The General Rules of the Categories of Work – Lesson 1

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s begin. What we’re really dealing with is the general rules of labor, and I want to give a somewhat broader picture, not get into the details of the laws of the Sabbath, but rather talk about the principles—what the big picture looks like. I’m going to begin with a definition of primary categories and derivatives: where they come from, what primary categories and derivatives are, what the relationship between them is, and so on. Everything really in a very general way, but still, that’s the framework of the discussion. We’ll talk first about purposeful labor, and then I’ll move on to the general rules of labor. What are the general rules of labor? There’s a whole collection of many, many principles that are general with regard to labor—how one does or does not violate prohibitions of labor. So of course there’s unintentional action, labor not needed for its own purpose, inadvertent involvement, destructive action, something enduring, indirect causation, unusual performance, in an abnormal manner, two people who do it together, partial measure, a non-Jew, various acts done on the Sabbath, and so on. All of these are basically principles that in principle apply to labor in general, and not to specific details of one particular labor. Sometimes I’ll need a specific labor, but that will only be in order to illustrate a general principle. That’s really the general goal of this series. A lot of the time people refer to this whole topic broadly as purposeful labor, but that’s a somewhat confusing expression. Because the simple tendency is to connect all these principles, or all these limitations, to the law of purposeful labor, which is characteristic of the laws of the Sabbath. But as we’ll see, some of these things have nothing to do with purposeful labor. And that’s why I don’t like using this expression, purposeful labor, and why I called it the general rules of labor. But still, there is room to discuss regarding each one whether it is part of the laws of purposeful labor or whether it is some independent rule. Simply speaking, the difference between asking whether a given rule belongs to the laws of purposeful labor or whether it’s some other principle—I would expect the implication to be the question whether it applies only to the laws of the Sabbath or to halakhah in general. If it belongs to the laws of purposeful labor, then it applies only to the laws of the Sabbath. If it’s something more general, then it applies to halakhah as a whole. But it turns out that even that is not a sufficient indication, in either direction. Meaning, there can be a law that belongs to the laws of purposeful labor but for some reason also appears elsewhere, which is very strange, but we’ll have to look at it. And the reverse can also happen: something that is not from the laws of purposeful labor but still applies only on the Sabbath. The two prominent examples are labor not needed for its own purpose and unintentional action. With labor not needed for its own purpose, this is a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim): Rashi says it’s purposeful labor, but Tosafot seems to indicate that it isn’t—Tosafot in Chagigah. And if labor not needed for its own purpose is not purposeful labor, then I would expect it to be exempt throughout all of Torah law. But no—labor not needed for its own purpose we find only in the laws of the Sabbath. It’s an exemption only in the laws of the Sabbath, for the one who holds of that exemption, Rabbi Shimon. The other side is unintentional action. Unintentional action exists throughout all of Torah law, not only in the labors of the Sabbath. But on the other hand there are medieval authorities who connect unintentional action to the law of purposeful labor. Never mind, but still, there’s no exemption there from Torah prohibitions in general. Or—Rabbi Chaim and other later authorities talk about the idea that there are two kinds of unintentional action. But on the face of it, unintentional action exists throughout all of Torah law, even though there are medieval authorities who connect it to the law of purposeful labor. So here we have two sides, and we’ll get back to this, two sides that somehow disconnect the discussion of whether this is purposeful labor from the discussion of whether it is only a rule in the laws of the Sabbath or a rule in halakhah generally. So what is the difference after all if we’re dealing here with the laws of purposeful labor? Tosafot, for example, in several places points out that, for example, with causing a wound, destructive action in causing a wound—or there is some special category of Sabbath prohibitions dealing with creating a wound—the source is basically circumcision. Since the Torah had to permit circumcision on the Sabbath, that implies that without the Torah’s permission we would have prohibited circumcision on the Sabbath. Why? After all, it’s destructive action. Because destructive action in causing a wound incurs liability. And therefore, had the Torah not permitted it, I would have prohibited it. So regarding causing a wound, Tosafot says in several… labor not needed for its own purpose, for example, in causing a wound would be liable, according to the one who says that this is because of purposeful labor. But rules that do not relate to purposeful labor—well, rules that provide an exemption throughout all of Torah law, like coercion—even in causing a wound there will be an exemption, because throughout all of Torah law coercion is exempt. The Merciful One exempted him. That has nothing to do with purposeful labor. It’s a general exemption in all of halakhah. So that will be true in causing a wound as well. So that, for example, is a possible implication of this discussion: whether the rule we’re dealing with is a rule from the laws of purposeful labor or whether it is a sweeping halakhic rule, more general. Fine. So we’ll deal with all these topics after I speak a bit about purposeful labor, about the system of labors—that is, the primary categories and derivatives, the relations between them, their definitions, what they share and how they differ—and then we’ll get into all the details: unintentional action, inadvertent involvement, labor not needed for its own purpose, destructive action, all the forms of indirect causation, two people who do it together, everything I mentioned in the list above. The prohibition against doing labor on the Sabbath appears in the Torah in many places. Maimonides, in the ninth root for example, writes that there are—he’s speaking specifically about the positive command, not the prohibition. But he says the positive command appears twelve times. A positive command to keep the Sabbath—I’m not talking about sanctification and havdalah—a positive command in the sense of resting on the Sabbath, not doing labor. It’s a positive command parallel to the prohibition, yes? It has the same content. What? Yes, rest on the Sabbath. So that appears twelve times, says Maimonides. Yes, I—what doesn’t appear in Maimonides and in Ketzot, I don’t know. Torah is not—it’s irrelevant. So Maimonides says that this appears twelve times in the Torah. But still, says Maimonides, it’s obviously not the case that we build twelve positive commandments around keeping the Sabbath; we count one. Okay, yes, that’s obvious. And Nachmanides argues with him there; the question is why—why was this repetition done? According to Maimonides, it is to intensify the severity of the prohibition, and according to Nachmanides, every such repetition has to teach something. Meaning, the Torah does not simply repeat things just to say that they’re more severe. Fine, but that doesn’t concern us here. In any case, the prohibition against doing labor on the Sabbath appears—or the obligation to rest, or the prohibition against doing labor. But what is this labor? What is the labor that was prohibited? That doesn’t appear in the Torah. Laborious work as opposed to food preparation labor—there are these distinctions with a Jewish holiday. But in principle there are no definitions of what labor is. There are four exceptions, not one; we’ll get to that in a moment.

[Speaker B] “Let no man go out from his place”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—kindling, carrying, plowing, and harvesting. We’ll see in a moment. There are four exceptions where the labors appear explicitly in the Torah. But other than that, the labors do not appear. Meaning, before I even get into the question of how I know the labors, it’s clear that there is some source from which the labors are learned. Or in other words, the labors do not need to be written in the Torah for us to know that they are labors prohibited on the Sabbath. Right? The assumption is that there is some source. That of course immediately raises the question: fine, so why were these four written? Right? Either you have to write them, in which case write them all, or you don’t. Or prohibit only those four. Why are you assuming that there are thirty-nine primary categories of labor? Right, the Mishnah in the chapter Kelal Gadol says there are thirty-nine primary categories of labor. So why were these four written? Fine, in any event, we’ll get back to that later. In any case, the characterization we find for the labors of the Sabbath in the Torah—and even that really does not speak about the labors of the Sabbath—is purposeful labor. But purposeful labor appears in connection with the Tabernacle and not in connection with the Sabbath. And the connection between the Tabernacle and the Sabbath, of course, appears in many places, but it is far from unequivocal. There are all kinds of disputes, and I’ll touch on them a bit as well. Fine. So this connection between the Sabbath and the Tabernacle is used in many places also to establish the list of labors, that the list of labors is learned from the Tabernacle. That’s not agreed upon—we’ll see this. There’s a passage on folio 49 from which it seems that it’s not connected to the Tabernacle at all, but rather that the word “labor” appears thirty-nine times in the Torah, and from there we know that there are thirty-nine labors. But yes, according to the accepted approaches at least, it’s learned from the Tabernacle. But even when I say something is learned from the Tabernacle—and this is something general that I want to present here—that does not mean there isn’t some internal logic behind it in its own right. Meaning, that these labors are not really significant—and I’ll talk about what it means to call them significant—in and of themselves, by logic. The fact that I learn it from the Tabernacle is not enough. Why not? In the Tabernacle they also walked, so is walking forbidden on the Sabbath? I once heard in the name of the Klausenberger Rebbe that he said that if it had not been written in halakhah that one may cut bread with a knife, then he too would have prohibited that. Fine, there are those who think that anything not permitted is prohibited, but of course that’s nonsense. Whatever was not prohibited is permitted. To prohibit, you need a source; to permit, you do not need a source. Fine. In any case, the point is that this characterization called purposeful labor appears with regard to the Tabernacle and not with regard to the Sabbath, but from the juxtaposition—for example in the portion of Vayakhel and elsewhere—from the juxtaposition between the Tabernacle and the Sabbath we understand that there are things written concerning the Tabernacle that actually come to teach us what happens in the labors of the Sabbath. For example, the Talmud in Beitzah 13b discusses the relationship between the completion of labor for tithes and the completion of labor for the Sabbath. Okay? Setting up the heap, right? So the Talmud makes the distinction there and says that on the Sabbath you need purposeful labor. And therefore setting up the heap is not… setting up the heap, right? when they set up the heap. Huh? Yes. So the Talmud says, and Rashi says: “What then can you say? Even though for tithes it is considered labor, for the Sabbath the Torah prohibited purposeful labor, which is skilled labor, for the section of the Sabbath was juxtaposed to the work of the Tabernacle in Vayakhel, and there the term purposeful labor is written.” We see that there is a special characteristic of the labors of the Sabbath, that they have to be purposeful labor, and Rashi says: skilled labor. All right? Something that is not skilled labor is not significant, and so it will not be prohibited on the Sabbath, although for tithes, for example, there is no problem—even though it is not skilled labor, from my perspective it is considered completion of labor. Let’s say—and this will be true for many of the rules we’re going to encounter—a definition sounds nice, but the truth is it doesn’t say all that much. In the end, think for example about gathering produce into piles, one of the primary categories of labor. What is gathering produce into piles? Collecting produce into a basket. Does that sound to you like skilled labor? Is that more skilled than setting up a heap? In my eyes, setting up a heap is more skilled than that. A heap you have to build; you have to see that it’s organized; there’s some actual work by the person here. In gathering produce into piles, you take a number of scattered fruits and collect them into a basket, right? Like at the beginning of Eilu Metziot—there were scattered fruits, you collect them into the basket, and that’s gathering produce into piles; you violate gathering produce into piles. What? Not to pack them in? No, to gather them. Not to pack them in and nothing of the sort. So what? But that has nothing to do with skilled labor. If you ask yourself what is more skilled, setting up a heap is much more skilled than collecting fruits into a basket. Okay? As one example. We’ll see this a lot more also with the distinctions between labor not needed for its own purpose and unintentional action, which is a story for the prophets. Even though there are definitions, mainly among later authorities and somewhat among medieval ones, for the difference between them, when you try to translate that into practice it’s very hard to see why those definitions really explain why one thing is unintentional action and another is labor not needed for its own purpose. So definitions have their place, but somehow in the end application is no less important. This is true in general. And I’ve spoken about this more than once: in general the Talmud, and halakhah in general, do not really believe in definitions. Definitions are treated with respect and suspicion. Meaning, they give you some direction, but in the end, in the end, right? the positivist outlook is an outlook that thinks you can work top-down. Right? You give a general definition and then derive conclusions from it. That’s not how it works. Meaning, definitions give you a general direction, but in the end, in the end, you get the feel in your fingers from looking at the examples, at the applications. Sometimes you don’t get a feel in your fingers except numbness. Meaning, these topics can really be embarrassing when you try to define things seriously. Fine. So this characteristic of purposeful labor in this context seems to be a leniency, right? Meaning, something that elsewhere in the Torah would count as a prohibition, or as something that… on the Sabbath would not. On the Sabbath it would be permitted. In other words, the criterion of purposeful labor is usually a criterion for leniency. On the Sabbath, the standard for liability is higher. When you set a higher standard in order to impose liability, that means you are being lenient. Right? It’s like the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel at the beginning of Beitzah: leavening agent in an olive’s bulk and leavened food in the bulk of a date. So the Talmud says there: why leavening agent in an olive’s bulk and leavened food in the bulk of a date? Because leavening agent is more severe. And therefore is that a reason to be lenient or stringent? Stringent, right? And the measure—an olive’s bulk—is a smaller measure than the bulk of a date. Because a smaller measure is indeed more stringent, since you lower the threshold for liability. Even for an olive’s bulk you violate, not only for the bulk of a date. The more you raise the threshold, the more lenient you are. When you lower the threshold, you are stringent. Right, in prohibitions. In any case, this characteristic of purposeful labor in the laws of the Sabbath is usually a lenient one. But there are some exceptions. Labor not needed for its own purpose, or things like that—purposeful labor. What does purposeful labor mean? That because of it you exempt, because it is not purposeful labor. In other words, the basic connotation of saying “purposeful labor” is basically a lenient connotation. When on the Sabbath you require purposeful labor in order to prohibit something, that means that anything which is not purposeful labor will not be prohibited. And that is a lenient statement. But there are some exceptions. For example, the Talmud in Bava Kamma, folio 60. The Talmud there talks about one who winnows and the wind assists him, as opposed to one who fans a flame and the wind causes it to spread. There, there’s a damager with the help of the wind, versus one who does labor on the Sabbath with the help of the wind. And there are four amoraim there in the Talmud who make the distinction as to why on the Sabbath he is liable, while in damages he is exempt. Rav Ashi is the fourth; he says that on the Sabbath the Torah prohibited purposeful labor. Notice: on the Sabbath the Torah prohibited purposeful labor, and therefore on the Sabbath it is forbidden, even though in damages he is exempt—on the Sabbath it will be forbidden. Meaning, the concept of purposeful labor appears there as a stringency, not as a leniency. So Rashi indeed explains: “purposeful labor”—and this is a very common definition in this context—“his intention was fulfilled, because he is pleased that the wind assists him.” What does that mean? You winnow the chaff from the kernels, and then the wind comes, blows away the chaff, and the kernels fall. So what does that mean? The wind performed the process of selection. Winnowing is really the same as tossing, the same as selecting, the same as sifting. In other words, winnowing is a kind of selecting. But it’s selecting with the help of the wind. Seemingly there is room to exempt him—the wind did the work, not me. He made a plan, and since this was his plan from the outset, the plan materialized. With the help of the wind indeed, but the plan materialized—his intention was fulfilled—and that is enough to make him liable. In other words, it is enough that his intention was fulfilled to make him liable. Which is not the case in damages or elsewhere in halakhah, where indirect causation is exempt. If you only caused it, but in the end you didn’t do it—something else did, or it happened on its own, something else did it—then you cannot be held liable. So on the Sabbath, in this case “his intention was fulfilled,” this purposeful labor, is a reason for stringency and not for leniency. Meaning, even though elsewhere in the Torah you would be exempt, on the Sabbath, because your intention was fulfilled, you are liable. In damages that’s because there he did not intend—in damages he…

[Speaker B] He did not intend to cause damage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The point of purposeful labor, what I’m trying to say that exempted him, is because it pleased him, not because… No, “his intention was fulfilled, because he is pleased that the wind assists him” means that this is what he planned from the outset, that the wind would do the work. No. And if he planned to cause damage, then what? Then he’s exempt? He would be liable? No. Something else. No. You won’t find that anywhere. No. If I intend to cause damage with the help of the wind, that doesn’t matter. Intent is intent. Nachmanides, in his treatise Dinei DeGarmi, asks what the difference is between direct causative damage and indirect causation, and one of the suggestions he offers there is intention. Meaning, that direct causative damage is a case of indirect causation with intention. But simply speaking that’s not correct. Because the phenomena of indirect causation that appear in the Torah—for example, someone in the chapter Kol Kitvei HaKodesh who places jars of water in front of a fire so that the fire will burst the jars and the water will spill out—that is presented there as indirect causation. And there he intends to extinguish; that’s why he put the jars there. So it’s hard to say that this is the difference between indirect causation and direct causative damage. So in the simple understanding, intention has no significance at all. Once it’s indirect causation, then even if you intended it, that changes nothing.

[Speaker B] In damages, that’s already a different part of what he intends.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see what the difference is. What do you mean? The wind does the selecting, but I planned from the outset that this is what would happen. The very damage that was created. Someone—yes, Tosafot only brings Bava Batra there, but in the Talmud itself it says “he fanned it and the wind caused it to spread.” “He fanned it and the wind caused it to spread” means that I kindle a fire and the wind takes it and causes damage. Whether it was a normal wind, an unusual wind, that doesn’t matter right now, but basically they want to hold him liable in some way?

[Speaker B] No,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, even if he intended it. It’s not relevant. There is no difference between whether the person intended it or did not intend it. In general, with a person who causes damage, after all, a person who causes damage is liable even under coercion. A person is always forewarned. No, we haven’t found such a distinction, that if you intended it then it’s not indirect causation. If it is indirect causation, then in damages he is exempt. That’s not so—except perhaps for Nachmanides. So Rashi here writes that his intention was fulfilled, and therefore he is liable. Meaning that purposeful labor in this case is a criterion for stringency, okay? In contrast to the usual appearances of purposeful labor, which are generally lenient. But we’ll come back to this when we talk about indirect causation on the Sabbath. The Rosh there disagrees with Rashi and explains differently why in fact on the Sabbath one is liable when he winnows and the wind assists him. So he says that this is the normal way to winnow. This is how people generally winnow. In other words, how do you winnow? You throw it up into the air, the wind blows away the chaff, and the kernels fall. That is the normal way of winnowing. In a labor whose normal way is to do it with the help of the wind, then the fact that you did it with the help of the wind does not exempt you. Doing it with the help of the wind exempts you only where that is not the normal way to do it. But if that is the normal way of doing winnowing, then you are liable. Let’s formulate it a little more sharply—we’ll discuss this more—but let’s say, if that is how they did winnowing in the Tabernacle, they did winnowing in the Tabernacle that way too. That’s how it is done, okay? So if that’s the case, when you learn it from the Tabernacle, then if that is what existed in the Tabernacle, then clearly you will be liable for that kind of winnowing. I’m not interested in the fact that it was done with the help of the wind, okay? How does that fit into Rashi’s language, “his intention was fulfilled”?

[Speaker D] Rashi is excellent—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Purposeful labor comes from the word thought: when you plan something and it materializes, that’s called purposeful labor. According to the Rosh, how does that fit into the Talmud?

[Speaker D] According to the Rosh he has to explain—it’s not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a characteristic of the Sabbath, it’s a characteristic of winnowing. A labor that existed—

[Speaker D] In the Tabernacle, they winnowed with the wind, so we do too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. Or one could say that the intention is… What? No, but why in the Talmud? And why does the Talmud explain the difference that way between one who winnows and one who fans a flame and the wind causes it to spread? Winnowing is skilled labor. What’s skilled about it there? That’s how the labor is done. That’s not called skilled labor. Skilled labor means there’s a more complex labor here, not merely that that’s how it’s done. What difference does it make whether that’s how it’s done or not? On the contrary—if it isn’t done that way, that’s more skilled. In labor there’s some standard, some normal way of doing it.

[Speaker B] That’s not called skilled labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Skilled work means something that requires some thought, something that isn’t just done mechanically. Like in the laws of Chol HaMoed, right—professional work, or things like that. You see that it’s something that requires… I think it’s the same thing, the same idea. It doesn’t have to be exactly the same category as on Chol HaMoed, but that’s the idea. In any case, the point is that “his intention was realized” means purposeful labor—melechet machshevet. Right? You have to remember that the Sabbath is a remembrance of creation. Right? What the Holy One, blessed be He, did in creation—He created it through ten utterances, through speech, correct? And what does that mean? If God’s intention was realized, that’s called that He did it. If His intention was realized, that itself is called that He did it. “In the beginning God created”—He didn’t really create by hand, He only spoke. Fine, but when He spoke and the plan comes into effect, that’s really the meaning of the matter, and as a remembrance of that, on the Sabbath we are supposed to cease from labor. Therefore, purposeful labor really just defines the relation to creation, and so in this case it goes in the stringent direction, and as I said, the Rosh apparently does not accept this. Meaning, he does not see here a principle of purposeful labor, or a sweeping principle. Say according to the Rosh, for example, there is no such rule that indirect causation on the Sabbath would make you liable. According to Rashi, it comes out that indirect causation on the Sabbath would make you liable. That’s difficult in light of other passages, never mind, but that is what comes out of this Rashi. There are contradictions between the passages and people try to reconcile them. But according to the Rosh, no—there is no general rule that indirect causation on the Sabbath makes one liable. Just as everywhere else in the Torah, indirect causation here too is exempt. Specifically regarding winnowing, since that is the normal way, that is how the labor is defined. It’s like planting: I plant it in the ground. What is the labor in that? I put it in the ground—so what? The labor is that in the end it grows. But the fact that I caused the growth—that’s indirect causation. So why is he liable? What’s the idea? The idea is that this is what the labor is called. The labor is to cause this thing to grow. That’s how you do it; a person cannot make it grow himself. You put it in the ground and the ground makes it grow. Okay? I didn’t understand. Right. But what’s the idea? In planting, the idea is not to put it into the ground. Putting something in the ground is not planting. Putting something in the ground in such a way that it will later grow—that is planting. No, the act of causing is the labor. That’s exactly the point. And with winnowing too, the same thing. It could be not. No, no. It could be not. That’s the question of taking bread out of the oven; the Minchat Chinukh deals with this a lot, there are many discussions, it’s not simple at all. If it doesn’t grow afterward, it’s not certain that you are liable. Yes. Yes. The question is whether they would execute you or not, fine. So yes, you could say it’s a doubtful warning. A doubtful warning—or maybe not a doubtful warning; you follow the majority. Fine, fine. Yes. Like baking, right. That’s exactly what the Minchat Chinukh talks about, exactly this—the difference between planting and baking. In planting, if you take the bread out of the oven, then the fact that you stuck it to the oven still does not yet make you liable. What happens if you stuck it in close to the end of the Sabbath, and it gets baked after the Sabbath, and you take it out after the Sabbath—then what? And what is the relation to planting—what happens if I take it out of the ground on Sunday? I planted it and then take it out of the ground on Sunday; it won’t grow or anything, it has not yet taken root. Okay. Would he be exempt or not? So there are whole discussions there, both in Minchat Chinukh and in Eglei Tal and others. Fine. In any case, that is the Rosh. Why am I bringing this? I’m not going into it right now; we’ll talk about it more when we discuss indirect causation. I’m only trying to show that in all the places where they bring the rule of purposeful labor in a stringent direction, it is not agreed upon. Rashi here brings the rule of purposeful labor in a stringent direction, but the Rosh disagrees. There are additional places too. For example, I added here more places: there is a Rashbam in Bava Batra who says that a partial measure is forbidden on the Sabbath because of purposeful labor. Meaning, his intention gives this act significance as labor. In other words, if you are occupied with a partial measure, then the very fact that it interests you and you are occupied with it gives it importance. And therefore you are liable because of purposeful labor. But we know there are quite a few later authorities (Acharonim) who wrote that there is no such thing as a partial measure in Sabbath labors. The Chacham Tzvi and others; there is also Sefat Emet at the beginning of tractate Shabbat. What? That it is forbidden. What do you mean forbidden? No, I wrote “forbidden”; it’s not a quotation. So he says that because of the contradiction—because his intention gives this thing significance—therefore he is liable, and this is because of purposeful labor, and once again here, in this case, purposeful labor is being used stringently. They make you liable because of purposeful labor. Elsewhere a partial measure is exempt—or yes, I don’t know, exempt but not punishable, right—the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan. In any event, this is another source. So there too we see that on the one hand there is use here of the rule of purposeful labor in a stringent direction, but this too is disputed; it is not agreed upon. Like with Rashi and the Rosh that we saw in the previous example. A third example is the Ran at the end of the chapter HaBoneh. He talks about engraving around letters. Engraving around letters is when you create the letters by carving out the area around them. Right? You basically recess the surrounding area, and what remains is the shape of a letter. So you did not write the letter; rather you—yes, it’s like they always say that a sculptor really does nothing; he only removes the waste. Meaning, he removes everything in the stone that is unnecessary, and what remains is the sculpture. So the sculptor didn’t make the sculpture; he only removed what prevented you from seeing it. Huh? Hollowing a stack. No, but there it’s something else. The question there is whether that means creating the space or creating the structure. That’s a different discussion. It could be that with a sukkah, the structure is only a way of making the space exist, and then that is not engraving around letters at all, because the sukkah is the empty space. But you need a framework around it so that the space has meaning. A dispute between Tosafot and Rashbam in Bava Batra: if someone is forbidden to derive benefit from a pit—if he is forbidden to derive benefit from a pit—may he use the empty space of the pit, or the walls? What do you mean? What about the vapor? Yes, “its excavation is its vapor.” Yes. But there, the question is whether the bagel is the hole. So the Ran, regarding engraving around letters, says that with respect to the Sabbath, if he wrote through engraving around letters he is liable. Why? Because his intention was realized. Well, he says because the Torah forbade purposeful labor, but the meaning is apparently like Rashi in Bava Kama that we saw: what does “purposeful labor” mean? It means that his intention was realized. In the end, writing appeared here by itself, but it didn’t just happen by accident—that was his plan. I will recess everything around it so that what remains for me will be letters. So if that is so, then my plan was fulfilled; my intention was realized. If so, on the Sabbath I am liable. No, but that is not the normal way of writing. I don’t think so. No, but embossing and recessing is not engraving around letters. No, no, no—embossing and recessing, both of them are not engraving around letters. Engraving around letters is when you recess the surrounding area; you do not touch the letter itself. There are two ways to do… Right, both are liable. Not true—you can emboss it, what do you mean? You can emboss it, in a block, in metal. Right. I don’t know; it applies to anything. Why specifically wood? Anything. By the way, it also applies to ink. Meaning, it could be that there is a blot of ink and you expose it—that too is called engraving around letters. You remove the ink and leave only the form of a letter. No, even without recessing, I’m saying, you can remove the black from around it and the shape of a letter will remain. In other words, engraving around letters means when you do not touch the letter itself; the letter is formed on its own. You remove, like a sculptor. But that is not the normal way to do it; it’s hard to accept that. That is not the normal way to do it. I understand. There is a difference between an unusual manner and the normal manner. “The normal manner” means that this is the ordinary way to do it, and there is no other. If it is also a normal way, but not the only one, that is not enough. Fine, but that’s not… But it is still engraving around letters because there is also another way to do it. Fine, we’ll leave that for when we talk about the… But I said people do not do it that way at all. The question is whether this is the normal way to do it. The normal way, not a normal way. No, the Rosh is talking about winnowing—he says that this is the way it is done; there is no other way. Another way would be an unusual way to do winnowing, to do… yes. There could be two ways, but that is not what the Rosh is talking about. The Rosh is talking about a situation where if there were two ways, then perhaps the Rosh would not say that you are liable for winnowing. The Rosh says this is how they did it; this is the way they did it—not that they also did it this way. Now we have to discuss what happens when there are two ways. Obviously, this is how winnowing is done. Winnowing is done with wind; there is no other way to do it. What do you mean there isn’t? It could be, I don’t know what, you could pick out every bit of chaff one by one and throw it away—but this is how it is usually done. And with water?

[Speaker B] With water?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Fine, in any event, with the Ran too we see that the rule of purposeful labor appears in a stringent direction. His intention was realized, and therefore in the case of engraving around letters on the Sabbath he would be liable, as opposed to engraving around letters, say, in a bill of divorce, where perhaps it would not work because it says, “and he shall write for her”—it requires writing. Okay? So again, this is an example where purposeful labor is brought stringently, and in this example too there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with him. Not everyone agrees with the Ran. So I’m saying: we have seen here three or four examples where purposeful labor appears in a stringent direction, but in all these examples there is a dispute. It is not agreed upon. Usually purposeful labor appears leniently; those are agreed matters. If there is something that is not purposeful labor, then you are exempt for it on the Sabbath—that, the lenient side, is agreed upon. For example, one who acts unintentionally. The Talmud says about one who acts unintentionally—there in Sanhedrin 62—the Talmud discusses the difference between one who acts unintentionally regarding forbidden fats and sexual prohibitions, and one who acts unintentionally on the Sabbath. And the Talmud says: and in accordance with what Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel, that one who acts unintentionally with forbidden fats and sexual prohibitions is liable, since he derived pleasure; and one who acts unintentionally on the Sabbath is exempt, because the Torah forbade purposeful labor. So here, an unintentional act is excluded because of purposeful labor, and he is exempt. We will still have to discuss what happens with unintentional action regarding other prohibitions that are not Sabbath prohibitions. If it is because of purposeful labor, then apparently one who acts unintentionally regarding other prohibitions should be liable. And the Talmud here contrasts unintentional action with forbidden fats and sexual prohibitions—not with unintentional action regarding other things. Right? So with unintentional action regarding other things it seems he would also be exempt, so how does that fit with the idea that this is because of purposeful labor? After all, purposeful labor is only on the Sabbath. What? He intended to throw two cubits and threw four, for example, Bava Kama. There are cases where he is not aware that he is now doing a forbidden act. You walk in the street and somehow tear off a branch. But you’re not—you are just walking there. Yes. Yes, a light or something like that. Yes. When you walk on the Sabbath and cause a light to turn on, that is even worse than unintentional action, because you are not even turning on the light. With the branch, you tore it off; it just somehow happened on its own while you were walking. With the light, you did not turn it on at all. It decided to turn on because I passed by here. That’s its problem. What do you want from me? I didn’t even do the act, maybe not even unintentionally. The question is whether that is even unintentional action; it’s not clear. Yes. What? It is unintentional action. It is unintentional action because when you stepped on the snake, you killed it. Fine? But here, with the light, it turned on by itself; I only passed by. I did not perform the act of turning it on. What? The one who turned it on was the light—it turned itself on. I didn’t press something. I didn’t do an act; I passed by here and it decides to turn on when I pass by. That’s its problem, what… It’s like if someone sets someone on me—someone says to me, look, if you don’t give me a shekel I’ll kill so-and-so. Fine? Suppose. Now I didn’t give him a shekel, so he killed so-and-so. So do they say that I killed so-and-so? No, he killed so-and-so. Maybe it’s my fault; he got angry that I didn’t give him a shekel, but I did not perform the act of killing. In any case, this mechanism is a mechanism that has nothing to do with me. At most it has to do with the one who built it. It has nothing to do with me. I’m passing here—what do you want from me? In my opinion, that’s worse than unintentional action. Yes, it is not my act. I’m walking, I’m not… No, this is an intermediate case where there it is my act, but still indirect—not direct contact. But here I’m saying there is nothing at all; I’m just simply walking. What? We’re not going into the rule of “since he derived pleasure” right now. The pleasure substitutes for intention. Right? He did not intend it, but if he derived pleasure, that takes the place of intention. Yes. Fine, there is also in Pesikta Zutarta, where he says as follows: “Its explanation is that anything that comes about through indirect causation is not forbidden on the Sabbath. For a person plants wheat in the ground on Friday and they take root on the Sabbath; a person places hides in the earth with tanning agents on the eve of the Sabbath and they become processed on the Sabbath; and likewise many labors are completed on the Sabbath. And the Torah forbade only purposeful labor. We learn that if one lights a fire on the eve of the Sabbath and it burns on the Sabbath, this is not called kindling on the Sabbath. For his kindling was yesterday, and it is similar to one who waters a field and opens a river on the eve of the Sabbath and the seeds drink all through the Sabbath.” Apparently this is the opposite of Rashi. Because Rashi uses purposeful labor regarding indirect causation in order to make one liable. Even though it is indirect causation, since his intention was realized, then on the Sabbath that is purposeful labor and so he is liable. Here he says that by the rule of purposeful labor he wants to exempt indirect causation. But of course it is not the same case. Rashi is talking about a situation where I did the act on the Sabbath. It’s just that this act only causes the forbidden result, okay? Like winnowing and the wind helps, or I winnow on the Sabbath and now the wind comes and blows away the chaff, okay? He is talking about a situation where I did the causation on Friday. The caused result happened on the Sabbath. What? No, with resting of one’s utensils there is a similar case, okay—Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel—but with resting of one’s utensils there is a similar case. You activate a machine on Friday and the machine continues working on the Sabbath, so they do not make you liable for activating the machine. For activating the machine you are exempt because of what Pesikta Zutarta says—purposeful labor. But the question is whether they make you liable for the machine’s operating on the Sabbath, since that is forbidden to do on the Sabbath. So that is a question of resting of one’s utensils. Planting. So no, I go back to the same point we discussed earlier. Yes. They only make you liable for the rooting by virtue of the fact that you placed it in the ground. So they define it—but it is still basically an act whose forbidden essence is the rooting that comes afterward, even though what you actually do is of course only the preparation for the matter. Fine, so for example there is a Mishnah in Chagigah 10: “The laws of the Sabbath, festival offerings, and misuse of consecrated property are like mountains hanging by a hair, for they have little scripture and many laws.” Yes, regarding the laws of the Sabbath there is little scripture and many laws. Now if I had to give the example, I would have brought all the… because “you shall not do any labor” is written explicitly in the verse; it is not merely a hint. All that remains for me is only to clarify what labor means. Fine, I can learn that from the Tabernacle, I can learn it from all sorts of other places, but all of that learning merely clarifies what the Torah forbids when it says “you shall not do any labor.” When it says here “mountains hanging by a hair,” the meaning is that the prohibition itself is only hinted at and not explicitly written. Okay? Meaning that with Sabbath prohibitions it is not just a hint; it is written explicitly: it is forbidden to do labor. The only question is what is called labor—that is an interpretive question. But here the prohibition itself is only hinted at. Okay? So therefore this is… and what is that prohibition? So he writes: “The laws of the Sabbath are indeed written.” The Talmud asks: the laws of the Sabbath—why are they mountains hanging by a hair if they are written explicitly? It’s not just a hint. What is written? Nothing is written. The thirty-nine categories of labor and their subcategories—what is written? Nothing is written. What does “indeed written” mean? Because it says “you shall not do any labor”—that is “indeed written,” what I said before. It says “you shall not do any labor.” The fact that the Torah does not explain what labor is—that is interpretive; do the correct interpretation and understand what labor the Torah forbids. But the Torah explicitly forbids labor; that is called “indeed written.” “It was only necessary for the statement of Rabbi Abba, for Rabbi Abba said: one who digs a hole on the Sabbath and needs only its dirt is exempt for it”—that is a labor not needed for its own sake, because he digs the hole, so the hole itself is the prohibition. But what you need is not the hole—you need the dirt. So basically you did a labor, but it is not needed for its own sake; you did it for another purpose and not for the forbidden purpose. So he is exempt for it. And this whole rule that a labor not needed for its own sake is itself a mountain hanging by a hair, because it is not written anywhere. According to whom? According to Rabbi Shimon, who says that one is exempt for a labor not needed for its own sake. You may even say Rabbi Yehudah: there, he improves; here, he damages. What then makes them “mountains hanging by a hair”? “The Torah forbade purposeful labor,” and purposeful labor is not written. Rashi says: “Purposeful labor” means labor that his thought conceived in his mind and that he intended, and here he did not intend this construction, therefore he is exempt. Now, one who digs a hole and needs only its dirt—that depends whether it is in a field or in a house. If it is in a field, it is because of plowing; if it is in a house, it is because of building. Rashi is talking about a house, so he speaks here about building. “Therefore he is exempt.” “And this is but a slight hint, for purposeful labor regarding the Sabbath is not written, rather it is written only regarding the Tabernacle; and since in Parashat Vayakhel the section of Sabbath is juxtaposed to the section of the Tabernacle, we learn purposeful labor for the Sabbath from the Tabernacle.” Therefore these are mountains hanging by a hair: there is only a hint. What is the hint? After all, the Torah does say “purposeful labor.” Yes, but it says it regarding the Tabernacle, not regarding the Sabbath. So really there is only a kind of analogy, that the section of Sabbath was juxtaposed to the section of the Tabernacle, and we learn purposeful labor from the Tabernacle to the Sabbath. And that is only a hint; it is not written explicitly. Therefore it is called mountains hanging by a hair. By the way, Rashi here really writes that labor not needed for its own sake is an exemption derived from the laws of purposeful labor. Right? That is what we saw here. The Talmud says: “The Torah forbade purposeful labor on the Sabbath.” And Rashi explains what that is—it is labor not needed for its own sake. So it comes out that labor not needed for its own sake is an exemption learned from the laws of purposeful labor. Tosafot there disagrees with him. Tosafot claims that labor not needed for its own sake is not an exemption that comes from purposeful labor; rather, one simply learns it from the Tabernacle. Just as in the Tabernacle the labors were done only for their own sake, so too what is forbidden on the Sabbath is labor done for its own sake. But not because there is some general rule called purposeful labor.

[Speaker C] Labors that are done for the sake of the main objective—or regardless of the objective that existed in the Tabernacle, which is itself debated. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or what was done in the Tabernacle, or the principal case—there’s a debate about this—but it’s one of those two possibilities. What? No, but not necessarily that what was done in the Tabernacle is the main purpose of people who do that action in general. Say, for example, in the Tabernacle they cooked dyes in order to prepare color, and from there we learn the prohibition of cooking, okay? Usually when you cook, you’re not cooking dyes, you’re cooking food. So if you ask me whether the main purpose of cooking is to make dyes—the answer is no. But that is the purpose it had in the Tabernacle. All right? Okay, so Rashi and Tosafot disagree somewhat about a labor not needed for its own sake; I mentioned this earlier—whether that is a law within the rules of purposeful labor or not. And here I noted that the question is whether the “need” is the need that existed in the Tabernacle or the important need, but we’ll talk about that when we discuss a labor not needed for its own sake. Okay.

Now I want to go a bit into purposeful labor and the background: Sabbath, Tabernacle, and the like. I want now to get more into the actual labors. So as I said, the Sabbath labors do not appear in the Torah except for four: carrying out—“let no man go out from his place on the Sabbath day.” In the portion of Ki Tisa there is another verse: “Six days you shall work, and on the seventh day you shall rest; in plowing and in harvest you shall rest.” So on the simple reading, it looks like this is about the Sabbath, right? Plowing and harvesting regarding the Sabbath. In Moed Katan—wait, but then we have kindling, carrying out, plowing, and harvesting. Those are the four exceptions.

But in the Talmud in Moed Katan you see that it learns that verse as referring to the Sabbatical year, without even explaining. It’s just taken as obvious. The Talmud there is very strange. What? There? No, I didn’t understand the comment. The question is whether he was gathering into sheaves or carrying from a private domain to a public domain, okay. Nothing is written. It doesn’t say, “Do not gather into sheaves.” That’s after the Sages interpret it. They also interpret “Do not do any labor”—they interpret that too. That is not something explicitly written in the Torah. The Sages interpret what he did. I’m looking for something that does not depend on rabbinic interpretation, where the Torah itself says that this is a prohibited labor. It says he did something prohibited; it doesn’t say what. True, but they didn’t call it a primary category of labor, so I don’t know what it is. So I can’t treat it as something actually written. Certainly if it’s carrying out, then it doesn’t matter, because carrying out is written anyway. But even without that, it’s not…

So the Talmud in Moed Katan says: “Are these halakhot? For we learned: ‘In plowing and in harvest you shall rest.’ Rabbi Akiva says: It need not state plowing and harvest of the Sabbatical year, for it has already been stated, ‘You shall not sow your field, and you shall not prune your vineyard’; rather, it refers to plowing on the eve of the Sabbatical year that enters into the Sabbatical year, and harvesting of the Sabbatical year that extends into the period after the Sabbatical year. Rabbi Ishmael says: Just as plowing is optional, so too harvesting is optional, excluding the harvest of the omer, which is a commandment.”

I’m not going into all the details at all, but notice that the Talmud begins discussing plowing and harvesting as referring not to the Sabbath—that’s obvious. The Talmud just says: yes, but regarding the Sabbatical year this too is redundant, since it is already written, so apparently this means plowing before the Sabbatical year that enters the Sabbatical year, or they make some kind of move… For the Sabbatical year itself you don’t need this. But we’re talking about the Sabbatical year—the verse is speaking about the Sabbath. So explain to me: maybe for the Sabbath it isn’t needed, therefore it must be about the Sabbatical year, and then continue. But for the Sabbatical year too it isn’t needed, so therefore it must be referring to the extension of the Sabbatical year. Fine. But the Talmud doesn’t even bother to note that the plowing and harvesting here are not about the Sabbath at all. It’s obvious. It’s a first principle. There’s nothing to discuss. Why is that so obvious? The verse speaks about the Sabbath.

Apparently—this is how I understand it at least—the Talmud is certain that ordinary primary categories of labor are not written in the Torah. They cannot be written in the Torah. The fact is that all the primary categories are not written in the Torah. So why would you assume that plowing and harvesting, which appear here, are primary Sabbath labors? Then they should write all thirty-nine. No, obviously they do not write primary categories of labor. Therefore plowing and harvesting are probably for the Sabbatical year and not for the Sabbath. It can’t be. Now regarding the Sabbatical year you can discuss: Sabbatical year, extension of the Sabbatical year. Fine, that can be discussed. But for the Sabbath it’s not even an option, because in principle the labors of the Sabbath are not written.

So that of course leaves us with kindling and carrying out—they are written. What do we do with them? Plowing and harvesting only sharpen the point that if it’s written explicitly—no, that can’t be about the Sabbath, and they don’t even bother saying it’s not the Sabbath because it’s so obvious. But with carrying out and kindling, there it is clear that this is the Sabbath. There is no Sabbatical year there, no such concept of Sabbatical year, right? It’s talking about the Sabbath. So the question is: why is it written?

So here the Talmud in Shabbat… yes, so the Talmud in Shabbat says: “But let him derive the distinction between the labors—from where does Rabbi Natan derive it? For it was taught: Rabbi Natan says: ‘You shall kindle no fire throughout your dwellings on the Sabbath day.’ Why is this stated? Since it is said, ‘And Moses assembled all the congregation of the children of Israel… These are the things… six days labor shall be done.’ ‘Things,’ ‘the things,’ ‘these are the things’—these are the thirty-nine labors said to Moses at Sinai. One might have thought that if he did all of them in one lapse of awareness he is liable only one offering. Therefore the verse states: ‘In plowing and in harvest you shall rest’”—what is this? Here we learn that plowing and harvesting are Sabbath labors, not Sabbatical-year labors, right?—“to teach that one is liable for each and every one. But I still might say: for plowing and harvesting one is liable for two, but who says that for all thirty-nine, if he did all of them, he would be liable for thirty-nine? Therefore the verse states: ‘You shall kindle no fire.’ Kindling was included in the general category and then singled out. And why was it singled out? To compare all the others to it and tell you: just as kindling is a primary category of labor and one is liable for it independently, so too for every act that is a primary category of labor one is liable independently.”

Kindling was singled out in order to divide. Kindling was singled out to separate the categories. And Shmuel holds like Rabbi Yose, who says that kindling was singled out only as a prohibition and not to divide, as it was taught: kindling was singled out only as a prohibition—these are the words of Rabbi Yose; Rabbi Natan says: it was singled out to divide.

Meaning, for our purposes, what matters is that the verse that brings the labor of kindling requires interpretation, requires explanation. Why does it appear? After all, labors do not appear, so if a certain verse does appear, the Tannaim immediately interpret it. One interprets it to divide, to tell you that if you perform one primary category of labor, you are liable—you do not need to do all thirty-nine in order to be liable; one primary category of labor is enough to make you liable, and if you do several, then you are liable for each and every one. And the other says: kindling was singled out only as a prohibition. Apparently, “to divide” is unnecessary—it’s obvious that you’re liable for each primary category of labor, so apparently it was singled out only as a prohibition. What does that mean? That one who kindles on the Sabbath violates only a negative commandment; it is not a stoning prohibition, it is only the negative commandment that applies to all. What? Okay, fine, I’m not getting into the logic of that right now—I don’t understand it either. But what matters for us is that the verse that mentions the labor of kindling must be interpreted; meaning, without an interpretation, why on earth does it appear there?

Okay, so that’s regarding kindling. Regarding carrying out, the Talmud does not address it. Why did they bring carrying out as well—that too is a question, why they brought it. But in the medieval authorities it appears—yes, in the medieval authorities it appears that carrying out is an inferior labor. And the explanation, at least in some of the medieval authorities, is that this is why the Torah wrote the labor of carrying out, because otherwise I would not have thought to prohibit carrying out, since carrying out is an inferior labor. So we’ll still talk about what the meaning of “inferior labor” is and why it is inferior and so on. But what we see, at least in the medieval authorities, is that the labor of carrying out, which was written separately in the Torah, was also written for a particular reason. There must be some reason why it was written: because it is an inferior labor, I would have thought one is not liable for it, and the Torah comes to teach that one is liable for that too. With kindling, the Torah comes either to divide or because it was singled out only as a prohibition. So in both of these there are explanations.

With plowing and harvesting, it appears here that this was said about the Sabbath, right? That it comes to tell you that it refers to the Sabbath. But in the end it is rejected. The Talmud says “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest”—you see that one is liable for two. The Talmud says: yes, but maybe that is only for plowing and harvesting, and not for all the other labors, that for each of them one would be liable independently? And the Talmud says: kindling was singled out to divide—we learn it from kindling. Now let’s go back: so why is plowing and harvesting written? Sabbatical year. There was an initial assumption to follow the plain sense of the Torah that plowing and harvesting refer to the Sabbath, but that was rejected. Once that is rejected, we no longer need plowing and harvesting at all, since “kindling was singled out to divide” already takes care of the whole issue. So plowing and harvesting revert, and apparently this is what is written in the Talmud in Moed Katan: it refers to the Sabbatical year. If we did not find an interpretation to make plowing and harvesting about the Sabbath—and it cannot be that it simply appears there, because the labors do not appear—then apparently it was said regarding the Sabbatical year.

And then it turns out that the plain sense of the verse of course speaks about the Sabbath, but its midrashic interpretation speaks about the Sabbatical year. All right? Its midrashic interpretation speaks about the Sabbatical year because in its plain sense it is redundant. The plain sense of the verse speaks about the Sabbath; the midrash does not change the plain sense. Yes, that’s a common mistake, as the Vilna Gaon says, that people are very troubled by the fact that when I interpret something midrashically it contradicts the plain sense. There is no problem at all. The midrashic interpretation is not supposed to fit the plain sense. The plain sense is read straightforwardly—“a verse never departs from its plain sense.” The plain sense is always correct; we read it straightforwardly. Only alongside it there is another mode of reading, and that is the midrashic mode of reading. Yes, there are methods that oppose this, and the Vilna Gaon argues against them. If they replace the plain sense, then the midrash is not a midrash—it is plain sense, so then that is the plain sense. Huh? You can say that this is also kidnapping—to say that it is only kidnapping, you’re right, meaning to say that it is not theft of money. But it could be that it is both kidnapping and theft of money; only regarding theft of money it is redundant, because it already says, “You shall not steal.”

Yes, fine, but there are all sorts of places where it’s not completely dichotomous what counts as plain sense and what counts as midrash. There is—even in the thirty-two principles, in the Baraita of the thirty-two principles of Eliezer son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean—so Rabbi Samson of Chinon in Sefer Keritut asks why these principles do not appear in Rabbi Ishmael, who has only thirteen. So he gives several explanations. For each of the principles he explains why it does not appear in Rabbi Ishmael, and among them he basically has, I think, three categories. One of them does not appear because it is aggadic midrash; Rabbi Ishmael was talking about halakhic midrash. Another one does not appear—or there is a type that does not appear—because it is really plain-sense interpretation; it is not midrash. Meaning, sometimes plain-sense interpretation is not entirely literal, but in the end, once you understand it, that’s what the verse is saying. It is not a parallel reading, but the reading of the verse itself. So here is an example of something that looks like a rule of midrash, but in the end it decodes the verse itself.

Suppose, for example, that I would understand “an eye for an eye” as being interpreted to mean monetary compensation. Right? Suppose I would understand that when it says “an eye for an eye” it really means monetary compensation—not that what is written there is not the eye, but that is what it means. Then it comes out that monetary compensation is the plain sense of Scripture, not its midrashic interpretation. If I say this is a midrashic interpretation, that means “an eye for an eye” means taking out an eye. That is the plain sense. And alongside that there is also a midrashic reading, and in the midrashic reading you take monetary compensation for an eye. All right? Those are two parallel readings. The Vilna Gaon brings proofs for this and argues that this is the mistake of the apologists—Luzzatto and all those people—who try to plant the midrash inside the plain sense. There are interesting logical arguments there, but that doesn’t concern us now.

So in short, all these exceptions basically require interpretation, right? Otherwise one has to explain why they appear in the Torah.

A general comment before I continue. It is clear that when we speak about primary categories of labor, even though they are not written in the Torah—the Torah says “Do not do any labor”—the list of primary categories is a list determined by the Sages. Even if you make the derivation from the Tabernacle and say that we learn the Sabbath from the Tabernacle, still, the Sages are the ones who determined what in the Tabernacle counts as primary categories of labor. As I said earlier, there too there are margins of dispute. Okay? Not that there is an agreed list without exception, but there are disagreements at the margins. Even Rabbi Yehuda, for example, has forty primary categories of labor and not thirty-nine. Winnowing, selecting, and sifting—some wanted to say that this is one category or three. But that’s at the margins. Broadly speaking, the list is agreed upon. So the Sages are the ones who basically constructed the specific list, the list of the labors themselves. But of course that does not mean it is rabbinic. It is certainly Torah law. Why? Even according to Maimonides, who says in the second root that derivations have the status of the words of the Scribes—a thing learned by derivation has the status of the words of the Scribes; it is not Torah law. On that Nachmanides gets angry with him, yes, and Maimonides is almost alone in that position. What? Correct. That is exactly what he says.

But even according to Maimonides, here it doesn’t matter. Because here the derivation, the comparison of the Sabbath to the Tabernacle, is a derivation that basically interprets the concept of labor in the verse “Do not do any labor.” When the derivation serves to interpret what is written in the verse, even Maimonides agrees that this is Torah law. Only if the derivation introduces for me a new law that is not written in the verse, or if it expands the verse—for example, “You shall fear the Lord your God”—to include Torah scholars; that is the example Maimonides brings. So the particle “et” comes to include, according to Rabbi Akiva, and it comes to include Torah scholars. Now obviously that inclusion does not interpret what is written in the verse. In the verse it says to fear the Holy One, blessed be He, not Torah scholars. The “et” comes to include another law. When the verse comes to include an additional law, not to interpret the law written in the verse, then Maimonides says this is from the words of the Scribes. But where the derivation interprets the verse itself—even if the interpretation comes through a derivation—still, once I have done the derivation, I understand that this is what the verse itself says. And if it is written in the verse, then it is Torah law, not rabbinic.

Okay? This is one of the common mistakes made against Maimonides from his own words at the beginning of the laws of marriage. Maimonides writes there that the Mishnah says a woman is acquired in three ways—money, document, and intercourse; yes, the Mishnah at the beginning of tractate Kiddushin. He says that intercourse and document are from Torah law, and money is from the words of the Scribes. Now some of his commentators were not even familiar with the second root. It was written in Arabic; it is in the Book of the Commandments. But even those who did know it understand that this thing is really connected to the second root. Money is “from the words of the Scribes” because money is learned by the verbal analogy of “taking” from the field of Ephron or something like that, and we learn it through a derivation, and derivation means “words of the Scribes.” So everyone asks: but one law later, Maimonides says that one who has relations with this woman after she was betrothed is liable to death. And he does not say this applies only in the case of intercourse and document but not money. If betrothal by money is only rabbinic, then someone who has relations with that woman—she would be only rabbinically married—would not be liable to death. So how can Maimonides say he is liable to death and not distinguish that this is only for intercourse and document but not for money?

The answer is that when Maimonides says “from the words of the Scribes,” he means that it emerges from a derivation. The Scribes are the ones who introduced it, and it is not explicitly written in the Torah. But since here the innovation merely comes to say: “When a man takes a woman”—what is that taking? That taking is by money, document, and intercourse. When I interpret the concept of taking in the Torah, even if the interpretation comes through a derivation—yes, the interpretation is produced by way of derivation—but if in the end I am interpreting the language of the verse in the Torah, then its status is Torah law. One who has relations with her is liable to death. She is betrothed by Torah law, not rabbinically. Only the Scribes are the ones who introduced that the concept of taking includes money and not only intercourse and document. That is an act of the Sages; in this specific case it is an interpretive act of the Sages, and therefore it is Torah law and not rabbinic.

What does “words of the Scribes” mean? These are translations. It is written in Arabic, the second root. The translations say “words of the Scribes,” and on that some people built theories—some Yemeni commentator on Maimonides, I already don’t remember his name, no, no, it was three or four hundred years ago—he tried to create this distinction, that “words of the Scribes” is not rabbinic. “Words of the Scribes” means Torah law created by the Scribes. “Rabbinic” is a different halakhic status, a rabbinic status. It doesn’t get off the ground. It’s simply a mistake, a mistake in understanding Maimonides. In several places Maimonides uses “words of the Scribes” and “rabbinic” interchangeably. It is simply a translation from Arabic, that’s all. No, you can see—but there is no systematic expression where here it says “rabbinic” and there it says “words of the Scribes.” You won’t find consistency in the terminology.

Yes, so fine, I wrote—I have a book about this. In many of the cases the explanation is what I said here. Once the derivation interprets a verse, then although the derivation is doing the interpretation, in the end this is what is written in the verse as far as I’m concerned, and therefore it is Torah law. There are very few derivations that introduce laws which are not interpretation of the verse but actually introduce new laws. This is true also of a law given to Moses at Sinai, by the way. Regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai, Maimonides also says that it is from the words of the Scribes. That is less well known. In several places he writes this. In the second root there is only a hint, but elsewhere he writes it explicitly. Of course. Clearly. Almost all midrashim are creative. And that has nothing to do with what I am saying here. What does that have to do with it? Not to fulfill the verse, but to interpret the verse. But that thing is creative. Before that midrash existed, I did not know that this was the interpretation of the verse. The midrash creates, but its function is interpretive and not to introduce a new law. Yes.

Fine. Therefore I say that when I say the list of labors was created by the Sages, that does not mean it is rabbinic. The list of labors is Torah law because it is the interpretation of the word “labor” in the Torah, where the Torah forbids performing labor. The difference between Torah law and rabbinic law is not whether the Sages created the law or whether the law was written in the Torah, whether it existed from the start. That too is a common mistake. Both rabbinic laws and Torah laws are created by the Sages. There is no difference. The whole question is what tools they use when they create those laws. If they use tools of interpretation, then the law is Torah law. If they use tools of legislation, then the law is rabbinic. The Sages can perform two kinds of actions: they can legislate new laws, and those will be rabbinic laws; and they can interpret the Torah, and then although the Sages are the interpreters, the product is Torah law.

Okay, and regarding midrash this is a dispute with Maimonides, but I am talking right now about interpretation, not even about midrash. Now if the Sages today were to derive or interpret the Torah with a new interpretation, the result would be Torah law even though that law did not exist until today—it would be created today. Why would it be Torah law? Because it was created through tools of interpretation, not through tools of legislation. And that is Torah law. By contrast, there could be a rabbinic law that existed in the time of Moses our teacher. The ordinance of reading the Torah is an ordinance of Moses our teacher, and that is rabbinic. Some want to say it is Torah law, but there is no reason to say that. It is rabbinic. Why? Because when Moses our teacher created that ordinance, he created it by way of legislation; he did not interpret a verse and conclude that one must read from the Torah. I am talking about Sabbath, not Monday and Thursday, which is Ezra’s ordinance. So once Moses our teacher acted legislatively, then even if the legislator is Moses our teacher and not a later sage, it is still a rabbinic law. Chronology is irrelevant to the distinction between rabbinic and Torah law. The difference between rabbinic and Torah law is not chronological but lies in the question of how the law was created—through legislation or through interpretation. Here, in this case, it is interpretation. And since it is interpretation, even though the Sages did that interpretation, the law is Torah law.

And a nice proof of this is the Talmud when it says “kindling was singled out only as a prohibition” or “was singled out to divide”—what is it really saying? It assumes in the subtext that even when the Torah writes kindling, that cannot be necessary. It cannot be. Even if it is already written, the Talmud sees that as a difficulty. It is not only that the Talmud makes peace after the fact with the fact that the labors are not written; if one labor is written, that itself is a difficulty. You have to understand what it comes to say, what it comes to teach. Why? Because the Talmud understands—think about it—if the list of labors were rabbinic, then there would be no room for this whole issue. Because kindling is written to tell you that it is Torah law. What, you can’t ask why kindling is written if what is not written has only rabbinic status. Obviously what is not written also has Torah-law status, and then the Talmud asks: so why write it? As they say, “Why do I need a verse? It is logical.” When they say “Why do I need a verse? It is logical,” what do they mean? Something that emerges from logic certainly has the status of Torah law. Because if it had the status of rabbinic law, then how could you ask, “Why do I need a verse? It is logical”? You need the verse to say this is Torah law and not rabbinic. What kind of question is that? If you see two equivalent alternatives, then they have to be completely equivalent with all their laws as well, otherwise they are not equivalent.

Okay. Now that was a general comment. Now I want to enter a bit more into the matter of primary categories and derivatives. We are familiar with several systems of primary categories and derivatives. We know primary categories and derivatives in Sabbath law; that is perhaps the most common example. Thirty-nine primary categories and many derivatives; yes, each one has derivatives. There are primary categories of damages: the four primary categories of damages—the ox, the pit, the grazer, and the fire—the Mishnah at the beginning of tractate Bava Kamma. Later there are Rabbi Chiyya and Rabbi Oshaya with thirteen and twenty-something—I think twenty-four—primary categories of labor, yes, twenty-four. Primary categories of damages and primary categories of labor. So there are primary categories of damages, there are primary categories in Sabbath, primary categories and derivatives also in damages. If there are primary categories, that implies there are derivatives, right? The Talmud at the beginning of Bava Kamma: “Since it teaches primary categories, that implies there are derivatives,” yes? So it is clear that if there are primary categories, there are also derivatives. The same with the Sabbatical year: we speak about primary categories and derivatives. Moed Katan, in that same Talmud passage I mentioned earlier. Medieval authorities speak about primary categories and derivatives in leprosy-like impurities. Shabbat 68, for example—Tosafot and Rashba and others. There is Tosafot there in the same place speaking about tithes. Yes, it doesn’t matter. There is shearing of a firstborn animal—how do you shear? There are primary categories and derivatives, yes. Sowing in the rough wadi—“it shall not be sown,” yes, in the rough wadi of the heifer whose neck was broken—so what counts as sowing? There is a primary category of sowing and derivatives of sowing. Okay? So for example, is pruning permitted in that rough wadi? Pruning a tree in that rough wadi—is that permitted? Pruning is a derivative of sowing on the Sabbath. Okay, but in the rough wadi too it is like that. There are primary categories and derivatives.

So in all these places, medieval and later authorities, or sometimes the Talmud itself, speak about the relation between primary categories and derivatives. I want to say a little about this issue: what exactly are primary categories and what are derivatives?

So the accepted view—and this is how Rashi explains the Mishnah in Bava Kamma when it says “four primary categories of damages”—is that it means four that are explicitly written in the verse. Meaning, primary categories are what is written in the Torah. This is very interesting, because on the Sabbath the thirty-nine are not written. And even what is written is interpreted for other things, but they are not written. So the definition of “primary categories” on the Sabbath looks a bit more problematic. You can’t say it means what is written in the Torah. The second possibility is that it is learned by comparison to the Tabernacle. So yes, it is learned, okay. But still, once you define it as primary categories, it should have some connection to what is in the Torah—written in the Torah, or learned by comparison, or something like that. If there is a derivative that we learn by comparison or in some other way from the Torah, then seemingly that too should have to be a primary category and not a derivative. In contrast to damages, say, where what is written you can call a primary category, and what is not, a derivative. On the simple level, primary categories are what is written in the Torah.

What are derivatives? With derivatives there is an inherent tension. On the one hand, it has to resemble the primary category, right? Because I learn the derivative from the primary category. The primary category is written in the Torah, and I learn from the primary category that the derivative too is prohibited, or creates liability in monetary damages, and so on. So it has to be sufficiently similar to the primary category. It cannot be too far from the primary category. On the other hand, it cannot be too similar to the primary category, because then it would be a primary category and not a derivative. Then I’m not learning it from the primary category in the Torah—it is the primary category itself. Okay? So there is some tension in defining the similarity between a primary category and a derivative, which says: if you resemble the primary category—not completely, but also not too little—then you will be a derivative. If you resemble it completely, you will be a primary category. If you do not resemble it, or only resemble it very little, then it will not be a Torah prohibition; it will be an unusual manner of doing it, it will be rabbinically prohibited, or perhaps altogether permitted.

Okay? So there is a spectrum of levels of similarity to what is written in the Torah, and that spectrum will determine the halakhic status of the labor under discussion. Will it be a derivative? Will it be an actual primary category, because it is completely identical to the primary category that is written? Will it be a derivative—similar to the primary category but not completely identical, and still prohibited by Torah law? Will it be rabbinically prohibited—an unusual manner, indirectly? It is not completely similar; there is some meaningful difference here. Or is it not similar at all, in which case it will be permitted? All right?

I already assumed something here: that within rabbinic prohibitions on the Sabbath there are two kinds of rabbinic prohibitions, and we’ll talk about that too. There are rabbinic prohibitions such as riding a horse: they prohibit that rabbinically, a decree lest one break off a branch. While riding the horse, one may break off a branch. Obviously riding a horse is not pruning on a rabbinic level, right? Riding a horse is not rabbinic pruning. Yes, that is a distancing measure or fence or decree because of, right? The prohibition is the branch-breaking, but riding a horse is not branch-breaking on a rabbinic level—it is something else that could bring you to a Torah prohibition. Okay.

By contrast, selecting food from waste—waste from food is a Torah prohibition. What about food from waste? There there is room to discuss. One could say that food from waste is nothing at all, completely permitted, and they only prohibited it as a decree lest one come to select waste from food. But there are quite a few indications—you can see in halakhic decisors, medieval and later authorities, and even in the Talmud itself—that there are also rabbinic rest prohibitions on the Sabbath of another type. Here you have the idea of the Torah prohibition, but it is too weak to be prohibited by Torah law, so it is prohibited rabbinically. It is half a Torah prohibition. Huh? Like selecting food from waste. In selecting food from waste there is the idea of selecting, so it is not completely unlike selecting waste from food. Therefore it cannot be included in the full Torah prohibition of selecting, but it is not prohibited out of fear that you might come to select waste from food. It is prohibited in its own right. Why? Because the Sages understood that the spirit of selecting is present here too. Therefore the Sages basically lowered the threshold of the Torah prohibition and prohibited this as well.

All right? So when I spoke earlier about levels of similarity, I was talking about prohibitions of this type. Prohibitions that are decrees—rabbinic prohibitions that are decrees—are not related at all to the level of similarity. They are simply prohibited because they can lead to a Torah prohibition. That is why they are prohibited. Okay.

Now let’s look for a moment at the Talmud in Shabbat—in Bava Kamma, sorry. This is a foundational Talmudic passage. When the Mishnah there in Bava Kamma brings the four primary categories of damages, the Talmud says this: “Since it teaches primary categories, that implies there are derivatives. Are their derivatives like them or not like them? Regarding the Sabbath we learned: the primary labors are forty less one. Primary categories—this implies there are derivatives. Their derivatives are like them: whether it is a primary category, one brings a sin-offering; whether it is a derivative, one brings a sin-offering. Whether it is a primary category, one is liable to stoning; whether it is a derivative, one is liable to stoning. And what difference is there between a primary category and a derivative? The practical difference is that if one performed two primary categories together, or two derivatives together, one is liable for each and every one. But if one performed a primary category and its derivative”—two derivatives of the same primary category, it makes no difference—“one is liable only once.”

So in the case of the Sabbath, their derivatives are like them. Meaning, this one is stoning and that one is stoning—everything has the same law. So why define primary categories and derivatives at all? Just say there are thirty-nine primary categories, and that’s it. Why talk about derivatives? No, because if there is a primary category and its derivative, then you are liable only once. If in one lapse of awareness you performed a primary category and its derivative, you bring only one sin-offering. That is the classificatory significance of primary category and derivative. It doesn’t really matter whether you are a primary category or derivative, but from the standpoint of classification it matters. Because if you do two different primary categories, you are liable twice. If you do a primary category and its derivative, you are liable once. Two? Different. It’s the same thing—category. The primary categories are basically categories under which many derivatives fall. If you do two things from two different categories, you are liable twice. And according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds one liable for the derivative in place of the primary category, he also holds one liable twice for a primary category and its own derivative. So there is no practical difference at all between a primary category and a derivative. Then why define it at all as primary category and derivative? What practical difference is there? What is the difference? There is none. So the Talmud says: why is one called a primary category and why is one called a derivative? That which was in the Tabernacle. In short, there is no practical difference; it’s just a name. What was in the Tabernacle is a primary category; what was not in the Tabernacle is a derivative, but it is only a name. There is no difference in the laws.

So therefore, in Sabbath law, bottom line, their derivatives are like them. Whether according to Rabbi Eliezer or according to the Sages, their derivatives are like them; it is the same law. There is no difference between a primary category and a derivative. What? Between primary categories and derivatives—we’ll discuss that more. Right now in the Talmud it doesn’t look that way. In a moment we’ll talk about that too.

[Speaker E] But is there an infinite collection of derivatives?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are infinitely many, yes. Something similar to the primary category—it is not a closed list. The list of primary categories is a closed list, and I’ll talk about that too, but the list of derivatives is not a closed list. So that is regarding the Sabbath. On the Sabbath, their derivatives are like them.

The Talmud continues: “We learned: the primary categories of impurity are the creeping thing, semen, and one impure through a corpse. Their derivatives are not like them. For the primary category imparts impurity to a person and vessels, while the derivatives impart impurity only to foods and liquids; they do not impart impurity to a person and vessels.” So here there is a difference in law between the primary categories and the derivatives of impurity. So now we have a thesis and an antithesis, yes? Primary categories and derivatives on the Sabbath—their derivatives are like them. Primary categories and derivatives in impurity—their derivatives are not like them.

Now the Talmud asks: what about here? Regarding primary categories and derivatives of damages, are the derivatives like them, as on the Sabbath, or not like them, as in impurity? Right? That is the Talmud’s question. Rav Pappa said: some of them are like them and some of them are not like them. Some are and some aren’t. Fine. Now the Talmud begins discussing this for two pages. It grinds away at Rav Pappa’s statement: what exactly did he mean? Which are the “like them” and which are the “not like them”? So it starts going through all the primary categories of damage, surveying their derivatives, the lists of derivatives in various baraitot and so on, and seeing whether they are like them or not like them. And it discovers that all of them are like them. All the derivatives of the primary categories of damage are like them.

Look, for example: “What is the derivative of goring? Butting, biting, crouching, and kicking.” That is a baraita. “What is different about goring that it is called a primary category? Because it is written, ‘if it gore.’ But butting too is written, ‘if it butt.’” So butting also appears in the Torah, so why is it a derivative? Right? The Talmud says: this “butting” is really goring. As it was taught: it began with butting and ended with goring, to tell you that this butting is that goring. Okay. In the case of a person and vessels, it’s different, but not important right now. But butting when you’re speaking bodily is butting, not goring. The butting written in the Torah here means goring. Fine. But the justification isn’t important right now.

Now the Talmud says—I’m skipping a bit—“Biting: is biting a derivative of eating?” Yes, butting, biting, crouching, and kicking are derivatives of goring. But why is biting a derivative of eating? It’s with the tooth. The Talmud says: no, eating involves benefit from its damage; this one does not involve benefit from its damage. Crouching and kicking—again, derivatives of goring. Why are they not derivatives of foot? Crouching and kicking are all with the foot. The Talmud says: no, foot is damage that is common; these are not commonly damaging. So then to which did Rav Pappa refer when he said some derivatives are not like them? If you say he referred to these—what is different about goring? Its intent is to damage, it is your property, and you are responsible to guard it. These too intend to damage, they are your property, and you are responsible to guard them. So those derivatives are like them. Rather, the derivative of goring is like goring.”

Then it says Rav Pappa meant with regard to eating and foot. And then it continues with eating and foot, and again, nothing works. Pit, fire, everything. It goes through all of them and finds nothing. The Talmud’s conclusion at the end is: “Rather, the derivative of fire is like fire”—that is basically the end of the previous section—“and this is what Rav Pappa meant: the derivative of foot…” Foot—we already established that the derivative of foot is like foot. The Talmud says: “half-damages of pebbles, which is a halakha received as tradition.” Meaning, “some are like them and some are not like them” means all of them are like them except for half-damages of pebbles, which is a derivative of foot that is not like it. Why is it not like it? Never mind—because it is only half and not full, but it also is not like goring because it is not from the body itself but from the owner’s assets. In any case, its derivatives are not like them.

What lies behind this whole issue? So there is a brilliant explanation by the Nachalat David, in my opinion, on this passage. Once you read him it seems so simple, but it is really brilliant. He explains the passage wonderfully. He says like this: when the Talmud asks whether the derivatives in damages are like them, it brings a thesis and antithesis—Sabbath and impurity. Right? Notice the difference between Sabbath and impurity. On the Sabbath, their derivatives are like them; in impurity, their derivatives are not like them. The Talmud is saying: on the Sabbath the derivatives are instructional derivatives. Meaning, the derivative resembles the primary category. So if the primary category… the primary category generates the derivative conceptually. In impurity, a first-degree impurity exists because the primary source touched it. It’s not that you learn first-degree impurity from the primary source because it is an instructional derivative. It is not based on similarity between the two things. It is a relation of causation, right?

Now notice, this is very interesting: if so, it is not accidental that on the Sabbath their derivatives are like them, while in impurity their derivatives are not like them. On the Sabbath there is similarity between them, so why should there be a difference? Their derivatives are like them—it resembles it, so the same law that applies here applies there too. If the derivatives are instructional derivatives, then there is no reason they should not be like them, right? By contrast, in impurity—why should they be like them? There is no similarity between them; one only generated the other. It has generated its effect, so it is weaker, so of course it imparts less impurity. Therefore their derivatives are not like them.

Meaning, says the Nachalat David, the Talmud’s question is not really whether their derivatives are like them or not, but whether the derivatives in damages are instructional derivatives or derivatives of causation. If they are instructional, then they are like them; if they are causal, then they are not like them. Does it resemble Sabbath or resemble impurity? Wait, wait, one second, just a moment. Okay? That is what… that is the Talmud’s question in the subtext.

Now they begin clarifying the whole matter in the Talmud. And what do they say? There are derivatives of goring: goring, butting, biting, crouching, and kicking. The Talmud says: wait, biting is a derivative of tooth. Why is that a derivative of tooth? That is not generation, right? But it is not similarity, right? It is not similarity. You’re right, it’s not generation, but it’s not similarity. The Talmud understands that “tooth” means what does the thing. The Talmud says: no, no, we’re talking about similarity. There is benefit from its damage. In biting, there is no benefit from the damage. In idea, it is really goring—never mind that it is not done with the horn; conceptually it is really goring: intent to damage, unusual behavior, and all the definitions of goring.

So the Talmud’s initial assumption was that the derivatives are not instructional, and therefore there was an initial assumption that they would not be like them. Then the Talmud says: no, rather the derivatives of goring are like goring. Why? Because just as goring intends to damage, so too these intend to damage. Meaning, the conclusion is that these are instructional derivatives. If they are instructional, then of course they are like them.

In the end, what are we left with? That all the derivatives of damages, since they are instructional, are exactly like Sabbath—it is obvious that their derivatives are like them. There is only one exception: pebbles. Why? Think what pebbles are. Why is that a derivative of foot? Because the foot created it, not because it resembles foot. What are pebbles? The animal walks and kicks a stone, the stone flies off and causes damage, right? So who… the pebbles do not resemble foot-damage; they were produced by the foot. Here it is really produced, unlike tooth and biting. This is actual production. Because in foot-damage, when you kick a jug and break it, that is foot-damage. Not kick—walk and crush the jug. But if you step on a stone and the stone flies off and breaks the jug, then the foot created the damaging force. It created the damager; it is not that it resembles it. Therefore, half-damages of pebbles really are the only case in damages where the derivatives are not like them. Because this is not an instructional derivative but a causal derivative, and so it resembles impurity, not Sabbath.

So we learn for our purposes that in Sabbath derivatives, in the primary categories and derivatives of the Sabbath—and now I… after all, this whole discussion is only in order to learn about the Sabbath; we are interested in Sabbath derivatives—it turns out that on the Sabbath the derivatives are instructional derivatives and not derivatives of causation. And once these are instructional derivatives, it is no wonder that on the Sabbath their derivatives are like them—that the derivative and the primary category have the same law. There will be no difference, because they resemble one another. If the Torah prohibits this, then certainly that too is prohibited because it is similar.

All right? Now I said earlier that in derivatives the similarity is not complete. Not too far and not too close either; it’s something in the middle. Once… once I said that sexual prohibitions in the Torah are divided into two kinds: there are prohibitions that are too far away, and prohibitions that are too close. You are not allowed to marry something too far away—not a gentile, not an animal, not something remote. You are not allowed to marry someone from your family—your sister, your mother—that is too close. You have to find a relationship that is not too far and not too close. Okay? It is the same here too. A derivative is something that is close enough, but not too close—something in the middle.

Now you have to understand that this means that when I speak about an instructional derivative, it is still not identity. Because if it were identity, it would literally be the primary category itself. It is similar, and therefore their laws are the same, but it is not perfect similarity, because if it were perfect similarity, it would actually be the primary category itself. We will see this in Maimonides, who distinguishes three categories: there is a primary category, something akin to a primary category, and a derivative. Three things. And all three are Torah law. Okay? Up to here.