Mitzvot and Their Enumeration – Lesson 18

Table of Contents

• Categories of halakhic / of Jewish law sources and the place of reasoning
• “Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning” versus the demand for a scriptural source
• Continuums rather than dichotomies: the heap paradox, connection to scripture, and an unusual manner on the Sabbath
• Responsa Shevut Yaakov: strong reasoning and weak reasoning
• The topic / passage of blessings over enjoyment and the tension between Torah-level / of biblical origin and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin
• The students of Rabbeinu Yonah, the sacrifice for misuse of sanctified property, and the distinction between the content of the blessing and the sages’ formula
• Tzelach: interpretive reasoning that is Torah-level versus innovative reasoning that is not a Torah-level commandment
• Rav Nissim Gaon: obligations based on reasoning bind anyone of sound mind
• Minors, gentiles, and “stumbling and disgrace”: reasonings that apply beyond the formal boundaries of command
• Oath, writing, and Maimonides: an obligation based on reasoning versus punishment by human courts
• Essence and command, doubts, and the similarity to derivations according to Maimonides
• Reasoning based on the will of God and piety beyond the letter of the law

Summary

General Overview

The text defines the place of reasonings within the classification of the sources of Jewish law and clarifies their status in relation to Torah-level / of biblical origin and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law. It distinguishes between interpretive reasoning, which explains an existing law, and innovative reasoning, which generates a new law, and argues that there is a spectrum of strengths of reasoning, so no binary rule can be set. It raises a difficulty against Maimonides, who requires a scriptural source for Torah law, in light of Talmudic expressions such as “Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning,” which imply that reasoning can establish a law with Torah-level status, and it presents disputes and distinctions through Shevut Yaakov, Pnei Yehoshua, and Tzelach. It applies this to the topic / passage of blessings over enjoyment, building a distinction between an essential obligation that comes from reasoning and the formal template of divine name and kingship, which is a framework instituted by the sages, and it expands this to implications for gentiles, minors, oaths, and an additional model of “reasoning based on the will of God.”

Categories of halakhic / of Jewish law sources and the place of reasoning

The text divides Jewish law into layers that include a law written explicitly in the Torah, a law learned through straightforward interpretation, a law learned through derivations, a law transmitted through tradition with a supporting derivation, a law given to Moses at Sinai, and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin laws, which are enactments, decrees, safeguards, and customs whose source is the decision of the sages. It emphasizes that according to Maimonides, some things learned through derivations and some elements of tradition are defined as “the words of the sages,” whereas most approaches regard derivations and laws given to Moses at Sinai as Torah-level / of biblical origin. It presents reasoning as an additional category and distinguishes between reasoning that serves to interpret an existing law and reasoning that creates a new law, and between reasonings behind decrees and safeguards (“do not do this lest you come to a Torah prohibition”) and reasonings that establish an independent obligation. It argues that the fundamental question is whether a law with Torah-level status can exist without a source in a verse when it rests on strong innovative reasoning.

“Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning” versus the demand for a scriptural source

The text cites places in the Talmud where the Gemara says, “Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning,” such as in the case of “the burden of proof rests on the one seeking to extract money from another,” and concludes that this language assumes that reasoning can be equivalent to a scriptural source. It sets this against Maimonides’ view that Torah law requires a source in scripture and a command, and it distinguishes between “essence,” which is understood through reasoning, and “command,” which is created by a verse. It illustrates this with the example of traffic laws, where logic alone does not create legal liability without legislation, and concludes that reasoning alone has difficulty establishing “Torah law” in the sense of command and warning. It argues that binary thinking should be avoided, because there is a spectrum of connection to scripture and a spectrum of the strength of reasoning, so the question is whether there are especially strong reasonings that justify a stricter status.

Continuums rather than dichotomies: the heap paradox, connection to scripture, and an unusual manner on the Sabbath

The text uses the heap paradox to show that many concepts are not sharply divided into “yes/no” but exist on a scale, so “adding one stone” changes the status slightly even if language forces us to draw a line. It applies this to “connection to scripture” and argues that there are degrees of dependence on the biblical text that create intermediate zones between Torah-level / of biblical origin and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law. It compares this to the laws of the Sabbath involving performing an act in an unusual manner, and explains that there is a negligible deviation that does not remove the act from Torah-level liability, a medium deviation that gives it rabbinic status, and a substantial deviation that removes it even from a rabbinic prohibition. It concludes that reasoning too has gradations of force, and therefore there is no sweeping rule that reasoning is always Torah-level or always rabbinic.

Responsa Shevut Yaakov: strong reasoning and weak reasoning

The text quotes Shevut Yaakov, who rejects the rule that “whatever is based on reasoning is only rabbinic,” and states, “this is not a valid general rule.” It brings his proof from Talmudic passages where the question is asked, “Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning,” and concludes that if reasoning were only rabbinic, there would be no question about the need for a verse. It formulates a distinction between “strong reasoning” and “weak reasoning,” and determines that the status of the law depends on the strength of the reasoning rather than on a sharp classification. It presents this distinction as the key to understanding the apparent contradictions between different sources.

The topic / passage of blessings over enjoyment and the tension between Torah-level / of biblical origin and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin

The text cites the topic / passage in Tractate Berakhot 35, which states, “Rather, it is reasoning: it is forbidden for a person to benefit from this world without a blessing,” and it describes the language of the sages about misuse of sanctified property, “like holy things of Heaven,” and robbery “from the Holy One, blessed be He, and the community of Israel.” It brings Pnei Yehoshua, who asks how the decisors define blessings over enjoyment as rabbinic when the Talmud’s reasoning seems to imply a Torah-level obligation, and it mentions the practical difference of “in cases of doubt regarding blessings, one rules leniently.” It presents Pnei Yehoshua’s answer, according to which even if the obligation is Torah-level, one still cannot “be stringent” in a doubtful case because of the prohibition of an unnecessary blessing, and it goes more deeply into the terminological difficulty of “leniency” versus “do not take [the name of God] in vain.” It develops a definition of leniency as opening up options rather than necessarily requiring the easier course, and explains how the rule “in cases of doubt regarding blessings, one rules leniently” creates permission not to bless, but the principle of “do not take [the name of God] in vain” narrows the actual choice in practice.

The students of Rabbeinu Yonah, the sacrifice for misuse of sanctified property, and the distinction between the content of the blessing and the sages’ formula

The text cites the students of Rabbeinu Yonah, who connect eating without a blessing to liability for a sacrifice for misuse of sanctified property, and presents this as a difficulty if the prohibition is only rabbinic. It suggests a solution according to which the very obligation not to benefit without a blessing comes from reasoning and has essential severity, but the formal template of “divine name and kingship” is a rabbinic framework. It argues that in a doubtful case one can fulfill the essential obligation by expressing thanks or permission in ordinary language without mentioning God’s name, and in that way avoid the problem of “do not take [the name of God] in vain” while preserving concern for a possible Torah-level obligation. It compares this to Maimonides’ view on prayer, according to which the basic obligation is Torah-level while the times and formulations are rabbinic, and in a doubtful case one may recite a personal prayer.

Tzelach: interpretive reasoning that is Torah-level versus innovative reasoning that is not a Torah-level commandment

The text cites Tzelach, who accepts that reasoning is equivalent to a verse when it clarifies “one of the laws,” such as the laws of evidence and judicial procedure, and explains this as reasoning that interprets a law that already has an anchor, such as “With righteousness shall you judge your fellow.” He rejects applying this principle to the creation of a new “commandment” solely by force of reasoning, and argues that if that were so, “all the commandments that are rational would have been written for nothing.” He adds the claim that reasoning such as blessings over enjoyment applies to all human beings, and therefore if it were a Torah commandment in the formal sense there would be reason to obligate even the descendants of Noah, so he concludes that this is a rabbinic enactment based on reasoning. He sharpens the point that the question is whether reasoning has the power to create a stringent obligation without turning it into a formal commandment within the count of commandments and the mechanisms of punishment.

Rav Nissim Gaon: obligations based on reasoning bind anyone of sound mind

The text quotes Rav Nissim Gaon’s introduction to the Talmud, which states that “all the commandments that depend on reasoning and on the understanding of the heart” obligate a person and his descendants “from the day that God created man on the earth.” It presents his answer to the question of why the Torah was given to Israel if reasonings obligate everyone, and distinguishes between commandments that depend on reasoning and commandments that depend on prophetic transmission. It concludes that an obligation that arises from reasoning is not limited only to Israel but applies to anyone who understands the reasoning, and suggests that this resolves Tzelach’s claim about gentiles by showing that the essential obligation may apply to them even if the sages’ formal wording does not.

Minors, gentiles, and “stumbling and disgrace”: reasonings that apply beyond the formal boundaries of command

The text cites the Mishnah and Gemara in Sanhedrin about stoning an animal that was involved in bestiality, and the discussion whether the reason is “stumbling” or “disgrace,” and presents the conclusion of the topic / passage that in the case of a boy or girl there is “stumbling” because of intentionality, even though the Torah has pity on them. It raises a difficulty from the topic / passage in Yevamot about a non-priest who performed Temple service on the Sabbath, which depends on the bringing of two pubic hairs as a sign of maturity, and it brings in the name of later authorities (Acharonim) a distinction between prohibitions whose basis is only in scripture and prohibitions that also have a basis in reasoning. It determines that prohibitions based on command can be limited to adults because the Torah determines to whom it is addressing itself, whereas prohibitions that have a basis in reasoning bind anyone who understands the reasoning, even if he is a minor or a gentile. It adds the principle, “there is nothing forbidden to a descendant of Noah that is permitted to a Jew,” as a formal way of describing the idea that the dimension of reasoning within the human being obligates Israel as well wherever a descendant of Noah is obligated.

Oath, writing, and Maimonides: an obligation based on reasoning versus punishment by human courts

The text cites Maimonides in the laws of claims and defenses, where he states that a minor is not made to swear because “he does not know the punishment of an oath,” and interprets this as a hint to a heavenly punishment that stems from the very reasoning underlying the desecration of God’s name. It quotes the responsum of Ri Migash as brought in Avnei Nezer, according to which a written oath obligates a person to fulfill it even without verbal expression, but “one cannot impose anything on him by human courts,” and explains that the obligation to fulfill it rests on the basic reasoning of commitment toward another person or toward the Holy One, blessed be He. It presents the questions of Mishneh LaMelekh about oaths before the giving of the Torah and about the meaning of “he shall not profane his word,” and brings Avnei Nezer’s explanation that the command defines a formal framework of punishment, while the reasoning obligates fulfillment itself even without speech. It concludes that obligations based on reasoning can apply universally and at all times, whereas the punishments of a religious court and formal conditions depend on the Torah’s command.

Essence and command, doubts, and the similarity to derivations according to Maimonides

The text presents a model of two dimensions in law: the dimension of obedience to command and the dimension of the essence of benefit or harm, and argues that in doubtful cases of Torah law, the tendency to rule stringently stems mainly from concern for the essential dimension and not from concern about “rebellion” when there is no certainty about the command. It applies this to laws learned through derivations which, according to Maimonides, are “the words of the sages” but still possess essence, and therefore in cases of doubt one rules stringently, as in the example, “You shall fear the Lord your God” — including Torah scholars. It concludes that innovative reasoning can generate a strong essential obligation, and in cases of doubt one rules stringently, even if it is not a formal “commandment” in the count of commandments. It determines that interpretive reasoning explains an existing law and therefore has full Torah-level status, whereas innovative reasoning does not create command and punishment by human courts, but it still obligates, from the standpoint of essence, anyone who accepts it.

Reasoning based on the will of God and piety beyond the letter of the law

The text presents another type of reasoning in which a person does not understand the internal logic of the act but does understand that it is “the will of God,” and it calls this “reasoning of the type of the will of God.” It cites Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim, who interprets the verse in Jeremiah 19, “which I did not command, nor did I speak, nor did it arise in My heart,” according to the Aramaic translation, “which I did not command… and did not send… and it was not My will,” and concludes that there is a dimension of the will of God even without command and speech. It cites Mesilat Yesharim in the trait of piety, describing a person who loves the Creator and does not suffice with the boundaries of the well-known obligation, but learns from hints what gives pleasure to his Maker and acts beyond explicit command. It concludes by presenting “the will of God” as another type of reasoning alongside essential reasoning of “this is how it ought to be” and interpretive reasoning of “this is the meaning of the law.”

Okay, what I want to do today is talk about the topic of reasoning. Really, yes, what is the meaning of logical reasoning in the context of commandments and the counting of Torah-level commandments and rabbinic ones and so on. If we look at the division of Jewish law into categories, then basically we have, you could say, I don’t know, six or seven categories. There are laws that are written explicitly in the Torah. That is certainly Torah-level. There are laws learned from interpretation of what is written in the Torah, interpretation in the plain-sense way. That too is Torah-level. There are laws learned from homiletical derivations. Laws learned from derivations, according to most opinions, are Torah-level. According to Maimonides, as we saw in the second root, that is rabbinic, words of the Sages. Maimonides says there are also laws transmitted through tradition, but with a supporting derivation, and that too, in his view, is Torah-level. That’s already four, I think, four kinds. There are laws transmitted through tradition, sorry, laws yes, laws transmitted through tradition, a law given to Moses at Sinai. In Maimonides’ view that is words of the Sages. In most approaches that is Torah-level. That’s already five kinds. After that there are rabbinic laws, which are divided into decrees, fences, enactments, customs, and so on, but that is all enactments, rabbinic laws, and what distinguishes them from all the other categories I listed until now is that these laws are the product of a decision by the Sages, of the Sanhedrin, let’s say, or the authorized body. It does not hang on a source in the Torah, not by derivation, not by plain interpretation, it does not come by tradition from Sinai; meaning, the source is not the Holy One blessed be He, the source is the Sages themselves. So that is rabbinic law, that is the sixth source, and it divides into all kinds of shades. Also with laws given to Moses at Sinai I distinguished between a law that innovates a new rule and a law that explains an existing rule, where even Maimonides would say that is Torah-level, like the legal measures. And the last category that I want to touch on today—in fact we touched on all these categories over the course of the semester—the category I want to talk about today is reasoning, that is the seventh category. Laws that come out of reasoning. There are such laws that come out of reasoning, and the question is what their status is. On the face of it, every rabbinic law is a law that comes out of reasoning. Why did the Sages establish this law? They had some reasoning that it was proper to forbid this. So basically, a law that comes out of reasoning, on the face of it, is a rabbinic law. But that is not exact, not necessary. First, one has to distinguish between interpretive reasoning and independent reasoning. There is reasoning by means of which I interpret an existing law, just like the division I made regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai, and there is reasoning that creates a new law. Those are two different things. Beyond that, rabbinic laws are not reasonings in the sense of what is proper or improper to do, but as I said earlier, these are enactments, fences, customs, and so on. Let’s say fences and decrees are the easiest example there: fences and decrees are reasonings of a very, very particular sort, reasonings that say don’t do this, because otherwise you may end up violating a Torah prohibition. Right, so I’m basically putting up a fence; “fence,” in literal translation, is a barrier. I put a fence around the Torah-level law. It isn’t something with an independent reasoning that says this is how one ought to act. What perhaps comes closer to that, another category we talked about in the second root—in the first root, sorry—is rabbinic enactments like Hanukkah and Purim. Hanukkah and Purim are basically, basically reasonings: the Sages decided that this is the proper way to mark the events we went through, and they established some law. It is not derived from a Torah prohibition or a Torah commandment, it is not interpretation, it is not a fence, but something with independent standing. That seemed right to them. So that perhaps already comes close to the concept of reasoning I’m speaking about here, but even there it is not quite that, because there that type of decision or activity of the Sages can be anchored in the text. Right, the text basically gives the Sages—there are those who for that reason decide that Hanukkah and Purim are Torah-level, because one must mark a day on which a miracle happened for us. Now the Sages established the patterns, exactly how to do it, what to do, what not to do, but the Torah already directs them toward that determination. I am talking about reasonings that have no connection to the Torah whatsoever. It is not the Torah’s intent; the Sages suddenly decided that this is the right way to act. What is the status of reasoning of that kind? So at first glance, especially in light of what we saw in Maimonides, that for a rule to be a Torah rule it has to have a source in the text—reasoning has no textual source. Again, I am not talking about interpretive reasoning, but about innovative reasoning, reasoning that generates a law. On the other hand, the Talmud in several places asks: why do I need a verse? It is reasoning. For example: from where do we know “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” or from where do we know “the burden of proof lies on the claimant”? From where? The Talmud brings a verse, “the owner of the matter shall approach them,” and then the Talmud says: why do I need a verse? It is reasoning. “One who feels pain should go to the physician.” Right, that is the reasoning behind “the burden of proof lies on the claimant.” So if the Talmud says “why do I need a verse? It is reasoning,” then the Talmud is basically saying: why are you bringing me a verse? I could have learned this from reasoning. Now, if reasoning did not carry the same weight as what comes from a verse, there would be no room for such a question. If, say, what comes from reasoning were a rabbinic law, what are you asking me for—why do I need a verse, when I have reasoning? If it came from reasoning it would be a rabbinic law; the verse comes to say that this is a Torah-level law. So what is the difficulty? If the Talmud asks this, that means it assumes that something derived from reasoning and something derived from a verse have the same status. Or in other words, reasoning is Torah-level. Something derived from reasoning is Torah-level. And in several places in the Talmud you see this. Now that does not sit so well—sorry, today I’m a little hoarse—it does not sit so well with what we saw in Maimonides, that for something to count as Torah-level it needs a source in the Torah. Because here we are talking precisely about something that has no source in the Torah but comes out of reasoning. Without a commandment—we talked about the fact that every Torah law has a command and has an essence. Reasoning says there is some essence here, but there is no command. Because for a command you need a verse. And we already talked about the fact that essence without command cannot count as Torah-level, because you are not commanded in it, you are not warned against it. The example I gave was: if there were no law forbidding crossing on a red light, it still would not make sense to cross on a red light because it is dangerous, but no one could sue me if I crossed on a red light. It is unreasonable, but there is no prohibition. Meaning, they cannot prosecute me when the law has not established a prohibition for it. Same in Jewish law: things can be—the reasoning tells me that this really makes sense to do or not do—but as long as there is no verse in the Torah saying so, you cannot prosecute me. It has not been legislated, right, it is still not law. So therefore reasoning, on the face of it, should not be enough to establish a Torah-level rule. Now another remark: in the second root, in the discussion of the second root, I spoke about the heap paradox. Remember? I said that a dichotomous view of reality can lead us to contradictions, difficulties, paradoxes, and legal or philosophical problems, because basically you are not allowed to see reality in shades of black and white only. There are intermediate shades as well. So basically—yes, I said, let’s take one example—the heap paradox talks about a heap of stones. So I say: one gravel stone is not a heap. If I have a collection of stones that is not a heap, adding one stone will not change its status. But ten thousand stones are a heap. Now these three claims do not fit together, right? Because if one stone is not a heap, and adding one stone changes nothing, then two are not, and three are not, and four are not, and so on. So therefore, therefore, you need to understand what to do with these assumptions, and I argued that the assumption that is wrong here is that adding one gravel stone does not change the status. It changes it, but only a little. Meaning, it becomes a little more of a heap if you add one more stone. If you add another stone it becomes a little more of a heap, and so on. In our language we slice this sharply—we say this is a heap, this is not a heap—but in reality there is no real way to define sharply the concept of a heap. The concept of a heap is a concept with a range of values, say between zero and one, kind of fuzzy logic, right, vague logic, and you can speak about the degree of “heapness” of the collection. You cannot really speak about yes-heap or no-heap. And similarly for many other concepts. So we also spoke about the question of connection to the text—there I brought this up in the context of the question of connection to the text. When something is found in the text, it is Torah-level; when something is not connected to the text, it is rabbinic. But there are things connected to the text at intermediate levels. They are pretty connected to the text, a little connected to the text, very connected to the text, but they are not written. There is a continuum of levels of connection to the text, and I said that there there is room to hesitate: is it Torah-level or rabbinic, and where is the line? That we discussed there. Now I want to return to that same issue and say something similar: my claim is that reasonings too come in all kinds of types—or all kinds of levels, not types. When we ask whether reasoning is Torah-level or rabbinic, we need to know that there are several levels of reasoning. There is reasoning where it is completely clear that this is what must be done; it is essential, fundamental, totally clear. There are situations where logic says that this is what should be done, but not one hundred percent certain—more logic, less logic. Again, you can place it between zero and one, the degree of force of that reasoning, how strong the reasoning is. And when I speak about Torah-level reasoning, then maybe I will find places where the reasoning is reasoning, something comes out of reasoning, and nevertheless it is not Torah-level. Maybe it is not Torah-level not because generally reasoning is not Torah-level, but because there the reasoning was not strong enough. When the reasonings are not strong enough, then they are not Torah-level. We are not really asking whether every single thing that comes out of reasoning is Torah-level. Obviously not. The question is whether there can be something derived from reasoning that is Torah-level. Meaning, if the reasoning is strong reasoning and something follows from it, can that be Torah-level even though there is no verse? I don’t know—define it however you want. If to your mind it is strong, it is strong; if not, then not. It is in the eye of the beholder, obviously. Everything is in the eye of the beholder. There is no need to issue a legal ruling on anything. If in your eyes it is so, then you have to act that way; that will not obligate me if I disagree with you. What the Sanhedrin determines obligates everyone, but that is only a question of authority, of power. On the principled level, each person is supposed to act according to his own reasoning. So when we talk about reasoning, we are not asking whether every reasoning is Torah-level. We are asking whether there is reasoning that is Torah-level, meaning whether there can be a Torah law that has no source in a verse. That is really the question. Like I spoke a bit about validating derivations and creating derivations—I said: obviously not every derivation creates. The debate is whether there are any creating derivations, not whether all derivations are creating. Maybe another example: there is a rule in the laws of the Sabbath that if you do something in an unusual way, then it is prohibited only rabbinically, not Torah-level. Now you understand by yourselves that there are different levels of unusualness. Right, what is unusualness? There can be a dramatic change that no longer resembles the original at all; there can be less of a change; there can be a very slight change. There are many levels of change. In principle, a chair too is a modified table, right, but it is a very modified one. Or a dove is a modified table, but that is very modified, very far. Okay, a dove also has legs, two, fine. So can you call that a modified table? No. Why not? Because it is too far. But for example, here too, a table with two legs instead of four legs, unlike other tables that have four legs—so yes table or no table? The assumption is yes; it is similar enough to count as a table. Meaning, levels of similarity or levels of difference—there too we have a continuum of levels. And therefore later authorities often say: wait, if you did it in an unusual way, then how can someone permit something because it was done in an unusual way? If it was unusual, then it is prohibited rabbinically, not permitted. And the answer is no: if it is a very substantial change and it no longer resembles the original at all, then it will not be a rabbinic prohibition; it will be permitted. Meaning, the concept of unusualness too is a concept with a continuum of possible levels. More than that: there are changes so slight that they are not significant at all, and it will remain a Torah prohibition. In the end, if you did it, you did it while, I don’t know, bending your knees a little. You selected while slightly bending your knees in the process, right, you were also sort of swaying while doing that selecting. So what does that mean? Now it is only a rabbinic prohibition because you did it in an unusual way? No. The selecting was more or less normal, so now you bent your knees a tiny bit—so what? That is an insignificant change. Therefore, when we talk about concepts like similar, different, connected to the text, reasoning—concepts like these—we have to be very careful not to treat them in a binary way, in a black-and-white way. Either it is similar or not similar, either it is unusual or not unusual, either it is connected to the text or not connected to the text, either there is reasoning for it or there is not. No. There are different levels, and one has to know which level we are dealing with. I’ll bring you maybe one source that speaks about this, from the responsa Shevut Yaakov. He speaks there exactly about this question: is reasoning a Torah-level law, or is reasoning a rabbinic law? So he says: “Also what follows, according to the words of your honored Torah, that what is based on reasoning is only rabbinic—this rule does not seem right to me for several reasons.” You say that something derived from reasoning is rabbinic? That doesn’t seem right to me, says the Shevut Yaakov. “And what you brought in defense of your words from the Talmud in Pesachim 68b, under the words ‘all agree’—this is not a rule that can be generalized, because if so there would be difficulty from several sugyot in the Talmud, where it asks, ‘Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning,’ in this manner Tosafot asks in Shevuot 22. And if your honor were right, there would be no difficulty at all, for by reasoning it is only rabbinic.” What is he saying? Someone brought some proof from the Talmud in Pesachim that reasoning is only rabbinic. So the Shevut Yaakov says: that cannot be an absolute rule—“not a rule that can be generalized.” It cannot be some rule that is always true. Why? Because the Talmud in several places asks: why do I need a verse? It is reasoning. And we spoke about this earlier: if the Talmud asks this, it apparently assumes that something that comes from reasoning has the same status as something written in a verse, and therefore the verse is unnecessary if there is reasoning. So that means that something derived from reasoning is Torah-level, not rabbinic. So maybe there are some reasonings that are Torah-level and some reasonings that are rabbinic, but you cannot lay down an absolute rule here—that is what he says. “Also according to Tosafot’s answer it is proven that not all reasonings are equal, for there is strong reasoning and weak reasoning.” Yes, there is strong reasoning and weak reasoning. “And similarly, that case in Pesachim, where there is also reasoning in the opposite direction, that it is the day of the giving of the Torah, and the verse too supports it, as it is written ‘a solemn assembly for the Lord your God’”—never mind, that is already the sugya in Pesachim. In short, what he is saying here is that one must be careful not to turn this into an absolute rule. It depends on the strength of the reasoning. If it is strong reasoning, then it will be Torah-level; if it is weak reasoning, then it will be rabbinic. But it is not that one establishes some blanket rule that all reasonings have some Torah-level or rabbinic status. Okay, so up to here this was just a general introduction. Let’s see one sugya as an example. The Talmud in Berakhot 35 discusses where we know from that one must bless over food before eating it. Grace after meals—“and you shall eat and be satisfied and bless”—that is a blessing after eating; if you eat an olive-sized amount, an egg-sized amount, bread—that is, enough for satiety—then there is a Torah-level obligation to bless: “and you shall eat and be satisfied and bless.” Where do we know blessings of enjoyment, that one must bless before eating? So the Talmud there raises several possibilities and rejects them, and the conclusion of the Talmud is—look here: “Rather, it is reasoning: it is forbidden for a person to benefit from this world without a blessing.” There is a reasoning: if you did not bless, you are forbidden to benefit from this world. Some kind of asking permission from the Holy One blessed be He, or something like that. He created the world; to benefit from the world, you need to bless. “The Sages taught: It is forbidden for a person to benefit from this world without a blessing… and anyone who benefits from this world without a blessing has committed misuse of sacred property.” Right, one who ate without blessing has committed misuse. “What is his remedy? Let him go to a Sage.” Right, the fix is that he should go to a Sage. “Let him go to a Sage”—what will the Sage do with this? What help is the Sage? He already committed a prohibition. “Rather,” said Rava, “he should go to a Sage from the outset and the Sage will teach him blessings so that he not come to misuse of sacred property.” Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: “Anyone who benefits from this world without a blessing is as if he benefited from consecrated things of Heaven, as it says, ‘The earth and its fullness are the Lord’s.’” Rabbi Levi raised a contradiction: it is written, “The earth and its fullness are the Lord’s,” and it is written, “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but the earth He gave to human beings.” No difficulty: here before a blessing, there after a blessing. Fine. This whole discussion is basically the reasoning that it is forbidden to benefit from this world without a blessing, and if you do, that is misuse. Rabbi Hanina bar Pappa said: “Anyone who benefits from this world without a blessing is as though he robs the Holy One blessed be He and the Jewish people, as it says, ‘One who robs his father and mother and says there is no transgression is a companion of a destructive man.’ And ‘his father’ means none other than the Holy One blessed be He, as it says, ‘Is He not your Father who acquired you?’ And ‘his mother’ means none other than the Jewish people, as it says, ‘Hear, my son, your father’s instruction, and do not forsake your mother’s teaching.’ What is meant by ‘a companion of a destructive man’? Rabbi Hanina bar Pappa said: a companion to Jeroboam son of Nebat, who corrupted Israel with respect to their Father in Heaven.” In short, all these sources basically say: it is forbidden to benefit from this world without a blessing. And that is the source for the requirement to bless. So it comes out that the source is reasoning. It says: “it is reasoning, that it is forbidden to benefit without a blessing.” The Pnei Yehoshua asks: “Rather, it is reasoning—it is forbidden for a person” etc.—“from the language of all the halakhic authorities it seems that according to this conclusion here, every blessing of enjoyment is only rabbinic, apart from grace after meals alone.” Yes, the Pnei Yehoshua says the authorities write—and this is supposed to fit the conclusion of the sugya—that blessings of enjoyment are rabbinic. Only grace after meals is Torah-level. Blessings of enjoyment are rabbinic. Again, blessing on Torah study is disputed whether it is Torah-level or not, same kind of sugya. “And according to Rashba, the blessing after the seven species is also Torah-level, and regarding the rest of the blessings he agrees. And in my humble opinion one should wonder, for throughout the Talmud it seems that anything that comes from reasoning is Torah-level.” Yes, throughout the Talmud we see that if something comes from reasoning, then it has the status of Torah-level. So why are blessings of enjoyment—where here the Talmud says this is reasoning—why do they have rabbinic status? “On the contrary, the Talmud asks, ‘Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning.’” And in truth, from the language of Tosafot there is no proof, because maybe what they wrote—that the verse cited above—is only a scriptural support, and maybe they intended this very point itself, that since it is reasoning, there is no need for a verse. Tosafot there in Berakhot says they brought a verse, and that verse is only a support text. The Pnei Yehoshua says that proves nothing—how is it only a support, but still it comes from reasoning and therefore it is Torah-level? In short, he asks: why are blessings of enjoyment considered rabbinic law? How do we know they are considered rabbinic law? Blessings of enjoyment—when in doubt about blessings we rule leniently, right? Why do we rule leniently in doubtful blessings? Because the obligation to bless is rabbinic; and in a rabbinic doubt we rule leniently. Okay. Now he says this: “However, it seems to me that even if you would say that this reasoning is also Torah-level, even so it still works out well that we hold that in doubtful blessings we rule leniently, because stringency is not applicable, for since it is forbidden to recite an unnecessary blessing, therefore this reasoning automatically falls away.” What is he saying? It may really be that blessings of enjoyment are Torah-level, and still in doubt we rule leniently. Why? Even if it is Torah-level, still the doubt will be ruled leniently. Why? “Because stringency is not applicable, for since it is forbidden to recite an unnecessary blessing, therefore this reasoning automatically falls away.” With blessings of enjoyment it is always a question—yes, you know, these concepts of leniency and stringency, we are all sure we understand them very well, but the truth is we do not understand them. Why does “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently” mean not to bless? Why doesn’t “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently” mean yes, bless? If you want, bless; I’m being lenient with you. “Do not take the name of the Lord in vain.” So why is that called lenient? You’re explaining the law to me; I’m asking about the terminology. Why is that ruling called lenient? On the contrary, call it stringent: do not utter the Divine Name in vain. You are forbidden to bless. Why is that called “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently”? Lenient on the person—what does that mean? As if he is exempt from the commandment. Meaning, anything that is more pleasant for me, that makes it easier on me—that is called lenient. Some kind of stance like that: we stand opposite Jewish law, and the less Jewish law bothers us, that is called lenient. And what if someone enjoys blessing? Then maybe we can be lenient with him and let him bless. And if someone enjoys fasting two days? A bit much, no? The Rebbe of Sanz once said that he sat in the sukkah even when it rained—the previous Rebbe, from Klausenburg. He sat in the sukkah even when it rained because he said he was distressed to leave the sukkah on Sukkot. One who is distressed is exempt from the sukkah, and therefore one leaves when it rains, but he said: no, I’m distressed to be outside the sukkah on Sukkot. And therefore he sat there when it rained. So what is he, basically? A pathological case. In practice, what we really want is to escape Jewish law as much as possible, and so lenient means whatever is more comfortable and pleasant for us. Okay, that is called lenient. According to this, it should have been that he is permitted to bless, not that he has to refrain from blessing. Right? If they tell us he must not bless, that doesn’t sound lenient. If they tell us you may refrain from blessing, if you want don’t bless—that is called lenient. You know, in the tales of the Enlightenment people, at the end of Agadat Brisk—Garlitz, right, there are two volumes of Agadat Brisk—so at the end he brings all kinds of stories. In one of the stories, the Beit HaLevi arrives in Minsk, and some wealthy fellow from the town comes to him and says: why are you rabbis always so strict? Why don’t you be a bit lenient, make the Torah more accessible, make the public love it, and so on. So the Beit HaLevi says to him: I’ll reveal a secret to you. The truth is that I’m a great lenient authority. I have many very well-known and famous leniencies, and you’re absolutely right. Come, I’ll give you a few examples. There are those who are strict and say that if you are in doubt, you may not fast two days on Yom Kippur. I am lenient—meaning, if you want, you may fast two days. Okay? Or there are those who are strict and say that if midnight has passed you can no longer recite the Shema—the dispute at the beginning of Berakhot. I am lenient: you can also pray the evening prayer after midnight. There are those who are strict and say that if you missed one day of the counting of the Omer, then you can no longer bless on the following days. I am lenient—and in fact this is well known as the Beit HaLevi’s position—he says to continue counting with a blessing. And so on. Now why are these called “tales of the Enlightenment,” things meant to make us smirk? Aren’t those leniencies? He permits things that someone else prohibits. Someone else prohibits fasting two days, and he permits fasting two days. So why is that not a leniency? The feeling is that it is not a leniency because of what you said earlier, Ariel—what Ariel said earlier, what was that? He is basically making things harder for us, not easier, right? When he tells us to fast two days, is that lenient? Fasting two days is stringent. So the feeling is that he is making fun of that Enlightenment fellow, but these are not really leniencies. But that is not correct—they are completely leniencies. The point is this. Let me maybe tell you what the definition of leniency is. The definition of leniency, what Ariel suggested earlier, is something easier, less harassment from Jewish law. That is called leniency. I say: not true. Leniency means opening up more possible options. That is called leniency. Between two halakhic decisors—wait one second—if there are two decisors, one of them says: look, you have three possible paths you can take in the case you are asking about, and the other says: no, you have four possible paths, then the second one is the more lenient. It makes no difference at all that this fourth path may perhaps be very burdensome for me, like fasting three days for Yom Kippur if I’m in doubt. As long as you opened one more option compared to the other decisor, you are the lenient decisor. A lenient ruling means opening more options. That is leniency. It just happens that many times, when the different options are open to me, I will choose what is easier for me. Because after all, it is permitted for me to do this and permitted for me to do that, so I will choose what is easier for me—that is already my choice. From the point of view of the decisor, the leniency is that I am allowed to choose that path, not that I have to choose that path. In other words, he opened that path for me too. Okay? That is called a lenient ruling. In other words, a lenient ruling is the opening of more options. Exactly. So now I come to “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently.” “In doubtful blessings we rule leniently” means that you are permitted not to bless. You can bless and you can refrain from blessing. That is “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently.” But after you can bless and you can refrain from blessing, there is another law besides the laws of blessings: the law of an unnecessary blessing. You are uttering the Divine Name in vain. Therefore, if you have the option not to bless, then do not bless. So in the final analysis, the bottom line is that you are forbidden to bless—not that you are permitted not to bless, but that you are forbidden to bless. Why is that considered lenient? It really isn’t lenient, it is stringent. A stringency built on a leniency. The leniency is in the laws of blessings. In the laws of blessings, you can bless and you can refrain from blessing. On top of that there is a stringency in the laws of “do not take the Name.” Once both options are open, you are not compelled to bless, then they tell you: fine, then don’t bless, because of taking the Name in vain. So many times we encounter rulings that sound to us like stringent rulings and yet are defined under leniency. And the answer is that we are looking at a complex ruling with more than one aspect. And when we speak about the leniency we are talking about a certain aspect. In that aspect we rule leniently. There is no obligation to bless; that is a lenient ruling. When one says there is no obligation, that is by definition a lenient ruling. It makes no difference what you prefer, whether you like blessing or not. If you have both options, then that is a more lenient ruling than a ruling that says you have only one option. But after, in the laws of blessings, you have both options, in the laws of “do not take the Name” they tell you: yes, but in that case, don’t bless. That is already stringency, not leniency. Okay? The same, by the way, with the Beit HaLevi’s examples. When the Beit HaLevi says that it is permitted to fast two days on Yom Kippur, that really is a leniency. A leniency in what? Not—the laws of Yom Kippur, that is stringency. It is a leniency in the laws of saving life. Those who say you may not fast two days on Yom Kippur say so because of danger to life. Don’t fast two days, because you endanger your life. The Beit HaLevi says: I am lenient in the laws of saving life; it is permitted to fast two days. The problem is that once there is no danger to life and you have doubt as to the day, you do not know which is the real Yom Kippur, then you have to fast two days, because with a Torah-level doubt we rule stringently. That is a stringent ruling, that you have to fast two days. But the fact that it is permitted to fast two days, in the laws of saving life—that is a lenient ruling. It is exactly the same structure as in the laws of blessings. Once there is a lenient ruling in the laws of Yom Kippur saying you can fast two days—in the laws of saving life, you can fast two days and you can refrain from fasting two days—then come the laws of Yom Kippur and laws of doubt and say: fine, if you can fast two days, then fast two days. Or if you can pray after midnight, pray the evening prayer after midnight—then why is that a leniency? Because you can pray. It’s just that if you can pray and you didn’t pray earlier, then in the laws of prayer they tell you: fine, then pray. So that is stringent, not lenient. Okay? So there is a leniency on which a stringency gets layered. Once the leniency opens more options, another principle can come and say: fine, if from the point of view of the laws of blessings the options are open, then from the point of view of “do not take the Name” I tell you to choose this option and not that one. But that is not the laws of blessings; that is the laws of “do not take the Name.” Therefore, when they say “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently,” it means you are permitted not to bless. That is the rule of “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently”: you may refrain from blessing. You may also bless, you may refrain from blessing; it is just that when you may refrain from blessing, then in the laws of “do not take the Name” they tell you: fine, then don’t bless. But that is no longer connected to “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently.” There is a Talmud passage—Berakhot 54, I think—the Talmud there discusses the thanksgiving blessing, the blessing of gratitude. And there is a dispute there whether you need to say the thanksgiving blessing before ten people, with two Torah scholars among them, or twelve, with two Torah scholars among them—in other words the two Torah scholars in addition to the quorum of ten. That is a dispute in the Talmud. Now among the authorities there there is a terminological tangle. There are authorities—Rosh and Tosafot there and so on. Tosafot says that we are lenient and therefore we recite it also before ten, with the two Torah scholars among them, because we rule leniently. So the Tzelach asks him—sorry, the Tzelach asks: what is this called, ruling leniently? “In doubtful blessings we rule leniently” means not to bless, not yes to bless. You are telling me that with ten including the two Torah scholars—there is a dispute whether to bless or not—and you rule leniently, meaning to bless. Lenient means not to bless. Right now I’m not getting into why Tosafot really rules there to bless; I’m only asking why he calls that a lenient ruling. It does not fit the rule of “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently.” And the answer is: it really is a lenient ruling, because he allows blessing even with ten and not only with twelve. The question why there is no taking the Name in vain here, if you can bless and you can refrain from blessing—that can be discussed separately. But why is it called lenient? Because of that. Okay, so in short, what the Pnei Yehoshua says here is that blessings really are Torah-level, and in a Torah doubt we should be stringent and ought to bless. But because we are in doubt and there is the prohibition of taking the Name in vain, therefore we rule that he should not bless. Okay? Therefore he says “stringency is not applicable” in such a case, because stringency here brings you to the prohibition of taking the Name in vain. Therefore one does not bless in doubtful blessings, even though the obligation to bless is Torah-level because reasoning is Torah-level. That is what the Pnei Yehoshua proposes. Why is it called “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently”? Why is it called that according to him? It is not lenient; it is not blessing. Not blessing is stringent. The terminology is hard according to him. Right? Because what is “in doubtful blessings we rule leniently” according to him? It is all stringency. More than that, his position is also unclear because here we basically have a positive command overriding a prohibition. There is the positive commandment to bless, and the prohibition not to take the Divine Name. Now we have a whole discussion about this; in Sdei Chemed there are several sections on it. What happens when we are in doubt? We have a doubtful positive command against a doubtful prohibition. From the standpoint of the doubtful positive command I should be stringent and bless; from the standpoint of the doubtful prohibition I should be stringent and not bless. What happens when there is a doubtful positive command against a doubtful prohibition? Does a doubtful positive command override a doubtful prohibition or not? There are opinions that it does. According to those opinions, again, one cannot understand what is written here. Because if that were so, I would have to bless, and it would override the doubtful prohibition of taking the Divine Name in vain. In short, I want to make a different claim. I want to say—maybe before that, look. In the students of Rabbeinu Yonah on the Rif there, he writes as follows: “What is his remedy? Rava said: let him go from the outset to a Sage expert in blessings. Meaning, one who does not know the blessings—how can he eat at all? For if he eats, he is liable for a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property every single time. And we answer: let him go to one who is expert and he will teach him the blessings for each and every thing. And similarly, even if he knows only the blessing ‘that all came to be by His word,’ he has fulfilled it and escaped misuse, for we learned that for all of them, if he said ‘that all came to be by His word,’ he fulfilled. Rather, he needs to learn so that he bless the appropriate blessing for each and every thing.” Here there is a comment. What he says here is that if someone eats without a blessing, he is liable for a misuse offering. He has to bring a sacrifice. How can that be? What prohibition did he violate when he ate without blessing? A rabbinic prohibition? So how do you bring a sacrifice to the Temple for a rabbinic prohibition? That is unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard. How can you bring a misuse offering for a rabbinic prohibition? So what the students of Rabbeinu Yonah say here is not clear. That is seemingly a proof that the Pnei Yehoshua is right, and eating without a blessing is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition. Because it comes out of reasoning, as we saw in the sugya. So we are left with the question: then why do we rule leniently in doubtful blessings? And the Pnei Yehoshua’s answer does not work. So I want to claim the following. What does the reasoning actually say? The reasoning basically says that it is forbidden to benefit from this world without a blessing. To solve the Torah-level problem, I do not need to bless with the Divine Name and Kingship, in the special formula of blessings established by the Sages, right? It is enough to say, “Thank you very much, Holy One blessed be He, for this apple,” and eat the apple. Or, “With Your permission I am eating the apple.” Okay? Right? You do not need “Blessed are You, Lord our God, King of the universe,” Divine Name and Kingship and so on, in the regular formula of the blessing. For the Torah-level reasoning, that is enough. Therefore, if I am really in doubt—say I’m about to eat an apple and I’m in doubt whether I already blessed, I don’t remember, maybe I did—what do I do in that case? I want to argue that what I should do in that case is say, “Thank You very much, Holy One blessed be He, for the apple,” before I eat it. Because a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently, and there is a Torah-level obligation to bless based on reasoning. But what about taking the Name in vain? No problem—I did not mention the Divine Name. Mentioning the Divine Name is certainly rabbinic law; that is the formula the Sages established for how to bless. But the very obligation to bless comes out of reasoning; that is Torah-level. Yet to bless on the Torah plane, I do not need the formula established by the Sages. So if so, the solution is very simple according to this, and that is probably what the students of Rabbeinu Yonah and the Pnei Yehoshua and others hold—or what emerges from their position, I don’t know if they explicitly hold this—that the obligation to bless really is Torah-level; it comes out of reasoning, and therefore when in doubt we are stringent. So if you are in doubt, you should bless—I’m talking about blessings of enjoyment, not every blessing. But there is a problem of taking the Name in vain. You are in doubt, so what do you do? You bless in your own language. That is what should be done. Then there is no problem of taking the Name in vain, but I still fulfill the Torah-level obligation of blessing. I did not eat without a blessing. Okay? So then really everything works out. And accordingly, one who did not bless—not according to the formula established by the Sages, but one who did not bless at all, even in ordinary language—has to bring a misuse offering because he violated a Torah prohibition. That is what the students of Rabbeinu Yonah are saying. Something like this exists in—you know there is a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides regarding the commandment of prayer. Maimonides, in the Book of Commandments, counts “to serve Him” as prayer—“what is service of the heart? This is prayer”—and therefore from his perspective prayer is a Torah commandment. But it is obvious that the formulations, the times, and all the rules of the laws of prayer are not Torah-level; they are rabbinic. According to Nachmanides, prayer is entirely rabbinic, but according to Maimonides the formula is rabbinic, while the obligation itself is Torah-level. Therefore, for example, in a doubt regarding prayer, according to Maimonides one has to pray, because in a doubt we are stringent. But not in the formula established by the Sages, with the Divine Name and all those things, because that part is a rabbinic doubt. Say some personal prayer of your own. Okay? Exactly like what I am saying here about blessings of enjoyment. So what comes out here? That if we have something based on reasoning, like blessings of enjoyment, then it has the status of Torah-level, and in doubt we really should be stringent. Were it not for the prohibition of taking the Name, I would literally have to bless; because of taking the Name, I bless in my own words, not in the formula established by the Sages. But the Tzelach—that is the Noda B’Yehuda on the Talmud, Tziyun LeNefesh Chayah—writes as follows: “As for what the gaon, author of Pnei Yehoshua, wrote—that since the conclusion is that it is reasoning, then automatically it is from the Torah, for we do find that they said, ‘Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning’—it follows that reasoning works like a verse, we see that reasoning works like a verse. I say that this applies only to a legal rule among the rules, as in Ketubot, from where do we know ‘the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,’ or in Bava Kamma, from where do we know ‘the burden of proof lies on the claimant,’ where in these places the Talmud asks, ‘Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning.’ But to say regarding something that is reasoning, that it counts as a Torah commandment—we have not heard that. And if that were so, all the rational commandments were written for nothing. Moreover, this reasoning that it is forbidden to benefit from this world without a blessing—this reasoning applies to all human beings, not only Jews. If so, would blessings of enjoyment also be obligatory on gentiles? How astonishing! Rather, certainly the intent is that since it is reasoning, therefore the Sages enacted blessings of enjoyment. And this is true for all the other fruit blessings; but regarding bread, there is room to discuss whether this is a full a fortiori inference, and then perhaps it would be Torah-level or not”—there is an a fortiori argument that if one blesses after it, one should also bless before it. What does he mean, what is the difference between “a legal rule among the rules” and “a commandment” or our case of blessings of enjoyment? “A legal rule among the rules”—the examples he brings are “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” and “the burden of proof lies on the claimant.” These are the two examples where the Talmud itself asks “why do I need a verse? It is reasoning.” In both these cases, the reasoning does not create a new rule, but interprets an existing rule. For example, it is written, “judge your fellow with righteousness.” It is written in the Torah. And what does it mean to judge with righteousness? There are rules of procedure, rules of evidence, principles for how to judge righteously, right? “The burden of proof lies on the claimant”—that is part of legal procedure. “The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” is part of the laws of evidence. So these reasonings of “the mouth that prohibited” and “the burden of proof” are reasonings that explain what “judge your fellow with righteousness” means. They do not create some new rule but explain an existing rule: how one carries out “judge your fellow with righteousness.” In such a case, says the Tzelach, of course something derived from reasoning is Torah-level. It is reasoning that interprets a law that has a source in the text, so it is Torah-level. But when the reasoning creates a new law, a new commandment, like blessings of enjoyment—blessing before I eat—that does not interpret an existing law, it generates a new law. There, reasoning is not Torah-level. If there is no verse, it cannot be Torah-level. Okay? That is basically the distinction he makes. So he brings that all the authorities say it is rabbinic and so on; obviously it is rabbinic. What would the Pnei Yehoshua say to this? The Pnei Yehoshua basically argues that blessings of enjoyment—blessing before eating—come out of reasoning and therefore are Torah-level. What does “therefore Torah-level” mean? It does not necessarily mean that if he were writing a count of commandments there would be another commandment to bless before eating. Rather, the status of the blessing is like a Torah law—for example, that in doubt it should be treated stringently. As I said earlier, without Divine Name and Kingship but blessing in our own language, one should go stringently. What is the idea behind this? I remind you that we saw that a law derived from a homiletical derivation, according to Maimonides, is treated stringently in doubt, even though it is not Torah law. It is words of the Sages. Why? I remind you that I said there—I made a distinction there—that in every commandment or prohibition there are two aspects. One aspect is obedience or rebellion against the command, and the second aspect is the essence, the benefit or damage in the act itself. Okay? Where one of these aspects is missing, it is not Torah law—for example, one does not receive lashes for it. But still it makes a difference which of the two aspects is missing. If what is missing is the command but the essence exists, then the doubt will be treated stringently even though it is not Torah law. Because at the end of the day there is concern that maybe you are causing the damage. That is the reason one goes stringently. In contrast, if there is a command but no essence—which I said is a law given to Moses at Sinai—then in that case the doubt is treated leniently. Because doubtful rebellion against a doubtful command is not rebellion. We talked about that then. In other words, in Torah law a doubt is treated stringently not because it is Torah-level. Suppose I have a piece of meat and I do not know whether it is pork or not. So out of doubt you should be stringent. Why be stringent? Because maybe I will violate the prohibition of pork? No. Because perhaps the damage of someone eating pork will occur here. As far as the command not to eat pork is concerned, if I am in doubt, that is not called that I rebelled against the command, because I am not sure there is a command here at all. That is not rebellion. Doubtful rebellion is not rebellion. But there is still concern that in practice you will eat pork. Therefore you have to be careful. Meaning, “a Torah doubt is treated stringently” is because of the essential dimension, not because of the command dimension. But if it is because of the essential dimension, then even with rabbinic laws, as long as they have an essential dimension, the doubt should be treated stringently. And that is what I said in Maimonides regarding laws derived from derivations, which are rabbinic laws but have an essence, such as “the Lord your God shall you fear”—to include Torah scholars. What does that mean? That the essence of fear of God is also present in fear of Torah scholars. The essence exists, but there is no command, because a derivation is not considered a command according to him. The same applies to a law derived from reasoning. A law derived from reasoning—the Pnei Yehoshua will say—what does the reasoning actually say? The reasoning says that this is the proper or improper way to act. One cannot eat from this world without a blessing. What does that mean? It means exactly that although there is no command, the reasoning says there is essence here. If you eat without a blessing, you did something problematic, even though there is no command. Well then, if the act is intrinsically problematic, independent of command, then its doubt should be treated stringently. Therefore, says the Pnei Yehoshua, in doubtful blessings one should be stringent. That does not mean he would count it in the tally of commandments. In the count of commandments one includes only something that also has a command, and blessings do not have a command. We have only reasoning. But the fact that there is reasoning means that essentially there is something problematic here in itself, not just a failure to obey a command. And since that is so, its doubt goes stringently. That is what the Pnei Yehoshua would answer. Or in other words, he says something very similar to the Tzelach. He too does not mean that it is literally Torah-level; he only means that its doubt is treated stringently like Torah law. But of course because he adds this point, we will be stringent only with a blessing in our own language, not with the formula established by the Sages. He also asked there, the Tzelach, as we saw earlier: what about gentiles? Are gentiles also required to bless? On the face of it, if it comes out of reasoning, then gentiles also need to bless. What difference is there between a Jew and a gentile? So actually, look here—I photographed a section from the introduction of Rav Nissim Gaon to the Talmud. It is printed at the beginning of tractate Berakhot. “And if the questioner should answer and say: since you say that everyone whose mind is complete is obligated in the commandments, why did the Holy One blessed be He single out Israel to give them the Torah and burden them with its commandments, they alone and no other nation besides them? Surely all are equal regarding obligation in the commandments. And furthermore one may ask: how can they be punished for something they were not obligated in and was not given to them? Surely they can answer: had we been commanded we would have done it, and had we been warned we would have been careful and accepted it just as they accepted it,” just as the people of Israel accepted. “And we answer these claims and say that all commandments that depend on reason and the understanding of the heart, everyone was already obligated in them from the day God created man upon the earth, he and his descendants after him throughout all generations. And the commandments that are known by tradition from the words of the prophets, our God did not refrain from obligating the ancients in whatever in His wisdom it was fitting to obligate them in,” and so on. He starts getting into commandments. What does he say? If there are commandments one can arrive at by reasoning, then obviously everyone is obligated in them—anyone who understands the reasoning. Here there are no divisions of men, women, minors, adults, gentiles, Jews. Whoever understands the reasoning—if the obligation is an obligation of reasoning, then everyone who understands the reasoning is obligated in it. And there too he writes—the Talmud says there are seven Noahide commandments. And when we count, we find almost thirty. Why are they called seven commandments? So Rav Nissim Gaon says there that because things whose basis is reasoning—gentiles are obligated in them even though they were not commanded. They were commanded only in the seven commandments. But if there are additional obligations whose basis is reasoning, then they are obligated in them even without being commanded. The seven commandments are the seven things concerning which they were commanded. But that is not all the things in which they are obligated. Two different things. Things that come out of reasoning obligate them even if they were not commanded. According to this, the Pnei Yehoshua would say to the Tzelach: same here. Right, gentiles too have to bless before they eat. Not to bless with Divine Name and Kingship according to the formula established by the Sages—that is rabbinic law and applies only to Jews. But the law that comes from reasoning, that it is forbidden to benefit from this world without a blessing, and one who benefits is as though he committed misuse—that applies among gentiles too. Obviously. They too need to bless. By the way, in other religions too it is accepted—they bless. In another language, in their own language, they bless. Anyone who believes in God understands that he should bless before he eats. That is exactly what the Pnei Yehoshua would answer the Tzelach. Of course not in the formula of the Sages, Divine Name and Kingship—they do not need that. That is rabbinic law. Rabbinic law obligates only Jews. But something that comes from reasoning obligates everyone. I want to show you—come, see an implication. In the Mishnah in Sanhedrin, sorry, it says as follows: “One who has intercourse with a male or with an animal, and a woman who brings an animal upon herself—they are stoned.” If a person sinned, what sin did the animal commit? They stone the animal too. What sin did the animal commit? “Rather, because a stumbling block came to the person through it, therefore Scripture said it shall be stoned.” Yes, through it a transgression came to the person, a stumbling block, and therefore it shall be stoned. “Another explanation: so that an animal should not pass through the market and people say: this is the one because of which so-and-so was stoned.” This is what the Talmud there later calls “stumbling block and disgrace.” There are two reasons why they kill the animal: because of the stumbling block it caused for people, and because of the disgrace, that if it passes through the market people will say, “Oh, that’s the animal with which so-and-so had intercourse,” or something like that. That is the question of disgrace. The Talmud there discusses what happens with an animal that was used by a minor boy or a minor girl. Rav Yosef said: “Come and hear: a girl of three years and one day old…” and so on, “and if one of all the forbidden relations mentioned in the Torah has intercourse with her, they are put to death on her account, and she is exempt.” “One of all the forbidden relations”—even an animal. “And here there is disgrace, but there is no stumbling block, and yet it teaches that they are put to death on her account.” What does that mean? We have the question whether they kill the animal because of the stumbling block or because of disgrace. Now if it is a minor girl, then there is no stumbling block. It is not a transgression. A minor girl is not obligated in the commandments, so there is no transgression. There is disgrace, but no transgression. So if they kill the animal even when a minor girl had relations with it, that proves the issue is disgrace, not stumbling block. So that is a difficulty for the one who says they kill it because of the stumbling block. The Talmud says: “Since she acted intentionally, there is also a stumbling block, but the Merciful One had pity on her. On her He had pity; on the animal He did not have pity.” What does the Talmud say? Because this minor girl acted intentionally, therefore there is really a transgression here. “Stumbling block” means transgression, so there is a transgression even with a minor girl; it is just that the Torah had pity on her and therefore does not punish her. The animal gets no pity; the girl does. Likewise for a minor boy. Rava said: “Come and hear: a boy of nine years and one day disqualifies an animal from the altar and it is stoned on his account. And if he has intercourse with one of all the forbidden relations, they are put to death on his account. And here too there is disgrace, but no stumbling block”—same thing: earlier it was a minor girl, now it is a minor boy—“and yet it teaches that it is stoned on his account.” “Since he acted intentionally, there is also a stumbling block, but the Merciful One had pity on him. On him the Merciful One had pity; on the animal the Merciful One did not have pity.” What does that mean? That basically a minor boy and a minor girl who had intercourse with an animal violated a prohibition. On the simple level, by the way, a Torah prohibition. Against this, several later authorities ask from the Talmud in Yevamot 33. The Talmud says: “A non-priest who performed the service on the Sabbath, such as where he produced two pubic hairs on the Sabbath, so that non-priesthood and Sabbath came simultaneously.” The Talmud there in Yevamot discusses the rule “one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition.” In the sugya of one prohibition not taking effect on another, there are several qualifications. Right? If someone, say, eats pork on Yom Kippur. Fine. If he eats pork on Yom Kippur, then once there is one prohibition, the second prohibition does not take effect. So he violated only one prohibition and not two. But there are qualifications. Specifically with pork on Yom Kippur, that is not right. Why? Because there are qualifications. There are basically three, maybe more: one that adds, one that includes, and one that comes simultaneously. The idea is that if the second prohibition is broader than the first in terms of the things it prohibits, or broader in terms of the people to whom it applies—that is “adding” and “including”—or if they both take effect at the same time, so there is no earlier one and later one. So the Talmud says: what about a non-priest who performed the Temple service on the Sabbath? It says that is “simultaneous.” An Israelite—not a priest—who worked in the Temple on the Sabbath, for example he slaughtered an animal on the Sabbath, then he violated both the prohibition of non-priesthood, because a non-priest may not perform the Temple service, and also slaughter on the Sabbath, taking life on the Sabbath, because he did the act. So he violates both. How can that be? Does one prohibition not take effect on another? The Talmud says: we are talking about a case where he produced two hairs on the Sabbath. Once he produced two hairs he became an adult and then became obligated in the commandments, and then the prohibition of non-priesthood and the prohibition of Sabbath took effect on him at the same moment, simultaneously. And therefore here both prohibitions take effect because it happens at the same time. If one came first and the other came later, then no. But if both prohibitions take effect simultaneously, then both take effect. What do you see? That he becomes obligated in prohibitions only from the time he produced two hairs, right? Before that he was not obligated, otherwise the whole discussion would never begin. But we saw above in the sugya of stumbling block and disgrace that a minor too is obligated in commandments even before he produced two hairs. It is just that the Torah had pity on him, but he is obligated in commandments—it is a transgression. So why does it say here that he is not obligated until he produced two hairs? That is what several later authorities ask—the Chelkat Yoav, the Or Sameach, Rabbi Yitzhak Elhanan, quite a few later authorities, Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman—they ask this, and they answer in different styles, but they all mean more or less the same idea. There is a difference between these two kinds of prohibitions. The Sabbath prohibition and the prohibition of non-priesthood—someone who is not a priest working in the Temple—are not prohibitions whose basis is reasoning; they have no reasoning. They are prohibitions whose basis is the text. The Torah says not to desecrate the Sabbath, and says that the service is only for a priest and not for a non-priest. But that is only because the Torah said so; there is no reasoning that says these things. Here, minors certainly are not obligated, because the Torah that created the prohibition also said that it speaks only to adults; it does not speak to minors. That prohibition was created by the Torah, so the Torah can also determine to whom it is addressed, and it says: I address adults, not minors. But in the prohibition of stumbling block and disgrace, in the prohibition of bestiality, there there is reasoning that this thing is forbidden. Beyond the command—there is also a command—but beyond the command there is also reasoning. Once there is reasoning, then obviously there is a transgression here for anyone who understands the reasoning. There is no distinction here between minor, adult, gentile, Jew, woman, man—it makes no difference. Where the prohibition begins from the command of the Torah, then the Torah can also say to whom it speaks. I command, and I command so-and-so and not so-and-so. But where the prohibition is based in reasoning, then who is obligated in it? Whoever is obligated in it is anyone who understands the reasoning. It can be a minor, it can be an adult, it can be a woman, a man, a gentile—it makes no difference, anyone who understands the reasoning. Therefore the Talmud in Sanhedrin, speaking of the prohibition of bestiality, which is a prohibition based in reasoning, says that even a minor boy and girl are obligated in it. Why? Because prohibitions of reasoning address minors too. But the Talmud in Yevamot, speaking about the prohibition of non-priesthood, or Sabbath desecration, which are not prohibitions based in reasoning—there, whoever was commanded was commanded; whoever was not commanded—the minor—is exempt, because the Torah that commanded also determined whom it commands. Therefore it says there that minors are not obligated. What really stands behind this is the following claim. The Hatam Sofer writes that we know the rule that the legal measures were not said regarding gentiles. Legal measures are a law given to Moses at Sinai; that was said only to Jews. Gentiles do not have legal measures. What about the measure of adulthood? When do you become an adult? From when you produce two hairs, or according to Rava’s presumption, age thirteen—does that apply to gentiles? So the Hatam Sofer says no; that is legal measures. Every measure was said regarding Jews, not gentiles. So from when are gentiles obligated in commandments? From when is a gentile considered an adult obligated in commandments? If there is even such a thing. What—does a gentile become obligated in commandments even at one week old? From what age or stage? Two hairs, age thirteen—that does not exist for him, because that is legal measures. Right—from when he understands. Right? In other words, by a gentile, the basis of obligation is from the moment he understands. Once he understands, because the obligation is one that has reasoning in it, then the moment you understand the reasoning you are obligated. Maimonides writes regarding the seven Noahide commandments that they are things to which the mind inclines. The seven Noahide commandments are things with reasoning behind them. Therefore the gentile who becomes obligated in them is anyone who understands the reasoning. If he is five, six, seven—I don’t know how old—once he understands, he is obligated. Meaning that all commandments whose basis is reasoning also obligate gentiles, also minors, all kinds of people—anyone who understands the reasoning. Later authorities formulate it a bit more formally, and they say: after all, the Talmud in Sanhedrin says, almost on the same page, “There is no matter in which something is forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to a Jew.” Right, there is no case where for a gentile it is forbidden and for a Jew it is permitted. A Jew is only stricter than a gentile, never more lenient than him. And then they say: so if in those same matters that gentiles are also obligated in, they are obligated from age six, or from the moment they understand, then in those same matters it must be that Jews are also obligated from age six. Because after all “there is no matter in which something is forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to a Jew.” If we were to say that all Jews are obligated only from age thirteen, then it would come out that there are things forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to a Jew—that cannot be. What stands behind it is that in every Jew there is a little gentile. Right? A Jew is a gentile plus one more level, but he also has the gentile dimension in him—the first floor. Therefore anything a gentile is obligated in, a Jew is obligated in through the gentile dimension that is found in him, the first level. Beyond that he has additional obligations belonging to the second level. You know what the difference is between a gentile and a complete gentile? A complete gentile is only a Jew. Have you ever heard someone say of a gentile that he is a “complete gentile”? “A complete gentile,” sorry—when you say about someone that he is a complete gentile, that is only a Jew. He is a complete gentile. You say that only about a Jew. A gentile is just a gentile, not a complete gentile. Anyway, for our purposes, that is what they claim. I think that behind it lies something more essential, not technical—that if the Noahide is obligated then the Jew must also be obligated because it cannot be that the Noahide is stricter than the Jew. That is the technical expression of the issue, but essentially what is written here is that because these prohibitions are based in reasoning, they obligate everyone who understands the reasoning. Jew, gentile, what age—it makes no difference. Okay? Look for example here. Maimonides in the laws of claims and pleas, chapter 5, writes as follows: “My teachers ruled that one does not administer an oath of the Torah on the claim of a minor, but a rabbinic oath of inducement one does administer. And even if the minor is not sharp enough for commerce, one administers an oath of inducement on his claim, so that one should not take his money when he is a minor and walk away for free. And to this my opinion inclines, and it is an enactment for the world. You thus learn that if a minor claimed against an adult, whether the adult partially admitted, whether he denied everything, whether there was one witness there or whether there was no witness there, he swears an oath of inducement and cannot transfer the oath back to the minor, because one does not administer any oath at all to a minor. And even a general ban he does not accept, because he does not know the punishment of an oath.” What interests me is the end. What does Maimonides say at the end? You cannot make a small child swear. Suppose I sue a small child over some debt and I have one witness. Can one administer an oath to the minor? He says no. Why not? Why do we not administer an oath to a minor? Because he does not know the punishment of the oath. Maimonides writes—look at the last words—“because he does not know the punishment of the oath.” What is the whole idea of an oath? The idea of an oath is that a person might lie just ordinarily, but if you make him swear, then he is lying in the name of God, and he understands that there is a very, very severe punishment for that. That deters him. That is the whole value of an oath. The value of an oath is that it deters. Therefore there is less chance that the person will lie if I administer an oath. But if the minor does not know the punishment of the oath—he is a minor, he does not understand—then there is no point in administering an oath to him. What would you gain from that oath? It will not deter him; he does not understand the severity of the punishment, and the whole point of an oath is that someone who understands the severity of the punishment will be deterred from lying. Therefore they do not administer an oath to a minor. Does that sound logical to you? To me, no. They do not administer an oath to a minor because he does not know the punishment of the oath? They do not administer an oath to a minor because there is no punishment of an oath on him. It is not because he does not know the punishment. He is a minor. A minor is not subject to punishments. So what does Maimonides want here? He says because he does not know—it sounds as if there is a punishment on him, but he does not know it. Since he does not know it, then there is no point; it will not deter him. No—it is not because he does not know the punishment of the oath, but because there is no punishment of the oath on him. He is a minor; he is not obligated in the commandments. In my view, what Maimonides means to say is that a minor who swears falsely does have punishment on him. But he does not know that. Since he does not know that, the oath will not deter him. Why is there punishment on him? Isn’t a minor exempt from the commandments? Because false oath is a prohibition that has reasoning in it—you are profaning the Divine Name. And anything that is a prohibition with reasoning obligates everyone who understands the reasoning, even if he is a minor. And here I’ll show you: many times surprising things we find in Maimonides can be traced back to the Ri Migash. The Ri Migash was the teacher of Maimonides’ father. Later authorities discuss the question of what happens with an oath, a vow, naziriteship—all these things—in Maimonides these are included in the Book of Hafla’ah. What is hafla’ah? “When a person utters distinctly,” “when a man utters distinctly a vow.” Hafla’ah means speech with the mouth. Okay? Meaning, to swear you need to speak. If you did not speak, there is no oath. The oath has to be made in speech. What happens if someone wrote an oath? He did not speak. So later authorities discuss: is writing like speaking, or not? They disagree. In a responsum of the Avnei Nezer in Yoreh De’ah, he writes as follows. “If he wrote in his own handwriting an oath and gave him his written document, he is obligated to fulfill what he swore, even if he did not utter the word of oath with his mouth. And if he did not fulfill it, his judgment is left to Heaven. But one cannot obligate him anything by human courts, since he did not utter the oath with his mouth.” This is the responsum of the Ri Migash. Yes, the Ri Migash basically says: you cannot give him lashes, because he did not utter the oath with his mouth, but he is obligated to fulfill what he swore, even if it is a written oath that he did not utter orally. Why? So the Avnei Nezer explains the responsum of the Ri Migash as follows: “And it appears that the Mishneh LaMelekh, chapter 10, law 7 of the laws of kings, had difficulty with oaths before the giving of the Torah—Abraham and Isaac to Abimelech, Esau to Jacob, Eliezer to Abraham”—right, we find many oaths before the giving of the Torah. “The Mishneh LaMelekh wonders: after all, an oath is not among the seven commandments commanded to the Noahides. So what was the reason to swear there or to administer an oath there? If it is not among the Noahide commandments, you are not obligated to fulfill it, so why administer an oath? Moreover, even if they were commanded, still all the force of an oath is because of the commandment ‘he shall not profane his word,’ and in what way is this warning greater than the other warnings in the Torah? And what additional force does the oath add to the Torah’s warnings, since the oath too is only a warning?” What is he saying? He asks: why did they make the people of Israel swear at Mount Sinai to keep the Torah? The Talmud says in several places that they are sworn and standing from Sinai. They made us swear at Sinai to keep the Torah. Where? No one knows. Probably a fiction, but never mind—that is how the Talmud treats it. So he asks: what is the point of making the people of Israel swear to keep the Torah? They are in any case obligated to keep the Torah, because when it says not to eat pork, then they must not eat pork because the Torah forbade eating pork. If you make them swear, they also have to keep that only because the Torah said one must keep oaths. So what did you gain by making the people of Israel swear to keep the commandments? You gained nothing. Therefore, says the Avnei Nezer, “it seems clear that certainly one who swears to another, reason decisively dictates that he is obligated to fulfill it, and no warning is needed for this. And that is the oath of Abraham and Isaac and Eliezer and so on. And likewise one who swears to the Holy One blessed be He. But one who swears to himself that he will not do something or will do something—in that there is no reasoning, because to whom has he obligated himself? And if you say, to the Holy One blessed be He, from where do we know that the Holy One blessed be He desires this obligation or prohibition? For that the Torah needed to command, ‘he shall not profane his word; according to all that came out of his mouth he shall do.’” Therefore the Torah had to command these things, because were it not for the command—were it not for our being sworn at Sinai to keep the Torah—then in fact we would not have had to keep things that have no reasoning in them. “And therefore the oath at Sinai is also understandable, when they swore to the Holy One blessed be He to keep His commandments, and this is from reasoning. But regarding the obligation that comes from reasoning, we do not find any punishment for it in human courts. Now the words of the Ri Migash are also understood: with oaths before the giving of the Torah, neither explicit utterance nor speech is mentioned in the Torah, and therefore there is no difference between by mouth and in writing. Thus, if one swore to his fellow in his own handwriting and gave him the written document, he is obligated to fulfill it, but one does not punish him in human courts, since there is no prohibition stated, and we do not find any punishment for it in human courts.” What is he saying? He says, basically, when you swear to the Holy One blessed be He or to another person, reason dictates that you have to fulfill it; therefore even before Mount Sinai we needed to keep the oath we swore. This does not come from “he shall not profane his word” at Sinai; the obligation existed before that, from reasoning. What did Sinai need to innovate? That you get lashes if you violate it. That I would not know without the command at Sinai—the lashes. But that you have to fulfill it—obviously you have to fulfill it. Therefore, says the Ri Migash, what happens if I now made a written oath? Then there was no distinct utterance, right? As far as “he shall not profane his word” is concerned, the prohibition of “he shall not profane his word” does not apply here, because there was no utterance. But there is the reasoning that if you swore, you have to fulfill it. That is what the Ri Migash means when he says that he is obligated to fulfill what he swore even though he did not utter the word of oath with his mouth, and if he did not fulfill it, his judgment is left to Heaven, but one cannot obligate him anything in human courts since he did not utter the oath with his mouth. What does he mean? There is no “he shall not profane his word” here, because in order to violate “he shall not profane his word” one needs utterance, one needs verbal expression. But the reasoning that you have to fulfill what you swore—obviously that reasoning exists whether you swore in writing or orally. What difference does it make whether you swore in writing or out loud? Reasoning says that you have to fulfill what you swore. So what do we learn from this? That the obligation to keep an oath is basically an obligation based in reasoning. In reasoning too, beyond the Torah’s command there is also reasoning here. And because of that, this obligation exists everywhere and for every person who understands the reasoning: among gentiles, among Jews, among minors, adults, women, men, before the giving of the Torah, after the giving of the Torah—it really makes no difference. An obligation from reasoning exists wherever the reasoning exists and for anyone who understands the reasoning. What the Torah said—“he shall not profane his word”—regarding the obligation of an oath, those are the definitions it gave: not for a minor, yes for an adult. Those are already the definitions the Torah gave. So there will be no lashes for a minor because he does not violate “he shall not profane his word,” but the obligation to fulfill it he certainly is obligated to fulfill. That is exactly what Maimonides said in the laws of claims and pleas. We saw there that Maimonides says one does not administer an oath to a minor “because he does not know the punishment of an oath.” And I asked: what does it mean he does not know the punishment of an oath? Is there a punishment of oath on him and he just doesn’t know it? If he is a minor, there is no punishment of oath on him at all, not that he does not know. The answer is: not true. There is punishment of oath on him—not punishment in court, but punishment at the hands of Heaven. There is punishment. Why? Because the obligation to keep oaths is an obligation based in reasoning, and anyone who understands the reasoning is obligated in it. So what do we really learn here? We learn here that there are things whose basis is reasoning, and at least according to Maimonides the plain simple reading is that if there is no command regarding them, then this will not be Torah law in the sense that one will not be punished for it, one will not get lashes for it, and so on. But if the reasoning is interpretive reasoning, interpreting an existing law, then it certainly is fully Torah-level, because it simply explains what the law says. If the reasoning innovates a law, as with blessings of enjoyment, then it is not Torah-level in the sense that we will not count it among the commandments and we will not give lashes to someone who eats without a blessing. But there is an obligation that has the force of Torah-level obligation, and for example in doubt in such a case one goes stringently. So reasoning basically joins in—reasoning looks very similar to things that come out of derivations, what we saw in Maimonides. There too we saw things that come from a derivation—what does that mean? That the content present in the verse probably also exists in the law derived by interpretation. For example, “the Lord your God shall you fear”—to include Torah scholars—so the essence present in fear of Heaven is also present in fear of Torah scholars, but there is no command because a derivation is not a command according to Maimonides. That means there is something here that has an essence, the essence of the underlying principle is present in it, but there is no command on it. That is exactly what we see here with reasoning. Reasoning basically says that the essence is here, because that is what the reasoning says: that there is something problematic here. But there is no command, because it comes out of reasoning; there is no verse. And therefore the laws will be exactly like laws that come out of derivations. We will not count it in the tally of commandments; it will not be a commandment in the formal sense, but there is a full obligation to do it and its doubt is treated stringently. Even more so than a law given to Moses at Sinai or an actual rabbinic law. An actual rabbinic law—its doubt is treated leniently. A law that comes out of reasoning, that the Rabbis did not establish at all—its doubt is treated stringently. More than that, as I said earlier. Suppose there is some reasoning that is only my own reasoning. You do not agree. But I think it is right. Then I am obligated to do it; I will be held accountable if I do not do it. And if I am in doubt, I have to be stringent. Because a doubtful prohibition that is based in reasoning is treated stringently. And that has nothing to do with anyone else; it applies only to me. You do not need to do it, because you do not agree with the reasoning. Only whoever understands the reasoning is obligated in it. If the Sanhedrin were to establish it as an obligation, then of course it would obligate everyone. I just want to finish with another type of reasoning. I could show—I won’t now, I won’t get into it. In the Talmud in Gittin you see that the obligation to separate terumah in a measure of one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and one-sixtieth is Torah-level, not rabbinic. Usually it is accepted that one grain exempts the whole pile. Meaning in separating terumah, one grain of wheat is enough. Rabbinically they said to separate one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, or one-sixtieth—generous eye, stingy eye, and average eye. But there are several proofs—in Maimonides certainly, though it starts already in the Talmud—that this is Torah law, not rabbinic law. But it is a special kind of Torah law. What do I mean? I argued that this is a law whose basis is that this is the will of God. In other words—and this is another kind of reasoning. What does that mean? There is reasoning that says one should fear Torah scholars. Why? Sounds reasonable—one should fear Torah scholars, they represent the Torah or something like that. Or reasoning that one should bless before eating. Why? Because if we benefit from this world without a blessing, it is as though we committed misuse. That is reasoning about the matter itself. But there are reasonings where I do not understand why the thing itself should be done, but I do understand that the Holy One blessed be He wants me to do it. I call this reasoning of the type “the will of God.” Not reasoning about the thing itself—I have no reasoning why it should be done or forbidden—but I understand from the text or in some other way that the Holy One blessed be He has an interest that I do or not do this. That too is a kind of reasoning, and it is called reasoning of the will of God. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim, brings a nice proof for this. He explains it exactly this way. “And with this one can explain the intention of the verse in Jeremiah 19: ‘They built the high places of Baal to burn their sons in fire as burnt offerings to Baal, which I did not command and did not speak and did not arise in My heart.’” End quote. “And its meaning in the Targum is—what does it mean, I did not command, I did not speak, and it did not arise in My heart? The Targum explains: ‘which I did not command in the Torah, and which I did not send by the hand of My servant the prophets, and which is not My will.’” What is “not My will”? “And this verse explicitly teaches that there are three parts of Torah: one called command, two called speech, and a third on which there is neither command nor speech, but only the will of God. And those are all the rabbinic commandments”—that part I do not agree with—but there is also the will of God. What does “the will of God” mean? I understand that the Holy One blessed be He wants me to separate terumah generously. He did not command it, but I understand that this is what He wants. Also I have no intrinsic reasoning that this should be done, for the sake of the discussion. Still, if I understand that the Holy One blessed be He wants it, then I am supposed to do it. In contrast to the reasoning of blessings of enjoyment, which is not reasoning that the Holy One blessed be He wants it; the reasoning there is that this really is what should be done. The reasoning I am speaking about here is another kind. I do not know why this should be done, what the logic is, but I understand that the Holy One blessed be He expects me to do it. That is a reasoning of the type of the will of God. The source for this is in Mesillat Yesharim—you can see it in the trait of piety. “The essence of piety itself is something deep to understand correctly, and it is founded on great wisdom and the ultimate refinement of action. And now we will explain this matter in order. The root of piety— the root of piety is what our Sages said: Happy is the person whose labor is in Torah and who gives pleasure to his Maker. The matter is that the commandments imposed on all Israel are already known, and their obligation is known, and how far it extends is known. However, one who truly loves the Creator, blessed be His Name, will not try and aim merely to exempt himself with what is already publicized as obligatory upon all Israel generally. Rather, it will be like what happens to a son who loves his father, that if his father reveals to him even slightly that he wants one of a number of things, then the son will increase in that thing and that act as much as he can, even though his father said it only once and only half-spoke it. Behold, for such a son it is enough to understand where his father’s mind inclines, to do for him even what he did not say explicitly, since he can infer by himself that this thing would be pleasing before him, and he will not wait until his father commands him more explicitly or says it to him a second time.” In other words, this is the reasoning of the will of God. Reasoning of the will of God means: I understand in some indirect way or another that this is what the Holy One blessed be He expects. So I will do it, and I am supposed to do it, and I am expected to do it. He did not command. What? No, yes, exactly. Without understanding why it is right, but if I understand that this is what the Holy One blessed be He wants, that is also enough. That is another kind of reasoning called reasoning of the will of God. Okay, I’ll stop here. There is much more to elaborate on this. That’s it, we’re finishing the semester. Again, as I said earlier, check your attendance.