Conceptual Analysis – Lesson 21
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- General Overview
- Money as embodied value and the abstraction of value
- Substance and value, acquisition by money and acquisition by barter
- Money and produce are not acquired through barter
- Ownership of the substance and ownership of the produce, and an explanation of the term “produce”
- A woman’s betrothal: a legal effect, not ownership, and why barter is impossible
- Critique of the idea of “acquisition” as ownership and the distinction between acquisition and legal effect
- Less than a perutah’s worth, barter, and Rashba on a vessel not worth a perutah
- Betrothal with a date and the status of money
- Time-limited acquisition, Tosafot in Arakhin, the Jubilee, and royal confiscation
- A deposit of money, a loan, purchase money, and using money for legal acquisitions
- The prohibition of interest as renting out value, and the difference between a loan, rental, and borrowing
- Acquisition by money in movable property, the rabbinic enactment of pulling, and “your money was burned in the upper chamber”
- Identifying money and merchandise in transactions, the initiator of the transaction, and the Sabbatical year
- Compensation for idleness from work, Rashba in Ketubot on conjugal rights, and the distinction between value and a specifically required obligation
- Silver and gold in the chapter HaZahav: sharpness and importance as relative criteria
Summary
General Overview
The text presents a view according to which money is the embodiment of an abstract concept called value, and that embodiment allows us to treat value as an object and transfer it in practice by means of a note or coin that has no significance in itself other than by social agreement. From this are derived distinctions between acquisition by money and acquisition by barter, the halakhic relation to “produce” and to “money” as things that are not acquired through barter, and an explanation of why betrothal of a woman by money is not an act of ownership over the woman but a formal act that creates the legal effect of a betrothal bond. The text then brings additional applications of the distinction between substance and value in the areas of deposits and loans, the prohibition of interest, the rabbinic enactment of pulling in movable goods, and the criteria for identifying what counts as “money” and what counts as “merchandise” in complex transactions.
Money as embodied value and the abstraction of value
Money is understood as a representation of value and not as an object with essential self-standing meaning, so that when a one-hundred-shekel note is transferred, what is really being transferred is value, by virtue of the agreement that the note represents it. The note or coin has no significance in itself, but is simply a practical way to transfer value from one person to another. From this understanding comes a distinction between an act that exchanges value for value and an act that exchanges substance for substance.
Substance and value, acquisition by money and acquisition by barter
Every object has a substance and a useful meaning from which its value is also derived, like a hammer whose worth comes from the uses that can be made of it. Acquisition by money is defined as an exchange of value for value, whereas acquisition by barter is defined as an exchange of substance for substance, as an ancient and simple form of commerce. The claim is that there is a resemblance between these forms of acquisition, but also essential differences, especially the fact that certain things cannot be acquired through barter.
Money and produce are not acquired through barter
Money is not acquired through barter because it is an object that has only form and value by force of social convention or the king’s stamp, without substance and body in the ordinary sense, and therefore it is not suitable for an exchange of substance for substance. As for produce, the claim is that its use consumes the substance, so it is impossible to separate ownership of the body of the fruit from ownership of its use. In another sense, the fruit is said to lack significance beyond its value and its use. From here it is explained that with money and produce, barter does not apply; only acquisition by money does.
Ownership of the substance and ownership of the produce, and an explanation of the term “produce”
The halakhic concept is presented of ownership of the substance and ownership of the produce, and the claim is that there is ownership of the substance for produce, which allows one person to own the thing itself while another owns its uses, as in a house where one owns the structure and another owns the right of dwelling in it. The term “produce” is explained through a tree, where the uses appear as separate objects that one can literally point to, and therefore the uses of any other thing are also called “produce,” even though with things like a house or a hammer one cannot point to the use itself. The text links produce to money in that both illustrate turning an abstract concept into an object that can be bought and sold.
A woman’s betrothal: a legal effect, not ownership, and why barter is impossible
The claim is that in betrothal the husband does not acquire the woman and she is not his property, and already medieval authorities (Rishonim) such as Shiltei HaGiborim, Ran, and Nachmanides speak this way and raise difficulties where it seems otherwise. In the name of Rabbi Chaim Ozer it is brought that money does not “return” in betrothal, and the claim is that the money of betrothal is not “money of equivalent value,” because what is acquired is not “the woman’s value,” but rather a bond of betrothal is created. The Talmud / Talmudic text in tractate Kiddushin 3a is brought as the source that a woman is not acquired through barter, and two versions are discussed: according to Rashi, the reason is that barter can be done with less than a perutah, and that is degrading for her; according to Tosafot and Ritva, the reason is that barter is substance for substance, and a woman’s body is not acquired. The claim is that acquisition by money is an abstract legal act that can generate a legal effect, and therefore it is suited to betrothal, whereas barter is viewed as a primitive act of exchange that does not contain such a legal effect.
Critique of the idea of “acquisition” as ownership and the distinction between acquisition and legal effect
The text argues that one of the things that causes confusion is the word acquisition, and that in Jewish law acquisition is not ownership but a formal act that generates a halakhic legal effect. Ownership, it says, is only one example of a legal effect that is expressed through acquisition, whereas there are other legal effects as well, such as betrothal, terumah, and contracts. The text discusses questions of financial relations, the rule that “what a woman acquires, her husband acquires” as a rabbinic law, and the possibility of “I will not be supported and I will not work,” in order to establish that the husband does not own the woman even though there is inequality in Jewish law, including divorce against her will and the decree of Rabbeinu Gershom.
Less than a perutah’s worth, barter, and Rashba on a vessel not worth a perutah
The text argues that barter works even with less than a perutah’s worth, and presents this as an indication that barter does not operate on the plane of value but on the plane of substance. Rashba’s doubt is cited as to whether acquisition by money can be done with a vessel that is not worth a perutah, and it is said that plainly speaking, less than a perutah’s worth is not value at all and therefore cannot serve as monetary equivalent for acquisition by money. From this it is explained that a vessel worth less than a perutah is effective for barter because barter does not require value, but it is not effective for acquisition by money, which is defined as acquisition operating on value.
Betrothal with a date and the status of money
The text cites the law that if one betroths a woman with a date that is not worth a perutah, she is doubtfully betrothed, perhaps because it is worth a perutah in Media, and it discusses why value elsewhere is relevant. An explanation is brought in the name of a yeshiva head that betrothal does not require the woman’s value, but rather the formal act of giving something that carries the status of money. Therefore it is enough that the object can be considered to bear the status of money because somewhere it is worth a perutah. The text uses this as another indication that the money of betrothal is not payment of value but a mechanism for generating a legal effect.
Time-limited acquisition, Tosafot in Arakhin, the Jubilee, and royal confiscation
The text cites Tosafot on Arakhin 30, that anything destined to return to its owner cannot be acquired through barter because acquisition for a limited time is ownership of produce and not ownership of the substance. Ketzot asks how barter is learned from Boaz if a field returns in the Jubilee, and the text answers that a field when the Jubilee applies is not a time-limited acquisition but a complete acquisition in which both substance and produce are acquired, and only at the Jubilee is there royal confiscation that removes it and returns it. Proof is brought from Mishneh LaMelekh, chapter 14 of the laws of the Sabbatical year, that one may dig pits, ditches, and caves in a field bought when the Jubilee applies because the substance is fully owned until the confiscation. The text also cites the pierced slave and “forever—meaning until the Jubilee” as an illustration that the acquisition is defined as permanent until it is removed, and not as something originally acquired for a fixed term.
A deposit of money, a loan, purchase money, and using money for legal acquisitions
The text argues that when money is deposited as a deposit, what is really deposited is an embodiment of value, and therefore one may return different banknotes of the same value, because the note itself is not an object of significance. The difference between a deposit and a loan is explained through the distinction between purchase money and a loan: in a loan, the lender does not have “his own value” by the borrower, only a debt; whereas in purchase money and in a deposit, the recipient possesses a certain value that belongs to the depositor. From this it is argued that one can acquire an item or betroth a woman by means of value that is held by another, such as a deposit or purchase money, unlike a loan.
The prohibition of interest as renting out value, and the difference between a loan, rental, and borrowing
Interest is described as payment for waiting on money, that is, payment for the time of using money, similar to rental fees for using a car. It is explained that in a loan the same coins are not returned, because a loan is given for expenditure, and therefore interest is really payment for the use of value and not for the use of a specific object. The text suggests that the prohibition of interest expresses the idea that a loan is not renting out the lender’s value but giving value as a gift to the borrower, and therefore it makes no sense to collect payment for the use of value that is no longer considered “the lender’s.” The text then distinguishes between rental, where the object remains the property of the owner, and a loan, where the object becomes the borrower’s, and in borrowing it says the object remains the lender’s, except that he forgoes payment.
Acquisition by money in movable property, the rabbinic enactment of pulling, and “your money was burned in the upper chamber”
The text cites the enactment of the Sages that movable property is not acquired by money until it is physically pulled, because “perhaps he will say to him: your wheat was burned in the upper chamber,” so that the seller will make an effort to save the merchandise as long as it is still his. The question is asked why we do not worry about the reverse after the goods have been pulled, that the buyer will say to the seller, “your money was burned in the upper chamber,” and the text answers that the seller does not acquire specific banknotes but acquires abstract value, which does not “burn.” From here the text argues that when we say the money is acquired, the meaning is that the buyer has in his possession value that belongs to the seller, not ownership in particular coins.
Identifying money and merchandise in transactions, the initiator of the transaction, and the Sabbatical year
The text argues that in the chapter HaZahav it is necessary to define in each transaction which side is the money and which side is the merchandise, because if one pulls the merchandise the money is acquired, but not the other way around. The equation that “something worth money is like money” creates situations in which objects can also function as money, so it is not always clear what should be defined as money and what as merchandise. An example is brought from tractate Shevi’it, chapter 8, that one may not pay for labor with Sabbatical produce, and the text explains that when the haircut recipient initiates the deal and wants a haircut, the haircut is the merchandise and whatever is given in return is the money, even if it is produce, because the compensation is not required specifically as that object but only as value. It says that if the other party were the initiator and specifically wanted the produce, then the relationship would reverse and the haircut would be considered money relative to the produce as merchandise.
Compensation for idleness from work, Rashba in Ketubot on conjugal rights, and the distinction between value and a specifically required obligation
The text cites the law that if a laborer was promised a lamb as payment, the laborer does not acquire the lamb merely by doing the work, and the employer can pay him with something else, because the lamb was given as value and not as specifically required merchandise. Rashba in Ketubot 56 is cited as distinguishing between food and clothing, which are financial obligations that one may stipulate away, and conjugal rights, which are a commandment specifically in that form and are not defined as a monetary obligation even though they involve enjoyment worth money. The text uses this to emphasize that the question of whether something is defined as money depends not only on possible value, but on whether it is given as equivalent compensation or as a specifically required essential obligation.
Silver and gold in the chapter HaZahav: sharpness and importance as relative criteria
The text argues that the discussion in the chapter HaZahav about exchanging silver for gold is not an attempt to define what money is in an essential sense, but to deal with a case in which both sides of the transaction are “money” in the sense of carriers of value. The criteria of sharpness and importance are presented as relative criteria for deciding which side will be considered money and which merchandise when both sides are money, and not as a fundamental definition of money. The fundamental definition of money is presented as consideration given only because of its value and not because it is specifically required, and it is said that if a silver coin is required specifically, it may become merchandise rather than money in that transaction.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time I spoke a bit about the concept of money, and the conclusion was that money is basically an embodiment of an abstract concept called value. And that abstraction basically causes us to relate to the concept of value as an object. And in order to make this a little easier, and also to make it practical to work with this concept, people invented money, which embodies this abstract concept. Now if I want to transfer to you a value of one hundred shekels, I just take out a one-hundred-shekel bill and give it to you. But really, really, what I’m giving you is value, because the bill in itself has nothing at all—just an agreement that this bill represents a value of one hundred shekels. It’s a representation; it has no significance in itself. It’s only a practical way to transfer value from me to you. And from that I derived various conclusions. I said that the concept of acquisition by money is basically exchanging value for value, as distinct from acquisition by barter, which exchanges substance for substance. And I said that every object in the world has its substance, or its significance as what it is. A hammer, for example, has value because you can use it—to hammer nails, crack nuts, or whatever. And as a result it also has value in the monetary sense. So really every thing in the world has essence and form or characteristics—in this case, value. And when I want to buy the hammer, I can do it in two ways: I can give you fifty shekels and buy the hammer in the sense of buying its value in exchange for the value I gave you—that’s what’s called acquisition by money. And I can buy it by barter and give you another object in exchange for this object, which I said is the ancient, primitive acquisition, from before people invented the concept of money and legal abstractions and things of that kind. Just commerce as one sees it in the simplest possible way, like with children: you have a marble and I have an apple; take the apple and give me the marble. In other words, it’s exchanging one thing for another thing. That’s what’s called acquisition by barter. And despite the similarity between these two forms of acquisition, there are several differences between them. For example, produce and coins and money are not acquired through barter. Why not? As for money, the explanation is simple: money is basically an object that has only form; it has no essence, no material, no body in the ordinary sense the way a hammer does. The value of money is not derived from the uses you can make of it, because there really aren’t uses for it—except maybe to use it as a stopper for a flask. Rather, its value is given to money by social agreement, or what you might call the form that the king decides to stamp onto the coin. That’s what determines the value of the coin; it’s an agreement, a convention. It’s not the result of assessing what practical use can be made of it. Since that’s the case, if a hammer has both substance and value, money has value but no substance. And therefore money cannot function in barter, because barter is an exchange of substance for substance, and money has no substance. The same is true of produce, although in a certain sense produce is the exact opposite of money. You might have said that produce has only substance and no value, because when we talk about substance and value we usually mean something that can be split. You can own the substance and I can take for myself the value or the uses. You can own the hammer itself, but I can use it for a certain time, derive benefit from it, or make use of its value for a certain time, while you remain the owner. With produce that doesn’t exist, because with produce, whoever uses the fruit—the use of fruit is to eat it—therefore with produce, the use actually consumes the substance. You can’t say that I own the use of the fruit and you own the body of the fruit. If you own the body of the fruit, then it would be forbidden for me to eat the fruit, because when I eat it I am destroying your property. So using the fruit is a use that consumes it. And because of that, produce, although it seems to be only substance, having use and no separate value, can on the other hand also be viewed the other way around: that really produce has only value. Beyond its value—beyond what can be done with it—the fruit has no significance in itself the way a hammer does, and therefore it does not enter into barter. There’s the concept of produce in Jewish law: ownership of the substance and ownership of the produce, or substance-for-produce. Complete ownership of produce, according to most opinions, doesn’t really exist, but there is ownership of the substance for the sake of produce. What does that mean? You can acquire the thing itself, and you can acquire the uses of the thing, the value of the thing, the benefit that can be derived from it. Like a house: you can, say, own the dwelling rights of the house, while someone else owns the house itself. Okay? So he owns the substance and I own the produce. A house has produce—“produce” in the sense of what uses can be made of it. Why is that called produce? Why that term? The answer is very simple. When you look at a tree, what are the uses I can make of the tree? To eat the fruit, right? In other words, a tree, unlike a hammer, has its use as a separate object. With a hammer there is the hammer, and using the hammer means actions I can do with it. There isn’t some thing called “the use of the hammer” or “the value of the hammer”; the value is the value of the hammer. There is a hammer, and not something else. But with a tree there’s something special. With a tree, you can own the tree and I’ll own the fruit, meaning the uses that can be made of the tree. The uses that can be made of the tree are objects, unlike the uses that can be made of a hammer, which are not objects. The uses that can be made of a tree are the fruit of the tree—to eat the fruit. Therefore whenever we speak about the uses of a thing, we call those uses “produce,” because produce, in the case of a tree, is the thing in which this concept called use is revealed most clearly. Produce is basically a concretization of this abstract concept called use. And in the fruit of a tree there really is such a thing: the fruit actually is the use of the tree. You can point to the use—here, this orange, that’s the use of the tree. With a hammer, you can’t point to the uses of the hammer; the uses of the hammer are not existing objects. That’s why we call it the produce of the hammer, or the produce of the house, or the produce of some other device or tool. The concept of produce comes from the fact that with a tree and its fruit, the fruit really is the use; there you can point to the concept of use.
[Speaker B] Even with a house you can’t point to it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.
[Speaker B] Even with a house you can’t point to a specific use?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and that’s why it’s called the produce of the house. Only with fruit can you point to it.
[Speaker B] With a house you can’t point to it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, you can’t. Not with a house and not with a hammer—only with fruit. And therefore, everywhere we talk about uses, where you can’t point to the uses, like with a house, like with a hammer, like with anything else, we call it the produce of the house or the produce of the hammer. Why is the term “produce”? Because in a tree the uses are something you can point to. So all the uses of everything else are called produce. Okay? Because we want to express the fact that I relate to the value of a thing or the uses of a thing as an object, as something that one can own, buy, and sell. So how do you say that in language? You say that this thing has produce. Okay, and that is basically parallel to money. Do you see the similarity between produce and money? With money it’s exactly the same thing. Money is basically the thing that comes to turn the abstract concept of value into a tangible object. Here is the money, the bill or the coin. The same is true of produce. The uses of things—when I want to relate to the use as something, as an object, something that can be bought and owned—I call that produce. And that is the similarity between produce and money, and therefore in neither case can you acquire through barter. Because barter is substance for substance. And with produce, when you want to use value or produce, that works only through acquisition by money, not through acquisition by barter. One implication I brought as an example is with regard to a woman’s betrothal. When we betroth a woman, we learn “taking” from “taking” from the field of Ephron, that one can betroth a woman—betroth a woman with money, yes? Money, document, and intercourse—those are the three ways a woman is acquired. Money, document, and intercourse. Money means that I basically perform an act of giving money and through that I supposedly acquire the woman. But I mentioned that in truth, with betrothal the husband does not really acquire the woman; she does not belong to him. She does not become his property in any way. This is not apologetics because there are now feminist critiques of the matter. Already the medieval authorities (Rishonim) said that a woman is not the husband’s property—Shiltei HaGiborim, Ran, Nachmanides, and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) discuss this. In places where it seems that the woman is the husband’s property, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) ask: how can that be? After all, a woman is not the husband’s property. These are not excuses, not apologetics; it’s a simple understanding. And therefore I mentioned Rabbi Chaim Ozer, who says that money does not return in betrothal. In betrothal, according to everyone, money is not money of equivalent value. According to the Taz and the Sema—I mentioned them in the previous lecture—is the money in acquisition by money “acquisition money” or “money of equivalent value”? So Rabbi Chaim Ozer says that everyone agrees that in a woman’s betrothal, the money is not money of equivalent value, because I’m not buying the woman’s value. She does not become my property. I do not make use of the woman. I create a bond of betrothal between me and her. The novelty that we learn from the acquisition of a field is that the creation of the bond of betrothal is done by giving money, just as acquiring the field is done by transferring money. But that is only a similarity in the nature of the legal act of acquisition; it is not a similarity in the result. The result in an ordinary acquisition is that the object becomes mine, but in giving money to a woman, the result is not that the woman becomes mine; rather, a bond of betrothal exists between me and her. Therefore the Talmud / Talmudic text in Kiddushin 3 says that a woman is not acquired through barter. And we saw, we discussed, that there are two versions there in the Talmud / Talmudic text. Rashi’s version is: why is a woman not acquired through barter? Because barter is done with less than a perutah’s worth, and a woman does not transfer herself for less than a perutah. The woman is unwilling, says Rashi—it is degrading to her to transfer herself for less than a perutah; it is demeaning, and she is unwilling. Tosafot and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) ask about this: and if she were willing? If she says she is willing, then would she be acquired through barter? The Talmud / Talmudic text implies that a woman is not acquired through barter, period—not only a specific woman who expressed her opinion or did not. Therefore they have a different version. Ritva and Tosafot have a different version: a woman cannot be acquired for less than a perutah. Why not? Because in barter we exchange substance for substance, and a woman’s body is not acquired by me. It is not an exchange of merchandise the way it is in barter. So why does acquisition by money work? Because acquisition by money is basically a novelty; it is a legal abstraction. I perform an abstract act that really has no meaning at all: I give you a piece of paper. That paper isn’t really worth anything, we just have an agreement between us that this paper marks a value of one hundred shekels. So this is a legal abstraction; it is not acquisition in the primitive sense that I give you something and you give me something I need. Rather, it is an abstract legal act. The Talmud / Talmudic text says that just as this abstract legal act can acquire a field, so too it can generate betrothal. Not because betrothal is an acquisition in the sense that I acquire the woman, but because I need an abstract legal act in order to generate the legal effect of betrothal. And barter is not really a legal act at all; barter is just exchange, the kind of thing people did before the whole world of legal concepts existed. It belongs to the primitive world where you give me something and I give you something. But with a woman—no. She is not mine, she is not my property; it makes no sense to do that by barter. What you need is acquisition—a formal abstract legal act that generates a legal effect; in this case, the legal effect of betrothal; in another case, the legal effect of ownership. That can be done only through acquisition by money, not through barter. Yes, in general this is just an aside—I wrote an article about it that you can find on the site. There was an article in Akdamot a few issues ago by some woman protesting this whole matter that according to Jewish law the husband acquires the woman. What does that mean—what is a woman, merchandise that one buys, and so on? She brought all kinds of proofs for the idea that this is really an act of acquisition, meaning that I buy her and she becomes my property. And I wrote a long article responding to her and showed that this doesn’t even get off the ground. It’s a common mistake, and it’s simply not true.
[Speaker C] Not true—all their proofs are not proofs.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And on the contrary, there are very strong proofs against that whole idea. For example, the Talmud / Talmudic text there, which I mentioned at the beginning of Kiddushin, learns “taking” from “taking” from the field of Ephron for acquisition by money regarding a woman. So the Talmud / Talmudic text learns: a field is acquired by money, by document, and by possession. And a woman is acquired by money, by document, and by intercourse. Very similar. Now, what is possession that acquires a field? Use of the field—locking it, fencing it, breaching it. If you do an act of use on the field that expresses your ownership, then you are the owner of the field. That is one of the forms of acquisition for a field. Now if there really were a verbal analogy between a woman and a field, then I would expect all the modes of acquiring a woman to be learned from “taking, taking” from the field of Ephron. Just as in the field of Ephron one acquires by money, by document, and by possession, so too with a woman one acquires by money, by document, and by intercourse. Intercourse is exactly the possession one performs with a woman—the act of ownership-use that I perform with the woman, that is intercourse. But the Talmud / Talmudic text, after making the “taking, taking” derivation from the field of Ephron and learning from it betrothal by money, immediately asks: what about betrothal by document? From where do we learn that? And then it learns it from “and she leaves and she becomes”—it compares becoming married to leaving. Just as divorce is by document, so too betrothal is by document. And intercourse is learned from “when a man takes a woman and has relations with her.” That’s where intercourse is learned. Why? Why does the Talmud / Talmudic text ask this, and why does it not answer simply: there is a verbal analogy between the field and the woman; the three acquisitions of the field are exactly the three acquisitions of the woman? More than that—the rule is that a verbal analogy is not partial. If one learns something by verbal analogy, then everything learned in the one case should also apply in the other case. You do not make a half verbal analogy. That is a rule in the Talmud / Talmudic text. So now it is even harder. After the Talmud / Talmudic text already has a verbal analogy from woman to field, it goes looking for the source of betrothal by document and betrothal by intercourse? Why? After all, a verbal analogy is not partial. There is a verbal analogy, so all the acquisitions that exist for a field should exist for a woman: money, document, and intercourse—the latter being the counterpart of possession. What’s the problem? You see that the Talmud / Talmudic text itself understands that there is not really any similarity between acquiring a field and acquiring a woman. The “taking, taking” is just a revealing indication; it is not a real verbal analogy. Now the term “taking” is interpreted as transfer of money, because transfer of money is an abstract legal act which, just as it creates the legal effect of ownership, also creates the bond of betrothal. And once you’ve learned money, now I have to ask myself: okay, and from where do I know document and intercourse? Each of those needs its own separate source. There is no real comparison between acquiring a field and acquiring a woman. And there are many more proofs of this; it’s a simple matter. Rabbi?
[Speaker D] Yes. What bothers us about saying this is acquisition, that’s all? What’s the problem with that? I don’t understand. What’s wrong with saying it’s a kind of acquisition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, nothing bothers us; it’s just the truth. Independently of whether it bothers us or not, the truth is that it’s not ownership; the woman is not the husband’s acquisition. Besides, if you’re asking me personally whether it bothers me—yes, it bothers me. It bothers me because of the unequal outlook that sees the woman as an object, as merchandise. But that’s already my personal issue, whether it bothers me or not. I’m not arguing this because it bothers me. I’m arguing it because it is not true.
[Speaker D] But there are elements—you can’t ignore that there are elements of acquisition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are no elements of ownership at all.
[Speaker D] “What a woman acquires, her husband acquires,” and so on.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s unrelated. Financial relations—he is responsible for the household funds. That doesn’t mean the woman is his property or under proprietary acquisition. And by the way, “what a woman acquires, her husband acquires” is a rabbinic law.
[Speaker D] It’s not Torah-level. Yes, but Rabbi, in every acquisition there isn’t an absolute right. If I acquire a slave, if I acquire an animal, it’s not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you acquire a slave, he is yours just like an ox or a donkey. What?
[Speaker D] If you acquire a slave, he is yours just like an ox or a donkey. If I acquire a Canaanite slave, if I acquire a Hebrew slave, if I acquire an animal—every acquisition has its limitations, not every…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are no limitations. A slave is your property just like an animal. The same thing.
[Speaker D] And a Hebrew slave?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A Hebrew slave too—his body is acquired, the Talmud / Talmudic text says. There there is maybe more room to discuss. But plainly speaking, you acquire him too. Fine, but—
[Speaker D] There’s a difference between my ownership of the animal and my ownership of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying again: I’m not at all sure there’s a difference.
[Speaker D] Ownership is different—there’s also a difference within ownership. What, the Rabbi thinks there’s no difference?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: first, I don’t think there’s a difference between ownership of a slave and ownership of an animal. That’s one. Second, even if there is a difference, the fact remains that with a woman there is no ownership. Period. There isn’t. Simply isn’t. That’s the reality. It has nothing to do with whether it bothers me or not. I said it does bother me, but that’s not the point here. The fact is that there isn’t. You can read the article; I lay it all out there, and it seems to me it’s very hard after that to say otherwise. It’s worth reading. Okay, as if the Rabbi is ignoring… One of the things that confuses people is the word acquisition. That’s a big mistake. The word acquisition in Jewish law has nothing to do with ownership in any direct sense. The term acquisition means a formal act that generates a halakhic legal effect. That is what acquisition means. For example, when I make a contract with you, I didn’t acquire you. And we perform an act of acquisition so that the contract should take effect. What is acquisition? Acquisition means an act that expresses final intention, and then the legal effect takes hold. That’s all. True, when I buy something and become its owner, that too is a legal effect. Therefore that also is called acquisition. But that’s just one example. The concept of acquisition has nothing to do specifically with ownership. Ownership is one example of the concept of acquisition. And there are other acquisitions too. For example, betrothal is also an acquisition. It’s a legal act of acquisition that generates an effect. That’s all. It has nothing to do with ownership at all. Today people use the concept of acquisition in that sense—that if someone is possessive, then as if I own him. But that is a borrowed usage. In Jewish law the concept of acquisition means a legal act that generates a legal effect. Now, with every legal effect, you have to discuss what exactly it is. There is a legal effect of ownership, there is a legal effect of betrothal, and there is a legal effect of terumah. Separating terumah is also a legal act of acquisition. Same thing—it creates the legal effect of terumah. That’s all.
[Speaker B] And redemption of the firstborn—is that also a legal act of acquisition? Can you hear? Is redemption of the firstborn also a legal act of acquisition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Redemption of the firstborn is not a legal act of acquisition because you are not generating any legal effect. There is no “redeemed” status that comes to exist on the child. It doesn’t—it has no significance. There is no real legal status of being redeemed.
[Speaker B] Yes, he becomes mine, my son.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t become anything. No, that’s not it. You’re not buying him from the kohen. On the contrary. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) discuss this too. The redemption is not purchasing the son from the kohen. It’s part of the priestly gifts.
[Speaker D] If someone injures a woman, to whom does he pay—her or the husband? Can you hear? If someone injures a woman, to whom does he pay the damages?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle he pays the woman. It is true that “what a woman acquires, her husband acquires” is rabbinic, and as part of the arrangement between them he is obligated to support her and therefore her earnings go to him. But if she says, “I will not be supported and I will not work,” then you do not need to support her and she does not give you what she earns. No—you do not own the woman. That’s simply not true. It’s an incorrect conception.
[Speaker B] And what about a divorce document—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Against her will?
[Speaker B] Can you hear? And what about a divorce document against her will?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else. It is not an issue of ownership. I didn’t say the woman is equal to the husband. I didn’t say there is equality in Jewish law. There is no equality in Jewish law. That bothers me. Here’s an example: it bothers me, and it’s still true. What can you do? There is no equality in Jewish law. But ownership—not because it bothers me. That also bothers me, but not because of that. There simply is no ownership. You do not own the woman. It’s simply a mistake.
[Speaker B] Fine, but the fact that you can give her a divorce document against her will is a sign that she’s your object.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, she’s not my object. Rather, I am the one who can decide to dissolve the bond of betrothal between us. The decision is only mine. That does not mean she belongs to me. There is no equality—I agree there is no equality, and I wrote that in the article too. If the inequality bothers you, it bothers me too. True. And I have no solutions. In some matters there is inequality. By the way, some of what Rabbeinu Gershom wanted to do was to somewhat reduce the inequality. The decree of Rabbeinu Gershom—that one does not divorce a woman against her will and does not marry two women. But of course all that is only the decree of Rabbeinu Gershom; by the basic law it is not so. So there is no equality in Jewish law; I am not claiming that Jewish law is egalitarian. I am claiming that in Jewish law there is no ownership of the woman by the husband. That is simply a mistake; it is not true. Fine, so let’s get back to it. All of this was only a parenthetical remark; it isn’t our topic right now. I only wanted to explain that I made that remark in order to show that the act of betrothal is an abstract legal act of acquisition, whose purpose is to generate the legal effect of betrothal—to create the bond of betrothal. And therefore it cannot be done by barter, because barter is not a legal act. Barter is a child’s act: take this thing, give me another thing instead. When you want a legal act, it has to be something abstract, belonging to the legal sphere. And therefore there you need to use acquisition by money and not acquisition by barter.
[Speaker C] Maybe an example, maybe a continuation of the same point. In Ketzot—before Ketzot, one moment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the Rashba in Kiddushin discusses this. And he raises the question: we know that with symbolic exchange, you don’t do it with money but with utensils. Clothes, utensils, things like that. What happens if the utensil isn’t worth a perutah? It’s worth half a perutah, or a quarter of a perutah. Does that work for symbolic exchange? Say, a matchstick. You take a matchstick—the matchstick is an object, fine, but it isn’t worth a perutah. Now I want to use this matchstick to acquire a field through symbolic exchange. Can I? Can you make a symbolic acquisition with a matchstick? That’s what the Talmud in Kiddushin says: symbolic exchange works with less than a perutah’s worth, whereas a woman is not betrothed with less than a perutah’s worth. Meaning, symbolic exchange can be done with less than a perutah’s worth, and therefore a woman cannot be acquired through symbolic exchange. My claim is that the problem is not as Rashi says, because it is degrading for her to be acquired for less than a perutah’s worth. So everyone asks him: what if she says it’s not degrading to her? Or, what about symbolic exchange done with an expensive utensil? It’s not an object worth less than a perutah, so there’s no degradation of the woman there. Why shouldn’t she be betrothed through symbolic exchange? Therefore I really claim that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Rashi are actually saying: no, symbolic exchange works with less than a perutah’s worth, and therefore what? Therefore it is clear that symbolic exchange does not operate on the plane of value but on the plane of the object itself, the substance. And therefore a woman cannot be acquired through symbolic exchange. Not because of degradation, not because it’s less than a perutah’s worth, but because symbolic exchange in its essence cannot work for betrothal. Because symbolic exchange is an exchange of object for object. And the indication is that symbolic exchange works even with an object worth less than a perutah. How does that work? You see that it does not function through value but through the essence of the object. And therefore a woman is not acquired through symbolic exchange, not because it is degrading, as Rashi says. The fact that it works with less than a perutah’s worth is an indication; it is not the reason why a woman is not acquired through symbolic exchange. Rather, the fact that symbolic exchange is done with less than a perutah’s worth indicates that symbolic exchange is not a money acquisition. Symbolic exchange is object against object, and therefore you cannot betroth a woman through symbolic exchange. And therefore even if you do symbolic exchange with a very expensive utensil, it won’t help at all. You cannot do symbolic exchange with a woman not because it involves something cheap, but because it is object against object. The fact that you can do it with something cheap is an indication of that—that we are not dealing with value but with objecthood. So automatically you can’t do it with a woman even with an expensive utensil, not only with a cheap utensil. Now the Rashba is uncertain: what happens if I want to make a money acquisition—a money acquisition—but use a utensil that is not worth a perutah? So he says he has reason to say that maybe it would work. Because a utensil, even if it is worth less than a perutah, apparently is still considered to have value, because the fact is that it can be used. So maybe even in a money acquisition I could give you a matchstick as the money acquisition. Of course that wouldn’t be the payment itself—the payment would be many matchsticks—but with one matchstick you would perform the legal act of acquisition. So the Rashba is uncertain, maybe yes maybe no. And many objections were raised against him from all sorts of directions. On the face of it, less than a perutah’s worth has no value. So why should I care whether it is a utensil or not a utensil? Here the utensil is serving as money-equivalent. A money-equivalent is like money. So a utensil worth less than a perutah is not money-equivalent, because it lacks value; less than a perutah’s worth is not value at all. You know, theft of less than a perutah is not theft. And from Rashi it seems there isn’t even theft by the rule of a partial measure; it isn’t theft at all. Half a perutah is not an issue of a partial measure. Half a perutah is simply not value at all. Meaning, with less than a perutah, it isn’t that there is a small value and it’s just insufficient. Less than a perutah’s worth is not value at all. What does that mean? It means that essentially a utensil worth less than a perutah has no value. It has only objecthood but no value-use. Therefore I think there is no reason to say that a money acquisition would work with a utensil worth less than a perutah. The reason a utensil worth less than a perutah works in symbolic exchange is because symbolic exchange does not require value, not because a utensil worth less than a perutah also has value. Rather, for symbolic acquisition you simply don’t need value. But in a money acquisition, its whole essence is that it operates through value.
[Speaker C] So it’s obvious that making a money acquisition with a utensil worth less than a perutah can’t work. For example, another example—the Talmud says—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or another aspect, not another example: the Talmud says that someone who betroths a woman with a date. Even though the date is not worth a perutah, the woman is doubtfully betrothed. Why? Perhaps it is worth a perutah in Media. Meaning, maybe there is some country somewhere in the world where such a date is worth a perutah. True, here it is not worth a perutah, but maybe there is another place where it is worth a perutah. So the later authorities (Acharonim) struggle a lot with this—why should it matter to me whether the date is worth a perutah somewhere else? Here it is not worth a perutah, and in order to betroth a woman you need something that has the value of a perutah. What does it help me that in Media this date has the value of a perutah? So once the head of the yeshiva gave a general lecture in the yeshiva many years ago, and I heard this explanation from him. I don’t know whether it’s written somewhere; maybe it is. The claim is basically this. When you betroth a woman, after all, you are not betrothing her with value—a woman has no value. You need to perform a formal legal act. And the Talmud derives that this act is the giving of money. It derives it through the phrase “taking” “taking” from the field of Ephron. But it’s not that you really need a perutah’s worth in order to betroth a woman, because you are not buying the woman’s value. So essentially you don’t really need it to be worth a perutah. What do you need? You need this item to have the status of money. Right? Now if this date here is not worth a perutah, the problem is that it isn’t money. Not that it isn’t worth a perutah—it isn’t money, because less than a perutah is not—
[Speaker B] money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if this date is worth a perutah in Media, then true, here it isn’t worth a perutah, but you can say that it does have the status of money.
[Speaker B] Because the fact is that in Media it is worth a perutah. And therefore maybe one could betroth a woman with it even here. Not maybe—definitely. The reason she is only doubtfully betrothed is just because you don’t know whether in Media it is worth a perutah. The implication of the Talmud is that if I know there is a country where it is worth a perutah, then this is definitely betrothal, not doubtful betrothal. The doubt here is simply because I don’t know whether there is such a country. But if there is such a country where it is worth a perutah, then it is definitely betrothal, not doubt. Rabbi, whereas if you steal an object worth less than a perutah’s worth, then is that permitted?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For theft you need value. For a woman’s betrothal you do not need value. In a woman’s betrothal, what you need is that the thing I give her be money—it has the status of money. So if in Media it is worth a perutah, then it definitely has the status of money. The fact that here it is not worth a perutah—so it isn’t. That is exactly a wonderful indication of the point that with a woman, not only are you not giving value against value, so symbolic exchange doesn’t help—you also are not really supposed to give value at all. Because a woman has no value; you are not buying her value. Rather, the act of giving money—that is the abstract act that effects the betrothal. For that, the thing you give has to have the status of money. And there can be a case where it is not worth a perutah, but if it has the status of money, that is also good enough for me. That is an even stronger indication that with a woman, even when I make a money acquisition, it is not a money acquisition like when I buy a field, but rather I perform a formal act that effects betrothal. It isn’t value against value. Therefore it doesn’t really need to have value here. The only reason you need value with the date is simply so that it has the status of money. But for that it is enough that it have value in Media; it doesn’t need to have value here. In any case I relate to this date as an object that has the status of money, and then you can use it to perform an act of betrothal. There is—
[Speaker C] Tosafot that says in Arakhin, Tosafot in Arakhin on page 30, that anything destined to return to its owner cannot be acquired through symbolic exchange. Something acquired for a limited time. Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because something acquired for a limited time—when I transfer to you, say, a field for two years—then essentially the substance of the field is mine. The value of the field, the ability to use the field, the produce of the field—those are yours. And therefore you cannot acquire a field for a fixed period, or anything for a fixed period, through symbolic exchange. Because symbolic exchange is always when one acquires the object itself. But an acquisition for a limited time, by its essence, is an acquisition of the produce-rights, or the object for its produce; it is not an acquisition of the object itself. And therefore Tosafot says you cannot do that through symbolic exchange. There are other medieval authorities (Rishonim) who discuss this, saying that every limited-time acquisition is essentially an acquisition of produce-rights. There is no such thing as acquisition of the object itself for a limited time. Acquisition for a limited time means: make use of the thing for a fixed time. Ownership of the thing itself? Me. I am the owner of the thing itself. You can only use it for a fixed period, and therefore such a thing cannot be acquired through symbolic exchange. The Ketzot asks on Tosafot in section 195, in that same area dealing with acquisition. So he asks Tosafot: how do we learn symbolic exchange from Boaz, from “and the man removed his shoe” in the Scroll of Ruth? We derive symbolic exchange from there, and there he acquired a field. But the field returns in the Jubilee year, so that is an acquisition for a limited time. So how does that fit with Tosafot? The answer is that acquisition of fields when the Jubilee is in force is not an acquisition for a limited time. Even though after a certain time, when the Jubilee arrives, the field returns to its original owner, still it is not an acquisition for a limited time.
[Speaker B] That’s the Torah imposing on you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can you hear?
[Speaker B] That’s the Torah imposing on you that the field should be returned to— or—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if it uproots the—let me explain this a bit more. There is a Talmud in the chapter HaZahav; the Talmud relates to the Jubilee, to the operation of the Jubilee, as an annulment by the King. The King annuls it. The King—God—annuls ownership of the fields and the slaves and sets them free in the Jubilee. What does that mean? Basically this means that why is acquisition for a limited time an acquisition of produce-rights? Because in the end the object remains mine; I am only giving you a certain time to make use of it. A practical difference, for example: if you buy the field for a certain period, say for two years, you cannot dig pits, ditches, and caves in it. You cannot ruin my field, because the field is mine—the substance of the field remains mine. You are allowed to use it for a certain time, but don’t destroy the substance, because the substance remains mine. But when you buy the field at a time when the Jubilee applies, the buyer of the field is allowed to do whatever he wants with it. He can dig pits, ditches, and caves in it, yes. The Mishneh LaMelekh in chapter 14 of the laws of the Sabbatical year discusses this: when you buy a field at a time when the Jubilee applies, you may dig pits, ditches, and caves in it. Why? Isn’t this an acquisition for a limited time until the Jubilee? The answer is no. When you buy the field while the Jubilee is in force, as long as the field is with you it is entirely yours, including the substance. When the Jubilee comes, the King takes the field away from you and returns it to me. But this is not an acquisition for a limited time. An acquisition for a limited time is one originally acquired for a specific number of years. Here I transferred it to you as a permanent acquisition. It’s just that after a few years the King will come, take it from you, and return it to me. That is not the same as acquisition for a limited time. This is a permanent acquisition. It’s just a permanent acquisition that the King, when He wishes, has the right to annul and return to me. Therefore here it is completely yours, both the substance and the produce are yours. An example of this—just a second—the example is when the Talmud speaks about slaves. Regarding a slave whose ear was pierced, it says, “And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl… and he shall serve him forever.” He is my slave forever—a pierced-ear slave. But the Talmud in the portion of Behar says, the Torah in the portion of Behar says, that he goes free in the Jubilee. So the Talmud in Kiddushin says: what do you mean “and he shall serve him forever”? He goes free in the Jubilee. So the Talmud says: for the world of the Jubilee. What is this wordplay? So until the Jubilee is that called forever? They said no—“for the world of the Jubilee.” What does that mean? The point is this: every limited-time acquisition is basically only a right of use. The substance remains mine. I gave you a right of use for a specific number of years. In the Jubilee, the acquisition is complete—substance and produce—not just a right of use, not just uses. The thing itself is also acquired by you; it’s just that after a few years the King will come and take it from you and return it to me. But in the meantime, as long as it is yours, it is yours both in substance and in produce. Therefore it is called “for the world of the Jubilee.” Meaning what? In a normal limited-time acquisition, it’s an acquisition that from the outset I make with you for two years. In the acquisition of a field when the Jubilee applies, the acquisition is forever, eternally—it becomes yours. That’s it, it is yours, both substance and produce, all of it yours. After a few years the King will come and take it away from you, but this is not an acquisition that from the outset is for a limited time. That’s what the Sages mean when they say “for the world of the Jubilee.”
[Speaker C] So therefore, the Mishneh LaMelekh also says that while the field is with you until—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the Jubilee—you may dig pits, ditches, and caves in it, because the field is entirely yours. So if that’s the case, what the Ketzot asks on Tosafot is no difficulty at all. He says: why is it possible—why in Boaz’s case did they acquire the field through symbolic exchange? After all, when the Jubilee applies, that is an acquisition for a limited time, and Tosafot said that acquisitions for a limited time are not acquired through symbolic exchange. A regular limited-time acquisition is not acquired through symbolic exchange. But acquisition of a field when the Jubilee applies is not an acquisition for a limited time. It is an acquisition of the substance, a permanent acquisition. Once it is an acquisition of the substance, of course it is acquired through symbolic exchange, because I acquired the substance as well. The fact that after a few years the King will come and annul it—that’s another matter. But as long as He has not done that, the substance is completely mine. Just a second, I’m feeling a bit dizzy, one moment.
[Speaker C] Fine. Okay, I’ll continue. Let’s go back now to this matter of value as an abstract object.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The claim, basically, is that as I said, money is a concretization of this abstract concept called value. If I see this abstract concept as an object, then I concretize it through money. That’s why we made all the distinctions between symbolic acquisition and money acquisition and so on. What happens when I deposit money with you as a deposit? We spoke about a loan, about a deposit, about remission of debts in connection with this issue. When I deposit money with you, I am basically placing with you an embodiment of value. But according to what I’m saying here, it is entirely reasonable that if I deposited with you an envelope with two hundred shekels, you still are not obligated to return to me the exact two hundred shekels I deposited with you, because those two hundred shekels are not really an object at all. Those two hundred shekels are merely a symbol for the fact that I deposited with you value amounting to two hundred shekels. Therefore you can return to me a different two hundred shekels even in a deposit. In a loan that’s certainly true, and I’m saying even in a deposit, since the banknote as such has no significance at all; it is not an object. It is a symbol of the value of two hundred shekels, and if you return me a different two hundred shekels, that is perfectly fine; it’s the same thing. So what is the difference between this and a loan, for example? The difference is: when I deposited with you two hundred shekels, this is basically parallel to what I described as purchase-money. Remember the difference between purchase-money and a loan? In a loan, after I lent you two hundred shekels, I have nothing with you—not even the value of two hundred shekels. In purchase-money, I have with you two hundred shekels, the value of two hundred shekels, and in that sense this is like a deposit: I deposited with you two hundred shekels, I have with you value amounting to two hundred shekels. A practical difference: one can acquire with it. With a loan you cannot acquire, you cannot betroth a woman. But with this you can acquire. When I deposit with you two hundred shekels, it is as if you have—rather, I have with you—purchase-money, two hundred shekels. Therefore you can give me a different two hundred shekels; it is not that this specific note belongs to me. But it is not similar to a loan in the sense that I do have with you value amounting to two hundred shekels. One can betroth a woman with it, one can buy with it, and so on. Another example where you can see this is with the prohibition of interest. Yes, when I lend to you with interest, then basically I lent you money, and the interest is some kind of rental fee, right? What is interest? In interest you are basically paying me for the use of my money, not for my money itself, because my money you are going to return to me. So what is the interest for? Interest is payment for waiting on the money. It is the time during which you can make use of my money, right? So basically interest is a kind of rental of money. If I rent you a car, after some time you return the car to me. So what are you paying me rent for? For the time. I am giving you the time of use of the car. That’s the produce, right? The produce of the car. You can use it for a certain period, and for that you pay me. Now it turns out that with money there is a prohibition against renting money. I want to rent you money, give you my money, and you will pay me for the time during which you use my money. The Torah prohibits this. But there is a difference here between interest and the car, because with the car, after I gave you the car, you return to me the same car I gave you. If you return me a different car… then that would be like lending money, right? But with money, it’s not that you really need to return to me the exact money I gave you. Why? Because a loan is given to be spent. You do not have to return to me the money I gave you. So in what sense is this a rental of money? The answer is: it is a rental of value, not a rental of money. I gave you value that was mine; use it for a certain period, and after that period you can return value to me. But returning value to me does not mean returning the same coins I gave you, but only coins of the same value as the coins I gave you. Okay? We already saw that in a loan it’s not even exactly that, because you do not really have a specific value with you on my behalf. I gave you value, you must return value to me, but obviously not necessarily the same coins I gave you. And the meaning of interest—let’s put it this way—the prohibition of interest basically expresses another side of the same issue. I said that when I lend you money, I don’t have value with you. I gave you value that was mine, but I gave it to you as a gift. Once I gave it, I no longer have my value sitting with you. That is why there is a prohibition of interest, because the prohibition of interest basically means: I treat a loan as a kind of rental of money. So I gave you value that is mine, use it, and pay me rental fees on the value. So this basically means viewing a loan as though there is with you value that is mine, you use my value for a certain time, and for that you pay me interest, which is basically the rental fee. The prohibition of interest basically says, it seems to me at least, that this is not the correct way to look at it. A loan is not me giving you my value so you can use it; I gave you a gift, a certain value, and now it is yours. You are not using my value. Automatically, then, you cannot pay me interest, because interest is payment for my value that you are using, but there is no value of mine sitting with you, and therefore it makes no sense to pay interest on it.
[Speaker B] Is there a difference between lending money and lending a car? No. There’s no difference? So what, the car has to be the same car you return to me?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why it’s not a loan—what do you mean? That’s why it isn’t a loan. Because if it were a loan, then you could return a different car, and if that were the case, it would be forbidden to take payment for the use.
[Speaker B] Fine, so when I lend you a car, what is that called?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. Is it a loan? Obviously. And then it would be forbidden for me to take money from you for the rental.
[Speaker B] No, but when I lend you a car, I give you a car to use for some period of time, so can I rent you that car?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that’s not a loan, that’s a rental. A loan of a car would mean giving me a car, but I can give you a different car in its place when I repay the loan. In that situation you may not charge rental fees; that would be interest.
[Speaker B] Fine, so is there interest on things other than money too?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. That’s explicit in the Talmud. A loan is any loan, not just a money loan. In a rental, what happens is not a loan of a car but a rental of a car. The car you gave me is your car, and therefore when I use it I must pay you for it because I am using your car. But if you loan me a car, then I am using my car, not your car, so why on earth should I pay you for that? That’s interest. Got it.
[Speaker B] So in your view, what is the difference between a loan and borrowing? When the borrower takes from me the object that he wants, that he needs.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly the difference: in borrowing, when I borrow an object from you, the object I borrowed is yours, not mine, but in that case you waive payment for me—you are effectively renting it to me for free. In a rental. Fine, and what about borrowing with money? Borrowing of things.
[Speaker B] So what is borrowing with money?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I take the money and spend it.
[Speaker B] Yes, I spend it and then return it to you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what kind of borrowing is that? In lending an object, when I borrow, I have to return to you what I borrowed. There is a deposit of money, which is like borrowing—it isn’t exactly borrowing, it is a deposit. It is safekeeping. You have to be a guardian over an envelope with money. But even there, as I said before, when I return it to you, I think on the face of it you can return different banknotes too; you do not need to return the exact notes he gave.
[Speaker B] Yes, definitely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it is true that in a case where you deposited with me one hundred shekels, then there is with me one hundred shekels—value amounting to one hundred shekels—that is yours. But still, I am not obligated to return specifically the coin you gave me; I can give you a different note or a different coin. But, for example, if you want to betroth a woman with that or buy with that, you can, because there is with me value amounting to one hundred shekels that is yours. Fine. It’s very subtle, but it seems to me that in light of the definitions I’ve given here, it comes out very clearly. For example, in the Talmud regarding money acquisition, another example. Did I say? I don’t feel well. In the Talmud regarding money acquisition, the Talmud says that land is acquired by money. But movable goods, by Torah law, are acquired by money, whereas by rabbinic law they require pulling. Why? Lest he say to him: “Your wheat was burned in the attic.” Suppose I want to buy wheat from Eliav for one hundred shekels, all right? Now we discussed this at the beginning of the chapter HaZahav; the Talmud discusses how one acquires. So the Talmud says: if he took the money from me, I did not acquire the wheat from him. By Torah law yes, but by rabbinic enactment no, until I pull the wheat. But if I pulled the wheat, he acquired the money from me. There is an asymmetry between the money and the wheat, the merchandise. When you pull the merchandise, the money is acquired; when you pull the money, the merchandise is not acquired. In symbolic exchange it’s symmetrical—you can pull whichever of them you want and the other one is acquired. With money, no.
[Speaker B] You already talked about this.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now, why do you really need pulling? Why doesn’t money acquisition acquire? Because there is a concern lest he say, “Your wheat was burned in the attic.” If a fire breaks out and your wheat is still with me. My wheat is with Eliav, all right? And I paid him the money. Now if we were to say that payment of the money acquires the wheat, then if a fire broke out at Eliav’s house or warehouse there, the wheat would be burned and it would be my problem. I acquired the wheat and it burned—I’m the one who got hurt. He wouldn’t make the effort to save it, because why should he care? The wheat is my wheat. Therefore the Sages enacted that the wheat is not acquired by me until I pull it. The transfer of the money does not acquire the wheat. Now I ask: why are we not concerned lest he say, “Your money burned in the attic”? Because when I pull the wheat, the money is acquired by Eliav. But the money is still with me. So if a fire breaks out where I am, where the money is located, I’ll say to Eliav: “Your banknotes were burned in the attic.” Why is the money acquired? What do you say?
[Speaker E] Maybe the logic is that it simply becomes obligated to the transaction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.
[Speaker E] Maybe the money becomes bound to it—you have other money, money-equivalent; you aren’t necessarily obligated to give specific coins.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not exactly bound—that is exactly the point. Because what is acquired by him is not specific banknotes of money; what is acquired by him is value. The money is only an embodiment. So what difference does it make? And that value I can give him in this coin, or another coin, or whatever coin—it doesn’t matter. Therefore even if the money burns, it changes nothing; I will still have to give him value amounting to one hundred shekels. Therefore with money it makes no sense to say, “Your banknotes were burned in the attic,” only with merchandise. This is another indication of what I said earlier: when we say that he acquired the money, it does not mean that he acquired a specific coin of money; he acquired value amounting to one hundred shekels that is with me. He now has with me one hundred shekels’ worth of value, and this abstract value can never burn. It makes no sense to say about it, “Your money burned in the attic.” All right? That is another indication that acquiring money is not the same thing as acquiring merchandise. When one acquires money, the meaning is that there is with me value amounting to one hundred shekels that is yours, and you acquired it—but this is abstract value, it cannot burn. Therefore it makes no sense here to enact that you must pull the money in order to acquire it; you acquire value, not money. So when they say that when I pulled the merchandise you acquired the money, the intention is that a certain value located with me belongs to you—not coins, value. When I pay it to you, I’ll do it by means of coins, but what you acquired was not the coins; you acquired the value. Good, so that is another example. Rabbi?
[Speaker D] Yes. Rabbi, maybe the Rabbi should rest? What? Its suspension is its fulfillment—maybe the Rabbi should rest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, I’ll continue a few more minutes, I hope that’s all right. Look, the chapter HaZahav basically begins with various transactions. Buying silver with gold or gold with silver, and the attempt, the desire, is to clarify in each such transaction which side is the money and which side is the merchandise. The practical difference is what I just said now: if I pull the merchandise, the money is acquired, and if one pulls the money, the merchandise is not acquired. Therefore in every transaction it is important to define which side is the money and which side is the merchandise. Now why is this complicated? Because we know that a money-equivalent is like money. Therefore even if I owe you one hundred shekels, I can give you a lamb worth one hundred shekels and it will serve as the money. So now when I buy tomatoes from you and pay you in cash, then ostensibly it is obvious that the tomatoes are the merchandise and the money is the money here, right? But in fact it is very unclear, because I can relate to the tomatoes as money-equivalent, and then the tomatoes too are money. And vice versa: I can say that I want the money from you and I am paying you tomatoes in exchange for it. Why decide that the tomatoes are the merchandise and the money is the money? Or, for example, I can give you tomatoes and receive a chair in exchange for them, because money-equivalent is like money. Now originally exchanging tomatoes for a chair was a symbolic exchange acquisition, but once money acquisition was introduced, one can define the exchange of tomatoes for a chair as a money acquisition, not as symbolic exchange. And then we will have to think: what here is the merchandise and what is the money? It is very unclear. Once you define it as a money acquisition and not symbolic exchange, then it is very important to define which thing is the merchandise and which thing is the money. I’ll give you several examples where this question comes up and they shed light on the fact that it is not really clear what the merchandise is and what the money is. For example, the Mishnah in tractate Shevi’it, chapter 8, says that one does not pay for labor with Sabbatical-year produce. When you go to the barber and he cuts your hair, you cannot pay him with Sabbatical-year produce. So the Chazon Ish asks: why say that the grocer is paying the barber with Sabbatical-year produce? Say that the barber is paying the grocer with labor. Essentially the produce is the merchandise, not the money, and the labor is the money. Then that also solves the problem that one may not hand over Sabbatical-year money to an ignoramus—not important right now, it solves various problems as well. So there are different answers that are given to this. But it seems to me that the simple explanation is—and there are many, many questions of this type, and I think they all have the same explanation—what defines the concept of money follows from what I’ve discussed up to now. When I go to the barber, what I basically want is a haircut. I pay him with Sabbatical-year produce. The barber—the initiator of the transaction is me, not the barber. The merchandise that I wanted to buy was the haircut. The Sabbatical-year produce I pay him not because he specifically wanted Sabbatical-year produce, but because I owe him one hundred shekels, and the Sabbatical-year produce is money-equivalent that serves me to pay him the hundred shekels that are due to him. I could also have paid him with a lamb or with a coin worth one hundred shekels or a hundred-shekel note or with produce. Wherever I use produce, or an instrument, or whatever it may be, as value, as payment, then that thing is the money. And the one who initiated the transaction is me. I wanted a haircut. Therefore it is obvious that the haircut he gave me is not money-equivalent; it is the merchandise. And the payment I give him is the money, even if I give it to him in produce or in a utensil. It doesn’t matter. Since here I could have given it to him as a chair, I could have given it to him as a lamb. I give him something, but I could have given him anything else. Once I could have given him anything else, whatever I give him is the money of the transaction, and what he gives me is the merchandise.
[Speaker D] Why isn’t that just the primitive straightforward symbolic exchange? I understand. I’m asking what the difference is between that and straightforward symbolic exchange.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, I’m saying this is only a matter of definition. I could have defined it as symbolic exchange. But if I defined it as payment, as money, then here what is defined as money is the produce and not the haircut. Maybe I could also have done symbolic exchange. In the case of labor you can’t do symbolic exchange, at least not equal-for-equal symbolic exchange. Because you are not receiving from him some kind of object, and we said symbolic exchange is exchange of object for object. Therefore here one performs an acquisition that is a money acquisition. But when you define a money acquisition, still, even in a money acquisition there is a side that is money and a side that is merchandise. And how do you define which side is the money and which side is the merchandise? I say: the side wanted specifically is the merchandise. The side where I don’t care what you give me—that is the money. Okay? And this solves a great many difficulties that the later authorities get tangled up in. Now that I’ve defined it, I think it looks completely simple. There is no reason to get tangled up in it. It is entirely clear. I’ll give you another example.
[Speaker D] Wait, Rabbi, but the barber may specifically want produce and not other things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he stipulates that he specifically wants these produce items, then that really won’t be money. Only if I give him these produce items as value that he is prepared to accept as equivalent value. But if he had initiated the transaction, and he had wanted produce from me, and he had said to me, “I’ll cut your hair in exchange for that instead of your paying me,” then the haircut would be the money and the produce would be the merchandise. It’s all relative. The whole question is what is wanted specifically and what is given only because of its value.
[Speaker B] Isn’t it that, in short, the whole question is who initiated what, who initiated what. But even if the barber is interested in produce, if—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who initiated the transaction, the customer or the barber?
[Speaker B] No, the customer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The customer. So that means the haircut is the merchandise. And the barber says: I have no problem, I need produce, so I’m willing for you to pay me in produce too, that’s fine. But he would also have been willing to accept money, not just produce. I, in exchange for these produce items, would not have been willing to receive money—I want a haircut. Therefore the haircut is the merchandise and the produce is the money.
[Speaker B] No, but now that he receives produce he says to himself, good for me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course good for me, otherwise he wouldn’t have agreed to accept it, but that doesn’t matter. He still accepts it—he would also have agreed to take money; it’s just that he doesn’t mind taking produce too, because produce is also fine. As long as he did not initiate it because he specifically wanted produce, but merely agrees to produce because from his point of view that’s also okay, then the produce is the money. For example, in the Shulchan Arukh, section 293 in Choshen Mishpat, if you stipulate with a hired worker who worked for you—say I hire a worker and stipulate that I will give him a lamb as payment—then the Talmud says if the worker worked, he did not acquire the lamb.
[Speaker C] And there too it also says another novel point, that he is not obligated to give him the lamb but can pay him with anything else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why can he give him anything else? Because the lamb here was given as value; it was not merchandise. Therefore the fact that you said you would give him a lamb is not specific. Rather, you mean that he agreed to a lamb, but essentially the lamb here was money. If so, then you are not obligated to give him a lamb; you can also give him something else. There is a Rashba, for example, in Ketubot on page 56. The Rashba—the Talmud says there that one who betroths a woman on condition that he has no obligation toward her of food, clothing, and conjugal rights, then the condition is valid because this is a stipulation concerning monetary matters; one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, in a monetary matter, his stipulation stands. The Rashba says: that is only with food and clothing, not with conjugal rights. Because food and clothing are merchandise that I obligate myself to provide to the woman, so that is a monetary matter and one can stipulate about it. But conjugal rights are a commandment specifically as such. That is what the Rashba says. So the later authorities ask: but what do you mean? Conjugal rights are a kind of benefit worth money, and the woman can waive it, so why can’t one stipulate concerning it? He says: because the obligation of conjugal rights is not a monetary obligation. Conjugal rights are not given as money-equivalent. True, the woman can waive it if you give her something else instead, but conjugal rights you owe her specifically as conjugal rights, not as monetary value. Clothing you can give her money and she can buy clothing with it, but for conjugal rights you owe her the conjugal rights themselves. Even if she can waive conjugal rights for a certain period, you still cannot stipulate away conjugal rights because that is not called a monetary matter. Now there are also various other difficulties that can be resolved in the same way, but I’m saying these are all applications of the same point. I just want to finish with one point. The Talmud in the chapter HaZahav—many also struggle with it—the Talmud discusses there when I exchange silver for gold, then the Talmud discusses which is the merchandise and which is the money. And the Talmud brings two criteria there: marketability and importance—I mentioned this, I think. Marketability means something that circulates in commerce, and importance means something important. In the end the Talmud says that gold is the merchandise and silver is the money. Silver the metal, yes, is the money. Why does the question even arise there? Marketability and importance are not the concepts that define money. There are many later authorities who claim that this is the definition of money—marketability and importance. That is not correct. The definition of money is what I said earlier: non-specific payment, payment that you give only for its value. That is the definition of money, something that is value. But when you buy a silver coin with a gold coin or a gold coin with a silver coin, then on both sides there is something that is value. I specifically want gold coins and am willing to give you silver coins for them. In that case this is money in exchange for money. If you want to define it as a money acquisition, then there it really is not clear what is the money and what is the merchandise, because on both sides there really is value. Only in cases where it is not clear what the money is and what the merchandise is does the Talmud try to define artificially what is the money and what is the merchandise, and then marketability and importance serve as the Talmud’s criteria. For example, the decisors say that if you specifically want a certain silver coin, then that silver coin will not be the money; it will be the merchandise. And the whole discussion of the Talmud at the beginning of the chapter HaZahav has nothing to do with the question of what money is. People who try to define the concept of money go straight to the passage at the beginning of HaZahav—that is a mistake. The Talmud there is not dealing with the definition of what money is. The definition of what money is is what I said here, and it is entirely clear. The Talmud there is discussing the question: when both sides in the transaction are defined as money, how can I nonetheless define a transaction so that it will be a money acquisition? Relatively speaking, yes? Gold versus silver—which is the relative money? The Talmud says: when you are discussing relatively, the one that circulates more in commerce is considered the money in that transaction. But all of that is only in a situation where both sides are money. It is not really the definition of the concept of money in that passage. The definition of the concept of money is that one is talking only about its value—that is the definition of the concept of money. Good, let’s stop here. I apologize for the interruptions I made. No problem. Does anyone else want to comment or ask something?
[Speaker B] Just one question, if possible?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Speak loudly, I can’t hear.
[Speaker B] Just one question? In the Talmud it says that it is permitted to steal less than a perutah’s worth, right? So according to you, since you defined the prohibition “you shall not steal” by first defining the other person’s right, and “you shall not steal” is derived from the other person’s right—that my obligation is derived from the other person’s right, your whole thesis—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have no right over less than a perutah’s worth.
[Speaker B] I have no right over less than a perutah’s worth? Why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it isn’t money. Some explain it by the law of a partial measure, and then indeed it would also be forbidden, but that Rashi people bring, according to which there isn’t even a prohibition of a partial measure, means that it is completely permitted. So the claim is that less than a perutah’s worth is simply not money.
[Speaker B] So according to Rashi it is literally permitted?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It isn’t value; it isn’t worth anything.
[Speaker B] Fine, so according to your approach, would it be permitted to save myself using another person’s property if it is worth less than a perutah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently yes, because there is no theft here.
[Speaker B] But I’m saying that even though—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a utensil worth less than a perutah, then no.
[Speaker B] What, what, what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a utensil worth less than a perutah, then no. With a coin, with money that is worth less than a perutah—maybe then no. With a utensil worth less than a perutah, that is something else. Fine, but—because, for example, you can perform symbolic exchange with it, you can make—
[Speaker B] use of it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, fine, but the value of—
[Speaker B] less than a perutah’s worth is not value. Yes, I’m talking about money worth less than a perutah—who says that isn’t value? It’s my right, it’s my right to hold that money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi’s view is like that; the view of other medieval authorities (Rishonim) is not. No, but I’m talking about your thesis, not according to Rashi or Tosafot and so on. Whether less than—according to my own view as well, you can say it this way and you can say it that way. The question is whether half a perutah is value.
[Speaker B] So is it value or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Rashi says no, others say yes; I don’t know how to determine that.
[Speaker B] Okay. But if it has value, why would it be permitted to steal it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it has value, then it’s forbidden. Forbidden perhaps under the rule of a partial measure, but it’s forbidden.
[Speaker B] Under the rule of a partial measure with regard to theft?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are those who claim that a Jew waives a claim to less than a perutah, but a gentile, for example, does not waive a claim to less than a perutah, and then it would be forbidden. If a Jew waives it, then that’s a straightforward waiver, so you violated the prohibition of theft, but there is no obligation to return it, because a Jew waives it.
[Speaker B] But it’s not a law agreed upon by everyone that it’s permitted to steal less than the value of a perutah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. What is agreed upon is that you don’t have to return it. And there are those who claim that you don’t have to return it because there is waiver on less than a perutah.
[Speaker B] But the prohibition of theft still applies? Yes, under the rule of a partial measure. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, thank you very much. All right, goodbye.
[Speaker E] Sabbath shalom.