Time in Halakha 4

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Speaker C] Kashering utensils. Yes, what was there? If a utensil that isn’t pure gets mixed in—

[Speaker D] Or something—maybe that also applies to food utensils.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the end it comes down to food. Meaning, the prohibition with a utensil—the prohibition is to eat from it; do whatever you want with the utensil as long as you don’t eat from it. Unless it’s cooking—in the case of meat and milk there’s also a prohibition of cooking. If it has absorbed meat and milk, then it’s also forbidden to cook with it. Fine, I don’t know, but I’m almost sure—I’d have to check, I don’t remember right now. Okay, so I’m closing the parenthesis. So what actually happens? The Talmud says that vows are something that has a way to be permitted. Why is it something that has a way to be permitted? Because you can go to a sage and ask him to release you from the vow. So the Jerusalem Talmud asks—the Rosh brings this there, the Rosh cites it in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud, in his rulings on tractate Nedarim; there’s also the Rosh’s commentary on Nedarim—in his rulings on Nedarim he cites the Jerusalem Talmud asking: what do you mean? When you go to a sage who releases the vow, he releases it retroactively. It’s based on an opening and regret; that is, he finds that the vow never took effect. Right? If so, then this is not something that has a way to be permitted. If you went to a sage, then it was never forbidden. If you don’t go to a sage, or he decides not to release you from it, then it will always be forbidden. Something that has a way to be permitted means something that is forbidden, and then a certain stage arrives from which on it becomes permitted. But a vow isn’t like that. If you went to a sage, then there never was a vow. If you didn’t go to a sage, or he didn’t release it for you, then that vow is eternal. So in what sense is a vow called something that has a way to be permitted? Go to a sage—go. If you didn’t go to a sage, then it’s like any other prohibition; what’s the difference? So the Jerusalem Talmud and the Rosh there say something that Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains this way. It’s not completely clear to me that that’s what they mean, but that’s how Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains it, and Rav Shmuel discusses this and brings other examples; Rabbi Shimon uses this in many places. He wants to say that release by a sage is not merely revealing a fact retroactively. We understand that when I go with a vow to a sage and he releases me from the vow, what really becomes clear is that there never was a vow. That means—which of the categories I mentioned earlier does releasing vows belong to? In principle it belongs to the first category. In fact the reality was already true today; I just didn’t know it. After I came to the sage, it became known to me—but what became known to me is that it had always been true. Right? In other words, ironically, even though a future event determines the state of affairs now, actually it doesn’t determine the state of affairs now; it only reveals to me the state that was already known. The Holy One, blessed be He, already knew this wasn’t a vow. He knew that I would go to a sage and all sorts of things like that. I didn’t know, so it became known to me only when I went to the sage. But now I know what had always been true. So that really belongs to the first category. Rabbi Shimon Shkop argues that this is not correct. Release of a vow is not merely revealing a fact retroactively. Rather what is it? It is from now on, retroactively. What does “from now on, retroactively” mean? It means this—I’ll try to formulate it a bit differently. Say I violated this vow and ate it. Now a religious court should flog me: “he shall not violate his word,” I transgressed it, so the religious court flogs me. Then I went to a sage and he released me from the vow. So if it becomes clear retroactively that the vow never existed, then the religious court flogged me in violation of the prohibition against injuring—meaning it’s forbidden for them to flog me. Right? In fact, according to this, a religious court could never flog anyone for vows at all, because I could always go afterward to a sage and he’d release me from it, and then it would turn out they had simply injured me for nothing. Okay? No—the religious court can flog me for the vow, and even if I afterward went to a sage and he released it, the religious court can still have flogged me, could have flogged me. After the sage released the vow, then the religious court will no longer flog me. Meaning, what’s happening here is that from the moment the sage releases it, I look at the past differently—but it didn’t change the past; it changed my perspective from the future, how I see the past. That’s “from now on, retroactively”: from now on I see the retroactive past differently, but it didn’t really change the retroactive past. What—

[Speaker D] How is that different from plain retroactive effect?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it were plain retroactive effect, they could never have flogged me.

[Speaker D] And here too they can’t.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they can’t flog me after the release, but before the release they can. Before the release I violated a prohibition; from the perspective of that time, I violated a prohibition and they flogged me. Okay? From that point on, when people look back at the past, then I didn’t violate the prohibition. Maybe I’ll give you an example—I already mentioned this, I don’t remember—in the name of Tuvia Gefen, about the age of the world. I mentioned that, right? So that’s exactly an example of this issue. Tuvia Gefen says that all these questions about the age of the world don’t arise because Kant already taught us that space and time are forms of human perception, and before there was a human being there was no time. So the world was created when the human being came into being; before that there was no “before”—that is, the concept of time didn’t exist when there was no human being. So that’s how he proposes solving the problem of the age of the world. Fine—today they think human beings existed earlier too, but never mind, that’s what he wants to claim. Now I say—I think he’s wrong; in any case he’s wrong. Why? Because after the human being is born, he puts on glasses of time, and now looks at the world through glasses that also contain time. Meaning, I arrange things according to the times they happened and things like that. I can also look at the past through these glasses, and then I’ll ask myself how old the world is, and I can answer myself: 14 billion years. True, before these glasses were created no one could use them, so there were no concepts of time and there was nothing to talk about. But after these glasses were created, my view of the past is already colored by time. So now I already look at the past in that way. So this happens after these glasses are created: I see the retroactive past differently. But that doesn’t mean there was time then; there wasn’t time then. Time was born with man. But after he was already born, I can look in terms of time even at what was before him. It’s inconceivable that I couldn’t ask when my grandfather was born. Forget the age of the world—let’s talk about me. If time is a form of my own perception personally, and if it belongs to the human being, then each person has his own time; your time doesn’t help me. When I ask when my grandfather was born, can’t I ask that because I was born and my time was born only when I was born? Of course I can. Through the glasses I received at birth, I now look at the past and ask myself how long before me my grandfather was born. Right? There’s no problem with that. What is this really saying? It is exactly an example of “from now on, retroactively.” “From now on, retroactively” means that there can be a situation where from now on I look at the past and see it differently—even the past. But not that the past itself really was different; rather, the perspective on the past is different. And if you remember, when I began this series about time, I said that time travel is basically something like this. Time travel really requires two time axes, and that basically means that at the same point in time I can have two different perspectives on that same point—just like with a condition. I said, right, that with a condition I might say: I divorce a woman on condition that she not drink wine. Now I ask myself: is the woman divorced? It depends—depends when you look. If you look after a week, then meanwhile she’s not divorced. If you look after three weeks, when she has already not drunk wine for two weeks, then already at that same time you looked at before, she really was divorced. So at that time was she divorced or not? It depends from where I’m looking at that point in time. I can look at that point in time either from being at that very point itself, or from a future point in time, and then I examine that point and it looks different to me. In other words, the value of the function depends on two values of the time axis—on t and on tau. We talked about there being two time axes, and therefore at one time point there can be several values depending on from which—

[Speaker C] And how is it that way with a vow? In a vow, the sage reveals that it was a mistake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—the claim is: no. The vow—he doesn’t reveal that it was a mistaken vow; he determines it. That’s also why without a sage it doesn’t help. Seemingly, why do you need a sage? If the vow was mistaken, then true, maybe only a sage can determine that, but in principle you don’t really need the sage. If it really was mistaken, then there is no vow. What difference does it make whether I went to a sage or not? So now, when I stated the vow, apparently I’m only in doubt, because if the sage looks and says there was a mistake there, then there was no vow, and if not, then not. But no—as long as the sage hasn’t looked, there isn’t even a doubt; it’s a vow. Meaning, the sage here has a constitutive role; he doesn’t just reveal. So that really means it’s not true that it simply turns out that it never was. Otherwise you wouldn’t need a sage; you would only need to know what the truth was. The sage could help me know what the truth was, but he wouldn’t determine it. But no—the sage determines. That is exactly the proof to the contrary. It means that the future event really determines what was in the past—determines, of course, with respect to how from now on we will look at the past. Okay?

[Speaker E] Can you say the same thing about annulment of betrothal? What? The same thing. Meaning, suppose a woman says: look, in retrospect I obviously want to be divorced, but don’t now determine for me that my whole life I was in, let’s call it, promiscuous relations—I don’t… Suppose they annulled the betrothal—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She can say whatever she wants; they decide. What do you mean, she says?

[Speaker E] No, because if we go according to this approach, maybe they

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] decide to annul the betrothal.

[Speaker E] If we go according to this approach, maybe they annul the betrothal from now on and that’s it, but everything that was until now remains as it was?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That has nothing to do with what the woman says. You’re just asking in general: whenever someone betroths, he does so subject to the rabbis’ consent, and when the rabbis annul the betrothal, is that “from now on, retroactively,” or merely revealing a fact retroactively? Right. Since the mechanism is a mechanism of condition—that’s at least how it’s generally understood, right? We betroth subject to the consent of the sages, and therefore if they agreed, then it takes effect, and if they did not agree, then the condition is voided. So really this is a mechanism of condition. So what you’re asking is not specific to annulment of betrothal; you’re asking generally about conditions. What does a condition do? We’ll talk about that in another moment, okay? Rabbi Shimon argues that there too it is “from now on, retroactively”; with conditions too it is “from now on, retroactively.” Yes.

[Speaker D] Also in the example you gave about the eruv that they place at two ends—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s selection by clarification; we’ll talk about that even later. We’re going to talk about condition and about clarification by later determination; that’s where I’m aiming all this conceptual preparation.

[Speaker D] But regarding the vow you mentioned: if someone violates the vow before he releases it, and after he releases it, is he entitled to compensation for the flogging he received?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Because at the time the religious court did it, they did it lawfully.

[Speaker D] Even though he wasn’t really liable, meaning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From a later perspective, when we look back there, he wasn’t liable. But the religious court did it based on how things looked at that time. So I mean, I impose compensation on them if they acted improperly—but they did act properly. Because at the time they did it, that was the correct answer. Now, so I return to what Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains: why is a vow really something that has a way to be permitted? Because he argues that even when I go to a sage and he releases the vow, it’s not that it became clear that there had never been a vow. The vow was forbidden, and now that prohibition was uprooted—but it was uprooted retroactively. But it happened; that is, the vow took effect and was uprooted—not that it became clear that it never existed. Rather, the vow took effect and was uprooted, uprooted retroactively but uprooted. Okay? And therefore it is called something that has a way to be permitted. There’s the practical difference. There are many more practical differences regarding something that has a way to be permitted, but this is one of them.

[Speaker D] If I have a double doubt regarding a vow, then am I obligated to release it? Do I have to go to a sage? Meaning, if I have a double doubt regarding a vow, then seemingly it’s a Torah-level double doubt and I can be lenient, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, and you’re saying: since it’s something that has a way to be permitted, then right—yes. Yes. So really… I’m trying to remember… I don’t remember if there’s doubt with a vow, double doubt—I don’t remember right now; abbreviated expressions of vows, there’s a topic of doubtful vows. Double doubt—I’d have to check. But simply speaking, yes, that’s what emerges from the Jerusalem Talmud. Not the Jerusalem Talmud; really this is also in the Babylonian Talmud. That a vow is something that has a way to be permitted—that’s also in the Babylonian Talmud. The Jerusalem Talmud only asks why it is something that has a way to be permitted. Anyway, why am I saying all this? Because this is already a fourth level. We had three levels; this is the fourth level. And on this fourth level, the future event doesn’t create information from then on; rather, it creates a backward-looking perspective on the past, a different perspective, and maybe it even creates this causally. Meaning, the future event causally brings about what happened in the past. That is already totally different from logical determinism, where I said that the backward causation is not causal—it’s only logical causation because we create—

[Speaker E] Legally, let’s call it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, legal information. Yes. Everything is legal. Okay. As I already said—I began this series by saying that it’s important to arrive at a coherent description or model of time travel, even if physically it isn’t possible, because on the legal level we talk about it, and if it isn’t consistent then even legally you can’t talk about it. Physically maybe it isn’t possible, maybe it is possible, but at least it has to be properly defined; otherwise you can’t talk about it even on the legal level. So here—you see, this is the legal-level discussion of the issue. Now what I want is really to show how this works in conditions. I don’t know, something here spilled over for me—

[Speaker E] Onto another page.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. There are more pages off to the side. There’s a continuation here. This spilled over for me. The Talmud—I’ll just introduce a bit. What I now want to do is really enter into the subject of condition and clarification by later determination, and after that, the relation between them. In light of the conceptual introduction I’ve given until now, we’ll try to understand how a condition works, how clarification by later determination works, and what the relation is between clarification by later determination and condition, because these are really two topics in which we talk about going backward in time. Okay? So, the concepts of conditions are learned from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven. The Talmud basically says that a person can stipulate that a legal effect he creates will depend on various conditions. But there are rules—how do we formulate these conditions? What are called the laws of conditions. The laws of conditions mean how exactly the condition has to be formulated. Most of the laws of conditions deal with the question of how to phrase the condition. So the best-known rule is that you need a double condition. You say: if you cross the Jordan and go out to war, then you’ll receive your inheritance; and if you do not cross, then you won’t receive your inheritance. That’s a double condition. Beyond that, the affirmative must come before the negative: first, if you cross, you’ll receive; if you do not cross, you won’t receive—and not the reverse. And also, the condition must come before the act. Meaning, you have to say: if you cross, you will receive the inheritance—not: you will receive the inheritance if you cross. Fine, none of this really matters; these are just various rules for how to formulate the condition correctly. But there are also substantive rules. For example, you can’t make a condition against what is written in the Torah. Say I say: I am a Nazirite on condition that it be permitted for me to become impure through the dead. Fine? There’s no such thing. A Nazirite is forbidden to become impure through the dead—you’re making a condition against what is written in the Torah. Or: behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations. In principle that is making a condition against what is written in the Torah, because a man owes his wife food, clothing, and marital relations. Now what happens if someone made a condition but didn’t do it according to the accepted rules? He didn’t put the condition before the act, or the affirmative before the negative, or he made a condition against what is written in the Torah. So the Talmud says: the condition is void, but the act stands. Meaning, if I say: I am a Nazirite on condition that it be permitted for me to become impure through the dead, then I am a Nazirite and it is forbidden for me to become impure through the dead. The condition is nullified—that it should be permitted for me to become impure through the dead—and the Naziriteship remains. Right? Or: behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations. Then the woman is betrothed to me—the act stands—but the condition is void. Meaning, my attempt to exempt myself from food, clothing, and marital relations doesn’t work; it is nullified. Okay? That is the rule. Tosafot asks about this: how can that be? Look at Tosafot beginning with “behold she is,” your third source. “Behold she is betrothed and his condition is void.” Tosafot asks—the truth is, just to complete the picture so no mistake comes out here—according to Jewish law, “behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations” does work. It is making a condition against what is written in the Torah, but here it is a monetary matter, and in monetary matters the condition stands. This is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, and the condition stands. But again, the condition stands only because it is a monetary matter. In principle, such a thing is called making a condition against what is written in the Torah. As for marital relations, the Rashba asks: that is seemingly not monetary. So he argues that yes it is, because it is the woman’s right to receive marital relations, and that right is like a financial right; she can waive it, and one can make a condition about it. Some authorities indeed omit marital relations. It’s a dispute among the medieval authorities. In any case, Tosafot asks as follows: “Behold she is betrothed and his condition is void.” Necessarily this is speaking where he doubled his condition. Yes, we’re talking about a case where he doubled the condition. He said to her: if you have no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations, then you are betrothed to me; and if you do have a claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations, then you are not betrothed to me. He says to her: if you have no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations, behold you are betrothed, and if not, do not be betrothed. Right? Why does he put the food, clothing, and marital relations before the betrothal? Because the condition has to come before the act, right? The condition is: on condition that you have no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations; and then the act is that you should be betrothed. Fine? So that is the formulation of the condition. Since it says later on that Rabbi Meir’s reason, that his condition is void, is because he makes a condition against what is written in the Torah—and if he had not doubled his condition, one could have concluded that according to Rabbi Meir his condition is void simply because a double condition is required, as stated there. Rabbi Meir is the one who says that you must formulate a double condition. And here Rabbi Meir invalidates this condition because it is making a condition against what is written in the Torah. Rabbi Meir holds that even in monetary matters the condition is void. So Rabbi Meir invalidates this condition because it is making a condition against what is written in the Torah. Tosafot says: then it is obvious that we are dealing here with a doubled condition. Because if he hadn’t doubled the condition, Rabbi Meir wouldn’t need to get to the point that it’s making a condition against what is written in the Torah; the condition would be void because it’s not a double condition. According to Rabbi Meir, you need a double condition, right? Therefore it’s obvious that this is a doubled condition. Now Tosafot says: if we’re dealing with a doubled condition, then this whole matter is not clear. “And it is astonishing—if so, why is she betrothed? He explicitly stipulated that if she has against him food, clothing, and marital relations, she is not betrothed.” The man says: I betroth the woman on condition that she has no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations. And if she does have a claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations, then she is not betrothed. That’s what I say. And what do they tell him? She is betrothed to you despite you, and you are also obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations. What do you mean? How can they dictate to me to marry a woman I do not want to betroth? I did not want to betroth her if I have to provide support. You can tell me that I can’t betroth her without being obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations, because that is making a condition against what is written in the Torah. The Torah is not willing to accept that. In legal language, yes, this is called a mandatory rule. Meaning, you can’t contract around it—like, for example, social benefits of workers: even with the worker’s agreement, the employer can’t deprive him of the social benefits. It’s mandatory. Meaning, the legislator doesn’t allow it. And here too, Jewish law does not allow one to make a condition against what is written in the Torah. So you cannot create betrothal without becoming obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations. But then, Tosafot says, what should have happened is not that the condition is void and the act stands. What should have happened is that the act is voided—there is no betrothal. Because you can’t have half a betrothal. But you can’t tell me that there is betrothal and I’m also obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations, because if I am obligated in food, clothing, and marital relations, then on that basis I didn’t want to betroth her at all. Why are you coercing me to betroth a woman I don’t want? I don’t want to betroth her. So how can the rule in the laws of conditions be that the condition is void but the act stands? That is Tosafot’s question. And that’s why he first emphasized that he doubled the condition, because he needs to show that the man expressed very clearly that if there is food, clothing, and marital relations, he doesn’t want her. So how can you force her on him against his will? Before I continue reading, look above at Rabbeinu Tam, which appears in the old Tosafot at the side of the page. It doesn’t appear inside Tosafot. And Rabbeinu Tam says: this is just speaking extravagantly, and this is not a real condition at all, such that the condition should be upheld according to the one who says that when someone makes a condition against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void. And it is like saying: on condition that you ascend to heaven, as in “the workers were hired by sweetness”—that is, Rabbeinu Tam argues that really the man probably didn’t intend to stipulate anything at all. He just meant to toy with her a little, or laugh at her, or I don’t know exactly what. Because clearly he didn’t intend to do something against the Torah, and it’s like “on condition that you ascend to heaven.” “Behold, you are betrothed to me on condition that you ascend to heaven.” Fine—if she didn’t ascend to heaven, then she isn’t betrothed? The Talmud says: no, she is betrothed. Why? Because he didn’t really mean for her to ascend to heaven; he understands that she can’t ascend to heaven. And a person doesn’t betroth for nothing. So what did he mean? Just not to betroth? Then why did he make this whole fuss? He apparently meant to betroth her, and just wanted to laugh at her a little, jerk her around a little, I don’t know exactly what. Okay, so Rabbeinu Tam says: making a condition against what is written in the Torah is really the same thing. Making a condition against what is written in the Torah is just speaking extravagantly. Because he too knows that you can’t do something against the Torah, so why did he say it? What, he didn’t mean to betroth her at all? Just like Tosafot asked. Rabbeinu Tam says: what do you mean he didn’t mean to betroth her? Then why did he do all this? Clearly he did mean to betroth her, and the condition is just empty talk. Therefore the condition is void but the act stands. That is Rabbeinu Tam’s answer. On that the Kovetz Shiurim asks in the next source: “And Rabbeinu Tam answered that this is like speaking extravagantly. But this is difficult, because with regard to ‘on condition that you eat pork,’ in tractate Gittin chapter 4, Abaye and Rava dispute whether this is like speaking extravagantly. And in chapter 4, I think—not chapter 4. Whether it is like speaking extravagantly. And the Talmud asks there: let us derive it from the fact that he is making a condition against what is written in the Torah.” There is a dispute between Abaye and Rava about someone who stipulates with a woman: on condition that you eat pork. Yes? I divorce you on condition that you eat pork. What happens there? Is that like speaking extravagantly, and therefore the condition is void… or is it not like speaking extravagantly? Fine, and then it would be a real condition, and if she doesn’t eat pork then she isn’t divorced. So the Talmud asks: let us derive it from the fact that he is making a condition against what is written in the Torah. Why do we need to get to the question whether this is empty talk or not? This is making a condition against what is written in the Torah—the condition is void and the act stands. What’s the problem? What do we see? That making a condition against what is written in the Torah and speaking extravagantly are two different reasons. Because otherwise, what are you saying? I said it’s like speaking extravagantly—the meaning is that it’s making a condition against what is written in the Torah. Rabbeinu Tam explained that when someone makes a condition against what is written in the Torah, why is the condition void? Because it’s like speaking extravagantly. It’s the same reason, not two reasons. So what does the Talmud there mean when it says: why are you saying it’s because he is speaking extravagantly? There’s a much simpler explanation: it’s making a condition against what is written in the Torah. But Rabbeinu Tam says that making a condition against what is written in the Torah is speaking extravagantly—it’s the same explanation. What do you mean, ‘simpler’? It’s the very same explanation. “Even if we were to say that it is not speaking extravagantly, nevertheless his condition is void because he makes a condition against what is written in the Torah. And it is clear that these are two separate matters, and this requires analysis.” It’s easy to explain, I think; I don’t think it’s difficult. There’s a question in the Talmud there—what does the Talmud answer? The Talmud may answer this very point, that speaking extravagantly is making a condition against what is written in the Torah. Fine, we’d have to see what the Talmud answers there. But beyond that, simply speaking, this is not making a condition against what is written in the Torah at all. To tell her that she should eat pork is not making a condition against what is written in the Torah. Making a condition against what is written in the Torah is when I want to create a legal effect in a way that goes against the Torah. I want to be a Nazirite but also become impure through the dead. There’s no such thing—the Torah said a Nazirite is forbidden to become impure through the dead. I want to betroth a woman without food, clothing, and marital relations. There’s no such thing—the Torah said that if you betroth her, you owe food, clothing, and marital relations. But I want to divorce a woman on condition that she eat pork. How is that making a condition against what is written in the Torah? If you don’t want to, then don’t eat pork and there won’t be a divorce. I’m not making partial divorce, divorce not according to how the Torah said. I’m stipulating that she commit a transgression. So what’s the problem? Am I forbidden to stipulate that? If she doesn’t want to, then let her not commit the transgression. Rather what? It is like speaking extravagantly. This kind of making a condition against what is written in the Torah—the type of “on condition that you eat pork”—that is making a condition—

[Speaker E] against what is written in the Torah in the sense that it’s simply speaking extravagantly. What’s the issue? It’s not really making a condition against what is written in the Torah. It’s just like speaking extravagantly, that’s all. Okay. Fine, but that doesn’t matter. I just want to say that Rabbeinu Tam’s answer—that it’s speaking extravagantly, comparing it to ascending to heaven—what, people don’t commit transgressions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but the assumption is yes—the assumption of the sages is that there’s no such thing; people don’t commit transgressions. It may be that if in fact a person said this to a woman for whom there is a reasonable chance she would eat pork, then maybe we really wouldn’t say he’s speaking extravagantly. But with an ordinary decent woman, you say such a thing to her—it’s obvious to you she won’t do it, so it’s like ascending to heaven: just empty talk. That would be a practical difference. If it’s making a condition against what is written in the Torah, then it doesn’t matter who the woman is. It’s making a condition against what is written in the Torah; the condition is void and the act stands. But if you say it’s like speaking extravagantly, then you have to examine the situation. If this really is a woman for whom there is a chance that she—

[Speaker C] would do it—then if there’s no

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] problem of making a condition against what is written in the Torah, and the whole issue is only empty talk, then here it may really be that it won’t be considered empty talk, and then it will be a full-fledged condition. So what is the problem of “speaking extravagantly” according to Rabbeinu Tam? That he doesn’t really intend to make the condition. Meaning, he intends to toy with her or laugh at her; he doesn’t intend to stipulate, he doesn’t seriously intend the condition; what he really intends is the act.

[Speaker C] Why doesn’t he intend it? What do you mean, why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it’s obvious to him that she won’t commit a transgression, or obvious to him that he can’t do this against the Torah—you can’t act against the Torah.

[Speaker C] Right, not in the pork story—in the story of food, clothing, and marital relations. Same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When he says, “I betroth you on condition that you have no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital relations,” well, you know the Torah doesn’t allow that. Betrothal entails food, clothing, and marital relations. So why did you say it? You didn’t mean it seriously. It’s like saying “ascend to heaven.” It’s impossible, exactly like—

[Speaker C] ascending to heaven is impossible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then why did you say all this?

[Speaker C] If he makes it a condition, then it is possible. No, it’s not possible—it’s making a condition against what is written in the Torah. Maybe he thought that if I make it a condition then it will be possible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but it’s making a condition against what is written in the Torah; the Torah just doesn’t allow such a thing. Was he mistaken? As if he didn’t know that the Torah doesn’t allow such a thing? Let him check. The assumption is that we’re not talking about ignoramuses; before he performs a legal act, he checks with Torah scholars and knows what he can and cannot do.

[Speaker C] The Torah speaks about ordinary betrothal, where in ordinary betrothal you owe food, clothing, and marital relations. But the Torah doesn’t speak about someone who makes a condition. Someone who makes a condition—then it’s not making a condition against what is written in the Torah at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re not asking: so what if it’s making a condition against what is written in the Torah? You’re saying: it’s not making a condition against what is written in the Torah at all, because the Torah didn’t forbid that. But the Talmud assumes that it is. The Talmud assumes that even if you stipulate—

[Speaker C] we don’t allow it—it’s mandatory,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] meaning, why not at all? Why really not? Because the Talmud understands that when the Torah said that you owe food, clothing, and marital relations, the Torah said: I am not willing for there to be betrothal without this. Even if you make stipulations—I’m not willing. It’s not a default rule that if you said nothing, then that’s the betrothal and you owe food, clothing, and marital relations, but if you stipulated, then fine. It’s not like stipulating that an unpaid bailee should have the liabilities of a paid bailee or something like that. Here it’s not like that. The Torah defined the act of betrothal, and the act of betrothal entails food, clothing, and marital relations. If you don’t want that, then it isn’t betrothal. It’s some other invention—do whatever you want—but betrothal it isn’t. That’s how the Talmud understands it, okay? Otherwise it wouldn’t belong to the whole topic of making a condition against what is written in the Torah at all. Now, assuming that is how we understand it, and the person who checked knows that this is the situation, then what did he stipulate? He was just speaking extravagantly.

[Speaker E] But at the very least you have a doubt here, meaning… suppose we say it’s speaking extravagantly—wait, but what? Don’t you have a doubt? After all, there’s a question here whether he intended it or didn’t intend it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not it. He’s just exaggerating for effect; he didn’t mean it. Why? Why is there no doubt? That’s his assessment. Maybe he did mean it? My assessment is that he didn’t. If he brings two witnesses who prove to me that he really did mean it, then so be it. Then so be it that it really isn’t just exaggeration. And then indeed the act might be voided. The act would be voided—not that it would remain valid without the condition, with the condition. That can’t be, because he is stipulating against what is written in the Torah. So then we would choose among them—after all, in the end there are three options. If I said, “You are betrothed to me on condition that you have no claim on me for food, clothing, and conjugal rights,” there are three options. One option is: “You are betrothed to me and I am also obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights.” A second option is: “You are betrothed to me and I am not obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights.” A third option is: “You are not betrothed to me at all.” Right? Now they tell me, listen, the second option is out of the question; it goes against the Torah. The Torah said that betrothal includes food, clothing, and conjugal rights. The whole question is: since that option is impossible, what do I choose instead? So the Talmud says I choose the third: she is betrothed, and I am obligated to her for food, clothing, and conjugal rights. Tosafot asks: why not the first? Because how can you want to obligate me that she be betrothed to me when I didn’t want that? Okay? That’s what Tosafot asks. So Rabbeinu Tam says: because he didn’t mean it seriously. But really, according to Rabbeinu Tam, if it became clear that he did mean it seriously—he said it before two witnesses, and it was clear that he didn’t know that the Torah forbids it, or it doesn’t matter, he meant it seriously—then what would the result be? Not the second, of course, because the second is impossible; it goes against the Torah. The first. Right? There would be no betrothal, because in truth he did not intend to betroth her on that basis, and since otherwise it cannot be done, there is no betrothal. But assuming this is a normal person, then he’s just exaggerating for effect, and then the condition is void and the act stands—that’s the third option. Okay? That is according to Rabbeinu Tam.

But as Kovetz Shiurim objects to him—and never mind, many do not accept Rabbeinu Tam’s view—then the question remains: fine, so why indeed is the condition void while the act remains valid? Let’s go back to Tosafot. Tosafot says: “And the Ri says”—I’m skipping a bit because it’s only a side note not important for our purposes—“that if we had not derived it from the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuben, I would have thought that no condition can ever void an act, and even if the condition is not ultimately fulfilled, the act still stands. But now that we derive from there that a condition can be effective to void an act, we say that this is specifically when one is not stipulating against what is written in the Torah, similar to the descendants of Gad and Reuben, who did not stipulate against what is written in the Torah.” What does he mean to say? He means this—and this is how the later authorities explain it. The whole mechanism of a condition is a novelty introduced by the Torah. Had we not learned it from the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuben, there would have been no possibility of making conditions in Torah law. Okay? Since the whole mechanism of a condition is learned from the descendants of Gad and Reuben, then you have to formulate the condition the way it was there with the descendants of Gad and Reuben. What was there? The condition precedes the act, the positive precedes the negative, that one may not stipulate against what is written in the Torah, all those rules. By the way, not everyone agrees that the rule that you may not stipulate against what is written in the Torah is learned from the descendants of Gad and Reuben; Tosafot claims it is. Some say it’s a general principle; it has nothing to do with the descendants of Gad and Reuben. But Tosafot understands that we learn it from the descendants of Gad and Reuben—or the Ri understands that—and therefore you cannot make a condition in a way that was not learned from the descendants of Gad and Reuben.

On the face of it, that explains nothing. So what are you saying? That I can’t make the condition, and therefore what? The act will be voided? I don’t want her to be my wife if I’m obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights—so what did you answer? Tosafot didn’t answer anything. What did he answer? Fine, I understand that you can’t make such a condition because we learn from the descendants of Gad and Reuben that only that is how conditions work, and without that it isn’t a condition. Okay. But still, in terms of my intent, I did not mean for her to be my wife if I am obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights. So how can you force her on me as my wife?

So what he meant to say is this—and this is how the later authorities explain it. Essentially, there is a problem with a condition because when I effect a legal status, I’m supposed to effect it fully. There is no such thing as a legal status that on this side yes and on that side no. Either you betroth her or you do not betroth her. That’s what can be done. The Torah introduced a novelty: that if you operate according to the mechanism of conditions—let me say more than that. Some later authorities add this in, although I’m not entirely sure I agree, but some later authorities add that this is also a case of speech coming and nullifying an act. You perform an act of betrothal, and you want by means of speech—the speech of the condition—to nullify it. There is no such thing; without the Torah’s novelty, it cannot nullify it. So what do they tell you? Look, if you did it according to the Torah’s rules, then the Torah introduces the novelty that yes, such speech is strong enough and can uproot the act. But of course that is only if you did it according to the Torah’s rules: the condition precedes the act, the positive precedes the negative, not stipulating against what is written in the Torah, and so on.

Then they basically tell the person this: look, you want to make a condition, right? That’s your goal. Now, halakhically, only one channel is open to you. The channel that says: you perform the act in any case, whether there was a condition, whether the condition is fulfilled, whether it is not fulfilled; it’s just that you stipulate a condition, and that condition creates a situation in which the speech uproots the act if the condition is not fulfilled. Not that the act never happened—it is not retroactive clarification; here we are emphasizing what I said earlier. It is not retroactive clarification. Rather, the act will be uprooted. You perform the act in any case, whether you will be obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights or whether you will not be obligated, but you make a condition, and the power of the condition—if you made it properly according to the rules—is that such speech can uproot the act. Because the act here is a condition of “from now.” I betroth the woman from now on, on condition that something happen, say, within two weeks. If that something does not happen within two weeks, then the divorce that I did now will be uprooted. How can it be uprooted? Doesn’t speech not come and nullify an act? The Torah introduced a novelty: if you formulate the speech according to the rules of the descendants of Gad and Reuben, that speech will have the power to uproot an act.

So now the person says to himself: basically, I don’t want this woman if I will owe food, clothing, and conjugal rights, right? Only if there won’t be food, clothing, and conjugal rights do I want to marry her. It is clear that this is his intention. But there are halakhic constraints—how do you carry this out in practice? How can you succeed in making it so that she will be your wife if yes, and not your wife if no? There is only one way to do it: you betroth her in any case, whether there is food, clothing, and conjugal rights or not, and you utter speech that creates a mechanism such that if the condition is not fulfilled, the act will be uprooted—the betrothal will be uprooted, okay? Only that way can it be done; it simply cannot be done otherwise. So I did it that way. In effect, I betrothed her in any case and built a condition that would uproot it, and I built that condition incorrectly because I did not do it according to the rules of the descendants of Gad and Reuben. So what am I left with? I’m left with the fact that the woman is betrothed to me in any case, and what was supposed to uproot the betrothal—because I would be obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights—does not work, because that is speech that does not receive the force of the descendants of Gad and Reuben; I didn’t formulate it according to the rules of the descendants of Gad and Reuben. So such speech cannot uproot an act.

So even though, if you ask me what my goal really was, I did not want to betroth the woman if I would be obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights, but I consciously chose the halakhic mechanism of a condition, and that mechanism works only this way; it cannot work otherwise: namely, that I impose the legal status in any case, and only if the condition is not fulfilled is it uprooted. So if I chose that mechanism, then I imposed the legal status in any case, and I did not build the uprooting mechanism correctly—so what can be done? There is no uprooting mechanism. So I got stuck with this woman; if you want, divorce her. But this woman is my wife even though I owe her food, clothing, and conjugal rights. That is how the Ri explains it.

And then it comes out, according to the Ri, that the mechanism of a condition is really a mechanism that does not retroactively clarify. After all, the question was based on the conception of a condition—and here I come to your question—the conception of a condition as retroactive clarification. Then Tosafot really asks: I don’t understand. If it is retroactive clarification that I never wanted to betroth the woman in the first place, then how do you decide that this woman is betrothed to me and that I owe her food, clothing, and conjugal rights? After all, if I owe her, then I did not want to betroth her. Tosafot says: no. A condition is not retroactive clarification; a condition is causal generation backward in time. It is causal generation backward in time. Meaning, if the condition is not fulfilled, it uproots the act that you performed. It does not reveal that it was never done; it uproots it, and that is from now on retroactively. Meaning, the act was done, and if the condition is not fulfilled, then it will be uprooted. It will be uprooted; it is not that it turns out that it was never done. Okay? So if so, in a place where I did not properly build the uprooting mechanism—I did not do it according to the rules of the descendants of Gad and Reuben—then the legal status takes effect and the uprooting mechanism does not exist, and I am left stuck with the woman.

But for our purposes we have learned that the mechanism of a condition works, at least according to the Ri—and this is probably a dispute between the Ri and Rabbeinu Tam—because Rabbeinu Tam says no. Rabbeinu Tam says that really the solution should have been that there is no betrothal, were it not for the fact that he was only exaggerating for effect. But the Ri says, what do you mean? Not because of exaggeration for effect. He gets stuck with her even when he owes her food, clothing, and conjugal rights. The dispute between them is about how to understand the mechanism of a condition. Rabbeinu Tam says that the mechanism of a condition is retroactive clarification, and the Ri says that the mechanism of a condition is from now on, retroactively. Okay.

Now this has—we won’t have time to get to this. Maybe I’ll do it in the next lecture. Or maybe we’ll keep the pages, put them here somewhere. Next lecture we’ll continue with this, and then we’ll also come to the problem.

[Speaker E] Can we put it up top, this thing here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We can put it here too, no? We just have to remember that it’s here. We’ll try to remember. That concludes Rabbi Machpud’s lecture.

[Speaker B] That concludes Rabbi Michael Abraham’s lecture, Thursday, the twenty-eighth of Tevet, 5777, January twenty-sixth, two thousand seventeen.