Intention in Mitzvot – Lesson 2

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have a thought, but it’s not connected to motivation. This thought has to accompany me: I want to bake the matzah in such-and-such a way, and I guard it in order to keep it from becoming leavened. That’s not in order to fulfill my obligation. It’s a specific intention that relates to the matzah. The intention to fulfill one’s obligation is a universal intention; it doesn’t change from one commandment to another. In every commandment it’s the same intention: to fulfill one’s obligation. That’s all. Okay? So therefore the rule of for its own sake and the rule of intention are really two completely different rules. And therefore the rule of for its own sake exists only in certain commandments. Which commandments? Those commandments that are done through some particular object that I prepare, like matzah, like a sukkah, and so on. Then, at least for some of those objects, when you prepare the object it has to be done for its own sake. Okay? But the rule that commandments require intention is not specifically about commandments that require objects. Every commandment-act has to be done with the intention of fulfilling one’s obligation. If I say something, there’s no object involved here at all, but I still have to intend to fulfill my obligation. Without that, according to the view that commandments require intention, without that I haven’t fulfilled my obligation. What happens with Torah study? In Torah study, the concept that appears is Torah study for its own sake, to study Torah for its own sake. But the meaning of for its own sake here is not entirely clear—whether it belongs in the category of for its own sake or in the category of intention. Because in Torah study for its own sake, seemingly that means for the sake of the commandment of Torah study, for the sake of the commandment, and then it actually resembles commandments require intention more than the rule of for its own sake. So why do they use the term for its own sake and not the term intention? To study Torah with intention, not for its own sake. And that automatically excludes. Anything you do in order to fulfill your obligation, that automatically means you’re not blowing the shofar just to make music, you’re not blowing it for this or that—it always excludes. What?

[Speaker A] It’s not a commandment of research; it’s not just reading a text.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that’s the concept of intention, not the concept of for its own sake. It’s the concept of intention: I’m doing this for the sake of the commandment, in order to fulfill my obligation. That’s intention, not for its own sake. In the Talmudic text, Torah study appears as something that has to be for its own sake; that’s the term they use. But when you look at the meaning of the matter, it actually resembles the concept of intention more than the concept of for its own sake. First of all, because it accompanies the actual commandment-act itself, the learning, and not the preparation of some object before using it for a commandment. And second, in terms of content too—what does for its own sake mean? It means for the sake of the commandment. Well, for the sake of the commandment—that’s the content of intention, not the content of for its own sake. So Torah study for its own sake is really a bit tricky. So there’s an interesting point here; I’ll say it briefly because it’s not our topic. Do you remember the Talmudic passage in Nedarim 62 that the Mishnah Berurah brought as the source that all commandments require intention at the outset, and the whole dispute is only whether it is indispensable after the fact? Right? Which passage did he bring? A passage in Nedarim that says this: Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok says, Do things for the sake of their Maker, and speak of them for their own sake. Notice: Do things for the sake of their Maker means you do things for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, and speak of them for their own sake. What is the difference between for the sake of their Maker and for their own sake? The very speaking—

[Speaker A] It’s the act itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So speak of them means Torah study. Do things means fulfillment of commandments. Speak of them is Torah study. So fulfillment of commandments has to be for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, in order to fulfill one’s obligation. That is intention. From here the Mishnah Berurah brought the proof that one must, at the outset, intend—and the whole dispute over whether commandments require intention is only whether it is indispensable. And what is and speak of them for their own sake? That is Torah study for its own sake. And Torah study is for its own sake, not intention. It’s something else. Now what does that mean? So look at the Rosh, look at the Rosh. Do things for the sake of… when the Rosh, in his commentary—you know that on Nedarim there is a Rosh on the Talmudic text, not only the halakhic rulings of the Rosh. Okay? So he says like this: Do things for the sake of their Maker—for the sake of the name of the Holy One, blessed be He, who made everything for His own purpose. The Lord has made everything for His own purpose, and even the wicked for the day of evil—something like that. And speak of them for their own sake: all your speech and your involvement in words of Torah should be for the sake of Torah—for example, to know and understand and add learning and sharp analysis, and not in order to provoke or to become arrogant. About this, I mentioned—I said I’d get to Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin—Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin in Nefesh HaChaim, Gate 4, brings this passage and this Rosh, and he says, notice—again, against the Hasidim, by the way, since that also came up earlier—he says that and speak of them for their own sake does not mean for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He; that was for the sake of their Maker. Speak of them for their own sake—for its own sake does not mean for His sake, but for its own sake. What does Torah study for its own sake mean? For the sake of Torah, not for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He. Rather, Torah study is a value in itself; it doesn’t come to serve anything else. That’s not the intention of fulfilling one’s obligation. Rather, Torah study is an independent value and it is not instrumental. It is not a means serving some goal outside itself, such as provoking or becoming arrogant—but not even positive goals. You want to cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He? Torah study is not a means to cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He; Torah study is an end in itself. You have to study in order to add learning and sharp analysis in Torah. You study Torah in order to engage in Torah, not for some goal outside that engagement; it is a goal that stands on its own. That’s the point.

[Speaker A] And because that’s so, that’s why women are exempt, because they don’t have this concept.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In my view it’s exactly the opposite; that’s why women are obligated. No, no—the opposite. The obligation to fulfill the commandment is not imposed on them, but the value of study—not the commandment, the value of study—exists, and if it exists then it obligates women as well. Women are exempt from the commandment, not from values. If values are true, then they are true for everyone. Commandments—whoever is obligated is obligated, and whoever is exempt is exempt. I wrote a long article about this issue. The claim is basically this: the Talmudic passage says that Rabbi Shimon says it is enough to read one chapter in the morning and one chapter—even reciting Shema in the morning and Shema in the evening—and you fulfill your obligation. So what about everything else? There the Ran and the Rosh ask, there in Nedarim 8b, so what is neglect of Torah study? If with Shema in the morning and Shema in the evening you’ve fulfilled your obligation, then what is neglect of Torah study? Neglect of Torah study means that if there was time when you could have engaged in Torah and you didn’t, then there is a claim against you of neglecting Torah study. And what claim is there? After all, I read Shema in the morning and evening, everything is fine. So the answer, at least according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—it’s pretty clear, maybe even all of them, or most of them—is that the commandment is Shema in the morning and evening. The value—which is unrelated to the commandment—you fulfilled the commandment, but the value of Torah study exists all the time; it has no minimum. And that value is to know Torah—that’s the value, not in order to fulfill the commandment. For its own sake here is the opposite of commandment: it is a value that stands on its own, not in order to fulfill a commandment. And therefore in this too women are obligated, as I said earlier.

[Speaker E] In what commandment is it like that—the way a bill of divorce is for a woman, so Torah study is for Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, for the sake of Torah—that is, to see it as a value in itself. Rabbi Yisrael Salanter has a very interesting essay, it appears in Ohr Hashem but also separately as an essay, and he says there: why does the Talmudic text say in Menachot, I think, why is it uncommon that Torah scholars have sons who become Torah scholars like them? So one of the explanations is: because they did not recite the blessing over the Torah first. So he says, what kind of strange evil inclination is this? Those very people who devote themselves heart and soul, who see Torah study as their main business—Torah scholars, who see Torah study as their main business—and suddenly when it comes to the blessing over the Torah they cut corners? Not proper in the blessing over the Torah? Why exactly there? What kind of failure is that? Why specifically here?

[Speaker A] When they’re engaged in it, they see it as a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says—the Talmudic text in Menachot says that one does not recite a blessing over something that is not the completion of a commandment. And from here, for example, it derives the Babylonian Talmud’s view that one does not recite a blessing over building a sukkah, unlike the Jerusalem Talmud. Because building a sukkah is a preparatory act for a commandment, and blessings are recited over commandments, not over preparatory acts for commandments. In the Jerusalem Talmud it says otherwise—the question is what exactly it says there—but never mind, this is the Babylonian Talmud. So Rabbi Yisrael Salanter says: those Torah scholars who studied Torah all the time saw Torah as a means. A means to know what to do—not in the negative sense—a means to know what to do, because an ignoramus cannot be pious. A mistake. Someone who sees Torah that way, his sons will not become Torah scholars, because he does not grasp Torah properly. Torah is a value in itself; it does not come to serve anything else. Not cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, not knowing what to do, not love of God, not fear of God, and nothing like that. We need to study in order to study. Because of the value in the study. There is a dispute between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud whether one recites a blessing over building a sukkah. The Jerusalem Talmud says one does recite a blessing over building the sukkah, and the Babylonian Talmud says not. Some people want to claim that the Jerusalem Talmud means there is a commandment even in building the sukkah; I don’t think that’s correct. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, one recites a blessing even over a preparatory act for a commandment. But still—it’s a preparatory act, not a commandment. And according to the Babylonian Talmud, one does not recite a blessing over a preparatory act, only over a commandment. And Rabbi Yisrael Salanter’s claim is that Torah scholars did not recite the blessing over the Torah first—why? Because they thought Torah study was a means. And over a means one does not recite a blessing. It’s not an evil inclination; it’s a conception. But it’s a mistaken conception, a destructive conception. It’s a conception that does not properly understand the meaning of Torah study. And therefore the result is that their sons did not acquire the proper appreciation for Torah, and therefore they do not become Torah scholars. Okay, for our purposes in any case, what comes out of this is—

[Speaker A] Wait, is this the only commandment that’s not really an object and yet is for its own sake—Torah study?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I think so. In sacrificial offering, there there’s an object—the object itself, the sacrifice. Yes, I think this is the… So therefore here there’s room to hesitate. There are those who would see for its own sake in Torah study as part of the whole issue of intention, but it seems to me that even in the wording of the verse—do things for the sake of their Maker, that is for Heaven, for the sake of the commandment—and speak of them for their own sake. The verse does not use two different expressions for no reason, because this is intention and this is for its own sake. It’s not the same thing. And indeed, for its own sake in Torah study belongs to the category of for its own sake, not to the category of intention. By the way, the Mishnah Berurah too, when he learned from this very verse that according to everyone one needs intention at the outset and the dispute is only whether it is indispensable after the fact—that comes from the first half of the verse: do things for the sake of their Maker, because there it really is speaking about intention. But and speak of them for their own sake—that speaks about for its own sake, not about intention. Okay? Good. So now let’s take a look for a moment at the Talmudic passage in Zevachim and see the issue of for its own sake and unspecified being considered for its own sake. Ravina said to Rav Pappa—you know this, it appears in… I once wrote this too—there is a similar introduction in chapter 2 of Bava Kamma, in the issue of this one benefits and that one loses nothing. You weren’t with us—you can’t imagine what a fascinating passage you missed. Yes, you weren’t with us in the study hall. And this is also usually on Sabbath, so you weren’t there—you were outside the boundary in the evening, yes—so in any case you missed it. And after that there always comes some conceptual Talmudic inquiry. And I wrote there that what I began with in… there used to be a series at the National Library, Meeting in the Babylonian Talmud. So in one of the six meetings, they invited me with Meir Buzaglo and Tomer Persico. And we dealt with this issue of this one benefits and that one loses nothing. I suggested dealing with it, and I spoke about this introduction—how did you miss it, how were you not here, what’s the idea? What we do today in every class, simply—in terms of the amoraim this would have been unthinkable. One time they saw some conceptual inquiry by later authorities (Acharonim), and they were beside themselves with excitement. I mean, look at this—wow, there’s here this one benefits and that one loses nothing; the question is whether what obligates him is the benefit or the loss, and the practical difference follows. This is the ABC—every class starts with this. But there it was very rare; they didn’t think like that. Meaning, when they encountered something like this—yes, the wonderful point of Maimonides, for those who know, in his commentary to Keritot. Maimonides says there that he has some wonderful point, some nice distinction, but a wonderful point—I haven’t found anyone who noted it until today. A kind of wondrous excitement over some distinction. Fine, a young yeshiva student could say that distinction too. There’s something about the analytical mode of thought that we are so used to today, that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the amoraim did not think that way. This is not, by the way, a matter of stupidity and intelligence; it’s a question of what you are used to thinking like. These conceptual frameworks, the analytical treatment we do, did not exist for them. There were these sorts of intuitions, but they did not formulate them explicitly. Yes, right—associations or things not conceptually formulated. Anyway, for our purposes, here too there is some conceptual inquiry. What is the inquiry? That’s why these introductions always precede some conceptual discussion. So he says as follows. You were not with us in the evening in the boundary of Beit Charmekh—that’s the name of a place—where Rava posed two excellent matters against each other and resolved them. He set one thing against another and answered it. It was really fascinating, he says to him. What was there? We learned: all sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their own sake—that’s the mishnah we saw on page 2. The reason is that they were slaughtered not for their own sake; but if they were slaughtered unspecified, they do count for the owners toward fulfilling their obligation. If they were slaughtered not for their own sake, then they do not count for the owners toward fulfilling their obligation. What happens if they were slaughtered without specification? Not slaughtered explicitly… yes, for their own sake, but neither for their own sake nor not for their own sake—just unspecified. Okay? There was no intention. So what happened there, apparently? They count, right? What should it have said if they wanted to invalidate that too? All sacrifices that were not slaughtered for their own sake. If it said not slaughtered for their own sake, then unspecified too is not slaughtered for its own sake, so it would be invalid. But if it says slaughtered not for their own sake, then if it was slaughtered not for its own sake, it’s invalid. But if it was unspecified, then it was not slaughtered not for its own sake. So therefore it is valid. Right? This negation isn’t commutative, right? Yes, exactly. Yes, it’s like the difference between I want you not to put on tefillin and I don’t want you to put on tefillin. I want you not to put on tefillin means a prohibition. It is forbidden to put on tefillin—if there were such a commandment. I don’t want you to put on tefillin only means there is no positive commandment to put on tefillin. It does not mean there is a prohibition in putting them on; it means there is no commandment to put them on, okay? So that would be unspecified. Fine. Nothing happened. It’s not a transgression; just no commandment was fulfilled. And here, where we are dealing… yes, no, I’m just saying in terms of logic, the question is where the negation is placed. Whether the negation and the verb, when they switch places, it’s not commutative. And if it’s not-verb or verb-not, the meaning is different. It’s not the same thing. Anyway, so that’s on one side. So we see in our mishnah in Zevachim on page 2 that if they were slaughtered unspecified, then they count for the owners toward fulfilling their obligation. So evidently unspecified is also considered like for their own sake. So if you slaughter without specifying, it’s as if you slaughtered for its own sake. And Rava challenged this: every bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of the woman is invalid. You see the whole issue of for its own sake also with a bill of divorce. The inference is the same inference. Notice: every bill of divorce written not for the sake of the woman is invalid. That implies specifically that unspecified is valid; only if it was written not for its own sake. It doesn’t say not written for its own sake, but written not for its own sake. The inference is the same inference. But he said, and unspecified too is invalid. He adds that; he doesn’t infer it, because you can’t infer it. Where does he add it from? The Talmudic text clarifies later. Fine? So that’s the difficulty. On the one hand, with a bill of divorce unspecified is invalid, and in sacrifices unspecified is valid. And he answered: sacrifices, when unspecified, stand for their own sake. A woman, when unspecified, does not stand for divorce. A sacrifice in its default state stands for being offered. Therefore even if you did not positively intend, by default the sacrifice stands for its own sake, for offering, so unspecified is also fine. A woman does not stand for divorce. And since that is so, you need positive intention. And if you did not intend positively, then unspecified thought for its own sake does not help. Now, I already said that there are commentators who connect the rule of for its own sake to the rule of intention; mainly these things are discussed regarding the rule that unspecified is considered for its own sake. We see that there is such a rule here, called unspecified is considered for its own sake. If you offered it unspecified, it is valid. With a bill of divorce—not, because a woman does not stand for divorce. What happens with tefillin? Tefillin stand for being worn; they have no other use, right? They have no other use. So if I put on tefillin without specification—I did not intend to fulfill my obligation—okay? Seemingly that’s like sacrifices, right? It stands for the commandment, and unspecified is considered for its own sake should have helped. And that is what some later authorities (Acharonim) say: that in commandments that require intention, unspecified also helps, and they learn it from sacrifices. Now, of course, there’s room to wonder whether they assume that intention and for its own sake are the same thing—because we saw before that that’s not true. Or perhaps not—they are just saying the underlying reasoning. Just as an unspecified thought counts like a thought for its own sake, so too unspecified regarding intention counts like a thought of intention. Not that intention and for its own sake are actually the same rule. Fine? But we need to get into this a little more. Usually people are used to explaining what it means that unspecified is considered for its own sake. Maybe I’ll say one more sentence, actually, about the connection they make, because it will be important later. The connection they make between for its own sake and intention can be made in two ways. One can say that the reasoning of unspecified is considered for its own sake is the reasoning of the one who says commandments do not require intention. That is why he says it. Why do commandments not require intention? Because even unspecified is like having intended. That’s why he says commandments do not require intention. But then we need to understand what the view that says commandments do require intention holds. After all, unspecified really is considered for its own sake in sacrifices—that is the law. Okay? One could understand the opposite. Basically, it is not connected to the dispute whether commandments require intention or not. In places where the commandment, where the object, stands for the commandment, then there too unspecified will be valid even according to the view that commandments do require intention. Because the circumstances show that in effect you intended. So true, intention is required, but the circumstances provide a substitute. It is as if you intended. And that is within the view that commandments require intention. The rule that unspecified is considered for its own sake is speaking דווקא according to the view that commandments do require intention, not according to the view that commandments do not require intention. Those are the two possible connections. Clear? Again: the first connection says, unspecified is considered for its own sake—that is the reasoning of the one who says that commandments do not require intention. Why is intention unnecessary? Because even unspecified is good. The second explanation says no, commandments require intention; that has nothing to do with unspecified is considered for its own sake. Unspecified is considered for its own sake is an additional rule on top of that. According to the one who says commandments do require intention, if there is a commandment that stands for the matter, then there too unspecified is as if he intended. What? What do you mean?

[Speaker H] There are commandments that require intention; there are commandments that require for its own sake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—commandments, all commandments require intention. In addition to that, there are also commandments that have to be prepared for their own sake. We discussed that earlier. Those are certainly two different things. But still, the later authorities (Acharonim) make a connection between the rule that unspecified is considered for its own sake, which is said regarding for its own sake, and they want to apply it also in the context of intention. I said that before arguing whether that application is correct or not, one has to understand that it can be understood in two ways. It can be said according to the view that commandments do not require intention, and then what it is saying is basically the reasoning of the view that commandments do not require intention: unspecified is considered for its own sake. And one can say that it is stated specifically within the view that commandments do require intention. And what does it mean? In principle, commandments require intention. There are places where the context proves that you intended, so even if you didn’t actually intend—say someone went to synagogue in the morning and put on tefillin. He didn’t do it in order to play soccer with the tefillin, right? It’s fairly clear that he’s doing it in order to pray. So true, he didn’t explicitly think it, but the unspecified case is for its own sake, because the circumstances show that he in effect intended. So understand that if I use it this way, it is said specifically according to the view that commandments do require intention, not according to the view that commandments do not require intention. Yes, that’s what I’m saying. So since it stands for that, as with sacrifices, since it stands for that, the circumstances show that in effect you intended. Now notice: basically I am assuming here a certain assumption, and soon we’ll see that it’s not at all certain that it’s correct. The assumption—and many assume it—is that this reasoning of unspecified is considered for its own sake is based on the idea that in an unspecified case there is in effect for-its-own-sake implicitly. Meaning, the circumstances basically show that the requirement of for its own sake was fulfilled here. Because one could understand that unspecified is considered for its own sake means you don’t need for its own sake. In things that stand for being offered, say like sacrifices, there simply is no requirement of for its own sake. Not that if you did it unspecified, it is considered as if it were for its own sake, but rather that there is no need there for for its own sake. For its own sake is required only in places where the thing by itself does not stand for its halakhic purpose, so you have to designate it for its purpose. I remind you that for its own sake means designating an object for its use as a commandment. If the object stands for use as a commandment, then there is no need to designate it—not because unspecified is considered as if you designated it, but because there is no need to designate it. Now no—so I’m saying, you can interpret this one way or the other. I don’t think one is simpler than the other. You can interpret it this way, you can interpret it that way. Some understand unspecified is considered for its own sake to mean that the context shows that inside you there was in fact a thought of for its own sake, even if it was not conscious. But clearly inside you, you intended that. Or not. Rather, the requirement that you think for its own sake exists only regarding things that in themselves do not stand for the purpose of the commandment, so you need to prepare them in such a way that they are designated for the commandment. But if there are things that already stand for that, then you simply don’t need it. Not because in an unspecified case it is considered as if deep down you intended implicitly, like the Talmudic passage in Kiddushin—no, not that reasoning. Rather, it is a distinction between types of objects: where the thought of for its own sake is needed and where it is not needed. Let me maybe give you an example. The Talmudic passage in Kiddushin 49 says: someone who sells all his property on condition of going up to the Land of Israel. He wants to immigrate to the Land of Israel. Now in the end there was a problem and he was unable to go. Now the question is whether he can cancel the transaction. So Tosafot—there is a long Tosafot there—and Tosafot discusses it there. The Talmudic text says this is as if he stipulated it; basically he stipulated that he is doing it only in order to go up to the Land of Israel. If he did not go up to the Land of Israel, he did not intend to sell. Tosafot asks: but here none of the formal rules of stipulations were present. He didn’t say it, and certainly didn’t make a double stipulation, nor positive before negative, nor stipulation before action, and all the requirements we demand of stipulations. How can this be? So Tosafot says that these are matters in his heart and in every person’s heart. Meaning, if it is clear that this is really what he means, then he doesn’t have to say it; it is quite clear that it is there. In that vein, I want to say here too—one possibility is that even when you do it unspecified, it is clear that when you come to the Temple and offer a sacrifice, it is clear why you are doing it, it is obvious, obvious that you are doing it in order to offer the sacrifice; no other interpretation is possible, okay? With a woman, no, because a woman does not stand for divorce. So that is one interpretation of the rule that unspecified is considered for its own sake. The second interpretation says no: since unspecified is not intention—unspecified is the preparation of an object for a commandment. Preparation of an object for a commandment is required when the object in itself is not clearly prepared for this commandment. There it is required that when you prepare it, you do so, you prepare it, okay? But if there is an object that stands for that, fine, then you don’t need to prepare it. So here it’s not because unspecified is considered as if deep inside you in effect intended implicitly, like the Talmudic passage in Kiddushin—no, not that reasoning. Rather, it is a distinction between types of objects, where the thought of for its own sake is needed and where it is not needed. It’s not needed—not that it is fulfilled implicitly, but that the thought is not required, okay? But in any case—

[Speaker A] There’s some connection between this and intention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: in both these contexts, in both these interpretations, it seems to me that even if I connect this to commandments require intention, the connection will be different. If I say that the unspecified case is considered as if I actually intended implicitly, then that reasoning can also be said regarding commandments that require intention. True, it’s a different thought—intention and for its own sake are not the same thing—but the idea or the reasoning is the same reasoning. Some kind of thought is needed here, and from the circumstances it is proven that this was probably the thought inside me, so that is also fine; it serves as a substitute. But if I say that this is preparation of objects, then what does that have to do with intention? It’s a division regarding which objects need preparation and which do not—so what does that have to do with intention? Fine, and therefore what—

[Speaker A] In that case it proves nothing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to that context, no. It could be that it does prove something, but it won’t help me regarding commandments require intention. Not there either. The Talmudic text—let’s look for a moment further on. Further on in Zevachim, the Talmudic text brings a source. How do we know that with a bill of divorce, unspecified is invalid? What do you mean, how do we know? What’s the problem? No, it says for its own sake. But who says that unspecified is no good? Maybe unspecified too is like for its own sake.

[Speaker A] A woman stands for divorce?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s already the reasoning. They ask, how do I know? Wait, wait—what’s the question? The question rests on what I noted above. I noted above that linguistically, in terms of linguistic inference, with a bill of divorce it says exactly what it says in sacrifices: all sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their own sake do not count for the owners toward fulfilling their obligation. What happens if they were not slaughtered not for their own sake, but also not for their own sake? In between. Then they do count, right? But with a bill of divorce too: every bill of divorce written not for the sake of the woman is invalid. That implies that unspecified is valid. So why does the Talmudic text say that unspecified in a bill of divorce is invalid and unspecified in a sacrifice is valid? The same inference exists here and there. So it says here as follows. Wait, one at a time. Yes, yes.

[Speaker D] “And it shall be, if she find no favor in his eyes because he found in her some indecency, and he writes her a bill of severance and puts it in her hand.” Her—for her sake is explicit about her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re taking me back to explanations. I’m asking: from where do we know that unspecified is invalid? Afterward come the explanations. The explanation is: because a woman does not stand for divorce. What is the source? A source in the Torah, or in the Mishnah, or in the Talmudic text. From where does the Talmudic text infer it? Not reasoning. No, if it’s reasoning, then you’re starting—after all, they began with a difficulty. Right? In the difficulty they said: sacrifices, unspecified is for their own sake, and in a bill of divorce it is not. Then came the reasoning. The reasoning is the resolution. And I’m asking: the difficulty itself—where did the difficulty come from? After all, you don’t yet have the reasoning. So where did the difficulty come from? Why did you decide that in a bill of divorce unspecified is invalid? Where did you decide that from? Afterward there are explanations; the reasoning says—I understand—but the questioner didn’t know the reasoning. Where did he know from that in a bill of divorce unspecified is invalid? After all, in terms of linguistic inference it is the same inference. So the Talmudic text says: and regarding a bill of divorce, that unspecified is invalid—how do we know? Shall we say from this that we learned: if one was passing through the market and heard scribes dictating, so-and-so divorced so-and-so from such-and-such a place, and he said, that is my name and that is my wife’s name, it is invalid to divorce with it. Perhaps that is as Rav Pappa said, for Rav Pappa said: here we are dealing with scribes who are practicing, and it was not written for the sake of severance at all. He was passing through the market; the man wanted to divorce his wife. He passed through the market and saw some place where scribes were practicing writing, and someone was dictating—a scribe teaching his student was dictating, so-and-so divorced so-and-so from such-and-such a place, and the other one had to write what was dictated to him. There it is scribes who are practicing. The bill of divorce was not written for the sake of divorce at all. It was not written at all for the sake of divorce, not just not for the sake of this woman. So fine, there it may indeed be invalid. You have no proof that a bill of divorce written unspecified, but for the sake of divorce, is also invalid. Right? So that can’t be the proof. So what is? The Talmudic text says: rather, from this: more than that, if he wrote it to divorce his wife and then changed his mind, and his fellow townsman found him and said, my name is the same as your name and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s name, it is invalid to divorce with it. There it was indeed written for the sake of divorce, but for a different couple who happen to have the same names and are from the same town. Two Yosef ben Shimons in one town. So maybe this is a proof? That too is not a proof. Why? That case is different, because it was directed toward the divorce of that other woman. Here it was not just written unspecified; it was written for the divorce of a different woman. That is worse than not being written at all for the sake of this woman. Here it is positively aimed elsewhere. That is worse. But who told you that writing it generally unspecified is also invalid? By the way, from here already there is a proof for something that will come up later with us: what happens with opposite intention? According to the one who says commandments do not require intention, no intention is needed. But what if I intended the opposite? If I intended the opposite, then it may be invalid—that is what Rashbam and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) claim. It may be invalid even according to the one who says commandments do not require intention. Here there is a hint of that. Although for its own sake and intention are not the same thing, still the reasoning is the same reasoning that exists here. Directed for the sake of another woman is worse than unspecified. Rather, from this, says the Talmudic text: more than that, if he has two wives with the same names, and he wrote it to divorce the older one, he may not divorce the younger one with it. Now this is indeed the same couple with the same names in the same town and the same husband. Right? The Talmudic text says: that case is different, because it was directed for the divorce of this one. It was for the sake of another woman. Same husband, but another woman. Rather, from this: more than that, if he said to the scribe, write it so that whichever one I want I will divorce, it is invalid to divorce with it. You should write it—those two women, if they have the same two names—don’t write it for the older one and then I regret it and divorce the younger one. Write it for whichever one I decide tomorrow morning to divorce. I can’t afford to support two wives; tomorrow morning I’ll decide which one to divorce. In the meantime prepare me a bill of divorce. They have the same name; prepare me a bill of divorce, don’t intend it for a specific one, but for whichever one of them I decide tomorrow. That too is no good, says the Talmudic text. Maybe that case is different because there is no retroactive clarification. By the way, so what if there is no retroactive clarification? So there is no retroactive clarification, and therefore what? Excellent—so that is exactly unspecified, no? That is exactly unspecified. What’s the problem? If there were retroactive clarification, then he intended it for that woman. That is real intention; it is not unspecified at all. But if there is no retroactive clarification, then why—if there is no retroactive clarification, then there is intention for divorce and the woman is unspecified. That is exactly the case we are looking for, no? So why does no retroactive clarification reject the proof? The absence of retroactive clarification should do the opposite—precisely because there is no retroactive clarification, you cannot say that he intended this specific woman whom in the end I decided to divorce, but intended whom? Unspecified. Not for any woman. Well, that is exactly the case of unspecified. What kind of rejection is that? That’s the proof. Even better, even better. Here it is one out of two and it is invalid. So certainly when there aren’t even two—when no one is yet on the table—it is definitely invalid. I’ll just note in parentheses: there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) how to understand the concept of no retroactive clarification. Rashi’s view in several places is that it was written for a certain woman, one out of the two. I just don’t say that it was that one whom I eventually decided on, because what I decided at the end does not clarify retroactively that this was already so from the beginning. But there already is right now one woman for whose sake it was written, though it might not be the woman I ultimately decided to divorce. So one can understand what the Talmudic text says here. Because if there is no retroactive clarification, then it may be directed to another woman; therefore it is not valid. But according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), the Tur for example, who says that no retroactive clarification means there really is no for-its-own-sake at all—it is truly unspecified—this passage is very difficult for those authorities, in my opinion. Because according to those authorities, when there is no retroactive clarification this is exactly the case of unspecified. Fine, that’s just in parentheses. Rather, from this—this is the conclusion—rather, from this: one who writes standard forms of bills of divorce must leave blank the place for the man’s name and the place for the woman’s name and the place for the witnesses and the place for the date. Yes, all the specific substance, what is called the essential text. And Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: he must also leave blank the place for “you are hereby permitted to any man,” because that too is part of the essential text. Okay, that is the proof in the end. What are we talking about? Someone prepares for himself standard bill-of-divorce forms in advance in order to sell them later to people who come, and he prepares them—you know like in stores there are signs with boys’ and girls’ names, people buy them to hang on the bedroom door? Yankele, Berel, Yocheved, Lital, or whatever, whoever it is. Fine, so we prepare it in advance, and it is meant that someone with the relevant names will come and buy it from you.

[Speaker E] Also a store sells mass production in large-scale manufacture.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but you prepare it with the names. And you are relying on the fact that when someone with the relevant names comes, he will buy this bill of divorce from you. There are names. It says he must leave blank the place for the man’s name and the place for the woman’s name. Why must he leave it blank? Because if he does not leave it blank—if he writes the names—then it is unspecified and invalid. That is the Talmudic text’s proof. The proof of the Talmudic text is in a case where he wrote the names. If he wrote the names but there is no actual woman here yet, the husband who wants to divorce has not yet come before him—he wrote two names and prepared many bills of divorce with various names until someone comes and asks him for one; he will choose the relevant name and give it to him. Okay? This is the case of unspecified. From here, and it says it is invalid, from here is the proof that unspecified in a bill of divorce is invalid. Now think for a moment about the situation. After all, I am now writing the bill of divorce with the names, Devorah and Yinkleh. Fine? I wrote the name and “you are hereby divorced” and everything is in order, I left nothing blank—invalid. Now Yinkleh comes, his wife is Devorah, and he wants to buy the bill of divorce and divorce her. They tell him: it’s invalid. Right? Why is it invalid? Because unspecified is invalid. Okay? The Talmudic text explains that this is because a woman does not stand for divorce. Right? What if she did stand for divorce? Then it would be fine. Why? Why if she stood for divorce would it be fine? There is no woman here at all. When he wrote the… no, this is for the sake of divorce. He wrote it for the sake of divorce, just not for a certain couple. When a certain couple comes, they will buy this bill of divorce and use it. Now what there is—notice—I think it is very hard to understand according to the first understanding I suggested above. The understanding that says unspecified is considered for its own sake means that the circumstances show that there was in fact a thought of for its own sake here. There isn’t even any woman here yet. I’m saying: if there were a concrete woman here, the husband comes and says write for me for this specific woman, and he writes it for that woman, but he did not explicitly think the thought of for its own sake—that is the concept of unspecified—then I would say fine, the context is obvious, he is writing it for this woman, and therefore he probably intended it. That is like the one who sells his property in order to immigrate to the Land of Israel, right? But if we are dealing with the situation—and here that is the situation being discussed—where I have standard bill-of-divorce forms, where there is no woman on the table at all yet. It could be they haven’t even decided to divorce yet, but certainly he has not yet come to him. There is no concrete woman to whom this… So how can one say that if women stood for divorce—suppose women did stand for divorce, suppose there were a law that every woman marries her husband and after five years he has to divorce her, fine, imagine there were such a law in the Torah. Then every woman stands for divorce. Why would that help? The Talmudic text says: unspecified is considered for its own sake—why is unspecified not for its own sake in divorce? Because a woman does not stand for divorce. Meaning, if a woman did stand for divorce then it would be like sacrifices. So such a thing would work, right? Why would it work? Why would it work? Because it is evident, because the circumstances show that I intended this woman? Which woman? I didn’t know her at all. What circumstances?

[Speaker A] It’s not the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that is proof of this; it is proof that the concept unspecified is considered for its own sake does not mean that the circumstances show that I actually have a thought of for its own sake. If that were the meaning, then whether a woman does or does not stand for divorce would not be the explanation. It could not be the explanation.

[Speaker A] Like I said before, the circumstances that right now I’m doing it—so even without intending, the situation is such. Here, when he wrote the bill of divorce, there was no such situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m repeating what I’m saying, and that’s why the question is there, because it’s not the same thing. If the woman were generally headed for divorce, would an unspecified writing like this be valid? But I’m asking: if the woman—listen, I understood, you’re saying what I’m saying. If the woman really were headed for divorce—let’s say women were generally headed for divorce. Wait, wait. If women were generally headed for divorce, and I would write divorce documents this way, would that be valid? No. Ah. No, no, בלי because—you’re repeating what I’m saying. No. That’s what I said. Therefore the Talmud can’t explain why an unspecified document is invalid in divorce on the grounds that a woman is not generally headed for divorce, because even if she were headed for divorce, it should still be invalid. Right, the reasoning is irrelevant. Except what? Why is it irrelevant? It’s irrelevant only if we understand that “an unspecified act counts as for its own sake” means that the circumstances show that I really did intend it. That can’t exist here, even if a woman were generally headed for divorce. But if in fact, like the second way I suggested, when “an unspecified act counts as for its own sake” means that you have to prepare the object for its use—and if the object is naturally meant for that, then you don’t need that use, you don’t need to prepare it—then “an unspecified act counts as for its own sake” is not because when I think in an unspecified way it’s as if deep down the circumstances show that I thought it, no; you simply don’t need to think. That’s fine. If that were the case, then if women were generally headed for divorce, every bill of divorce I write is of course a bill of divorce intended for that use. So you wouldn’t need a specific intention “for its own sake.” Not that it’s considered as though I had some implicit intention “for its own sake”; you just don’t need it. That I can understand. By the way, even there it’s not perfectly smooth, but that I can still understand. But if “an unspecified act counts as for its own sake” were only an indication that deep down I really did have that intention implicitly, what difference would it make here if the woman were generally headed for divorce? It wouldn’t help. And that’s a strong proof against the accepted view. Now I want to add one more point that will be important for calculations later on. This doesn’t mean that this reasoning—that an unspecified act counts as for its own sake—is not valid reasoning. It only means that this is not the foundation of the rule. What’s the practical difference? What happens if I’m in circumstances that really do show that I intended it for its own sake? That would help regardless of everything I said earlier. It would help because there is intention for its own sake here. That’s not what invalidates an unspecified act or validates it as “for its own sake”; it’s unrelated. But the reasoning in itself is valid reasoning. Understood? So I want to argue as follows: in a bit we’ll see further on, I think Rashi explains like the second explanation, and Tosafot explains like the first explanation. In a moment I’ll show it. Okay? So if Rashi explains like the second explanation, “for its own sake” does not mean that the circumstances show that I intended it; rather, it means that if the object is naturally meant for that, then you don’t need to intend it for its own sake. Even an unspecified act is fine. Only if you do the opposite, then no; but unspecified is fine. Okay? What would happen according to Rashi in circumstances that show that I really do intend it, like in the case “as we learned: one who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel”? Rashi too would agree that this helps. It’s just that, in his view, that is not because of the rule that an unspecified act counts as “for its own sake.” That rule says there are certain circumstances in which you don’t need a specific intention “for its own sake.” But the reasoning that says that in places where you do need such intention, if the intention was implicit and the circumstances show there was intention, that can help even according to Rashi. Okay? That’s an important point, because we’ll see later that such arguments come up, and that doesn’t decide against Rashi in understanding the rule that an unspecified act counts as “for its own sake,” because the reasoning in itself is valid even according to Rashi. Okay? So let me repeat. In principle I suggested two possibilities for understanding the concept that an unspecified act counts as “for its own sake.” The accepted possibility is that this means the circumstances show that implicitly there really was an intention “for its own sake.” Even if it was unspecified, really I did think that. Okay? The second possibility is Tosafot—we’ll see later. The second possibility is Rashi: in his view, he says that in a place where the object is naturally meant for what it is meant for, you don’t need intention “for its own sake”; that’s why an unspecified act helps. Not because there is some thought inside me that I’m unaware of, but because no thought is needed at all. Okay? It’s true that even according to him, in a place where thought is required—that is, the object is not naturally designated for the commandment and therefore thought is required—if the circumstances show that I did think it, then that’s fine, that will work. Okay? And from the wording of the Talmud here, or from the source the Talmud brings regarding intention “for its own sake,” unspecified intention in a bill of divorce, it seems to me there’s an excellent proof for Rashi against Tosafot. Okay? Up to here, that’s what I said. Now let’s see it. Rashi writes as follows: “Ordinarily they stand for their own sake.” Right? He explains the Talmud’s distinction, that sacrifices ordinarily stand for their own sake, while a woman is not naturally headed for divorce. Rashi says: “Therefore, as long as their names have not been explicitly uprooted, they are for their own sake.”

[Speaker A] If there isn’t

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] an opposite intention, then the sacrifices are for their own sake. He does not say: if there isn’t an opposite intention, then I intended it. I didn’t intend it. The object stands for its own sake even without my intending it. True, even though it doesn’t depend on me, because the object stands for its own sake—if I myself intend the opposite intention, that invalidates it—but that doesn’t mean that the object’s validity depends on my thought. No. It stands for its own sake. It doesn’t need my preparation to turn it into something “for its own sake,” because from the outset it already stands for its own sake. It is meant for that. So my thought isn’t needed. Right? It seems that in Rashi—we’ll get to that in a moment, in just a second. So the claim is that in Rashi’s approach, it seems to me that “an unspecified act counts as for its own sake” does not mean that the unspecified act is considered as though I thought it, but rather that there are places where no “for its own sake” intention is needed; therefore an unspecified act is also valid. Okay? In Tosafot—there are two Tosafot comments here. Let’s start this; we don’t really have that much time left. “Sacrifices ordinarily stand for their own sake and are not invalid until he intends not for their own sake.” Up to this point, either way—you can interpret it this way or that way. “And if you say: in the first chapter of Hullin, Rabbi Yitzhak asks, ‘Does a minor have intention?’ And Rashi explains there, for example regarding the slaughter of sacred offerings, for we learn at the beginning of Zevahim that it requires being for its own sake; and if a minor slaughtered a burnt offering for its own sake, is that considered intention or not?” Yes, the Talmud there in Hullin 12 asks whether a minor has intention. And Rashi explains that it’s talking about slaughtering sacred offerings. If a minor slaughtered sacred offerings, is it valid or not? Because if he has no intention, it isn’t valid. Tosafot asks: “But here it sounds as though even unspecified is valid, and it isn’t invalid unless he intends not for its own sake.” So why should I care that a minor has no intention? After all, even unspecified is valid with sacrifices. Right? Fine, if a minor wrote a bill of divorce, you can tell me that doesn’t help because a minor has no intention, and in a bill of divorce an unspecified act is not for its own sake. But with sacrifices, if a minor slaughters a sacrifice, the unspecified act is for its own sake—so why should I care that a minor has no intention? And one could say—what? Unspecified means without intention?

[Speaker A] No, but for a person who has no intention, like the principle of “anything fit for mixing”—so what does “for its own sake” mean there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, “fit for mixing”—that’s an interesting comment. The Sefat Emet brings exactly this principle of “fit for mixing.” And notice, since you already brought it up, I’ll say it now. The Sefat Emet basically wants to say that there is a rule regarding sanctified offerings: whenever something is fit for mixing, the actual mixing is not indispensable. With meal-offerings, where mixing is required, if it is fit for mixing, then you don’t need to mix it in practice. But if it is not fit for mixing at all, then it is invalid. So what’s required is fitness for mixing; you don’t need the mixing itself. He says the same thing here: the minor cannot think. Someone who cannot think—then even an unspecified act is invalid. Okay? Now what is he assuming here? Whenever something is fit for mixing, the mixing is not indispensable. He is not saying that this unspecified act is as though he thought it, because after all a minor has no intention. Right? What he says can only go with Rashi. He says that if thought is needed, even an unspecified act counts like thought, because after all the person can think. So even an unspecified act is valid. And it’s not that there has to be thought and in an unspecified act there is some implicit thought. No. You don’t need thought at all, because it is enough that it be fit for thought. Okay? But Tosafot does not go in that direction. That’s already a first indication that Tosafot is not like Rashi. In the next Tosafot we’ll see it explicitly. “And one could say,” says Tosafot, “that the unspecified act of a minor is worse, because he lacks the understanding to grasp that these are sacred offerings, and he thinks they are ordinary, non-sacred animals; therefore he is acting unawares, and it is invalid.” What is this?

[Speaker A] So suddenly it’s about intention. Acting unawares—you remember?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like acting unawares—similar to intention, never mind, there is also “acting unawares” here regarding “for its own sake.” But notice, this is very similar to the prayer of a secular person, right? And that’s invalid. He says this isn’t only an ideal requirement from the outset; this is even after the fact. Then it isn’t considered an act at all. Because the “acting unawares” we saw there is similar to a requirement from the outset. And here we see that it’s not. I said: the prayer of a secular person is worse; it’s not a prayer at all. He says the same with a minor: he doesn’t understand at all what he is doing. He isn’t within the context of prayer at all, or a sacrifice, or whatever it may be. And that’s what he means by “acting unawares, and it is invalid,” as it says in the chapter Beit Shammai: “For the sake of ordinary animals they are valid; because of ordinary animals it is invalid.” And this minor—even if he says, “I know that these are sacred offerings, and I intend for their own sake”—we still ask whether his intention counts as intention, or perhaps it is ineffective if his actions do not prove it. That is, the thought or intention of a minor is worth nothing, because he does not understand at all where he is. So it is invalid not because the sacrifice is invalid, but because the slaughter is invalid; this isn’t a commandment-act at all. So in any case, we see here that Tosafot is taking a different path from Rashi. Because otherwise, if he went like Rashi, then the Sefat Emet could say: whenever something is fit for mixing, the mixing is not indispensable. Tosafot, who chooses another path, apparently that’s a hint—not necessarily conclusive, because it’s always hard to infer from the fact that Tosafot didn’t bring another answer. He brought another answer because that’s the answer he thought of. So it’s not… But I’m saying that in the next Tosafot we’ll see it. So that’s why I’m already pointing it out in this Tosafot. I brought here the Sefat Emet about “fit for mixing”—here, look. “Now at first glance one could resolve their question as follows: although an unspecified act is valid, one can say that this is only where he is fit to slaughter for its own sake; then even an unspecified act is valid, as we say elsewhere, ‘whatever is fit for mixing, the mixing is not indispensable.’ For in truth, ideally it seems that one must specify ‘for its own sake,’ for the verse says, ‘a sacrifice of peace-offerings,’ and so on.” In short, he brings in the whole idea of “fit for mixing.” But that all works because he is offering another answer to Tosafot’s question—why? Because he follows Rashi’s approach. But Tosafot does not accept this answer, because Tosafot explains “unspecified” not like Rashi. Tosafot explains that “unspecified” means that implicitly he really intends it. Not that intention isn’t needed, but rather that the unspecified act is itself a kind of intention. Yes, exactly. Good. The next Tosafot says this explicitly, but that will be for the next lesson. Have a good week.

[Speaker F] All right.