Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 11

Table of Contents

• Leavened food on Passover and sourdough
• Pesachim 21a: the dispute between Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu over prohibition of benefit
• Maimonides’ ruling in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu and the exceptions
• "A wonderful point" in the Commentary on the Mishnah: prohibition of benefit branches off from prohibition of eating
• Sefer HaMitzvot, prohibition 187: eating as a form of benefit and the implications for counting the commandments
• Eating as dependent on benefit versus a prohibition on the act of eating
• Leavened food as historical background: a separate source for benefit and understanding sourdough
• Spoiled leavened food and hardened leavened food: exemption not because it is not the normal way of eating, but because of the identity of the object
• The sciatic nerve: a historical prohibition and permission to derive benefit according to Maimonides
• A partial measure of leavened food: why Maimonides brings a verse
• The Maharlanach, the Mishneh LaMelekh, and the difficulty from Yom Kippur
• Yom Kippur: the obligation to fast and its implications for a partial measure

Summary

General Overview

The lecture redefines the concept of food prohibitions through the exceptional case of leavened food on Passover, where the Torah forbids even sourdough that is unfit for eating and extends the prohibition to benefit as well. Maimonides presents sourdough and leavened food as “one prohibition,” because sourdough leavens other doughs and is therefore the most quintessential form of leaven. But the question still remains: how can a prohibition of eating apply to something unfit for eating? From there, a conceptual framework is built: there are ordinary prohibitions of eating that are really prohibitions of benefit, with eating being the central example of benefit; and alongside them there are exceptional prohibitions in which the prohibition is on the act of eating itself even without benefit. That model explains leavened food, sourdough, and to some extent also the sciatic nerve and meat cooked in milk, and it leads to a fresh clarification of the rule of a partial measure and of the question of Yom Kippur.

Leavened food on Passover and sourdough

The Talmud in Beitzah presents sourdough as prohibited even though it is unfit for eating, and Beit Shammai even derive this by an a fortiori argument from leavened food, because its leavening power is stronger. Beit Hillel accept the a fortiori argument but point out a refutation, namely that it is “not fit for eating,” and therefore a verse is needed. Maimonides, at the beginning of the laws of leavened food and matzah, writes that leavened food on Passover is prohibited for benefit on the basis of “no leavened food shall be eaten,” and that one who leaves leavened food in his possession violates the prohibitions of “it shall not be seen” and “it shall not be found.” He emphasizes that the prohibition of leavened food and the prohibition of sourdough are “one and the same.” Maimonides explains that sourdough is prohibited because it causes other things to become leavened, and therefore it is clear-cut leavened food. But the difficulty remains: why is the name “leavened food” alone enough to prohibit it even when it is unfit for eating?

Pesachim 21a: the dispute between Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu over prohibition of benefit

Chizkiyah derives that leavened food on Passover is prohibited for benefit from the verse “no leavened food shall be eaten,” in passive language, and Rashi explains that this also forbids indirect benefit such as selling it. The Talmud suggests that were it not for the language “shall be eaten,” we would have understood only a prohibition of eating, and it sets this against the view of Rabbi Abbahu that everywhere the Torah says “it shall not be eaten / you shall not eat / you shall not eat,” it also implies a prohibition of benefit unless Scripture specifies otherwise, as it does regarding carcass meat: “To the stranger within your gates you may give it and he may eat it, or you may sell it to a foreigner.” Carcass meat serves as a disclosure that the default can include benefit, and there the Torah explicitly introduced permission of benefit.

Maimonides’ ruling in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu and the exceptions

Maimonides rules in the laws of forbidden foods that all formulations such as “you shall not eat” and the like include both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit unless permission is explicitly stated, as in the case of carcass meat, and as in the case of forbidden fat, where it is said, “it may be used for any labor,” or unless a tradition establishes that benefit is permitted. The lecture emphasizes that the very passage in Pesachim challenges Rabbi Abbahu from many cases in which there is a prohibition of eating but permission of benefit. That sharpens the question whether the prohibition of benefit is an external derivation attached to eating, or whether it is included in the very essence of the prohibition of eating itself.

"A wonderful point" in the Commentary on the Mishnah: prohibition of benefit branches off from prohibition of eating

In his Commentary on the Mishnah to Keritot, Maimonides presents “a wonderful point” in the context of the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another. He asks why the prohibition of meat cooked in milk does not take effect on top of the prohibition of forbidden fat under the rule of adding a further prohibition, since forbidden fat is prohibited for eating but permitted for benefit, whereas meat cooked in milk is prohibited even for benefit. Maimonides answers that the prohibition of benefit in meat cooked in milk is not an independent prohibition; rather, it comes “because Scripture prohibited its eating,” according to the rule that whatever is prohibited for eating is also prohibited for benefit unless Scripture specifies otherwise. Maimonides describes a two-stage process: first one examines whether the prohibition of eating takes effect, and if it does not take effect because one prohibition cannot take effect on another, then the extension to benefit does not arise either. Therefore this is not considered “adding” in the sense that would force the second prohibition to take effect.

Sefer HaMitzvot, prohibition 187: eating as a form of benefit and the implications for counting the commandments

In Sefer HaMitzvot, Maimonides defines eating as “one species among the species of benefit,” and when Scripture says “it shall not be eaten,” the meaning is that one may not derive benefit from it, whether by eating or otherwise. Therefore one should not count the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit as two separate commandments. Maimonides explains that in meat cooked in milk, three occurrences of “do not cook” were needed to teach the prohibition of cooking, the prohibition of eating, and the prohibition of benefit. But the prohibition of benefit is not counted as a commandment in its own right, because it is the same matter as the prohibition of benefit included within its prohibition of eating. Maimonides adds an interpretive reason: because in meat cooked in milk the Torah did not say “do not eat from it,” there is no eating-language from which eating and benefit could have been learned together, and so an additional prohibition was needed to teach benefit.

Eating as dependent on benefit versus a prohibition on the act of eating

Maimonides states in Sefer HaMitzvot that when the Torah uses language of eating, liability depends on deriving benefit from the eating, and someone who swallows a forbidden substance in a way that hurts and burns his throat is exempt, “except for meat cooked in milk,” and likewise mixed plantings of the vineyard, where one is liable even “not in the normal manner of deriving benefit.” The lecture identifies here two kinds of eating prohibitions: a prohibition on the benefit of eating, where eating is the characteristic form of benefit; and by contrast, a prohibition on the act of eating that does not depend on benefit, so that even eating in a way that is not the normal manner of benefit still falls within it. Within Maimonides’ formulation a tension remains: he also presents the prohibition of benefit as branching off from the prohibition of eating, but at the same time he describes, in meat cooked in milk, an eating prohibition that is not dependent on benefit. That raises the question of how those two claims fit together without counting additional prohibitions.

Leavened food as historical background: a separate source for benefit and understanding sourdough

The central claim of the lecture is that leavened food on Passover is not intrinsically disgusting, since the day before Passover and the day after Passover it is permitted for eating. Therefore the prohibition of leavened food is not a prohibition that distances us from an objectionable object, but rather a historical reenactment of the Exodus: “for our fathers’ dough did not have time to rise,” and therefore we eat matzah and refrain from the act of eating leavened food. On that basis, the prohibition of benefit in leavened food is not derived from the ordinary structure of “you shall not eat,” but requires a separate source. This explains why Maimonides, in the laws of leavened food and matzah, brings Chizkiyah’s derivation from “no leavened food shall be eaten,” even though in general he rules like Rabbi Abbahu. According to the same principle, sourdough is prohibited not because it is fit for the benefit of eating, but because it bears the identity of leavened food by virtue of causing other things to become leavened. Therefore it is enough to prove that it is “leavened food” for the prohibition of eating to apply, even if it is unfit for eating.

Spoiled leavened food and hardened leavened food: exemption not because it is not the normal way of eating, but because of the identity of the object

The lecture sharpens the point that permission in cases of leavened food unfit for eating is not because the eating is not “the normal way of deriving benefit,” but because the object is no longer considered leavened food. Sourdough remains “leavened food” even when it is unfit for eating because of its role in leavening, whereas leavened food that has spoiled and lost the identity of leavened food is no longer prohibited on the Torah level, because it is no longer the prohibited object. In this way one can say consistently that in leavened food the prohibition is specifically on the act of eating “leavened food,” and not on the mere fact of deriving benefit from it as such.

The sciatic nerve: a historical prohibition and permission to derive benefit according to Maimonides

Maimonides rules that “the sciatic nerve is permitted for benefit” and allows one to send to a non-Jew a thigh with the sciatic nerve still inside it, even though he rules that “sinews do not impart flavor.” The passage in Pesachim makes a dispute about imparting flavor depend on the question whether there is a prohibition of benefit, and many raise difficulties against Maimonides because his words seem to contradict the Talmud’s linkage. The lecture suggests that the sciatic nerve resembles leavened food in that it is a historical prohibition not based on the objectionable nature of the object. Therefore the prohibition of eating does not generate a prohibition of benefit without a separate source, and with the sciatic nerve there is no such source. So permission of benefit remains in place even if “sinews do not impart flavor.”

A partial measure of leavened food: why Maimonides brings a verse

Maimonides writes in the laws of leavened food and matzah that one who eats any amount whatsoever of leavened food violates a Torah prohibition based on “no leavened food shall be eaten,” even though karet and a sacrifice apply only for an olive-sized amount, and for less than an olive-sized amount one receives disciplinary lashes. The Kesef Mishneh asks why a verse is needed for leavened food, since a partial measure is generally prohibited on the Torah level for all prohibitions. The lecture explains that if leavened food is a prohibition on the act of eating and not on benefit, one might have thought that the rule of a partial measure does not apply, similar to the claim that there is no “partial measure” in an incomplete act such as lifting without placing in the laws of carrying. On that view, the verse “no leavened food shall be eaten” is needed to teach that even in this kind of act-of-eating prohibition there is still a prohibition even below the required measure.

The Maharlanach, the Mishneh LaMelekh, and the difficulty from Yom Kippur

The Maharlanach answers that a partial measure in leavened food is different from forbidden fat, because forbidden fat is always prohibited whereas leavened food has times when it is permitted. Therefore, he says, a verse is needed in the case of leavened food to prohibit a partial measure, and the Mishneh LaMelekh cites this. The lecture objects that the passage in Yoma derives the rule of a partial measure from forbidden fat to Yom Kippur, which is an obviously time-bound prohibition. So the rationale of “a time of permission,” understood merely as temporal dependence, cannot serve as a sweeping reason to deny the rule of a partial measure. The lecture therefore reformulates the point: the time factor is a sign of the character of the prohibition in leavened food, namely a historical act-prohibition rather than a prohibition on an objectionable object, and not a technical reason that cancels the rule of a partial measure.

Yom Kippur: the obligation to fast and its implications for a partial measure

Yom Kippur resembles leavened food in that the food itself is not objectionable and the prohibition depends on time, and there is even a commandment to eat on the ninth of the month. Even so, Yom Kippur is not structured as a prohibition on the act of eating in and of itself, but rather as an obligation to remain in a state of affliction. Therefore the prohibition is tied to the result of negating the affliction and to the benefit one gets from eating, and accordingly the rule of a partial measure applies there just as it applies to forbidden fat. The lecture concludes by pointing ahead to the continuation, where the framework of food prohibitions will be completed, drinking and other laws of Yom Kippur will be discussed, and further implications will be examined, such as nullification and distinctions between different kinds of benefit.

Okay. Last time I started discussing prohibitions of eating, and I tried to present their definition specifically through an unusual prohibition, namely leavened food on Passover. And the claim basically was—and I’m just summarizing what we did because we stopped in the middle—the claim basically was that leavened food on Passover has unusual characteristics compared to other prohibitions of eating. In the Talmud in Beitzah we see—and more generally too—that even sourdough starter is prohibited, even though it isn’t fit for eating. According to Beit Shammai, not only is it prohibited, but even if there weren’t a verse prohibiting it, I would derive it by an a fortiori argument from leavened food. If leavened food is prohibited, then sourdough starter, whose leavening is more intense, all the more so. And Beit Hillel also basically accept that a fortiori argument, except that they say it can be challenged because it isn’t fit for eating. But they too see the fact that its leavening is more intense as some kind of advantage. And since there is a challenge in both directions, you need a verse. And therefore I said that even according to Beit Hillel, despite the fact that you need a verse, the question still remains once there is a verse: why does the Torah prohibit, in the context of leavened food, even something that is not fit for eating? Meaning, true, you need a verse for that—but even once you have the verse, you still need to explain what the verse is saying. Why here does the verse prohibit even something that isn’t fit for eating? I brought Maimonides’ wording, where Maimonides… I think there are more pages here, though only some of them will be relevant. If anyone wants, there are a few more pages here, feel free to bunch together. So Maimonides, at the beginning of the laws of leavened food and matzah, explains: leavened food on Passover is prohibited for benefit, as it says, “No leavened food shall be eaten”—there may be no permitted eating of it. And one who leaves leavened food in his possession on Passover, even though he did not eat it, violates two prohibitions, and so on, as it says, “And sourdough shall not be found in your houses,” and the prohibition of the leavened food and the prohibition of the sourdough with which one leavens are one and the same. So in Maimonides it looks like he means to address precisely this point: why sourdough starter too is prohibited. And what he explains is that sourdough causes other doughs to become leavened, so what leavened food could be more leavened than that? Meaning, if ordinary leavened food, whose leavening is not especially intense, is called leavened food, then sourdough starter, which creates leavening in other doughs, is certainly leavened food. Meaning, it’s the most leavened thing you can have. And I commented that this explanation is, at best, only a partial explanation. Because even if Maimonides has shown in this way that sourdough is properly called leavened food—that is, it is called leavened food—that still doesn’t solve the halakhic problem. Even something that is leavened food, if it isn’t fit for eating, shouldn’t have been prohibited. Okay, the fact that you proved to me that sourdough is called leavened food is only half the journey. You still need to show me that if something is called leavened food, then even if it isn’t fit for eating there will still be a prohibition. And that doesn’t appear in Maimonides. That’s more or less where I stopped.

Now I want to move on and try to explain this issue in Maimonides through examining what prohibitions of eating in the Torah are in general. In the end we’ll also get to Yom Kippur, but as in all the previous topics, I want to give some conceptual framework and at the end also touch on what this says about Yom Kippur. So I’m starting with the Talmud in Pesachim 21a, a very fundamental passage regarding prohibitions of eating. Really, that whole topic there until around page 24 deals with all sorts of fundamental questions about prohibitions of eating. Hezekiah said: From where do we know that leavened food on Passover is prohibited for benefit? As it says, “No leavened food shall be eaten”—there shall be no permitted eating of it. What does “there shall be no permitted eating of it” mean? So Rashi explains that “no leavened food shall be eaten” means that even if you sell it to someone else, you yourself aren’t eating, but that leavened food’s being edible enabled you to make money or something like that—that too is prohibited. So they derive from here—I’m not getting into exactly how the verse yields that, you can really debate that quite a bit—but they derive from here that deriving benefit from leavened food is prohibited, not just eating it. From the passive wording, “shall not be eaten.” Right? If it’s written… even if in some passive way its eating causes you indirect benefit, that too is prohibited. So we see that benefit too is prohibited.

The reason is that the Merciful One wrote “shall not be eaten” regarding leavened food; had it not written “shall not be eaten,” I would have said that it implies only a prohibition of eating, not a prohibition of benefit. Right? What is Hezekiah assuming? That if it had been written in active language rather than passive—“you shall not eat,” singular or plural—then there would only be a prohibition of eating. Only because of the passive phrasing do we derive that there is also a prohibition of benefit here. The Talmud says: and this disagrees with Rabbi Abbahu, for Rabbi Abbahu said: Everywhere it says “shall not be eaten,” “you shall not eat,” or “you shall not eat,” it implies both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit, unless Scripture specifically tells you otherwise, as it does regarding a carcass, as it was taught: “You shall not eat any carcass; to the stranger in your gates you may give it, and he may eat it, or sell it to a foreigner,” and so on.

So Rabbi Abbahu says: regarding a carcass, the verse says, “You shall not eat any carcass,” and then the Talmud says, “to the stranger in your gates you may give it, and he may eat it”—where “stranger,” of course, in the Torah doesn’t mean a full convert, it means a resident alien. Meaning, some non-Jew living among you—he has no prohibition, let him eat the carcass, give it to him. Why does the Torah need to say this? It’s prohibited for eating, so why would it be prohibited for me to give it to the stranger? Of course I can give it to him. What’s the problem? Is it forbidden to give something to a non-Jew? We see from here that the Torah—even though the prohibition written there is only a prohibition of eating—we see that if not for this explicit indication, we would have understood it to include a prohibition of benefit as well. Therefore the Torah has to innovate that one may give it to the stranger, that there is no prohibition of benefit in a carcass. If not for the Torah’s teaching this, even though what is written is only a prohibition of eating, I would have understood that the prohibition of eating includes a prohibition of benefit, and so this novelty was needed.

There’s a bit of room to hesitate here, and this already comes up in Tosafot and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) here, and we’ll later see the significance of it. What did we learn from the stranger? You could have learned from the stranger that once we learned that a verse is needed in the case of a carcass, it comes out that generally we derive the prohibition of benefit from the prohibition of eating; here the Torah tells me not to derive it—there is no prohibition of benefit, only a prohibition of eating. But still, the prohibition of benefit is not part of the prohibition of eating; rather, every place that says a prohibition of eating has some sort of linkage, so every place there is a prohibition of eating you can derive that there is also a prohibition of benefit, except for the carcass given to the stranger, where the Torah teaches otherwise. One could also say—and in a moment we’ll see this is the simpler explanation in Maimonides—not that we derive the prohibition of benefit from the prohibition of eating, but that it is the same prohibition. When a prohibition of eating is written, it includes within it also benefit, unless it says otherwise. Okay, we’ll see later the significance of that.

So let’s start, in order to understand this, by looking at Maimonides in chapter 8 of the laws of prohibited foods. Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu, and I think most halakhic authorities rule like Rabbi Abbahu, although there are exceptions. The Rosh, for example, rules like Hezekiah. I wrote down a few: the She’iltot, and there are those who understood that way in the Rif. There are quite a few important authorities who rule like Hezekiah, or at least there is disagreement as to how to understand them. But Maimonides—and let’s say the central stream of the halakhic authorities—seems to me to rule like Rabbi Abbahu. Where do we see this? In several places in Maimonides. One of them is chapter 8 of the laws of prohibited foods, halakhah 15: “Every place in the Torah where it says ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘they shall not eat,’ ‘it shall not be eaten,’ it implies both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit, unless Scripture spells it out for you, as it does regarding a carcass, as it says, ‘to the stranger in your gates you may give it, and he may eat it,’ and regarding forbidden fat, where it says, ‘it may be used for any work,’ or unless the Oral Torah explicitly states that it is permitted for benefit.”

Those are already things that appear later in the passage in Pesachim. There are several places there where they challenge Rabbi Abbahu from cases where something is forbidden for eating but permitted for benefit. In fact, by the way, in very many places that’s the case. This rule is actually quite limited, that every place written in terms of eating—even that the language of eating teaches even things prohibited for benefit—that’s not because it says “eating,” but only if there is some special novelty that prohibits benefit as well. Then Rabbi Abbahu has to explain why the ordinary rule broadening eating to include benefit doesn’t apply there, and therefore one might have thought there would be no prohibition of benefit, and a special novelty was needed to teach that there is. The cases where the prohibition of benefit is learned from the prohibition of eating are very few, maybe one or two. But that doesn’t matter right now; Rabbi Abbahu’s general idea is still this. Let’s leave aside the exceptions for the moment. So that’s Maimonides. Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu. We see it elsewhere too.

Now look at the Commentary on the Mishnah in Keritot. This is what they call in the yeshivot “Maimonides’ wonderful point,” right? It’s a very famous Maimonides in the Commentary on the Mishnah. I’ll read it. “And in these words of ours there is a wonderful point to which I will call attention.” The discussion there is about whether one prohibition can take effect upon another, the topic of “one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition.” “For it will be a key to other matters in addition to the precision of analysis that is in it.” That’s just a parenthetical note—Maimonides is really enthusiastic about this wonderful point. Nowadays, every little piece from Rabbi Chaim—you’ll find bigger wonders than this. Meaning, clearly in the twelfth century, if someone had said some Rabbi Chaim-style insight, everyone would have danced with joy. We’ve gotten a little used to these things. Here Maimonides speaks of it as something that is really some astonishing conceptual distinction, something like this we’ve never seen.

By the way, you see this also in the Talmud in the topic of “this one benefits and that one does not lose.” In a few places the Talmud says, “Too bad you weren’t in the study hall; wonderful things were said in this topic.” And then the Talmud brings whether “this one benefits and that one does not lose” is liable or exempt. And there too it’s basically a kind of Brisker-style conceptual inquiry: does the benefit itself obligate, in which case “this one benefits and that one does not lose” is liable? Or does the loss obligate, in which case “this one benefits and that one does not lose” is exempt? The Talmud doesn’t formulate it that way, but it’s clear that’s what stands behind it. In a case where one benefits and the other loses, he is liable. The question is whether that is because of the benefit involved or because of the law of loss involved. And the practical difference is the case where one benefits and the other does not lose. And over that the Talmud gets excited: too bad you weren’t there, what Brisker-style insights we had in the study hall today. Meaning, we’ve gotten a little coarse about these things, and clearly this reflects some change over the generations.

All right, this is the famous dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua Hutner and the Seridei Esh. There is a very interesting correspondence between them—the Rabbi Yehoshua Hutner who founded the Talmudic Encyclopedia, and the Seridei Esh. I no longer even remember who says what; I think the Seridei Esh argues that Maimonides never dreamed of what Rabbi Chaim wrote, and Rabbi Yehoshua Hutner, I think—maybe I’m reversing them—says, what do you mean? That’s exactly what Maimonides meant. I actually agree with him. Not because Maimonides literally thought through every Brisker move, but because if you inserted him into the conceptual world of lomdut and presented Rabbi Chaim’s analysis to him, there’s a decent chance he’d say, yes, yes, that’s what I meant. I’m not claiming that all those moves were literally sitting in his head when he wrote the laws, but rather that this exposes his move in our conceptual language. You have to translate it into our conceptual language. Fine, that’s an interesting question in itself, though not totally well defined, but never mind.

In any event, he says as follows. What is the wonderful point? “It is known that meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit, while forbidden fat, for example, is permitted for benefit.” A kind of meat, yes, is permitted for benefit. Forbidden fat is prohibited for eating, even with karet, but permitted for benefit. “And if one cooked forbidden fat in milk”—that is basically a kind of meat cooked in milk—“why should the prohibition of meat cooked in milk not take effect upon the prohibition of forbidden fat?” This is the Mishnah in Keritot that he’s talking about: when one cooks forbidden fat in milk, there is only the prohibition of forbidden fat; the prohibition of meat cooked in milk does not take effect upon it. Because one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. And why not? We know there are three exceptions to the rule that one prohibition does not take effect upon another: “inclusive,” “adding,” and “simultaneous.” When the second prohibition takes effect on more things, that is called “inclusive.” When the second prohibition includes more components of prohibition—not more objects, but say it includes prohibition of benefit as well as prohibition of eating, so it is broader than the first prohibition—that too takes effect. Or when they come into effect simultaneously, not one after the other. Those are the three exceptions to the rule.

Here Maimonides is speaking about the category of “adding.” And Maimonides asks: surely the prohibition of meat cooked in milk should take effect upon the prohibition of forbidden fat under the rule of “adding.” Why? Because forbidden fat is permitted for benefit—only prohibited for eating. Meat cooked in milk is prohibited both for eating and for benefit. Right? So we’re not talking about more items to which the prohibition applies, but the prohibition itself has more components. Meaning, it is broader; it includes prohibition of benefit, not only prohibition of eating. Is forbidden fat considered meat? Yes, forbidden fat is a kind of meat, yes. And so Maimonides’ argument is that, seemingly, under the rule of “adding,” the rule that one prohibition does not take effect upon another should not have applied here. There should have been here two prohibitions of eating and one prohibition of benefit. Meaning, in forbidden fat cooked in milk: a prohibition of eating forbidden fat, a prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk, and a prohibition of benefit from meat cooked in milk. Because once the broader prohibition takes effect, then even the part that overlaps with the narrower prohibition takes effect, meaning the prohibition of eating too.

And what does the Talmud say? Only the prohibition of forbidden fat. The prohibition of meat cooked in milk does not take effect. Maimonides asks why. And the same applies to a carcass, says Maimonides, since it is an “adding” prohibition as we said here with sacred forbidden fat, and one would be liable for misuse of consecrated property on eating it because an additional prohibition has been added—fine, another example. “And the answer is this: meat cooked in milk is prohibited for benefit only because Scripture prohibited its eating, according to the rule we explained, that whatever is prohibited for eating is prohibited for benefit unless Scripture specifies otherwise.” Exactly the Talmud we just saw in Pesachim, okay? Rabbi Abbahu, whom Maimonides rules like in Jewish law.

Maimonides says: the prohibition of benefit from meat cooked in milk is a prohibition that branches out from the prohibition of eating. There isn’t one verse prohibiting eating it and another verse prohibiting benefiting from it; rather, both together are the prohibition of meat cooked in milk. And since we said one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, therefore the prohibition of meat cooked in milk will not take effect upon the prohibition of a carcass; so it will not become prohibited for benefit, but rather will remain permitted for benefit, and one who eats it is flogged only on account of a carcass—or forbidden fat, same thing—and the prohibition of meat cooked in milk drops away entirely because it never took effect.

What is he saying? Basically this. The prohibition of meat cooked in milk, fundamentally, is the verse—that is, it is a prohibition of eating. It is not a prohibition of benefit. There is no verse prohibiting benefit; the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating. So when you ask, if I cook forbidden fat in milk, then the prohibition of forbidden fat already exists—it is first. Why is it first? Because it exists on the forbidden fat even before it got mixed with milk, right? The prohibition of meat cooked in milk only becomes relevant when the forbidden fat gets mixed with milk. So the prohibition of forbidden fat is first, the prohibition of meat cooked in milk is second. Now the question is whether the second one takes effect. Maimonides says: at first glance it should, because it includes both eating and benefit, and therefore it takes effect as an “adding” prohibition upon the prohibition of forbidden fat. Maimonides says no. The content of the second prohibition is really only a prohibition of eating. Once there is a prohibition of eating, then the prohibition of benefit branches out from it. But first let’s see whether there is a prohibition of eating at all. The prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk does not take effect here because one prohibition does not take effect upon another; there is already a prohibition of eating forbidden fat. Consequently, the prohibition of eating does not take effect, and it therefore does not expand into a prohibition of benefit. In other words, he sees this as a two-stage process. In the first stage, treat it only as a prohibition of eating. After the prohibition of eating exists, then you say: okay, if there is a prohibition of eating, then there is also a prohibition of benefit here, and then that would have made it “adding.” So it should have been “adding,” but since this occurs in two stages, it isn’t “adding.” In the first stage you ask yourself whether the prohibition of eating takes effect. The answer is no, because one prohibition of eating upon another prohibition of eating is not an “adding” case. Once the prohibition of eating does not take effect, you do not then expand it into a prohibition of benefit. That is his claim. Since the prohibition of benefit is not a separate prohibition—not that with meat cooked in milk there are two prohibitions, one of eating and one of benefit—but rather the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating, and that branching-out occurs only where the prohibition of eating takes effect. First, when you want to discuss whether it takes effect, you have to relate to it only as a prohibition of eating; only afterward, if it takes effect, can you expand it to benefit. A classic Brisker move.

If someone benefits from meat cooked in milk, would he get two sets of lashes? We’ll discuss that in a moment, good question. So Maimonides’ claim is that Rabbi Abbahu’s view has an implication for the law of “adding.” That is one practical difference between Rabbi Abbahu and Hezekiah. In those prohibitions where the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating, then for purposes of the rule that one prohibition does not take effect upon another, a prohibition that includes eating and benefit together will be treated as a prohibition of eating, not as a prohibition of eating and benefit. After the prohibition of eating takes effect we can expand it also to include benefit, but for the question of whether it takes effect or not, I relate to it as a prohibition of eating alone. That is Maimonides’ claim. That’s the “wonderful point,” right? The move is that the prohibition of benefit really branches out from the prohibition of eating, and for purposes of one prohibition not taking effect upon another, you have to discuss the prohibition of eating by itself. After it takes effect you can expand it also to benefit, okay?

After that he adds another comment. There would have been room to object and compare it to sacred forbidden fat, had we said it was prohibited for benefit as we said regarding consecrated things, and one who eats it would not be liable because of meat cooked in milk—then there would have been room to object. Never mind, that’s another objection. We said that according to this, if the benefit doesn’t take effect on benefit that isn’t there… What didn’t I understand? We said that eating doesn’t take effect upon eating, but if there is a prohibition that includes eating and benefit, and the second prohibition is only eating—there is a verse, for example in a carcass, that permits benefit—and now I add another prohibition of eating that also includes benefit, then does benefit take effect because it adds onto the benefit that wasn’t there? No. If the second prohibition you want to impose is one where its benefit component branches out from its eating component, then it does not take effect. Because the second prohibition fundamentally is a prohibition of eating, and only after a prohibition of eating takes effect can you expand it to benefit—but it doesn’t take effect here because one prohibition does not take effect upon another. If you have a prohibition where there is a special verse prohibiting benefit and a special verse prohibiting eating, separately—not where the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating—and there are such prohibitions even according to Rabbi Abbahu, as you can see in the Talmud… the Talmud explains why you still need that. In fact most prohibitions are like that. Most prohibitions of benefit, even according to Rabbi Abbahu, are not prohibitions of benefit that expand out of prohibitions of eating; they are prohibitions of benefit that have a separate source for eating and for benefit. Why? The Talmud explains, case by case, why each one needs it. But de facto, in the bottom line, most prohibitions of benefit in the Torah are prohibitions with a separate source for eating and for benefit. But for meat cooked in milk, for example, as Maimonides says here, that is not so. There the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating, and when the second prohibition is of this kind, it will not take effect upon a prohibition of eating. And with meat cooked in milk, in general, how have you worked out all three times? Fine, that’s a question how that fits with what Maimonides writes here—he discusses that in a moment, we’ll see.

Up to this point Maimonides still doesn’t fully explain the mechanism of this branching-out of benefit from eating, but he says there is such a branching-out. Here we already have something that is not exactly like Tosafot’s reading of the passage in Pesachim. Tosafot says this is not a branching-out; it’s some kind of textual linkage. Everywhere there is a prohibition of eating, we derive that there is also a prohibition of benefit. It isn’t an expansion of the prohibition of eating itself; rather, there is a linkage, and the prohibition of benefit is a separate prohibition. When the prohibition of eating exists, there is a linkage that always brings with it a prohibition of benefit—unless there is some reason saying otherwise. In principle, yes. According to Tosafot, it’s hard to say what Maimonides says here, because there is no essential connection between the content of the prohibitions of eating and benefit. It’s not the same prohibition; rather, one prohibition is always accompanied by another. And if it is derived from this prohibition, so what? That’s just the question of the source. Practically speaking, right now there is a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit—why shouldn’t that take effect on something else that has only a prohibition of eating? Maimonides goes further. It isn’t that the prohibition of benefit is linked to the prohibition of eating; the prohibition of benefit itself is an expansion of the prohibition of eating. It is just another form of prohibition of eating, that’s all. It’s not that it’s linked, so that there is always some locomotive dragging a car behind it; it’s simply a bigger locomotive. That’s all.

Now what does that mean? This is explained more fully in the Book of Commandments, negative commandment 187. There Maimonides has another very famous passage, but he adds a few layers to the picture he described in the Commentary on the Mishnah. This also appears in the Sefer HaChinukh, commandment 113, same basic move. Commandment 187 is that we were warned not to eat meat cooked in milk, and this is also what He says in the second occurrence of “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” We don’t have it on the page, right? You don’t have it? Right, so the verse says again, “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” a second time, and from this they derive that it means a prohibition of eating, besides the prohibition of cooking. And in the Talmud in Chullin they said: with meat cooked in milk one is flogged for its cooking and one is flogged for its eating, so we see these are two prohibitions. And in the Talmud in Makkot they said: one who cooks the sciatic nerve in milk on a Jewish holiday and then eats it gets five sets of lashes—one because of eating the sciatic nerve, one because of cooking the sciatic nerve, one because of cooking meat cooked in milk, one because of eating meat cooked in milk, and one because of kindling. Fine, that part isn’t so important for us. He just says—look at the end of the first paragraph—that in the case of meat cooked in milk, the Merciful One did not write the prohibition of eating in the body of the verse, in order to say that one is flogged for it even when it is not consumed in the usual manner of benefit.

With meat cooked in milk, the prohibition—even the prohibition to eat it—is not written in the language of “you shall not eat”; it is written “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” And since this is repeated several times, besides cooking we derive eating and benefit. Maimonides says: if so, this is not like ordinary prohibitions of eating. Here you are flogged even if it was not consumed in the usual way of benefit. We’ll soon see the meaning of this. “And here it is fitting for me to hint at a great principle that, to the best of my recollection, no one before me mentioned.” Again: no one preceded me in this matter—another wonderful point. Same enthusiasm.

And this is that His statement, exalted be He, “You shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” is repeated in the Torah three times. And those who transmitted the explanation—meaning the Sages, the tradition—said that each of these prohibitions addresses a different matter. They said: one for the prohibition of eating, one for the prohibition of benefit, and one for the prohibition of cooking. And for one who raises the difficulty and says: why did you count the prohibition of eating it and the prohibition of cooking it as two commandments, but you did not count the prohibition of benefiting from it as a third commandment? In Maimonides’ count of the commandments, there are only two commandments, two prohibitions: the prohibition of eating meat cooked in milk and the prohibition of cooking meat cooked in milk. The prohibition of benefit from meat cooked in milk is not counted among the commandments. The question is why.

Maimonides says this: the questioner should know that the prohibition of benefit should not be counted as a separate commandment, because it and the prohibition of eating are one matter. There is no reason to count another prohibition here; benefit is another aspect of the prohibition of eating. Because eating is one kind of benefit. And when He says concerning something that it shall not be eaten, this is simply one instance among the instances of benefit, and the intention is that one not benefit from it, neither by eating nor by any other means. Maimonides says like this—and here he explains Rabbi Abbahu, though he doesn’t say that explicitly, but that is clearly what he means. What is Rabbi Abbahu’s idea according to Maimonides? Unlike Tosafot, and this is their disagreement. Maimonides argues that when Rabbi Abbahu says that every prohibition of eating, however it is written, means both eating and benefit—why? Because the Torah is really just saying “do not eat” as an example of benefit. What it really means is: do not benefit. It’s just that usually, how do you benefit from foods? By eating them. So the Torah uses the common form of benefit as an example, to make clear that what it really wants is that you not benefit. So when it says “do not eat”—notice how this differs from what I said before in Tosafot—when it says “do not eat,” it includes a prohibition of benefit not because there is some textual linkage between the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit, two prohibitions with some linkage that always joins them. If a prohibition of eating is stated about something, then immediately a prohibition of benefit always comes along with it. Maimonides says no. Rather, the prohibition of eating itself is not really a prohibition of eating at all; it is a prohibition of benefit. When it said “do not eat,” it meant “do not benefit.” The Torah just says this by way of the common example of benefit, like “if one ox gores another man’s ox.” The Talmud derives that the category of goring damage includes any damage whose intent is to harm and that is unusual—not only actual goring. So why does the Torah use goring? Because that is the common example of that type of damaging act. And what about a dog biting? Since a dog biting is also unusual damage whose intent is to harm, that too is the same category. So why does the Torah say, “if one ox gores another man’s ox”? Because that is the common example of that kind of damage, that’s all. The Torah often, when writing a prohibition, uses a common example, but really means to prohibit the whole type of things of which that is only the example. Maimonides says the same with prohibitions of eating. Prohibitions of eating—except in places where we have derivations showing otherwise—but generally, the starting point, if we have no contrary interpretive consideration, is that this is not really a prohibition of eating at all, but a prohibition of benefit. Eating is just an example of a common form of benefit. That is what Rabbi Abbahu means when he says that every place the Torah says “you shall not eat,” “you shall not eat,” “it shall not be eaten,” it implies both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit. Wait, wait, I’ll get to that in a moment.

To eat pork—is it prohibited to eat pork? Of course. And is it also prohibited to benefit from it? No, benefit is permitted. I said the prohibition… I mean, that doesn’t fit. No, it doesn’t fit, obviously. I said the Talmud itself asks Rabbi Abbahu from many things. In the end it comes up with unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard, I think, as one example where Rabbi Abbahu’s principle has practical significance. Basically, Rabbi Abbahu’s principle has almost no practical significance. In no prohibition is the prohibition of benefit derived from the prohibition of eating even according to Rabbi Abbahu, except maybe one obscure case, and perhaps another according to some views, some Tannaitic disputes there. Almost nothing. But Rabbi Abbahu’s basic principle is still this as a starting point. When you see a prohibition of eating in the Torah, it implies both prohibition of eating and prohibition of benefit. Except that in many places there is some reasoning that tells us to distinguish, and then it may turn out to be only a prohibition of eating and not of benefit. Or alternatively the Torah itself may innovate that there is also a prohibition of benefit even though you could not derive it from the prohibition of eating. It teaches that there is a prohibition of benefit anyway, but for that you need a separate source. The places where the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating without any additional source—you could count them on your fingers. Meaning, there are hardly any. But is there also an example of “eating” without the root being about benefit? “The bush was not consumed”—using the root that means eat. Right. So what is “the bush was not consumed”? The fire did not consume it. So there, are you saying it isn’t benefit, it’s only eating? What? It’s not even in any basic sense of eating, but rather as something involving consumption or destruction. Like I “eat up” fuel or “eat up”… I consume the energy of something. Right, because clearly “eating” is also used as a term of consuming, in the technical sense of the word. What do you do? You consume something. We often use metaphors of eating: the fire ate this, or… But that doesn’t mean that is the basic definition of the concept of eating. It’s a metaphor that uses the word in terms of its practical effect. Practically, when someone eats he consumes, but in its essential meaning, eating means benefiting. By the way, even with fire, you can look at the wood not only as something the fire consumes. The wood is the food on which the fire is built; thanks to it the fire exists. In that sense there is benefit there. It isn’t benefit in the sense that someone feels pleasure; there’s no human factor there to feel pleasure. But it is benefit in the sense of digestive benefit and throat benefit—we’ll see that later—the concept of benefit means that this gives me some output, some result, sustains me, the energy I derive from it.

Usually prohibitions of benefit are not specifically about consumption. In every prohibition of benefit? There are certain places, with priestly gifts and misuse of consecrated property, where they distinguish between consumptive benefit and benefit that is not consumptive. Here, in benefit from consecrated property? Right, there it’s broader. Yes, exactly. So I’m saying: with consecrated property and priestly gifts, there they draw distinctions between consumptive benefit and benefit that is not consumptive. It may be, by the way, that both are prohibited, but from different directions, from different sources. But generally, when we speak of a prohibition of benefit, we mean a prohibition of benefit. If you give it to the stranger and get money for it, that is prohibited benefit, even though you didn’t consume it. The stranger may consume it when he eats it, but your benefit came from the sale, not from the stranger’s eating. So that is called prohibited benefit.

So Maimonides says this. Yes, so that is the principle here: he explains Rabbi Abbahu. “And this is what they, peace be upon them, said: every place where it says ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘it shall not be eaten,’ it implies both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit, until Scripture specifies otherwise, as it specifies regarding a carcass, where it clarifies the permission of deriving benefit from it, in saying, ‘to the stranger in your gates you may give it, and he may eat it.’” And according to this principle—that up to here is the explanation of Rabbi Abbahu—“according to this principle, the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit should not be counted as two commandments,” says Maimonides. That was his question, why he does not count two commandments. “And if we counted them as two commandments in meat cooked in milk, then similarly with leavened food, orlah, and mixed planting in a vineyard, there should be in each of these a separate commandment for the prohibition of benefit. But since in these cases we did not count anything beyond the prohibition that came in the prohibition of their eating alone, while included in it is also the prohibition of benefit as we have posited, so too in meat cooked in milk.” In all these cases, the prohibition of benefit is not counted separately from the prohibition of eating, even though there is also a prohibition of benefit. But it is not counted separately because it branches out from the prohibition of eating.

His claim is that in all these cases—even though, by the way, this does not appear explicitly in the Talmud in Pesachim. As I said, the Talmud itself finds almost no example where Rabbi Abbahu’s principle is actually implemented in practice. But Maimonides claims, for reasons of his own, probably from parallel passages, that in these four cases Rabbi Abbahu’s principle does apply, that the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating, and therefore there it is indeed not counted as two commandments. In places where the prohibition of benefit is learned from a separate source, because even according to Rabbi Abbahu it could not have been expanded from the prohibition of eating, then Maimonides would count it as two commandments. But in these cases—mixed planting in a vineyard, meat cooked in milk, and the others he mentioned—there he does not count them as two commandments.

But why here, where in all three times it does not say “you shall not eat,” from where does he derive it? One could say that since “you shall not cook” appears three times, you can derive a prohibition of benefit from it and count it. Maimonides understands it as a rabbinic derivation. A derivation. It isn’t really written there explicitly. A derivation by itself is not enough to count separately. If the derivation revealed something about the verse itself, then you would count it. But that’s exactly what he is saying: the derivation that adds benefit to eating is just a derivation that reveals the meaning of the prohibition of eating. So really they could have written “you shall not eat.” But they didn’t write “you shall not eat.” Interesting question why the Torah did not write “you shall not eat” and save a verse. In a moment Maimonides addresses that. In the Torah or elsewhere does the Talmud bring another derivation? He doesn’t bring this derivation of the three times, but says: Scripture did not remain silent from prohibiting eating except because it prohibited cooking—that is to say, even cooking is prohibited, and needless to say eating—as Scripture remained silent from prohibiting a granddaughter from the grandfather when it prohibited the daughter of the daughter… never mind. But “Scripture did not remain silent” does imply that. “Scripture did not remain silent” means it did not write it in the language of eating, but rather in the language of “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk”—that’s what he means. Here too he speaks about it.

But here he starts with the derivation from the threefold repetition. So if I go with that method of the threefold derivation, then seemingly I really should have… No, he argues not. Because even after the derivation, what you learned is that even though the language of eating is not written here—he’ll explain this in a moment, but I’ll say it in advance—if it had said “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” only once, you would derive one time about cooking; the second time… and not the third. You would understand that there is also a prohibition of eating here, but you would not expand it to benefit. Why? Because the prohibition of eating that you derive is not written in the language of eating. It is only included through the extra “cooking,” and in order to expand it to benefit, you need it to be written in the language of eating. Why? Because when the Torah writes in the language of eating, it itself gives you the example that eating is one of the instances of benefit. But there can also be a prohibition of eating that does not expand to benefit—and there are many such cases. So when you derive the prohibition of eating from “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” you don’t know whether this is a prohibition of eating whose real meaning is beneficial eating, in which case it expands to benefit, or whether it is a prohibition on the act of eating, not on benefit, in which case it doesn’t. Therefore you need one more occurrence to tell you, no, here this is a prohibition… In the first occurrence you would already derive that it is forbidden to cook. Right, you would say it’s like the case of a granddaughter. So with the first occurrence I’ve already solved both eating and cooking. Okay, and then I’m left with two more. But the second, the eating, no. From the second I would derive benefit, and count it. So then the question is simply why three are needed. That’s a different issue. The simple question why three are needed is unrelated. No, because then he gives yet another derivation and still doesn’t count benefit. So it looks like he is sort of forcing this issue of benefit in even though the verse is different. But I’m saying: the question why you need three sources is a different question from what we’re discussing. Suppose there are three sources—it’s even worse. If there are three sources, then why don’t you count the benefit? Maimonides says no, because the fact that there are three… So I’m saying: because the fact that there are three—without getting into whether elsewhere you need all three—let’s assume you do need all three. Then why don’t you count the benefit? My answer is: the first one counts cooking; the second includes eating. But even when you include eating, there are two ways to explain what you included. Did you include the act of eating, or did you include beneficial eating? If you included beneficial eating, then the third verse really is unnecessary, because beneficial eating, as Maimonides explains in Rabbi Abbahu, includes other benefits as well; eating is only an example. But you don’t know that this is what was included. Where the Torah itself says “eating,” then the Torah means beneficial eating. That is the rule, unless, again, something explicitly says otherwise. But here you need the third verse to reveal what kind of “eating” the second verse is teaching. Once it reveals that, though, it does not add another prohibition. It merely defines the prohibition of eating as a normal prohibition of eating that includes benefit. Therefore, says Maimonides, you do not count the benefit separately.

But that’s why Maimonides says he is liable for cooking and for eating. Yet they weren’t learned from the same verse? Not from the same verse; it’s a different verse. One verse of “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” and another verse of “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” Different verses. The question is why the third verse, which teaches benefit, is not itself a basis for counting benefit. Maimonides sees the third verse as revealing the meaning of the second verse. He basically wants to say that the second verse… The good question is why not say that instead of writing the next two verses, just write one verse. Meaning: write “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” for cooking, and add “you shall not eat meat cooked in milk.” Then the Torah wouldn’t need a third verse, because that would already teach both eating and benefit. So that is what Maimonides now asks. And that… if it said three times “you shall not eat,” then the third would be benefit. So not the third, only two. No, one time, not two. One time “do not eat.” It tells him not to eat; it doesn’t say not to benefit. No, but eating is an example of benefit. So one “do not eat” is enough. Right, because eating is benefit. So here Maimonides asks why the Torah wrote it in the language of “do not cook” and didn’t say “do not eat,” which would have saved the third verse.

Then one could answer in the name of Rabbi Abramsky that the source of the prohibition of meat cooked in milk is really connected to idolatry. Meaning, there is nothing problematic in eating it as such, in the substance itself, but rather some kind of imitation of idolatry. So when you say don’t eat it, then the problem isn’t benefit that comes out of the thing itself, but the act itself, which is some sort of quasi-idolatry. Then you’d say, fine, only eating is prohibited, but selling it… I agree completely, and I’m getting to that in a moment. But in Maimonides there still remains, it seems to me, a problematic point at the end. So let’s continue reading for a moment.

“And one question alone remains here. Namely, one could say: if the prohibition of benefit follows from the prohibition of eating, as the Sages explained, why then did Scripture need a third prohibition in meat cooked in milk so as to prohibit benefit from it, as we explained?” Right, why do you need a third verse to teach benefit, if the prohibition of eating already includes benefit and the third verse is redundant? You’re telling me it branches out. “The answer is that this was needed because with meat cooked in milk there is no ‘you shall not eat from it’”—there is no language of eating in the prohibition. That’s what I said earlier, just in advance of Maimonides’ own wording. “From which both benefit and eating would be prohibited. Rather, it is written in the language of ‘you shall not cook.’ Therefore another prohibition was needed to prohibit benefit.” If it had been written in the language of eating, then indeed the third verse would have been redundant. But it isn’t written in the language of eating; it is written in the language of cooking. So the third verse is not redundant—it comes to reveal to you that the second verse is really a prohibition on eating and benefit together.

And now he continues beyond what I explained before. This is a really detailed interpretive move. In the end, though, there remains a point that still seems problematic to me, which I don’t think he fully closed off. At least I haven’t succeeded in understanding it. “And we have already mentioned the reason why the Merciful One did not write eating with meat cooked in milk.” That is really your question. Right, why didn’t it write two verses: one “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” and the second “you shall not eat”? Maimonides says: in every place where eating is mentioned, one is liable only if he benefits from his eating. But if he opened his mouth and swallowed one of the prohibited things, or ate it while it was hot to the point that it burned his throat and caused him pain while swallowing, and anything similar—what is called not in the normal manner of benefit, or not in the normal manner of eating—he is exempt, except for meat cooked in milk, for which one is liable for eating it even if he did not benefit, as they mentioned. And similarly mixed planting in a vineyard. In short, all these special prohibitions.

Right? In all these things—not in all these special prohibitions, but in all places where the prohibition of eating is not written in the language of eating—the prohibition applies even when you eat not in the normal manner of benefit. Okay? Now here is a problematic point. Why is it problematic? Because seemingly, on the one hand, you wanted to tell me that you do not count the prohibition of benefit separately because the prohibition of benefit branches out from eating. So once I have the three verses, I’ve effectively learned that this is exactly like one verse saying “do not cook” and another verse saying “do not eat.” It’s just that the Torah phrased it as three verses about cooking. One could have said: because the Torah wrote “cooking” three times, what it meant was this—one for the prohibition of cooking, one for the prohibition of eating as the act of eating, not beneficial eating, and the third for prohibition of benefit. Fine? But then of course he would have had to count three prohibitions in the Book of Commandments. Maimonides says not so. He says the third verse of “you shall not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” which teaches benefit, is really just a revelation about the second verse: that the second verse, although it doesn’t use the language of eating, is as if it used the language of eating, and eating includes benefit. But if so, how can you have it both ways? On the one hand you tell me that the prohibition of eating here, after the whole story, is really a normal prohibition of eating—what is forbidden here is benefiting through eating. Well then, why is one liable if he ate not in the normal manner of benefit? If even eating not in the normal manner of benefit is liable, then surely benefit in general should be forbidden. No, not necessarily. No. It’s a prohibition on eating—and the opposite. In every place where it says “eating,” benefit is also forbidden, like then—even eating not in the normal manner should be forbidden. No, no—the claim is the opposite. In a place where it says “eating,” if it was not in the normal manner of eating, you are exempt. Exempt. But here, because it isn’t written in the language of eating, it comes to teach you that even if you ate not in the normal manner of benefit, you are still liable. Now I ask: how is he dancing at two weddings here? So isn’t that more severe? What? If in a place where not in the normal manner of benefit still makes me liable, yet benefit itself is forbidden, then in a place where I’m not even liable—where I am liable even not in the normal manner of benefit—then surely benefit itself should also be forbidden? Not at all. Exactly the opposite—it’s the same point. Why is eating not in the normal manner of benefit forbidden? Because the foundation is not the benefit. So then why prohibit benefit? Why, when it’s not in the normal manner of eating, are you exempt? Because the whole idea is the benefit involved in eating, and when there is no benefit, you are exempt. So you see there is a prohibition of benefit, not the opposite. So the a fortiori argument doesn’t work here. It’s not an a fortiori issue; it’s a question of the type of prohibition.

I only have a problem with the word “benefit.” One kind of benefit in our language is that a person enjoys it, it tastes good. Okay. And another kind of benefit is that he gains usefulness—vitamins, calories, whatever, he ate. I said that too is benefit. That too is benefit. So he is speaking here about someone who eats in a way that burns him—there is no pleasure, no calories, nothing, he benefits from nothing. Fine, the point is: something that adds nothing to him, that’s not benefit. Such a thing is not benefit. Like a pill—he can greatly benefit from its utility. So that is the dispute we’ll get to later between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish: benefit to the throat versus benefit to the intestines. For now, halakhically we rule like Rabbi Yohanan: it’s benefit to the throat. So if it burns, there is no benefit. Right? In terms of the act, yes. So I’m saying there’s a point in Maimonides here that I’m still not fully clear how he closes off. About the eating, he says that this eating expands and splits into two: both eating that includes benefit and eating that does not include benefit is still covered by the prohibition. But then I would ask again: then why don’t you count two prohibitions—one prohibition for eating with benefit and one prohibition for the act of eating? Both are eating prohibitions, except that eating here is broader. But those are two different types of prohibition, not simply more severe. Different types—it’s not a question of severe or lenient. It is still eating—he eats, he just doesn’t benefit. But the eating is not the eating prohibition. No—benefit means you benefited. Only, even where eating not in the normal manner is still considered eating, there it is still eating. But if you benefited, your prohibition is not eating; it is benefit. It’s just that eating is the way of benefiting, that’s all. But the prohibition is a prohibition of benefit. Prohibition of eating also means benefit, and here the novelty of eating meat cooked in milk is that even not in the normal manner of benefit one is liable. But I’m saying again: there is some double posture here. If in the end you tell me that the revelation is exactly… then the revelation tells me that the eating forbidden here is like every place where it says “you shall not eat”—that it includes benefit, meaning what was done… through eating. Therefore he didn’t count eating and benefit here as two separate prohibitions. But if so, I would expect that if it was not in the normal manner of benefit, one should be exempt, because the whole eating prohibition here is to benefit by way of eating. And if I did not benefit… yet Maimonides says no, because it is not written in the language of eating, it comes to teach you that even not in the normal manner of benefit one is liable. But he does not retract the claim that I am not counting two separate prohibitions here. So here I’m not completely sure how Maimonides stitches it together. Okay? But he clearly sensed this difficulty; clearly he had some explanation there. I don’t know—but still, it’s difficult.

Maybe he sees it as a textual decree. Basically the prohibition of eating is a prohibition on benefiting by way of eating. And the fact that it wasn’t written in the language of eating—that’s a good question—it comes to teach you by textual decree, meaning even if… I don’t know, even if you didn’t benefit, it is still prohibited. But I don’t know—then what is the textual decree? Count them separately. Why don’t you count it? Fine, it’s a textual decree—so count another prohibition. I don’t know. In any case, for our purposes what matters is the analysis regarding meat cooked in milk. For our purposes, what comes out in Maimonides is that in the end Maimonides apparently understands that there really are three prohibitions in meat cooked in milk. One is the prohibition of cooking. The second is a prohibition on the act of eating, and therefore even if it is not in the normal manner of benefit one is liable. The third is a prohibition of benefit, whether by way of eating or in some other way. Why didn’t he count it? I don’t know. Good question why he didn’t count it, because in principle these really are three prohibitions. Okay? But for some reason he did not count it.

Why is this significant? Because it turns out that Maimonides, through his explanation of Rabbi Abbahu, shows us that in Jewish law there are really two types of prohibitions of eating. There is a prohibition of eating which is a prohibition on beneficial eating—that is what we usually learn when the Torah forbids eating. And there is a prohibition on the act of eating. And with meat cooked in milk and mixed planting in a vineyard, it is a prohibition on the act of eating, and therefore even not in the normal manner of benefit one is liable. Because you do not need to benefit through eating; you need to perform an act of eating. That is the point.

What lies behind this idea? It seems to me that the basis of the matter is, I think, in Maimonides chapter 1 halakhah 2, what I brought at the beginning. Maimonides says there that, first, sourdough is included in leavened food—we’ll get to that in a moment—but already at the start of halakhah 1 he writes… did I bring it here? Sorry, at the beginning of halakhah 2: “Leavened food on Passover is prohibited for benefit,” and what does he bring? “As it says, ‘No leavened food shall be eaten’—there may be no permitted eating of it.” What is that? That is Hezekiah’s reasoning. Yet he rules like Rabbi Abbahu. According to Hezekiah—sorry, according to Rabbi Abbahu—you don’t need “shall not be eaten”; every place it says “eating,” it already includes prohibition of benefit. So why does he bring Hezekiah’s reason, Hezekiah’s source? The Kesef Mishneh already notes this—I don’t remember if I brought it for you. Maybe after Maimonides. Okay, at the end: “One who eats from the leavened food itself…” I find this difficult. No—“And our master, even though he holds like Rabbi Yohanan…” no, okay, never mind.

In any event, the Kesef Mishneh there brings a well-known principle in interpreting Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah: that Maimonides often brings scriptural sources that are not necessarily the actual halakhic source, but rather something that helps you remember, something that fits the wording better. You should not infer from the source Maimonides brings what his substantive halakhic position is. That is a commonly accepted rule among many commentators on Maimonides, and that is also what the Kesef Mishneh claims here. It is a bit strange, because here this is the whole dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Abbahu. It’s not just that you chose this verse rather than that verse. You are stating Hezekiah’s principle. Hezekiah’s principle is different. And all the while you say that the principle you rule by in Jewish law is Rabbi Abbahu’s. So it’s very odd to apply that rule here. If you bring me that verse rather than this verse, and somehow in the Talmud there is a practical difference, fine, maybe you brought the verse that isn’t practically determinative, but it is a verse that better fits your formulation, expresses more clearly the law you want to state. But here that is the very point in dispute. Does every prohibition of eating include prohibition of benefit or not? And he brings the view that every prohibition of eating does not include prohibition of benefit, and therefore you need “shall not be eaten,” some passive formulation. Why don’t you bring what you say in all the other laws—that every place the Torah said prohibition of eating, it implies both prohibition of eating and prohibition of benefit? He himself writes that explicitly in the Mishneh Torah in two or three places. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, in the Book of Commandments—everywhere he repeats it. So why here does he suddenly remember Hezekiah? Therefore I think the Kesef Mishneh’s answer is difficult.

On the other hand, it seems to me that the root of the matter lies in this very question of sourdough, with which I began. Why really, after we proved that sourdough is called leavened food—because its leavening is stronger, because it causes other doughs to rise—why is that enough to say it is prohibited as leavened food? Even without a verse, according to Beit Shammai. According to Beit Hillel, after the verse—but still, why is the fact that it is “more leavened” enough? After all, it isn’t fit for eating. The answer is: because I don’t care that it isn’t fit for eating. What matters is whether it is called leavened food or not. And why? Because the prohibition of leavened food is a different type of prohibition of eating. Ordinary prohibitions of eating are prohibitions on things that are repulsive; the Torah wants to distance them from us. Call them prohibitions on the object, if you like. This object is repulsive in the Torah’s eyes, and so the Torah says: stay away from it. Therefore, “both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit.” Don’t touch it, stay away. And it doesn’t matter how you benefit from it—by eating, by some other benefit—stay away.

The prohibition of leavened food, even though it also includes a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit, is a prohibition of eating that is a prohibition on the act of eating; it is not a prohibition on benefiting by way of eating. I’ll say more than that: even according to Rabbi Abbahu, that is true in the case of leavened food. Not that Maimonides rules like Hezekiah. Specifically with the prohibition of leavened food, even Rabbi Abbahu agrees that the prohibition of eating does not include the prohibition of benefit, and therefore you need a separate source to teach that there is also prohibition of benefit. Why? Because with leavened food it is completely obvious—despite all the homiletical sermons they always drive us crazy with—that there is nothing repulsive about leavened food. What is repulsive about it? The day before Passover and the day after Passover you can eat it and everything is fine. It isn’t pork. It isn’t something the Torah says, stay away from. It is something tied to a time, to the essence of that time. There is nothing in leavened food itself that is repulsive, such that the Torah distances you from it.

What is the idea behind it, in my opinion? I’ll soon prove it, or at least support it. The idea is that leavened food is a prohibition whose basis is historical. The prohibition to eat leavened food is a memorial to the Exodus from Egypt. Just as our ancestors… this is explicit in the Torah—why do we eat matzah? Because our ancestors’ dough did not have time to rise. Therefore we too today do not eat leavened food, right? That is what the Torah says, and all the Sages say it explicitly. What does that mean? That there is nothing repulsive in leavened food. The prohibition of eating leavened food does not mean it is forbidden for you to benefit from leavened food, stay away from it, it is repulsive. Against all the little sermons—I’m saying this is the evil inclination and you have to search for it in the cracks and God forbid avoid it. So what happened the day after Passover? The day before Passover, it would have been proper, maybe ideally, to avoid leavened food all year long—the super-pious. Simple people like us, maybe eight days are enough. But the super-pious should have avoided leavened food entirely all year, right? Of course not. There is absolutely no idea of distancing oneself from leavened food the rest of the year. Why? Because in itself there is nothing problematic about leavened food. The reason eating leavened food is prohibited is because our ancestors did not eat leavened food. That’s all.

So what is the basis of the prohibition? Not distancing yourself from leavened food, but not performing the act of eating leavened food, just as our ancestors did not. They ate matzah, so we too must eat matzah. They did not eat leavened food, so we too must not eat leavened food—not perform the act of eating. If I wanted to say even more, I’d say this is a branch of the memorial to the Exodus, almost part of the story of the Exodus itself. You have to reenact what happened then. So you eat matzah and do not eat leavened food—not because it is repulsive, but because for our ancestors it was absent, and not because it was repulsive. So for us too it should be absent, in order to remember, to reenact, to see ourselves as if we personally came out of Egypt. So we too eat matzah and do not eat leavened food.

Now if that is really so, Rabbi Abbahu’s reasoning according to Maimonides does not belong here. According to Tosafot it would. Because if you say that every place written as a prohibition of eating teaches a prohibition of benefit, fine. But according to Maimonides, the prohibition of eating is itself a prohibition of benefit; it’s not that you derive it. It means: it is forbidden to benefit from the thing; stay away from it, it is repulsive. With leavened food it is not like that. With leavened food all you need is a reenactment of history, remembering what happened there. Don’t eat. Who says benefit is also forbidden? Then Hezekiah comes and says yes, but the Torah says “it shall not be eaten” in the passive voice. That teaches that the Torah also wants to prohibit benefit. And actually this fits very well. Why is benefit forbidden? Not because the eating prohibition is a prohibition of benefiting by way of eating, but because even benefit—our ancestors did not benefit from leavened food; they had no leavened food. So under that same rubric of commemorating the Exodus, just as eating leavened food is prohibited, so too benefiting from leavened food is prohibited. But it is not the same prohibition. They are two separate prohibitions, both as a memorial to the Exodus, and therefore one cannot be treated as an expansion of the other. My claim is that even someone who rules like Rabbi Abbahu—that prohibitions of eating in the Torah are really prohibitions of benefiting by way of eating—would say not so in the case of leavened food. That is basically the claim.

And that is why, by the way, the same is true with meat cooked in milk and mixed planting in a vineyard. There too the prohibition is not benefit by way of eating, but a prohibition on eating. So how do you know that benefit is prohibited? You need another verse to teach that benefit is prohibited, and then indeed consuming it not in the normal manner of benefit, not in the normal manner of eating, will still be prohibited, because what is prohibited is the act of eating. It does not matter whether you benefited or not; the act of eating is forbidden. That is exactly the point. Okay.

Now, what happens with sourdough and with leavened food that is not fit for eating? From here everything is clear—this is the explanation in Maimonides for why he brings Hezekiah’s derivation. Now it is also clear why with sourdough both Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel say that it is certainly prohibited in eating. It is not fit for eating—so what? Why should I care that it is not fit for eating? My issue is not benefiting from the sourdough, but performing an act of eating on something called leavened food. Just a second. So sourdough is certainly called leavened food, right? After all, it is the thing with which you make other doughs rise—it is the most leavened thing there is. If I eat it, I have performed an act of eating on something called leavened food. So what if I didn’t benefit? Just like with mixed planting in a vineyard and meat cooked in milk, where even not in the normal manner of benefit is prohibited because this is a prohibition on the act of eating, not a distancing from some repulsive thing so as not to benefit from it. Therefore Maimonides says that in order to explain why sourdough is prohibited, it is enough to tell you that sourdough is called leavened food. I do not need to explain further: okay, but it isn’t fit for eating. That is not relevant to the prohibition of leavened food. What matters is only proving to you that this thing bears the name “leavened food.” Once it bears the name “leavened food” and you performed an act of eating on it, then you transgressed the prohibition.

Where will the implication be? The later authorities really struggle with this and don’t have an answer. What about hardened leavened food, or all sorts of moldy leavened foods? There it is clear that you do not violate the prohibition. Why not? If with leavened food, even not in the normal manner of benefit—as with sourdough—it is prohibited, then why not with moldy leavened food? Because moldy leavened food is not leavened food. The problem is not because you are not eating the leavened food, but because what you are eating is not leavened food. Leavened food that has spoiled and is no longer fit for eating is no longer leavened food. In the case of sourdough, even though it is not fit for eating, because it is fit for causing other doughs to rise it is called leavened food. That is the whole point. Therefore, from Maimonides’ perspective, it is enough to prove that it is called leavened food in order to explain why it is prohibited. But that does not mean that every thing not fit for eating will be prohibited regarding leavened food. All the leniencies for things not fit for eating apply to leavened food too. If it is not fit for eating, there is no Torah prohibition. Okay. Because it is not leavened food—not because that is not considered eating.

I think Adi—I don’t remember, someone in one of the previous classes suggested another possibility here: that with sourdough, every thing not fit for eating is not prohibited because it isn’t pork, not because it isn’t eating. And then with sourdough, although it is not fit for eating, you can’t say that therefore it isn’t leavened food—it is the father of leavened food; you use it to make other doughs rise. So why should I care that it’s not in the normal manner of eating? Therefore it would still be prohibited. I claim that this is true only with leavened food. Now I return. I claim that this is true only with leavened food. With ordinary prohibitions of eating, not necessarily. There are disagreements among the medieval authorities and I don’t want to get into them, whether consuming something not in the normal manner is a defect in the act of eating or whether the thing consumed is no longer the prohibited thing. That is a dispute among the medieval authorities. I’m saying that with leavened food we don’t need to get into that, because with leavened food the whole point is to perform an act of eating on something called leavened food. That is the prohibition. Therefore, according to Maimonides, you really do need a separate source to prohibit benefit—that’s Hezekiah. And therefore, more than that, that’s why in the very same halakhah where Maimonides shows that benefit is prohibited, Maimonides also adds the point that sourdough and leavened food are the same thing. Because it’s the same principle. Why is sourdough like leavened food? Because the prohibition of eating is not benefit by way of eating. So you might have said: okay, if so, then there really is no prohibition of benefit with leavened food, because with leavened food the prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating. Okay. Therefore Maimonides says: yes, just as they prohibited eating, they also prohibited benefit—but there is a separate source for that. “It shall not be eaten,” not because it is an expansion of the eating prohibition, but because it is a separate source. In fact this halakhah 2 brings two aspects of the same principle: both that you need a separate source for benefit, and that sourdough is like leavened food. Those are two sides of the same coin. Because what that halakhah is really telling you is that the prohibition of eating leavened food is a prohibition on the act of eating; it is not a prohibition on benefit by way of eating. Okay? And in that sense it is like mixed planting in a vineyard, like meat cooked in milk, and all the other similar things.

So leavened food that isn’t fit for eating—according to this, leavened food that isn’t fit for eating should also be prohibited. Right? Not sourdough, actual leavened food. Why? You performed an act of eating, but not on leavened food. I performed an act of eating, but not on leavened food. Right. Leavened food that burns you, or moldy leavened food, sorry. Fine? That is exactly the point. Meaning, perhaps an act of eating exists there—at least according to some medieval authorities, eating something not in the normal manner is a defect in the act of eating, and according to others it is a defect in the object. And here, even according to those who say it is a defect in the object… Another implication is this: what other eating prohibition do we know that has a historical basis? The prohibition of eating… the sciatic nerve. Right? I would expect the same thing to be true there if I am right about leavened food. And indeed it is exactly the same thing. Maimonides writes—and in the Talmud in Pesachim, we won’t get into it now because that piece is a bit complicated—but what comes out there practically is that there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah regarding the sciatic nerve: whether it imparts flavor or does not impart flavor, whether the nerve counts as having the taste of food or not, and the Talmud ties that to the question whether there is a prohibition of benefit with the sciatic nerve or not.

Now Maimonides, in the laws of prohibited foods, chapter 15 halakhah 17, says this—wait, one second, yes—at the end he writes: “And the nerve itself is not measured, and it does not prohibit, because nerves do not impart flavor.” That’s the end of the halakhah. He rules like the opinion that nerves do not impart flavor, okay? According to that view, the Talmud in Pesachim says that there is a prohibition of benefit from the sciatic nerve. Tosafot explains: because if it does not impart flavor, then clearly what was prohibited here was not eating but benefit, okay? Because if it imparts no flavor, eating has no significance here. Fine, that can be debated, but that is what the Talmud says explicitly. And on this all Maimonides’ commentators ask: this is against the Talmud. You rule that nerves do not impart flavor, and at the same time you say there is no prohibition of benefit from nerves. Look at chapter 8 halakhah 14—this is literally one halakhah before the one where he rules like Rabbi Abbahu that we read earlier. “The sciatic nerve is permitted for benefit; therefore one may send to a gentile a thigh with the sciatic nerve still inside it,” and so on. So everyone asks: how can it be permitted for benefit? You rule that nerves do not impart flavor. The Talmud says these two things are interdependent. The Rosh, for example, asks this. The Ramah asks it. Everyone asks this on Maimonides.

My claim is that what Maimonides says here rests on the same principle. Since with the sciatic nerve… I didn’t understand. What Maimonides says here rests on the same principle: what happens with the sciatic nerve is that there too the prohibition to eat the sciatic nerve is a historical prohibition. There is nothing repulsive in the sciatic nerve in itself, right? Therefore the fact that it is prohibited for eating cannot teach me that it is prohibited for benefit. You need a separate source if you want to prohibit benefit. The prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating the sciatic nerve. And why? Because just as Jacob had this experience, so we are supposed not to eat it—exactly like Passover. Same thing. Therefore Maimonides says that the eating prohibition of the sciatic nerve is a prohibition on the act of eating, and so if you want to prohibit benefit from it you need a separate source. With leavened food I have a separate source from the passive language “it shall not be eaten.” With the sciatic nerve I do not. Therefore there is no prohibition of benefit there. You’ll ask: but what about the Talmud, which ties them together? I’ll ask you an even stronger question on the Talmud. The Talmud says, at the beginning of the passage we read, that Rabbi Abbahu states his principle regarding leavened food—that’s where the whole dispute starts. The whole dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Hezekiah concerns leavened food. And I argued that according to Maimonides, Rabbi Abbahu’s principle is not relevant to leavened food. With leavened food even Rabbi Abbahu agrees that the prohibition is not one of beneficial eating, but of the act of eating. My claim is that, according to Maimonides, that Talmudic passage is not the law. That passage consistently learns like Tosafot. It understands the prohibition of eating leavened food really as a prohibition of beneficial eating. But Maimonides, consistently—and I can show this in more places—does not rule like that passage in the Talmud in several places, systematically.

I’m saying: maybe, by the way, Maimonides’ source is the Talmud in Beitzah. You can isolate Rabbi Abbahu and leave him standing. Rabbi Abbahu as interpreted by the Talmud in Pesachim is not like Maimonides. Maimonides claims that Rabbi Abbahu himself means something else. Where do we see that? In the Talmud in Beitzah, which says that I would make an a fortiori argument from leavened food to sourdough. According to Rabbi Abbahu, that should be inconceivable. If the prohibition of eating is fundamentally a prohibition of beneficial eating, then how can you make an a fortiori argument from leavened food to sourdough, when sourdough has no beneficial eating? We see in the Talmud in Beitzah that all that matters for the question is how much “leavened food” it is, not how much beneficial eating there is in it. That’s a different conception of Rabbi Abbahu’s view. So maybe, I’m saying, Maimonides’ source is the Talmud in Beitzah. One thing is clear—and I have many proofs for this, I don’t know, maybe eighteen proofs—systematically: in every paragraph of the Talmud in Pesachim—and it’s a long passage, three pages—Maimonides rules not like the Talmud’s conclusion. And everywhere the later authorities challenge him and don’t understand what this is—how can it be, this is against the Talmud? But systematically, Maimonides goes against the sugya in Pesachim. The Talmud in Pesachim assumes that the prohibition of leavened food is—perhaps even that there are no other kinds of prohibitions—but at least that the prohibition of leavened food is one of benefit by way of eating. Maimonides says no. And from that, many things follow. Same with the sciatic nerve, same with leavened food.

Now look at another implication. Also with meat cooked in milk, I said that the prohibition is a prohibition on the act of eating, and therefore for benefit you need a separate source—just as with leavened food. In that sense, meat cooked in milk is like leavened food: a prohibition on the act of eating, not on beneficial eating. It’s just that in these two places there is also a prohibition of benefit. It isn’t learned from the prohibition of eating; it’s learned from a separate source. With the sciatic nerve I don’t have a separate source. All I could have done was derive it from eating, but from eating you can’t derive it because this is a prohibition on the act of eating. So I’ll skip a bit—therefore not in the normal manner of benefit is prohibited, all that we discussed.

Now look at Maimonides in chapter 1 of the laws of leavened food and matzah, halakhah 7. Is it on your pages? I don’t remember anymore. Maimonides says this: “One who eats from the leavened food itself on Passover, any amount whatsoever, this is prohibited by Torah law, as it says, ‘No leavened food shall be eaten’”—again the passive language. “Nevertheless, he is not liable to karet or a sacrifice except for the measure of an olive’s bulk. And one who eats less than an olive’s bulk intentionally is given disciplinary lashes.” As background, you need to know that Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish—and this is in our chapter in Yoma—disagree about the law of a partial measure. I already mentioned this. Resh Lakish says a partial measure is prohibited only rabbinically. Rabbi Yohanan says a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. “Any forbidden fat, any blood”—forbidden fat—and the logic is that it is fit to be combined; but a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law.

Several commentators ask, headed by the Kesef Mishneh but also others here on Maimonides: why does Maimonides bring a source for the fact that a partial measure of leavened food is prohibited? There is a general rule in the Torah that a partial measure is prohibited in all prohibitions. Again he brings that same verse “it shall not be eaten,” from Hezekiah. Here this isn’t about Hezekiah, because it isn’t tied to the dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Abbahu, but he brings a source for the fact that a partial measure of leavened food is prohibited. Why? Maybe because according to Maimonides there are no lashes here in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan. In any event there are no Torah lashes. Everyone agrees there are no Torah lashes. No—less than an olive’s bulk gets disciplinary lashes. Disciplinary lashes are not Torah lashes. The same for the other prohibitions too? In the simple sense yes—why not? Even for rabbinic law one gets disciplinary lashes. Why on a Torah prohibition that doesn’t incur Torah lashes shouldn’t he get disciplinary lashes? Even for neglecting a positive commandment one gets disciplinary lashes. The Kesef Mishneh senses this, and here he remains with “this requires further analysis.”

On halakhah 2 we saw that the Kesef Mishneh suggested that Maimonides brings a source because it fits his phrasing better, although he doesn’t really rule like Hezekiah. Here I claim it is the same Maimonides consistently—let me explain. But here the Kesef Mishneh again asks: “One who eats from the leavened food itself on Passover, as it says…” I find this difficult. Why do I need a verse for leavened food on Passover? We hold that in every prohibition in the Torah a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. And another difficulty: if from the verse, the opposite should have been derived from it, since “shall not be eaten” implies an amount of eating… He doesn’t understand the source. Fine. There is, by the way, a novelty of the Avnei Nezer—sorry, the Eglei Tal—that according to Maimonides, a partial measure on Passover means specifically half, not less than that. This comes from the Kesef Mishneh’s next question, which I didn’t read—never mind. Why does Maimonides say “less than the measure”? He should just say “any amount.” So apparently it means only half. An interesting innovation—why? I once saw an article by Rabbi Zilberstein trying to distinguish between the logic of “fit to be combined” and the inclusion derived from “any forbidden fat, any blood, forbidden fat.” But fine, maybe if I get to partial measures.

My claim is very simple. Here again Maimonides is following the same approach. If the prohibition of eating… Why really is a partial measure prohibited by Torah law according to Rabbi Yohanan, whose view we follow? Rabbi Shimon explains it this way: in the end, when you eat a partial measure of food, it’s true that you did not have a full measure of benefit. But you did do the same type of prohibited thing—the very type of thing that is forbidden. If now you ate another half measure, then it would become something carrying lashes. So even if you didn’t eat the second half, it is “fit to be combined”; the quality of the prohibition is already there, only the quantity is lacking. Therefore in principle it is prohibited by Torah law. You won’t receive lashes for it, because lashes require the novelty of minimum measures—less than a full measure doesn’t incur lashes—but the quality of the prohibition is present.

According to this we can understand, for example, the beginning of tractate Shabbat—maybe I mentioned this, I don’t remember—there is a discussion there about carrying into and out of a domain, or rather about lifting up and setting down in the labor of transferring. The Mishnah and Talmud discuss the poor man stretching his hand in and placing something by the householder, or the householder taking from the poor man. The householder is in the house, the poor man is in the public domain, and the question is when he takes from the poor man. The later authorities ask: why is he not liable under the rule of a partial measure? There was a lifting up, but there was no setting down, so there is half of the act of transferring. Why shouldn’t that at least be prohibited by Torah law as a partial measure? Not liable, but prohibited by Torah law as a partial measure.

So the Sefat Emet argues—what? Maybe the definition is two parts, and only when both are present do you have the full category, and this is only half a measure. Here, until you do both lifting up and setting down, it doesn’t belong at all… You mean it’s a qualitative half, exactly. So the Sefat Emet there wants to say—he gives a broader principle—that there is no “partial measure” in actions. There is a “partial measure” in quantities of objects. Regarding prohibitions… the Chacham Tzvi says this only about prohibitions of eating. The Sefat Emet extends it a bit more broadly, not only prohibitions of eating. In carrying too perhaps one could discuss it. But when you have half of a certain object, you can talk about a partial measure. Not half of an action. Why? Because half of an action is not that the quantity of the action is lacking; such a thing has no significance as an action at all. If you ate half a measure, there is basically half the benefit. It is not full benefit, so it is prohibited by Torah law though you are not flogged. Half an action is not an action at all. Here it is of course much easier to understand. If there is lifting up without setting down, that is not half a transfer—it is no transfer at all. Transfer means the whole thing together. Maybe if you transfer less than the full amount but do complete lifting up and setting down, then you can talk about a partial measure. Maybe. There are disputes. But if you do only lifting up without setting down, then the quality of the action does not exist at all—not merely lacking in quantity, but lacking in quality too. Completion? Exactly. What? It isn’t fit to be combined. If you lift up twice, that doesn’t bring you to Torah liability. Therefore even one lifting up isn’t a partial measure. If you eat two half-olives, then you do reach a Torah prohibition. So even when you ate one half-olive, the quality of the prohibition is there; only the quantity is lacking. Okay?

And now my claim regarding leavened food. In swallowing, for example, there is no benefit? Of course there is. If there is no benefit, then there is no prohibition. There is benefit. There isn’t. If there is benefit, then there is a prohibition; if not, then not. Right. It depends on what benefit is required in order to violate the prohibition. Each prohibition has its own definition. But come on, I want to move on. So my claim is this: since the definition of the prohibition of eating leavened food is not benefiting from leavened food, but the act of eating leavened food, a partial measure does not belong here. There is no “partial measure” in actions. In ordinary prohibitions of eating, what is lacking is that you had some benefit, just not in sufficient quantity, and that is the law of a partial measure. But with leavened food this is half of an action. It is like lifting up without setting down. Again, one could distinguish, because lifting without setting down lacks in quality, whereas here you nevertheless did the same thing, only on a smaller quantity. But still, since the minimum measure is lacking, it is not a complete action. Then you could say that perhaps there is no law of a partial measure here at all.

Then Maimonides comes and says: yes, but I have a verse that nevertheless creates a law of partial measure. And now we can discuss this in light of what I said before. What exactly did the Torah teach? Did it teach that there is nevertheless a law of partial measure here? Or is this itself what the Torah taught—that this is not like lifting up and setting down, but rather here the full quality of the action is present, even though it is an action and not a benefit, and so the full quality of the action is present even when performed on only part of the quantity; therefore here there will be a prohibition of a partial measure. But to say that, you need a verse. That is my claim. Once there is a verse, I say it is not like lifting up and setting down. But to say that, you need a verse. Therefore the difficulties people ask on Maimonides are not difficult. It is the same principle. What was not difficult in Maimonides on halakhah 2 is the same thing in halakhah 7.

Now the interesting point is that the Pri Megadim says the same thing about the sciatic nerve, and everyone attacks him. There would be no law of partial measure regarding the sciatic nerve. Why not? According to what I’m saying now, it makes perfect sense. Even if he hadn’t said it, I would have said it. Because with the sciatic nerve too, the prohibition is a prohibition on the act of eating, not on benefiting from the thing. With the sciatic nerve—by the way—it resembles leavened food in another respect. Just as with leavened food, sourdough is prohibited even though there is no beneficial eating in it at all, so too with the sciatic nerve, which imparts no flavor, there is no beneficial eating there either—you’re eating wood. The Talmud calls the sciatic nerve wood. You’re eating wood. Where else do we find that the Torah prohibits eating something not fit for eating? It is really just like leavened food. The similarity between these two things is perfect. Because in both places, I don’t care about the benefit; what is forbidden is the act of eating as a memorial to something historical. Therefore with the sciatic nerve too, a partial measure would be the same as a partial measure of leavened food. Exactly the same.

There is an interesting point here—I’m skipping ahead a bit because we need to finish and I don’t want to drag this out. Look at the Maharalnach that the Mishneh LaMelekh brings. I did bring you the Mishneh LaMelekh, right? On that same halakhah in Maimonides, halakhah 7. He answers the Kesef Mishneh’s question. “I saw the Maharalnach,” and this already brings us closer to our topic. “And I saw Rabbi Maharalnach in responsum 51, who raised the difficulty of our master, the Kesef Mishneh. And he answered that the prohibition of leavened food is unlike forbidden fat. For a partial measure is learned from ‘any forbidden fat’—any amount of forbidden fat. So he says the prohibition of leavened food is unlike forbidden fat. Why? Because there we learned that a partial measure is prohibited since forbidden fat is prohibited forever and never had a time when it was permitted. Not so with leavened food, which is permitted before Passover, and therefore a separate verse was needed with leavened food to prohibit a partial measure.”

How do people usually understand this? In terms of prohibition on the person and prohibition on the object. Many later authorities say that a prohibition dependent on time is not a prohibition on the object, because the very same object is permitted at one time and forbidden at another. Nothing changed in the object itself. Clearly the prohibition is directed at the person and not at the object: at a certain time the person is forbidden to eat the thing, but this is not a prohibition in the thing itself. Okay. So Maharalnach argues that with Passover, since it is a prohibition dependent on time, I would have said that partial measure does not apply. Therefore he brings a verse that creates a prohibition of a partial measure. That is how he answers the Kesef Mishneh. These words are astonishing. They seem completely impossible. What is the whole Talmudic discussion about partial measures? It is learned from forbidden fat, but what is the conclusion of the discussion? They bring the source from forbidden fat to Yom Kippur. “Conclude from this regarding the day.” The discussion is about someone who ate a partial measure on Yom Kippur. Where do you have a prohibition more dependent on time than that? How can one say that in a prohibition dependent on time there is no law of partial measure, when the whole Talmud is learning it from forbidden fat to Yom Kippur? So I can’t learn from forbidden fat to prohibitions dependent on time because forbidden fat is a prohibition not dependent on time? Then what is the Talmud doing when it learns it regarding Yom Kippur? Rabbi Zolti asks exactly this in his responsa, Mishnat Yaavetz. Yes, Mishnat Yaavetz, not She’elat Yaavetz—that’s something else. He asks this on Maharalnach, but I’ve seen it elsewhere too. It is very strange. Maybe—I don’t know—this is really the main thing missing from his words, but as written his words are completely implausible. It’s not that he missed something small; this is the very heart of the passage.

It could be that what Maharalnach meant was what I have been saying. And what he means is this: ordinary prohibitions of eating are prohibitions on the object. The object is repulsive and the Torah wants to distance you from it. Therefore the Torah says, stay away—don’t benefit, and eating too is only an example. Don’t do anything with it—not eating, not benefiting, nothing. Stay away from the object. Leavened food is not like that. How do I know it’s not like that? Because it depends on time. What I said earlier. Leavened food, I said, is not repulsive in itself. On the eve of Passover or the day after Passover, you can eat it and everything is fine. There is no reason to avoid leavened food except during Passover. That is exactly the consideration I gave you before to show that leavened food is not like pork. Leavened food is not something repulsive in itself, but a memorial to a historical event. Dependence on time, for Maharalnach, is a sign, not a cause. It is a sign that the prohibition of leavened food is a prohibition on an act, not a prohibition of distancing oneself from a repulsive object. Because before the holiday and after the holiday there is no reason at all to avoid it.

But with leavened food there is “you shall eliminate it,” and the reason for “you shall eliminate it” is so that we distance ourselves from it. I didn’t understand. Not nullification—burning. Why do you have to burn it? There is nullification too. That raises the question whether the obligation to burn is in order to distance oneself. It’s not clear at all, not clear at all that burning is meant as avoidance. On the contrary, we brought the Avnei Nezer, who brings that Ran as an exceptional example for those who say there are safeguards in Torah law, that “you shall eliminate it” is a safeguard for “it shall not be seen.” And the simpler view is that there are no safeguards in Torah law. In any event, my claim is this: Maharalnach—and the Mishneh LaMelekh who brings him, and the Mishneh LaMelekh himself doesn’t ask against him from Yom Kippur. He brings him and everything is fine. That’s not some oversight they would have made. The point is that dependence on time is a sign, not a cause. It’s not that every prohibition dependent on time is being discussed. With Passover I’m telling you that in principle I have no problem with your benefiting from leavened food. The eating prohibition is not a prohibition of benefit. There is a separate prohibition of benefit, but the prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating leavened food. Therefore he says that a partial measure does not belong here. The time-dependence is only a sign showing you that this isn’t something repulsive, but rather there is a prohibition on the act of eating—what I said earlier.

What about Yom Kippur? Here we’ve basically reached Yom Kippur. Yom Kippur is also unusual, right? It is a time-dependent prohibition. The object itself is not repulsive, because you can eat all those foods before Yom Kippur and after Yom Kippur. There is even a commandment to eat on the ninth, right? So the same consideration exists there too. But on the other hand, on Yom Kippur this is not a prohibition of eating at all; rather, what is it? An obligation to fast. Right. There is no prohibition of eating. We said this already—it is an obligation to fast. If it is an obligation to fast, then the law of a partial measure swings back the other way. Then obviously it is like forbidden fat. Since on Yom Kippur you were not prohibited from doing the act of eating. True, it is not a repulsive object, and in that sense it is not like the ordinary Torah prohibitions, where the object is something you must distance yourself from—not benefit from it, not eat it, like every ordinary eating prohibition. In that sense it is not like ordinary Torah prohibitions, but neither is it like leavened food. Because here it is a prohibition on the person, but not in the sense that the act of eating is prohibited to you. It is result-oriented. The person must be in a state of affliction. You are forbidden to benefit from the thing you eat, because if you benefit, then you are not fasting. The problem is not the act of eating. If so, of course a partial measure is prohibited—what difference is there between that and forbidden fat? So what if it depends on time? The dependence on time is a sign, not a cause. With Passover the dependence on time shows you that this is a prohibition on the act of eating. On Yom Kippur the dependence on time shows you that the object is not repulsive—in that sense it is like leavened food on Passover. But on the other hand you cannot say that this is not a prohibition on benefiting from the thing, or a requirement to avoid the thing, when the whole foundation of Yom Kippur is the obligation to fast. Okay. Therefore on Yom Kippur a partial measure really does apply, and there is no problem learning it from forbidden fat. Okay?

All right, I’ll stop here. I’ll send you—there’s also more regarding nullification and many other things; there are lots of implications of this interesting principle. I’ll send you an article I wrote on it. But next time I want to finish the definition of prohibitions of eating, move on to drinking, and finish a few discussions about Yom Kippur as much as we can. We really only have one more meeting. A complete recovery, thank you very much, blessings to you.