Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 9: A Values-Based Perspective
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The starting point: the ketubah and the feeling of “the woman as merchandise”
- Three approaches to the relationship between morality and Jewish law
- Morality as a religious and universal category
- Conflict versus contradiction, and the examples of Amalek, the Sabbath, and chocolate
- An intra-halakhic solution versus a moral-religious conflict
- Jewish law is not aimed only at morality, and the non-moral commandments
- “And you shall do what is right and good,” “You shall be holy,” and a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah
- “Your mercy reaches even the bird’s nest” and separating the moral plane from the halakhic one
- When morality prevails in practice: “A transgression for its own sake is greater”
- The authority of the Sages: obligation to halakhic rulings without obligation to the underlying values
- Anachronism and the social-historical context of enactments
- The example of betrothing a minor daughter even to a man afflicted with boils
- Culture versus religion and the integration of customs into the halakhic structure
- The possibility of halakhic change within Orthodoxy
- Interpretation as the basis of Torah law and the difference between Torah-level and rabbinic law
- A practical summary regarding the ketubah
Summary
General Overview
The speaker presents a position according to which Jewish law and morality are two parallel spheres within the will of God, and therefore conflicts can arise between them without this being a logical contradiction, even when the act itself is perceived as halakhically required but morally forbidden. He rejects the simple identification of “Jewish morality” with Jewish law, argues that morality is universal, and that the Sages are authoritative in Jewish law but not as a binding source of authority for the value foundations behind it. He adds that many laws and social patterns need to be judged against the background of historical circumstances in order to avoid anachronism, while at the same time arguing that within the Orthodox framework there are mechanisms for changing Jewish law, even in Torah-level laws through interpretation, and certainly in rabbinic laws, when circumstances change.
The Starting Point: the Ketubah and the Feeling of “the Woman as Merchandise”
The speaker addresses the feeling that the discussions about the ketubah present the woman as a kind of commodity with a different price depending on different “conditions,” and accepts that this sounds problematic from a value standpoint. He frames the question as what this means with regard to the Talmud, to the authority of the Talmud, and to the way values underlie Jewish law, with the ketubah serving as one example in a broader discussion.
Three Approaches to the Relationship Between Morality and Jewish Law
The speaker describes two approaches that identify morality with Jewish law but lead to opposite conclusions: one approach sees only Jewish law as the binding world and denies significance to morality outside it, and another approach (attributed to Rabbi Kook) argues that Jewish law is ultimate morality, and therefore conflict is always a confusion in understanding either morality or Jewish law. He proposes a third conception according to which morality and Jewish law are two separate and parallel systems, and there can be a real conflict between them, while distancing himself from Leibowitz’s position that places morality “outside the religious world” and defines it as an atheistic category.
Morality as a Religious and Universal Category
The speaker argues that there is no such thing as “Jewish morality” in any essential sense, because morality is by definition universal and binding on all human beings, and therefore “Jewish morality” is an oxymoron. He states that morality is not human in the sense of an independent source, but rather the will of God planted in a person as conscience and moral perception, and therefore moral disagreements do not prove relativism but rather the possibility that one side is right and the other is wrong, similar to disagreements in physics.
Conflict Versus Contradiction, and the Examples of Amalek, the Sabbath, and Chocolate
The speaker distinguishes between contradiction and conflict, and argues that conflict is a situation in which two valid values pull toward opposing practical applications without any theoretical contradiction. He illustrates an internal moral conflict through a story he attributes to Jean-Paul Sartre about a student during the Holocaust who is torn between caring for his mother and joining the struggle against the Nazis. He explains that within Jewish law itself there are practical conflicts such as a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, and presents saving a life versus the Sabbath as a contingent conflict, in contrast to Amalek as a conflict that appears essential. He then argues that even there, the issue is a conflict between two spheres: religiously it is an obligation, and morally it is a prohibition, similar to the chocolate example where it is “worthwhile” to eat it because it tastes good and “not worthwhile” because it is fattening.
An Intra-Halakhic Solution Versus a Moral-Religious Conflict
The speaker argues that within the Torah there is no “interpretive problem” between “You shall not murder” and specific commands such as Amalek, because the rule of lex specialis means that the specific command prevails so that it is not erased from the system. He raises the separate question of morality versus Jewish law and emphasizes that this is a conflict between two categories, not an internal contradiction within the same category, and therefore the existence of conflict is not a philosophical problem but a problem of practical decision.
Jewish Law Is Not Aimed Only at Morality, and the Non-Moral Commandments
The speaker argues that Jewish law is not simply “morality in practice,” because there are many commandments that have no connection to morality at all, such as the prohibition against eating pork or the laws of sacrifices, which are non-moral rather than anti-moral. He explains that even commandments that seem moral, such as “You shall not murder,” are written in order to add a binding religious layer beyond what should be morally understood even without a command, and he illustrates gaps in which an action might be considered murder morally but exempt halakhically because of indirect causation and formal exemptions.
“And You Shall Do What Is Right and Good,” “You Shall Be Holy,” and a Scoundrel Within the Bounds of the Torah
The speaker cites “And you shall do what is right and good” as a source showing that the Torah also demands moral requirements beyond Jewish law, and notes that Nachmanides interprets the verse that way, though the verse is not counted among the commandments. He connects this to the idea of “a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah” and to the similarity between “You shall be holy” and “And you shall do what is right and good,” presenting this as proof that morality is within the will of God but outside formal Jewish law.
“Your Mercy Reaches Even the Bird’s Nest” and Separating the Moral Plane from the Halakhic One
The speaker interprets the position that resists explaining commandments in terms of mercy as a position that separates the halakhic plane from the moral plane, not as a denial of mercy. He argues that the commandment is not given “because of” the moral rationale, even if the mercy itself is true, because the commandments are directed toward realizing religious values.
When Morality Prevails in Practice: “A Transgression for Its Own Sake Is Greater”
The speaker argues that in contingent cases there can be a decision in which morality overrides Jewish law, and he cites the Talmud in Nazir on “A transgression for its own sake is greater than a commandment not for its own sake,” with examples such as Yael and Lot’s daughters. He explains that such a situation cannot become a fixed principle that erases a halakhic clause, and therefore by definition it is limited to extreme cases and not to situations in which the Torah itself commanded something explicitly.
The Authority of the Sages: Obligation to Halakhic Rulings Without Obligation to the Underlying Values
The speaker states that the obligation is to the halakhic rulings of the Sages, not necessarily to their value-laden subtext, just as one is obligated to the laws of the Knesset but not to the morality of the legislators. He says that even if someone proves that the Talmud holds a certain social position, that does not obligate us to adopt that position, and he illustrates this through a distinction between “bottom lines” and the reasoning in a court, where one follows the majority of judges even if there is no majority for any specific rationale.
Anachronism and the Social-Historical Context of Enactments
The speaker warns against judging the discussions through modern eyes without understanding the social framework in which women were economically and socially dependent. He argues that distinctions such as the ketubah of a virgin and marriage customs were intended to maneuver within an existing reality in order to protect women, not to endorse an ideal of “merchandise,” and that “pure” moves can actually worsen their situation in practice if they do not change the social foundation.
The Example of Betrothing a Minor Daughter Even to a Man Afflicted with Boils
The speaker presents the permission for a father to betroth his minor daughter, even to a man afflicted with boils, as an example of a mechanism intended to allow the father to ensure her survival in a world where she has no means of livelihood. He says that a religious court can intervene and apply pressure or punishment against abuse, but the legal framework grants the father authority derived from responsibility, and he emphasizes that this permission applies to a minor, not an adult daughter.
Culture Versus Religion and the Integration of Customs into the Halakhic Structure
The speaker describes a conversation with a Muslim who argued that murder for family honor is an Arab custom and not an Islamic principle, and uses this to illustrate how cultural norms penetrate religious frameworks until it is hard to distinguish between them. He argues that in the Jewish world as well there are cultural components that entered Jewish law, and notes that the ketubah too began as a social custom that received halakhic anchoring.
The Possibility of Halakhic Change Within Orthodoxy
The speaker argues that there is room for changing Jewish law even within the Orthodox halakhic framework, and attributes modern rigidity to a reaction against Reform and the Enlightenment. He points to women’s Torah study as an example of a significant change that has already occurred, and speaks about changes in reality and technology that create new situations and require renewed examination.
Interpretation as the Basis of Torah Law and the Difference Between Torah-Level and Rabbinic Law
The speaker states that there are almost no Torah-level laws without rabbinic shaping, because verses always pass through interpretation, and he gives as an example “When a man takes a wife,” which the Sages interpreted to mean that the man performs the betrothal and not the woman. He argues that if the Sages’ interpretation also rested on cultural reality, there may be room for a different interpretation according to the rules. He adds, in the name of Maimonides in the laws of rebels, that changing rabbinic enactments requires a court greater in wisdom and number, whereas in Torah law change can be easier, and therefore “Torah laws are easier to change than rabbinic laws.”
A Practical Summary Regarding the Ketubah
The speaker concludes that one must weigh religious considerations alongside moral judgment and not see morality as the only bottom line. He states that one can uphold a rabbinic ruling without adopting its value foundation, and that in some cases one can also change the ruling itself according to the mechanisms of Jewish law, especially when circumstances have changed. He returns and emphasizes that understanding the past requires caution against anachronism and recognition that the Sages operated within given social conditions, and that the current standing of women and attentiveness to their difficulties are part of the progress of reality that justifies renewed examination.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I apologize for being late. Our printer just—I don’t know—I tried to get water out of a rock, but without much success. You have to hit it; in this country, only force works. Yes, yes. So I really want to take this opportunity—I coordinated this with Rabbi Matanya as well—to talk a little about the value implications that accompany these topics. I understand that during the learning there were also some hesitations or questions about what these things are saying. It comes across as though the woman is some kind of commodity, so if she is in one condition then she gets one maneh, and if there are two conditions then two hundred, and it sounds like this kind of buying and selling, and it sounds very bad, and rightly so, it seems to me. The question is how to relate to this. What does it mean for us? What does it mean about the Talmud? What does it mean about the significance of the Talmud for us? But I want to do this from a broader perspective. I want to talk in general about the meaning of the values that underlie Jewish law—what it means, or what the authority is, what the status of the Talmud is, both with respect to Jewish law and with respect to the values that underlie Jewish law—and this case of the ketubah is perhaps one example. So that’s one thing. And maybe at the end I’ll also get to the matter of changing laws, which of course is an outgrowth of this discussion. I’ll start maybe דווקא with a more general question of morality and Jewish law. In the common conception regarding Jewish law, it seems to me that people tend to see it as some expression of what is called Jewish morality. That is, Jewish morality—its practical expression—is basically Jewish law. As distinct from some other universal morality, or whatever, or other moralities that have different bottom lines and therefore are the result of different moral assumptions—but here there is some Jewish morality. Maybe it is better, maybe it obligates us; one can also speak in evaluative terms, how I relate to it—but first of all there is the very claim that there is such a thing as Jewish morality. So on that matter I want to make a few comments. First, once again: everything I’m presenting today is my own position. That is, each of you should decide what she thinks, but I am presenting my own position. I’m not going to bring sources here, and I’m not claiming that everyone thinks this way, and each of you should of course form her own outlook. This identification between Jewish law and morality can take on two meanings that, at least at first glance, seem opposite. There is an outlook that sees Jewish law as Jewish morality, and there is an outlook—that is, yes, there is an outlook that identifies morality with Jewish law, and there is an outlook that identifies Jewish law with morality. Those are two different things: to identify morality with Jewish law, or to identify Jewish law with morality. What I mean to say is that from this identification one can arrive at the conclusion that moral considerations have no significance at all, no value whatsoever. In the end, what matters is Jewish law.
[Speaker C] What’s the second feeling? There’s no morality outside Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Meaning, what we have is Jewish law. What we call morality is the statutes of the nations. Meaning, those are other matters; it’s unrelated; those are things accepted in other societies or by other people, and we are supposed to be rid of that. In other words, Jewish law basically presents us with the ultimate demand, and maybe the only one. Everything beyond that does not exist in the Jewish world, okay? And that’s how it should be.
[Speaker D] That doesn’t mean it isn’t moral. No, morality is in Jewish law. All Jewish morality is in Jewish law. Yes, but things you don’t need to write as laws, things—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that are outside Jewish law have no status at all. They are not binding, they have no value, they have no importance. That’s the first outlook.
[Speaker B] That’s also relativism with respect to morality. Morality—as if it’s fixed. Someone decided.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. There is no such thing as morality; there is Jewish law. Jewish law is morality. You clarify the Jewish law, and when you reach the halakhic conclusion, that is what is relevant. Why should I care what all kinds of other people call morality? Others can call it whatever they want. Those are just labels; it doesn’t matter. Interesting. From the standpoint of a person obligated by Jewish law, from the standpoint of one who serves God, all he has in his world is the four cubits of Jewish law. He has only Jewish law; there is nothing beyond that. The opposite identification—which is ostensibly the same identification but can lead to opposite conclusions, and in practice the conclusions will also be very different—the first identification is sometimes attributed to the Chazon Ish, although I don’t think that is correct. The second identification can be found in quite a few places in Rabbi Kook: that Rabbi Kook basically argues that Jewish law is ultimate morality. That is, in the end, when we feel there is a contradiction between Jewish law and morality, we are the ones who are confused. Meaning, we’re confused—we haven’t understood morality properly, because Jewish law is ultimate morality. And that is ostensibly the same thing. Both identify morality with Jewish law, but they arrive at conclusions that in many cases are opposite. Because in the first conception, in the first identification, when I encounter some conflict between Jewish law and morality, I’m not bothered at all. Jewish law is what binds; morality is an illusion, the evil inclination, a challenge placed before me that I am supposed to overcome and not, God forbid, fail by behaving morally, and instead act according to Jewish law. According to the second conception, I absolutely should be troubled by conflicts between Jewish law and morality, and the answer is that in the final analysis Jewish law is always the most moral solution there is.
[Speaker B] You didn’t understand the Jewish law properly if it clashes, basically?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Now the question is whether I didn’t understand morality properly, or I didn’t understand Jewish law properly, but somehow in the end we create coordination. And again, the practical translation of these principled conceptions is complicated, and I don’t know to what extent I can present some unambiguous translation, some clear derivative of what the result of each conception is. So for now I’m speaking only at the principled level, and in terms of application there is still a great deal to discuss. But let’s say that with Rabbi Kook, clearly, you will always find some moral explanation that shows why Jewish law is the most moral solution there is. Now how will he do that? He won’t change morality; Rabbi Kook does not deny natural morality. That is, what we perceive as moral is real. He will add some assumption or another that explains why nevertheless Jewish law accords with the rules of natural morality. Okay? Therefore, from Rabbi Kook’s standpoint, natural morality definitely has importance—it’s not like the first identification. Natural morality matters, but he still does not recognize the possibility of a conflict existing. That is, there can’t be such a thing. That is—
[Speaker B] Would you put Leibowitz in the first camp?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leibowitz? No. Not in either one. Not in either one. In a moment I’ll explain. I am more or less where Leibowitz is. But—well, I’ll talk about that in a moment. So those are the two approaches that identify morality with Jewish law, but actually take that identification in opposite directions. One says: morality is unimportant; it is the evil inclination; in the end all I have is Jewish law; there is no morality in the world. The second conception basically says: there is no Jewish law in the world—the conception of Rabbi Kook—what there is is morality. What we call Jewish law is just the result of moral clarification. That is, after reaching the moral clarification, the moral conclusion, that is what appears in Jewish law. Okay? And again, Jewish law is a very broad thing—Shulchan Arukh, Mishnah Berurah—I’m not getting into that. I’m speaking only in very broad brushstrokes, okay? Without really getting into details. And it’s important to get into the details, but I won’t be able to do that here. Now, against these two conceptions—and as I said before, with Rabbi Kook I think this identification is indeed correct, as far as I understand him, though I’m no great expert in his thought—with the Chazon Ish it is clearly not correct. There are statements in the beginning of his book Faith and Trust from which it somewhat looks like this approach, but if you read carefully, even there you really see that it is not true. And certainly elsewhere. But never mind; for me the personalities are less important. I’m speaking now about the map of possibilities, not the figures located on each branch of this tree. The view that I at least think is correct is the one that sees Jewish law and morality as two parallel spheres.
[Speaker C] That’s a third conception?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, a third conception. Two parallel spheres. Now, some identify Leibowitz with the first conception, but that is not true. It’s not true, and people have already pointed that out. Again, the personalities matter less to me; I’m only saying it to sharpen the point itself. Leibowitz clearly preached morality many times, and therefore people challenged him: after all, you said that the only thing that matters is Jewish law—so why are you preaching to us about the occupation and all these matters, all his moral exhortations? And that is a misunderstanding. Leibowitz did not claim that morality has no significance. Leibowitz claimed that morality has no significance within the religious world. That is, the religious world is only Jewish law. But a religious person is also—and first and foremost—a human being, and as a human being he is obligated to morality like every other human being. The additional level, the religious level, contains only Jewish law.
[Speaker B] And when it clashes—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, when it clashes, then I’m in conflict. One has to think about what to do, but in principle there absolutely can be a clash. It is a clash between two things, and yes, that can happen. I’ll just add one more comment. I said that I’m more or less in Leibowitz’s niche; I’ll say where I disagree with him. I do think these are indeed two separate spheres, but I think both of them are within the religious world. It is not true that morality is an atheistic category, as Leibowitz used to put it. More than that: I think that if you view it as an atheistic category, then in a certain sense being committed to these two systems is a kind of idolatry in partnership. Because you are basically committed to the demands of the Holy One, blessed be He—that is Jewish law—and you are also committed to something that doesn’t come from Him at all. And these can come into conflict, and sometimes you don’t know which will prevail. Sometimes this will prevail, sometimes that will prevail—well, we’ll see what to do with conflicts. But the very fact that you are committed to another source of authority besides the authority of the Holy One, blessed be He—there is here, I’m not saying at the halakhic level idolatry, but on the conceptual level there is some kind of idolatry. You are committed to two sources of authority, meaning not only to the Holy One, blessed be He, but also to something else that obligates you no less. I think that is not right. It cannot be right, and there is no need to get there. To say what Leibowitz says, one can say it entirely within the religious framework. And still say that within the religious framework, within the framework of the will of God, let’s call it, there are two categories. One category is the moral category, and the second category is the religious category. One indication of this is, for example, the verse, “And you shall do what is right and good.” “And you shall do what is right and good”—Nachmanides says there, yes, that is the plain simple meaning of the verse: that you are required to do things beyond Jewish law. Okay? Now, that is written in the Torah; it is not an atheistic category. On the other hand, check the enumerators of the commandments: none of them count this among the commandments. “And you shall do what is right and good” is not a positive commandment for any enumerator of the commandments. Why not?
[Speaker B] Maybe because it’s general?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is how they explain it. The Maggid Mishneh in the laws of neighbors wants to claim that, but I don’t think it’s correct. Rabbi Lichtenstein has a long article on this issue that follows the Maggid Mishneh, and I really disagree.
[Speaker C] Sometimes in halakhic discussions it appears, like saving a life overrides the Sabbath—“and live by them, and not die by them.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not it. “And live by them” is a commandment. “And live by them” is a commandment; that’s not morality. Not “and you shall do what is right and good.” What? I’m saying, “and you shall do what is right and good” means that there is also “You shall be holy.” Right, “You shall be holy”—Nachmanides there is very similar to “and you shall do what is right and good.” Again, I’m not getting into sources. Also “and choose life.” No, “and choose life” is something a bit different. “And choose life” means to do commandments; that’s not morality. Yes?
[Speaker B] And what about “proper conduct preceded the Torah”? Aren’t you obligated in morality before—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, yes, “proper conduct preceded the Torah” is a saying; you can do whatever you want with it. Meaning, it’s not—granted, proper conduct… I’m talking now about clear sources. So as far as clear sources go, there are verses that demand moral demands of us, but those verses usually do not enter Jewish law and do not enter the count of the commandments. And not by accident. They do not enter Jewish law precisely because this is an extra-halakhic category.
[Speaker C] Because there is also “a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah,” someone who keeps all of Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s “You shall be holy,” that’s Nachmanides on “You shall be holy,” which was mentioned earlier. The point is that within the religious world, within the world of the will of God, you can still grasp that there are two independent categories. The Holy One, blessed be He, wants morality, and the Holy One, blessed be He, wants Jewish law. These are two things. Now, one has to understand that this is not a trivial statement. It is not a trivial statement because after all there can be conflicts. What do we do with conflicts? More than what do we do with conflicts—how can there be conflicts? If the Holy One, blessed be He, is the basis of this and the basis of that, then how can it be that He tells me, I don’t know, to kill Amalek? Let’s say killing Amalek is a moral problem, but it is a religious-halakhic command. Okay? So what, both came from the Holy One, blessed be He, and He’s confused? What, He doesn’t know what He wants? Maybe He does know—maybe we are the confused ones who don’t understand. Rabbi Kook will explain to you why killing Amalek is terribly moral. Fine? That’s the supreme Jewish morality.
[Speaker B] Maybe it’s the Amalek within you?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, no—those are funny expressions, nonsense.
[Speaker B] Within the halakhic world, unrelated to morality, there are conflicts too, for example shaatnez.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. No, shaatnez is not a conflict; shaatnez is just something not understood. No, it’s not a conflict. A conflict means a contradiction between two values, not something you don’t understand. Something you don’t understand is not a conflict.
[Speaker B] No, she’s saying that within Jewish law there are things that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there are conflicts—but not shaatnez. In a moment, I… The point is this: this panic from conflict, or the view that conflict indicates that the two sides could not have come from the same source—that is a mistake, a philosophical mistake, a conceptual mistake. Clearly there can be conflicts within the halakhic system itself, and yes, also within the moral system itself. There are conflicts. Jean-Paul Sartre describes a student of his who came to him during the Holocaust in occupied Paris and said: look, I have an elderly mother whom I care for, and my father is collaborating with the Nazis, and my older brother was killed by the Nazis. Now I’m in a dilemma: either to flee to the Free French army, to de Gaulle, and fight the Nazis, or stay in Paris to help my mother. If I flee, she remains alone. Okay, what do I do? Now this is a conflict entirely within morality; it is not Jewish law versus morality. Now, can you say this is a contradiction? There is no contradiction here at all. There are two values, each of which pulls you in practice in a different direction. You cannot realize both on the practical level, but there is no contradiction between the two values. Is there anything that contradicts the value of fighting evil? Between the value of fighting evil and the value of helping my elderly mother—does that contradict anything? No, it contradicts nothing. Reality created a situation in which I cannot realize these two values simultaneously. That is what I call a conflict, as distinct from a contradiction. A conflict is not a contradiction. Conflict means I don’t know what to do with two opposing values. A contradiction is when I believe in the value of human life and also do not believe in the value of human life, or think that murder is a good thing. That is a contradiction.
[Speaker B] But the story of Amalek is specifically a contradiction according to what you’re saying. What? The command regarding Amalek is a kind of contradiction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait—now I’m getting there. I just wanted to sharpen the difference between conflict and contradiction. A contradiction—right, in a system that comes from one source, I would not expect there to be a contradiction. Either He wants X or He wants not-X; He can’t want both together. But if within the same system there are two values which in themselves do not contradict each other, but in their application a conflict arises, a situation can arise in which there is a conflict—that can come from a single source. A positive commandment overrides a prohibition, right? Positive commandments and prohibitions, both came from the Holy One, blessed be He. There are situations in which I have to violate the prohibition in order to fulfill the positive commandment. I have no grain on Passover except from the new crop, and it is forbidden to eat from the new crop. Do I have to violate the prohibition of the new crop in order to fulfill the commandment of eating matzah, or not? That is the question of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. So does that mean that either the positive commandment or the prohibition did not come from the Holy One, blessed be He? Of course not. Both come from the Holy One, blessed be He. There is no contradiction between the commandment to eat matzah and the prohibition against eating grain from the new crop, but on the practical plane a conflict arises. On the practical plane I have to decide which of them to do; I cannot fulfill both, and I have to decide. And we know many such dilemmas, both in morality and in Jewish law, and there is no problem with that. My claim is: there is no theoretical problem with that. There is a problem of, okay, now we have to decide what to do—that’s not a simple question. But on the theoretical level, the existence of conflicts raises no philosophical difficulty. There is no problem with it. Meaning, even a system that comes from one source can contain values that lead to conflict—not contradictory values, but values that lead to conflict in certain situations. Now the more subtle point is that in the kinds of conflicts that arise between Jewish law and morality, there are also conflicts that are not contingent conflicts. For example, saving a life and the Sabbath is a contingent conflict. What do I mean? There is no essential contradiction between the value of life and the value of keeping the Sabbath. What’s the problem? One can uphold the value of life and uphold keeping the Sabbath, everything is fine. When does a conflict arise? When by chance someone becomes ill on the Sabbath and it is impossible to save him without desecrating the Sabbath. Now the case has presented me with a situation in which I have to decide which value to fulfill and which value to violate. I cannot fulfill both. That is a contingent conflict, and with that there is no principled problem. The problem, of course, is making the decision—but the existence of such a conflict does not raise a problem.
[Speaker B] But the Torah gave you the decision in that case.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah did not give the decision; the Sages found it through various tools, and not simple ones, but never mind. Right now I am ignoring the question of what to do with the conflict; I am speaking about the very existence of a conflict. But take, for example, killing Amalek. Assuming there is a moral problem here—let’s leave aside for the moment the explanations of why it is not a moral problem, but let’s assume. Is it like terrorists? Never mind. Let’s assume—or if it’s like terrorists, we didn’t find that in the Torah, so that’s not it. I’m speaking about something we did find in the Torah, not things people think. So I’m saying, let’s say there is a moral problem here, okay, in killing Amalek. Here it is not something contingent. Every killing of an Amalekite inherently—the command itself contradicts the value of human life. That is the moral problem here. It is not like saving a life on the Sabbath, where a case arose; it could have happened that this case would never arise in a whole lifetime. By chance someone encounters a situation in which he has to choose: positive commandment or prohibition, saving life or Sabbath. Here, every killing of an Amalekite—the command to kill, including the children and so on—this command in its very essence involves a moral problem. It is not a contingent case; it is not something accidental that might never have happened; the command itself contains a problematic element. That really creates a greater difficulty, because here it is no longer just a conflict. Ostensibly there is already a contradiction here as well. Since killing Amalek means that the value of human life is apparently not among the important ones, ostensibly, and therefore there is some problem or contradiction between the values. It is not a conflict in the question of how to apply them, some accidental conflict. And the question is whether that does not indicate that there are really two systems here, and one of them has to be abandoned. It is not possible that both came from the Holy One, blessed be He—or else one has to identify, abandon, all the things I discussed in the earlier possibilities. So I want to argue that here too, no. And my claim is basically the following: I want to argue that there can be situations that look like an essential contradiction, not a contingent one, like killing Amalek, and they are still a conflict and not a contradiction. Why? I want to argue that the obligation to kill Amalek—and again, without getting into it, I think I can think of moral justifications even for killing Amalek. Without getting into it now—I’m not entering the issue itself; I’m only using it to illustrate the logic, okay? So we won’t get into the question now of whether there really is a moral problem here or not. There are other things where I have no explanations; there is a moral problem. In this case, what I want to argue is that in the religious sense, the commandment to kill Amalek is a commandment with religious purposes. So from the religious standpoint there is a commandment to kill Amalek; from the moral standpoint it is forbidden to kill Amalek. There is no contradiction between them. On the religious level it is obligatory; on the moral level it is forbidden. Now of course I have a conflict when I have to realize this in practice. The question is whether to follow the decision on the moral plane and ignore the religious value that is being trampled here, or the opposite: to follow the religious command and ignore the trampling of the moral value. But again, this thing is a conflict and not a contradiction—that is what I want to argue. But that assumes something—that the religious sphere and the moral sphere are two spheres that do not speak to one another; they are two parallel spheres, and therefore it can absolutely be that the same act in this sphere appears positive and in that sphere appears negative, and there is no contradiction. The two spheres can come from the same source. So I’m explaining: morally it is forbidden to kill, but halakhically there is an obligation to kill. It says in the Torah that one must kill Amalek; that too is written in the Torah. Okay? So that contradiction within the Torah is not hard to solve. That contradiction within the Torah is not hard to solve. There is what jurists call lex specialis. When there is a contradiction between two values—you’re a jurist, actually—when there is a contradiction between two values, usually the more specific value overrides the broader one. That is what is called lex specialis. In this case, let’s say there is the value of the prohibition “You shall not murder,” and on the other hand there is an obligation to kill Amalek, or to kill Sabbath violators in the presence of witnesses and warning, or whatever—there are people liable to death. On the contrary, “You shall not murder” is broader: it is forbidden to kill people. In contrast, there is a specific value that says one must kill Amalekites. How does that fit together? Or not how does it fit together, but how do we decide which one prevails? The answer is very simple: if we decide that the value of “You shall not murder” prevails, then the value of killing Amalek is erased from the Torah, right? Because every time you kill Amalek, we are violating “You shall not murder.” But if we decide that killing Amalek prevails, the value of “You shall not murder” is not erased from the Torah. In every other case that is not Amalek, the value of human life still remains and it is forbidden to kill. Therefore it is clear that on the interpretive level—this is an interpretive consideration, not a moral one—on the interpretive level, if I have a system that contains a broad command and a specific command, interpretively it is correct to prefer the specific command. That is obvious. Okay? Therefore the intra-halakhic dilemma between “You shall not murder” and killing Amalek does not exist. If that is the issue, then clearly one must kill Amalek. I am asking, fine—but morally, it is forbidden to kill Amalek, just as it is forbidden to kill anyone else. I am not talking about someone who is threatening me right now—that is something else. I am talking about killing an Amalekite infant. Okay?
[Speaker F] But killing an Amalekite when he symbolizes the wicked—the wicked, that’s not difficult.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—I’m talking about an infant. That’s why I say: let’s talk about the extreme case. Who decides what is moral? What?
[Speaker F] Who decides what is moral?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who decides what a wall is? If you see that there is a wall here, then it’s a wall.
[Speaker C] But that’s within the Torah. He’s now saying that from within the Torah there is no contradiction.
[Speaker G] The morality of the Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no morality of the Torah. Morality is a universal thing. There is no such thing as the morality of the Torah.
[Speaker G] But morality changes a lot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t change. There are disagreements here and there—so what? There are disagreements in Jewish law too. Who decides what the Jewish law will be?
[Speaker G] Who decides what the Jewish law will be?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Aren’t there disagreements in Jewish law?
[Speaker G] There are. But morality is more absolute in religion than in morality. That’s not true.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I completely disagree. There are more disagreements in Jewish law than in morality. Far more. In morality, all in all, on most things I think most people would agree. There are disagreements, of course, sometimes important disagreements. But all in all the core of the matter is basically agreed upon.
[Speaker B] Is the death penalty—someone being killed for having killed someone else—the moral thing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so very few people would say that today. Very few people would say that today, and fine. But again, I’m not looking for examples where there is disagreement. There are such examples. The question is how many there are. I’m saying that overall, it’s pretty marginal. In Jewish law there are a thousand times more disagreements. In Jewish law there are disagreements all the way down to the core. Everything is disputed. So if disagreements trouble you, then we’re not in the issue of Jewish law and morality—we’re nowhere at all.
[Speaker G] No, I’m only saying that morality is very relative.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Jewish law too is very relative, very changeable. Everything you said is also true of Jewish law.
[Speaker G] You’re striving toward some truth.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in morality too I am striving toward some truth. In morality too I am striving toward some truth.
[Speaker G] But the Torah is the word of the Holy One, blessed be He.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But morality too is the word of the Holy One, blessed be He, and there too I am striving toward some truth.
[Speaker G] Morality is not the word of the Holy One, blessed be He. Yes, it is. Are you talking about general morality?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m talking about morality in general. Morality.
[Speaker B] So just as you can explain it morally too, like the law of a pursuer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, I don’t want to get into that, because it’s not interesting. I said I can offer explanations for why killing Amalek is in fact moral. I’m using it only as an example for the logic; I don’t care. Let’s assume for the sake of discussion that I have no explanation, okay? It’s not moral. Because that’s what matters for our purposes here; I’m not discussing killing Amalek itself.
[Speaker H] I want to go back for a moment to what Yael said. What I see is that the difference between the halakhic sphere and the moral sphere is that in the halakhic sphere there are laid-down rules, there’s some kind of mapped-out path, some built-in rules. In morality I haven’t encountered such a system of rules.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So first of all,
[Speaker H] definitely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Study ethics in philosophy and you’ll see that there are rules there too.
[Speaker H] And second, though, the rules that were decided in Jewish law are deterministic rules.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, that’s naïveté. That’s naïveté. There aren’t really rules in Jewish law either, first of all. And there are rules in morality too. In the end, who determined the rules of Jewish law? Did the philosophers determine them? No, no, no. A negligible minority, a negligible minority. People, interpreters, determined them.
[Speaker G] Who determined the rules of morality?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Holy One, blessed be He. I claim that this is a religious category. I claim it’s a religious category.
[Speaker G] Then go study, I don’t know, religious outlook. Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I study ethics; that’s how I learn how the Holy One, blessed be He, legislated morality. What do you mean?
[Speaker B] But—
[Speaker G] Ethics always speaks about…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no.
[Speaker B] What, for example, is a case where there’s an argument?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can bring a few examples, but—
[Speaker B] Wait—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] one thing, I just want to explain the logic. Look, what I want to argue is the following. There can be a situation—the example I always like in this context is the chocolate example, yes, some people here have already heard it from me many times. There’s a debate whether to eat chocolate or not, okay? One person says it’s not worth eating chocolate because it makes you fat. Someone else says it is worth eating chocolate because it tastes good. Who’s right? Both of them. Both are right, correct? It both tastes good and makes you fat. So now the question is: how can the same person hold these two value systems? The system of health, or aesthetics, whatever, either one—the question of gaining weight or not gaining weight—and the hedonistic system, of pleasure. Okay? Now I ask: is there any contradiction in a person who tells me, “My health matters to me and enjoying myself matters to me too”? Okay? Is there a contradiction there? No, of course not. There’s a conflict. Now this is a built-in conflict. As is well known, these are two disjoint sets with no overlap. Things that taste good and things that are healthy are two sets; that’s a complete partition. Meaning, a complete partition in the sense that these are two subsets with no overlap that cover the entire space. Okay? That’s the… So in the end this is an essential conflict, as I said before, and still it’s a conflict and not a contradiction. I can hold both of these systems of norms or values, and there is no internal contradiction in that.
[Speaker B] So give an example of a contradiction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: to murder and not to murder. To murder and not to murder—that’s a contradiction. There can’t be a system with a contradiction, because in a system with a contradiction, obviously you’ll remove one of the sides. It’s simple.
[Speaker H] That’s exactly the point—that killing Amalek and “do not murder” is a conflict. I didn’t understand. Right. It’s not a contradiction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, yes.
[Speaker B] If that’s the contradiction, then Amalek—then—
[Speaker H] It’s “murder Amalek” and “do not murder.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. “Murder” and “do not murder” is a contradiction. But “do not murder” and “kill Amalek” isn’t even a conflict, because there I have a solution—I said lex specialis. But the moral prohibition against murder and the halakhic commandment to kill Amalek—at first glance that looks like a contradiction, and I claim that there too it’s a conflict and not a contradiction. It’s a conflict because it’s like health and taste. Just as with chocolate, from the standpoint of health it’s not worth eating it, and from the standpoint of taste it is worth eating it, so too by analogy I’m saying the same thing: from a halakhic standpoint, one must kill Amalek; from a moral standpoint, one must not kill Amalek. What’s the problem? Those are two different aspects. They’re not aimed at the same thing, and therefore there is no contradiction between them. This aims to realize a religious value, and that aims to realize a moral value. Just like health and taste. True, on the practical level I haven’t said what should be done or how one decides, because there is certainly a conflict here. The question is what to do, okay, that’s another discussion. But first of all it’s very important to understand—I think at least, if I’m right—that there is no contradiction here. I’m not supposed to be troubled by the existence of a contradiction. I need to find ways to deal with it when it appears, how to make decisions about what to do in practice. But I’m not supposed to be troubled by the fact that this thing exists.
[Speaker B] Are there rules for this, or is it something—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, there can’t be rules here, because the question is where they would come from. They can’t come from either morality or Jewish law, because this is a clash between Jewish law and morality. It’s something meta—meta to these systems.
[Speaker J] Rabbi, let’s say same-sex marriage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So even on the moral level there can—
[Speaker J] Because today, let’s say on this issue, morality is very socially dependent. Because today even within the moral world there’s a clash there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so? And therefore?
[Speaker J] So it is socially dependent. Morality…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Jewish law is also socially dependent. I go back to what I said to Iris. Why? Ashkenazim rule one way and Sephardim rule another way, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman rules this way and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein rules differently. What, are there fewer disagreements in Jewish law than in morality? There are a thousand times more disagreements. A thousand times more.
[Speaker K] Ninety percent no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean ninety percent no? In morality ninety percent no. In morality ninety percent no. In Jewish law there are a thousand times more disagreements than in morality. A thousand times more.
[Speaker K] What do I define as morality? Morality is what I perceive…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Morality is what is right, no. Again, that brings us into the question of moral relativism. The question is whether my moral intuitions are something subjective or whether they in fact latch onto some objective moral truth. I’m an objectivist in this context… I’m not a relativist. And therefore I think that the fact that there are disagreements—fine, we have to argue, and of course there are disagreements—but there is still moral truth, and I strive toward it. I’m not always sure I’ve reached it, but that’s true in Jewish law too. There too there are disagreements over whether there is halakhic truth and we strive toward it, or whether it’s just each person and his own outlook. But I’m saying that both in Jewish law and in morality, at least in my view, there is truth, and the fact that there are disagreements—so what? There are disagreements in physics too. In physics too there is truth and there are disagreements about it, so what?
[Speaker L] Is this approach Rabbi Kook’s approach? Because it’s basically…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. My approach says that I’m not trying to reconcile the moral problem with the obligation to kill Amalek. I’m not going to argue that the obligation to kill Amalek is moral—or not necessarily, without getting into explanations right now. I’m saying no, it’s not moral, and still there is a religious obligation to do it. Two different things. There is a religious obligation to do it, and I’m in conflict. Because religiously I’m obligated to kill Amalek; morally I’m forbidden to kill Amalek. And now I need to decide what to do, like with the chocolate. Obviously a bit more fateful. But I’m saying that on the logical level it’s similar. On the logical level I want to argue that it’s very similar. It’s basically the same logic. By the way, in analytic ethics, in moral philosophy, they talk about this; they formulate it this way—I don’t agree with this formulation—but they formulate it by saying that the basic laws of logic do not apply to moral statements. Because you can hold two opposing moral statements simultaneously. I think that’s not true. The laws of logic do apply there; it’s just that the laws of logic apply to contradiction, not to conflict. In a conflict there simply is no contradiction. What’s the problem? It’s like the chocolate example—it’s not even from morality—and there too you would say that the laws of logic aren’t valid, because it’s worth eating since it tastes good, and it’s not worth eating because it makes you fat. There is no logical contradiction here. It’s not a matter of logic not applying there; it’s simply not contradictory, that’s all. There are two different aspects here, and each aspect says its own thing. And now the question is what to do—a good question. Not simple what to do. But I’m saying that on the principled level I’m not troubled by it, and I’m also not looking for reconciliations. I’m not looking for explanations. Of course, the assumption in the background here is that the Holy One, blessed be He, is seeking not only the most moral life, but also has other goals He has set before us: a life that realizes religious values in the best possible way. Okay? What exactly are the religious values? I don’t know; one can argue. The commandments strive—that’s my claim—they strive for the realization of religious values. One of the indications of that is that very many commandments deal with things that have no connection at all to morality. The prohibition against eating pork, or I don’t know what, sacrifices, all kinds of things. These are things that have no… connection to morality. They are amoral, not anti-moral—they simply don’t touch morality. So if Jewish law were basically just our path to the most moral life possible, a substantial part of Jewish law—I don’t know what it’s doing there. Quite apart from explanations, I’m not talking about conflicts and excuses and whether it contradicts morality; I’m talking about things that don’t touch morality at all, aren’t related to morality.
[Speaker B] But sometimes morality, so to speak, is things that are obvious and don’t need to be written. So if you’re saying these are parallel things, then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it does need to be written. No, wait a second. First of all, it was written. “Do not murder” and “do not steal,” and very many—“honor your father and your mother”—very many things were written. And in fact it’s a big question why they were written, and in my opinion the answer is very simple. The answer is what I said, that what… no, but what was written there, that’s exactly it, exactly. The moral commandment didn’t need to be written. The Holy One, blessed be He, rebukes Cain for murdering Abel before the Torah was given. Why? Because it’s obvious that one must not murder. Morally a person should understand that murder is forbidden. Again, I don’t care right now whether it’s a myth or whether it really happened—but what does the Torah tell us on this matter? It tells us that this thing should be obvious to everyone even without the commandment. So why does the Torah say “do not murder” or “whoever sheds human blood, by man shall his blood be shed”? To tell you that there is also a religious prohibition here, in addition to the moral prohibition. And by the way, the religious prohibition has its own definitions. If I murder someone indirectly, by some trick or another, it could be that I’m exempt from the halakhic prohibition of “do not murder” and I won’t incur the death penalty. But morally I am a murderer in every sense. And in fact this resolves many difficulties in Jewish law. There are many exemptions regarding murder—but not only murder; murder is extreme—also in other things. You do it this way, and you do it indirectly, and you place barrels here, yes, and you pull various tricks, and in the end it’s obvious what will happen, and it’s even certain that it will happen, and still you’re exempt because you did it that way. So what? Where is morality here? You murdered him. What do I care that you murdered him in this way? You murdered with your own hands in a way that clearly leads to his death. I’m not talking now about cases where it’s unclear and there’s only partial responsibility or things like that; I mean a clear wrong in itself, only done through an indirect act. So I’m saying: religiously, that thing is not an act of murder. Morally, it’s murder in every respect. Same with stealing from a non-Jew. There is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether stealing from a non-Jew is a Torah-level prohibition—whether “do not steal” was said about non-Jews as well or only about Jews. Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: obviously stealing from a non-Jew is also Torah-level forbidden. In my translation I would say: obviously stealing from a non-Jew is a moral-legal offense. The question is whether the halakhic “do not steal” applies to it or not; that’s a question in Jewish law. Jewish law does not deal with morality, and morality does not touch Jewish law. These are two categories that do not talk to one another in all three types of halakhic cases you can think of. Also in the type where there is conflict, with which I began—say Amalek and morality; also in the area I moved on to, the amoral area where there is no contact—the prohibition on eating pork has no connection at all to morality; and also in the truly moral area, like “do not murder” and “do not steal,” where Jewish law commands something that at first glance looks like a moral commandment. I claim that there too it’s the same thing. There too Jewish law is not dealing with morality; it is dealing with the halakhic aspect of the matter. The moral aspect of the matter is “do what is right and good” and the things we are supposed to understand on our own. Yes.
[Speaker B] That’s exactly the statement of the Sages, “Your mercies extend even to a bird’s nest.” Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Holy One, blessed be He, says, “If they call Me merely lenient, let His innards be overlooked”—yes.
[Speaker B] Meaning, if someone thinks that because of the moral side the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, he’s saying, like… Right, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And people struggle with this a lot, by the way, and in my opinion the answer there is the same answer I’m giving here. It’s not that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not care about the bird; of course He cares about the bird. But the commandment does not come because of that. The commandment is about realizing the religious value. Beyond that, a person also has to be a mensch, also has to be moral, and that is certainly true. The Torah expects that from us too. That statement there is not an anti-moral statement; it is a statement meant to detach the halakhic plane from the moral plane. Precisely because of the moral side, because Jewish law does not deal with morality.
[Speaker B] But when the religious value is the one that demands—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, you’ve gone back to what you asked before; I don’t agree. No, there are… Look, I’ll say this: I need to move on already because I also want to get to our topic, but—
[Speaker B] Let me explain for a second, just a second.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I want to explain for a moment. Look, I’m not just throwing around empty words. I want to explain this to you. Even when there is a contradiction between Jewish law and morality, sometimes morality will prevail. That’s what I want to argue. It’s not that—wait, one second, one second—it’s not that I always say, yes yes, Jewish law is independent of morality, but in practice Jewish law always wins in the end, so it’s all just words. It’s not just words, because there are situations where there is no conflict—the other two types of halakhic cases I mentioned. But I claim that even where there is conflict, it’s not just words. There are rulings—even of halakhic decisors, by the way—there are rulings saying that Jewish law retreats before morality. The Talmud in Nazir says that a transgression for its own proper sake is greater than a commandment not for its proper sake. And the Talmud says there that there are situations in which a person must commit a halakhic transgression—there is no permission to commit that transgression—but there is some sufficiently cardinal consideration for which it overrides Jewish law. For example, what Yael the wife of Hever the Kenite did there, or Lot’s daughters, who had relations with their father because they understood that otherwise humanity had been wiped out. Meaning, that was the only way to bring children into the world. And the Sages greatly praise them for this—you have to understand. The Talmud there, in that same passage, praises Lot’s daughters highly for this. Okay, obviously this won’t be a fixed rule, because if it were something fixed, then the Torah itself should have told me. By definition this will always happen in some temporary circumstance. Of course, because if the Torah said it, then it already took that into account too and still told you to do it—that’s exactly the point. Therefore, in the context of Amalek, for example, there’s no way out. In the context of Amalek, if the Torah said to kill Amalek, then it took the moral aspect into account too and still told me to do it. Therefore by definition it will always be occasional cases. It will never be a permanent ruling in favor of morality against Jewish law. Because if it were a permanent ruling, that would mean erasing a law from the Torah or—
[Speaker B] from the Shulchan Arukh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but I don’t erase a specific clause either; the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, so why did He command it? If He expected me to erase it, then He shouldn’t have commanded it. There’s something going on here.
[Speaker B] What? I didn’t understand. If Jewish law prevails over morality?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not true that always. In occasional cases it can happen the other way around. In fixed cases, no—because in fixed cases, again, this is an interpretive consideration, not because Jewish law is more important; it’s not because of that. Rather, as an interpretive consideration, like lex specialis.
[Speaker B] Just—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second. The interpretive consideration says that if the Holy One, blessed be He, said to kill Amalek, then He intended for you to kill Amalek, right? But He knew there was a moral problem here, I assume, right? So why did He say it? Apparently He took the moral problem into account and said that here the religious value overrides the moral problem. So now, through this interpretive consideration, I’ve reached the conclusion that in this case the religious value prevails. But that’s an interpretive consideration—the question is what the Holy One, blessed be He, intended. In an occasional case, this interpretive consideration won’t exist. Because in an occasional case I can’t say, “The Torah would not have written this here”; it wrote it for the other cases; here I have a particular case. And therefore there really can be—and there have been—such rulings. The author of the Akedah discusses the question of institutionalizing prostitution, a very famous question. After all, there can be very severe prohibitions involved there—the woman may be a menstruant, maybe a married woman, and all kinds of terribly severe prohibitions. So he said: forget it, let’s institutionalize it. We’ll open special houses for this purpose, make sure the women immerse, make sure they are not married, and we’ll make it organized. And his conclusion was: absolutely not. Why? In terms of dry halakhic reasoning, in my opinion that’s what should be done. But clearly it’s simply not fitting. There are things one does not do based on a human moral judgment. Concubinage may also be a good example. There are rabbis in our time—halakhic decisors in our time or in recent generations—who wonder whether when arranging marriages for people who are not committed to the commandments, one should intentionally invalidate them, bring invalid witnesses so that the marriage does not take effect. Why? Because then if there are issues of adultery or promiscuity or something like that, you save the problems of illegitimacy, you avoid the prohibitions of relations with another man’s wife, right? Again, in dry halakhic reasoning, in my opinion that is an obvious conclusion. By the way, here and there there are decisors who actually support it. But that’s a shining minority; the overwhelming majority of halakhic decisors oppose it. Why? Again, because it just isn’t fitting. It cannot be that people will not live as a married couple according to the law of Moses and Israel. True, this leads to severe halakhic problems; nothing to be done. In the end, the broader considerations—not the formal halakhic considerations—override the halakhic consideration.
[Speaker E] Why—someone who lives without—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] marriage.
[Speaker C] That’s promiscuity.
[Speaker E] Fine, but that’s because of the situation, because they’re not in order—we want to try to—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there is “do not place a stumbling block,” there is “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”—what do you mean? It’s the same thing. That too is in conflict. “Do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” “you shall surely rebuke your fellow”—full Torah-level commandments.
[Speaker D] What you’re describing—and here’s the connection with law—is that there’s the legal system and there’s morality. For example, that whole case—I won’t say the name—of the famous singer whose case was closed because morally it was wrong but legally there wasn’t evidence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A distinction between morality and law.
[Speaker D] It’s a similar analogy. If I look at law, then the difference between morality and law is: law—I’m obligated to law as a citizen, I have to; whereas morality is something freer, that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in what—
[Speaker D] if it’s the same thing, but if I make the distinction in comparison to religion and morality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very similar between them, very similar.
[Speaker D] Very similar, with one small difference: in the legal context as opposed to the moral one, the accepted conceptions at least—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] see legal norms as a subset of moral norms, those that we are willing to impose sanctions on.
[Speaker B] Wait, those—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] those that we are willing to impose sanctions on. There are moral norms where we say, we’ll give you a medal if you did it, or if you didn’t do it we’ll condemn you socially. But if there’s something I impose a sanction on—if it’s morally basic enough—it will enter the legal system. That’s often how people understand the relation between law and morality; that too can be discussed. But in Jewish law I think it’s not like that. In Jewish law there is a categorical otherness between these two systems. It’s not that the essential part of morality, or the binding core of morality, is Jewish law. No—it’s simply something else. But the relation is similar, meaning in the logical sense. Now, let’s continue, because I want to move forward.
[Speaker B] I wanted to bring in the connection to Hasidism.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s already in my head. I’ll get to it from several directions, but I deliberately want to give the broad picture, because this is an opportunity to talk also about broader aspects than just this question. Now, what really stands behind this view—and I think, I don’t know, many argue with it; I hardly know anyone who actually holds it. I don’t understand how one can argue with it; it’s a necessary view, in my opinion you can’t say otherwise. But what stands behind it really is a conception that I think is what people have trouble accepting: a conception of otherness between morality and Jewish law. There is another kind, another category of values, which I call religious values, and Jewish law comes to achieve them. The moral values—that’s morality. More than that, I claim that moral values are by definition universal. There is no such creature as Jewish morality. “Jewish morality” is an oxymoron. Meaning, if something is moral, then it is moral and binding on all human beings. And if it is not moral, then it is not moral. There is no Jewish morality and non-Jewish morality. The question is what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects of us and what He does not expect of us.
[Speaker B] How is morality not universal? We need to understand. Right. Morality is a human thing—is that what you’re… human beings?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is the will of God; it’s not human morality in the sense of its source. It is the will of God, but everyone understands it more or less—again, within the limits of disagreements.
[Speaker G] How is it the will of God?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do they understand it? From the fact that He implanted it within us.
[Speaker G] By virtue of their being human?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. He implanted within us our conscience, our moral perception, and that is our way of understanding what is moral and what is not moral.
[Speaker F] Like in the example of murder for family honor—what’s it called? Blood revenge, honor killing—in certain societies the moral thing is to kill the daughter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again we’re returning to the same question; it already came up. I know there are disagreements in this area. It exists. No, it doesn’t exist. Relativism?
[Speaker G] I’m saying there is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You didn’t answer it. I answered it and I’ll answer it again.
[Speaker G] No, you can’t say human morality when we show that there is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can say it, and not only can I say it, I already said it, and now I’ll say it again. What I’m basically saying is that the fact that disagreements exist doesn’t prove anything. There are disagreements in physics too, and physics is still objective. The fact that there are disagreements only means that one is right and one is wrong. The fact that there are people who are wrong does not mean there are multiple truths. The assumption that if there are several opinions, that means by definition there are multiple truths—that’s a postmodern leap. I don’t agree. The fact that there are disagreements doesn’t mean there are many people who are right. One is right and one is wrong. That’s all. And in Jewish law, as I said earlier, aren’t there disagreements? So is Jewish law also not from the Holy One, blessed be He? There are disagreements: this one thinks this way and that one thinks that way. So what? What’s the difference? The fact that there are disagreements—more than that, I also say that the disagreements are only on the margins. You can find examples, true, like honor killing, but those are basically marginal examples. Most people agree on the moral core.
[Speaker C] The issue of same-sex relationships, which in recent years has become so significant—it shakes this whole statement. Okay. What will people say in another ten years—that here at Bar-Ilan they censored books?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll tell you what they’ll say in another ten years, and what they already say today: that there really is no moral problem with it. It’s a religious problem. That’s all. And there isn’t… that’s true. And this helped us discover that fact, because we once thought there was an identity between the religious problem and the moral problem. The world changed. I don’t agree with it, because I think religiously it is forbidden, but I do understand from what changed in the world that one must not identify the religious value with the moral value. That’s all.
[Speaker C] And the same thing for pedophilia? So there’ll be—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Today it looks like a moral problem. I already wrote about this in some response in the Haaretz weekend supplement a long time ago; Gadi Taub wrote a series of articles there in the Haaretz supplement, and I argued that there too it’s the same thing.
[Speaker C] That a day will come when they discover that it’s moral?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that there is—
[Speaker B] no problem with it on the principled level.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’m not sure of that today. Today there are those who would say that multiplying the world is the moral problem, because the world is already too crowded and there isn’t enough food for everyone. But leave it—I’m only discussing these examples to show the logic of how to deal with the problem; I don’t intend to deal with the problems themselves.
[Speaker E] Yes. No, I’m going back a bit to that, but I do agree that there are two systems, but I always shift uncomfortably when the moral system is always, always the one that retreats. Yes. Why? And it’s uncomfortable, because as someone who does believe in the Torah—I don’t know—like a priest’s wife who was raped, the condemned city, all these things, morality is always the thing that yields before supposedly higher religious values.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: if I understood what these religious values are, I assume I would understand.
[Speaker E] I can understand, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why can you understand? Is idolatry something that so justifies killing women and children and animals?
[Speaker C] What did they do wrong?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? What? Because you’re used to thinking that idolatry is terribly, terribly severe. So what is so severe about idolatry? So they worship some statue, and because of that you kill—
[Speaker B] all the children there in the city? But first of all, that’s a statement of the Torah that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—there’s your answer. Because it’s a statement of the Torah; what can I do? I trust the Giver of the Torah that if He said this, then apparently He took the moral aspect into account and told me that here it overrides the moral aspect—not that I understand why. But if I trust that, then I say: that’s the situation. So it’s no wonder that it always gets pushed aside. It always gets pushed aside because wherever the Torah said so, that’s what it said.
[Speaker B] No, but idolatry is such a strong value, it’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] as though I don’t believe in the Holy One, blessed be He. What difference does it make? A priest’s wife who was raped is the same thing. The sanctity of the priesthood—that religious value, preserving the sanctity of the priesthood—overrides the suffering of the woman, yes. I wouldn’t say this on my own, but if the Torah said it, then what can I do? That’s what the Torah says, so it revealed to me that this religious value overrides the moral value that yields before it. But it’s obvious that this will always happen; it shouldn’t surprise you that it always happens. Because after all, everywhere the Torah said something, that’s what it said: act according to the religious value even though it involves a moral problem. Where would it not happen? Where the Torah didn’t say so—then, fine, there I will indeed act according to the moral value. It’s not accidental that the religious value always prevails, because obviously, in an essential clash. In an accidental clash—not true. In an accidental clash I don’t agree.
[Speaker B] That essential clash is the problem, so to speak.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not a problem; it’s a lack of understanding. It’s not a problem. If I trust the Giver of the Torah, it’s not a problem; it’s a lack of understanding. I don’t understand why that value is so important in His eyes that it overrides the moral value, but presumably it must be important enough if He said it. That’s it. So I don’t understand—so what? There are many things I don’t understand. It’s a problem when I understand that something is wrong, not when I don’t understand. Do you understand? When I understand something that is not right, that creates a problem for me. When I don’t understand—I also don’t understand why we put on tefillin. I don’t understand. Fine? And I trust that if the Holy One, blessed be He, said so, then apparently that’s what should be done.
[Speaker B] Okay, on the other side of this, isn’t this a bit like Yeshayahu Leibowitz? I don’t know his approach that well.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A bit, yes. I said that in this matter I’m similar to Yeshayahu Leibowitz, except that I put these two things within the religious framework, whereas he claimed that morality is an atheistic category. Yes, right. Okay. I said the personalities aren’t important; it doesn’t matter who said what. I’m saying that on the principled level this seems to me to be the required view.
[Speaker B] I understand this view. Yes, yes. What do you mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the point is that if that’s so, then basically the point is that morality is a universal thing. There is no such thing as Jewish morality. Therefore, by definition, morality is what we understand as moral—what every person more or less, within the limits of disagreements, and there are disagreements of course, that’s all true—but more or less what people understand as moral. Look, even the worst Nazis there were—you always hear these stories about how much wine they had to drink before they shot all those people into the pit. Even from their point of view they understood that murder is a problematic thing, so they invented all kinds of theories as to why it was nevertheless permitted and even a commandment and that they were saving the world. But you see, there is some foundation about which nobody argues. There is a value to human life, that one does not murder people.
[Speaker B] Where is the quote from: “Believe in wisdom among the nations; believe in morality among the nations”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not morality—Torah. Torah. In any case, on the contrary, wisdom—and morality is part of that, by the way.
[Speaker B] It’s part of wisdom.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Maimonides there are the Laws of Character Traits; for Maimonides, yes.
[Speaker G] “Do not believe in Torah among the nations; believe in morality among the nations”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Morality too. What? Okay, so let’s see for a moment, let’s continue for a moment. Now, that’s one point. As a result of this, let’s take one more step. Let’s say I now get directly to the ketubah, and afterward I’ll show additional aspects. Suppose I see in the subtext of the halakhic passages we’re looking at here a problematic conception of women in this context, a conception of women as merchandise—that’s what troubles people in the context of the ketubot. Then, in light of what I said, several possibilities open up. One possibility is that Jewish law is speaking about the legal-halakhic aspect. That does not mean that this is also the correct perspective morally. It could be that I can live with the fact that morally it is not right to act this way, but there is a halakhic reason to do so for some reason, in principle. On the other hand—or really this is the other side of the same coin—the fact that even if the Sages really did see women in such a way, for the sake of argument, that doesn’t mean that I must accept it. Since the authority of the Sages is authority granted to them in the halakhic sphere, just as the authority of the legislator is in the legal sphere—your analogy—that doesn’t mean I have to accept the moral principles that most members of the Knesset believe in. I am not obligated to the morality of the Knesset; I am obligated to its laws. Here too it’s the same. True, this somehow seems to thin out the meaning of learning or the meaning of the Sages, but I don’t think that’s so. I think that is exactly what is being said there. The authority of the Sages is stated in the halakhic context, not the moral context.
[Speaker C] But the halakhic rulings of the Sages are not based on the positions—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait, one second, I’m getting there. So first of all, therefore, for example, if someone were to prove to me beyond all doubt from the Talmud that the Talmud was socialist—would that mean I am supposed to adopt a socialist position in my life today? I’m not talking about specific laws here and there. My answer is, first, no one will manage to prove that. And second, even if they do manage to prove it—no, I’m not obligated. Why not? Because I am obligated to the halakhic rulings that appear in the Talmud. I am not obligated to the subtext, to the foundational values of the Talmud. The foundational values of the Talmud are not binding on me. Again, that’s my personal view.
[Speaker M] But Jewish law in discussing their foundational values…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Jewish law is based—
[Speaker M] on moral values.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If Jewish law is based on those foundational values, then if the source is a valid halakhic source, like the Talmud for example, I will adopt the law and I will not adopt the foundational values—and I’ll be in conflict. But I won’t adopt them. Elsewhere, let’s say, if I have to determine my attitude toward women, not in the area of how much I write in a ketubah, I won’t behave in that way. In the ketubah I have a halakhic issue—an issue, or not, or a halakhic command, whatever you want to call it—as I see it, and there I stick to what appears in the Talmud. That doesn’t mean I’m adopting that outlook. First of all, this follows from what I’ve said up to now. But isn’t that a personal position? It affects things—what can I do?
[Speaker B] But they themselves don’t adopt… What? If there are disagreements, that shows that the Sages also—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying that where there is disagreement, then of course I always have the option of choosing the view that better fits my moral outlook. But let’s say I didn’t find one. There is no disagreement, or all the opinions are not in a direction that seems moral to me. Then I say: fine, my commitment to Jewish law does not obligate me to adopt the moral outlook, even the moral outlook that underlies the law I’m discussing. As a matter of commitment, by the way—I just wrote an article on my website about the question: what is Jewish law? Is Jewish law the bottom line, or is Jewish law the reasoning behind the bottom line? And I showed there through several halakhic implications that we do not relate to the reasoning but only to the rulings themselves. For example, when in a religious court there is a dispute among three judges—and by the way, you have this in the legal system too in various places—let’s say, for example, in capital cases there are twenty-three judges. Fifteen hold the accused liable to death and eight acquit him. But the fifteen who hold him liable to death do so for different reasons, each one for a different reason, okay? Now, if we examine the level of the reasons, then against each of those reasons there are twenty-two judges who oppose it. So none of the reasons for conviction is correct, because there is a majority against each one. So that man should really be acquitted, even though fifteen people think he is liable to death and only eight think he is exempt. But no—the law says we go by the majority of people. Why? Because what obligates me is what they rule, not their reasons. That is the law. And if I apply that here, then I say: even if I am bound by some halakhic ruling because it emerged from a valid source, I am bound by the ruling, not necessarily by the value position that underlies it. I can object to it, and I am also allowed not to hold it. The question whether I will keep that law does not necessarily derive from the question of what my relationship is to the moral infrastructure underlying it. Those are two different things.
[Speaker H] And how do you relate to places where the Sages are clearly trying to educate us morally?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then I won’t accept it if I disagree. They’re trying to educate me, that’s perfectly fine. Why are they trying? Because they believe that that is right and that that is moral. Fine—but I can disagree with them. No, I understand why they want to persuade me, because they believe in it. But the Sages also educate. Fine, so what? I also see myself as, I don’t know, a botanist—I’m not. What do you mean? They’re trying to educate me, they’re trying—
[Speaker H] Is the way I relate to them different from the way I relate to, say, some non-Jewish sage trying to educate me?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. No, in my eyes there’s no difference. Personally there’s no difference. Why? The question is what his arguments are. If his arguments persuade me, then I’m persuaded; and if not, then not. There is no authority in this area—that’s what I want to say. It’s not that there is authority. If they persuaded me, excellent, and if not, then not.
[Speaker C] Why, when the difference—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s only in Jewish law, in my view.
[Speaker C] When we have a contradiction between a ruling of the Sages and—because they rely on a certain scientific truth, and today we know it’s not correct—the ruling changes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, in my view, it does change, yes. So why? Because that would be a mistaken ruling. Since this is not a mistaken ruling, it’s an outlook shaped by a moral disagreement. I can’t say there’s an error here in the sense that they failed to perceive reality correctly. I disagree morally. A mistaken ruling is a ruling where, even if they had understood reality, they themselves would not have ruled that way. It’s like a mistaken transaction in a contract.
[Speaker C] Okay, even if they had really known women, they still wouldn’t have ruled that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But they did know women! What does “if they had really known” mean?
[Speaker C] Women?
[Speaker G] They knew women. The women they knew reflected a certain period.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s something else. That’s the claim.
[Speaker G] When you look at things in the historical context of the Jewish people, the ketubah was written in relation to what the situation was among the nations of the world, and it was a very moral and very elevated situation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’m getting to that, that’s the next stage.
[Speaker G] And that has to be taken into account.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get there, I’ll try to address that, I’m trying to get there, just a second.
[Speaker B] Could it be that the word acquisition has several meanings? Acquisition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with us?
[Speaker B] Acquiring a woman, “a woman is acquired.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah yes, “a woman is acquired” — I wrote an article about that in the most recent issue of Hakdamot, or maybe the one before that, I don’t remember anymore. Look there, against Rivka Lubitch. She wrote that this is basically acquisition and that the woman is the husband’s property. In my view that’s nonsense. I brought a lot of proof there that this isn’t true. In any case, that’s a different discussion, I don’t want to get into it here. Look, I want to move on, because I’m doing this in stages. First of all I stated the minimum. The minimum is that even if all hope is gone and everything — it’s blatantly immoral, all true — it could still be that I remain committed to Jewish law, but I won’t adopt the value structure underlying it. That’s all under the assumption that I have no solution and that it is immoral. Now I’m still going to deal with that too. Okay? So that’s one point. A second point — and I’ll get to changes at the end too — but even before changes: look, there really are situations where, first of all, before the question of what I do, how do I look at the Sages through these eyes? When they looked at women this way, before the question of whether I will do what they say, what should my attitude be toward people who rule that way or relate that way? So here you need to understand: many times in a situation like this there’s a certain kind of anachronism. I’ll give you an example. Anachronism, yes, means looking with today’s perspective at a reality that was completely different; it’s not right to look at it through today’s lens. I’ll give you just an example. We have an older acquaintance, an elderly woman, who once went looking for a livelihood. She had no income. She went to the nearby kiosk and offered to bring in the newspapers delivered in the morning, the bundles of newspapers, and put them into the kiosk. He told her: I can’t bear to see an elderly woman doing that kind of work. So he didn’t take her. Now, he pitied her, and therefore he didn’t give her a livelihood. Meaning, I identify with the feelings, with what he was expressing, but on the other hand, you’re not changing reality. You’re not offering her some other job instead, right? Given that she has no livelihood, she herself prefers to bring the newspapers and make a living. So don’t worry about her more than she worries about herself. So I’m saying, it’s the same thing here. There are situations that we don’t sufficiently understand from the way we see things today — and maybe that’s a good thing — but first of all we need to understand that this is so. In a world where a woman really was merchandise — first of all, that’s a fact in a certain sense. The woman was like that. She was dependent on her husband, the husband supported her; while she was with her father she was under her father’s authority, afterward she passed to her husband, yes, they passed the baton in a relay race, transferring the stick, the responsibility, the baton from one to the other. Yes, that was the situation. First of all factually, socially, that was the situation. Not only among Jews. No, no, generally. I’m saying: now you can say, I reject this situation, what do you mean, we’ll write every woman a ketubah for 700, not 200, and every woman regardless of her status. What would happen? Men wouldn’t marry non-virgins. Because in fact people don’t want to, didn’t want to, fine? In the ketubah. Now you’re worrying — by the way, this often happens, people are terribly concerned for weak populations and end up hurting them to the fullest extent. Because you’re not changing the underlying structure within which the whole thing operates. And given that structure, you need to understand that sometimes you have to maneuver and choose the lesser evil, given that it exists. You’re not going to change the situation. Therefore, where the attitude is like that, it won’t always be right to say, okay, we’re purists, we don’t discriminate between women, no one is merchandise, everyone gets a huge ketubah. No one will marry any woman. Will that be better for women that way? No, it won’t be better for women. So the question is whether we compromise or whether we bang our heads against the wall — and by the way, sometimes there is value in doing that, and sometimes there are no rules, sometimes. Sometimes you do have to fight, I’m not saying you don’t; I’m just saying you have to take into account that very often our way of looking at things is anachronistic. We look at things through our eyes today. Another example you could take in this context, which also arouses a lot of antagonism, is the father’s right to give his daughter, to marry off his daughter, to a leper. He can marry her off against her will to a leper as long as she is a minor. Yes, he can give her to a leper. You say: what kind of right is that? A leper? A sick person, someone who is ill, yes. Very difficult though. Yes, no, someone who is also repulsive, as though unpleasant to live with. So that arouses a lot of outrage, as if — what do you mean, what is she, merchandise again? Is he just doing whatever he wants with her? You have to understand: if in the background we’re talking about a person where the situation is that a woman has no ability to make a living — that was the world then, okay? Now the father…
[Speaker N] Jewish law obligates us even today, even if today we…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, one second, one second. First I want to talk about how we judge what was then; after that we’ll see what we do today. So the point is that the father wants, in principle, to take care of his daughter. You have to give him the tools to do that. Now his daughter won’t want to marry a leper — she’s a minor and it repulses her, she doesn’t want to. On the other hand, she doesn’t understand, she’s still a child, she doesn’t understand that the result will be that she’ll die of hunger. Life expectancy then wasn’t exactly great, her father will die at age thirty-five, and this young lady will be left at age twelve or thirteen, I don’t know, with nobody to support her. Either she’ll go out into the street and people will do with her whatever they do with her — and the Sages talk about this. Many enactments were made because of this, regarding a Canaanite maidservant and a captive taken in war and a Hebrew maidservant and all kinds of things like that. Or she simply won’t have a livelihood, she’ll just die. So what’s the alternative? So Jewish law gives the father the ability to betroth his daughter — and of course no one recommends that he betroth her to a leper — but what they want to say is only that he has the ability to do this to whomever he understands to be appropriate, even against the daughter’s will, as long as she is a minor. With an adult daughter, no; she is already independent, she understands, and she needs to make decisions for herself. But as long as she is a minor, and the father feels, for example, that he is going to die, that he won’t be here to take care of the girl, he has to arrange things for her. Now in a world like that, it’s very purist to say, what do you mean, where are the rights of the child, Yitzhak Kadman didn’t exist then. Today he doesn’t either, by the way — he retired in 2016, just yesterday I looked up where he disappeared to. But yes, the person responsible for child welfare, the head of the National Council for the Child. I’m saying, that’s purism. You won’t bring about a better world that way; you’ll bring about a worse world. There are certain givens you need to understand are the givens, and you act within them. That’s first of all regarding how to see the reality that existed then, in the sense of how I judge the Sages or the society of that period. Society perhaps can be judged one way or another, although I assume that if we had been there too, we would have acted similarly. Fine, there’s nothing to be done; the world takes time to develop. That’s true, the world developed, there’s no need to panic. But in the end, given that this is the reality, it isn’t always right to go with the purest approach possible; you have to maneuver within that framework. And by the way, a religious court could see a father giving his daughter to a leper and beat him to knock that idea out of his head. They definitely did things like that too. That doesn’t mean he doesn’t have the legal right — yes, by the way — the legal right to do it, because first of all you have to give the father the tools to arrange matters for his daughter, and those tools mean that he determines whom she will marry. The legal way of saying it in an extreme form is “even to a leper,” meaning: it doesn’t depend on what she wants, that’s what they mean to say. They do not mean that a father can abuse his daughter. What they mean is that it is in his hands. He has to make the decision, and it doesn’t depend on her agreement because she is still a minor. By the way, when she is grown, then no — when she is grown, only she decides whom she will marry. That’s why I’m saying we are speaking about a minor; you have to understand that. And then what that means in practice is that the religious court has not said the last word with the Jewish law. After Jewish law permits a father to marry off his daughter to a leper, that does not mean the religious court won’t intervene there and wring his neck if he does it, because if the court sees that he is abusing his daughter, it won’t let him do it. But the legal right, or the legal framework, says that the father is responsible for his daughter, and with responsibility comes authority. Meaning, you have to be given the tools by which you can care for her. And in that sense, that is caring. The same thing with the ketubah: “so that it should not be easy in the husbands’ eyes to divorce them,” therefore they enacted the ketubah enactment. What does that mean? Because to send a woman away from her husband — and of course say her father is no longer alive — then there will be no one to take care of her, and that’s a real problem. So you need to ensure that it won’t be so simple to send a woman away from her husband. Today we often hear about opposite problems, but I’m saying the ketubah enactment is an enactment that came within a background that needs to be understood. It’s a different background from ours today. And very often this criticism is anachronistic criticism. It can be criticism… I’ll give you an extreme example, not really connected here, but once someone told me — I spoke with some Muslim scholar, actually very interesting to talk to him — I spoke with him about so-called honor killings. So he says, look, there isn’t a single Muslim religious scholar who agrees with this — that’s what he claimed. Not a single religious scholar. You don’t believe it, but this exists. None of us believes anyone when they say this about somebody else; when they say it about us, we believe it. I’m saying, that’s what he told me, I don’t know, I’m not an expert in Islam. That’s what he told me. He told me it’s simply an Arab custom, a custom that came from the deserts of Arabia. Now very often the culture of a group or a people, yes, enters into the religious patterns, becomes integrated into them, and many times people no longer distinguish. By the way, in the Jewish world too it’s like that. A great many things among us are cultural matters and not matters of Jewish law; they entered into Jewish law — by the way, including the ketubah. The ketubah too received halakhic grounding, but it began as a social custom. It began as the social custom I described before, which also had social aims.
[Speaker B] So things like that are Oral Torah in the sense that really it’s something that’s custom, the custom of Israel?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, in a certain context, that the obligations of the woman are called “Jewish practice,” yes.
[Speaker B] So why hasn’t it changed today?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I haven’t gotten to change yet. First I was talking about how I relate to what existed then. I said I’d get to changes at the end, I hope, that I’ll get to changes at the end.
[Speaker B] That Arab you spoke about — did it start with Ishmael? Again? “His hand against everyone and everyone’s hand against him.” Okay, fine, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying, still, one has to distinguish. We often feel that this is some kind of apologetics or propaganda, that they aren’t really describing the situation to us. Maybe that’s true, I don’t know, but it could be that it isn’t true. Meaning, clearly there are such situations. It’s very easy for us to judge the Muslims. When people say this about us, we immediately have a thousand excuses no less good than theirs. It’s just that in our case we believe it and in theirs we don’t believe it, because we have empathy. Therefore I take into account the possibility that maybe he’s right, that he wasn’t just feeding me propaganda. Rather, it may really be so. I think it really is so, by the way.
[Speaker H] It sounds
[Speaker B] to me like someone speaking while a gun is being held to his forehead by some other Arab tribe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, yes, I assume they’d say there are non-Arab Muslim societies where, over there, I don’t think people kill over family honor. Apparently absolutely. Yes. I don’t think they kill over family honor in non-Arab Muslim societies. So that means it’s something Arab, not something Muslim. Yes.
[Speaker B] So a cultural claim or a feminist claim may really be true regarding the Sages, regarding things the Sages enacted or interpretations of the Sages. Regarding things built into the Torah, just this asymmetry in morality…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, also things built into the Torah. I’m not talking now about the moral aspects, I’m talking about social aspects. What, the killing of Amalek? Are we going back to the killing of Amalek? No, let’s say now, the man betroths.
[Speaker B] The man betroths, the man betroths, yes. That’s the asymmetry, he can acquire.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “The man betroths” — here, this is the last topic I want to talk about, and that is the topic of change. Wait — the woman also has to remain married, that too is a problem. Nothing is Torah-level in that sense.
[Speaker G] You spoke about the problem being that the woman is merchandise, but there’s another point here too — why really… okay, let’s say everyone is merchandise, but why is the merchandise measured according to virginity?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because that’s what the husband wants. You can’t fight reality. Ask him!
[Speaker G] That’s something social!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying, that’s exactly the point. The ketubah wasn’t created in a vacuum. There is a functioning society, and within it there are norms. Whether we like them or don’t like them is a good question. But given that these are the norms, there are two possibilities. Either to say: I’m fighting it and I won’t allow a distinction in the ketubah between a virgin and a non-virgin. What will happen? No one will marry the non-virgin. Today? No — then. I’m talking about then. Wait, just a second, let me do this in my order. I’m talking about then. In a moment I’ll get to today. I’m saying, I have two possibilities. Either to bang my head against the wall, be a purist, and say I don’t recognize this. In the end I’m hurting women that way. And what the Sages are telling me is: okay, we’ll go with it, but we’ll bring it under criticism — meaning control, halakhic control. So this one gets this, that one gets that, patterns are established, and we make sure the whole thing is conducted in some supervised way — not ideal, but you can’t fight head-on against a reality you will not overcome.
[Speaker B] But wasn’t Judaism’s goal to repair the world?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so I said: even repairing the world can be done in two ways. I don’t know what “Judaism” means, but repairing the world can be done in two ways. It can be repaired within the given framework, and it can be repaired by fighting against the given framework. The great wisdom is to know when — when to do this and when to do that. And sometimes, by the way, this changes from period to period. It could be that then the Sages thought it right to do this within the framework, and maybe indeed another period comes in which the framework needs to be broken. I’m not ruling that out either. Now I’m getting to the last stage of the discussion, because I see I’ll have to finish soon, so I just want to get to what this means for today. Now here this is a long topic, I won’t be able to get into it; really, what I’m saying today is just telegraphic. But in principle there definitely is room for halakhic change. There definitely is room even within the Orthodox halakhic framework. This sounds very alarming to people accustomed to ordinary halakhic thinking. There is — I’m about to publish books on this matter, and there I build in a very systematic way a theory of halakhic change. There is a way to change Jewish law within accepted halakhic patterns, not Reform and nothing of that sort, and there definitely is room for changes on the basis of changed reality, and there are tens and hundreds of examples of this. The change regarding women studying Torah — I’m not even talking about that anymore, because we’re sitting here and studying Torah; that itself is an enormous change.
[Speaker G] It’s an enormous change. Today, a man after a car accident can become a vegetable and his wife remains an agunah. That’s something that changed technologically. What do you mean it changed?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because
[Speaker F] once
[Speaker G] after the accident he would have died.
[Speaker F] could
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He could also have remained a vegetable in the past; even without keeping him alive he could remain a vegetable.
[Speaker G] Only because of
[Speaker C] anesthesia and ventilation, that’s not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, it’s more common, but it existed in the past too. It existed in the past too; it’s not only more common today. It existed in the past too. And there is — I’m saying again — this matter here is a point that needs to be understood, and it’s also connected to the first point with which I opened. First of all, who says it’s not good? That he remain a vegetable? Yes, who says that’s not good? You’re assuming that this situation is problematic because the woman suffers, of course. Okay? But on the other hand, perhaps there is some religious value here that we understand less well that pushes… not that there aren’t ways to dissolve a marriage; there are ways to dissolve marriages and ways not to. But why only the woman? So what? True, there is asymmetry between man and woman. So I’m saying, here the whole spectrum I described today has to be applied to every such case. I can begin with this: first of all I’m not sure that moral judgment is the only thing on the field. There is also religious judgment. And it could be that religious judgment operates in ways different from ours; what seems very immoral — and it really is immoral — still might have some religious value that obligates me nevertheless to do it. It could be that it really needs to be changed. It definitely could be — that’s the point I’m getting to now. There are things that can be changed and need to be changed, and they can be changed even without a Sanhedrin and even when there is no authority; there are ways to change Jewish law, and the Sages did this throughout the generations. There is a certain reaction to the rise of Reform and the Enlightenment and all the developments of recent generations that has caused a kind of rigidity in the halakhic establishment, so that they are unwilling to make changes that in the past were made — including ones that were indeed made in the past. But that isn’t essential. In the end there are ways to make changes. So I’ll really conclude in a completely general way, because every one of these things requires a series of lectures. Every chapter of what I’ve just spoken about is a series of lectures, not one lecture. So I’m saying, bottom line: after I reach the conclusion that socially I do not identify with this, and if I come to the conclusion that this is an enactment of the Sages and not of the Torah — that’s what you asked earlier — an enactment of the Sages. An enactment of the Sages is presumably the result of the circumstances in which the Sages operated. If they were living today, I assume it would be carried out differently. There is room to consider change in such a situation. As for the Torah, that too is an important point, and with this I’ll finish. Even things that are Torah-level, not enactments of the Sages — still, almost nothing Torah-level is actually written in the Torah. The overwhelming majority of Torah-level laws are laws shaped by the Sages. There are no naked verses; a verse always goes through interpretation. And when it says, “When a man takes a woman,” it was the Sages who said that the husband must take the woman and not the woman the husband. Otherwise one could have said: the Torah spoke in terms of the normal case — that’s how things were customarily done, the husband betroths the woman, that was the custom; that doesn’t mean it’s mandatory. But the Sages turned that into binding law. And that is Torah-level, not rabbinic. But the ones who turned it into binding Torah-level law were the rabbinic interpreters. And now the question is whether that interpretation itself is not based on some cultural-social conception that existed in their time, and it may be that today the conception is different and there is room for a different interpretation. There are rules; perhaps a court is needed so that there be a court greater in wisdom and number, or not greater in wisdom and number. There are rules for how this is done, but on the principled level there is no halakhic barrier to changing even Torah-level laws. On the contrary: changing rabbinic laws is harder than changing Torah-level laws. Maimonides writes in the Laws of Rebels that in order to change a Torah-level law, any court can change the words of an earlier court. With rabbinic law, the later court must be greater in wisdom and number. Because the Sages reinforced rabbinic laws more than Torah-level laws. So Torah-level laws are easier to change than rabbinic laws — so long as the sages of today understand that today this really needs to be applied differently. Why is it not practical? Because there is no court.
[Speaker B] So what? What does that have to do with anything?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no court — so what? Then we need to establish a court and do it. You’re saying to me, it’s not happening. So I also have criticism of the fact that it’s not happening, but that’s not criticism of Jewish law; it’s criticism of those who are managing it now. Fine, in many respects I share that criticism. But I’m saying, on the principled level, when I look at Jewish law, Jewish law has a mechanism to deal with all these things. So if I sum up for a moment and apply everything to the ketubah: first, one needs to understand that there are considerations beyond moral considerations. There are religious considerations, and moral judgment is not always the bottom line. Moral judgment is only one aspect. Just as chocolate may be very tasty to eat, but it’s also unhealthy. You need to remember that. So the fact that it tastes good does not yet mean that automatically one should eat it. So first of all, one has to understand that. Second, assuming I’ve concluded that this really requires change, but I am obligated because the Sages said so, then I can adopt the rabbinic ruling but not the value structure of the Sages. Because over value structure the Sages have no authority. That’s the third level. And sometimes I can even change the ruling itself. It depends — with rabbinic law, with Torah-level law, there are rules about when and how, if the circumstances have changed, and if it is clear to me that under today’s circumstances it is not right to apply this in that way. And the Sages did this throughout the generations. There are tens and hundreds of examples of things where they changed Torah-level laws and rabbinic laws — they changed everything. Completely, without hesitation. What do I mean, without hesitation? Where they found that this is what needed to be done, not just because they felt like it. But I’m saying, there definitely are ways to do that as well. And a final point is simply to know that in judging what existed then — now I’m no longer talking about what we do, but about how we view the topics or what the topics express or bring to expression — very often one has to beware of anachronism. Even if it wasn’t okay, and it’s true that today we would perhaps do it better — assuming that we are right and it really is better, and for the sake of discussion let’s assume that — that doesn’t mean that in their time they did something problematic. You need to understand that they acted within given circumstances. If men prefer women of one sort and not another sort, then you have to make sure the women get married. You have to take care of them. You can’t change people’s taste. The men only want blondes — fine, I don’t know, okay? So now will the Sages enact that all women dye their hair blonde? Today all the feminists will come and say, what do you mean, I want to be, I don’t know, with black hair, not blonde. Why are you harming my femininity? I’m saying, that’s true, it’s a valid claim, but on the other hand, so what do you want — to remain unmarried? Today that won’t happen, no problem. But when you are in a given situation, you need to judge it accordingly.
[Speaker H] Never mind, I’m just saying,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the principled level, on the principled level, we have to be careful also in the criticism we make of what was there; we have to beware of anachronism. Anachronism means looking with our eyes today and our norms today at what existed there. And what existed there was completely different. That needs to be understood. I didn’t understand.
[Speaker I] No, I’m repeating some
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] sentence — this ruling, the Knesset too is blocked. Are you talking about today? What do we do today? What was then? What are you suggesting, that they leave the women unmarried? That there be no solution for non-virgin women? But that pertains to today. So I spoke about what we can do today. But I’m saying, regarding the way we look at what was there too, one has to understand that anachronism is a problematic way of looking. Okay, thank you very much, so what’s the problem? That’s very good. Okay, thank you very much. That’s very good. And therefore, because women today have more standing and people listen more to the problems they raise, that is perfectly fine; that is part of progress.