Innovation, Conservatism, and Tradition – Lesson 15

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because it’s not moral, it doesn’t fit the norms accepted in the world today, or whatever it may be. Okay. But you still need an argument that shows why that Jewish law is nullified. We spoke a bit about “it just doesn’t fit” considerations on the margins; maybe they have some kind of place, but basically you need a conservative interpretive framework in order to change Jewish law. Without that, this is what’s called a Reform claim, okay? Now, that means that on the one hand, his motivation is a motivation I very much identify with—not his specifically, I’m not discussing him—but I strongly identify with that motivation. The motivation is not Reform. What is Reform is treating the motivation as a sufficient reason for change. Meaning, once I have a motivation, that’s enough to make the change. That’s Reform. Because if I take that motivation and then go look for a conservative interpretive framework, then I really will make the change. The motivation is only what causes me to look for the conservative interpretive framework. But the motivation in itself is not an instrument that is sufficient, nor a sufficient basis, to make that change.

I’ll make one more comment in this context. In this case of a convert, the motivation is even stronger than just an ordinary moral motivation. You could say: a moral motivation—today the world believes in equality, and I too, as part of it, believe in equality, and I have a moral motivation to equalize the status of a convert with the status of a Jew. Here it’s much stronger, because the Torah itself tells us to equalize the status of a convert with the status of a Jew. This isn’t just some moral principle drawn from the surrounding culture, from the contemporary environment in which we operate—which again, I do not dismiss at all; I already spoke about that. But here it’s much stronger still: this is a motivation taken from within the Torah itself, not an external motivation. The Torah itself says to equate the convert with a Jew. On the other hand, the Torah also says that he is permitted to marry a mamzeret, prohibited to a kohen, and prohibited from being appointed to positions of authority. The Torah says that too. So the fact that the Torah says to equate a convert with a Jew—even though that is an internal Torah motivation—is still not enough to carry out this change. At most, it serves as motivation to look for a conservative interpretive framework that will let me make the change. If I find one, I’ve found one; and if I don’t find one, then no—I can’t make the change despite the motivation.

Now I’ll try to show you, after I go a little into the sources so you can see what this is about, I’ll try to show you a conservative interpretive framework, as an example, that I proposed in order to change the status of a convert, and essentially to say that today the prohibitions against appointing him, and maybe even the marriage prohibitions concerning a convert, no longer exist. And not only am I proposing a conservative interpretive framework, I also bring evidence for it. I said in the summary that if I have a conservative interpretive framework that fits my reasoning, I’ll act on it even without proofs. But here this framework is even stronger—I can actually bring proofs for it. So that’s very nice.

But here’s an anecdote that illustrates the need for our whole discussion. I once sent this article to Tehumin, many years ago. And after they sat over it for a long time and I didn’t get an answer, I called them to ask what was going on. So they told me: Look, the editorial board can’t publish this article. I asked, why not? You don’t agree? They said no, not because of objections to your arguments, but because you’re raising a question, surfacing a question that could lead to all kinds of criticism and attacks on Jewish law and desecration of God’s name and things like that, because you’re basically putting on the table the discrimination Jewish law makes against converts. So I said to them: and then of course everyone will latch onto that, won’t read the answer, and will say—see, what an outdated view, an immoral view that discriminates against converts as compared to a Jew, a racist view if you want—and there will be all sorts of criticism.

So I told them that in my opinion, even if I’m willing to hear that kind of consideration, I think they were mistaken tactically. Beyond the principled argument—because I think everything should be put on the table—but even if not, even tactically you’re mistaken. Why? Because when I raise the question, the answer comes attached to it. I also explain why Jewish law is not in fact discriminating against converts, and therefore why today it can already be changed. Never mind—I’ll explain soon what I mean, but right now I’m talking only about the schema. If we don’t publish the article, then in our world, with the internet and openness and open information databases, someone will discover this pretty quickly—the discrimination between Jews and converts—and the question will come up, and then there won’t be an accessible published answer to it. So will the situation be better? The criticism will arise and there will be no way to defend against it.

It makes much more sense, even tactically, to put things honestly on the table, to discuss the criticism, to present the criticism too, because after all I also share that criticism. When you don’t equalize, when you discriminate between a Jew and a convert, that really is not okay. That’s not an anti-Semitic claim; it’s a claim that a Jew should also feel a problem with. And together with that, I write—or propose—along with the question or the criticism, I offer the explanation that resolves the matter. So in my view it makes much more sense to do that, certainly in the internet age, when in the end it’s all going to come out anyway. So to raise the question honestly and put the answer beside it makes much more sense than to hide the question and rely on the hope that no one will discover the problematic nature of the matter—quite apart from the dishonesty involved, of course, and so on, which I also don’t agree with. But even tactically it seems to me this doesn’t work. They weren’t convinced; the article wasn’t published. In the end, by the way, it was published in Asif, the journal of the hesder yeshivot, in issue 1, when they asked me for an article, so I dumped this already-ready article on them. Anyway, that’s the framework of the discussion.

[Speaker C] I’m only trying to show that the form

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of this kind of thinking really is a form of thinking that can look dangerous to people. Because I was actually pleasantly surprised by Tehumin’s response, since I expected them to object to my arguments. Because my arguments are basically arguments of interpretive conservatism: I’m changing Jewish law because of one interpretive move or another; a Torah-level Jewish law accepted by all the halakhic decisors, and I say today it is—. That’s not a Reform argument. Interpretive conservatism is conservatism. In that sense, they actually did take what we might call a progressive approach. Because I assume that if I had sent this to most other platforms, they would have thrown it out immediately, not because of fears that there might be criticism, but because they wouldn’t have accepted this kind of thinking at all. Like with Meiri—that the gentiles of old, all the laws were said about the gentiles of old, not the gentiles of today. After all, that’s also what I’m saying. All these laws were said about the converts of old, not the converts of today. Again, I’ll explain this later, but that’s really a Reform move. And specifically in that sense Tehumin didn’t reject it on the grounds that it was Reform; they rejected it because of their fears of criticism. Again, I didn’t like it, I didn’t agree with it, neither substantively nor tactically. But still, let’s say the lectures I gave up till now—they didn’t need them. Meaning, the lecture I just gave, trying to explain why such a move is not Reform but conservative, just interpretively conservative—that’s a move you’d need to explain to an editorial board that was rejecting the article as a Reform article. There I would have had to explain to them: no, no, this is interpretively conservative, not Reform. But Tehumin rejected it because of a tactical problem, not because they had any principled problem with the argument. In that sense, I actually say this to the credit of that editorial board, the Tehumin editorial board.

All right, so let’s begin. I’ll bring an example. About the Passover offering it says this: “And when a convert sojourns with you and would make the Passover offering to the Lord, let every male of his be circumcised, and then let him come near and perform it, and he shall be like a native of the land; but no uncircumcised person shall eat of it. One Torah shall there be for the native and for the convert who sojourns among you.” What is a native as opposed to a convert who sojourns among you? Now the Torah is basically saying that a convert also observes Passover, exactly like a Jew by birth. In that sense, the Torah is actually equating the convert with a Jew. But notice the way it does that. The way the Torah equates the convert with a Jew is troubling. Because for the ordinary Jew it uses the term “native,” and the convert is someone who is not a native. But the verse says: no matter, a convert too must be equated with the native regarding the Passover offering. So he’s not really a native; he’s a second-class Jew, let’s call it that, but as far as the Passover offering goes you have to equate him. So from these verses you can understand both sides, both sides of the tension here. On the one hand, there is some kind of different treatment of convert and Jew, and on the other hand there is still some desire to equalize them so there won’t be discrimination. So that’s exactly the two sides of the equation.

And in the Mekhilta of Rabbi Ishmael on this verse it says: “One Torah shall there be for the native”—why is this said? Has it not already said “and he shall be like a native of the land”? So what does “one Torah shall there be for the native” teach? Since it says “and when a convert sojourns with you and makes the Passover offering,” I only know of Passover, where the convert is made equal to the native. From where do I know this for all the other commandments in the Torah? The verse teaches: “One Torah shall there be for the native and for the convert.” Scripture comes and equates the convert to the native in all the commandments of the Torah. So here the Sages are already taking the Torah’s move of equating native and convert and applying it to all of Jewish law, not just the Passover offering. So that pushes things even more in the egalitarian direction. But something remains in the background. The convert is not a native. Convert and native are two different things. A native is only a Jew by birth. Except that the Torah and Jewish law say: yes, but the treatment you give must be given to the convert just as to the native. So there is still some dimension here… I would have expected that after the convert has converted he would be considered a native, end of story. He is a Jew in every respect, like a newborn child. Why do we need to include the convert as one who is like a native? What, the convert is not a native? He too is a native; he’s a Jew. Again, not citizenship in the political sense meant today; “native” here means a Jew, a member of this people. Okay? So there is still some view of him as a different caste, but we equalize him on the halakhic planes.

That’s what Maimonides says in the Laws of Forbidden Relations: all gentiles, when they convert and accept upon themselves all the commandments of the Torah, and slaves when they are freed, are like Israelites in every respect, as it says, “The congregation—one statute shall there be for you,” and they are permitted to enter the congregation of the Lord, to marry Jewish men and women, immediately. Provided that the convert or the freed slave marries a daughter of Israel, and an Israelite man marries a female convert or a freed woman. Okay, so basically they are permitted to marry; they are like Israelites in every respect. And here Maimonides doesn’t even write the expression “native” as opposed to “convert.” It somehow appears that there is no distinction—they are fully equalized. Also in other places in the Torah, when the Torah says “speak to the children of Israel” or uses the term “children of Israel,” there is a special inclusion of converts in quite a few places. Okay? So true, on the one hand converts are included like the children of Israel, but on the other hand converts are not seen as an integral part of the term “children of Israel.” So again there is that tension: in practice, in the end, they really are equalized, but there is still no identity. They are not the children of Israel; they are not natives. In some places—but again, halakhically they are equal to a Jew in every respect, as Maimonides says, as the Talmud says.

There are certain opinions in the Talmud that speak about differences of wording that a convert says—for example regarding the declaration over first-fruits, in prayer, in Grace after Meals, in the invitation to Grace after Meals, in all places where the wording refers to “our fathers.” A convert can’t talk about his fathers, because his fathers were not Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; they were not Jews. So there are opinions in the Talmud that there he cannot say the regular wording that a Jew says. But there it is not discrimination; it’s just that he cannot say “our God and God of our fathers” because those are not his fathers. He is like a newborn child, but he does not have Jewish fathers. So there it’s not discrimination but only telling the truth, so that the wording he says will indeed be true wording. By the way, in Jewish law we in fact do not rule that way; in practice the convert says these formulations in all those contexts, the same wording a Jew says. But there is an opinion in the Talmud—opinions in the Talmud—that say no. Okay? And I’m saying that it doesn’t really matter, because even the opinions that say no are not because of discrimination, but because the claim is that he wouldn’t be saying something true. The opinions that say yes claim that it is true and he should say it—never mind, they interpret it in the appropriate way.

But up to this point the picture is relatively reasonable. True, the convert is not considered among the children of Israel and is not considered a native, but in practice he is equalized with the children of Israel and with natives in every respect throughout Jewish law. But as I mentioned in the introduction, this is not entirely precise. There are three main exceptions, as I said earlier. One exception is the prohibition on appointment—that a convert cannot be appointed to authority, and that remains even as practical Jewish law. The second prohibition is that a convert, male or female, cannot marry a kohen. And the third exception is the permission regarding a mamzer: a female convert may marry a mamzer and a male convert may marry a mamzeret. So in that sense these three things are mainly the differences that remain, even in the final analysis, even in practical Jewish law, between a convert and a Jew. And therefore I want to focus on those three contexts, because they are what really raise the main problem.

So Maimonides, in the Laws of Forbidden Relations, writes: a mamzer is permitted to marry a female convert, and likewise a mamzeret is permitted to a convert, and the children from both are mamzerim. Meaning, they may marry, but the child is considered a mamzer. Because the offspring follows the blemished one, as it says, “in the congregation of the Lord,” and the congregation of converts is not called a congregation. Okay? So that means that the congregation of converts is not called a congregation, even in Jewish law. A convert is not part of the congregation. And here this is no longer merely some conceptual difference with no practical significance; here there is practical significance. And the child also comes out a mamzer, the child of both of them.

And of course it continues: a female convert… a female convert who married a convert and gave birth to a son, even though his conception and birth were in holiness, he is still permitted to a mamzeret. And so too his grandson and great-grandson, until the name of his conversion becomes absorbed and it is no longer known that he is from converts. After that he becomes prohibited to a mamzeret. And both converts and freed slaves have the same law in all these matters. So basically this racism continues into the children; it doesn’t stop with the convert himself. Also his children and his children’s children all have the status of converts until the name of his conversion becomes absorbed. Until we lose track of the fact that the person before us is descended from converts. That itself is a strange criterion—what does it mean to lose track? If we lose track, then there are laws of doubt; we should keep records so that we know not to stumble into a prohibition. It sounds as though we’re also not keeping records, and we’re kind of helping this accounting to become blurred. Okay. The question is: how does that work? Why is that so? What is the meaning of this law? The truth is that there is a dispute on this matter, a dispute among the Tannaim, whether it is until ten generations or forever, but the dispute is not substantive, because the question is simply when the name of conversion becomes absorbed—after ten generations, or eventually, or forever. Okay, so the dispute doesn’t matter for our purposes. But here you really see that a mamzer is permitted—that is, a convert is permitted to a mamzeret, or a mamzeret to a convert.

That’s one difference. The second difference, we said, is regarding a kohen. And likewise, if a kohen has relations with a female convert or a freed woman, he profanes her—and his offspring from her are disqualified priests. A kohen is basically prohibited from marrying a female convert or having relations with her. So that’s also the matter of the kohen.

And regarding appointment, this is Maimonides in the Laws of Kings: one does not appoint as king someone from the congregation of converts, even after several generations, until his mother is from Israel, as it says: “You may not place over yourself a foreign man who is not your brother.” You see? “A foreign man who is not your brother”—this is speaking of a convert who converted, a righteous convert who accepted the commandments, a righteous person whom it is forbidden to discriminate against. He is called “a foreign man,” and one does not place him as king, and he is “not your brother.” And not only for kingship, says Maimonides, but for all positions of authority in Israel. Not only a military minister—he may not be an officer in the army. Not an officer over fifty or over ten, not even an official over the water channel who distributes water to the fields. Needless to say, not a judge or nasi, who can be only from Israel, as it says: “From among your brothers shall you place a king over yourself”—all appointments that you make shall be only from among your brothers. So the convert is not “from among your brothers”; he is “a foreign man.” And therefore it is forbidden to give him any authority over Israelites in any field whatsoever. All positions of authority in Israel. The official over the water channel is what we mentioned—the one distributing water, a commander in the army, anything, a municipal official, an official who has some authority, not a clerk who just records things. Anyone who has authority over Jews—it is forbidden to appoint a convert so that he will have authority over Jews. This whole business is really surprising and outrageous.

Now, as I said before, this disqualification of the distributors of water is puzzling in itself, beyond the moral and human problem. Where do we ever find a person being disqualified from serving as a water distributor? What does Jewish law have to say about who should be a squad commander in the army or an officer in the army? A squad commander too is forbidden—anyone who has authority over soldiers. What does Jewish law have to say about who should be the squad commander? Maybe only kohanim should be squad commanders? What? Jewish law has nothing to say about these kinds of jobs. This is what I called before monkey business. If you have an excellent squad commander who is a gentile, you wouldn’t appoint him as squad commander? Why not? If he’s good, he’s good—what’s the problem? The consideration should be the role itself, not the person himself. It’s not like a witness, a judge, maybe even a king and nasi—those are roles that Jewish law defines, and in Jewish law we find many disqualifications, yes? A wicked person can’t be a witness, a relative can’t be a witness, all kinds of things, a gentile can’t be a witness, a woman can’t be a witness. So for those roles we really do find in Jewish law that it sees them as roles for which certain people are indeed disqualified. But for water distribution you won’t find any disqualification except a convert. So where did this disqualification come from? Why, how did this happen?

And here again, the problem is not only moral—that we discriminate against a convert compared to a Jew—but there is also some interpretive problem here. It isn’t clear from simple reasoning. Where did this disqualification of converts from positions of authority come from?

In the Talmud, in the Mishnah in Kiddushin, it says this: anyone whose ancestors were established as officers over the public or charity collectors—yes, officers or charity collectors, meaning people who have authority—one may marry their daughters into the priesthood. Meaning, if there is a woman whose father was a charity collector, we do not suspect that she is the daughter of converts, and we marry her to a kohen and need not investigate her lineage further. Seemingly, how would we explain why not? Because if he were a convert, you couldn’t have appointed him as a charity collector, right? So if he was appointed as a charity collector, apparently he’s not a convert, no problem, everything is fine, one may marry this daughter to a kohen.

But the Talmud explains it differently, apparently. The Talmud explains there as follows: and charity collectors—one marries into the priesthood from them? What is the reason? Since they get into quarrels with people—for the master said that one may compel collection for charity, even on the eve of the Sabbath—and if it were so, that would become known. What does that mean? That every charity collector or public officer always stirs up trouble; people are always fighting with them. They try to impose some authority on me, to give me instructions; usually people will quarrel with them. Now if they were from a family of converts, if they were children of converts, then whoever quarreled with them would mock him: okay, you’re the son of converts, what kind of nobody are you, or something like that. Therefore specifically regarding public officers and charity collectors, if we did not hear that people quarreled with them and called them children of converts, then apparently they are not children of converts, and therefore his daughter may marry a kohen without investigation.

But notice—this is a somewhat fine distinction, but it is a completely different explanation from what I said before. Because I would explain it entirely differently: what does that have to do with quarrels? If he was appointed charity collector, then he’s not a convert. Why? Because it is forbidden to appoint a convert as a charity collector. What does all this have to do with quarrels and reminding him and so on? Simply because it is forbidden to appoint him. And indeed some later authorities—the Or La-Yaakov, the glosses of Maharsha, and so on—they wrote that one should not appoint a convert as a charity collector, and they mention this Talmudic passage. But the straightforward meaning of this passage says the opposite. The straightforward meaning of this passage says the reverse: that it is permitted to appoint a convert as a charity collector. So why don’t you suspect his daughter of being from converts and therefore not marry her to a kohen? Because I know that if he’s a charity collector, lots of people have surely quarreled with him already, and I would have heard if he was from converts, because when people quarrel with him they would immediately pull that card—yeah, you’re the son of converts. And if I didn’t hear that, then apparently he isn’t from converts. But the fact that he was appointed charity collector is not the consideration that tells me he isn’t a convert. Meaning, we see that in the Talmud there is no obstacle to a convert being a charity collector; only that if he were a convert, we’d hear about it. That’s all. But the appointment itself does not prove he isn’t a convert. So from this passage it is actually proven that there is no problem appointing a convert as charity collector. Yet some halakhic decisors write that there is a prohibition.

See further there in Kiddushin, the Talmud brings the following story: the host of Rav Ada bar Ahava was a convert. There is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether he was descended from converts or was himself a convert; it doesn’t matter. And he was quarreling with Rav Beivai. One said, I will exercise authority over the town, and the other said, I will exercise authority over the town. Each wanted to get the position of authority there in that place, in the town. They came before Rav Yosef. They came to Rav Yosef to decide to whom the position should be given. He said to them: we learned in a baraita, “you shall surely place over yourself a king from among your brothers”—all appointments that you make shall be only from among your brothers. Meaning, you, the host of Rav Ada bar Ahava, you are a convert, so you cannot be in authority over Israelites. That is the source for Maimonides’ law.

Rav Ada bar Ahava said to him—he came to defend his host: even if his mother is from Israel? Meaning, if his mother is from Israel, then in what sense is he a convert? After all, he is a Jew if his mother is from Israel. Because his father is a convert. His father is a convert and his mother is from Israel, so the child is descended from converts. Does even someone whose mother is from Israel have the status of one descended from converts, such that he may not be appointed to positions? He said to him: if his mother is from Israel, “from among your brothers” applies to him. No, if his mother is from Israel, that’s okay. Therefore: Rav Beivai, who is a great man, should look after heavenly matters, and the other one should look after the town’s matters. Fine, never mind, they found some compromise and gave each one some role.

This is very strange, because the rule in laws of lineage is that if there is a transgression, then the child follows the blemished one. Say, what is the child’s lineage? If there is a transgression—for example, a kohen who married a divorcee, there is a transgression there, okay? So if there is a transgression, you follow the blemished one. If there is no transgression, then you follow the father, the male line. Now when a convert marries a Jewish woman, is there a transgression? No. If there were a transgression, then the son would follow the blemished one, which is the convert, and the son too would be a convert. But here there is no transgression, right? So if there is no transgression, then he should follow the male. In this case the father is a convert, so the son too should be a convert. What happens with the son of a female convert and a Jewish man? They are allowed to marry, so there is no transgression here. So you don’t follow the blemished one but the male. So the son should not be a convert but a Jew; he receives the lineage of his father and not of his mother, right? So not only if his mother is from Israel, because if his mother is from Israel, then on the contrary he should still be a convert. After all, there the host’s mother was from Israel. His mother from Israel and his father a convert—what should his status have been? Like the father, right? A convert. So why is it permitted to appoint him if his mother is from Israel? He is considered a convert in terms of his lineage. Only if his father were from Israel and his mother a female convert could you say that the son has the status of a Jew and can therefore be appointed. But if his mother is from Israel, that doesn’t fit the ordinary halakhic rules of lineage.

What I want to argue—I’m moving a bit ahead now because I don’t have time to elaborate too much—is… maybe one more sentence later in the passage, which is important for our purposes. Rabbi Zeira appointed them; Rabbah bar Avuha appointed them. In the West, in the Land of Israel, they would not even appoint them as supervisors over measuring vessels; in Nehardea, even as head of the water channels they would not appoint them. Meaning, Rabbi Zeira and Rabbah bar Avuha would appoint converts to positions, to authority. In the West, in the Land of Israel, they would not appoint converts even as the officials over measuring tools, the market inspectors. In Nehardea, in Babylonia, not even as the head of the water channels, the water distributor. That is the source for Maimonides, and that is how Maimonides rules. But we see here that it depended on custom. What do you mean it depended on custom? If it’s the law, then it’s the law. What, does someone here disagree with the law? Let him bring a source. It isn’t presented as a dispute. It somehow looks like in one place they had this practice and in another place they did not. Yes, each place according to its custom. Is it a custom? Then it’s not law? What is going on here?

In short, there are lots of mysteries here, and I would like, with your permission, to be one who knows mysteries. And I want to argue that the disqualification of a convert is a functional disqualification, not a lineage disqualification. What does that mean? We saw in the Talmud that if people quarrel with someone and that someone is a convert, they remind him: ah yes, you’re descended from converts, you’re from an inferior status. Meaning, the accepted attitude in the Jewish people, to our shame, toward converts was a bad attitude. They mocked them, they were of low status, people reminded them of their origin. That’s how they behaved. Why does the Torah warn so many times that we must have proper treatment toward converts? Because in practice that was not the case, because people did not properly treat converts. That’s obvious.

When I sent this to Asif for publication, the editor, Rabbi Shmuel Ariel, brought me proof of this from Rashi in Bava Kamma 49a. The case there is a maidservant who was freed—that is, a freed woman or a female convert who is married to a convert or a freed slave, and the same applies to a Jewish woman married to a convert, and so on. So Rashi says: and the reason he mentioned a maidservant and a female convert is that an ordinary freed maidservant is married to a freed slave, and an ordinary female convert is married to a convert. Meaning, it was accepted practice that a Jew does not marry a convert. It’s permitted; there is absolutely no halakhic prohibition. But no—it was low status; people didn’t marry them. They have no pedigree. By the way, one of my students in Yeruham was seeing a girl descended from converts—maybe she was even herself a convert, I don’t remember—and he went to some baba, I won’t say his name for fear of slander, and that baba said: what are you talking about, stay away, she’s from converts, she has gentile impurity, her parents are gentiles, or things like that—stay away, don’t touch this match. And his parents, who were very close to that baba, pressured him a lot to break off the match. I shouted at him and told him: absolutely not. Absolutely not—what do you mean? You are violating a prohibition if you do such a thing. You are violating the prohibition of oppressing a convert—what do you mean? It is an outright prohibition, several Torah-level prohibitions.

[Speaker D] Moses our teacher married a convert, didn’t he?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Well, apparently he didn’t have such amazing pedigree. Yes. So among many people the attitude is: no, we don’t marry converts. Now sometimes, you know, sometimes it’s just concern about a different mentality; it’s not necessarily a kind of discrimination. So there is room to discuss that, and maybe one can understand it. But there are places where it is clearly a view of the convert as something inferior, which is a kind of discrimination. And in the past it certainly was like that. The attitude toward converts was like that.

And the claim I want to make, and there is lots of evidence for it—from the Talmud and from Rashi that we saw, and from many other places, it is clear, and from the Torah itself in that it warns so often to give proper treatment to converts—I want to claim that the attitude that was given to converts was the reason the Torah prohibits appointing them to positions of authority. And the reason is a practical one; it is not discrimination. There will simply be turmoil; people won’t obey him. The moment he gives an order or makes some decision, the public won’t accept that decision. So the Torah here is basically recognizing, de facto, a problematic social reality, an immoral reality, in the way the Jewish people treated converts—a way that was not proper. It is against what the Torah wants, but the Torah says: in practice this is the situation, I cannot ignore the situation, and therefore I say: do not appoint converts to positions of authority.

Now clearly, if that is so, then all my difficulties fall away. Notice, I’m not proposing this only because it gives me a solution, because today if I treat converts properly, then of course there is no reason not to appoint them to authority. After all, that is what I’m aiming for. Understand: this is the conservative interpretive framework I’m proposing. The whole reason converts were disqualified from appointment to authority was because the attitude toward converts was that they were inferior, an improper attitude. But that was the attitude; that was the fact. So Jewish law says: you cannot appoint such a person to authority because he simply will not succeed in filling his role. That is a functional criterion, not discrimination. But of course, if we are a proper society that treats converts the way they should be treated, the way the Torah wants us to treat them, then in such a case there is no problem at all; one may appoint a convert to any position one wants. Regarding a king, there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) maybe; I claim even a king. In Maimonides at least it sounds that way. But there are medieval authorities who say not regarding a king. In any event—so what? I want—now look, all the difficulties are resolved. And once all the difficulties are resolved, that means this interpretive framework has proofs, because it solves problems. It is not just an interpretive move that allows me to carry out my moral motivation. I said that beyond Mosheh Zemer one must propose a conservative interpretive framework that allows this change. So I proposed a framework. What is the framework? That the way Jewish law sets the status of converts derives from a situation of a society that is not functioning properly. But if there is a society that behaves properly in its treatment of converts, then those laws are nullified. That is the conservative interpretive framework. At that point I’m already Orthodox. I’m no longer Reform.

But now I’ll be ultra-Orthodox—plain-text conservatism, not interpretive conservatism. What do I mean? I claim that I have proofs from the Talmud and Maimonides for this framework. Not that I’m merely proposing it as a logical suggestion. I have proofs for it. So what have we gained? What are the proofs? Many proofs.

First proof, as I said before: why are there disqualifications for water distributors? Where do we ever find disqualifications? According to what I’m saying now, there really are no disqualifications. They’re only telling you that functionally it’s not advisable to appoint a convert to this, because he won’t succeed in functioning. But not that there is truly some disqualification here, the way we disqualify a relative from testimony, or from judging, or a wicked person, or a gentile, or a woman, or whatever it may be. No. It’s simply a practical claim, like: I want the distribution to be done fairly. I want the distribution to be done in an orderly way, that the business should be run properly. So don’t put converts there. Therefore I have no problem with there being a disqualification regarding the appointment of converts to authority. It’s not because authority itself—yes, if you make it software that’s perfectly fine. A convert is not fine because they won’t argue with the software the way they argue with the convert. But if there is a society in which they won’t argue with the convert and they will accept his authority the way they accept the authority of anyone appointed, there is absolutely no problem—put a convert there. So this solves the problem of how we found a disqualification regarding water distribution, or supervision of measuring tools in the market, or head of the water channels, or all these things.

The second difficulty was: how can it be that if his mother is from Israel then it’s okay? After all, the son’s lineage is determined by the father if there is no transgression. He should have the lineage status of a convert. What is the answer? Very simple. The moment this convert married a Jewish woman, it means that the public accepted him as one of them. So now the attitude toward him is no longer that of someone inferior. Therefore his son has the status of an ordinary Jew; one may appoint him to authority. And I don’t care that in terms of lineage the son is considered a convert. He is considered a convert, because one follows the father. But lineage does not determine the disqualification; rather, the public attitude toward him does. And if the public attitude toward him is proper, then I don’t care that his lineage is that of a convert. That solves the second problem.

The third problem: how can it be that everything depends on custom? Rabbi Zeira and the others appointed them, in Nehardea they did not appoint them even to that, in the West they did not appoint them even to that. What do you mean? This is Jewish law. What does it mean that in one place they observed Jewish law and in another place they didn’t observe Jewish law? The answer is no. There were places where there was a proper society and the attitude toward converts was the proper attitude, like toward anyone else in society. There they appointed converts to authority. Why not? There is no prohibition. In those places that were not proper, where the attitude toward converts was problematic, there they did not appoint the convert to authority, because for a practical reason he would not have been able to manage the matter. So this also explains how there can be dependence on customs.

Fourth difficulty: what happens after the name becomes absorbed? We saw that after ten generations, or after the name becomes absorbed, he can already be appointed to authority. Why? Very simple. Because even if he really is from converts and ostensibly there is a law of doubt here, if we don’t know that he is from converts then there is no problem—he receives the same treatment as anyone else. So why not appoint him? Everything depends on our attitude toward him, not on his lineage, not on his halakhic status.

Now there are more things I could show as proof for this thesis. But you can see that there is a conservative interpretive framework here which, in my opinion, is very strongly grounded. Therefore in this context I have very few doubts; I say this as practical Jewish law. All these laws regarding converts are nullified today. Completely nullified. In societies that do not treat converts properly, then maybe not—but there social repair is needed. In societies that do treat converts properly, there is no place at all for these laws.

And Moshe Feinstein writes that when he was asked this question, he wrote that because we are commanded to love the convert and bring him close, and of course to treat him as one of us, then in every doubt we have, we must interpret leniently, to rely on lenient opinions, and so on. So notice, he too goes with the motivation, but he does not make do with motivation alone. Of course there has to be some opinion with halakhic reasoning that allows it. It doesn’t exist—this law does not exist today, it is not relevant today, everything is null and void.

Okay, this is really an example of a conservative interpretive framework, of the kind I spoke about earlier. I showed what Mosheh Zemer would do with it. I said that I bring to it an interpretive framework, and therefore this is not a Reform claim, but interpretive conservatism. After that I showed that for this framework one can actually bring proofs from the sources—from the Torah, from the Talmud, from Maimonides, from the halakhic decisors—and therefore this is in a certain sense not even interpretive conservatism but rather plain-text conservatism. And still I think that in most places to which I would send this article, or propose this suggestion, they would throw me down all the stairs. They would tell me: you’re Reform. They are not willing to accept this kind of interpretation that changes Jewish law. I said to Tehumin’s credit, praise be said of the Tehumin editorial board, that with them it was not like that.

Okay? Look, for example, in Maimonides, Laws of Kings chapter 1, law 6: one does not appoint as king or high priest a butcher, or a barber, or a bath attendant, or a tanner—not because they are disqualified, but because their trade is lowly and the people always look down on them. And anyone who did one of those jobs for even one day is disqualified. Someone who was a tanner for one day, or a bath attendant, or a barber, or a butcher, is forever disqualified from being king or high priest. But not because he is truly disqualified; rather because their trade is lowly and the people look down on them. Which is exactly what I said. So this is no longer a proof for what I’m saying—it simply says in Maimonides what I’m saying. It’s written. Only it isn’t written there about a convert. It’s written there about a butcher, barber, bath attendant, and tanner. I’m saying it about a convert. But once we have found disqualifications like these regarding a king and high priest, disqualifications that are not essential disqualifications but only because of the public’s attitude toward them, then I have no problem saying that a convert also belongs to that category. Of course that strengthens the claim regarding a convert.

Now notice that here Maimonides is speaking also about a king and high priest, not only about a water distributor and so on. Meaning, even regarding a king one may perhaps say that not appointing a convert as king is also—again, I’m not now entering the question of whether he must be from the house of David or not; that is another discussion—but as far as not appointing converts to positions of authority goes, even for a king in principle, in my opinion, one may appoint a convert in a proper society.

Now Maimonides wrote that if his mother is from Israel, that’s okay. The Kesef Mishneh here writes: and it seems to me that he mentioned his mother to make an even stronger point, and all the more so if his father was from Israel, even if his mother was not from Israel. Why? Why is that all the more so? And that way it works out how King Rehoboam could rule, although his mother was not from Israel, but his father was from Israel. What, why is that all the more so? Because if his father is from Israel, then the son’s lineage is not like that of a convert; he is a Jew, one follows the male. But if his mother is from Israel, then the son has the lineage of a convert. Therefore the Kesef Mishneh says: if Maimonides says that if his mother is from Israel it’s okay, then all the more so if his father is from Israel, because that simply means it doesn’t depend at all on the question of his lineage. Rather, once there is a Jewish spouse, whether father or mother, that means that the other spouse—the convert, male or female—has undergone rehabilitation. The public recognized them as someone socially accepted. Consequently there is no obstacle to appointing their child to positions, to authority in Israel.

Maybe that is also how one can understand the disqualification of a convert from judging. A convert is disqualified from serving as a judge. Now regarding judges, of course there are also disqualifications that are essential disqualifications, not because of lack of practical competence but essential disqualifications: a wicked person is disqualified from judging, a gentile, a woman, and things of that kind. But the disqualification of a convert from judging may be that even among judicial disqualifications—where in principle there are essential disqualifications—the disqualification of a convert, even in judging, is of the kind I’m talking about.

Look at Tosafot in Yevamot, there on the passage I brought before in Yevamot that one does not appoint a convert to positions, all appointments in Israel. And if you say that here it implies that a convert whose mother is not from Israel is not fit to judge, but if his mother is from Israel he is fit to judge. Notice, his father is a convert, so he is basically in the status of a convert. Fine? If he is in the status of a convert, then he is fit to judge, and yet he is fit to judge. Only if his mother is not from Israel—both his parents are converts—then he is not fit to judge. Meaning that if his mother is from Israel, that qualifies him even to judge, not just to be a water distributor. That means that the disqualification from judging also is not really because you are a convert. It is because of how the public relates to you. And if the public relates to you properly, there is no problem appointing you as a judge.

[Speaker D] Like a king.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. But in judging it is even more than with a king, because in judging there are whole discussions about bodily disqualifications from judging. And I claim that even in judging, a convert is not a bodily disqualification. And what happens if his mother is not from Israel? Then he is disqualified, but again not essentially, only because people do not treat him properly. Look at the Tosafot—he asks in the chapter One Who Judged Monetary Cases in Sanhedrin, we learned: everyone is fit to judge. It says that everyone is fit to judge, all Jews. And it asks: we already learned that. And it answers: one is to include a convert and one is to include a mamzer. That implies that a convert, even if his mother is not from Israel, but he converted himself, is fit to judge. So how does that fit with the Talmud in Yevamot, that a convert whose mother is not from Israel is not fit to judge? So look what he answers, an amazing answer: one can say that there it is speaking of judging his fellow convert. Again it returns to the social issue. That is

[Speaker D] to say

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A convert may judge his fellow in a matter of Torah law. And if his mother was from Israel… That is to say, a convert whose two parents were not from Israel, or who himself converted, cannot judge Jews, but he can judge converts. So what does that mean? If he were intrinsically disqualified from judging, then a relative also could not judge converts. A wicked person, a woman, a gentile cannot judge converts. Because anyone who is bodily disqualified cannot sit on the judge’s seat. But a convert can judge converts; it’s only Jews that he cannot judge. Why? Where do we find such a disqualification in judging? According to the way I’m explaining it, it’s very clear. Because if he judges converts, the converts won’t laugh at him because he’s a convert; they too are converts. In their eyes he is not inferior. So there is no obstacle to a convert judging converts. The whole reason he cannot judge Israelites is because an Israelite sees him as inferior and will not accept his authority, will treat him with contempt, will not obey his halakhic ruling. Therefore a convert cannot judge an Israelite. I’m talking about a full convert, with neither parent Jewish. But regarding converts, where there is no concern of contempt, there he can judge. This is really strong proof for the claim that the disqualification of a convert, even when I’m talking about his disqualification from judging—which is already a truly substantive halakhic question, not dividing water—even there the disqualification is only because of contempt, and it is not an intrinsic disqualification, not a bodily disqualification. That’s an even bigger novelty. And therefore, if his mother was from Israel, then there is no problem even with judging, not only with dividing water. All right, I’ll stop here even though there is still more to continue with. Maybe next time I’ll continue a bit more, I don’t know, we’ll decide later. But for our purposes, I tried to demonstrate through this how halakhic change works when it is based on a motivation to search. Of course, I began with motivation; I had a motivation to analyze the topic / passage in order to see how it could be that a convert is discriminated against in this way. That was the motivation, and in that sense it’s like the Reform movement. The motivation is a proper and correct motivation in my view. But motivation by itself is not enough. I need to find a conservative interpretive reading that will allow me to make that change in practice. And then I really can rule that way in actual Jewish law. And here we also saw that this interpretive reading is not even really a conservative interpretive move in the sense of interpretive conservatism, but since I have proofs for this reading, it is after all just an interpretation of early sources; this is plain-sense conservatism. So much for this example. Comments, questions, if there are any? Thank you very much, Rabbi. Goodbye, Sabbath peace.

[Speaker B] Thank you very much, good night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe one more comment. There was, in the series I gave on—in this series, sorry—on conservatism and innovation, in this series after lesson number 10: lesson number 10 was a bit about… about politics and the Hardalim. And if you remember the semi-political analysis I made, that Haredi society opposes Zionism and opposes modernity. And someone who is not Haredi can be either this or that, but on our map we don’t have the second type, only the first type. So afterward two or three people who listened to the lecture told me that this was something important that should be summarized and circulated, to spark discussion. And afterward I also got inquiries from other places. Next week it will be distributed: there is an article I wrote that will be handed out in synagogues, and it is also attached to Makor Rishon, and it will also go up as a column on the website next week. It’s a summary of that lecture, an edited summary of that lecture. And I hope it will spark discussion. I would be happy if anyone here who thinks it appropriate would also share it further, this matter, because I really think it is an important discussion, especially important these days. And it’s not with direct political implications—there are also political implications—so it’s not without political implications, and certainly not without party-political implications. But it is still very important, I think. Important for a person so that he can formulate his own position for himself. All right, that’s it. I just wanted to say it in advance because next week it will already start before the lecture. So that’s it, that’s all.

[Speaker C] More power to you. Goodbye. Will there be a faith / belief class next week? What? A faith / belief class next week?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, apparently. A message will be sent.