Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 12

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or alternatively. That’s exactly the practical difference. Right. Okay, there’s a lot to get into here. I mentioned it in passing. There are already discussions in the Talmud and among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). I’m not going into it now; I’m just sketching the basic lines. I’d even put it a bit more sharply, in slightly different wording. If the Torah had defined the prohibition as a prohibition on a result rather than on the action, then theoretically I could argue: I performed the action, and the result came about on its own; I only put myself into a state of compulsion. How can you punish me for such a thing? Right? That of course depends on the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about someone who places himself into a situation of compulsion. But at least according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim), yes, someone who boards a ship three days before the Sabbath, or that child whose hot water spilled out in Eruvin 97, there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) on this issue. But according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who hold that someone who places himself into compulsion is exempt, then the Torah basically cannot define a prohibition as a result-based prohibition when all that is in my hands is the action. Because if I did the action and the result came on its own, then let the Holy One, blessed be He, complain to Himself. I only did the action. That’s permitted. The result is already something that came about on its own. Of course this is just another way of presenting what I said earlier: that the Torah prohibits only what is in my control, not what it really wants to prevent. Okay.

Now a few more comments on this matter. In the Mishnah in Keritot 12, the Tannaim there dispute whether liability for the prohibition of eating requires that from the beginning of the eating until its end it be within the time it takes to eat half a loaf. And in practice we rule like the Sages, that it has to be within that time. Okay? That’s the accepted ruling, so we’re used to it, but in fact it’s a Tannaitic dispute. Okay. Now the Chelkat Yoav in Yoreh De’ah, section 9, asks: according to Reish Lakish, who says the prohibition is intestinal benefit, why should I care whether it was within the time it takes to eat half a loaf? In the end, an eating-sized amount is sitting in my intestines. The satiety is the same satiety. What difference does it make what pace I ate at? Whether I ate it in less than four minutes, more than four minutes, or nine—depending on how long that time is. Still, in the end—on the contrary—even when you eat slowly there is more satiety… you’re more full. Right? So why… why should the pace of eating matter?

Granted, according to Rabbi Yohanan—and here the Chelkat Yoav assumes what I said earlier—that according to Rabbi Yohanan, when he says “benefit of the throat,” it does not literally mean benefit of the throat. The benefit is only a manner of speaking; what he means is the act of eating, not benefit. Okay? So he says, fine, then the act of eating is defined as eating at a certain pace, or up to a certain pace. But if the problem is really only result-oriented, namely intestinal benefit, then why should the pace matter? That’s his question.

So first of all, you see from here that the Chelkat Yoav really understood that according to Rabbi Yohanan, when it says “benefit of the throat,” it doesn’t actually mean benefit of the throat, but rather the act of eating—yes, the expression “benefit of the throat” is only… And then he makes a very interesting claim that turns the whole thing upside down. He claims that even according to Reish Lakish, this is not really a result-based prohibition. The prohibition is a prohibition on placing the food in the intestines. Meaning: I said earlier that the question is whether according to both of them it is a prohibition of benefit, or whether for Rabbi Yohanan it is a prohibition on the action. And according to Reish Lakish it is clearly a prohibition… but it is still a definition of an action, not a definition of a result, of the benefit. And then he says: if so, then even according to Reish Lakish one can speak about the time it takes to eat half a loaf, because you are defining what the action is that the Torah prohibited. I already mentioned that the Minchat Chinukh argues that even according to Reish Lakish—according to Reish Lakish one needs both benefit of the throat and benefit of the intestines—so there are all sorts of debates here.

One could of course say that eating not within the time it takes to eat half a loaf is not the normal manner of eating, and therefore you are exempt. After all, everyone agrees that eating in an abnormal manner is exempt. How does that fit with Reish Lakish? He doesn’t disagree about abnormal eating; at least there’s no indication that Reish Lakish disagrees with the principle that abnormal eating is exempt. No? So how can he say: even though the prohibition is a prohibition of benefit, if you do it in an unusual way, with some change, you are still exempt—even though the prohibition is a prohibition on benefit. So here too it could be the same thing.

According to Maimonides there is in general also room to discuss Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish—why at all? Because if according to Maimonides the prohibition of eating is nothing other than a prohibition of benefit, just different forms of benefit, then why should I care which benefit is required? Say, according to Reish Lakish, if there were only benefit of the throat and not benefit of the intestines, then it would not be prohibited—why not? After all, every benefit is prohibited; eating is only one example. So why does it matter which benefit there is? Therefore, according to Maimonides, it seems that Reish Lakish at least understands that benefit of the throat is not benefit at all; it is an action, and therefore he says it is not prohibited—they prohibited benefits. If benefit of the throat were benefit, just a different kind of benefit from intestinal benefit, then Reish Lakish should not disagree, because as we saw from Rabbi Abbahu, the Torah prohibited eating only as an example; in truth it prohibits all forms of benefit, and eating is only an example. So what difference does it make whether it is benefit of the throat or benefit of the intestines? After all, benefit that is neither in the throat nor in the intestines is also prohibited. What’s the difference? Therefore it makes sense that Reish Lakish, who requires intestinal benefit, probably sees benefit of the throat as not benefit at all.

And now we have to discuss Rabbi Yohanan. Rabbi Yohanan, who says that it is prohibited—after all, according to Maimonides, the prohibition of eating is a prohibition of benefit, and he rules like Rabbi Yohanan that benefit of the throat is required—so Rabbi Yohanan apparently learns that benefit of the throat is also benefit, and that itself is exactly where he disagrees with Reish Lakish. He says: why should I care which benefit? The main thing is that there is benefit, because the prohibition of eating is not specifically eating; the main thing is that there is benefit, no matter what kind. And then it really comes out that according to Rabbi Yohanan, both intestinal benefit and throat benefit create liability; the point is simply that there is benefit, because why should it matter what kind of benefit—it isn’t important what kind of benefit, as long as there is de facto benefit, okay? Maybe according to Maimonides Reish Lakish is like…

[Speaker C] Fat. Meaning, even after I swallowed it, if say I induced vomiting, right, then there was no intestinal benefit even though you did enjoy it—you ate and enjoyed it, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question—whether he sees that as benefit.

[Speaker C] Right, when did you enjoy it? You only enjoyed it through the throat, but not… Rabbi Yohanan is stricter; he says the moment it reached the throat, you enjoyed it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously that’s possible. I’m just asking how, according to Maimonides, that could be, because according to Maimonides all benefit is prohibited, so why should it matter if I only benefited in the throat? Why does Reish Lakish say I’m not liable?

[Speaker C] Where is the place that defines the benefit? Why should location matter?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if the benefit is neither in the throat nor in the intestines? I just used it for, I don’t know, a bath. What? That too is benefit, after all it’s a prohibition of benefit. According to Maimonides eating is not specific—any benefit.

[Speaker C] Right, the act of eating probably has places where you define the benefit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, define? Either you have benefit or you don’t.

[Speaker C] You also have benefit in the palate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then why is that not prohibited as benefit?

[Speaker C] So Maimonides knows that benefit of the palate is not benefit. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, it’s not benefit at all? No—that’s exactly what I’m saying. So he holds that something like that is not benefit. At what stage of eating is it when…

[Speaker C] You receive it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s why no—it’s not plausible in Maimonides. Because for Maimonides the prohibition is not on the act of eating; eating is only an example of deriving benefit. So why should I care if it is not defined as an act of eating? So I derived benefit not by way of the act of eating—but benefit not by way of the act of eating is also prohibited. After all, that is exactly the point: the act of eating is not specific; it is only an example.

[Speaker C] Eating and benefit may perhaps be connected according to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But according to Maimonides, we said they are not. Because according to Maimonides that is exactly the point.

[Speaker C] After all, Maimonides explicitly writes that a person who tastes something and spits it out—Maimonides doesn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About that I’m saying that this is not a simple question at all, and the question is whether such a thing would perhaps not be called benefit at all according to Maimonides. Ah—not benefit at all. Yes, that’s what I’m saying. Therefore according to my explanation also, a person…

[Speaker C] …who puts it only into the throat would not be called benefit, or benefit that reaches only the intestines would not be called…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what I’m claiming. And you wanted to say that it is benefit, only not the benefit of eating. I’m saying that if that were the case, then according to Maimonides it would not be plausible. Because if it is benefit, it should have been prohibited.

[Speaker C] So then it is prohibited—what difference does it make what kind of benefit? Earlier we said that Reish Lakish in a sense includes Rabbi Yohanan. Now when we look at it this way, Reish Lakish is the lenient one. Right. Meaning even according to the view that if he spits it out, according to Reish Lakish that’s still not benefit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it didn’t reach the intestines. It didn’t reach them and he spat it out.

[Speaker C] Meaning that it’s not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it didn’t reach, yes.

[Speaker C] Meaning it passed through the throat. Yes. No, one could sort of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is the approach—the common approach, the standard view, the standard interpretation—is that Reish Lakish disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan; he doesn’t add to him. What I said to him.

[Speaker C] Meaning he is more lenient.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So he is lenient—each one is lenient in some way. There’s room to discuss it. Rabbi Yohanan also…

[Speaker H] …is lenient.

[Speaker C] If it reaches…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …the stomach not דרך, not through the throat.

[Speaker C] Okay, so earlier we said that Reish Lakish includes Rabbi Yohanan.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: there is such a view; I mentioned such a view. But the simple understanding is that this is a dispute from one extreme to the other. And then I say: according to Maimonides, how are we to understand Reish Lakish? Why should it matter that it is benefit of the throat? The main thing is that there is benefit. It could be that Reish Lakish says, what are you talking about—that’s an action, not benefit. And prohibitions of eating are really prohibitions of benefit according to Maimonides. So what does Rabbi Yohanan disagree with? Rabbi Yohanan says what you said: that benefit of the throat is not an action, it is another kind of benefit. So then why should I care, really? After all, all benefit is prohibited. Okay. That is the first introduction regarding prohibitions of eating and what kind of benefit is required.

What about drinking? With regard to drinking, is there a difference between eating and drinking? So now we’ll begin talking about that. The Talmud, in Shevuot 22b, says that drinking is included in eating. The Talmud says there that for something whose normal mode is drinking, one is liable for drinking just as for eating, because if its normal mode is not drinking then it is simply not its normal way of being consumed. But on the fundamental level there is no difference between eating and drinking; drinking is included in eating. That’s it—we’ll see this in a moment. The measure for eating and the measure for drinking are different. Eating is by an olive’s bulk, and drinking by a quarter-log. Fine? Now the question is: why? Why is there a difference in the measures? If drinking is included in eating, why?

Now another question in the background: is there intestinal benefit in drinking? Say according to Reish Lakish, who requires intestinal benefit—or according to anyone who thinks Rabbi Yohanan might as well. In drinking there simply is no intestinal benefit, at least not of the sort there is in eating. It quenches your thirst in some way, but that’s not intestinal benefit; it’s not sitting there in your intestines. There is a level of benefit in everything.

[Speaker E] But that’s utility, not just pleasure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the question is whether you see that as the same thing as intestinal benefit according to Reish Lakish, or not. Okay. If you say that here you require intestinal benefit literally—that is what is called eating—then drinking doesn’t have that. Drinking is something else. Now that too is prohibited, as the Talmud says. I’m not saying drinking is permitted. But the question is whether it is the same type of prohibition as eating or something else. And then all the criteria would be different criteria, and that’s also why the measures are different. Here it’s a quarter-log and there it’s an olive’s bulk. So here too there is room to hesitate: since the measures are different, does that really mean these are different types of prohibition, or only that different measures are required to reach the level of prohibited benefit, because the benefits are produced in different ways, while still being the same type or the same basic idea.

Okay, there are all sorts of references here; I’ll send you the summary and then you can see. I’m not going into the details. Also regarding the time one has to drink, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree. Maimonides, in the Laws of Forbidden Foods, holds that the time is the time to drink a quarter-log. And there are others—yes, for example the Ran, and this view is also brought in the Shulchan Arukh—that it has to be within the time it takes to eat half a loaf for drinking as well. It has to be within that time.

[Speaker E] What’s the difference between a quarter-log and the time to eat half a loaf in terms of…?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a different amount of time. Never mind—the time is different.

[Speaker C] Wait—in ordinary eating, drinking a quarter-log, eating half a loaf?

[Speaker E] How long is that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Drinking a quarter-log is faster; there’s a difference in time.

[Speaker C] In principle, for drinking a quarter-log it’s basically what you normally drink. Here, regarding the time for eating, we said that you don’t eat the olive’s bulk in the amount of time it takes to eat an olive’s bulk; rather, you eat the olive’s bulk in three or four times that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying there’s a difference here even beyond the question that one is a quarter-log and the other an olive’s bulk. Although it’s not entirely clear.

[Speaker C] That’s why whenever people talk about eating matzah, it’s not logical that people eat so fast, because the idea is that the moment you eat in a normal way, you could then multiply that by another factor of three or four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously—but I’m saying that… But you have to eat, you have to eat an olive’s bulk. The moment you ate an olive’s bulk, you violated the prohibition, so what difference does it make?

[Speaker C] No, but you can eat that olive’s bulk with intervals of several times the normal rate of eating. Meaning if, say, it takes you a minute to eat an olive’s bulk, then supposedly you can eat it stretched over three or four times that continuously. Because what does an olive’s bulk within the time it takes to eat half a loaf mean? Not an olive’s bulk within the time it takes to eat an olive’s bulk. An olive’s bulk within the time it takes to eat an olive’s bulk might take you a minute; an olive’s bulk within the time it takes to eat half a loaf—which is three eggs, four eggs—that’s three or four times as much. Obviously. But with a quarter-log you don’t have that gap of—you just drink normally.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a quarter-log it’s the time of drinking. Even though what you drink is the time you need—right. If you drink two quarter-logs, say, then you’ll do it in the time of two quarter-logs. For the first quarter-log you’ll incur liability in the first time span, and for the second quarter-log in the second time span, if it’s not all at once, and so on. Yes.

So in short, there are differences in the measures, and the question is whether that means there are two kinds of prohibition here. So I said there is a dispute over what amount of time is required, and maybe the dispute is over what it means that drinking is like eating. The one who says it is within the time it takes to eat half a loaf—the Ran, who says that—basically says that drinking really is eating; it’s just another form of eating. Therefore the time measure is a universal one, the time it takes to eat half a loaf. But Maimonides, who says it is the time to drink a quarter-log, at least opens up the possibility—one can still say—that this is like a normal prohibition of eating: derive the rule from it and apply it accordingly, meaning with drinking, look at what makes sense in terms of how long drinking takes; each thing according to its own nature. Okay? Just as here you need a bit… so why don’t you do the same with foods? It depends what you eat. Some things are eaten quickly, some slowly. Why not there? Fine. So either you have here a fixed rule, or something like that, or a law given to Moses at Sinai: measures, partitions, and barriers are a law given to Moses at Sinai. But according to Maimonides at least, the possibility is opened up to say that these really are two different prohibitions, and therefore the time it takes to eat half a loaf simply does not apply to drinking; it’s not relevant. The measures of eating and drinking do not combine. Someone who ate half a quarter-log and drank half a quarter-log and ate half an olive’s bulk is not liable. The measures don’t combine. And that really does indicate a bit that these are two different types—that it’s not like eating two half-measures in different forms, like eating half an olive’s bulk of fried pork and half an olive’s bulk of cooked pork. Then you still ate an olive’s bulk of pork, so of course that combines, right?

[Speaker B] Is an olive’s bulk a measure of volume or weight?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Say volume. Why does it matter?

[Speaker B] If it’s weight then it’s obvious why they don’t combine—you can’t combine weight. A quarter-log is volume, right? A quarter-log is volume. You can’t combine weight—two different kinds of measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And a quarter-log is volume…

[Speaker B] An olive’s bulk is also volume.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is a quarter-log also weight? Of course—whoever translates into weight translates that too into weight. Why not? What’s the difference? Weigh how much a quarter-log of water weighs, and an olive’s bulk. A quarter-log of water, a quarter-log of wine—all that is translated from volume. Yes.

[Speaker B] So from the volume you translate it into weight?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whoever translates into weight will translate that too into weight.

[Speaker B] But here it’s a prohibition measured by volume, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are both prohibitions measured by volume? According to everyone?

[Speaker C] Not according to everyone, okay…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ashkenazim, Sephardim—there are all sorts of views on that. Yes. Okay.

[Speaker C] So how does that fit with the statement that drinking is included in eating? These seem to be two different things, drinking and eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That if something’s normal way is by drinking, then one is liable for drinking it as though one ate it. Meaning, you don’t need a separate prohibition in the Torah for drinking; it is enough that there is a prohibition of eating—you have violated the prohibition of eating. If the normal mode of that item is drinking, then that too will count as eating for purposes of the Torah’s prohibition. But in terms of the relationship between when you eat and when you drink, they do not combine because these are two different ways of violating the prohibition of eating.

[Speaker C] Yes, but then the assumption is very… If the Torah says “you shall afflict yourselves,” you could say “you shall afflict yourselves” only…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “you shall afflict yourselves” we’ll get to later. I’m not yet on Yom Kippur; I’m still with ordinary prohibitions of eating. Got it. I’m still… And on the contrary, that’s exactly where the practical differences will be. The claim is that if the two measures do not combine, that is an indication that these are two different prohibitions. But one could say no: it is the same prohibition, but they do not combine because there is a condition in the prohibition, namely the measure. Measures, partitions, and barriers are a law given to Moses at Sinai, and the condition was not met, because the condition for drinking and the condition for eating are different conditions, and you did not fulfill that condition. This is really a question of how I relate to measures altogether in prohibitions of eating and drinking. Does the measure define what is called eating, or not? Is eating still eating even below the measure, but there is a measure that tells me from when there is prohibition, from when there is liability? What? In other words, is the definition a halakhic one or a conceptual one?

I think I spoke about this one of the previous times, maybe about the counting of the Omer—you remember I think I spoke about it—there are sometimes situations, yes, when I mentioned a minor who reaches adulthood in the middle of Yom Kippur, and I said: does he have to complete the fast? Apparently, according to the one who says that the fast is one unit, then he’s stuck; half the day he already didn’t fast, so there’s nothing to complete. And then I said that’s not true, because the question is: when you define the fast as one unit, is that a definition of the concept of fasting, or of the prohibition of fasting? Or of the obligation to fast? If it is a definition of the concept, then what’s the problem? After all, the minor also fasted until now by virtue of educational obligation. So if he continues fasting until the end of the day, you ask yourself: did he fast? Certainly he fasted. True, in the first half he did not fulfill the commandment of fasting because he was a minor; he fasted only for educational purposes. But the action—the act of fasting—he did. So if the definition of the act of fasting is a full day, then he has to continue fasting. If the definition is a halakhic definition of what the obligation of fasting is, then no, because the first half of the day… And the same with the counting of the Omer: a minor who reaches adulthood in the middle of the counting of the Omer. The question is whether when the Torah requires completeness, that is a requirement in the concept of counting, so that even if I counted under the educational obligation until I reached adulthood, once I reach adulthood I continue counting because after all I did count; or whether that is a definition in the laws of counting, in which case I say: I did not fulfill the laws of counting as long as I was a minor, so I have no reason to continue counting.

So here too it is basically the same issue. The question is whether the measure defines the act of eating, or whether it defines the prohibition of eating. The question whether less than the measure is eating at all will of course be connected to the question of a half-measure, the law of a half-measure. Whoever says a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law—perhaps that is really because at the end of the day there is eating here, only the prohibition is not complete until you have done a full measure.

In Hullin 120 the Talmud talks about someone who melted the forbidden fat and gulped it down. Forbidden fat is a prohibition of eating, right? But he turned it into a liquid—he melted the fat, a kind of mashed forbidden fat—and he drank it. So the Talmud says there that he is liable, and then asks: but with forbidden fat, Scripture says “eating,” and this is not eating. And they answer: we derive from “soul” to include one who drinks. On the basis of eating as such, you would not have said this; basically he would have been exempt. But there is a special derivation that includes one who drinks. Tosafot ask there: why do we need a verse? After all, there is a general principle that drinking is included in eating. For in all prohibitions of eating it says “eating,” and we include drinking in that. Even more so, yes. So Tosafot say that this rule is stated only regarding something that is by nature a drink, things that are essentially liquids. Forbidden fat is essentially food; about such a thing it was not said that drinking is included in eating. What do we see? That according to Tosafot, “drinking is included in eating” does not refer to the act of drinking but to liquids. Liquids—eating liquids is also eating; how do you eat liquids? You drink them. But if you drink forbidden fat, then that is not included in eating; for that you need a special source that also prohibits such a thing. So he is basically saying that drinking melted forbidden fat is considered eating, not that it is considered drinking—it’s not drinking. On the side of the prohibition of drinking he would not be liable; rather, this too is considered eating—that is the novelty. But the prohibition on forbidden fat is a prohibition of eating, right? Therefore if I were drinking forbidden fat I would be exempt. Only here there is a novelty: if I melt the forbidden fat and drink it, that is called that I ate, not that I drank. So it comes out that “drinking is included in eating” does not mean that drinking literally is eating; on the contrary, with foods you can do that, fine, but it’s not that drinking is included in eating. Without a separate source you would not have needed…

[Speaker C] Melted pork would be the same thing. No? Here you don’t have a separate verse. You don’t have that extra derivation…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …to tell you…

[Speaker C] So then you performed an act of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …

[Speaker C] The Torah did not make you liable for eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be—unless you can learn it from forbidden fat, I don’t know. But yes, maybe, I don’t know.

[Speaker F] Liquid forbidden fat being prohibited is not so simple.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Talmud says: he melted the forbidden fat and drank it.

[Speaker F] If it was intact and he melted it, he basically took on another form.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is liquid forbidden fat? Forbidden fat is not liquid.

[Speaker F] It got heated up and became liquid.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the question is whether it is prohibited. We’re not talking about lamp fat; we’re talking about animal fat, yes? Doesn’t it become liquid in heat? That’s called melting—what do you mean?

[Speaker F] No, but he doesn’t want… there’s a difference if I’m standing in front of fat…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that doesn’t matter. Heaven did that—what difference does it make? The sun did it. But in the animal it was not liquid. In any case, originally it was not liquid. It’s like if you froze blood and ate it.

In Tosafot HaRosh there in the same place in Hullin, Tosafot HaRosh asks the same question, and answers similarly: forbidden fat, whose normal mode is by eating, therefore I needed a special derivation; but something whose normal mode is not by eating does not need a special derivation. Rabbi Akiva Eiger there notes that you see from Tosafot that drinking forbidden fat is eating, not drinking. But Tosafot HaRosh adds: “and from here too we do not learn that something whose normal mode is by drinking is called eating.” He says, why not learn from here the principle that drinking is included in eating? And then he says: because drinking melted food is eating, not drinking; but you cannot learn from that about drinking liquids. According to Tosafot, with drinking liquids this is obvious; you don’t need to learn it from here. According to Tosafot HaRosh, you cannot learn it from here. The dispute is over what exactly the verse of “soul” taught us: that when we melt forbidden fat and drink it, that is drinking; or that when we melt forbidden fat and drink it, that is eating, because forbidden fat is eaten, not drunk, and then it has nothing to do with drinking liquids, with things whose essence is that they are liquids.

Rabbeinu Manoach, for example, holds that the measure for melted leaven is a quarter-log. Leaven—if I melted the leaven, now I turned it into a liquid—its measure is a quarter-log, even though it is melted leaven, leaven that was originally solid. In Maimonides it seems that it is by an olive’s bulk. And indeed the later authorities (Acharonim) say that there is a dispute here on this matter.

[Speaker C] According to Tosafot…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether in the end this thing is considered…

[Speaker C] …drinking in its own right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. It is really eating, and therefore its measure is an olive’s bulk. Okay, that is exactly the point. Because Maimonides himself, by the way, is the father of the view that for liquids the measure is a quarter-log and not the time it takes to eat half a loaf, because Maimonides understands that liquids are drinking, something different. Therefore when you drink something melted, you are not simply eating; that is not called drinking.

[Speaker C] And according to that, it solves the whole problem of in-between cases, like yogurt—you don’t know whether it is drinking or eating. But according to those who say that if originally it was something solid, if it was originally…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Originally—what do you mean?

[Speaker C] What was it originally?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, after they manufactured it—that’s not called that I melted it.

[Speaker C] But it’s not like drinking water.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Originally it was drink, because it was milk, but they made from it…

[Speaker C] Unless it’s milk, yes. And if you turn something from solid to liquid, it remains solid.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what practical difference does that make?

[Speaker C] For the blessing… no, I’m telling you that it’s by an olive’s bulk.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the question whether it is by a quarter-log or by an olive’s bulk is exactly the same dispute. The question is whether melted leaven or a melted prohibition of eating is eating, and therefore it is prohibited; or whether it is drinking, and therefore it is prohibited. And then the question is whether the measure is a quarter-log or an olive’s bulk.

In Tosefet Yom HaKippurim he is uncertain in a case where there is an initial assumption that food and drink combine. Do they combine to a quarter-log, or do they combine to an olive’s bulk? In the initial assumption. In the conclusion they do not combine, but combine to what? Half a quarter-log or half an olive’s bulk? The question is whether you go by the smaller minimum measure or by the larger one. It could be that this too depends on the same question. Is eating… is it the same prohibition, eating and drinking, and then they combine to an olive’s bulk; or not, in which case you cannot combine to an olive’s bulk when half of it is drinking. You have to combine to a quarter-log, because then at least you have the more appropriate measure between them.

Okay, so that finishes the introductions. I’m now moving into Yom Kippur. On Yom Kippur, everything we have discussed until now basically leads us to the point that the comparison between the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur and prohibitions of eating in general is not trivial. It depends on the different views both in prohibitions of eating and in understanding the prohibitions of Yom Kippur. In the passage on 74a, we saw—you remember—that Reish Lakish looks for a negative commandment regarding eating, right? Because regarding eating, what is explicit in the Torah is the positive commandment of affliction: “you shall afflict yourselves.” The negative commandment is not explicit. With the prohibitions of labor it is the opposite. So Reish Lakish says there in passing that the Torah could not have written “do not eat.” Why not? Because then I would have said that the measure is an olive’s bulk, whereas on Yom Kippur the measure is a large date. Why? Because a large date is what settles the mind, right? A large date is what gives a person mental relief. So what do we see? That indeed the essence of the prohibition on Yom Kippur is different from ordinary prohibitions of eating. The change in the measure is not just a change from a law given to Moses at Sinai, but follows from the definition of the prohibition. Is the prohibition a prohibition of damaging the affliction, or is it a prohibition of eating? So apparently, in Reish Lakish there, it sounds as though the prohibition on Yom Kippur is not a prohibition of eating; it is a prohibition of mental relief.

[Speaker I] Settling the mind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, in the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter it says that eating and drinking do not combine on Yom Kippur. Eating and drinking do not combine. In the Talmud on 81, a Tannaitic dispute is brought on this from the Mishnah in Me’ilah, where the Tannaim disagree whether the blood of a creeping creature combines with the flesh to transmit impurity in the amount of a lentil, and Rabbi Yehoshua says that all laws and measures that are the same combine. So there is a Tannaitic dispute whether food and drink combine. And here it says that on Yom Kippur they do not combine, so the Talmud asks how this is to be reconciled. There is a dispute among the Amoraim over how to reconcile the two Mishnayot. Rav Chisda and Reish Lakish say that our Mishnah is according to Rabbi Yehoshua; our Mishnah, which says that food and drink do not combine, is according to Rabbi Yehoshua.

[Speaker C] Like the dispute on Yom Kippur. Exactly. Like the dispute in other eating prohibitions, so too the dispute on Yom Kippur.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s Rav Chisda and Reish Lakish. Rav Nachman and Rabbi Yohanan say that here even the Rabbis would agree that they do not combine. Skin and flesh combine because we are dealing there with impurity, and there it is one impurity. But regarding mental relief—so says the Talmud—regarding mental relief, eating and drinking are not the same kind of relief, and therefore they do not combine.

Now apparently—actually, not apparently—there is a dispute among the Amoraim here over whether combining eating and drinking on Yom Kippur is the same as in other eating prohibitions or not. That is basically the discussion. What is more interesting here is that among the disputing Amoraim are Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. Now let’s do the accounting for a moment. According to Rabbi Yohanan, Yom Kippur is a different kind of prohibition. Why? Because it is about mental relief, and therefore they do not combine. Rabbi Yohanan is consistent with his own view, because in other prohibitions of eating Rabbi Yohanan argues that what matters is benefit of the throat, not benefit of the intestines. Benefit of the throat is not mental relief, not satiety. Therefore according to his view, Yom Kippur is certainly different. And then this is a major novelty. It comes out from here as a very, very fundamental principle: Rabbi Yohanan, who says that in ordinary prohibitions of eating what determines things is benefit of the throat, would agree that on Yom Kippur it is benefit of the intestines, because on Yom Kippur what matters is mental relief.

And Reish Lakish, who holds regarding the other prohibitions that it is benefit of the intestines—it is no wonder that he says that just as there is a dispute in the other prohibitions, so too there is a dispute on Yom Kippur, because it is benefit of the intestines both on Yom Kippur and in the other prohibitions. Mental relief and benefit of the intestines are the same thing. Except that then, of course, the question arises: according to Rabbi Yohanan, why in the other prohibitions is the measure not a large date? According to Reish Lakish, why is the measure not a large date? If we identify benefit of the intestines with mental relief, then I would expect Reish Lakish to hold that in all prohibitions of eating, where the basis of the prohibition is benefit of the intestines—which we will translate as mental relief—the measure should have been a large date and not an olive’s bulk.

[Speaker J] They also define the definition of eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker J] The verb “to eat.” You…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean that if one eats an olive’s bulk there, then what, that isn’t eating? So why in the other prohibitions are you liable for it? Necessarily, here according to Reish Lakish—we are now just organizing everything we have learned until now, using all that we have learned until now, all the possibilities—it could be that according to Reish Lakish the measures really do not define the prohibition but are imposed on the prohibition as an external condition. A law given to Moses at Sinai. And then it works like this: there is mental relief in every food you eat. But how much relief is there? Every grain you eat gives some degree of mental relief. There is mental relief in an olive’s bulk; there is mental relief in a large date. So why is there a difference between Yom Kippur and the other prohibitions? A law given to Moses at Sinai—measures, partitions, and barriers are a law given to Moses at Sinai.

And indeed the Talmud explicitly says—let’s see if I can find where—the Talmud explicitly brings the large-date measure of Yom Kippur as a measure that is a law given to Moses at Sinai. It does not tie it to mental relief. So apparently it really seems that this is not a direct consequence of the concept of mental relief, as though with less than a large date there is no mental relief. The criterion is mental relief, but how much mental relief is needed for it to count as prohibited mental relief? There is some mental relief even in an olive’s bulk. The law given to Moses at Sinai says a large date. Usually the conception is that a law given to Moses at Sinai concerning measures does not determine the essence of the matter, but only says how much of the thing is required in order to violate the prohibition. Therefore, certainly according to Rabbi Yohanan—by the way, the interplay between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish here comes in from every direction. They disagree in every aspect of the passage, and the question is in which aspects there is a connection and in which aspects there isn’t.

Also regarding a half-measure, after all, that too is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. And Rabbi Yohanan’s claim that a half-measure is prohibited by Torah law—usually, this is how Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains it, and I think that is the accepted understanding—is that it is fit to combine. What does that mean? It means that even in a half-measure there is something of what is in the full measure, just not enough; the deficiency is quantitative. So the quantitative requirement does not mean that below the measure you did not eat. You also ate below the measure; you just did not eat enough to become liable. So there is a prohibition here, only you won’t receive lashes, you won’t receive punishment. So that is exactly the conception that says the measure is, all in all, an arbitrary measure. Because if the Torah had said: mental relief is prohibited—how much mental relief, though? There is mental relief that I reach with an olive’s bulk, and with a large date. It is not a matter there of whether there is or is not mental relief. It is a matter of how much mental relief is required to violate the prohibition. For that the law given to Moses at Sinai concerning measures was needed. It is only a quantitative question. Even an olive’s bulk calms him a little.

[Speaker C] So no—then it’s a law given to Moses at Sinai.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a law given to Moses at Sinai: a large date. It’s not an estimate. So why do you need a law given to Moses at Sinai?

[Speaker C] I think you need it because with a law given to Moses at Sinai you can also say it’s rabbinic. You can say a law given to Moses at Sinai is rabbinic; it’s not really, so to speak, Torah law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t say that. Tosafot says in one place—and there are two places—that regarding something said to be a law given to Moses at Sinai, they say it is rabbinic. But plainly it does not seem that way in our passage, I mean in the passage of measures. Because in the passage of measures they bring either the verse “a land of wheat and barley” or a law given to Moses at Sinai. Plainly it looks as if both are Torah law, especially since the measures determine the measure for lashes. It is hard to assume that something rabbinic determines the measure for lashes. It is Torah law, plainly. I think the law given to Moses at Sinai concerning measures is Torah law.

[Speaker C] Fine, if you are trying, so to speak, to assess this matter of how the Sages want to evaluate when the Torah says “you shall afflict yourselves,” yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it’s not a law given to Moses at Sinai; then the Sages established it.

[Speaker C] Fine, but when the Torah says, say, measures—by measures you mean all the Torah’s measures. It’s not that it says them explicitly in the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, a law given to Moses at Sinai isn’t Torah law?

[Speaker C] A law given to Moses at Sinai isn’t Torah law. Yes, but just like derivations—you can also say that once you make a derivation, that defines for you…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …the Torah’s prohibition.

[Speaker C] It’s not similar.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But still, Maimonides…

[Speaker C] …says that derivation is rabbinic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so here too, as it were. With derivation, indeed, you don’t get lashes. With a law given to Moses at Sinai—whereas for a half-measure you also don’t get lashes.

[Speaker C] The determination that you don’t have—as Maimonides defines it—the determination about which there is no dispute, everyone agrees on it, and Maimonides simply says that this determination basically defines how much a person settles his mind so that he is no longer fasting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that is a definition of the Sages, then why do you need here a law given to Moses at Sinai?

[Speaker C] Because Maimonides defines a law given to Moses at Sinai as something transmitted orally without dispute, say, that has no textual proof in the verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—a law given to Moses at Sinai means at Sinai. So where does it come from? It comes from Sinai. That’s where it comes from. Maimonides says that’s true: the Oral Torah, but from Sinai. The Oral Torah, but from Sinai. There was no dispute about it because it came from Sinai. But beyond that—and even if not Maimonides—even in Maimonides I think that’s not correct. When, in the straightforward sense, what is the accepted view regarding measures? When the Torah establishes what the prohibition is, after all there is a continuum of levels. You cannot know from what point it is called eating. Is one gram eating, and ten grams eating, and fifty grams eating, and two hundred grams eating? How much eating is needed for it to be prohibited? After all, there is no way to draw a sharp line. For that you need a law given to Moses at Sinai to draw the line. If that is indeed the case, then a large date on Yom Kippur is a law given to Moses at Sinai. The mental relief as a concept exists even below that; it is just the level of mental relief required. So if that is so, there is no contradiction as to why Reish Lakish in the other prohibitions requires an olive’s bulk—why an olive’s bulk is enough and you do not need a large date. Because the law given to Moses at Sinai said that the level of mental relief or intestinal benefit required in the other prohibitions is an olive’s bulk, and on Yom Kippur it is a large date.

[Speaker C] I asked: why define this mental relief? Specifically on Yom Kippur we have this concept of mental relief…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …and in other eating prohibitions we don’t? On the contrary—we do have it according to Reish Lakish.

[Speaker C] According to Reish Lakish, in the eating of other prohibitions there is mental relief.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—intestinal benefit. That is what is called intestinal benefit.

[Speaker C] You are explaining as though intestinal benefit is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And according to what I said earlier, that Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan are each consistent with their own approaches, Reish Lakish basically identifies the concept of intestinal benefit with the concept of settling a person’s mind, and that’s very reasonable—it’s very similar. And Rabbi Yochanan is consistent with his view that this is benefit to the throat.

[Speaker C] That sounds more like someone who’s fasting, not someone who now wants to violate a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you violate a prohibition, you need a definition of what counts.

[Speaker C] No, obviously, but when you talk about settling the mind, it sounds like a person—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is—

[Speaker C] Settling the mind?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means a person who’s fasting, and you give him a date, and he calms down. Obviously it has nothing to do with an olive-bulk. Obviously the goal is not that the pork should calm my mind, but the criterion for when I violated the prohibition of pork is that if I were hungry and I ate this, it would settle my mind. That gives me the measure of what counts as eating pork. But no, obviously the goal is not literally settling the mind in eating pork. Because that’s what’s called intestinal benefit. What does that mean? Go out and see—look at the meaning. What is intestinal benefit? Intestinal benefit is settling the mind. True, with pork the point is not that you have to be fasting from pork—that’s not the point—but still, the definition of the prohibition is: if you were hungry, and eating this amount of pork would settle your mind, then you violated the prohibition of pork. That’s what Reish Lakish says. Exactly—that’s what I asked. And I’m saying the answer is that the concept of settling the mind exists even with an olive-bulk, not only with a large date-bulk. A law given to Moses at Sinai determines how much settling of the mind is required, and it said: for other prohibitions, an olive-bulk is enough; on Yom Kippur you need a large date-bulk. But it’s still the same concept of settling the mind. No—why without a reason? The reason is exactly what you said earlier: because breaking a fast is not the same thing as—let me put it this way—when it comes to pork, what you really need is to derive benefit from the pork, right? As Maimonides says. Okay, when do you derive benefit from pork? Even if your mind is not settled, you still can’t say you didn’t enjoy it; even with an olive-bulk you enjoyed it. I’m not saying I would stop eating now if I were in a fast. After an olive-bulk I wouldn’t stop. But can you tell me I didn’t enjoy it? But the prohibition is not that my mind should be settled; the prohibition is that I benefit through intestinal benefit—a prohibition of benefit. So intestinal benefit is achieved even with an olive-bulk. On Yom Kippur there is no prohibition of benefit. On Yom Kippur you have to be fasting. When are you no longer considered fasting? When you’re calm. Not when you enjoyed it. Calm—that’s only with a large date-bulk. Or sufficiently calm—that’s only with a large date-bulk. There’s a lot of logic in this; these aren’t just formal excuses. There’s real logic here. Okay. So it could be that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish here are consistent with their own views, and the question of how this fits with their views about a partial measure—that’s also an interesting question. Because according to Rabbi Yochanan, a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, and then it makes a lot of sense that according to Rabbi Yochanan the measure is an external measure. Because even less than the full measure has the quality of the prohibition; the measure only determines how much is needed to incur lashes. According to Reish Lakish, the straightforward understanding is that less than the required measure doesn’t have the prohibition at all; the measure defines the prohibition. Let’s say a practical implication, for example—we won’t have time to get into partial measure, so I’ll just note it a bit here. Take Rashi in Sanhedrin: Rashi says that less than the value of a perutah, less than a perutah, is completely permitted. Entirely by Torah law, maybe even rabbinically—why? Because a person waives it. Now everybody asks: but what about partial measure? There’s a rule of partial measure. So fine, if someone says that partial measure applies only to prohibitions of eating, then there’s no problem. But according to certain approaches, the Maggid Mishneh claims that less than a perutah is not money. And here that’s exactly the point. But that’s in contrast to other kinds of partial measure, where Rabbi Yochanan does prohibit by Torah law. Why? Because in other cases, half an olive-bulk of pork or three-quarters of an olive-bulk of pork—that is pork. There just isn’t enough for lashes, so there it’s prohibited by Torah law. From theft, which is exceptional in the laws of partial measure, you can learn what the situation is in the usual case of partial measure, where according to Rabbi Yochanan it is prohibited by Torah law. Why? Because the measure does not determine the definition of the thing; the measure is an external condition. The definition of the thing exists even below the measure. Where the measure determines the definition of the thing, there even Rabbi Yochanan would agree that a partial measure is not prohibited by Torah law. As with theft. It is fit to combine.

[Speaker E] He’ll steal from him half a perutah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Less, because “fit to combine” is only an indication, a sign—it’s not the reason. It may be fit to combine, but that would be a phase change. Meaning, you transfer a quarter-perutah and another quarter-perutah and another quarter-perutah—suddenly after four times, money appears. A quarter-perutah is not money at all, not that it’s a quarter of money; it’s not money at all.

[Speaker C] And still, a person can rob his fellow—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to that, quarter, quarter, quarter, quarter?

[Speaker C] Yes, in separate acts, yes. So then why do we need the exposition of “all fat” at all, if it’s fit to combine?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so “fit to combine” is the explanation of “all fat,” simply speaking. There are two sources there, and the question is what the relation is between them; that needs discussion, you have to get into that passage. But if I take both of them, then the reasoning of “fit to combine” explains to me the meaning of “all fat.” Okay? The Chatam Sofer writes in a responsum that on Yom Kippur, according to everyone, the basis of the prohibition is intestinal benefit. Even Rabbi Yochanan agrees that on Yom Kippur the basis is intestinal benefit. Because everything Rabbi Yochanan says about benefit to the throat is in other prohibitions, where the prohibition is on the act of eating. On Yom Kippur, certainly the prohibition is about fasting, about settling the mind—that is, damage to the fast. So there too Rabbi Yochanan knows that it’s intestinal benefit, with all the implications. That’s the same line of thought I said earlier, only earlier I said it the other way around. I claimed that according to Rabbi Yochanan, in the other prohibitions—wait. No—that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish each go according to their own views: Reish Lakish says that in all prohibitions it’s intestinal benefit, so from his perspective Yom Kippur and the other prohibitions are the same thing, so just as there is a dispute here there is also a dispute there, and then you need explanations why they didn’t make the same dispute, or why they did make the same dispute. According to Rabbi Yochanan, who says that in other prohibitions it’s benefit to the throat—no, it’s the same as the Chatam Sofer, not the opposite—then on Yom Kippur he too agrees that it’s intestinal benefit, because it’s the settling of the mind of the fast. So therefore here, yes, this is really exactly what the Chatam Sofer says. He didn’t say it exactly this way, but almost. And he says: “And in my novellae I said that there it is speaking regarding Yom Kippur, that there it is speaking regarding Yom Kippur, and the large date-bulk of Yom Kippur, according to everyone, requires a larger measure, that a large date-bulk should remain in his intestines after what stuck between his gums.” Meaning, after some of it sticks between the gums, there must remain in the intestines a large date-bulk. In eating prohibitions, it is enough that you ate an olive-bulk even if an olive-bulk didn’t reach your intestines. But for the measure on Yom Kippur, if some stuck here in your teeth and a large date-bulk did not reach the intestines, you did not violate the prohibition. Because everyone requires intestinal benefit—that’s what he wants to claim. “And this reasoning appears in the Jerusalem Talmud, chapter 8 of Terumah; see the commentator there, who distinguishes between Yom Kippur and other prohibitions.” There are other passages too where you see this idea. The Tzafnat Pa’neach, for example, wants to claim in Hashlamah, volume 4, that on Yom Kippur too one receives lashes for eating an olive-bulk; it’s only the liability of karet that doesn’t apply to that. For karet you need a large date-bulk, but for lashes, an olive-bulk is enough. He apparently understands that on Yom Kippur there is a prohibition of eating; the condition of settling the mind is only a condition for karet, not for the very definition of the prohibition of eating. Now, how are we to understand that? One could have understood that karet, according to his view, is for the positive commandment, and lashes are for the prohibition. So lashes are for an olive-bulk and karet is for a large date-bulk. But then it comes out strange, because then it comes out that on Yom Kippur too the karet is for the positive commandment. Although we saw that according to Saadia Gaon and someone else too—Tosafot Rid—they say that indeed on Yom Kippur too the karet is for the positive commandment, not only in circumcision and Passover, which is a bit unusual.

[Speaker H] If he gets lashes, is he exempt from karet? Likewise, if he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he got lashes for the large date-bulk, he’ll be exempt from karet. But if he did not get lashes and he ate a large date-bulk, he’ll have karet. If he did not get lashes and ate an olive-bulk, he will not have karet. He is liable for lashes, but not in a way that exempts him from karet—just an ordinary liability for lashes.

[Speaker H] But exemption from karet—does that happen only when he is actually lashed, or when he becomes liable under a prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, when he is actually lashed. Those liable to karet who were lashed are exempted from their karet. Otherwise, where do we find liability to karet? In every prohibition involving karet, are there lashes? No. Or Sameach proves from the Jerusalem Talmud against the Chatam Sofer—not only from the Jerusalem Talmud, also from the Babylonian Talmud, from several places. He says as follows: “And behold, this is clear”—that means section 4:1—“that even though the measure on Yom Kippur is a large date-bulk, because it says ‘that she not be afflicted’ and not ‘eating,’ and for that reason the Merciful One did not write ‘eating’ concerning Yom Kippur, as Reish Lakish explains in Yoma 81, nevertheless its essence depends on benefit to the throat.” Against what I said, and what the Chatam Sofer says. He says: although on Yom Kippur what you really need is settling the mind, still it is clear that Rabbi Yochanan will continue with his own view that this is benefit to the throat and not intestinal benefit. Why? He apparently holds that the fact that it is written in the language of fasting is only a disclosure—it discloses that the measure is a large date-bulk—but the prohibition on Yom Kippur is a prohibition of eating, well, an obligation of fasting, like all eating prohibitions in the Torah. And if Rabbi Yochanan says that in Torah eating prohibitions the prohibition is benefit to the throat, then on Yom Kippur too it is benefit to the throat. So why is it a large date-bulk? Because it wasn’t written in the language of eating but in the language of affliction. That hints that the measure here is a large date-bulk and not an olive-bulk, but it’s not essentially because the obligation is fasting, and therefore that’s how we learn it. It’s only a disclosure, a revealing indication. That’s what he wants to claim. Which is strained. Maybe because of the reason of the verse that we talked about earlier.

[Speaker C] If you move this into the realm of technicality, then you can say anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. But I’m saying—that’s his claim, that’s his claim. I also really don’t tend to think that way. And he has proofs. He says, for example, as is explicit in the Talmud in Shevuot 13: “How do you ever get karet on Yom Kippur?” After all, the very day itself atones. So how is there karet on Yom Kippur? The day itself atones. So how do you become liable for the prohibitions of Yom Kippur that carry karet? He says: he swallowed a piece of meat and choked and died. He ate meat and choked and died. So the day itself did not manage to atone for him, and he violated the prohibition. Now why exactly did he violate the prohibition? It choked him in the throat, so it never reached the intestines. So how can Rabbi Yochanan hold this? Therefore this is proof that according to Rabbi Yochanan, even on Yom Kippur it’s benefit to the throat and not intestinal benefit.

[Speaker G] And that’s strained—there are tons of answers—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There—end of the day and so on—so the question is whether really, yes, but according to the one who says that it’s not the end of the day, then again the question is whether there is a dispute among the various interpretations there. You can reject it, but that’s one of his proofs, for example. And for instance he goes against the Chatam Sofer, and according to him that same dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan in the other prohibitions will also exist on Yom Kippur.

[Speaker C] And what about the measure in the teeth—did he agree with him on that? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That the measure is—that’s a practical implication. There’s no proof for it, so maybe he would disagree there too.

[Speaker C] Meaning that even if some remains in his teeth—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same as in the other prohibitions. The very fact that he put it into his mouth—same as in the other prohibitions. Okay, the measure is a large date-bulk and not an olive-bulk, that’s all. And there’s no difference between Yom Kippur—which has many implications—and the other prohibitions. All the implications I mentioned, the ones that distinguish Yom Kippur from the other prohibitions, are erased according to the Or Sameach. According to the Chatam Sofer they remain. The question is whether you take the idea of settling the mind, or the concept of fasting, as merely a disclosure that there is a different measure, and that’s all—or whether you understand that there is a different essential nature to the prohibition here, which is the whole direction I’ve been taking all along, namely that it is not just that. But according to the Or Sameach, that really is not correct. In the Talmud on page 80 it discusses the pace of eating and says that it is within the time of eating half a loaf, and the rationale there on Yom Kippur is that in this way his mind is settled. So apparently you see against the Or Sameach. What do you mean, “in this way his mind is settled”? So you see that settling the mind is not just an indication that the measure is a large date-bulk. It really is the criterion for whether you violated the prohibition or did not violate the prohibition—the question is whether there is settling of the mind or not. That is proof against the Or Sameach—together with the Chatam Sofer. According to most halakhic decisors, the measure for drinking on Yom Kippur is a cheekful and not a quarter-log. Again, because of settling the mind. Because a quarter-log is only a measure of what is significant—how much of the prohibited object is significant. On Yom Kippur, the question is not how much is significant in the object, but whether your mind has settled or not settled. Again, we see that we treat settling the mind as the criterion. You see this in the Talmud in several places. That’s why I find it hard to accept what the Or Sameach says. So his reason still needs discussion there in the passage in Shevuot, but on the face of it it’s hard to accept what he said. Look—in Sukkah 6 it says that a large date-bulk on Yom Kippur is one of the measures that are a law given to Moses at Sinai. True, it is not stated explicitly, because what it says there in the initial assumption is that the Talmud derives it from “a land of wheat and barley,” all the measures. “Olive oil and honey”—the last “honey” there is the large date-bulk, the fig. That is the large date-bulk—no, honey is a date, actually, right? I don’t remember. In one of them it is the large date-bulk, and from there they learn the large date-bulk of Yom Kippur. Then when the Talmud rejects that and reaches the conclusion that it is a law given to Moses at Sinai, the assumption is that all the measures that were learned from the verse are now a law given to Moses at Sinai, and then it comes out that the measure of the large date-bulk on Yom Kippur is itself a law given to Moses at Sinai. According to the approach that settling the mind is an essential criterion on Yom Kippur, then apparently, as I told you earlier, you seemingly wouldn’t need a law given to Moses at Sinai here, because just determine from when a person’s mind is settled, and that’s it. But that can be rejected in two ways. Either indeed the large date-bulk is not a law given to Moses at Sinai; what the Talmud said in general is: don’t learn from the verses what is supposed to be learned from a verse, but there is a law given to Moses at Sinai. The large date-bulk on Yom Kippur really remains a matter of reasoning—because in this way his mind is settled, that’s all. A second possibility is like I said earlier: a person’s mind is also settled with an olive-bulk; the question is how much settling of the mind is required, and for that you need a law given to Moses at Sinai. Where exactly is the line drawn? So in my eyes this is not such a strong proof. Rashi there in Sukkah writes explicitly: because on Yom Kippur it does not say “eating,” but rather something that removes him from affliction—something that takes him out of the category of an afflicted person. So you explicitly see that the large date-bulk is some definition of what counts as not fasting. Of course, according to the Or Sameach, he’ll say that this is only a sign, not the reason. The fact that it is written in the language of affliction is an indication that the Torah wants a large date-bulk here, not that this is the essential definition of the prohibition—it’s only the revealing indication. Rashi in Beitzah, in the passage in Beitzah 7, says the same thing: why do Beit Shammai say that leaven is by an olive-bulk and leavened bread is by a large date-bulk? Because in this way his mind is settled. But again, according to the Or Sameach, “in this way his mind is settled” is only a revealing indication. From the fact that the Torah did not write a prohibition of eating but only fasting, it taught us that the measure is what settles the mind in this way. Also in Rashi in Pesachim 44, and many other places—in short, this comes up elsewhere as well. Eating—another practical implication: what happens if someone ate before Yom Kippur less than a large date-bulk, and then completed it on Yom Kippur, within the time of eating half a loaf, to amount to a large date-bulk? He ate right at the beginning of the fast and continued into the fast—let’s say during the added time when there is no karet, never mind, we can discuss it. Eating—another practical implication: what happens if someone ate before Yom Kippur less than a large date-bulk, and then completed it on Yom Kippur, within the time of eating half a loaf, to amount to a large date-bulk? He ate literally at the onset of the fast and continued into the fast. Let’s say during the added time, where there is no karet, never mind, that can be discussed. Okay? And all of it is within the time of eating half a loaf. So here there are disputes from one extreme to the other. The Ketav Sofer in Orach Chaim 31 connects it to this: he says that he is liable. Because the Torah does not say “eating.” All in all, he reached settling of the mind on Yom Kippur. By the way, that same Ketav Sofer who—no, sorry—and the Sdei Chemed claims that even if he ate everything before the fast, and entered Yom Kippur with his mind already settled, then there is a moment on Yom Kippur when he is not fasting. So he violated it. That’s karet. This is the same Sdei Chemed I mentioned, who explains that way the law of adding onto Yom Kippur, remember? I explained that there are explanations for why the added time is by Torah law, because really it’s not a law of addition at all; rather, if you ate during the added time, then on Yom Kippur itself you are not fasting—your mind is settled. That’s the same Sdei Chemed.

[Speaker F] A novelty—that there is karet without an action?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Because fasting—that’s the essence of the matter. Also, by the way, in circumcision, when you did not circumcise, you have karet without an action. In Afikei Yam he claims that one is exempt even if he ate an olive-bulk before and an olive-bulk after; he needs to eat a large date-bulk during Yom Kippur itself in order to be liable. According to the Or Sameach that’s obvious, right? According to the Or Sameach, all this is not an essential definition that you need settling of the mind on Yom Kippur; it is only a revealing indication of why the measure of eating on Yom Kippur is a large date-bulk. So according to that, clearly Afikei Yam is correct. Another discussion that comes up here concerns drinking vinegar. Something that is not a beverage—it doesn’t quench thirst.

[Speaker E] It doesn’t quench thirst, but you drank it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? So what happens there? The Talmud on 81b says that if he drank a little, he is exempt; a lot, he is liable. If he drinks a lot, then he is liable. Maimonides ruled that even with a lot he is exempt, against the Talmud, and they discuss there how he derived that. But for our purposes, beyond the question of how he fits with the Talmud, what does this actually mean? Does this count as not in the normal manner of drinking? Then why should it matter how much you drank? If it is in the normal manner of drinking, then why not the regular measure? What’s this distinction between a little and a lot? Say a large date-bulk, or a quarter-log, or a cheekful—the normal measure. Agra explained that drinking a lot breaks his thirst, and then he violates “the person who shall not be afflicted.” Fine—in vinegar, simply as a matter of fact, if you drink a cheekful it doesn’t quench your thirst because it’s such a poor kind of drink. But if you drink a lot, then it still quenches your thirst. And then of course that is an essential approach: you need to arrive at fasting. Only if you damage the fast have you violated the prohibition, and if not, then not.

[Speaker E] Is the issue the prohibition of eating? The issue of the measure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that—even the measure, even the measure itself is variable. The measure of a large date-bulk is then not a law given to Moses at Sinai at all. Not only is it a law given to Moses at Sinai that reveals settling the mind—it’s not even that. There is no fixed measure of a large date-bulk. There is a measure of settling the mind, so if with vinegar it takes more, then it will be more. Now true, obviously this won’t vary person by person and we’re not going to start measuring every individual. So we go by the average person—that’s true. With vinegar, the average person is different. Okay?

[Speaker C] And in eating too is there an example like that? What? Let’s say he ate some type of food where he’d need to eat more than a large date-bulk for that to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s universal, apparently yes. I don’t see a difference. In the Sha’agat Aryeh, for example, he wants to claim that on Yom Kippur there is no exemption for eating not in the normal manner. What difference does it make if you ate it with your left hand or in an unusual way? If in the end you have enough in your intestines to satisfy you, then you’re satisfied. It’s like saying that even according to Rabbi Yochanan, what is needed on Yom Kippur is intestinal benefit. Brilliant. He says there is no exemption for eating not in the normal manner on Yom Kippur. A very major practical implication. You see, all along the way there isn’t a single law in the eating prohibitions where Yom Kippur is simple and agreed upon. There are disputes, but there isn’t one law where the whole issue doesn’t get stirred up. And of course everything begins with the question how you understand the essence of Yom Kippur. Is fasting only a revealing indication that the measure is a large date-bulk, as the Or Sameach says, and from there on these are just ordinary eating prohibitions? Or no—fasting is the essential definition of the prohibition here: if you damage the fast, you violated the prohibition; if not, then not. For example, the Vilna Gaon and the Mahar”a Fulda, in the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot at the beginning of chapter 6—I simply collected practical implications—at the beginning of chapter 6 they write that according to Reish Lakish on Yom Kippur, according to everyone—even Reish Lakish says—a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. Because after all there is some degree of settling the mind even before that. Which, by the way, is very interesting. Because Reish Lakish is the father of the position that in the other prohibitions too what matters is intestinal benefit. So why doesn’t he say there too that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law? You see that they understand that intestinal benefit and settling the mind are not the same thing. Right? Intestinal benefit and settling the mind are not the same thing. And why? As I said earlier: intestinal benefit means benefit. That can be achieved even with an olive-bulk. I asked earlier: according to Reish Lakish, why isn’t intestinal benefit a large date-bulk? Because intestinal benefit means that you have benefit through the intestines. “Settling the mind” means that you are no longer fasting. Those are not the same thing. You enjoyed it, fine, but you’re still as hungry as before. Not related. The question how much you enjoyed it and the question whether you are no longer fasting—those are two different questions. Okay, that’s exactly what you see here.

[Speaker C] Why, if it’s eaten in installments, is one exempt according to Reish Lakish? I would have thought, what difference does it make if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You ate it in—

[Speaker C] After all, in the end, after that time gap—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In that time gap there is—

[Speaker C] Settling of the mind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Actually, it could be that he would not be exempt. Settling the mind—not only according to Reish Lakish; on Yom Kippur it’s settling the mind according to everyone.

[Speaker C] No, but here everyone agrees there are measures, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. The fact that a sick person who eats a partial measure is exempt? It could be that this does not create satisfaction—it depends how you understand eating in installments.

[Speaker C] But from the standpoint of the intestines? If they don’t care whether in the end you are satisfied—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—who says? It could be that the food that was already in the intestines is no longer there if you waited long enough after eating it.

[Speaker C] Meaning, if you defined such a person, apparently he did not fast.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, it depends. If indeed—it depends how one understands his state. Four minutes or nine minutes passed after the first half-olive-bulk that he ate. It could be that he no longer even remembers the first half-olive-bulk. I don’t know, this needs discussion.

[Speaker C] Meaning, you don’t look at the whole day—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As a whole, but only at this segment? Yes. And the question is whether there really is settling of the mind or not.

[Speaker C] And the view about partial measure—is that on Yom Kippur? So maybe Reish Lakish thinks there is partial—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Measure on Yom Kippur.

[Speaker C] I didn’t understand. He himself says there is no partial measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says in the Jerusalem Talmud. The approach of the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot, as the Mahar”l Fulda and the Vilna Gaon say, is that the Jerusalem Talmud disagrees with the Babylonian Talmud. The Jerusalem Talmud claims that on Yom Kippur Reish Lakish agrees that a partial measure is prohibited. The Babylonian Talmud disagrees with that—that’s clear. Okay, more or less those are the points. All right, may you all be sealed for a good year, a good year.

[Speaker B] Thank you very much, may you be sealed for a good year.