and punishment, because it is clear that he is speaking about it in terms of reward, not in terms of a plan, as I discussed in the previous chapter. Here, when he lays out his own teaching, suddenly we see that things I was willing to accommodate in the previous chapter no longer fit here. He speaks about it at the level of a doctrine of reward, not in terms of the realization of a plan. And then it really is unclear to me why he sees this as a principle. As someone remarked earlier—after all, Maimonides says we are specifically supposed to serve God for its own sake, to do the truth because it is truth, and not because of the hope for reward, not because of reward.

[Speaker B] I think here the question is—I think the question is double, because he not only brings this in as a principle in the religion of Abraham, he brings it in as a principle in divine religion in general. Why? Even in the religion of Moses it doesn’t have to be, seemingly, and all the more so when he makes it a foundation in divine religion. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He sees it as something essential to religiosity in general, and it’s not so clear to me why that is. I don’t understand. Apparently he sees perhaps some kind of interaction between us and the Holy One blessed be He.

[Speaker C] Reward basically means—no, he says providence, like that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He sees providence.

[Speaker C] He says it’s providence, like, that’s how he sees providence. What? That’s how he sees providence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s not talking here about providence, he’s talking about reward.

[Speaker C] He says providence includes reward and punishment in this world—“and included in providence are reward and punishment in this world,” and for the body in the World to Come, and for the soul.

[Speaker B] But why should providence be a principle in every divine religion?

[Speaker C] No, providence is very understandable as a principle in divine religion. What’s the claim—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think the claim is that without providence, in philosophical language, you’re basically dealing with deism, not theism. Meaning, belief in a God who created the world—even some philosophical entity that created the world—but who has no interaction with us, wants nothing from us, is not in interaction with us, is usually taken as a philosophical position, not as a religious one. Philosophers who believe in God. A religious position requires something more. Now what more? Usually people think: first, expectations from us—meaning commandments, what is permitted and forbidden and obligatory to do; and second, interaction with us. Because expectations… He could have given us the expectations and gone home. But also interaction with us—a God who is supposed to be present in our lives, and not only one in whom we believe in some philosophical sense. And if so, then maybe one can understand why he sees these as principles of divine religion in general. In my humble opinion, as you know my view, I think command is indeed essential, but providence—I don’t think so. I don’t see why it is essential.

[Speaker C] Meaning the Rabbi also sees providence, only the Rabbi says not passive providence. Yes, okay, that’s probably just a dispute over what providence means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, he speaks about providence for reward and punishment.

[Speaker C] That’s how he understands providence. The Rabbi understands providence differently, but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s see how he understands providence, and I’m not sure I would determine it to be a principle. I’m not even sure it’s true. Fine, in any case, so—and in our view, the coming of the Messiah is not a principle. Yes, he continues. In our view, the coming of the Messiah is not a principle, and if it is a principle, it is not particular to the Torah of Moses, because the Christians also make it a principle in order to undermine the Torah of Moses. Yes, their messiah who already came. And it is a particular principle for them, without which the existence of their religion cannot be conceived. And these and the like, which are principles of particular religions, are all included within the three principles we have mentioned. However, whether it is possible for there to be more than one divine Torah at the same time, or in successive periods, will be explained later. Okay, so that’s the claim. After that, the rest of the chapter basically says—he has a nice little idea here—he says: And what indicates that these three principles are root and foundation of the faith through which a person attains his true success is what the Men of the Great Assembly established for us in the Musaf prayer of Rosh Hashanah: three blessings—Kingship, Remembrances, and Shofarot—which correspond to these three principles, to illuminate the human heart, for by believing in these principles with their branches and roots as appropriate, a person will merit in his judgment before God. And now he begins to spell it out. For the blessing of Kingship corresponds to the principle of the existence of God. Yes, Kingship is basically faith in that—that is the first of the three principles. And this is indicated by the wording of the blessing: “Therefore we hope to You, Lord our God, to see speedily the glory of Your might, to remove idols from the earth and the false gods shall be utterly cut off, to repair the world under the kingdom of the Almighty,” and so on, “all who dwell on earth shall recognize and know that to You every knee should bend, every tongue should swear, and all of them shall accept the yoke of Your kingship.” So Kingship is basically the belief in the existence of God; therefore crowning the Holy One blessed be He on Rosh Hashanah is basically first, to recognize His existence, and second, to accept our obligation toward Him. And similarly the blessing of Remembrances—the second part—indicates providence and reward and punishment. And this too is indicated by the wording of the blessing: “You remember the deeds of the world and attend to all the creatures of old; before You all hidden things are revealed,” and so on. “Remembrances” means that the Holy One blessed be He remembers us, remembers our deeds. And that is providence and reward and punishment. That is Remembrances.

[Speaker C] Yes, here it’s really like the Rabbi here—Remembrances. Here it’s more like passive providence, like remembrance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. It doesn’t say—

[Speaker C] “And attend”? “And attend to all the creatures of old”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And attend”—so maybe that really is the addition. Okay. He says providence for reward and punishment—He remembers and attends. And the blessing of Shofarot hints at the third principle, which is Torah from Heaven. And therefore it begins: “You revealed Yourself in the cloud of Your glory to Your holy people to speak with them; from heaven You let them hear Your voice,” and so on. And since the giving of the Torah was accompanied by the sound of an exceedingly strong shofar, such as had never been in the world, it is called Shofarot. Because the voices and torches that were there had already existed in the world, things like them or of their kind, but the sound of the shofar without an actual shofar—since there was no shofar there in reality, only the sound of a shofar—that never was and never will be until the time of redemption, when they will blow the great shofar for our freedom. That will be the moment when the true Torah will become known before the whole world, and regarding that time it says, “And the Lord God shall blow the shofar,” according to the opinion of some of the Sages. So the blessing of Shofarot is basically the principle of Torah from Heaven. So Kingship, Remembrances, and Shofarot—these are basically our three principles. And to allude to these three principles, which are the cause of success, Isaiah included them in one verse, saying: “For the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our King; He will save us.” “The Lord is our Judge” alludes to the principle of providence, and in a similar sense, “He who justifies me is near; who will contend with me? Let us stand together,” and so on—meaning that from this side it is fitting that we merit in judgment. And he said “the Lord is our Lawgiver” to allude to Torah from Heaven, which is the second principle, because He gives us the laws. For “lawgiver” is called the giver of the Torah, as in “for there the portion of the lawgiver was hidden,” which is said about Moses, because the Torah was given through him. And he says on this, and so on—in short this—

[Speaker C] If we believe in Torah from Heaven, then the first two principles are no longer relevant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if—right, he builds the—

[Speaker C] Let’s say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the third contains the first two.

[Speaker C] Yes, it contains everything, so then that’s already true, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There would indeed be room to wonder about that. But I can understand why he builds it step by step. Meaning, in the Talmud, you know, they speak about the difference between “not only this, but even this” and “this, and it goes without saying this.” Here it is built in the form of “not only this, but even this.” If it were “this, and it goes without saying this,” then you’d be right: then you would say Torah from Heaven, and it goes without saying there is also a God who gave it. Okay? That would be “this, and it goes without saying this.” But he builds the principles in the form of “not only this, but even this.” Meaning: first, there is a God; second, He gave a Torah; third, there is reward and punishment for one who fulfills or does not fulfill. So it is “not only this, but even this.”

[Speaker C] So his claim about the Sages not speaking about principles and so on—it seems to me it’s simply because the Sages just knew: either you believe in Torah from Sinai or you don’t believe in Torah from Sinai. It’s just the most basic thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and it’s also obvious that belief in the Holy One blessed be He is basic; there’s no need to speak about that either.

[Speaker C] Yes, obviously, but in the end—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what settles it, in the end—

[Speaker C] But in the end, that’s what will decide, as it were, between someone who is with you in Torah from Sinai and someone who isn’t with you in the game.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but you’re right that after he writes that these are the three principles, the question why the Sages didn’t talk about them is already mostly emptied of content. Because clearly, these three things are not something one needs to discuss; they are self-evident, obvious, found everywhere. Meaning again, providence and reward and punishment—I’m less emphatic about that. But the existence of God and the giving of the Torah—there’s nothing to discuss there; it’s obvious. And he says—and this is how he concludes now, returning to Maimonides at the end—he says: It is possible that Maimonides’ view in numbering the principles is according to the path we have written; Maimonides also agrees. That he counted the three we mentioned, which are parent categories, together with the roots branching from them, and called them all principles. Therefore he counted the existence of God, which is the parent category, as the first principle, and counted with it four other roots branching from it as principles: namely unity, rejection of corporeality, that He is primordial, and that it is fitting to worship Him and not another. And he counted Torah from Heaven, which is the parent category, with three other roots branching from it as principles: prophecy, the prophecy of Moses, and that the religion will not change. And he also counted knowledge of God and providence and reward and punishment, which is the parent category, with three other principles: reward of the soul, Messiah, and resurrection of the dead. Okay? So basically the claim is that Maimonides also counted the details as principles. Meaning, principles are not necessarily only roots. Principles are the foundational matters, and although there are only three roots, there are thirteen principles. But then of course the question arises: fine, what about the rest? Free choice, creation ex nihilo, all the things he asked above—how does that fit? So he says: according to this, there is no difficulty as to why he did not count creation ex nihilo, because he did not count it since it does not fall under one of these three that we mentioned. So what? If it doesn’t fall under them, that means there ought to be four and not three. Meaning, the way he says it, these are the three; what falls under them Maimonides includes and also calls them principles, because if it falls under them then okay. But whatever does not fall under these three, whether it is important or not important, is not a principle. So once again we’ve returned to some very technical sort of explanation. And he did not count free choice and purpose even though they are necessary for divine Torah.

[Speaker C] Wait, but the author himself also didn’t count creation ex nihilo. He also doesn’t count creation ex nihilo. I don’t understand. The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim also didn’t count creation ex nihilo. So how is it that according to this there’s no difficulty as to why he didn’t count creation ex nihilo?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he counts only the three principles; novelty isn’t a principle. He counts only three roots. Those three roots are only what he stated. Maimonides doesn’t count only the roots; he also counts the branches. So then you could say: then let him count novelty as well? But novelty is not one of the roots, so I don’t count it. But Maimonides, who also added the details—so why not novelty? He says: because novelty is not a detail within one of the three roots.

[Speaker C] And he also didn’t count free will and purpose even though they are. Why? Why? That’s a root.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what he— that’s what he answers. He asked only about Maimonides, because Maimonides, after all, didn’t count only roots; Maimonides also counted things that are not roots. He set up only roots, but Maimonides also counted things that are not roots. So why doesn’t he count novelty? The answer is: even when Maimonides counts things that are not roots, those are only branches of these three roots. But things that are not roots and also not branches of these three roots—those Maimonides did not count. “And he did not count free will and purpose, even though they are necessary for a divine law, because these are not necessary to it insofar as it is divine,” as, with God’s help, he explained earlier—because that does not actually distinguish a divine religion; it exists in a natural religion as well. But still, according to this approach, it remains difficult: why did he not count life and ability and other attributes under the principle of God’s existence, just as he counted eternity and the other attributes? And similarly one may analyze everything he omitted from the other principles, and all this will be clarified in the course of our discussion later on, with God’s help. All right? Now he says: “And let us return to analyze the principles according to our approach, that they are three and are primary categories, and first we will explain the principles of conventional religions, and afterward we will speak about the principles of divine religion, with the help of the blessed God.” Okay.

[Speaker C] Natural religion—resurrection of the dead and Messiah, does he count those, like, as branches of providence?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Maimonides does. And the author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim doesn’t count them because he counts only the roots. Okay, the questions here—the details matter less to me than the overall picture, as you’ll see, how shaky it is. See how much you can play with these things and then tell me that on this basis I would build laws. After all, we talked about the question of what the halakhic implications of the principles are. I’m already slipping a bit into summary mode, but I’ll still say it here in two sentences. We talked about things like “they are lowered down but not brought back up,” “a heretic with regard to a principle,” and so on. Do you understand that in order to define someone as a heretic regarding a principle—for the purpose of saying it is permitted to kill him, or that one is not obligated to save him—and to build that on these dubious reasonings, that sounds absurd to me. It’s so flimsy, yes, so far from unequivocal and not well-defined—I wouldn’t build any cardinal implication on that. So the whole justification for dealing with principles in order to understand who is a heretic regarding a principle and who is not—once you understand that the principles are something decided in such a non-definitive way, it seems to me you’ve thrown the baby out with the bathwater here. Meaning, you cannot derive real halakhic conclusions from this, just as the Raavad essentially attacks Maimonides—he says, many greater and better than he believed in corporeality, so what do you want, to throw them into a pit and not pull them out just because they think differently from you? So okay, we’ll get back to that in the summaries. Up to here—if there are comments or questions.

[Speaker C] No, but the first two principles, the simple ones, God’s existence and Torah from Heaven, so the Rabbi does agree that those really are the legs the whole thing stands on. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He—

[Speaker E] The author of Sefer Ha-Ikkarim at the beginning attacked Maimonides on the grounds that Torah from Heaven doesn’t follow from that. Afterward he does agree that it does result from it, he just says he divided it into three branches.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Torah from Heaven means the Torah of Moses.

[Speaker E] About the Torah of Moses he says that he divided it into three branches? He said that about religion in general. Yes, but for the religion of Moses it’s obvious that Torah—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —from Heaven certainly belongs to the religion of Moses; he’s not going to argue about that.

[Speaker E] Yes, but at the beginning he writes that it does not follow, that it doesn’t compel that conclusion. Are you talking about the previous class? No, no, I mean now, in the text we’re learning. That it’s not sufficient?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Torah from Heaven? Where do you see that he writes this?

[Speaker E] Explicitly—that these are necessary principles but not sufficient. Without what? But not sufficient.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, you mean necessary but not sufficient? Yes, yes. No—Torah from Heaven is necessary but not sufficient, but if you take all three together, then it is necessary and sufficient.

[Speaker E] So then what’s his problem? He was talking about the general structure of all the principles.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has no problem at all. Who said he has a problem?

[Speaker E] He attacked Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he attacked Maimonides before he reached that conclusion. Now he says the opposite—in the end he actually says that maybe Maimonides too is basically following his approach, apart from the questions of classification. Okay. So, Sabbath peace, and goodbye. Sabbath peace. Sabbath peace, goodbye. Sabbath peace.

[Speaker B] Sabbath peace.