Dilemmas Concerning Human Life – Lesson 4

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I need to harm someone who has nothing to do with the situation, I’m not allowed to do that even at the cost of my own life. Opposed to that principle stands the law of a pursuer: in a case where the third party I’m supposed to harm is not really a third party, but rather the one creating the threat, the one creating the situation—there I’m allowed, and maybe even required, to harm him in order to save myself or to save the pursued person. I said that in the law of a pursuer there are two aspects. One aspect is saving the pursued person, and the second is a punitive aspect directed at the pursuer. Since the pursuer is liable to death as a murderer, and we’re told not to wait until he actually kills and only then becomes liable in practice, but rather to kill him first, there’s no point in waiting and then losing the life of the pursued person as well. I said that the implication of the punitive dimension is, apparently, in the case of a minor pursuer or an insane pursuer, where the Amoraim in the Talmud disagreed whether the law of a pursuer applies even to a minor. And simply put, the basis of the dispute is exactly this. If the law of a pursuer is based on the fact that the pursuer deserves punishment and therefore we kill him, then a minor is not punishable and does not deserve punishment, so we don’t kill him. But if it’s about saving the pursued person, then it has nothing to do with whether he’s a minor or an adult, obligated in commandments or not—we kill him in order to save the pursued person. But the conclusion in the Talmud and among the halakhic decisors, both in Jewish law and in the Talmud itself, is that even a minor pursuer is killed. And I already mentioned—and I won’t repeat it again—that these principles are not only part of Jewish law; I think they’re accepted in almost every legal and moral system I know, so there’s nothing unique to Jewish law here, and precisely for that reason I think this topic is interesting. So in practice, apparently, there is no punitive dimension, because the fact is that even a minor pursuer is killed; so apparently you don’t actually need the punitive dimension in order to kill the pursuer. But I said I’d show later that it’s still important to know that there is also a punitive dimension here, and that can have consequences, and today we’ll see one consequence of that. After that, when I place these two things opposite each other—saving oneself at the cost of another’s life, and the law of a pursuer—my next claim was that both of these laws go all the way in an extreme way. Meaning, under the law of a pursuer, you kill him no matter what the value of the pursued person’s life is, no matter how it compares to the value of your life—under any situation whatsoever, there is no calculation. Meaning, if you are the pursuer, then you die and not the pursued person; the pursued person must be saved in any case. Say, for example—by extension—someone pursuing a fetus in order to kill it. Even though the value of a fetus’s life is lower, we saw that, still, if someone is pursuing a fetus, he may be killed. Even though he is a full human life and the fetus is only a partial life-value. Why? Because under the law of a pursuer you don’t make that calculation of where life has greater or lesser value. I said at the end of the previous session—even, no, I didn’t say it, but it follows from what I said. Someone who is pursuing property, I also claim, may be killed. Meaning, you don’t even need an endangered life here in order to justify killing a pursuer. I claim that even someone pursuing property may be killed. We’ll get to that later when I talk about killing a thief, Shai Dromi, a burglar tunneling in, and all those things. I claimed—and I’m already saying this here just to complete the picture—that once someone is defined as a pursuer, even if he’s pursuing property, which has no life-value at all—it’s less than a fetus, it’s just property. And that too is reversible.

[Speaker B] Right, that’s

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something reversible—it can be reversible—and still it’s permitted to kill. Permitted, but apparently not required in that case, unlike a pursuer in the full sense, but it’s permitted. That’s an extreme case that shows us one side of the coin.

[Speaker C] When you said someone who really only wants to take the property, that you’re certain he only wants to take the property, but it could

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Develop

[Speaker B] Usually, right,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the problem. We’ll get to that topic.

[Speaker D] The two sides you mentioned, if it’s

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the angle of saving a life—it’s not saving a life. If it’s on grounds of punishment—stealing is not a capital offense. That’s why I said: this is not saving a life, it’s saving my right, not necessarily my life. But if you say it’s because of punishment, that the reason you kill him is—

[Speaker B] No, then clearly the punitive dimension—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t exist here, that’s clear. But I said that in the end the punitive dimension also doesn’t remain in practical Jewish law, because after all even a minor pursuer is killed.

[Speaker B] I said there would be consequences to this, and you’re right that those consequences need to be examined specifically regarding a pursuer. A pursuer is killed, just like a minor pursuer is killed—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone already pointed that out here earlier; I’ll get to it, okay? It’s clear that that’s the heart of the discussion there. So that’s one side of the coin. Meaning, if we’re talking about the law of a pursuer, then the law of a pursuer means death no matter what the value of the pursuer’s life is compared to that of the pursued person, to the point that now I’ve added that even if we’re not talking about the life of the pursued person, but rather the property of the pursued person. In other words, any threat to someone else’s right justifies killing him. That’s the claim. A pretty far-reaching claim; I’ll go into it more later. That’s one side of the coin. On the other hand, if the person is not threatening, then of course we’re in the domain of the second principle, that a person may not save himself at the cost of another’s life. And there, that’s what we saw at the end of the previous lecture, the claim there is that even at the cost of property I’m not allowed to save myself—I have to give up my life and not harm the other person’s property. And that’s the opposite extreme. Notice that what I’m trying to show is that when we are located at one of the two ends of this framework, then we are basically in a completely extreme state—there are no limitations at all. Meaning, the law is the law with no qualifications. Meaning, if the law of a pursuer applies, you kill the pursuer even in order to save property. If the law of a pursuer does not apply, then even harming property is forbidden in order to save a life. In other words, the reverse. Okay? Meaning, you can’t infringe on anyone’s right unless he has the status of a pursuer. If he doesn’t have the status of a pursuer, you can’t infringe on any of his rights, even if you’ll die. And that is Rashi’s view. I said I’m basing myself here only on some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), Rashi’s view, and I said that Rashba also agrees with him in principle. Most of the medieval authorities of course say that one may harm property in order to save life, and that’s also the practical halakhic ruling—but of course one must pay. And that basically means I’m not taking the property. I cited Rashba, who says that this is only because there is really no prohibition of theft here, but if there were a prohibition of theft, Rashba too would join Rashi in saying that it would be forbidden to harm property in order to save life. So that’s the basic picture I want us to keep before our eyes.

[Speaker B] If you have nothing to pay with, then it’s forbidden. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you don’t have

[Speaker B] Anything to pay with, then you remain a debtor, so it’s impossible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s one of the consequences that will follow. Unless you say, okay, maybe later if I get money, then maybe it would be allowed. But here the discussion already begins. So that’s the basic picture. And the basic picture is that there are two principles here, and in every situation we need to decide whether we belong to this principle or to that one. In other words, whether the person I need to harm is an involved party or an uninvolved party—a third party. And that will determine the Jewish law in an extreme way. Meaning, if he is involved, then I may harm him for the sake of anything. And if he is not involved, then I may not harm him for the sake of anything. That’s really the point I want to sharpen. Now, the last point on the general map before I move into applications is combinations. Up to now I described extreme situations, but we brought Maimonides regarding a fetus, right? The Mishnah in Ohalot, a fetus that has put out its head or has not put out its head. And I said that from the Talmud it appears that such a situation is ultimately not defined as pursuit. And why—so why is it forbidden to kill the fetus if it has not put out its head? Because the value of its life is lower—no, that’s why it is permitted to kill the fetus, sorry, in order to save the mother, because the value of the fetus’s life is lower than the mother’s. Okay? So therefore it is permitted to kill the fetus. But if it has put out its head, once it is a person, then you can’t—one life is not set aside for another. Meaning, you don’t kill one in order to save the other. That’s the plain sense of the Talmud. But Maimonides says—so from the Talmud itself you see that not so, meaning that even if there is an uninvolved party like the fetus, you can still harm it if the value of its life is not complete. Why is it uninvolved?

[Speaker B] It is involved—it’s killing the mother.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because in the end the Talmud says that this is not a situation of pursuit.

[Speaker B] Meaning, you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You kill it in order to save yourself; you don’t kill it because it’s threatening. It isn’t threatening.

[Speaker B] If the mother—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the mother weren’t here, it wouldn’t be harmed. They are each threatening the other. That’s not called a threat. And the question whether it is called a pursuer—the answer is no. Obviously. Also King David, whom we discussed, wanted to damage the Philistines’ barley in order to save himself—if he hadn’t damaged the Philistines’ barley, would he have been saved? What’s the problem? No—the question is whether the law of a pursuer applies or does not apply. I always harm in order to save myself; that still doesn’t mean the situation is a situation of pursuit. Therefore from the plain sense of the Talmud it appears unlike the picture I described earlier, because from the plain sense of the Talmud it appears that harming a fetus is permitted even though it is not a pursuer, because the value of its life is lower. Meaning, there is room for a calculation that compares the value of lives even in extreme situations. But for that I brought Maimonides, and Maimonides says that the reason one may kill the fetus is because it is like a pursuer after her to kill her. Then all the commentators on Maimonides ask: what do you mean? The Talmud said it’s not a pursuer. If it is a pursuer, then even if it has put out its head it should still be permitted to kill it. After all, a pursuer may be killed even if he is a full human being. So why does the Mishnah distinguish between a fetus that has put out its head and one that has not? So I explained that this Maimonides really is an addition to the extreme picture I described up to now. Maimonides says there are intermediate situations. There are situations where the pursuit is not really pursuit. You threaten my life, but not entirely. And therefore, let’s call it, you are half a pursuer. What does that mean? We’re not at one of the two extreme poles of the map. In such a situation there is already room to weigh the value of lives. Is this an innovation of Maimonides? One second—yes. Meaning, that’s how he understands the Talmud, but yes, it is an innovation of Maimonides. And Maimonides’ claim is that if you are not completely a pursuer, then we have to start discussing the value of lives. Meaning, then you can say that if the value of the fetus’s life is less than the mother’s, then one may harm the fetus—or must even harm the fetus—in order to save the mother. But if it has put out its head, then even though it is still like a pursuer, it is not fully a pursuer. And in a case where it is not fully a pursuer, you cannot kill someone whose life-value is a full value. And from this Maimonides comes the picture I described earlier. And that’s according to Maimonides. Therefore I say: what I’m describing is not according to all the medieval authorities; each time I’m choosing certain medieval views. It could also be otherwise, but that doesn’t matter right now. These are the views I’m using, I’m describing a picture according to certain medieval authorities, and I’ll always indicate whose view I’m following. Then the claim, the picture, is actually a somewhat more complex one. Meaning, the relation between an involved factor and an uninvolved factor—meaning a threatening factor and a third party—is continuous. It’s not one or zero. It’s not simply either you’re threatening or you’re not threatening. Sometimes you’re a little threatening, fairly threatening, very threatening. And that means the picture begins to get more complicated. There is a continuum of levels of pursuit, and there is a continuum of life-values that I harm or for whose sake I harm. So whom am I saving, and whom am I harming. There are three parameters, and all three can lie on a continuum. It’s a very complex picture according to Maimonides. In the earlier extreme dichotomous pictures, everything was clear. But Maimonides says these are continuous axes, not dichotomous axes—not yes or no. Now what are these axes? There are three. One axis is the value of the life of the pursuer, or of the one who must be harmed. Whether he is a pursuer or not—that’s a separate discussion. But the one who must be harmed: is he a fetus, is it property, is it a full person? Meaning, there is a continuum of the values of what you are harming. There is a second continuum, which is the values for whose sake you are harming. Am I coming to save property, to save a fetus, to save a person, perhaps a dying person, short-term life? There are many points on that continuum. That’s the second continuum. The third continuum is the continuum of levels of pursuit. The question is how much you are considered a pursuer. The fetus, for example, is something in the middle, says Maimonides—it is like a pursuer. There is some concept of pursuit here, but not full pursuit. Okay? There are three continua here. Now in complicated cases we need to integrate the continua. Meaning, if I am in the middle in terms of the degree of pursuit, then it could be that if I’m in the middle in terms of the value of the thing I’m harming, I’m allowed to harm it. If I’m closer to the edge, then maybe a dying person no, a fetus yes, property no—things of that kind. And here I have no rules. Meaning, I don’t know how to give a clear rule, because here it really is a matter of evaluation. And I said at the beginning of this whole discussion that what bothers me in these topics is that usually, when there’s public discussion of them, people immediately reach for the magic word: proportionality. This is proportionate, that isn’t proportionate. The feeling is that everyone is just talking from the gut. You say it’s proportionate, you say it isn’t—there are no reasons for anything. In the end you want to say forbidden, and you want to say permitted. What’s the reason? There are no reasons—proportionate, disproportionate, yes proportionate. Now, I said I can’t offer a computer algorithm for how to solve—one second—a system that will tell a computer how to decide. Obviously there are also considerations of proportionality, and we’ll get to them later. I only want to claim that there is a conceptual framework within which I use considerations of proportionality. The conceptual framework is the one I’ve described until now. And here, in those continua I described, that’s where proportionality considerations really enter. I don’t know how to give the mathematics of it. Here one has to think and assess what seems right to us. There are no clear rules here, and obviously there will also be disagreements among people about this. I only want to show where it is located. Meaning, if the pursuit is absolute there is no question, and if there is no pursuit there is also no question. Then we have to begin asking ourselves: does this justify it or not justify it? And then we’ll talk about proportions. Okay, so it seems to me there is room—obviously there is room—for considerations of proportionality. This is not a one-or-zero decision that a computer can simply make. But I do think the discussion is deficient because it lacks the picture of the framework, and where proportionality considerations enter—meaning within the framework, how and between what and what I’m supposed to maneuver. Okay.

[Speaker C] And this calculation has to be made by the pursued person while he’s under threat?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, sometimes by a third party, sometimes by the pursued person, right. And sometimes he can’t make that calculation—what can you do—but let him make it in advance, let him study the topic. What is the degree of pursuit—we don’t look at the outcome?

[Speaker C] If he’s a pursuer, the outcome is that he’ll kill.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that he’ll kill, but that I’ll be killed. Whether he’ll kill or not is a big question. Did the fetus kill the mother? It didn’t kill the mother; she’ll die if we leave him there. That’s exactly the question of whether he’s a pursuer or not. The outcome is not interesting; the outcome is always that I’ll die, otherwise why would I want to harm the other person? The question is whether the other person is threatening me. It’s not enough that the outcome is that I’ll die; that’s exactly the difference between the two poles I described. By the way, what you mentioned earlier—that relates to Roi Klein. I mentioned it once regarding Roi Klein, who threw himself on a grenade to save soldiers. In my humble opinion, that was an act that is forbidden—both not sensible and also halakhically forbidden. That doesn’t mean he isn’t worthy of admiration, self-sacrifice, and all those things. I’m only saying that from the halakhic standpoint, I think it’s forbidden to do such a thing. He violated a prohibition when he did that. I also think, from the operational standpoint, it wasn’t the right thing to do, as far as I understand—though of course I’m not an expert in the details there. But that’s exactly the point, okay? Still, he had those three, four, maybe four and a half seconds of the grenade in which to make the decision.

[Speaker F] There’s a difference between Soldier A and Soldier B, where Soldier A jumps on the grenade to save Soldier B. Roi Klein also had responsibility for his subordinates, he was responsible for them, so that could make a difference.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but Roi Klein also had responsibility for the mission—he was the deputy company commander there in order to achieve it. That’s a greater responsibility than responsibility for the soldiers. I’m not speaking about the operational aspect, I’m speaking about the rational aspect.

[Speaker F] But that’s part of the issue. That’s a greater responsibility than responsibility for the soldiers. He wants to save them—it’s not like one soldier for another soldier.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but on the other hand, it’s also not like the opposite case. He’s also responsible for achieving the result. If the deputy company commander goes down, that’s not the same as two soldiers going down.

[Speaker B] From the standpoint of operational judgment, a soldier takes the highest life-value for the most precious thing, yes. Today soldiers going out on a mission—the most important thing is that they come home safely, no matter what.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s a different discussion.

[Speaker B] No, it’s the same issue.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that really is a separate discussion. I only brought it as an example, and we’ll get to it later. I brought it only as an example of a situation where, within those three seconds before the grenade explodes, a person has to make decisions. So obviously a person can’t really make decisions in a situation like that, and therefore obviously even if I’m right that he made a mistake and it was a prohibition, it’s not as if someone is going to judge him now as a criminal—I assume not. He can’t make calculations to that extent. But in principle, it seems to me that that’s the situation.

[Speaker F] You ask because he sacrificed his life?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is forbidden to sacrifice your life in order to save another.

[Speaker F] Wait, there’s also the consideration of whether it’s one versus many.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Even one versus many, according to most halakhic decisors, is forbidden. And even the decisors who say it’s permitted usually say that’s when we’re talking about the public, not a large group. They derive it from Pappus and Lulianus.

[Speaker F] Maybe he—

[Speaker D] Thought he’d be killed anyway?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe he made some calculation. Look, those who know a bit— a grenade doesn’t kill if you know it’s about to explode. You lie down with your legs toward the grenade; that’s how they always teach soldiers. So there’s some—not everyone knows this—if I know the grenade is about to explode, I usually won’t be killed. Meaning, I lie with my legs toward the grenade, the grenade explodes kind of like a mushroom, usually. Of course all sorts of things can happen, but usually I won’t be killed. That’s what they teach in the army. I’ve never been in that situation, but that’s what they teach. So he could probably have saved himself, if I understand correctly. Again, I don’t know the details well enough.

[Speaker D] Fine, just regarding this calculation that you can supposedly do—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The calculation in the seconds you have to decide. That’s why, by the way, very often—

[Speaker B] It’s good to study the topics beforehand, because these are topics where usually, or often, when you’re inside the situation you can’t now start making the whole calculation, both moral and halakhic. You need to decide in seconds, and it’s complicated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s possible to save the pursued person by—

[Speaker B] Injuring the pursuer or preventing him in some other way, then it is forbidden to kill him—you can save him by injuring one of his limbs. I explained that to you. I really object to this, I really don’t accept it, but on the face of it—it’s clear. If you can save him by injuring one of his limbs, then it’s forbidden to kill him. That was with Joab and Abishai—he could have saved himself, he stabbed him with a stab, like this, or stabbed—he stabbed him in the liver instead of giving him some sort of blow to the leg.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I don’t remember. Fine. In any case, the picture is basically this: we have some framework, and within it you make proportionality considerations along the three axes that lie on a continuum. There you can make proportionality judgments of value against value. I’ll now bring an example of a consideration of that kind, where you also see the significance of the punitive dimension. I wrote a column about this on my site. There was some argument between Bennett and Gallant about harming the people launching the kites from Gaza. Bennett said they are pursuers, they are a threat, they are terrorists, they should be killed. And Gallant said, “It just doesn’t fit,” meaning, this can’t be, they’re children, you can’t kill these guys. Usually here too, as in all the other cases, the dispute is divided between right and left, even though Gallant is not left-wing, but somehow there’s a strong correlation between positions on this question and broader right-left worldviews. Maybe later I’ll say a bit more about the connection between right and left and disputes of this sort, which is sometimes real. In this case I think it isn’t real. And when I thought about that argument, my initial feeling was that that was where the penny dropped for me about the continuum and proportionality. Because my feeling was: clearly they are pursuers, because this thing can kill. So far it hasn’t killed, but there have already been cases where it came very close. They are doing this completely with the intention of harming, and even at the price of killing. And seemingly Bennett is right—that they should be killed. What difference does it make that they’re children? What practical difference does it make whether he’s a child or not? A minor pursuer is also killed. So what difference does it make whether he’s a minor or an adult? Then I thought—I don’t know whether Gallant made this calculation—but it seems to me that it fits into the picture I described earlier, and my claim is basically this. When people say he’s a child, they mean to say he is not culpable, right? But as we saw, the question of culpability doesn’t play a role in the law of a pursuer. Yes, but that doesn’t matter, because the question of culpability—after all, even a minor pursuer is harmed, right? And if he’s not a pursuer, then what difference does it make that he’s a child? Then it would be forbidden to kill an adult too. Either way, why is the fact that he is a minor relevant? You could say, okay, then it really is nonsense, they didn’t think it through, or they don’t think the way I described, or whatever—but it’s irrelevant. No, that’s something else. We’re talking about killing beforehand, of course. Or because of some concern about a future act—and then again you can talk about a pursuer. We’ll see in a moment. But apparently it still falls under the law of a pursuer. It will fit into what I’m saying here. Look, the point is this.

[Speaker B] There’s judgment involved here, as part of a continuum. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now my claim is basically that one can really present a consistent view that distinguishes between minors and adults, even though on the face of the dichotomous picture there’s no room to distinguish. If he’s uninvolved, then whether he’s an adult or a child, you may not touch him. If he’s involved, then whether adult or child, you need to kill him. But as I said earlier, there are situations on the continuum. Meaning, there are situations where one of the claims raised is that in fact there isn’t really pursuit here, because the fact is that until now, despite hundreds of thousands—I don’t know how many—kites, no one has been killed. I think some people were harmed, but no one was killed. That means: okay, there is risk; it’s not impossible, but it’s some risk that we can’t treat as obvious pursuit, like someone pointing a weapon and about to shoot another person. This isn’t full pursuit. Then one could say—I’m saying this as a possible claim—one could say that this is a case of pursuit in Maimonides’ sense. Meaning, this is a case where someone is creating a risk. But it is basically a small risk. In the end, the chance that someone will be hurt is small. Now if he were an adult terrorist making a cold-blooded decision to harm, even at the cost of killing, then one could kill him because he has the dimension of culpability. The punitive dimension joins in here and says: since the punitive dimension exists, then in a case of doubtful pursuit, where without the punitive dimension I would not have been able to kill him—I add the punitive dimension and say: one may kill him. But in the case of a minor, where the punitive dimension is absent, then in terms of the laws of a pursuer he is only like a pursuer; he is not actually a pursuer. And therefore here you could have a situation in which you distinguish between a minor and an adult, and on the one hand because of proportionality and the continuum, and on the other hand you see where the punitive question nevertheless enters. Because I said that in practical Jewish law, even a minor pursuer is killed. So it seems that the punitive dimension, even if it exists in the background, has no practical consequence at all. What difference does it make? Now I’m saying that because there are continuum cases, sometimes the punitive dimension is what will decide the issue.

[Speaker F] Why is there a punitive dimension here? I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the fact that he is pursuing? He is killing—he is going to kill me. Like a pursuer, right.

[Speaker F] Why is a quasi-pursuer liable to death?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again—if he kills me, then he is liable to death, yes.

[Speaker F] If he kills me—but the chance is small.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if he kills me then he’s liable for death, right? So I’m saying that since the probability is small, that’s the calculation. Since the probability is small, but you created it willingly and in full awareness, and you’re an adult. There, when it comes to the consequences, I’m not willing to take the risk.

[Speaker F] He’s not liable for the death penalty; the chance that you’ll kill me is very small.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t matter, but I also don’t deserve to die. So why should I let you kill me? Why is your chance better than my chance?

[Speaker F] So again, this isn’t a punitive dimension, it’s a dimension…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is a punitive dimension in the sense of the dimension of guilt, let’s call it that. You are guilty in this situation; the minor is not guilty because he has no judgment. And still, if it were a clear threat, then I would kill him only out of self-defense, regardless of the question of guilt. But I want to argue that there’s an intuition here that everyone has: the question of guilt can enter in when we weigh it together with an incomplete threat, with a quasi-pursuer situation.

[Speaker D] In a case of someone pursuing money, certainly, what? You’re saying he’s not really a pursuer because there isn’t such a great risk to life, but with respect to money. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if it’s permitted to kill someone pursuing money, then the whole discussion never starts. I agree. Everything I said was only on the assumption that it is forbidden to kill someone pursuing money.

[Speaker I] And with a non-Jew too, what’s the definition of a minor? Bar mitzvah age or…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who is a minor, who isn’t responsible for his actions. The Hatam Sofer talks about this, in the responsum of the Rosh, that regarding a minor…

[Speaker I] There are some fifteen-year-olds—it depends on the person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are some fifteen-year-olds who may already be of sound mind; there are some who are eight, so less so. I don’t know, I’m not familiar with the procedures there, but let’s say we’re dealing with a minor.

[Speaker B] And with a pursuer and the pursued, doesn’t the pursued have any responsibility to save his body by hiding in some corner or something? Here, after all, when they burn these fields, anyone can go into some corner and nothing will happen to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But who says nothing will happen to you? It depends what gets burned, it depends who gets burned, people have already been injured. It’s true they didn’t die—they haven’t died so far—but people were injured. It’s not like that. You can’t—what do you mean? I’m also not sure… By the way, I’m also not sure that I have to hide; maybe we’ll talk about that later, but even suppose that…

[Speaker B] We’re not talking about a case where there is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we’re talking about an ordinary pursuer. That’s the situation in which I need to hide.

[Speaker B] In a wartime situation altogether, I think all these considerations are something else, there’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we’ll get to wartime situations later. Right now I’m talking about a situation while ignoring wartime issues; at the moment I’m talking about the laws of murder and preservation of life.

[Speaker E] I remember from the Hatam Sofer that in the end there is no algorithm that defines a minor…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he says: whoever has understanding, that’s all. What? Decide whether he understands or doesn’t understand. There is no age. There isn’t.

[Speaker E] You have five seconds to decide.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no law of five seconds; we’re back to the previous problem—that’s a technical problem. If I have five hours and I want to decide, I can sit quietly and say: look, I also don’t know this fellow who’s flying a kite, and I don’t always see exactly who he is. I say he seems about ten years old. You have to make decisions; anything can happen. You have to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty—there’s no choice. Anyway, maybe I’ll give an example. I’m saying this example is important to me because it raises for us where, in everyday considerations, in real-life problems, this picture can come in, and what role the consideration of proportionality plays. It does not play a full role. Meaning: in a place where there is someone threatening me, I kill him, minor or adult. If he isn’t threatening me, I don’t kill him, neither minor nor adult. If he’s half-threatening me, then I begin making considerations of proportionality: how guilty he is, what the degree of danger is, and all sorts of considerations of that kind. And of course, if the time is short, then you have to do it quickly, but there’s no… I remind you, I said earlier that you need to prepare in advance for these situations because the time is short. So you study the passages in advance, and only when you enter the situations will you be able to do the… It reminds me of just an interesting point. Once I spoke with Doron… commander of Sayeret Matkal. Doron Avital, exactly. He was once a Knesset member for Kadima. He tried to show certain philosophical principles of Wittgenstein—he did a doctorate in Wittgenstein’s philosophy—and he tried to show that he actually implemented them in the combat doctrine of Sayeret Matkal and of the paratroopers in general. And the main motto in the book is, by the way, apropos training and thinking ahead, he claims that when you build a model to prepare for some operation, the model must not… Usually the accepted practice was to take mannequins from a shop window that look exactly like human beings and make the model as close as possible, one-to-one with reality. He strongly opposes that. He claims that to this day—that’s also the combat doctrine there—they don’t make models like that. He wanted cardboard targets, like the ones they put on shooting ranges. Because his claim is that the reality on the ground is never really what you practiced—never, ever, it won’t happen. Now if you are locked into a very, very specific model that you know is one-to-one with what will happen to you, then you have murdered judgment. Meaning, the person who suddenly encounters something different will freeze; he won’t be able to make decisions. In contrast, if you train on something schematic, and each time you try a different option—he could come from here, could come from there, maybe we missed a wall inside the house, maybe who knows what, all kinds of things, incomplete information, or something changed, or all sorts of things like that—then that prepares people better for the operation. Which means, coming back to us—it just reminded me—because obviously even if you study the passages in advance and prepare the tools properly, in the end, in the three seconds you have, you need to decide which tool this belongs to, make the proportionality calculation if needed—it isn’t really practical. I do think—and again this is also as a result of Wittgenstein, we need to continue there with that issue but I won’t get into it more—that many times, if you think through many situations and reach conclusions about them in the study hall, meaning not in the field, and it’s always different—and still, you train yourself to make decisions faster and more correctly in practical situations. And the more these situations are not cleanly one of two sides—complete threat or complete lack of threat—but all sorts of things in between, you build within yourself the right system that in the end will also make correct and quick decisions in the field. Therefore when I say it’s worthwhile to train in advance and study the topic, not in the sense that preceded it, of Doron Avital—meaning in the sense of, okay, we’ll think through every situation and then we’ll simply know an answer to every question, we’ll get to the field and know what to do. It doesn’t work like that. But it is true that it’s important to think through things in advance and through all kinds of situations, so that we can very quickly do a kind of instinctive, intuitive thinking and make better decisions. That is in our hands. Of course, in the field it’s always different.

[Speaker D] Experience is important too; here we have an advantage over the young, or a young person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, although you know, experience in war isn’t always a function of age, but yes, correct. Good. So that’s regarding the spectrum and the importance of the punitive dimension, the dimension of guilt. Maybe I’ll bring another example that shows the extremity of the sides. If someone comes and threatens me with a gun, says to me: give me a shekel, and if not—if not, I’ll shoot you. So ostensibly I can give him a shekel, assuming I believe him for the sake of argument, okay? So I give him the shekel; ostensibly I can give him the shekel and send him on his way. Am I permitted to kill him? Now the assumption, as I already said, is that if I can save the pursuer, the pursued—meaning the pursuer, it’s less punishment—to save him, to save whom? To save the pursuer or to save the pursued? So if I can save him by injuring one of his limbs, if I can solve the problem of pursuit without killing the pursuer, I am forbidden to kill the pursuer. Now in this situation, what happens? I can solve the problem of pursuit: I’ll give him a shekel and he’ll go on his way. Am I allowed to kill him? The answer, I think, is certainly yes.

[Speaker B] It’s permitted to kill him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re not obligated to, by the way, not obligated—but it’s permitted. Why? Because I don’t owe him a shekel. I don’t owe him a shekel, and if he threatens to kill me if I don’t give him the shekel, then he is basically a pursuer. He’s trying to use—I’ll get later to applications of this and you’ll see where it comes to expression—he’s trying to use this Jewish law that one can save him by injuring one of his limbs as a defense for violence. He basically wants to take a shekel from me now, and he knows I can’t kill him because I can save him by injuring one of his limbs, as a defense for violence; he basically wants to take a shekel from me. Give him the shekel? There’s no such thing. It can’t be that he uses this halakhic principle as protection for a violent act. Therefore I think that in such a situation there is no protection whatsoever. I’ll bring proofs and implications later, but right now I just want to sketch the map. There is no protection whatsoever in such a situation. I’m allowed to kill him and I don’t need to give him a shekel. Now I’ll bring you a very nice proof for this, a proof by a fortiori reasoning. Not only when I’m defending my shekel am I allowed to kill him, but even if I’m defending something that is my right but I’m forbidden to do it—even then I’m allowed to kill the person threatening me. And that is the case of Zimri. The Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin says that if Zimri had turned around and killed Pinchas, he would not be executed for it. Meaning, Zimri could have killed Pinchas when Pinchas came and threatened Zimri; Zimri could have killed Pinchas and he would be exempt. Pinchas has the status of a pursuer. So the Kli Yakar asks at the end of Parashat Balak: what do you mean? He could have stopped sinning, and then Pinchas would not have killed him. How is it permitted to kill a pursuer in such a situation, when I can save him by injuring one of his limbs? I can solve the problem of pursuit without killing the pursuer. In such a case it is forbidden to kill a pursuer. Just stop sinning, say okay, stop, I’m stopping, send Kozbi on her way—

[Speaker I] And then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Pinchas would not have killed him.

[Speaker I] And Pinchas also could have prevented the transgression if he had—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could have prevented the transgression, if he—

[Speaker I] could have saved him by injuring one of his limbs; maybe really—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In such a situation maybe he would have needed to do that; I don’t know what the situation there was. But I’m speaking right now about the other side. So when the consideration before us is: if I can prevent the pursuit not at the cost of the pursuer’s life, then it is forbidden to kill the pursuer. Now here, if he had stopped sinning, Pinchas would not have killed him. So how does the Talmud say that Zimri was permitted to kill Pinchas? Again, “permitted” may be a bit strong; it says he would not be executed for it. Plainly, the intention is that it is permitted, but there is room to hesitate because of the language of the Talmud. So the Kli Yakar says something very interesting—I think he brings it in the name of the Rebbe of Gur—that that’s true, but I have the right to sin. I want to sin; that’s my reckoning with the Holy One, blessed be He. And if I decided to sin, I owe you nothing. If you demand that I stop sinning or else you’ll kill me, then I’ll kill you. Why? Because the question whether I sin or do not sin is not your question; it is a reckoning between me and the Holy One, blessed be He. The Holy One, blessed be He, will settle accounts with me over my sins, but that’s not your business. You can’t say, listen, you could have stopped sinning, so why are you killing me? Suppose I come to kill him now, so Pinchas as if negotiates with me, says wait, wait—why are you killing me? After all, you could stop sinning and then you wouldn’t need to kill me. You can save yourself without killing me, exactly like with the shekel. He says: look, I don’t owe you that I stop sinning. I’m forbidden to sin, fine—that’s with the Holy One, blessed be He, I’ll settle that with Him. But to you I don’t owe it.

[Speaker B] Exactly like the shekel calculation—I don’t owe it to you. But he caused that whole plague because of Zimri’s sin. It doesn’t matter; he doesn’t owe that to Pinchas in any case. He owes it to everyone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So maybe to everyone—but to Pinchas he doesn’t owe it. Why? Because Pinchas also didn’t die in the plague; there, you see, Pinchas didn’t die in the plague. The point isn’t the importance of the plague right now. In the end there is no plague; okay, let’s talk about a situation in which there is no plague. Okay? In that situation do we agree? Now let’s ask: in that situation why is it permitted to kill Pinchas? Why was Zimri permitted to kill Pinchas? And the answer is that it’s exactly like the shekel, but of course all the more so. Meaning, the shekel really is mine; I truly am not obligated to give you the shekel. You’re trying to use this law that one can save him by injuring one of his limbs in order to extract a shekel from me by force, so Jewish law removes the shields, says no—here that law does not apply. If he threatens you, kill him. You don’t owe him anything that you don’t owe him. The fact that he makes these calculations is a reckoning unrelated to me. The Kli Yakar says the same thing about Zimri. With Zimri too it’s the same thing: I have the right to sin—not only do I have the right to hold onto a shekel that is mine, I have the right to sin. Now on the level of rights in Hoshen Mishpat, that really is my right. I have the right to sin, and the Holy One, blessed be He, will settle accounts with me. He cannot demand that I stop sinning; he has no right to demand that of me. And therefore I do not owe him, in order not to kill him, to stop sinning. I don’t owe you that. I want to continue sinning. If you enter the situation, then take into account that I will kill you under the law of—

[Speaker B] pursuer. But if he’s collecting a debt—he says return the shekel you owe me or I’ll kill you—is it permitted for you to kill him, because I say: listen, I don’t want to return the debt?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that doesn’t mean that. To return the debt, that you do owe; that is indeed his right.

[Speaker B] He has a right. But he has a right to sin?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not to sin against him. We already once spoke about Hoshen Mishpat; I said there is a difference between my obligation and an obligation that derives from your right. My obligation to pay you a debt that I borrowed from you is an obligation founded on your right to receive the money from me. In contrast, the obligation not to have relations with an Aramean woman is toward the Holy One, blessed be He; it has nothing to do with Pinchas. Pinchas cannot claim anything from me in this matter. Like what I said about a poor person and charity. I have to give a poor person money. Can the poor person summon me to a religious court because I didn’t give him charity? No. Why? Because that is an obligation on me; it is not his right. Okay.

[Speaker B] That doesn’t mean one is required to do it, yes, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t mean you can kill. It means you can threaten.

[Speaker B] It’s the blood avenger.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s from MMA 1, you know, those MMA 1 competitions.

[Speaker B] You could be the advisor to crime organizations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is unequivocal. If someone owes me money, am I allowed to threaten him with a gun so he’ll return my money? I’m forbidden to shoot. But am I allowed to threaten him with a gun so he’ll return the money? That’s clear. And not only that: he is forbidden to kill me as a pursuer, because he really does owe me the money. That’s exactly the point. To kill him over the money—that is forbidden.

[Speaker E] But if he’s only threatening him—give the shekel or your blood is on your own head—but he doesn’t tell him how. It could be that “your blood is on your own head.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know—what do you mean, your blood is on your own head? Is he threatening to kill me?

[Speaker E] He’s threatening.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re entering pursuer situations again. That’s it. So the question is, maybe there’s doubt here. You need to decide, to assess how serious it is.

[Speaker E] When we examine this topic, and you bring in an additional consideration—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said, if there really is a pursuer, a real pursuer,

[Speaker E] then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] since what is at stake here is not my life but only my money, maybe in such a situation there would be reason to give him the money and not kill him? I don’t know, I don’t know. That’s a question of proportionality. I don’t know how to decide. Listen, the question is what exactly the situation is, how strong your assessment is of the chance that he’ll kill you. If there’s a significant chance that he will kill you, then in my opinion he is a full pursuer. You don’t need one hundred percent. It’s enough that there is a significant chance that he’ll kill you. But sometimes you’re not even sure he’s serious, and then it becomes a more complicated question.

[Speaker E] Now one more small example, just a second. If he says to me: give me a shekel or I’ll kill you. Now there’s a split between two people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Quickly, quickly—I’ll kill the second one. Let that be clear. I’ll get there in order to defend myself. So I’ll kill the one threatening me. I don’t care who’s talking. Let whoever talks talk. There is no agency for a transgression. If that one kills me, then he is threatening me and he will bear the consequences. It has nothing to do with who is speaking.

[Speaker H] Is there a consideration of deterrence? Say, both with Zimri and with those Ethiopians, what we’re doing, or what Pinchas did, wasn’t only in order to kill them. He wanted to make an example within the nation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, therefore Pinchas is allowed to kill him. On the other hand, Zimri is allowed to turn around and kill Pinchas. It’s two… Look, the Mishneh LaMelekh in chapter 1 of the laws of murder wonders, in light of this law, what happens with an unintentional killer—there is the blood avenger. Is a person who killed unintentionally permitted to defend himself and kill the blood avenger? He’s a pursuer. I, the unintentional killer, do not want to flee to a city of refuge. I stay where I am, and if the blood avenger comes, I’ll kill him, because he is a pursuer. The Mishneh LaMelekh says yes. Yes to what? It is permitted to kill the blood avenger; he is a pursuer. Even though the blood avenger is permitted, or perhaps even commanded, to kill me. He brings Zimri in this context.

[Speaker E] I don’t remember exactly how they answer there. I haven’t seen anyone who… I haven’t seen anyone who disagrees, with that either.

[Speaker B] I haven’t seen anyone address it besides him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I spoke in Frankel about the Mishneh LaMelekh, what they say there on this issue. In any case, what?

[Speaker B] Can someone else kill the pursuer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have great doubt. I think not. Because precisely—that’s an excellent question, I think. Because it really shows that we are nevertheless in the middle. We are on a spectrum. Because this is not a full pursuer; he is doing a commandment or acting with permission. With Zimri, in Pinchas’s case, it was even a commandment. For Pinchas it was a commandment. But I, as the pursued, don’t owe anything. I have a right to defend myself. But a third party cannot prevent the blood avenger from what the Torah permits him, or even obligates him, to do. So that really is, I think, an interesting point. Right. The Mishneh LaMelekh goes further than that, wonders further than that. What about an agent of the court? Someone who desecrated the Sabbath with witnesses and warning. Intentionally, with witnesses and warning, he is liable for death. Now an agent of the court comes to kill him, to stone him. Am I permitted to kill the court’s agent? He is doing his job, but I don’t owe him anything. Meaning, he is threatening me; I want to kill him under the law of a pursuer. Here the position of the Mishneh LaMelekh is that no, it is forbidden. But he doesn’t explain. It seems to me somewhat disproportionate, as they say in today’s discussions. Without explanation. What is the reasoning behind it? It seems to me that exactly as with what I compared earlier, one can understand this too. Why indeed does the court’s agent kill me? The court’s agent kills me because the Torah imposes an obligation to kill Sabbath desecrators. On whom is this obligation imposed? This obligation is imposed on the public. The court is of course the executor; not everyone does it, but it is an obligation on the public. The public needs to appoint a court, the public needs to cooperate with the court. The court is the one responsible for carrying it out. Now, if this obligation is imposed on the public, I, the Sabbath desecrator, am also part of the public. I am also part of the public. Therefore, true, I don’t need to kill myself—we won’t go that far—but I can’t say, what do you mean, let him perform his duty while I defend myself according to my own interest? The obligation he is carrying out is also in my own name. I, as part of the public, am also commanded that they kill me as a Sabbath desecrator. It’s a bit like a loan. Someone who threatened me that I return the loan—to him I’m forbidden to kill. Why? Because it is indeed his right, yes, it really is his right to receive the money.

[Speaker I] What do you mean? That’s between me and the Holy One, blessed be He. What do you mean? But I’m allowed to sin, meaning it’s between me and… No, but the court has to kill you. Therefore it was allowed to save your life, and Zimri’s sin is not a matter…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, because there there is no court-imposed punishment. The Torah does not impose an obligation to kill Zimri. One who has relations with an Aramean woman—zealots may strike him—that is permission.

[Speaker I] Which is the same status…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not at all. One who has relations with an Aramean woman—zealots may strike him—there is no court-imposed punishment. When there is court-imposed punishment, the Torah itself says that the public is obligated to kill the Sabbath desecrator. Now, sin, do whatever you want, but the public needs to kill you, and if you are part of the public…

[Speaker I] But it’s a law and we do not instruct people to act that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “it is a law but we do not instruct people to act that way” is a permission, not an obligation. Not because it is “a law but we do not instruct people to act that way”—that’s not the difference. The difference is that killing someone who has relations with an Aramean woman is permission; it is not an obligation. “A law but we do not instruct people to act that way” is permission, but killing a Sabbath desecrator is an obligation. Not because it is “a law and we do not—”

[Speaker D] instruct people to act that way, but because it’s an obligation and not a permission. There was some case where it was by mistake, the court erred, an error. He didn’t really desecrate the Sabbath; he didn’t know. So, then, there is an issue that the public needs to accept…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a Socrates case. It’s really Socratic, yes, with the one they offered… It’s really a Socrates case. The Talmud brings, about the son of Shimon the Righteous, I think, that he was sentenced to death. There’s a story that he was sentenced to death, and in fact it was in error, and he said okay, let them kill me because the law needs to be carried out. Yes, exactly. Meaning, if they ruled on me that… Now the question is whether that is the strict law or whether he did it beyond the letter of the law; I don’t know. I don’t know what to say. If I know with certainty that it’s a mistake, then let’s say it’s obvious that I am allowed to flee. It could be that I’m allowed, by the way, even if it was not a mistake. Maybe, I don’t know. But if it’s a mistake then certainly I’m allowed to flee; maybe I’d even be allowed to injure the court agent. To kill? That sounds a bit too far-reaching to me. Again, I really don’t know; I have no clear arguments on the matter. This is again a case that lies on the spectrum; one needs to think about it. Good, so this is another example showing us that in fact even money—I don’t need to give it to you to save your life. If you threaten me, then you are at the pole of the pursuer, finished. There is no room for calculations. It doesn’t matter money, life, anything. I’ll kill you because you’re a pursuer. If you’re not a pursuer, nothing helps: I’m forbidden to harm anything—maybe even property according to the view of Rashi and Rashba and so on, even property may be forbidden to harm—and certainly, certainly your life I may not harm in order to save myself, because that is personal causation. In intermediate situations, there is the spectrum and the proportionality considerations. Good, I need to move on now. I’ll just do it in the first few sentences in the minutes that remain. Maybe one more point before that. There was another question that came up on my site: people asked there about various vegan organizations that do this kind of terror, break into places and destroy property and sometimes even harm people and things like that. And they said to me, look, what kind of thing is this? They come in the name of morality and do such immoral acts that it sounds absurd. And the truth is that I told him—I told the person asking there, or wrote to him—that I’m not completely sure he’s right. Because if indeed—and this ties into our picture—if indeed I see this institution that they broke into, say, a slaughterhouse or a farm where they treat animals problematically, and let’s assume for the moment that they didn’t just attack someone for no reason, but someone who really abuses the animals he raises or slaughters—and in many places that is certainly the case—then in effect he is a pursuer. Now he’s pursuing animals, not people. So if we… if we make the calculation of harming human beings in order to save animals from cruelty to animals, then suddenly it sounds—how can one justify harming human beings in order to save animals from agony, pain, suffering? But in the picture I described here, it isn’t simple. If the person really is defined as a pursuer, then I said that we do not make calculations. Where a person is a pursuer—an outright pursuer—there is no room for the question of what the value of the one saved is relative to the value of the one harmed. And so, for example, just as I harm a person to save my property, right? If I harm a person to save my property, like with the shekel I mentioned earlier, and later with the burglar tunneling in, the thief—I harm a person to save property. What is the difference between saving my property and saving animals from terrible suffering?

[Speaker D] But it’s not anyone’s property.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so what? To save them—for their own sake, not because they’re someone’s property.

[Speaker D] There’s something here: when can you determine them under the law? When can you go to a religious court? There is no law and no judge.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if that court is a court of Sodom, that does not judge it—so in my eyes, a court of Sodom lets them do what they do—then what should I do? The Nazis also had courts, so what? That’s how they see it—I’m saying, that’s how they see the situation. Now what are they supposed to do in that situation?

[Speaker D] How can you take the law into your own hands?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the law of a pursuer says that anyone can take the law into his own hands; with a pursuer it is immediate. No, does this stand the test or not stand the test? I’m not saying there isn’t a slippery slope here and that it isn’t dangerous; I’m only trying to show that the consideration is not absurd. If you really see reality in that way, you’re basically saying—think about someone, look, think about someone who keeps cats in his house and pulls out their claws morning till night, burns them, abuses them day and night, from morning till night. Now if someone entered his house and beat him mercilessly and freed all the cats, everyone would say, more power to him. What, you beat a person to save cats? Maybe yes, because he’s a pursuer, because he’s the one doing it. Now what’s the difference? Here we have an interest because we want to eat it, but other than that, what’s the difference? Assuming they are really doing some kind of abuse of that sort, then it isn’t absurd. I’m trying to bring this—I know it’s a bit provocative—but I’m trying to bring it as an extreme expression of what I said earlier, that once the situation is defined as pursuit, there isn’t much room for the calculation of the value of the one harmed versus the value of what you’re saving—meaning who has greater life value or financial value, fetus, property, whoever it may be. The problem is that you are guilty and you’re going to do something cruel, something criminal, and you’re trying to use the protection of Jewish law that no one should harm you because after all it’s only property, or only animals, or something like that. So the Torah removes those protections from you, and then those prohibitions fall away. And I’ll try to show this later as well.

[Speaker D] If you say, another calculation—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that too is a consideration that can come in, but I’m saying, again, it enters into the spectrum. I’m only trying to show, to illustrate.

[Speaker F] Why is he a pursuer? He’s harming property, right? And whose property?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not property—he’s harming animals, not property.

[Speaker F] Why is harming animals within the category of pursuer? Yes, where?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s a pursuer. Now what is a pursuer?

[Speaker F] A pursuer is after human beings. Who said? Who said?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is going to harm—what do you mean? That’s what I’m saying. He is going to harm a fetus; is it permitted to kill him?

[Speaker F] A fetus is on the spectrum of a human being.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, maybe animals too are on the spectrum?

[Speaker F] According to whom? Does that appear in Jewish law? No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What—what do you mean? And does property appear anywhere in Jewish law? Rashi interprets the Talmud that way, and I interpret it that way too. What do you mean, interpretations are possible; the question is one of reasoning. Fine, I’m not saying otherwise, I’m only saying, I’m only trying—

[Speaker F] to show that considerations—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of this type, which seem to us—

[Speaker F] I’m asking about property. Is property a pursuer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, Rashi argues that property is a pursuer.

[Speaker F] Okay, according to Rashi’s view, okay. If I see someone going to steal from someone, to damage someone else’s property, am I allowed to kill him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you have no other way to prevent it, in my view, yes.

[Speaker F] Yes, but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s my next topic. Not only Rashi—here I’ll show it more clearly, I’ll bring it from the burglar tunneling in—

[Speaker F] even for someone who is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not the owner of the property and not—

[Speaker F] connected, yes. On the contrary, the Talmud itself says this in the case of the burglar tunneling in, that it’s even a third party. But that’s my next topic—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the burglar tunneling in. There I’ll talk about it. I’ll say again: this example can of course be debated, and I brought it only to show a far-reaching implication of the picture I described—that in a place where we are at one of the poles, there is essentially no room for calculations, and it doesn’t matter what the relation is between the value of life or the value of the one harmed here and the value of the one harmed there. In the end, if you are guilty, you will bear the consequences. That’s the point. Meaning, in order to solve the problem, if you created it intentionally, of course, and clearly, you will bear the consequences to solve the problem, and it doesn’t matter what the intensity of the problem is and who is harmed by it and all sorts of things of that type. Now of course one can argue about which problem and to what this applies, and I agree. Now of course one can also argue about which problem and to what this applies, and I agree that everything can be debated. But I’m only trying to show the mode of thinking. Good. Let’s now see the Talmud in tractate Bava Kamma 27b. The Talmud there discusses exactly this point: to what extent a person must be responsible for the damages he causes or the damages caused to him. The Talmud says: It was stated—if someone placed a jug in the public domain, and another came and stumbled on it and broke it, he is exempt. The Talmud asks: Why is he exempt? He should have looked and walked. Meaning, why is he exempt? He should have watched where he was going. The Talmud answers: Rav Pappa said: at a corner. Meaning, it was in a place where he could not see it. Rav Zevid said: you can even say it was throughout the public domain, because it is not the way of people to inspect the roads. Meaning, there is here a definition of what counts as reasonable behavior. A person walking in the street does not have to keep searching all the time for obstacles on the ground. The responsibility is on the one who placed the obstacle, not on the one who stumbled over it. And this connects to what we discussed earlier, that a person’s responsibility is not infinite; it depends on the circumstances and on whether he acted reasonably or not. And from here we see the great foundation of the laws of damages: there is a difference between a person who causes damage and a person who stumbles into damage. On the one hand, a person is always considered forewarned, but on the other hand, we do not impose on him an unreasonable duty to be alert to every obstacle that someone else put in his path. And these things are major foundations in understanding a person’s personal responsibility, not only in damages but in all areas of life—that a person needs to know where his responsibility begins and where it ends.