Time in Jewish Law 1

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[0:00] Opening and mention of the topic of time
[2:40] Comparison to the Behag and the books of commandments
[5:49] Examples of temporary commandments according to Maimonides
[8:14] Commandment 187 – killing the seven nations
[11:01] The discussion of the commandment of Amalek on the Sabbath
[19:53] Difference between a commandment that applies for generations and temporary commandments
[21:19] The question of the sanctity of the sukkah and the Talmudic discussion in Beitzah
[28:26] The cessation of inherent sanctity and the connection to “expiration on its own”
[29:46] The sanctity of the sukkah after eight days
[31:01] Sitting in the sukkah in the rain without making use of the wood
[32:35] Participation of women and children in the sukkah and rabbinic enactments
[34:17] Defining universal commandments versus bounded commandments
[41:27] Counting the Omer – a commandment dependent on an event and not on time
[47:57] A physics analogy: dependence on time versus dependence on space

Summary

General Overview

The text opens with the speaker proposing to discuss time through a connection between philosophy and Jewish law, grounding this in an analysis of Maimonides’ third root in his enumeration of the commandments, which states that commandments that do not apply for generations are not to be counted. Maimonides distinguishes between one-time commands that depend on a specific time and principled commandments that do not depend on time, though they may become impossible to carry out because their object has been destroyed or disappeared. From there the discussion examines the commandment to destroy the seven nations and the commandment to erase Amalek, brings a halakhic-aggadic story in the name of Rabbi Zilberstein and the Avnei Nezer, and develops a conceptual distinction between dependence on time and dependence on events. Later, it is argued that Jewish law treats time as something somewhat real, and indications of this are brought from the Talmud and from Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed, including the claim that time itself was created.

Opening and the proposed topic: time between philosophy and Jewish law

The speaker says he didn’t send an email and just remembered now, and proposes talking about time because it has interesting aspects both in philosophy and in applications to Jewish law and in the connection between them. The speaker presents Maimonides’ roots as the rules for counting the commandments, and aims to begin with the third root.

Maimonides in the third root: commandments that do not apply for generations are not counted

Maimonides establishes in the third root that it is not appropriate to count commandments that do not apply for generations, and explains that the Sages’ statement that 613 commandments were said to Moses at Sinai indicates that these are commandments that apply for generations. Maimonides explains that commandments that do not apply for generations are not dependent on whether they were said at Sinai or elsewhere, because they are relevant only for their own moment. Maimonides brings the homiletic passage from Makkot on Torah being numerically 611, plus the two commandments heard directly from the Almighty, in order to establish the framework of 613, and explains that the attribution to Sinai emphasizes their status as commandments that obligate through the Torah given at Sinai.

The Behag and other enumerators of commandments: Maimonides’ criticism and the question of Saadia Gaon

The speaker says that before Maimonides there were almost no systematic enumerators of the commandments, and the Behag dominated the field until Maimonides. Maimonides dismisses the others and calls them liturgical poets who composed warning-poems rather than Torah scholars. The speaker raises the question whether Maimonides knew Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments, and presents his own uncertainty and arguments in both directions, including mention of an article in the jubilee volume in honor of Rabbi Rabinovitch of Ma’ale Adumim. The speaker notes the possibility that Maimonides knew Saadia Gaon’s liturgical warnings but not his Book of Commandments, or the reverse, and says he does not remember the conclusion.

The Behag’s example: prohibitions concerning Levites and one who steals the sacred covering

Maimonides says that “one of our predecessors” erred in this root and counted prohibitions that do not apply for generations, among them “they shall not come to see when the holy things are swallowed up” and “the Levites shall serve no more.” Maimonides attributes this to the fact that “his ability was strained” to complete the number, and the speaker explains that the meaning is that he was short of commandments in order to reach the count of 613 and therefore gathered additional ones. The speaker adds that according to Maimonides these are prohibitions that do not apply for generations, and notes that this is not agreed upon, and that the Behag, according to his own approach, sees them as applying for generations.

Maimonides’ argument against the Behag’s criterion: many one-time commands were not counted

Maimonides wonders why the Behag counted those prohibitions but did not count one-time commands such as “let no man leave any of it until morning” regarding the manna, “do not harass Moab and do not provoke them to war,” “do not besiege them and do not provoke them” regarding the Ammonites, “make for yourself a fiery serpent and place it on a pole,” “take one jar and place in it a full omer of manna,” “be ready for three days,” and “let not the flocks and the herds graze, nor let them break through to ascend to the Lord.” Maimonides establishes that all these are commands and warnings said to Moses, but they were only for the moment and do not apply for generations, and therefore are not counted. He adds that the blessings and curses commanded at Gerizim and Ebal, and the building of the altar upon entering the land of Canaan, are also one-time commandments.

Commandment 187 in the Book of Commandments: destruction of the seven nations and the difficulty vis-à-vis the third root

Maimonides counts as commandment 187 the command to kill the seven nations and destroy them, and explains that they were the root of idolatry and its original foundation, and that the purpose of the ban is “so that we not learn from their denial” and so that they not cause Israel to stumble. Maimonides presents the difficulty that someone might think this is a commandment that does not apply for generations, since the seven nations have already been destroyed, but such a person does not understand the distinction between “applies for generations” and “does not apply for generations.” Maimonides establishes that a command that comes to an end upon reaching its goal, without depending on a specific time, is not called “not applying for generations”; rather, it applies in every generation in which it is possible to fulfill it.

A story in the name of Rabbi Zilberstein and the Avnei Nezer: a labor not needed for its own sake and the Sabbath

The speaker recounts that he once heard on a tape from Rabbi Zilberstein a story about Rabbi Dissler from Yeshivat Oryata, in which a student who had become religious smashed on the Sabbath an idol that an archaeologist friend had brought him, based on “you shall surely destroy.” The speaker says Rabbi Zilberstein permitted it and brought proof from the Avnei Nezer, who distinguishes between the commandment to kill the seven nations and the commandment to erase Amalek regarding women, based on the category of a labor not needed for its own sake on the Sabbath. The speaker describes the Avnei Nezer’s claim that the purpose of killing the seven nations is to prevent them from causing spiritual stumbling, and therefore it is like killing a snake so that it will not harm, and thus it is a labor not needed for its own sake—which according to practical Jewish law is only rabbinically prohibited—so it can be done on the Sabbath. From this he concludes that the commandment applies all seven days and is not time-dependent for purposes of women’s obligation. The speaker adds that the Avnei Nezer describes the erasure of Amalek as a labor needed for its own sake and therefore not overriding the Sabbath, and concludes that it is therefore defined as a positive commandment caused by time, since it is possible only six days a week. The speaker notes that this is written in complete seriousness in the Avnei Nezer and seems strange to him.

Maimonides on the seven nations and Amalek: the commandment remains even when the object disappears

Maimonides says that the commandment to kill the seven nations and search them out is an obligatory war that applies in every generation in which the matter is possible, and describes how Israel pursued them until they were gone and cut off by David, and the survivors dispersed and became mixed among the nations until no name of them remained. Maimonides stresses that the fact that they were cut off does not make the commandment “not applicable for generations,” and parallels this to the erasure of Amalek, whose commandment applies as long as some descendant of Amalek is found. The speaker notes that Maimonides writes of the promised destruction of Amalek “as will happen speedily in our days,” and comments that this is interesting because Amalek was already not identifiable in Maimonides’ own time, and raises questions about assimilation among the nations, ethnic versus personal status, and the aggadic statement that “some of Haman’s descendants studied Torah in Bnei Brak.”

Maimonides’ central distinction: the commandment versus the thing we were commanded about

Maimonides instructs us “to understand and know the difference between the commandment and the thing concerning which we were commanded,” and establishes that sometimes the commandment applies for generations even though the thing concerning which we were commanded is absent in a certain generation. Maimonides explains that a commandment does not become one that “does not apply for generations” because the object is absent, but only when the command itself is limited to a certain time even though the object could still be present. Maimonides brings the example of an elderly Levite who was disqualified in the wilderness and later became fit, in order to show that there the command itself was only temporary and not dependent on the absence of the reality.

The sukkah example and Rashba: expiration of sanctity or expiration of the object

The speaker brings a discussion in Beitzah 30 about sanctity in the wood of a sukkah and the possibility of stipulating, “I do not separate myself from them throughout twilight,” and presents Rashba’s difficulty, who wants to connect this to the dispute in Nedarim 29 between Abaye and Bar Pada over whether inherent sanctity can expire on its own. The speaker says Rashba assumes that sukkah wood has inherent sanctity by analogy to the festival offering, and notes that this is a unique position, since the accepted view is to see the sukkah as an object used for a commandment, not an object of holiness, in light of Megillah 26, where objects used for commandments are discarded while holy objects are stored away. The speaker struggles with how inherent sanctity could expire at the end of the festival if inherent sanctity does not expire on its own, and proposes resolving it by saying that the sanctity does not expire; rather, after the festival the object ceases to be a “sukkah” and becomes a “pergola,” so this is not an expiration of sanctity but a change in the identity of the object.

Oneg Yom Tov and Kovetz Shiurim: sitting in the sukkah in the rain and the definition of “there is no sukkah”

The speaker cites Kovetz Shiurim quoting Oneg Yom Tov, who asks why the Shulchan Arukh says that one who sits in the sukkah in the rain is acting foolishly, if there is seemingly a prohibition on making use of sukkah wood. The speaker describes the line of reasoning that when rain falls to such an extent that one is exempt, there is no commandment of sukkah here, and therefore “this is not a sukkah,” and consequently the use is not within the framework of the commandment. The speaker notes a common answer in the halakhic authorities that sitting under the sukkah is not considered making use of sukkah wood, and brings further branches of the question regarding women and minors, while emphasizing that the point he wants to illustrate is the distinction between expiration of a legal status and absence of the object’s definition.

Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides and Rabbi Daniel the Babylonian: the difficulty of the fiery serpent and the jar of manna

The speaker says there is a debate in the book Ma’aseh Nissim between Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides and Rabbi Daniel the Babylonian concerning the roots, and there the question is asked: what is the difference between destroying the seven nations and “make for yourself a fiery serpent and place it on a pole” or the jar of manna, which also seem to be commandments that reached their purpose? The speaker sharpens the point that Maimonides has two formulations: one, that the command ended when it reached its purpose without dependence on time; and two, that the commandment applies “in every generation in which the possibility of that thing is found,” meaning that if the factual situation returned there would still be an obligation. The speaker proposes that Maimonides distinguishes by saying that with the seven nations, if they were found again the obligation would return, whereas with the fiery serpent and the jar of manna, even if a similar reality returned, the obligation would not return unless there were a renewed command.

Dependence on time versus dependence on events: temporary commandments and positive commandments caused by time

The speaker argues that temporary commandments according to Maimonides are conceptually similar to the definition of positive commandments caused by time, in that time itself is the factor generating obligation, and not merely events that happen in time. The speaker gives the example of Grace after Meals, which is not time-caused even though it is recited at particular times, because it depends on eating and not on time. The speaker brings Nachmanides in Kiddushin 34 on Counting the Omer as a commandment that is not time-caused according to the view that it depends on Passover as an event and not on the month of Nisan as time, and expands on Passover and the haste of “you shall eat it in haste, it is Passover to the Lord” as presenting a structure in which history beforehand realizes the meaning of time.

Historical time and cyclical time: the enumeration of commandments versus recurrence

The speaker distinguishes between linear-historical time, in which one-time commands are not counted, and cyclical time, in which commandments dependent on appointed times are counted even though they depend on time. The speaker presents the Ninth of Av as an example of a day on which the events “depend on it” rather than it depending on them, and brings the verse “He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men” from Tractate Ta’anit, including the homiletic interpretation that “appointed time” teaches that the New Moon is called an appointed time, alongside an interpretation that the term means a meeting. The speaker says that the Ninth of Av is perceived as a day of encounter with the Holy One, blessed be He, whose character may be reversed in the future, and describes the fixing of times as hinting at the inner meaning of the day.

Time as a cause: a philosophical claim emerging from Jewish law

The speaker presents the novelty that in Jewish law time is capable of “bringing about” obligation, and asks how time can be a cause if time is not a thing but a category for organizing events. The speaker cites Kant as saying that time and space are forms of intuition and not things in the world, and argues that if so, there would be no point to halakhic discussions about priority and relations in time. The speaker brings an indication from the Talmud at the beginning of Berakhot, where the question is raised whether evening comes after morning or the reverse, and argues that such a question assumes that temporal relations have some reality and are not merely an arbitrary choice of a starting point.

Association in vows: “like the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam was killed” and the day as an object

The speaker brings a passage in Shevuot 20 and in Nedarim about associative vows, and describes this as a transfer of the legal status of prohibition from something that already has an object-based prohibition to a new thing. The speaker says the Talmud recognizes a vow such as “this is forbidden to me like the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam was killed” as an example of such association, and concludes that a day is treated in Jewish law as a kind of existent on which prohibition can be “imprinted.” The speaker presents this as another sign that time, in the language of Jewish law, is not merely a descriptive framework but a bearer of legal status.

Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed: time was created and there is no “before” creation

The speaker quotes from Guide for the Perplexed, part II, chapter 13, that time itself is “among created things,” that time accompanies motion and motion is an accident in what is created, and that statements such as “God existed before the world was created” are “a borrowing of time or an imagining of time, not real time.” Maimonides describes time as a created accident, though not of the category of quality, and says it is difficult to grasp because it is “an accident of an accident,” since it depends on motion which depends on bodies. Maimonides concludes that “God’s bringing the world into existence in a temporal beginning” is impossible, because time was created together with the world.

“In the beginning”: a linguistic difficulty about time preceding creation

The speaker raises the difficulty of how one can say “In the beginning He created” if there was no time before creation, and formulates the problem that the wording may sound as though “the beginning” preceded creation. In this context the speaker mentions the Septuagint, which renders it as “God created beginning,” out of concern over misunderstanding the status of “beginning.”

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A new topic, and I didn’t send an email. Today I remembered—I mean, just now I remembered—that I didn’t send an email. I thought I’d talk about time.

[Speaker B] You thought that just now you remembered that you hadn’t decided what to talk about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But no, right, I just didn’t remember to send an announcement email. I thought I’d talk about time. It has all kinds of interesting aspects, both philosophy and applications to Jewish law, and the connection between them, so it seems to me this could be an interesting topic to deal with a bit. Maybe we’ll start with Maimonides in the third root. Maimonides writes as follows—the roots, I’m already hoping I don’t need to introduce them, Maimonides’ rules for counting the commandments. The third root: that it is not fitting to count commandments that do not apply for generations. Commandments that do not apply for generations are not included in the count of the commandments. Know that their statement, “613 commandments were said to Moses at Sinai,” indicates that this number is the number of commandments that apply for generations, because commandments that do not apply for generations have no connection to Sinai, whether they were said at Sinai or elsewhere. Meaning, the source for there being 613 commandments is a Talmudic passage at the end of tractate Makkot, and there it says that 613 commandments were said to Moses at Sinai. “Torah Moses commanded us”—Torah is 611 numerically, meaning from Moses, plus two more, namely “I am” and “You shall have no other gods,” which we heard from the Almighty, so altogether 613. But Maimonides says that if they tell us these commandments were said at Sinai, then apparently we’re talking about commandments that apply for generations. Because commandments that apply only for their own time—what difference does it make to me whether they were said at Sinai or not at Sinai? They were said for that relevant moment, at Sinai or not at Sinai, and that’s it. When they tell me that the commandment was said at Sinai, the meaning is that it’s relevant to me because it was said at Sinai. That is, I’m not commanded in it directly; I’m commanded in it through the Torah, so this is part of the Torah given at Sinai. And indeed they intended, when they said “at Sinai,” because the essence of the Torah that was given was at Sinai, as He, may He be exalted, said: “Come up to Me on the mountain and be there, and I will give you…” And they explained: what is the verse? “Torah Moses commanded us, an inheritance…” and so on. Yes, that’s the point. And then he says as follows: “And one of our predecessors also erred in this root.” Usually when he deals in the roots with a view he rejects, it’s the view of the Behag. Before Maimonides there were basically almost no enumerators of the commandments. The Behag was the main enumerator of commandments; he more or less ruled the field until Maimonides, his count ruled the field until Maimonides. The others followed him more or less, and Maimonides looks down on them—they were liturgical poets, writers of warning-poems, not Torah scholars, so for him that doesn’t count. What about Saadia Gaon? That’s a question—did Maimonides know Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments? That’s an interesting question. I thought not. I had a few proofs that not, because Maimonides writes in a few places things like “no one ever thought this,” and that appears in Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments. Maybe that when he writes “no one ever…” yes. But later I saw that in the memorial volume for… not the memorial volume, the jubilee volume in honor of Rabbi Rabinovitch of Ma’ale Adumim—they published a volume for his eightieth jubilee—there’s an article there, I think by Shtav? Rabbi Shtav, I think, I don’t remember whose, I think Rabbi Shtav, where he discusses whether Maimonides knew Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments or not. I think the conclusion—I don’t even remember what his conclusion was there, because there are two things: Saadia Gaon’s warning-poems and Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments. And it could be that Maimonides knew one of them and not the other. I don’t remember the conclusion anymore. Yes, but Saadia Gaon I assume isn’t included by Maimonides among the liturgical poets he looks down on. I don’t think so. So probably that was another indication—I wrote this in an article of my own too—one of the indications that he didn’t know Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments, from the fact that he disparages everyone and calls them liturgical poets except for the Behag.

[Speaker D] But does he mention the Behag explicitly? Doesn’t he always write “one of our predecessors”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In one or two places in the roots the explicit name Behag actually appears. In most places he writes, “one of our predecessors erred,” without—I don’t know exactly why only in those places he chose to mention him. It’s also not clear who the Behag is; there’s debate about that too, whether it’s Rabbi Shimon Kayyara or… yes, there are all kinds of attributions of the Behag, there’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about who he was. So it wasn’t his cousin. It was his cousin who also wasn’t called Behag, as is well known. Okay. In any event, Maimonides says: “One of our predecessors also erred in this root, and counted, because his ability was strained, ‘they shall not come to see when the holy thing is swallowed’ and counted ‘the Levites shall serve no more’”—yes, two commandments that do not apply for generations. One who steals the covering—that’s “they shall not come to see when the holy things are swallowed up,” someone who steals sacred vessels. And “the Levites shall serve no more,” after age fifty they no longer serve in the Temple. So Maimonides’ view at least is that these are not prohibitions for all generations. That isn’t agreed upon. But that is Maimonides’ view, and the Behag counted these two prohibitions, and Maimonides says “because his ability was strained.” What does that mean? He was short for the count of 613 commandments, so he had to recruit, to gather, a few more commandments to complete the number. Fine. Okay, but Maimonides says this can’t be right. And because of this root—I’m looking for the examples. So the examples: he says as follows: “And I wonder at this, that he counted these prohibitions”—the Behag who counted those two prohibitions—“why did he not count the statement regarding the manna: ‘Let no man leave any of it until morning’?” There was a prohibition concerning the manna not to leave it until morning. Well, he should have counted that among the commandments. Why doesn’t the Behag include it? “And the statement: ‘Do not harass Moab and do not provoke them to war’”—Moses our teacher was commanded not to fight Moab. That too was a command for its own moment; why doesn’t the Behag count it? That too was a command from the Holy One, blessed be He. “And likewise the warning that came regarding the children of Ammon: ‘Do not besiege them and do not provoke them.’” “And likewise he should count among the positive commandments the statement: ‘Make for yourself a fiery serpent and place it on a pole,’” the serpent in connection with the plague there. “And the statement: ‘Take one jar and place in it a full omer of manna,’” just as he counted the levy-offering and the dedication of the altar. “Likewise he should count: ‘Be ready for three days’” when they were about to receive the Torah, right? “And also: ‘Let not the flocks and the herds graze, nor let them break through to ascend to the Lord,’” and many such examples. In short, many, many commands were said for their moment in the sanctuary, and the Behag does not count them. So why—what’s his criterion? Now parenthetically I’ll say: his criterion is that he counts only commandments that apply for generations, the Behag too. But what? These commandments that Maimonides thinks do not apply for generations—the Behag’s position is that they do apply for generations. That Levites don’t serve after age fifty, and that one who steals the sacred covering, and all these matters. “And no intelligent person can doubt that all these were commandments said to Moses, commands and warnings”—it’s clear these are commandments—“but all of them were for the moment and do not apply for generations, and therefore they are not counted. And because of this root it is not fitting to count the blessings and curses with which they were commanded at Gerizim and Ebal, nor the building of the altar which we were commanded to build when we came into the land of Canaan, for all these are commandments for the moment.” And so on—he brings, in short, more examples of temporary commandments. Now this is the principle. On this principle Nachmanides already comments too. No one disputes this principle, not even the Behag. But here in the Book of Commandments itself Maimonides addresses this root and asks a question, which is the starting point here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Commandment 187. Yes, now I’m in the Book of Commandments itself. Commandment 187 is that we were commanded to kill the seven nations and destroy them—which is a very current issue. That they were the root of idolatry and its first foundation. What does that have to do with a current issue? Elor Azaria, the Azaria matter. And His exalted statement: “you shall utterly destroy them.” And He explained to us in many verses that the reason for this is so that we should not learn from their denial, so that they should not cause us to stumble. I think I mentioned this once—I once heard this on a tape from Rabbi Zilberstein. I was in the hospital and listening to some tapes, he has all kinds of nice lectures with all sorts of anecdotes, and the man is full of stories.

[Speaker B] Rabbi Zilberstein from Ramat Elchanan?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Ramat Elchanan. He has lectures, something… yes. He’s someone who speaks interestingly, with dramatizations and stories. In my opinion a good number of them never happened and were never created, but they’re wonderful stories. Really, there are things there that it’s hard to believe he actually encountered all of this, but that’s…

[Speaker B] All in Jewish law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, all in Jewish law, in Jewish law.

[Speaker D] The main thing is that it’s Jewish law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, what difference does it make whether the story happened? That’s not important. So it’s nice. In any event, once he told this story. This is someone I know, the head of Yeshivat Oryata, Rabbi Dissler from Bnei Brak. I know him well. So he told on that tape that Rabbi Dissler came to him with a question. A student of his in the yeshivah—it’s a yeshivah for people who became religious—had become religious and hosted for the Sabbath a friend, a secular friend. And that friend came to stay with him, and he was an archaeologist, this fellow. Now he brought him a statue from the excavations, I don’t know, as a gift. A statue from the excavations. The student did not hesitate. Didn’t hesitate for a moment, like it says in the song about Ammunition Hill, right? He didn’t hesitate for a moment—he took that statue and smashed it on the spot, “you shall surely destroy,” right? That was it. Now Rabbi Dissler went to ask Rabbi Zilberstein whether that was okay—he did it on the Sabbath. Was that okay? In short, Rabbi Zilberstein told him that he thought yes, and he brought proof from the Avnei Nezer. I’m just remembering this now because it really… this is a parenthesis, it has nothing to do with us. The Avnei Nezer asks about a contradiction in the Chinukh. Yes, people have already pointed this out. The Chinukh writes regarding the commandment of the seven nations, this very commandment, that women… meaning, he does not exempt women. But regarding the commandment to erase Amalek, he exempts women. Now if their way is not to wage war, then in both kinds of war, if it’s the same exemption, what’s the difference? So he says as follows: regarding the commandment of killing the seven nations, war and killing the seven nations, the Torah says that this is so that we not follow their ways. That’s what we just read now, so that they not cause us to stumble. So because of that, if one kills them on the Sabbath, it’s a labor not needed for its own sake. It’s like killing a snake so that it won’t harm me. Right? The Talmud says, one who traps a snake—three things… one of three things that is exempt and permitted, I think, I don’t remember exactly, there are three things there that… in any case, it’s a labor not needed for its own sake. Because you kill them not because you need them dead, but so that they won’t harm you, meaning it’s for another purpose, not the primary purpose, therefore it’s a labor not needed for its own sake. So since that’s the case, you can do it even on the Sabbath, because there’s a commandment to kill them, and the prohibition is only rabbinic. In practical Jewish law we rule that a labor not needed for its own sake—except according to Maimonides—a labor not needed for its own sake is only rabbinically prohibited, therefore it can be done even on the Sabbath. So if it can be done even on the Sabbath, then this commandment applies all seven days, so women are obligated in it and it is not… not time-dependent. But with the commandment of Amalek, the obligation is to kill them in order to kill them, not in order that we not follow their ways. Now that you may not do on the Sabbath, because that is a labor needed for its own sake. And a positive commandment overriding a prohibition is not relevant, because Sabbath of course is both a positive commandment and a prohibition, and it carries stoning, so a positive commandment does not override a prohibition there. So that may not be done on the Sabbath. Therefore it is a positive commandment caused by time, because it’s only six days, and women are exempt. That’s why they exempt women. Now if this were Purim I’d understand, but the Avnei Nezer writes this seriously. I saw it later inside.

[Speaker D] That’s not Rabbi Zilberstein’s own lecture?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Rabbi Zilberstein’s lecture only brought it up; that’s just why I remembered it. He brought this Avnei Nezer. I then quickly went to look it up—I said, it can’t be that he really writes that there. Yes, he writes it, absolutely writes it, and completely seriously. There are things there—I don’t know—strange things. In any event, he said that according to this, smashing that statue too is a labor not needed for its own sake, because you break it so that people won’t stumble over it, so on the Sabbath that would also be fine.

[Speaker D] That’s actually the relatively understandable part here. The puzzling part is the commandment of Amalek.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have comments on that too, but right, it’s less strange than what appears in the Avnei Nezer. In any event, let me get back here. In short: “And perhaps a thinker will think that this is a commandment that does not apply for generations, since the seven nations have already perished.” They no longer exist, so this is a commandment that does not apply for generations. If so, then the third root that we just read determines that such commandments are not counted. But here this is commandment 187, meaning he does count it. So he asks, why then? Meaning, according to the third root he should not have counted it. “And indeed only one who has not understood the matter of what applies for generations and what does not apply for generations will think so,” says Maimonides. Whoever asks this didn’t understand what I said in the third root. Why? “Because a command that ends when it reaches its purpose, without this depending on a specific time, is not said to be one that does not apply for generations; rather it applies in every generation in which the possibility of that matter is found.” “Do you think that the Lord, may He be exalted, will utterly destroy the seed of Amalek and cut it off to the last of them, as will happen speedily in our days, as He promised us”—that’s very interesting. What does “will happen speedily in our days” mean? The seed of Amalek had long since not existed already in Maimonides’ own time. Meaning, Maimonides apparently understands that there are some Amalekites wandering around somehow, assimilated among the nations, because after all they were not completely wiped out. And basically this commandment is still relevant, only we can’t fulfill it. And speedily in our days, when the Messiah comes, he will smell with the fear of God—he’ll sniff out the Amalekites from the other side, identify them, and we’ll do what needs to be done. What?

[Speaker D] What do you mean? In what way? But if they got assimilated among the nations then that’s already another people. Meaning, what—is the assumption that this passes through the mother or through the father?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume—Maimonides says it’s still relevant. Yes, yes. The law of Amalek—Amalek is a status in the person, it’s not an ethnic law, meaning Amalek is a status in the person. By the way, that’s an interesting question, because after all it says that descendants of Haman studied Torah in Bnei Brak. And the question is how could that be? Descendants of Haman should have had to be killed—they’re Amalekites. How did they convert them? When they came to convert they should have been killed. Okay, so people say there that this was after the time, there was no Bnei Brak then. Oy oy. Some say that almost all of Bnei Brak are descendants of Haman. Anyway, what happens with… I hope you’re not from Bnei Brak.

[Speaker D] What happens? Statistically that’s also true. What? Statistically that’s also necessarily true, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not Bnei Brak. We were talking about the seed of King David.

[Speaker B] Why, what if an Amalekite man and a Jewish woman have a child—what is he? The lineage…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, he’s Jewish. For a Jew the lineage follows the mother, so he isn’t Amalekite. No, certainly not.

[Speaker B] But he’s from the seed of Amalek?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the prohibition—a Jewish woman with an Amalekite is prohibited. Prohibited, okay, okay, but we don’t assume the Jewish people are holy enough to do such prohibited things.

[Speaker G] In short, it turned out after the fact, unintentionally, under coercion.

[Speaker E] Would they have had to kill him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, they discuss that issue there, by the way. That’s one of the proofs that if they come to convert, then yes, it’s possible. Maimonides in general says that they call out to them in peace, even in the war against Amalek he says they call out to them in peace. Maimonides in general has a different approach on this matter. But fine. Yes, in any event it doesn’t matter. So he says here that this command is not a command that does not apply for generations—the war against the seven nations—but rather a command that we carried out. It isn’t relevant today because it has already been carried out, not because it is bounded by time, not because the command was only for such-and-such a date or… The commandment was not nullified. The commandment was not nullified, but rather it has already been carried out. This is a commandment that needed to be carried out, and we carried it out. So such a commandment is not called a commandment that does not apply for generations, not a temporary commandment. It is a universal commandment; at some point it just reached its purpose, in Maimonides’ language, it was completed.

[Speaker B] It’s not a function of time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so because of that it is not a commandment that does not apply for generations, and therefore it is counted. He has a very interesting formulation here. Not only… he says that this commandment reached its purpose—sorry, yes, it reached its purpose after the seven nations had already disappeared. But he says: “rather it applies in every generation in which the possibility of that matter is found.” That’s a slightly different formulation. It could be complementary—it’s not a contradiction—but it’s a slightly different formulation, and in a minute we’ll see what its significance is.

[Speaker B] The claim is basically—what you can understand is that he’s saying that in principle it’s relevant in every generation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Practically, the obligation is not bounded by time; rather, we finished it. If it were theoretically, hypothetically, still relevant and existent today, then today too we would have had to do it, yes. But in a minute I’ll sharpen this a bit more. And then, yes, so he says about Amalek—he says, this should not be said, rather “it applies in every generation and generation so long as descendants of Amalek are found, there is a commandment to destroy them. And likewise, to kill the seven nations and destroy them—we were commanded concerning this, and it is an obligatory war, and we are commanded to search them out and pursue them in every generation and generation until they are gone and no person remains of them, and so we did until they were finished and cut off by David, and the survivors were scattered and mixed among the nations until no name remained for them. And it is not because they were cut off that the commandment with which we were commanded to kill them becomes one that does not apply for generations.” The fact that they were cut off does not mean that the commandment does not apply for generations.

[Speaker D] I just slightly disagree, but—is the obligation with the seven nations per nation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not exactly, but per nation…

[Speaker D] And with the Amalekites the obligation is per person?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that this is connected to what we discussed before. Because so long as they are identified at the ethnic level as the seven nations, with their culture and their idolatry, then there is concern that we might follow their ways. So one has to… maybe. I’m thinking now, I’m not sure. It’s worth checking. In any event, it really does seem from Maimonides that there is a difference in definition. “Just as it is not said that the war against Amalek does not apply for generations, even after they are all destroyed and lost, because these commandments are not tied to a specific time or a specific place, like the commandments specific to the wilderness or to Egypt that we saw,” such as the jar of manna or the fiery serpent, or the examples he brought in the third root. Those are commandments tied to a specific time. “But these are tied to every time in which that command is possible.” “And in general you should understand and know the difference between the commandment and the thing concerning which we were commanded. For sometimes the commandment applies for generations… and the thing concerning which we were commanded is already absent in one of the generations, and it is not by the absence of the thing concerning which we were commanded that the commandment becomes one that does not apply for generations.” If the thing itself with regard to which we are commanded disappears, is no longer found in the field, that does not mean the commandment is bounded by time. Rather, its application is bounded by time because it is not possible. But a commandment that does not apply for generations is when the command itself is bounded by time, not when the object concerning which we are commanded is bounded by time. “But it will be one that does not apply for generations when the matter is the opposite: namely, that one thing exists in a certain circumstance, and one was obligated to do one act or apply one rule to it at one certain time, and today it no longer applies, even though that thing exists in the same circumstance.” That is what’s called a commandment that does not apply for generations: the object concerning which we are commanded can still exist, and yet we would not need to do it, because the command ended and not the object. Like an elderly Levite who was disqualified in the wilderness but is fit for us today, as was explained in its place—that’s the elderly Levite, “the Levites shall serve no more,” which the Behag counts and Maimonides does not count. Maybe I’ll bring an example to sharpen this reasoning. The Talmud in Beitzah 30—the Talmud there brings an analogy between the sukkah and the festival offering: there, “a festival to the Lord,” so too the sukkah is “to the Lord.” So there is sanctity on the wood of the sukkah, and it is forbidden to make use of it. And the Talmud discusses there whether one can make a stipulation regarding the sanctity of the sukkah wood, whether I can say, “I do not separate myself from them throughout twilight.” They make stipulations—there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there about what exactly these stipulations are—but can I stipulate when placing sukkah wood that sanctity should not take effect on it? So Rashba there asks: there is a Talmudic passage in Nedarim 29. The Talmud there brings a dispute between Abaye and Bar Pada on the question whether inherent sanctity expires on its own or does not expire on its own. Meaning, if I consecrate something with inherent sanctity and I consecrate it for a time, for a week, or I consecrate it on condition that if something happens then the sanctity takes effect, and if it doesn’t happen then the sanctity dissipates, expires—so the question is whether one can do such a thing with inherent sanctity. In practical Jewish law we rule that inherent sanctity does not expire on its own, but it’s a dispute between Abaye and Bar Pada. Rashba asks: why doesn’t the Talmud in Beitzah make the discussion of whether one can stipulate concerning sukkah wood depend on the question in Nedarim of whether inherent sanctity expires on its own? After all, sukkah wood is compared to the festival offering and is essentially holy with inherent sanctity, yes? It has sanctity; it is forbidden to make use of it. If so, then the question whether you can stipulate about that sanctity is exactly the dispute in Nedarim between Bar Pada and Abaye. Why doesn’t the Talmud make it depend on that? He asks this, by the way, on one of them—I don’t remember at the moment on which one—because I think one can ask on both sides. Why doesn’t the Talmud connect them? That’s a more general formulation of the question. In any case, Rashba says there—that is, Rashba assumes that the sanctity of sukkah wood is inherent sanctity like the sanctity of an offering, which is not accepted by almost any of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) or later authorities (Acharonim); this Rashba is a unique position. Usually the medieval authorities and later authorities understand that we’re not talking here about sanctity but about a kind of prohibition that we compare to the prohibitions that exist regarding the festival offering, yes? But it’s not that there is actually sanctity in the sukkah. Why should there be sanctity in the sukkah? There’s no sanctity there. These are objects used for a commandment, not holy objects. The Talmud in Megillah 26 says there that objects used for commandments are discarded, while holy objects are stored away. There is a halakhic difference between objects used for commandments and holy objects. A sukkah is not a holy object; it’s an object used for a commandment. Tzitzit, strictly speaking, can be thrown in the garbage. People don’t do that today, but in principle it’s an object used for a commandment, not a holy object; you can throw it in the garbage. The sukkah is the same way. But Rashba holds otherwise. Rashba holds that it is actually holy like the festival offering, and the prohibition is because of the sanctity of the thing itself—that’s his assumption—and therefore he asks why this isn’t made dependent on the dispute in Nedarim.

[Speaker B] For all objects used for commandments, or only for the sukkah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says this only about the holiness of the sukkah. So the Rashba understands that—I don’t know, he doesn’t write anything about what to do with the sukkah, I don’t think he says it has to be put away in genizah. Maybe I’ll comment on that later actually; it relates to what I’m about to say. He doesn’t say to put the sukkah in genizah. In principle, you can throw out a sukkah. People don’t do that again, same as with tzitzit. So the custom is not to do that; you clear it away, yes, someone who is careful has the practice not to do that even after the holiday. You move it somewhere, I don’t know, to various places. In Bnei Brak, when I lived in Bnei Brak, there were all kinds of descendants of Haman there, they cleared it away in a very respectable and orderly way, pardon the… Okay, in any case, that’s the Rashba’s claim; that’s how he understands it. And I had difficulty when I read this Rashba, I had trouble understanding why—how can this be? The Rashba talks about making a stipulation, a condition. What happens at the end of the holiday? After the eight days of the holiday, the holiness flies away, right? Nobody says that the wood is holy in a way that forbids using it after the holiday. At most it is an object used for a commandment, and one must treat it respectfully. But nobody says this is that holiness which forbids us to use this wood after the holiday. Now if intrinsic holiness does not lapse on its own, then how can it be that here there is intrinsic holiness for eight days and after eight days it lapses? “On its own” meaning without an act. If I do an act—misuse of consecrated property or something like that—then maybe it can become non-sacred. But just on its own, just like that?

[Speaker B] Because it’s not fundamentally the law that the holiness is bounded to… But this holiness, this holiness, it’s bounded—that’s intrinsic holiness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if that’s the case, then maybe we learn from this also that you can make a condition—so why are you asking from vows? From vows they bring intrinsic holiness that does not lapse on its own, and they derive two practical differences from that: one is holiness for a limited time, and the second is holiness on condition. Now those are exactly the two things. So if they go together, then if the Torah introduced the novelty that here there is holiness bounded in time, then it follows that we also understand that you can make a condition. So what’s the problem? How is that connected to the dispute there?

[Speaker G] There, isn’t it that the sukkah as a whole is a commandment-object and therefore has holiness, and every part of it, as long as it is part of the sukkah, has that status? Or is every part of it like tzitzit, where…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like…

[Speaker G] where tzitzit are tzitzit only together, or is it wings separately and fringes separately?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and if you take a piece of wood from the sukkah, you’re forbidden to use it during the holiday because…

[Speaker G] You’re forbidden to take that part from the sukkah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the sukkah as a whole.

[Speaker G] It’s like taking apart the tzitzit. Because the garment is separate and the fringes are separate, so maybe there it’s hard to make one depend on the other because it’s a different character. So when the sukkah lapses, the sukkah as a whole lapses after the holiday, so it’s no longer a sukkah. Once it’s not a sukkah, then automatically there was no holiness in it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here’s how I’m thinking. I’m wondering whether that’s the same as what I’m about to say or something a bit different. It could be. Let’s come back to that in a moment. So what has to be said there is that a sukkah after… meaning, what is a sukkah? A sukkah is a certain object that Jewish law defines—how it has to be made, with two walls and a handbreadth, yes, in the form of an entrance, and at least seven by seven, and all the halakhic rules—but that’s not enough. Meaning, if I make such a thing in Cheshvan or in Nisan, if I make such a thing then, it won’t be a sukkah, it’ll be a pergola. A sukkah is when I make such a structure during the festival of Sukkot. Meaning that here time is definitional; it is a component in defining the object, the halakhic object. Meaning that this very same object, once you move to another time, after Sukkot it is no longer a sukkah; it has become a pergola. Now what happens if we have a sacrifice that after three days evaporated? Voldemort came, did this, and poof, it disappeared, okay? What do you do in such a situation?

[Speaker G] What is there to do? It’s gone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How can it be that intrinsic holiness lapsed on its own? After three days the holiness lapsed. Can Voldemort remove intrinsic holiness just like that? “There is no wisdom and no understanding and no counsel against God.”

[Speaker G] He made it disappear completely?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He made it disappear. So it’s gone.

[Speaker G] How can something disappear?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Intrinsic holiness does not lapse on its own. Intrinsic holiness lapses only after its commandment has been fulfilled, yes? After we perform its commandment. Once its commandment has been fulfilled, and then misuse still applies to it—that is, if I performed the commandment, that can remove the holiness. But here, just on its own? Obviously that’s not a question. Why is it not a question? Because what lapsed is the object, not the holiness. The object is holy with everlasting holiness, only at some point there is no longer any object.

[Speaker D] Wait, if it just died, in more realistic terms…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it still… it remains… we’d have to see what to do with it, yes. Even if it became blemished, you’ll see—let it graze until it gets a blemish; there are various rules for what to do with a sacrifice. And when it gets a blemish, I don’t know exactly what happens, I’d have to think, I don’t remember at the moment what the Talmud says there. But the holiness—I don’t think… although there too a change occurred, so maybe that change is considered like an act. There’s a difference with sacrifices, what you do with sacrifices…

[Speaker D] But evaporation is a substantive change, isn’t it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Evaporation is a change, okay. Look, the point is, it doesn’t matter, all that is hair-splitting. The point is that what I mean to say is that after the eight days of Sukkot there is no sukkah. It’s not that there is no holiness—there is no sukkah. Meaning, the sukkah had everlasting holiness, but the concept “sukkah” exists for eight days. After eight days, it’s not that the holiness lapsed on its own; the holiness never lapsed. The sukkah is holy with everlasting holiness forever. It’s just that after eight days there is no sukkah—the sukkah has lapsed. Yes, the sacrifice evaporated. It’s not that its holiness flew away, okay? Therefore this is not called holiness lapsing on its own. Therefore it’s not difficult for the Rashba. The Rashba says this is intrinsic holiness, and there is no difficulty for him as to why after eight days the holiness lapses, because the holiness does not lapse—the object disappears. That’s what I once thought. The Kovetz Shiurim cites the Oneg Yom Tov, and the Oneg Yom Tov asks why the Shulchan Arukh writes that someone who sits in the sukkah in the rain is a fool. Anyone who is exempt from something and does it anyway is called a fool. So he asks there: why a fool? It’s forbidden! It’s use of the wood of the sukkah—he is using it to protect himself from the rain. So he says that when it’s raining and there is no commandment, it’s not a sukkah. The Kovetz Shiurim says this. Something similar.

[Speaker I] In Borough Park they sell slats for sukkah roofs that have some kind of geometry where you can see the stars but the rain doesn’t fall on you. Okay. Wow. So now—so now, now can you sit in a sukkah when it’s raining and not be using the wood?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, because in such a sukkah there is a commandment. So it doesn’t depend on the fact that rain exists in the world; it depends on whether there is rain inside the sukkah. “Dwell as you live,” until the porridge spoils. If rain enters the sukkah—and if it isn’t significant, you continue sitting there—until the porridge spoils. That’s the rule; meaning that it ruins the food. Okay, that’s the rule. If not, then sit. Now if the sukkah is protected from rain by some such trick and it doesn’t get in, then there’s no problem. You are obligated in the commandment of sukkah; sit there.

[Speaker I] So where—then why—then why is it forbidden to use the wood of the sukkah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there it’s no longer forbidden because you are doing the commandment. The whole problem was that you were not doing the commandment. So if that’s the case, then there’s a prohibition here because you’re using the wood of the sukkah not for the commandment. So I say, fine—but then it’s not a sukkah, because at such a time it simply isn’t a sukkah. A sukkah designated for the commandment is a sukkah; if it isn’t designated for the commandment, it isn’t a sukkah.

[Speaker D] Wait, is it considered misuse of consecrated property if you sit under wood that has been designated for a sukkah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s another question. Most halakhic decisors say no. That’s how they answer the Oneg Yom Tov’s difficulty. They claim that sitting under the sukkah is not called using the wood of the sukkah. Using the wood of the sukkah means taking something from the sukkah—and this is very reminiscent of your definition—taking something from the sukkah and then making some use of it, using it in some way. The sukkah is there anyway; I’m just sitting underneath. That isn’t called using the wood of the sukkah. And the Oneg Yom Tov assumes that it is, and the Magen Avraham writes—

[Speaker D] You could ask more questions on that same logic; even aside from that answer it wouldn’t answer them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker D] If it’s permitted to put a small child there, say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About women—about women he—

[Speaker D] The Oneg Yom Tov asks.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what does he answer?

[Speaker D] About women—how are women allowed to sit there? After all, if you can say that they too…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They fulfill the commandment too, just that they are not obligated, or something like that. But say a child who has not yet reached the age of education? Yes, he asks about women in the same way, because if there is a prohibition when they don’t fulfill the commandment—so they do fulfill the commandment, but are not obligated. If there is a prohibition when they don’t fulfill it, then no, automatically they won’t have a prohibition. But what if they have no commandment? I want to fulfill the commandment also…

[Speaker D] when it’s raining.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I once heard that the Klausenburger Rebbe sat in the sukkah even in the rain. He said that for him, leaving the sukkah was itself the distress, even when it rained. By the way, that’s an interesting definition: is “one who is distressed is exempt from the sukkah” also exempt from leaving it? Meaning, it’s not only someone distressed by sitting in the sukkah. An interesting definition. Never mind. In any case, regarding that—so—

[Speaker D] Regarding that, this answer won’t answer it. Meaning the answer that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, obviously not. There it’s something else. I’m talking about circumstances that say that right now there is no commandment. Fine, that’s a different discussion.

[Speaker G] I think the criterion is whether you need a building permit for it or not. On Sukkot you don’t need a building permit, and afterward, once it’s a pergola, if the municipality comes after you that’s a sign that it’s already…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, you’re saying we have an objective definition; no need to check.

[Speaker G] The great sages of the municipality. They—they are the criterion.

[Speaker E] Heaven forbid. There are municipalities that will come after you even on Sukkot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. In any case, why am I bringing this example? Because in fact it is completely parallel to this distinction of Maimonides. Maimonides says that when the seven nations disappeared or when the Amalekites disappeared, that doesn’t mean the commandment is bounded by time. The commandment is an eternal commandment; there’s just no one to apply it to. What disappeared is the object to which the commandment applies, not that the commandment itself stopped in time. Now here too, with the sukkah, when its holiness lapses after eight days, it’s not that the holiness is bounded by time. The holiness is eternal. Intrinsic holiness has not lapsed on its own; the sukkah is bounded by time. Meaning that after eight days there is no sukkah. It’s exactly the same distinction. Okay. Fine, maybe I’ll come back to this. In any case, that’s what Maimonides says. Now there is a whole discussion between Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides and Rabbi Daniel the Babylonian in the book Ma’aseh Nissim, which is correspondence between them around the Book of Commandments and the root-principles, various questions. Rabbi Daniel the Babylonian asked Rabbi Abraham there: what is the difference between this commandment and placing a fiery serpent? A fiery serpent too is basically a commandment that reached its purpose, right? We were told to put up a fiery serpent; we put it up. So why is that called a temporary commandment—putting up a fiery serpent, or putting the manna in a jar—and this is not called a temporary commandment? There too we were commanded; hypothetically, at the time we were commanded, once we did it, it was over because we carried it out. So it reached its purpose. What is the difference, really, between these two things? That’s what he asks there. Now Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides explains things there that are basically already written in Maimonides. And therefore, when I read Maimonides, I told you to notice that there are two different formulations here. They seem complementary, but there’s a nuance difference. One formulation is that the commandment reached its purpose, and therefore it is not a commandment bounded by time. The second formulation—which seems like an indication of the first, but for our purposes now is important—is a formulation that says the indication is this: if we were to return to a situation in which reality was the same, would we again become obligated? If suddenly the seven nations were discovered, we would still have to destroy them. Therefore this is a commandment not dependent on time; it is a commandment that applies throughout the generations. In contrast, a jar of manna or a fiery serpent—it turns out that even if the exact same situation returned, we would not have to do it. That is what Maimonides writes. Okay?

[Speaker G] How does he know that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How does he know that? Interesting question. I don’t know—interpretation of the verses, I don’t know exactly. But that’s the difference; at least that is how Maimonides understands the difference, and that’s what Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides… Here, I’ll describe the situation to you. What? Say we went down to Egypt again, okay? We were exiled from our land, went down to Egypt, Pharaoh enslaved us, the ten plagues happened.

[Speaker D] What does all this have to do with anything?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has to do with putting… wait. The splitting of the sea, we went in the wilderness, we replayed the entire history of the Torah, and exactly the same thing happened with all the snakes and plagues and complaints and all those matters. And now—would we need to put up a fiery serpent?

[Speaker D] It seems to me that this is not the definition of a commandment that refers to an act. A commandment that refers to an act is a commandment defining a specific act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, given certain circumstances. So when those circumstances happened, the Holy One, blessed be He, said… This is from logic; it’s not that the commandment explicitly refers to that. Why?

[Speaker D] The commandment does refer to that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When there are such circumstances, the Holy One, blessed be He, told us: put up a fiery serpent, right? So He should repeat that every time such circumstances arise. Now you—true, those exact circumstances won’t occur this time, that’s not important—but on the theoretical level, this too merely reached its purpose. That is basically what Rabbi Daniel the Babylonian is asking. Because in the end, in principle, those circumstances could return again. Now according to Maimonides’ criterion, it comes out that even if those circumstances return again, we still would not need to put up a fiery serpent. Unless the Holy One, blessed be He, commands again. But if not, that command has expired.

[Speaker H] That’s a narrative formulation. We say that God commanded Moses our teacher to place a certain thing. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not a narrative formulation… no, “Make for yourself a fiery serpent”—what do you mean? That’s a positive commandment.

[Speaker H] It’s a command to Moses, not a command to each person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. What’s that got to do with it? So let the leader of the people do it. Aaron too—“when you kindle the lamps”—what is that? It’s a command to the priests for the generations. Never mind; so it was Aaron. But the leader should do it, the leader of that time. Maybe they’ll even call him Moses if we replay all of history; it’ll be a reincarnation of Moses our teacher. So once the circumstances return, Maimonides tells us again—I don’t know what his criterion is, when he interprets this way and when that way—but that’s how he learned it. He learned that even if the circumstances return and everything is the same, we will not need to put up a fiery serpent. Therefore it is a commandment that does not apply throughout the generations.

[Speaker D] This distinction seems unnecessary to me; I don’t see why we need to say it. Even regarding the seven nations there is a definition: if there are seven nations, do this. It’s something specific. Here the command was said at a certain time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Regarding the seven nations there is no “if” at all. Kill the seven nations. As long as there are seven nations, they must be killed. Here too they tell you: once you are in such a situation, put up a fiery serpent. There is no “if.” There too it isn’t defined as “if”; rather, obviously, it refers to the circumstances to which it refers. What’s the difference? Whenever you enter the land, set up an altar, Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal—do this, yes? Every time? Ezra and Nehemiah, in principle, should also have done this according to that logic. Why didn’t they do it? Because they didn’t need to. Maimonides says: why not? Because that commandment is bounded by time. The command is bounded by time, not the object upon which the command applies. It’s not the sukkah; here the holiness is bounded by time.

[Speaker D] And according to this we should ask again: if it should happen that we arrive in Egypt again and Pharaoh enslaves us and we get ten plagues and receive the Torah at Sinai, then would we have to do it again? Maybe then yes, we would need to again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We did not receive the Torah—independently of the Torah now, it has nothing to do with the Torah. This is a command that did not come from the Torah; it came directly from the Holy One, blessed be He. Moses our teacher did not receive this at Sinai as a commandment. That is what Maimonides writes, after all. At the beginning of the root principle that we read, there is no issue of Sinai or not Sinai regarding a commandment that does not apply throughout the generations. It doesn’t matter whether it was received at Sinai or not. Moses our teacher was commanded and told: do this. Afterward it was written in the Torah, but he did not receive this command at Sinai. What is this really saying? What this says is that temporary commandments, according to… understand, this is a big novelty that Maimonides is saying here. Very big, even logically. Why? Because it basically says there are commandments that are not a function of the circumstances. After all, in those very same circumstances you are not obligated. Why not? If I had to put up a fiery serpent in those circumstances that happened then, what difference does it make? If the same circumstances exist, that’s still the right thing to do, no? So why not now? I’m not talking about how Maimonides knows this. Fine, he has one interpretive consideration or another. I’m asking: what is the logic of it? Why should a commandment be defined this way at all? If under such circumstances it is right to put up a fiery serpent, then what is the problem? If we are in those same circumstances, then once again we should need to put up a fiery serpent. What is the logic in defining a commandment as inherently bounded by time—not because the circumstances are different? For example, I’ll give you perhaps another example of the same distinction. Nachmanides writes in Kiddushin 34, Nachmanides says there that the commandment of counting the Omer is a positive time-bound commandment—or is not a positive time-bound commandment. Fine? This is a well-known Nachmanides. People ask about him, and various later authorities explain the matter. Several of them speak in a similar vein and want to say that counting the Omer is not really a time-bound commandment, but rather a commandment dependent on events that occur in time. Meaning, counting the Omer is “from the morrow of the Sabbath,” meaning from Passover. If Passover were in Kislev, you would have to count the Omer from Kislev. It just happens that Passover comes out in Nisan. But counting the Omer is not inherently tied to Nisan; it is inherently tied to Passover, to events, and to the day after Passover in some way. And since that is so, it is not time-bound. Now that’s an interesting point, because then it comes out that Passover itself, which is a positive time-bound commandment, apparently depends on time and not only on the Exodus from Egypt. This is the Beit HaLevi, yes, who says: “Because of this the Lord did for me when I went out of Egypt.” Nachmanides mentions something like this too, and Rabbi Kook also has this idea, and the Beit HaLevi writes it most clearly: that this verse is backwards. Meaning: “Because of this the Lord did for me when I went out of Egypt”—backwards. I do these commandments, this, because of what God did for me when I went out of Egypt.

[Speaker B] What’s the answer to the wicked son?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Yes, exactly. So he says there: no, it’s straight, not backwards. The Holy One, blessed be He, did the Exodus from Egypt so that I would do these commandments. Yes, that midrash that Rashi brings about Lot, that he baked matzot and not leavened bread—Rashi says there: it was Passover. What Passover? We hadn’t even left Egypt yet, nothing had happened. Why would you eat matzot 200 or 300 years before the Exodus? Why eat matzot? Matzot are in remembrance of the haste with Pharaoh and all those tricks, no? So what does that have to do with Lot? Pharaoh hadn’t even dreamt of being born yet.

[Speaker G] Not exactly. Not exactly, because they were commanded to make matzot; they knew they would leave in haste.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly—that’s the answer. Meaning the claim is that there is something about the fifteenth of Nisan—I don’t know exactly what—that obligates these commandments. History builds it into reality in some fashion. But in principle, that’s what they claim. In principle that’s today’s subject. Actually here specifically the ethicists say this about all the special qualities of times: every time has some special feature. But I’m saying that here it is almost explicit in the Torah itself, what you said is really true. After all, on the first of Nisan the Holy One, blessed be He, says: “This month shall be for you the beginning of months; it shall be the first month of the year for you,” and then He commands about Passover and so on. “And thus shall you eat it: your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, and your staff in your hand; and you shall eat it in haste; it is a Passover offering to the Lord.” What haste? I thought Pharaoh chased us, our dough didn’t have time to rise, we hurried and ran quickly. That’s where the haste came from. Not two weeks before Pharaoh even knew we were going to leave. The Holy One, blessed be He, tells us: “You shall eat it in haste; it is a Passover offering to the Lord.” Meaning there is a law within Passover to eat in haste, not because Pharaoh chased us. It works the other way around. Pharaoh chased us in order to embed in history the fact that we would eat in haste, yes, in some fashion. So here specifically there is even a source for this in the Torah itself. Extensions, in any case, in any event—

[Speaker G] But I think there’s still a difference. What? Because the Exodus from Egypt—even if today we go down to Egypt and come back out, we are already a people. Meaning it’s not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, our memory is erased. We lost it. We went back down to Egypt. Jacob our father went down with seventy souls. Everything starts from scratch.

[Speaker G] Reset. We did a reset. If it’s all from the beginning, then he needs to receive the Torah from the beginning, because otherwise he has nothing. But if he receives the Torah, it could be that he’ll receive it with those same commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah, yes—but this… a command that did not come from the Torah. Which one? The command of “Make for yourself a fiery serpent”—that is not a Torah commandment. That is Moses; the Holy One, blessed be He, told Moses our teacher to do this. It is not a Torah commandment; that command is not dependent on the giving of the Torah.

[Speaker B] Wasn’t that a test? Looking at the serpent, the fiery serpent—wasn’t that a kind of test for the people? What? The fiery serpent, it was a kind of test for the people, and in a test you could also pass…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the fiery serpent was not a test. The fiery serpent was to stop the plague. Put a serpent there so they will look at it and be healed. That they should look at it? Yes. So it’s not a test, it’s… You mean the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah… yes, “Did the hands of Moses wage war?” Fine, never mind. In the end these commandments are commandments that are not dependent on the giving of the Torah; we were not commanded in them as Torah commandments. The Holy One, blessed be He, told Moses: in this situation, this is what you must do. The claim is that…

[Speaker G] Then that too would be a commandment? What? Meaning, if they get into the same situation and really are struck by snakes, then that is what they should do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Maimonides says not. That’s exactly the point—Maimonides claims not. So the explanation in Nachmanides there is that there are things dependent on time and things dependent on events that occur in time. Let me give you an example: is Grace after Meals a positive time-bound commandment? Because I bless only when I eat. Now suppose I eat breakfast at eight in the morning—so only at eight in the morning do I have to recite Grace after Meals? No. So why is it not a positive time-bound commandment? Let’s say I regularly eat at eight in the morning—for your sake let’s make it—

[Speaker B] Even so, no one eats only once a day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because the eating causes the Grace after Meals. So the fact that the eating occurs at some time—so what? The commandment is a function of events, and events by nature always occur at some time. But the commandment is not dependent on time; it is dependent on events. Events always happen at some time. That is basically the claim regarding counting the Omer. Now temporary commandments are the same kind of thing. Temporary commandments, says Maimonides, are like positive time-bound commandments. Positive time-bound commandments are commandments that depend on time itself, not on events in time. Temporary commandments too are commandments that depend on time itself and not on events. Meaning that if the same events occur at a different time, we would not be obligated. We would not be obligated. We return to those same… what I said earlier: we return to the same events, but it would be today and not then, at another time, and we would not be obligated. Why? Because the commandment is a function of time, not of the events. In mathematical language, let’s say events are X and time is T, and F is the function—the obligation—which is a function of place and time. So if we have F of X and T—I hope these basic concepts are familiar—then F of X and T can take two forms. It can be a function of time and place, and it can be a function of place, where the place itself is a function of time. Not an explicit function of time—X of T. Exactly: F of X, where X is X of T. For example, I’ll give you a physics example. In physics too, by the way, there is a difference between the two. Meaning, non-explicit dependence on time preserves energy; this is called a conservative force. Explicit dependence on time means energy is not conserved. Meaning, think of a particle moving, a little ball moving over some surface. If it is in a high place, it has high potential energy; if it is in a low place, it has low potential energy; and it moves. So its energy depends on time, right? At one time it has low energy, at another time high energy. But what characterizes this motion? That if it returns at another time to the same place, it will have the same energy. Since the energy is not really dependent on time; it is dependent on place. It’s just that the place changes with time; at each different time I am in a different place. So there is not really dependence on time here; the dependence on time is artificial. It is not really time dependence; it is dependence on place. It’s just that place depends on time. Right? In contrast, there could be a case where energy depends explicitly on time, not through place which itself depends on time. For example, I don’t know, take a capacitor, connect two electrodes to it, and put there a field that depends on time. A sine wave, a voltage that changes with time, whatever. Then the field inside the capacitor is a function of time. It is not a function of time because some place is changing; rather it is an explicit function of time. Such a field is non-conservative; you can’t define conservation of energy in such a field, nothing. When there is explicit time dependence, all the mathematics gets complicated. Meaning the quantities change, there are no conserved quantities, a huge mess, complete chaos. The nightmare of every first-year physics student. A non-conservative force. So in this context too, it is exactly the same thing. Meaning, if the commandment depends on circumstances—but circumstances always happen at some time, as with Grace after Meals—then in fact this is not dependence on time; it is dependence on circumstances, except that circumstances naturally always happen in time. That is not called a commandment dependent on time. But if the commandment depends on time and circumstances, meaning that if I reach the same circumstances at another time I would not be obligated—then the energy… my energy would be different, even though I am in the same place, but the time is different, so the energy is different. That means there is explicit dependence on time, not indirect dependence on time. In such a case the commandment depends on time itself; time itself causes the obligation, not just the circumstances that occurred at that time. In the context of positive time-bound commandments, this is what is called a positive time-bound commandment, from which women are exempt. In the context of temporary commandments here in Maimonides, these are what are called temporary commandments that were not included in the count of the commandments. In both cases we are dealing with commandments whose dependence on time is explicit. If the dependence on time is indirect, then according to Nachmanides at least it is not a positive time-bound commandment in that context, and according to Maimonides here it is a commandment counted among the commandments; it is not a commandment dependent on time, not bounded by time.

[Speaker G] Like Tisha B’Av. Tisha B’Av depends on events and not on time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Passover too, on the theoretical level, depends on events and not on time. But he tells us: no, no—there is something here. By the way, with Tisha B’Av it’s even more so. I think I once spoke about it—Tisha…

[Speaker I] B’Av.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Redemption at any time. Regarding Tisha B’Av, what you’re noting is actually especially interesting, because Tisha B’Av is really the exact opposite example. The Talmud says in Ta’anit: “He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men,” okay? That’s what the verse in Lamentations says. What does “He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men” mean? It means they intercalated the month between Tammuz and the first of Av, they extended the month so that the weeping over the spies, who went out on the first of Tammuz, would fall exactly on Tisha B’Av. They needed a longer month because it took them forty days until they returned, so they had to intercalate the month, and then it fell out—otherwise it would have fallen on the tenth of Av. “He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men” means that this appointed time of Tisha B’Av was fixed so that the downfall—the weeping of the people and of the spies—would fall on Tisha B’Av. Why? Because it is a problematic day, a special appointed time for various troubles. And throughout history we always have all kinds of little sermons about how things happened on Tisha B’Av and so on. By the way, I’m not sure that’s true; it’s a kind of myth. People connect various things that, by playing with the dates, can somehow be fit into Tisha B’Av. These aren’t really such… The Mishnah says five things happened to our ancestors on the seventeenth of Tammuz and five things on Tisha B’Av, which is very interesting—exactly five things here and five things there. That too is of course somewhat tendentious collecting. But they intercalated the month so it would fall on Tisha B’Av. But wait—Tisha B’Av didn’t yet exist. It’s like Lot. Tisha B’Av, ostensibly, is something that happened either after they cried, or when the Temple was destroyed—it doesn’t matter. The events that happened on Tisha B’Av are what gave Tisha B’Av its special character, no? Here you see that it’s not so. Meaning that there is something in the time itself of Tisha B’Av because of which the events happened, not that because of the events that became the nature of the time. The proof is that even before all the events happened, the Holy One, blessed be He, already had to make sure that the crying over the spies would fall on Tisha B’Av. Meaning that Tisha B’Av was prepared and ready for this matter from the outset. And therefore indeed—in the Talmud itself, “He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men”—the “appointed time,” just because of your question, parenthetically, the “appointed time” there is the New Moon, not Tisha B’Av. The Talmud also says: the appointed time—from here we learn that the New Moon is called an appointed time. But exactly—we have several mourning customs that we do not practice, or customs we do not practice on Tisha B’Av because it is an appointed time. Meaning the simple plain meaning of “He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men” is Tisha B’Av, not the New Moon. But there is no contradiction. No contradiction. The “appointed time” there of the New Moon means they established the New Moon so as to meet with the Holy One, blessed be He, on Tisha B’Av; that’s why they made the New Moon that way. The appointed time is indeed Tisha B’Av. Even according to the Talmud’s interpretation, the appointed time is Tisha B’Av. Because what is an appointed time? It comes from the language of meeting. Meaning, some encounter planned in advance, prescribed in advance. And this meeting of Tisha B’Av did not happen by chance because that’s when the Temple was destroyed, but because this date is the date on which we meet the Holy One, blessed be He. By the way, that’s why it will also become a day of joy in the future and so on, because the meeting is the meeting—that is today’s subject. The nature of the meeting depends: if we were not proper, then the nature will look gloomy, and if we are proper, or in the future, then the nature won’t be gloomy, it will be joyful. But it is still an appointed time; it is a place where one meets, where we meet with the Holy One, blessed be He. That is the reason that Tisha B’Av is actually the primary thing simply called mo’ed, appointed time, unlike all the other appointed times which are called that together. But what is distinctively called mo’ed is specifically Tisha B’Av. Because the other appointed times depend on events; with Tisha B’Av the events depend on it.

[Speaker B] Like the New Moon. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The New Moon. The New Moon is because of this, because of “He proclaimed against me an appointed time.”

[Speaker B] The New Moon comes exactly from Tisha B’Av.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “In your months and in your appointed times”—after all, specifically with the New Moon it’s not exactly an appointed time. “In your months and in your appointed times” is like… “upon the righteous and upon the pious,” you know. How do we know that the pious are not the righteous? Because it says “upon the righteous and upon the pious,” so apparently those are two different things. In any case, the…

[Speaker I] There’s also an intermediate category here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, obviously. You know, it’s… we already once talked about how a wife argues with her husband and says to him, “Whatever Sarah says to you, listen to her voice.” I don’t know who got tangled up—this is some kind of exam… So he says to her: of course, that’s a special scriptural decree that ordinarily one need not listen to women. Only here there is a special scriptural decree that with Sarah, yes, in this case you have to listen. On the contrary, from here we learn that one need not listen to women.

[Speaker F] Do you know what the Talmud expounds? One who throws fingernails on the floor is wicked, the righteous bury them, and the pious burn them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the pious burn them, yes, indeed.

[Speaker D] But that’s what we said—that a pious person is someone who goes beyond the law, while a righteous person is one who does exactly the core law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, fine, don’t refute a homily. We don’t refute homiletics. Don’t take seriously everything I said. Okay, where were we? Just one more second. Tisha B’Av? No, Tisha B’Av was just a parenthesis from Itzik—wait, I’m… one second. Ah, yes. So basically the claim is that there are commandments—now I’m returning to Maimonides—temporary commandments, or positive time-bound commandments, are commandments whose dependence on time is explicit. Okay? Meaning, time is the reason we are obligated, not just the circumstances. Time itself is part of the reason. Now this itself is very interesting. How can time be a cause of something? Is time even anything at all? Our topic is time, yes, so here I’m beginning. Until now this was all just introduction.

[Speaker B] Sabbath has significance—the seventh day is fixed and passes through every…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because we were told to rest every seven days, fine. But what… where is time here? Why should time generate something? It’s related to the six hours between meat and milk. We were told: every seven days, make a day of rest.

[Speaker G] But Rabbi, it’s a little different, though. Because it’s not simply resting every seven days, because if it were, then in the Talmud, when someone in the wilderness doesn’t know what day it is, he wouldn’t count seven days. Why does he count? Because there’s a dispute there whether this day is really Sabbath, as he says, and then it’s about time—or whether it’s simply every seven days.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I don’t think the conception is that the law of Sabbath is one in every seven days, that’s not… The question there—there is a dispute among the medieval authorities and later authorities; I don’t remember now whether it’s Torah law or not. There are those who really want to argue that there is some such law of making a Sabbath every seven days even if it isn’t the correct Sabbath.

[Speaker G] So then why in the Talmud is there even an argument whether he should count seven days or whether he should rest a bit each day?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s just laws of presumptions…

[Speaker G] No, because he only wants to hit the actual Sabbath. Meaning, if Sabbath as a time has significance as a time, then what’s the point of counting days? He could land on any other day of the week. And if it’s just every seven days to rest, then what difference does it make whether today is Sabbath or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s why I’m saying it’s not every seven days to rest.

[Speaker G] So it’s like he says—that it depends on time. That the seventh day itself, that specific time, the seventh—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sabbath when the Holy One, blessed be He, first rested from labor, and from then on every seven days. Right.

[Speaker G] But then if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is an initial condition to that equation. Meaning, every seven days you must rest. And it starts from the Sabbath that the Holy One, blessed be He… fine. But the Sabbath of the Holy One, blessed be He, is not time. It’s not time; it is the event—

[Speaker G] that the Holy One, blessed be He, rested from His labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the initial condition is not time; the initial condition is the event. So one could say likewise regarding time that depends on a date—that too is… if—

[Speaker D] If we’re talking about time like Tisha B’Av, then that too is measured from the creation of the world… No, it is measured from the creation of the world, but the reason we got stuck specifically on Tisha B’Av is not any event. It’s not about from where it is measured. It’s not because of any event, it’s not because so-and-so much time passed from creation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rather it is the date—I don’t know—the special quality of that date, at the time that arrives after such-and-such an amount of time; that’s how you define the time. But the obligations of Tisha B’Av, or what happens on Tisha B’Av, are a function of the time itself. It doesn’t matter how you define the time. You define time relative to the creation of the world—that’s true. But here it is not that Sabbath is defined relative to the creation of the world. The creation of the world is the reason for Sabbath. It’s not that this is just how I define the time axis.

[Speaker G] Here—the letter of Newton to his friend… Einstein.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of Einstein, sorry. Yes. He told him that time really isn’t…

[Speaker G] He didn’t really die at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, we’ll get to that later. We’ll get to that later. So the point is that when we say that time generates something, meaning it is a cause of something else, that’s a novelty. Because the accepted view of time is that time is not a thing. Time is a way of looking at things, or a way of organizing events or objects; we use different categories to organize them. Space, time… this is to the right of that, this is before that, this is after that. That’s how we organize things. But time and space are not something; they are categories. Kant, for example, says that space and time are forms through which we perceive the world, not things in the world itself. But if that were so, then time could not be the cause of anything. Because something that brings about something else is something real. In other words, something that does not exist cannot bring about anything; it cannot be the cause of anything. If you are the cause of something, that means you exist. Now, there are a few examples I thought of showing that in the halakhic view this is not like the Kantian view. One example: the Talmud at the beginning of Berakhot says there—they discuss whether evening comes after morning, whether morning comes after evening, and whether evening comes after morning. In the end, with consecrated offerings, yes, evening is after morning, and with ordinary food, morning is after evening. This discussion has no meaning at all if morning and evening are only forms of our perception. I mean, what comes after what? Decide however you want, put the point wherever you want, and then the other one comes after it. If you ask such a question, that means there is something in time itself that is not dependent on how you look at it, and the question really is what comes before what. In other words, it’s a question about the things themselves. There is no point in asking what comes before what when neither this nor that really exists and they’re just fictions that we define. I mean, what comes before what? Neither comes before the other. They’re not here and not there at all; there are no such things. So that’s one indication. A second indication: there is a Talmud in Shevuot 20a and also in Nedarim, and the Talmud there talks about association in vows. There are two ways to make a vow, right? I can say, “This book is forbidden to me like a konam,” and then I prohibit it to myself as a konam. And I can say, “This is like that”—take, say, a sacrifice, like the festival offering—we’ll mention it again—that is holy, that has some prohibition on it, or something vowed, meaning something upon which I imposed a vow-prohibition, and say, “This is like that.” And association, usually in the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—not agreed upon by everyone, but that’s the usual understanding—means transferring the legal force of the prohibition from one thing to the other. Again, that is why you need something that already has a legal force of prohibition on it, so that you transfer that status from one to the other. Now, the Talmud there says: “This shall be upon me like the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam died”—“This is upon me like the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam died”—that is a vow. If I say that—it’s an oath, it doesn’t matter—it’s a vow, not an oath. And that is an example of association. Meaning, I associate this loaf of bread with the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam died. Is a day a thing? How can association apply to something that isn’t a thing? I can’t associate it with the Sabbath prohibition. Associate it with the Sabbath prohibition—what does that mean? The Sabbath prohibition is not an object. No—association only works with something vowed. You can’t associate with something that isn’t a thing. To associate with a prohibition, to compare it to a prohibition—you need to take something that has an object-based prohibition on it and transfer that prohibition to the vow. And vow prohibitions are object-based prohibitions, whereas oath prohibitions are person-based prohibitions; that is why one can associate with something vowed. Okay? Because it is a thing, or holiness—which in this respect is like vows; holiness is also an object-based prohibition, so you can associate with something holy. Now here we are associating with a day. How can you associate with a day?

[Speaker J] But what is he trying to say by that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That it should be forbidden—this loaf of bread should be forbidden to me. It’s a vow not to eat. No—just like the prohibition of the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam died; that prohibition applies to me, I am forbidden to eat then, and this loaf too will be forbidden for me to eat. Okay? Now that means that essentially we view the day as a kind of object that has a legal force of prohibition on it, and then we can make an association. Again, this is another indication that the halakhic way of looking at time is as if it is a kind of thing. It’s not…

[Speaker B] But that’s a date. What? It’s something cyclical… it’s not time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, it’s a date.

[Speaker G] But here he’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Associating with a day.

[Speaker G] Is he associating with the fast, or is he associating…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? It’s annual, on the time axis—the date. What? But it’s something cyclical that has… No, yes, that’s clear; I’ll get to that. There is time that is historical time, and time that is cyclical time. Historical time is linear time, and that’s what Maimonides is dealing with here in the third root, where he says that something that happened once on the historical timeline is not included in the count of the commandments; it does not enter the count of the commandments. But positive commandments caused by time do enter the count of the commandments, and they are explicitly dependent on time, aren’t they? Now, if according to Maimonides something explicitly dependent on time does not enter the count of the commandments, then why do positive commandments caused by time—Passover, for example—enter the count of the commandments? It is also an explicit function of time. Because it is an explicit function of cyclical time, not of historical time. Historical time, when it is one-time-only, does not enter the count of the commandments. When it is an explicit function of cyclical time, it does enter—but women are exempt, because these are positive commandments caused by time. Okay? There is a difference between cyclical time and linear time.

[Speaker B] Is this day a thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Exactly. So the view is that the day is actually some kind of thing, some kind of existent. In Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed, Part II, chapter 13, Maimonides writes—he is discussing eternity, the eternity of the world, and within that he addresses time. So he says this: “Time itself also is among created things.” What does “among” mean? Time is created. By the way, this is also accepted in physics today—that space and time were created in the Big Bang. It’s not that time always existed and at some point in time a bang happened; rather, the bang was the coming into existence of space and time. Meaning, before it there was no time. When people ask what was before the bang, that is an illegitimate question in physics, because the concept of “before” does not exist. There is no timeline. So in that sense this is very similar. He too says that time itself is among created things. Meaning, time is created. That excludes Kant, who says time was not created; time is only our way of looking at things, so it is not a thing, and there is nothing to create called time. That is simply how we look at things. We were created with some temporal form of perception, but it is not that time itself was created. Now look—he adds something here, and I’m not entirely sure what he means: “And time is consequent upon motion, and motion is an accident in that which moves.” Motion is a property of the moving substance. Motion is not a thing, right? Motion is not a thing; motion is a property of things. Things can move. Motion itself is not a thing, okay? Now, he says that time is consequent upon motion, and motion is an accident in that which moves. I think he means to say that without time, motion would not be definable. Even though motion itself is not an entity—it is a property of things, not a thing in itself—still, it could not be defined if there were no such thing as time, because without time there is no motion. “And that which moves, to whose motion time is consequent, is itself originated,” which is apparently the moving object, I’m not sure, “and came into being after not having been. And this is the meaning of the saying that God existed before the world was created—although the word ‘existed’ indicates time.” Exactly like the Big Bang. How can you say “before the world was created”? There is no such thing, because when the world was created, time was created. So what does “before” mean? Exactly like the Big Bang, the very same thing. So how can you say that God existed before the world was created? Before the world was created there was no “before.” There is no “before”; time was created then. So he says, “although the word ‘existed’ indicates time, and likewise everything the imagination suggests about the duration of His existence before the world was created—a duration without end—all this is borrowing the language of time, or imagining time, not actual time.” It is only a borrowed expression. There was no time then. It’s a borrowed expression, and I’ll return to this point later; it is a very interesting remark by Rabbi Shem Tov Gefen. We’ll talk about it when we discuss the philosophy of time. “For time is undoubtedly an accident, and according to us it belongs among the created accidents, like blackness and whiteness.” Even though it is not in the category of quality—time is not a quality of things, like blackness and whiteness, hardness, and so on—still, it is among the created accidents. These are basically Aristotle’s categories: what, how much, why, how, form, and the like. “But it is definitely a positive accident of motion, as becomes clear to one who understands Aristotle’s words in the explanation of time and the truth of its existence.” And then he says that regarding the matter of time, what causes the matter of time to be hidden from many scholars, so that they became perplexed about whether it has real existence or not, such as Galen—the physician Galen—and others, is because it is an accident of an accident. Motion is an accident in bodies, and time is an accident in motion. So it is an accident of an accident—that is an abstraction on top of an abstraction—and people were perplexed whether such a thing exists at all. But Maimonides says yes, it exists. It is an abstract thing, but it exists; it is among created things. “For accidents existing in bodies with primary existence, such as colors and tastes, are understood upon first examination and their nature is intelligible. But accidents whose subject is other accidents, like brightness in a color, and curvature and circularity in a line, their nature is far more hidden. Especially when, in addition, the subject of the accident is itself not stationary in its state, but rather in one state after another.” In short, this matter of time is very elusive. “And so in time the two things come together: it is an accident consequent upon motion, and motion is an accident in that which moves,” and so on. Then he says, “And this is what caused the matter of time to be hidden.” And his point is that according to us it is a created thing, and it exists like the other accidents and the substances that bear those accidents. It too is a kind of existent, a kind of thing; it is a kind of substance, only abstract. “Therefore God’s bringing the world into existence was not in a temporal beginning, since time itself belongs among created things.” Okay? Therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, also did not create the world at some particular time, because time itself was created with the world. You cannot say at what time the world was created; it was not created at any time. Time was created together with it.

[Speaker J] What is the meaning of the word “In the beginning”? What? What is the meaning of the word “In the beginning”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “In the beginning God created”—at the beginning of the timeline, the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world.

[Speaker J] But you’re saying there is no beginning of a timeline.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is a beginning—on the contrary, I’m saying there is a beginning of the timeline. Time began then. The only question is what was before—but there is no such thing as “before.” But when I look today from the standpoint that there is a timeline, and I go backward, I… will reach the first point; there the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world.

[Speaker J] But then, according to what you’re saying, it should have said that He created, and then there was a beginning. You can’t say “In the beginning He created,” because then you’re saying the beginning preceded the creation. What? There was a beginning, and then He created.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As if “the beginning” is already a definition of… No, yes, but I don’t think so. It’s interesting with the Septuagint: “God created in the beginning” or “In the beginning God created.” The Septuagint says “God created in the beginning,” because otherwise people might make the mistake of thinking that “the beginning”…

Time in Jewish Law 1

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Opening and the proposed topic: time between philosophy and Jewish law

Maimonides in the third root: commandments that do not apply for generations are not counted

The Behag and other enumerators of commandments: Maimonides’ criticism and the question of Saadia Gaon

The Behag’s example: prohibitions concerning Levites and one who steals the sacred covering

Maimonides’ argument against the Behag’s criterion: many one-time commands were not counted

Commandment 187 in the Book of Commandments: destruction of the seven nations and the difficulty vis-à-vis the third root

A story in the name of Rabbi Zilberstein and the Avnei Nezer: a labor not needed for its own sake and the Sabbath

Maimonides on the seven nations and Amalek: the commandment remains even when the object disappears

Maimonides’ central distinction: the commandment versus the thing we were commanded about

The sukkah example and Rashba: expiration of sanctity or expiration of the object

Oneg Yom Tov and Kovetz Shiurim: sitting in the sukkah in the rain and the definition of “there is no sukkah”

Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides and Rabbi Daniel the Babylonian: the difficulty of the fiery serpent and the jar of manna

Dependence on time versus dependence on events: temporary commandments and positive commandments caused by time

Historical time and cyclical time: the enumeration of commandments versus recurrence

Time as a cause: a philosophical claim emerging from Jewish law

Association in vows: “like the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam was killed” and the day as an object

Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed: time was created and there is no “before” creation

“In the beginning”: a linguistic difficulty about time preceding creation

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Opening and the proposed topic: time between philosophy and Jewish law

Maimonides in the third root: commandments that do not apply for generations are not counted

The Behag and other enumerators of commandments: Maimonides’ criticism and the question of Saadia Gaon

The Behag’s example: prohibitions concerning Levites and one who steals the sacred covering

Maimonides’ argument against the Behag’s criterion: many one-time commands were not counted

Commandment 187 in the Book of Commandments: destruction of the seven nations and the difficulty vis-à-vis the third root

A story in the name of Rabbi Zilberstein and the Avnei Nezer: a labor not needed for its own sake and the Sabbath

Maimonides on the seven nations and Amalek: the commandment remains even when the object disappears

Maimonides’ central distinction: the commandment versus the thing we were commanded about

The sukkah example and Rashba: expiration of sanctity or expiration of the object

Oneg Yom Tov and Kovetz Shiurim: sitting in the sukkah in the rain and the definition of “there is no sukkah”

Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides and Rabbi Daniel the Babylonian: the difficulty of the fiery serpent and the jar of manna

Dependence on time versus dependence on events: temporary commandments and positive commandments caused by time

Historical time and cyclical time: the enumeration of commandments versus recurrence

Time as a cause: a philosophical claim emerging from Jewish law

Association in vows: “like the day on which Gedaliah son of Ahikam was killed” and the day as an object

Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed: time was created and there is no “before” creation

“In the beginning”: a linguistic difficulty about time preceding creation

Full Transcript

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