Authority and Change in Halakha, Lecture 15

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Changing Torah-level laws and the nullification of the rationale
Midrashic conservatism, plain-reading conservatism, and the naturalistic fallacy
Grounding a midrash: sources, indications, and halakhic implications
Women as witnesses: evidentiary difficulty, exegesis, and doubt about the source of the disqualification
Reasoning as a driver of change when there is no evidence, and the example of the Meiri
The price of error in both directions, and the response to fears of Reform
“We do not expound the rationale of the verse” and the scope of that rule
Rejecting the claim of “hidden reasons” as a defense against change
Rabbinic laws: the requirement of a religious court and the apparent lock-in
Actual changes in rabbinic law and interpretive mechanisms among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)
Concern versus enactment, uncovered water, and when the reason appears in the wording of the decree
The interpretation that the enactment never applied in the first place to a certain reality
The example of Rabbi Yishmael, practical distinctions, and temporary emergency rulings
Conclusion: moving from the topic of Torah-level law to rabbinic law

Summary

General Overview

The speaker argues that in Torah-level law, a change in circumstances that removes the rationale is not considered a change in law at all, but rather the correct interpretation of the law, because the Sages interpreted the Torah rather than established the law. Therefore, when reality changes, the practical law changes accordingly. He presents the need for “midrashic conservatism,” which adds an interpretive assumption connecting facts to norm in order to legitimate change, and connects this to the naturalistic fallacy and to the example of women’s fitness to testify. In rabbinic law, he points to the Talmud’s innovation that sometimes even when the rationale has lapsed, a religious court is still required, and according to Maimonides it must even be greater in wisdom and number. But he emphasizes that in practice the medieval authorities (Rishonim) changed rabbinic laws through various interpretive mechanisms, because “life is stronger than the rules.”

Changing Torah-level laws and the nullification of the rationale

The speaker states that in Torah-level law, if the rationale no longer applies because reality has changed, this is not defined as change, and the proper ruling is a different ruling. Maimonides appears to agree, and there is no reason to assume otherwise as long as there is no other source. He defines this by saying that the Sages do not “determine” Torah-level law but interpret the Torah, and therefore when circumstances change there is no reason to continue with what used to be.

Midrashic conservatism, plain-reading conservatism, and the naturalistic fallacy

The speaker distinguishes between midrashic conservatism, which requires an interpretive reading showing that the Jewish law depends on some circumstantial parameter, and plain-reading conservatism, which simply leaves the Jewish law “as it was” without exegesis. He argues that plain-reading conservatism is a fiction, and that in practice it is more of a Haredi ethos than a reality. He connects this to the naturalistic fallacy: moving from facts to a halakhic norm is invalid without an additional interpretive premise, such as the premise that the disqualification of women from testimony stems from lack of education or lack of involvement in the marketplace.

Grounding a midrash: sources, indications, and halakhic implications

The speaker says that to ground such an interpretation one has to study the Talmudic passages and the sources and look for whether the Sages explained the disqualification, or what legal implications testify to its explanation, and from those implications infer the rationale. He brings an example from the disqualification of wicked people from testimony and the dispute between Abaye and Rava, and presents in the name of the Ketzot a possibility that the dispute concerns whether the disqualification is due to suspicion of lying or an intrinsic personal disqualification. He illustrates this from the disqualification of relatives and from the rule of “its beginning in fitness and its end in fitness,” from which one infers that the disqualification of relatives is an intrinsic personal disqualification and not suspicion of lying. He adds that the formulation of the law is that “the Torah disqualified the testimony of relatives not because they are suspected of lying, but as a scriptural decree.”

Women as witnesses: evidentiary difficulty, exegesis, and doubt about the source of the disqualification

The speaker says that in the case of women it is difficult to extract a clear explanation from the Talmudic discussions, and there are statements such as “women are light-minded,” but it is unclear whether they explain the disqualification or not. Earlier commentators proposed such explanations before the issue became practically relevant. He presents a difficulty with the exegesis “and the two men shall stand… men and not women,” and emphasizes that it is “very problematic,” because “the men who have the dispute” refers to the litigants, not the witnesses, and in many places “men” includes women as well. He says he has no record of when the law was first introduced, and raises the possibility that the exegesis came to anchor a law that was already in the background, while admitting that “other than the Talmud there is nothing else.”

Reasoning as a driver of change when there is no evidence, and the example of the Meiri

The speaker asks what one does when there is no exegesis and no evidence either way, and argues that a good logical argument can suffice if it is made with intellectual honesty and not “manufactured just to reach the desired result.” He brings the Meiri as an example, who changed the halakhic attitude toward gentiles because they were “bound by the norms of the nations,” and presents the Meiri as grounding this on the reality in which he lived, “on nothing at all” in the textual sources. He rejects the claim “because we imagine, shall we act?” as a sweeping barrier, and argues that continuing to conduct oneself “as it was” is not “playing it safe,” because if a change is truly required, then failure to change is negligence both toward women and toward the litigants.

The price of error in both directions, and the response to fears of Reform

The speaker states that there is a price in both directions if one is mistaken, and there is no side that is simply playing it safe. He argues that fear of the Reform movement should not prevent needed changes, and even says that precisely making changes where possible is a way to deal with Reform, because otherwise “they discover that you’re just talking nonsense,” and then they won’t believe you even when change really is impossible. He raises the need for oversight and consensus as a matter of common sense rather than a formal halakhic requirement, and adds that where opposition stems from a conservatism unwilling to consider arguments on their merits, he is less troubled by the absence of consensus. He brings as an example Rabbi Shafran’s claim about tekhelet as “an opening for the innovators.”

“We do not expound the rationale of the verse” and the scope of that rule

The speaker distinguishes between a law explicitly written in the Torah and a law derived through exegesis, and argues that “we do not expound the rationale of the verse” applies mainly to laws written explicitly. He brings the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda about “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral” and explains that the rationale there is suspicion caused by nighttime visits, not the question of wealth. He argues that exegesis itself is intertwined with reasoning, and therefore in laws that are products of interpretation there is room for conceptual interpretation. He explains that almost all the laws we possess are products of interpretation or exegesis, so the rule becomes very narrow. He notes in the name of Rabbi Kook that in the future the Sanhedrin will be able to annul both the rule that we do not expound the rationale of the verse and the rule that one cannot disagree with an earlier religious court unless one is greater than it in wisdom and number.

Rejecting the claim of “hidden reasons” as a defense against change

The speaker addresses the idea that behind the laws there are hidden reasons, and stresses that he does not accept using that in principle to block change, whether in rabbinic law or Torah-level law. He says that if there is an obvious rationale that explains everything and there is no indication that it is mistaken, there is no logic in assuming hidden reasons. Only when there are indications that the explanation does not fit is he willing to say that not everything is understood.

Rabbinic laws: the requirement of a religious court and the apparent lock-in

The speaker says that in rabbinic law, even when the rationale has lapsed this is still considered a change that requires a religious court, and according to Maimonides it must even be a court greater in wisdom and number, while according to the Raavad a court is needed but not one greater in wisdom and number. He emphasizes that the discussion of change applies only in relation to an authoritative body such as the Sanhedrin or the Talmud, whereas interpretations by medieval authorities (Rishonim) do not enter the issue of “changes” from the standpoint of formal authority. He presents the situation as one in which, apparently, in a generation without a Sanhedrin “the gates of change have been locked” in rabbinic law, but argues that in practice there are paths showing that things are “not so simple.”

Actual changes in rabbinic law and interpretive mechanisms among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)

The speaker refers to Neria Guttel’s book, The Changing of Natures in Jewish Law, and argues that in the last chapter dozens of sources were collected from the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who changed rabbinic laws even without a Sanhedrin. He brings examples from Tosafot in Avodah Zarah and in Eizehu Neshekh of leniencies arising from livelihood needs and the king’s tax, and presents this as change driven by existential difficulty and not as a pure interpretation of the boundaries of the enactment. He cites Tosafot in Beitzah about the prohibition on attending to the needs of the dead on the second festival day when “there are Chaverim,” and states that Tosafot permits it “nowadays, when there are no Chaverim,” emphasizing that it says there, “one cannot say that another quorum is required to permit it,” because it is “due to a concern,” and when “the concern has passed,” “the rationale has passed.”

Concern versus enactment, uncovered water, and when the reason appears in the wording of the decree

The speaker argues that a concern not anchored as a formal enactment by an authorized institution is not like an established law. He gives as an example the distinction between a mere concern and a decree established by a religious court, such as poultry with milk. He quotes Tosafot, who cite the law of uncovered water, prohibited because “perhaps a snake drank from it,” and conclude that when “snakes are not common among us,” one may drink it ab initio, even though it is “a matter established by quorum,” while noting that Rabbenu Tam would prohibit it. He presents another mechanism according to which, when the rationale appears in the actual wording of the decree itself, such as the formula “one may not read by candlelight lest he tilt the lamp,” there is room to say that when the rationale does not apply, it was never prohibited to begin with. He adds that the responsa of the Rosh (section 2) writes that where the rationale is clear, one may change even in rabbinic law.

The interpretation that the enactment never applied in the first place to a certain reality

The speaker cites the Ran and the Pri Chadash as saying that “another quorum is required to permit it” applies only to a matter that had a rationale for prohibition at the outset and then that rationale ceased. But where the rationale never applied “from the outset” to a certain reality, there is no need for another quorum to permit it. He applies this to giving a gift to a gentile on the day of his festival, and argues that the prohibition applies only “at a time when they worship idolatry.” He suggests that broadening this type of interpretation can also explain moves such as the Meiri’s, as a claim that the enactments were never stated in the first place regarding gentiles who are “bound by the norms of the nations.” He says that “there is no general rule of no distinctions,” except in places where it is clear that the Sages deliberately made such a rule.

The example of Rabbi Yishmael, practical distinctions, and temporary emergency rulings

The speaker brings the Talmudic story of Rabbi Yishmael, who read by candlelight and tilted the lamp, and said, “How great are the words of my colleagues,” and quotes the author of Chazut Kashot, who suggests that a Torah scholar may weigh the rationale of the enactment as it applies to himself, except that Rabbi Yishmael erred in evaluating himself. He notes that in practice distinctions are found among later authorities (Acharonim), such as permitting reading by candlelight with a guard present, and presents this as a process in which need and rationale shape the boundaries of application. He adds that a temporary emergency ruling also operates even against an earlier religious court when “the hour requires it” and where there are harms, and it allows frontal change both in rabbinic law and in Torah-level law.

Conclusion: moving from the topic of Torah-level law to rabbinic law

The speaker concludes that in Torah-level law, changed circumstances lead to renewed interpretation that is not considered change, and in rabbinic law, although the rules are more rigid, there are practical and interpretive channels that allow adjustments. Therefore, “even on the rabbinic plane there are quite a few channels that allow us to work.”

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So last time we talked about changing Torah-level laws, and I argued that unlike rabbinic laws, with Torah-level laws, if the rationale no longer applies, then basically that isn’t even defined as a change at all—or at least that also seems to be implied by Maimonides’ language, and there’s no reason to assume otherwise. In principle, even with rabbinic laws—that is, if the situation changes and the rationale is no longer relevant—then on the face of it, were it not for what appears in the Talmud, I would say there’s no problem at all. So the previous law is nullified because the reality is different and it’s no longer relevant. There is a novelty in the Talmud that with rabbinic laws this is still called a change, and therefore you need a religious court that is even greater in wisdom and number according to Maimonides; according to the Raavad, no—you need a religious court, but not one greater in wisdom and number. But with Torah-level law, both in Maimonides’ formulation and as long as there is no other source, there’s no reason to assume anything else: if reality changes, then obviously the law is a different law. Meaning, the Sages did not establish the Torah-level law; the Sages interpreted the Torah. And once the circumstances are different, there’s no reason to continue with what used to be. And I brought those examples of swimsuits, and we applied that a bit to women’s testimony, and basically I said that changes in Jewish law can also take place within a conservative framework—what I called midrashic conservatism versus plain-reading conservatism—where midrashic conservatism basically says that you need to make some kind of interpretive move on the existing law in order to show that it depends on some circumstantial parameter, some factual parameter, and if that changes then you can change the law. In contrast, plain-reading conservatives supposedly stay with the law as-is, meaning just as it was, without making interpretive moves. I said that’s a fiction. There are no such conservatives. Meaning, that’s just the Haredi ethos; in practice the Haredi world is not like that, but the ethos is like that. Yes, I mentioned my uncle, that father and the rebbe learned in Yiddish. In any case, that’s just to close the circle I opened at the beginning of the previous lecture. It connects to what I spoke about at the beginning regarding the naturalistic fallacy—that we can’t derive a normative conclusion from factual premises. I said there that if I say women in the past weren’t educated, women today are educated, therefore today women should be accepted as witnesses or judges—that argument is invalid. It’s invalid because its premises are facts and its conclusion is a norm, a halakhic norm, that women should be accepted as witnesses. And for the argument to be valid, what else has to be added? No key? Right, I don’t have one today exactly—I didn’t bring it because my wife drove.

[Speaker C] Of all days, today you needed it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Murphy’s law.

[Speaker B] I’m counting on that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I usually bring it. Today my wife drove, she came with me, so the keychain stayed at home.

[Speaker B] It’s always the woman’s fault.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “The woman whom You gave to be with me—she led me astray.” Led me astray? Exactly, led me astray. So in order to complete the argument, you need to add some further premise saying that the disqualification of a woman as a witness is because of lack of education or lack of involvement in the marketplace. That’s the interpretive move I spoke about at the end of the lecture. What midrashic conservatism does is take the facts—the facts are that people wore swimsuits, those are the facts—now what? The weather turned cold. So can you change? No, make an interpretation. What does the interpretation say? That the reason they wore swimsuits was because that was the garment suited to the weather; now the garment suited to the weather has changed, so the garment suited to the weather is now different. Once I’ve made that interpretive move, I can change. It’s exactly the same structure as the argument for validating women as witnesses. So in fact, what I opened with—the point that you need to add one more premise beyond the factual premises—connects to what I said at the end of the lecture, and I simply didn’t close that point last time: that in order to make a change within a world committed to Jewish law, you need to make an interpretation. And that interpretation basically means adding that same interpretive premise that says how the law depends on the facts.

[Speaker C] And that interpretation is based on today—on what we think.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, now about that I’m going to say a bit more now.

[Speaker C] What about “we do not expound the rationale of the verse”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Remind me about that after I speak about this, okay? Because that’s true, it really needs to be addressed too. So first of all, the question really is how you make this interpretation, because that’s the root of the whole matter. If you find such an interpretation, then basically… then the change is a legitimate change. You’re committed to Jewish law; you’re just saying, the question is what does the law say? So if you make an interpretation, then that’s what the law says, and now there’s no problem at all. The question is how you can ground such an interpretation. Bring such an interpretation, by the way, and everybody will agree with you. Everything’s fine. We do things like this all the time, provided that you have some interpretation you can rely on. Now the question is how to make such an interpretation. Look, there are situations where you can do it—let’s go back, for example, to women’s fitness as witnesses. When I want to find—basically, when I want to make an interpretation, I need to find out why a woman is disqualified from testimony and see whether today’s reality is different or not. On what basis will I do that? In principle I’m supposed to look at the Talmudic passages, at the sources of Jewish law, and see whether the Sages explained why a woman is disqualified from testimony. It could be that they explained it, or at least that there are halakhic implications that testify to the explanation. We can infer the explanation from those halakhic implications. And if we find that it really depends on education or whatever parameter has changed, then there’s a basis for change.

[Speaker C] Where did the Sages get that knowledge from?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It was known through tradition, or from our standpoint, what appears in the Talmud is authoritative. Meaning, we can rely on it. That’s the basic assumption. Otherwise I don’t need any of this.

[Speaker C] If the Sages brought it as the basis for change, could it be that these are just things the Sages said?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—not as a basis for change.

[Speaker C] It could be that the Sages often expounded the rationale of the verse and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sages didn’t discuss expounding the rationale of the verse; they discussed halakhic implications. When something halakhic is said, that’s not “the rationale of the verse.” I’ll give an example. For instance, in the context of fitness for testimony that I spoke about—the fitness of women—let’s talk about wicked people. The disqualification of wicked people from testimony. There’s a dispute between Abaye and Rava, whether it’s specifically a wicked person guilty of monetary wrongdoing or a Torah-level wicked person, in the third chapter of Sanhedrin. The Ketzot explains that the dispute is over whether the disqualification of a wicked person from testimony is because of suspicion of lying or because it’s an intrinsic personal disqualification. The one who says it’s only someone guilty of monetary wrongdoing—the claim is that this is suspicion of lying. Because someone suspected of falsehood for money can’t be trusted regarding testimony because of money, false testimony, or something like that. But if it’s a disqualification due to wickedness—I don’t know, he eats pork or something like that—then that has nothing to do with suspicion of lying. Someone suspected regarding money isn’t thereby suspected regarding an oath; someone suspected regarding a prohibition isn’t thereby suspected regarding money. So it’s not because of suspicion. Rather, what is it? There is a disqualification of wickedness: a wicked person is disqualified from testimony. Okay? So that’s the question. The Ketzot—it doesn’t matter that there are lots of disputes here, the Ketzot is not agreed upon, I’m only bringing this as an example. In any case, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) discuss it. The medieval and later authorities (Acharonim), more explicitly, discuss the question whether the disqualification of a wicked person from testimony is an intrinsic personal disqualification or suspicion of lying. And that has various implications. For example, regarding relatives, we know—this is an explicit Talmudic passage that is always cited—about a relative who saw the testimony while he was still a relative and later became no longer related. Okay? So the question is whether we suspect him or not. In principle, whether we disqualify him or not. If it’s suspicion of lying, then he should be fit now to testify. Right? Because now he’s already distant, so what’s the problem? But if I say that he is disqualified and that we require “its beginning in fitness and its end in fitness,” which is what the Talmud says, then this is really an intrinsic personal disqualification, not suspicion of lying. Because now he’s distant. So if someone got divorced or something like that, it can be a relative who became distant. “He knew of the testimony before he became his son-in-law, and then he became his son-in-law,” or the reverse, right? So from that Talmudic passage in Bava Batra they infer that the disqualification of relatives is an intrinsic personal disqualification and not suspicion of lying. Here’s an example of one of the disqualifications from testimony where the Talmud says it explicitly, but certainly the medieval and later authorities also derive from this—it appears in Maimonides, in the Shulchan Arukh—that “the Torah disqualified the testimony of relatives not because they are suspected of lying, but as a scriptural decree.” Right? So we learn that from the Talmud. We could have learned that it’s suspicion of lying, and if it is suspicion of lying, then the same question can be asked about a wicked person. And with a wicked person too there are various implications. For example, if a wicked person repented—someone saw the event when he was wicked, and then he repented by the time he comes to testify. Various things. Through different indications in the laws concerning wicked people, one can examine whether a wicked person is disqualified because of suspicion of lying or because of intrinsic status. For example, whether it’s specifically someone guilty of monetary wrongdoing or not—that’s one of the indications the Ketzot brings. So there are various ways to see from the Talmudic discussions how the Talmud understood disqualification from testimony. In the same way, we can examine the discussions dealing with the disqualification of women and see from that how the Talmud understood women’s disqualification. Now, if I can prove that the Talmud understood women’s disqualification only because, say, they weren’t educated, then that is definitely a basis for change. Meaning, that would mean that if now they are educated, then everything is fine. Now specifically with women it’s quite hard to extract the matter. There are various questions whether it’s connected to “women are light-minded” or not; in the Talmud there is a not entirely clear expression whether it is connected or not connected, and in the medieval commentators and even more in the later authorities there are statements in both directions. But here and there there are such remarks. Here and there there are such remarks even from before this was relevant, so back then people still talked freely. Meaning, before… no one was saying, wait a second, if that’s the only problem then we can change it, because today women are different. Today no one would say such a thing, but once, before it was on the table, yes, they did suggest such explanations—that they are light-minded or things like that.

[Speaker C] Exactly the opposite: precisely because it wasn’t so relevant, it could be that the commentators weren’t compelled.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They weren’t compelled, but so what if they weren’t compelled? Still, that’s the explanation they give.

[Speaker C] I think with things like that, if we didn’t see that the Sages themselves—on the contrary—then it’s clean, because it’s not… And if the Sages themselves didn’t draw practical implications—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t mean they examined it…

[Speaker C] If you find—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —a practical implication and show me that the Sages didn’t make it, that would be evidence. You don’t find any implication that they made because they had nothing on the table.

[Speaker C] You can’t say about something that had no practical implication. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They had no evidence on the table. What’s the problem?

[Speaker C] They didn’t examine it decisively enough to know it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I have no other evidence and someone proposes an explanation, why assume that explanation is wrong? Do you have any evidence to the contrary? Because there are other rabbinic interpretations that are… what? What do you mean by interpretations? I’m not talking here about the Sages, I’m talking about later commentators, but fine, they are interpreting, they are saying it’s absurd because of this. So what’s the problem? Why not? In a moment I’ll sharpen this more. Let’s talk about what to do when there is no evidence at all. I’ll go even further with you.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, this is a little off to the side of the discussion. I can’t free myself from the technical problem every time. The Rabbi starts somewhere in the Talmud: like this and not like that. Our rabbis came to the people and told them, listen, we need to… they came and said that a woman is disqualified from testifying there. He’s standing there at Mount Sinai. So what happened now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no idea what happened there. I have no record of when this disqualification dates from. It’s an exegesis. Yes, apparently it was before… an exegesis, not even a very persuasive one. A very problematic exegesis.

[Speaker C] Could you illustrate which verse it’s based on?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And the two men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord.” Men and not women.

[Speaker F] Men and not women.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, “the men who have the dispute” refers בכלל to the litigants, not to the witnesses. Right, it’s very problematic. And everywhere in the Torah—after all, Torah law treats a woman like a man for all punishments in the Torah.

[Speaker D] Everywhere it says—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “men,” it means both men and women. That’s explicit in the Sages. And here they say, “And the two men shall stand”—men and not women. That somewhat strengthens even more, I’m saying—there are many strange exegeses, and we don’t always understand how the Sages made exegeses. I’m saying, this even somewhat strengthens the claim that this is an exegesis that basically comes to anchor some law that the Sages had already decided on in advance. And they decided it based on reason, or because they thought women were disqualified.

[Speaker D] I actually think they decided as if… it’s not that they decided… it’s like the Meiri’s explanation regarding idol worshipers…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The exegesis is just an asmachta.

[Speaker D] Right, because he had a certain reality and he just dressed the verse onto it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes, maybe no.

[Speaker G] Usually that’s how it is, no? What? The Sages determine something and then find for it…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know if that’s usually how it is. There needs to be a rationale, but when the exegesis holds water—

[Speaker G] Then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t care if the rationale is in the background. But when the exegesis is weaker… we’ll get there; that’s the second question Ouri asked, I’ll get to it in a moment.

[Speaker C] The question of indications from the time Israel left Egypt and so on and so on, regarding women’s testimony.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t know of any such indications.

[Speaker C] No, I’m just saying that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I have no idea when this law was introduced. There’s this exegesis in tractate Shevuot. When did it happen? Whether it was an earlier tradition? I don’t know. I simply don’t know. The truth is that among…

[Speaker D] Other than the Talmud there’s nothing else. What? Other than the Talmud…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud itself can tell us. The Talmud at the end of the discussion of ritual handwashing says that it is an enactment of King Solomon. The Talmud can say something is ancient. The Talmud can say it is a law given to Moses at Sinai.

[Speaker D] Aside from that, almost everything is exegesis from the Talmud onward.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And about exegesis I’ll speak in a moment. Right—exegesis is almost essential. So I’ll ask an even more far-reaching question. I have no exegesis. I found no evidence in either direction—not in the Talmud, not anywhere. Not in reasoning, not in the early commentators, not in the later commentators, nothing. I found nothing. What does reason say?

[Speaker D] What do I do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So let’s return to the Meiri. We saw the Meiri in the previous lecture. The Meiri spoke about changing the attitude toward gentiles: that the gentiles in his time were bound by the norms of the nations, and therefore the very attitude toward them should be like the attitude toward a Jew, in terms of interpersonal conduct. Okay, he didn’t permit marrying them, and he also didn’t permit items of worship—I mentioned that. But in terms of how they are treated, an attitude toward them as human beings, like toward Jews, like toward anyone else. What did he base that on? I went through it systematically—on nothing at all.

[Speaker D] On the reality he lived in.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On nothing at all. He simply looked around and said, listen, I see normal, reasonable people around me, and it cannot be that the Torah would not relate to them as human beings, and that’s all. And therefore he changed the law. What does that mean? It means that if you have a rationale—a good rationale, not something manufactured just in order to reach the result you want to reach—and of course that’s a matter of intellectual honesty, and that’s why there is logic in asking for some sort of consensus here, to see that people aren’t just doing whatever they want. Let’s say—what is the principle? You have some rationale that explains the law. Okay? You have no source, no precise proof from the Talmud, from any source, not from the medieval authorities, not from the later authorities. And if there had been medieval or later authorities, where would they have gotten it from? But never mind, let’s say you have nothing, okay? Still, I have a rationale. Now what? You tell me, okay, but bottom line, you want to validate women as witnesses. Up to now it’s been accepted that they’re disqualified, right? You have some rationale to validate them, and “because we imagine, shall we act?” After all, you have some rationale, you imagine it, maybe yes, maybe no. But that’s a very problematic claim. It’s a very problematic claim because you who don’t want to change also have no argument. So now I ask you—look, I have a reasonable argument. Fine, you also agree that it’s reasonable, only you tell me, yes, but maybe there is some other argument. It’s not necessary, you can’t prove it. Agreed. And I have a reasonable argument, and against a reasonable argument you come and tell me: yes, but maybe there is another argument that I have no idea what it is? Maybe. What do you want me to do with that? Doubt does not override certainty.

[Speaker C] Maybe, but it’s not symmetrical, because we keep practicing as before.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—what do you mean, as before? That’s just the obvious assumption? So no, I’m saying more than that. If you continue to behave as it was before, you are not playing it safe. As we discussed there, it could be that you are negligent by continuing as before, because what is actually required of you is to change.

[Speaker C] But Rabbi, all the same it’s not completely symmetrical. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why isn’t it symmetrical? Of course it is. If there’s absolutely nothing in either direction, then you’re right, I can accept that. But I do have a rationale—only a rationale. I have no proof for that rationale, but I have a good rationale, and I think it’s correct. It’s not that there’s some great mystery here. Let’s say women’s disqualification from testimony—ask me why. The straightforward rationale is because of those things. A straightforward rationale—why not? Now true, I have no proof for any of it. I don’t. So what am I supposed to do? After all, if in fact I should validate women as witnesses today… why? Wait a second—if suppose I should validate women as witnesses because women today are educated and in fact there is no reason to disqualify them—just a second, if that’s really so, then if I don’t validate them I’m negligent. Not only am I negligent toward women, I’m negligent toward the litigants. There is here valid testimony from witnesses saying that so-and-so robbed so-and-so, borrowed and didn’t repay, or murdered, I don’t know, desecrated the Sabbath, I don’t know exactly what. And I don’t accept it? What do you mean? The law needs to be carried out.

[Speaker C] From what the Rabbi is saying, this isn’t even a change in the law. The Rabbi doesn’t want us to change the law; it’s simply contained in the very definition of the law itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I’m right in the interpretation, yes. That’s what I said also about the swimsuits in the interpretation.

[Speaker C] You don’t have to replace anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. That’s what I said with the swimsuits; that’s why I introduced the whole swimsuit example first. Same thing, right—that’s what I’m saying. My claim is that I’m not changing the law; I’m changing the practical bottom line of what I do. I’m replacing a swimsuit with a padded coat. But that is actually the continuation of the original law; the only question is whether I’m right in my interpretation.

[Speaker C] But according to Maimonides, doesn’t this law have to be accepted by the public and things like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, this is Torah-level law that I’m talking about now. No, there’s nothing here that has to be accepted by the public. Torah-level law.

[Speaker E] What about the principle that the burden of proof is on the claimant?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where here is “the burden of proof is on the claimant”? We’re talking about a presumption…

[Speaker E] The initial definition of the law, as it were?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re not claiming property in monetary law; what you mean is an original presumption—that there is some presumption here in favor of the law. Fine, true, if I have a rationale—let’s go back to the Talmud I brought in Bava Batra 5a: a person does not repay before the due date. That Talmudic passage, right? Now there’s a case there where the borrower is in possession, and he claims, “I repaid.” Now the lender brought no proof, okay? And he says “I repaid,” but he claims this within the term. And based on reasoning alone—after all, a person does not repay before the due date, we know human character, people don’t repay before the due date—from that reasoning we take the money away from him, even though he is in possession. Even in monetary law, where a presumption of law is itself a novelty—I’m not sure such a thing exists—but even if you innovate it, it’s no stronger than possession of property, and we know that reasoning can override that.

[Speaker C] From what the Rabbi says, this isn’t even a change; there’s no need to get there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying all the time: in Torah-level law, this is not a change.

[Speaker C] Regarding women as witnesses, do we not need to get to what the Rabbi said about modern life—there’s no problem with “the burden of proof is on the claimant” because of an original presumption? No, you can tell me, fine, but who says that’s the correct interpretation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The interpretation that existed until now is the interpretation in possession. You come and propose a different interpretation. The interpretation that existed until now, the interpretation everyone thought until now—no one imagined it was because of lack of education. Okay, you can tell me: the interpretation in possession until now, you’re coming to take it away from. It’s true that if I’m right, then that is the law, I agree. You can raise some kind of claim that the innovator has the weaker hand. Fine. I’m saying that argument doesn’t trouble me. It would trouble me only where I have no rationale. Because understand—even if I have no rationale, even if I have no rationale, then it’s fifty-fifty. Why even in a fifty-fifty case shouldn’t I accept it? You can take this even further, but leave it. I’m talking now about a situation where I do have a rationale, okay? There are two things. First, if I have a rationale, throughout Jewish law I use reasoning.

[Speaker C] If—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you bring me another rationale, then we remain in doubt. But when you say maybe there’s some other rationale without presenting it—then what? Then let’s stop talking about what we always talk about in the study hall. After all, we use reasoning all the time.

[Speaker C] There’s no difference between a rationale and a definition. There’s a rationale that because women were prohibited because of being under the sun, they were prohibited absolutely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you’re returning to the issue of the verse itself; I’ll get to that in a moment.

[Speaker C] And that means even if we were to expound the rationale—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —of the verse, what’s the problem?

[Speaker C] Fine, that it’s our own handiwork.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If one expounds the rationale of the verse, then the rationale is the definition. The whole distinction they invented in the yeshivot between “definition” and “rationale” is in order to say that we do not expound the rationale of the verse, and yet we still explain the laws all the time. So what do they do? They say no, we’re talking about the definition, not the rationale. If one does expound the rationale of the verse, then you don’t need that invention—the rationale is the definition. I’ll get to the rationale of the verse, I will. So the point is that…

[Speaker D] Rabbi, maybe with this argument I can change almost half the laws in twenty minutes with rationales, and you’ll have nothing opposite me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mainly in religion.

[Speaker D] Good luck. Good luck. Yes, but you won’t do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know—let’s hear what you propose.

[Speaker D] Maybe yes, maybe no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s hear what you propose and we’ll see.

[Speaker D] Not so fast. The stubborn and rebellious son—why not a daughter? She can also be drawn into it, and there’s no concern, and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Today—look, the Talmud says!

[Speaker D] No, I’m saying now the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Today the reality—if the Talmud made that move, why can’t I make the opposite move? The Talmud made that consideration based on reasoning—that a daughter is not drawn in—and that’s all.

[Speaker D] Today the reality is that boys and girls are the same.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, if you think so—

[Speaker E] I’m not sure—

[Speaker D] By the way—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the way, I’m not at all sure that boys and girls today are the same, absolutely not. But if let’s say they are, then sure, there too I would do it. Let me tell you, it’s not as simple as it seems to you. Just so you know—I too was very troubled by this question, and I tried to examine it. With very many laws you will not succeed in changing them this way. It only seems to you that you can do whatever you want. You can’t. The other thing is, I’m not talking about just doing things in some way that sells the business just to get the result you want. I’m talking about acting honestly, finding a rationale that seems persuasive and for which we have no alternative. Bring me one like that, and I’ll change the law. Yes?

[Speaker C] Are women obligated in positive time-bound commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, yes, if you bring me a rationale for why they were exempt. Abudarham? That’s a strange rationale. Why? Abudarham says it’s because women are always taking care of the children, and because of that, a time-bound commandment—well, you end up with very far-reaching consequences from that regarding a time-bound commandment. If it applies only by day and not by night, once in… I don’t know, even circumcision—Tosafot asks, maybe that’s a positive commandment dependent on time? A woman is busy, so she can’t circumcise her son? It’s once in a lifetime. That rationale is strange. But fine—bring me some kind of rationale, and we’ll talk. I don’t know. Yes, I’m willing to discuss everything. Meaning, I think you can discuss everything. I’m not scared of anything. The important point here is, first, that if there is a rationale, we don’t find anywhere that someone says to you: look, but maybe that rationale is wrong because there’s some other rationale that none of us knows. You don’t find that anywhere. So why here, yes? That’s one point. Second, you have to understand that this is not “playing it safe.” I’ve said this more than once already. There are costs if you validate women as witnesses, and there are costs if you do not validate them as witnesses. If you’re mistaken, there’s a price to pay. Either way. The usual assumption is that if we leave the law as it is and don’t change it, that’s playing it safe. Whoever wants to change it has to bring proof. Leaving the law as it is is not playing it safe. Because if the law needs to be changed, then you are culpable if you leave it as it is. That has heavy costs. Not only that—it has much heavier costs than if we were to validate women as witnesses. Because after all, then we would be doing the truth. At worst we would be violating some scriptural decree that tells us not to do the truth—but the truth we would certainly be doing. So what’s the problem?

[Speaker D] We’d be doing the truth indirectly. That’s what we talked about here more than once, like—even the Rabbi told me, don’t worry, they’ll work it out, there’s the law of the king. The murder in the mikveh that the Rabbi mentioned.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem—those are all the workarounds I talked about, fine. But today I don’t have a workaround, I don’t have a king, I don’t have anything. I’m sitting in a community, there’s no king, nothing. So the question is, what do I do now? All right? Let’s talk on the principled level. Okay, so this is the question of “you can’t refute a rationale just by saying maybe it’s wrong.” This is not “a possibility does not override a certainty.” And the second point is that there is a price on both sides. Nobody is playing it safe here. Not the one who changes and not the one who doesn’t change. If that’s the case, then you have to do what seems most reasonable to us. We have nothing better than that. Therefore, on this issue—and here I return to Meiri—that is what Meiri did. Meiri didn’t bring a single proof anywhere for what he says. Nowhere.

[Speaker D] It didn’t cost him all that much on the other side.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Maimonides, according to Maimonides, it is forbidden to return a lost object to a non-Jew. Not just that you’re not obligated—forbidden. Meiri says you are obligated. According to Meiri, you desecrate a Torah-level Sabbath prohibition in order to save the life of a non-Jew. Is desecrating a Torah-level Sabbath prohibition not a price?

[Speaker D] I imagine Meiri wasn’t the only one who permitted that. I imagine Maimonides would also have permitted it if he had lived in a reality where he lived among non-Jews.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can imagine many things. In the written sources, there’s nothing.

[Speaker D] I don’t know what this pace of communication is—Maimonides didn’t write that one desecrates the Sabbath; even on rational grounds it doesn’t seem logical to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On rational grounds maybe it doesn’t seem logical to you—we talked about rationales before. But I’m saying: in the written sources, in the written sources, nobody permits this. Nobody in the world permitted it. Nobody. And not only in Meiri’s time—almost until our own day. Who permitted it? And when they did permit the Torah prohibitions, it was only because of concerns of peaceful relations, danger to life. No—I’m talking about a complete permission. Meiri says it is permitted, one must desecrate the Sabbath on earth in order…

[Speaker C] Not for reasons of…

[Speaker D] I’m trying to say, Rabbi, I accept that. I’m just saying that I think they had enough ways to work around it and validate it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m not talking about workarounds. I’m not talking about workarounds.

[Speaker C] Meiri also had enough ways to work around it.

[Speaker D] And he didn’t—he said it outright. I’m not sure this is such a far-off decree. I’m saying that when he said women—not to validate women as witnesses, for example. Fine. There is the Torah’s law; I’ll give you the opposite rationale. Okay? I’m trying to think, like, in… no, I want the opposite rationale, let me go back. The Torah’s law is a little different, like we showed in many things, okay? Like what Maimonides brought, that she should not go out, and so on. There is some law that from the Torah’s standpoint, this is what the Torah wants, and from the standpoint of morality and other things… I didn’t understand. From the standpoint of Torah law, women are not validated as witnesses.

[Speaker C] Who says that’s what the Torah wants? Why? Bring a rationale.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You said you’d bring a rationale. I’m waiting.

[Speaker C] That ever since Moses they weren’t…

[Speaker D] Then bring a rationale!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do I care what was in Moses’ time?

[Speaker D] I’m saying because the rationale was fitted onto a reality that existed in Moses’ time, because it’s not reasonable to assume this was some law introduced out of nowhere without having existed…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—first of all, it’s very reasonable to assume that. There were many laws introduced out of nowhere. That’s one thing. And second, even if it was in Moses’ time, the women in Moses’ time were not more educated than the women in the Second Temple period. So what difference does it make whether it was in Moses’ time?

[Speaker C] And also, the rationale you give—or someone gives—and it makes sense in the context, say, of the prohibition on a woman’s testimony, that also gives credit to the Torah. Meaning, I’m saying this isn’t just some arbitrary law, but something with logic in it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s obvious that there is logic. But whose logic? What? Other people won’t agree that there is logic; they’ll argue that there is another logic hidden from us, and so on.

[Speaker C] The fact is that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s my original argument.

[Speaker D] In a place where you simply have danger to life—come on, let’s take this money, let’s use this money to save children instead of buying the four species. Because there’s a lot of logic in that. It’s not… I don’t think everything has logic all the way through, but danger to life certainly does. So take all the money of all the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do you see that they cancel it? I don’t. Do it—don’t cancel. Why cancel? That’s the main law. If there’s danger to life, then do it.

[Speaker C] There’s danger to life—don’t buy it. Desecrate the Sabbath for danger to life.

[Speaker D] Can you sleep peacefully with the question of the four species?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s move on for a moment. So the claim, basically, in the end, is that even in a place where I have no source for the conservative midrash—what I called earlier—even a rationale is sufficient. Once you have a rationale, that’s enough. And of course this is very frightening to people because of the Reform claim—everyone is terribly afraid of changes. But I think we shouldn’t let the Reform movement win. Meaning, if there are changes that are called for and changes that can be made, then they can be made. On the contrary, I think the way to deal with Reform is to make the changes where they can be made, and not to make no changes at all, because then—as we’ve talked about more than once—very quickly people discover that you’re just a blabberer, and then they don’t believe you about anything. And then even changes that really cannot be made will be made, because they won’t believe you that they can’t be made; they won’t accept that they can’t.

[Speaker I] And who will decide on the changes? No, like Meiri for example—he alone?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he writes his opinion. He didn’t sit on the Sanhedrin; there was no Sanhedrin then. How do people come to believe? Every halakhic decisor, in principle—I’m saying there is logic in expecting there to be some kind of consensus. Unless you are an unquestioned authority in your region or something like that, fine. This is a question that has no clear answer. You have to assess it with common sense. Someone who was the rabbi of some small community somewhere—I would be more cautious. Meaning, you need some degree of consensus, just so there is some sort of check on what you think, I’m saying. All this is not because this is some formal halakhic requirement. There is no such requirement.

[Speaker F] But anyone who tries to change something will always have people who…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the disease of our generation, I agree. And in a place where it annoys me and I know they aren’t joining me only because of conservatism—because they are unwilling even to consider this argument, not that they considered it and disagreed with me—then I get less excited by the fact that there is no consensus. Because people are not really prepared to seriously consider what I’m saying. So the fact that they disagree—what does that mean? It means that I know they disagree for irrelevant reasons. What do I mean by irrelevant? Maybe for that person it’s very relevant, but not reasons pertaining to the issue itself. Meaning, not because they disagree with my argument, but because they fear all sorts of other things. I mentioned tekhelet—Rabbi Shafran with tekhelet, did I mention him, right? Yes. So he put the argument on the table: he doesn’t wear tekhelet because, I don’t know, it opens the door for innovators.

[Speaker E] Fine. And Rashi, for example, says against a midrash—not against the plain meaning; actually it fits the plain meaning. “Do not show them favor” applies only to the seven nations or something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the medieval authorities (Rishonim) already disagreed about that. You can see under Ibn Ezra—in the Encyclopedia, under Ibn Ezra—you can see there that there are major disputes about all these laws concerning non-Jews: whether this is only for idol worshipers, whether it is for all non-Jews, whether it is only for the seven nations, or for anyone who is not a resident alien. There are several positions among the medieval authorities (Rishonim).

[Speaker E] But he isn’t working against the plain meaning. Meaning, it can fit some approach that fits the plain meaning nicely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it’s against the Talmudic text—what is this? We do not follow the plain meaning of the Torah.

[Speaker E] No, because the Talmudic text made some kind of interpretive move, expanded the meaning…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We know what the Talmudic text is doing.

[Speaker E] Yes, but I’m saying the question is whether with such a rationale he can go against the plain meaning of the verses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Against the plain meaning of the verses—then that rationale is probably not correct.

[Speaker E] No, let’s say he’ll take male homosexual intercourse, so he’ll say: what does it mean “you shall not lie the lyings of a woman”? If it’s intercourse driven by lust.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s because of lust and not…

[Speaker E] Yes. Now here, specifically, he wants to go against the plain meaning. There’s no plain meaning here that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he is not against the plain meaning. That’s called deriving the reason of the verse. That is exactly deriving the reason of the verse. Deriving the reason of the verse means explaining the plain meaning, not going against the plain meaning—explaining the plain meaning. All right? But if the explanation fits into the plain meaning—not necessarily compelled, but it fits into the plain meaning—and there are two possible ways to decide which one is correct, and you can explain it within the plain meaning, then that is not something far-fetched in terms of the plain meaning. Now regarding this matter of deriving the reason of the verse, I wanted to complete something. Regarding deriving the reason of the verse, here maybe I’ll even use this very issue: “do not show them favor,” what is written, “do not show them favor”… well, there too, actually, not exactly. If there is something written explicitly in the Torah, there is a dispute among the tannaim whether one derives the reason of the verse or not. For example, “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral”—you do not take collateral from a widow; if she borrowed money from me, she borrowed money from me, you do not take collateral from her. Okay? Now there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda whether this also applies to a wealthy widow or only to a poor widow. And the Talmudic text explains that this is a case of deriving the reason of the verse. That is, Rabbi Shimon derives the reason of the verse and therefore says that from a wealthy widow you may take collateral, and Rabbi Yehuda says no. It says you don’t take from a widow, so you don’t take from a widow—without deriving the reason of the verse. By the way, the reason here is not that the wealthy widow lacks it less. The reason is that she ends up being visited among her neighbors—that when you return the collateral at night, and there is some garment or bedding or something like that, and you come return it to her at night, people see you with a woman at night, and suspicion arises and all kinds of things like that. That is the problem. The problem is not her wealth, that she doesn’t need it. For a wealthy widow you don’t need to return it, because she has enough; in any event no suspicion will arise. I once talked about this—I think I called it the human reason—but that is another passage. In any case, this is deriving the reason of the verse. But deriving the reason of the verse deals with a place, with a law that is written in the Torah. A law that is learned from a midrash—the phrase “we do not derive the reason of the verse” doesn’t apply there. Why? Because the midrash itself is a kind of deriving the reason of the verse. Because we already talked about this: there is no midrash that is not also based on a rationale. “The Lord your God you shall fear”—to include Torah scholars; the word “et” comes to include. How do you know what to include? You use a rationale. When you make a verbal analogy, how do you know in what respect to compare these laws? You use a rationale. “Learn from it and from itself,” or “set it in its own place”—you even qualify the comparisons sometimes, depending on the context. Clearly rationale is involved here. So in a place where we are dealing with a rabbinic midrash and not with a law written explicitly in the Torah, in such a place there is obviously room for rational interpretation. Because the original interpreter himself also used rationale to reach his conclusion. Everything we say—that we do not derive the reason of the verse—applies to things written in the verse itself, and even there Rabbi Shimon says that we do derive the reason of the verse, but Jewish law rules like Rabbi Yehuda that we do not derive the reason of the verse. Rabbi Kook talks about this as something for the future. Even that law itself will be annulled; when there is a Sanhedrin, it will be able to annul this law that we do not derive the reason of the verse, and the law that we do not disagree with an earlier court unless we surpass it in wisdom and number, because that too is a law, and that too can be annulled—you just need a Sanhedrin for it.

[Speaker C] Is that a dispute? The Sanhedrin will come with the Messiah. Okay, fine—optimistic or pessimistic…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Depends how you look at it. In any event, the issue of deriving the reason of the verse, in the end, almost never appears. Meaning, the Talmudic text is full of interpretations. Almost nowhere does the question come up: how can you derive the reason of the verse? Why not? This bothered me for years. After all, “we do not derive the reason of the verse” is a very strong statement. Every explanation in every place—definition, reason, all those tricks—those are inventions of commentators, mostly later authorities (Acharonim), even more than medieval authorities (Rishonim); there are some among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) too, but fewer. It hardly appears in the Talmudic text; discussions of deriving the reason of the verse in the Talmudic text are super rare, very few. Why? The answer, in my opinion, is simple: every law that comes out of exegesis—“we do not derive the reason of the verse” does not apply there. It applies only to a law written in the Torah. And how many laws are written explicitly in the Torah? Laws that the Sadducees would admit to, yes? “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral”—that is written explicitly in the Torah: don’t take collateral from a widow. That’s not exegesis, not interpretation, nothing—it’s written there. About that there is a dispute whether one derives the reason of the verse or not. But almost all the laws we have are laws that are the product of interpretation or exegesis—rabbinic involvement. If so, then there you can certainly interpret in light of the reason. And that greatly narrows this whole matter of “we do not derive the reason of the verse.” Okay, so that is regarding changing Torah-level laws. Now I want to move on…

[Speaker D] But the example of “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral”—isn’t that just the concept? As if the Torah brought it there only so that you could finish the concept from which we learn not to derive the reason of the verse? Meaning, and this is true for all the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no.

[Speaker D] We don’t learn it…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t learn from there the rule that we do not derive the reason of the verse; we apply it to that verse. But we don’t learn it from that verse. “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral” comes to teach a law in the laws of collateral; it is not a methodological law about whether one derives the reason of the verse or not. On the contrary, Rabbi Yehuda comes with the principle that we do not derive the reason of the verse independently of that verse, and he applies it to that verse. Where does that principle itself come from? From the Torah? I don’t know a source for that, by the way—that Rabbi Yehuda says we do not derive the reason of the verse and Rabbi Shimon says that we do. I don’t know; I’m not familiar with a source for it.

[Speaker C] There’s also this about rabbinic laws—Rabbi Dessler wants to explain why performing labor on the Sabbath, and other things like that, and he says there are hidden reasons.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Vilna Gaon, yes—I’ll get to that in a moment.

[Speaker C] So maybe that is also the idea in Torah law, that we do not derive the reason of the verse because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a wonderful idea. I don’t accept it. I don’t accept it, neither for rabbinic law nor for Torah law. Neither for rabbinic law nor for Torah law—not because there are no hidden reasons, but because if I have an evident reason and I have no indication that there are hidden reasons, why assume that they exist? And if I have indications—if I see that it doesn’t fit the explanation I am proposing—fine, I don’t understand everything, there are hidden reasons. I have no problem accepting that claim in principle. But the way people use that claim is basically as an argument against changes. It’s not really that there are… Why assume there are hidden reasons if I have a reason that explains everything and there is no indication at all that it is wrong? So why assume there are hidden reasons? It’s the same thought I mentioned earlier: maybe there is another reason, maybe this isn’t right because maybe… why assume that? I don’t see any logic in it other than the logic of trying to defend against arguments for change. And that too does not sound plausible to me. Everybody uses it, but to me it doesn’t sound plausible. I want to move on to rabbinic laws. With rabbinic laws the situation is more problematic. Why? Because with rabbinic laws, even if the circumstances have changed, you need a court, and you need a court greater in wisdom and number. And that means that specifically with rabbinic laws, even when there is a conservative midrash, it won’t help. You don’t make conservative midrashim. Only if there is a court greater in wisdom and number can it make a conservative midrash regarding an existing law. But here again one needs to understand several things. Maybe one thing first that also relates to Torah law. Everything I am talking about now, of course, applies only to enactments of an authorized court. Determinations of medieval authorities (Rishonim), for example—there is no problem changing those; they had no authority, they were not the Sanhedrin. Many times we read the Talmudic text or the Torah through the lenses of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and then what? That’s Torah law, you can’t change it. But that is the interpretation of sages. Now if it is the interpretation of the Sanhedrin, it is binding. If it is the interpretation of an unauthorized factor, then with all due respect, fine—I’ll think twice if I disagree with him and whether I want to change it, but there is no principled obstacle in terms of the laws of change. There is no principled obstacle to changing it. If I think differently, I think differently. No problem. This whole discussion of whether it is possible to change is not even directed against the medieval authorities (Rishonim); I already prefaced that—the whole first part of this series dealt with the issue of authority. Now I’m just applying it to the question of changes. So a change I am talking about is always a change against an authoritative factor. A change where the source is not an authoritative factor does not enter the issue of changes. So I may think, maybe I won’t dare disagree with Maimonides—fine, then I won’t disagree. But if I do disagree with him, there is no principled impediment. Meaning, there is no law that forbids it; nothing is required of me in that regard. That is true for both Torah law and rabbinic law. But we are now moving to rabbinic laws that were established by an authoritative factor—that is, the Talmudic text, the Sanhedrin, something like that. What do we do there? There, ostensibly, the door is locked. Because I cannot disagree with the earlier court, since I need one greater in wisdom and number—and today we do not even have a Sanhedrin, so there is nothing to discuss. But even if I am not disagreeing with them, and I only want to make a conservative midrash—meaning to say the circumstances changed and therefore the law changed—it turns out that even that cannot be done except by a court. According to Maimonides, even a court greater in wisdom and number; according to the Rosh, a court. According to Maimonides, a court greater in wisdom and number. So with rabbinic laws, the gates of change seem to be locked. Nothing to do. It turns out the matter is not so simple there either. Life is stronger than the rules. I’ve said this more than once, and I repeat it here. There is a book by Neria Gutel, The Change of Natural Conditions in Jewish Law. In the last chapter, in the last chapter of the book, he deals with the change of rabbinic laws. And he brings many, he collects many dozens of sources from the medieval authorities (Rishonim), simply because it is concentrated there, so that’s why I’m pointing you there—dozens of places among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who changed rabbinic laws. Now, among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there is no Sanhedrin, no nothing. How did they change them? With Meiri I have no problem that he changed Torah laws. Torah laws, if you tie it to changed circumstances, that is a conservative midrash. A conservative midrash you can change even without authority. But rabbinic law—a change certainly not. But even a change that is the result of changed circumstances, which as I said is not really a change but the correct continuation of the original law—even that cannot be done unless you are a court, and perhaps even one greater in wisdom and number according to Maimonides. So how does it happen? So there is a whole series of tricks and interpretive moves explaining how later authorities explain what the medieval authorities (Rishonim), or earlier later authorities, did—it doesn’t matter. Gutel brings a large part of those rationales there. I’ll bring just a few of them so you can get the impression that there too there are quite a few possibilities to work with.

[Speaker C] Just give an example of the change?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An example? I’m about to bring one. For example, Tosafot in Avodah Zarah 15, and there is a parallel Tosafot in Eizehu Neshekh regarding interest. “Certainly, this prohibition on selling an unclean animal”—it is forbidden to sell non-Jews an unclean animal—“that was specifically in their days, when many Jews lived together, and if a person had an animal he did not need, he would sell it to his fellow Jew and would not lose out. But now, what shall he do if he cannot find anyone to sell it to? Should he lose it? Therefore the geonim in exile practiced leniency in this matter.” What leniency? It is forbidden according to the law of the Talmudic text. What leniency? Because today there is a problem—I have no one to sell my animal to. Okay, so sell candy. What kind of definition is that?

[Speaker C] What? If it’s in the very definition?

[Speaker G] You mean it’s a definition?

[Speaker C] How is it in the very definition itself, that the reason this is forbidden is because what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The reason it’s forbidden is because I have no commerce? That cannot fit into the definition. It’s a constraint; it’s not interpretation. Here, this change is not the result of interpretation. Now there is a change in circumstances, but the changed circumstances do not project onto the law itself—they just say, simply, it’s hard for me. It’s hard for me; I can’t live—who will I sell to? Now what do you mean “I can’t live”? If it’s danger to life, you don’t need Tosafot for that. It’s not danger to life. Rather, it’s hard to make a living. So what? “There is no wisdom and no understanding against God”—what does “it’s hard to function like this” mean? No, Tosafot cancels it. He says: look—then he brings other examples. He says, brings more examples. Afterward I’ll bring something else. Yes, Tosafot in Eizehu Neshekh: “And what they now practice, lending to non-Jews with interest—and even according to the first version there is room to permit it”—there is a dispute in the Talmudic text there, doesn’t matter—“because the king and the princes impose taxes on us, and everything counts as what we need for our livelihood. And also because we live among the nations and it is impossible for us to earn a living in any way unless we engage in commerce with them.” Again, a problem of livelihood. Again I say: this is not danger to life; you don’t need Tosafot for this. It’s not danger to life. Rather, it’s difficult to make a living. Now he goes on. Ah yes—Tosafot in Beitzah. In Tosafot in Beitzah there are the chavrei, a certain nation that used to coerce Jews not to keep commandments. And during the period of those chavrei, it was forbidden to attend to the needs of the dead on the second festival day, because of the fear that these chavrei would cause us trouble. So we don’t do it. Strictly speaking, one may attend to the needs of the dead on the second festival day, but in the time of the chavrei one may not. So Tosafot says there: “And nowadays, when there are chavrei, we are concerned, for they force Jews to perform labor, and if they see that it is a festival day then they do not force us to perform labor. Now if we begin performing labor for the dead on the second festival day, they don’t know dead or not dead—they see us doing labor, and they will force us, so it is forbidden to do the labor on the second festival day.” “And now, in our time,” says Tosafot, when there are no chavrei, it is permitted. “And one cannot say that another count is needed to permit it.” Strange—another count is not needed to permit it? Why? The circumstances changed. What’s the difference? “Since this came because of a concern, and the concern has passed, the reason has passed.” What does that mean? I actually remembered this Tosafot when I wrote my column about kitniyot. There I made exactly this distinction, but I didn’t remember this Tosafot and brought other things from there. And just now some friend wrote to me asking where I got the source for the distinction between a concern and a custom. Here this Tosafot now writes it; suddenly you see it.

[Speaker D] But what about kitniyot, which people still eat? What kitniyot? Sure, sure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I gave up? What do you mean I gave up? You still eat kitniyot? So you said, what is there to give up? I’m not…

[Speaker D] Anyway, you said that every time you add the exposition, and in the end…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—since last year, a year and a half ago, meaning for two Passovers already I’ve been a veteran sinner. One more time and I’ll already have an established pattern. In any event, what is he saying here? What he is basically saying is that there is a difference between an enactment or a custom and a concern. That was basically my claim regarding kitniyot—I made it in relation to custom, but really it is the same distinction. What is the point? It’s like the broom of the Rebbe of Gur. Yes—the famous story, that the Rebbe of Gur asked his attendant to move the broom so that next year, when they come to light the candles—it was at the lighting of Hanukkah candles—they won’t put a broom there before lighting the candles. So the attendant moved the broom, and the next year all the Hasidim put a broom there, moved it away, and then lit the candles. All right? That’s the famous story. Now we laugh about it a lot, but that is what we do all the time. All of us. What are kitniyot if not that? There was some concern, and therefore they did not eat kitniyot. Now the concern has disappeared, and we continue not to eat kitniyot. What’s the difference? It’s the same thing. What, if there is a pit in the road, okay? And because of the very serious commandment of “guard yourselves very carefully,” we go around that spot, right? Now they filled the pit. For a year, the municipality didn’t function and didn’t fill the pit. Now they filled the pit—do we need to keep going around?

[Speaker C] There’s a story about the sages of Chelm.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. This is basically what comes out of these Tosafot passages. What am I really claiming? What I am claiming is that a concern is not a custom. If a concern is established by a court, then it becomes a law. And about that I agree. For example, poultry with milk. They forbade it lest you come to eat meat with milk. That too is a concern—lest you come to eat. But they forbade it in court. So then I can no longer change it, even if today there were no concern that I would come to eat meat with milk, because it has already been established as law. But kitniyot refers to the Middle Ages. There was no Sanhedrin, no authorized institution that could turn this into law. At most it may be a custom. But my claim is that it is not a custom—rather, they were simply concerned about leaven. There was leaven there. Okay, and when there is no leaven, why not eat kitniyot? What’s the problem? It’s not a custom and not an enactment and not a decree; it is a concern. And when the concern is removed—as Tosafot says here—when the concern is removed, then the law is removed. It’s a concern; it’s not a law.

[Speaker C] Even when there is a concern, there is a prohibition in the concern itself. If I do it now secretly in pressing circumstances, what’s the problem? No, there is a problem. What’s the problem?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there is a law—it is forbidden to you. What do you violate? What?

[Speaker C] What do you violate?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A rabbinic prohibition. But they didn’t enact it; they just said they are concerned. No, they also enacted it. Once the rabbis enacted poultry with milk, if you eat it secretly when there is no concern that you’ll come to eat meat with milk, you still violate a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker C] Poultry with milk, yes—but you gave the example… what did you mean by the example? The Tosafot example of the dead and the chavrei.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because with the chavrei, that is exactly the distinction Tosafot is making.

[Speaker C] Even at the time when there was the concern, even at the time…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because there Tosafot says that even in the time of the sages they did not turn it into a law. It was simply a concern during the period of the chavrei. But poultry with milk, which became a law—even if its basis was a concern—once it became law in the Sanhedrin, you can’t change it.

[Speaker C] Yes, I’m saying, but in the example of the chavrei. If in the Talmudic period, when there was concern, I were to do it, would I be violating anything? Is there a prohibition of “do not deviate”? So there’s no problem—you violate, it’s just a concern.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re simply taking a risk that maybe you shouldn’t take. It may be that they also established there not to take it; it doesn’t matter.

[Speaker C] But they didn’t establish it. What law? If there is no court, then what is it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—there is no court? This is the Talmudic text.

[Speaker C] There was no prohibition—it’s impossible to do that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmudic text has authority.

[Speaker C] And can authority also apply to a matter of concern? It can apply as authority—why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As long as it is…

[Speaker C] Not as an enactment like poultry with milk—why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A court has authority to do anything. A court can determine that when these chavrei are around, we stop; or when there is a pit in the road, we stop driving there; and someone who chooses to wreck his car driving on that road also violates a rabbinic prohibition, on top of everything else. Because we determine that it is forbidden. But that doesn’t mean that after there is no pit, we continue. From the outset, really, we only established it where there is concern. You can explain it that way too. But in a place where there is no court at all, as with kitniyot, then the whole discussion doesn’t arise. Because even if they had wanted to, they could not establish it as law, because there is no institution with the authority of “do not deviate” to establish law. So all that remains is just a concern, and a concern is fine—you can be concerned when it exists. But if it doesn’t exist, then it doesn’t. Why continue? That is simply what Tosafot says here. So here, for example, is a change—not really a change. It is simply saying: this is not law. We are not changing a law. The concern has gone, so it’s over.

[Speaker D] There’s another mechanism, Rabbi—what about final handwashing? The concern didn’t disappear, and people still insist on it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That, in fact, the Shulchan Arukh brings two opinions—that regarding final handwashing, there are those who permit today, saying final handwashing isn’t needed. There are opinions that say yes. But even those who say yes—some of them argue that the concern still exists. There the Shulchan Arukh is very strange in how he writes it, you know. First he writes, final handwashing is obligatory, then he writes a whole section about the laws of final handwashing, and in the end he says “and there are those who say,” at the end of the section. That’s odd. In any event, apparently he wrote it that way so that we wouldn’t do it. But the Arukh HaShulchan writes about exposed water. That’s already in Tosafot here; Tosafot here brings it. Here: “And here too we say regarding exposed water that it is forbidden, lest a snake drank from it”—also according to the law of the Talmudic text. “And now that snakes are not commonly found among us, we drink from it even ab initio, although it is a matter established by count. Nevertheless, Rabbenu Tam would forbid it.” But even Rabbenu Tam, who forbade it, that is because these laws are laws that were created in the Talmudic text. So he understood that it is a law established as an obligation. True, its source was concern, like poultry with milk—exactly like poultry with milk. Tosafot says no. Okay? Or another example: there are decrees whose reason appears in the language of the decree itself. For example—it’s not entirely clear—but for example: one may not read by candlelight. Talmudic text in tractate Sabbath: lest he tilt the lamp. Right? So there—in the Mishnah it doesn’t say that, “lest he tilt.” In the Talmudic text appears a baraita in which it says: one may not read by candlelight lest he tilt. So here there is some room to hesitate whether the baraita is an interpretation, or whether the baraita is another source that quotes the original enactment more fully. But let’s say for the sake of discussion that it is so. If indeed it is so, several later authorities wrote about this matter that if the reason appears in the body of the enactment, you can change it. Meaning, what does “change” mean? It means that when the reason disappears, you don’t need another count to change this law. Because otherwise, why didn’t they write the reason in every enactment? Here they wrote the reason in order to tell you that if the reason doesn’t apply, then we did not forbid it. Otherwise, why did they write the reason? That is the argument. Because in most enactments the reason is not written. We can think what the reason was, but it isn’t written. So that is, for example, another point. And even in a place where the reason is clear—by the way, Tosafot HaRosh writes, Tosafot HaRosh writes this regarding Torah law, that where the reason is clear, one derives the reason of the verse. That is what he writes in Bava Metzia 82. Now in the responsa of the Rosh, section 2, he writes the same thing about rabbinic laws. Where the reason is clear, then one may alter in light of the reason. That is what he writes. Now here we are speaking of a case where the reason is not written, but the reason is clear to us. If the reason is clear to us, even if it is not written explicitly, it can be changed. That is even more far-reaching. Okay? There are several places where it is much harder to understand the mechanism of how exactly… Here, for example, Pri Chadash brings Ran. There there is a case where Rav Yehuda sent a gift to a non-Jew on his festival day—which is forbidden, yes? I think it’s Rav Yehuda, not Rav Yehuda—it’s an amora, it’s Talmudic text, it’s in Avodah Zarah. So Tosafot there—well, the Ran there brings in the name of Tosafot: “I found written in Tosafot that it does not belong to the prohibition of ‘a matter established by count requires another count to permit it,’ since the concern that he will go and give thanks does not apply except in the time when they worshipped idols. Therefore it seems that their opinion is that even though we say it requires another count to permit it, that is only to permit things that had a reason for prohibition initially, even though it has now lapsed. But those which never had a reason for prohibition at all are permitted without another count.” He says: in a place where reality changed, you need another count to permit it. But if regarding our reality today the original legislators themselves would have said that it is not forbidden, or at least there is a rationale to say that it is not forbidden, then you don’t need another count to permit it. And if there is, say, some non-Jew whom you have no concern that you’ll be drawn after, and you can bring him the gift—okay?—then already in the time of the sages, when they forbade giving gifts on their festival days, they did not forbid it regarding such non-Jews. Maybe today there are more such non-Jews, or whatever, but in a place where you can make that distinction already at the time of the enactment itself, then it means you are not coming to change the enactment today because of changed circumstances, but rather you are already interpreting the enactment as it was then. That, he says, can be done. Pri Chadash, Ran, write this. That too can be changed. Now many times it is like this. Even Meiri, by the way—there it is Torah law—but look at Meiri’s logic. Meiri says that regarding non-Jews who are bound by the norms of the nations, all these Talmudic rules were never said. You can say that if there had been such a non-Jew in the time of the sages, they also would not have prohibited it regarding him. The change of circumstances is only the change in how many such non-Jews there are, or who the non-Jews around me are, but that does not mean there were none in the time of the sages. Maybe they were a minority, doesn’t matter. But you can make this distinction already at the time of the enactment. And if so, it is even easier to make the change that Meiri makes, because then it means that I am not changing the enactment of then because of today’s changed circumstances, but I am claiming that already then, in those places where the circumstances I am speaking about today prevailed, the enactment never applied from the outset.

[Speaker D] They didn’t say “no distinctions”? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so he says no—they do not make a blanket “no distinctions.” Where it is clear that they said “no distinctions,” then no distinctions. But there is no general rule of “no distinctions.” There are places where we know that they did not distinguish in their enactment, but if not, then not. Then you can make this change. In short, there is a whole series of—I’ll maybe give you an example. I began speaking earlier about “one may not read by candlelight lest he tilt.” There is the story that Rabbi Yishmael read and tilted—or almost tilted. There is a contradiction among sources. Then he came back—sorry, he read, yes—he was about to tilt, or he tilted, and he said: how great are the words of my colleagues, for I wanted to violate their opinion and indeed I stumbled. Fine? So the author of Chazut Kashot, at the end of tractate Beitzah—he’s someone who answers Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s difficulties one after another—at the end of tractate Beitzah, in another context, he brings this Talmudic text and asks: how did Rabbi Yishmael allow himself to do this? So what if he thought he wouldn’t tilt? But the enactment was not to read by candlelight. What difference does it make if you think you won’t tilt? The sages still forbade it. So he says that a Torah scholar like Rabbi Yishmael is permitted to make this kind of judgment based on the reason—yes, that with respect to me the reason does not apply, so I can. And after he did it he understood that he had been mistaken. But notice: he did not retract, at least it is not written, on the principled level from what he did. Rather: I was mistaken, I assessed it incorrectly—indeed I almost stumbled. But in principle, if my assessment really had been correct, it is not written there that what he did was improper.

[Speaker D] Then why did he say he would bring a sin-offering? What? Why did he say he would bring a sin-offering when the Temple is rebuilt, if he is allowed to do it as a…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One does not bring a sin-offering…

[Speaker D] For a rabbinic prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One brings a sin-offering for tilting, which is a Torah prohibition. He doesn’t bring a sin-offering, obviously—otherwise if he…

[Speaker D] If he didn’t tilt, he did nothing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. So there is no sin-offering regardless of what I’m saying. Even if he almost tilted—you don’t bring a sin-offering for a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker D] Only if he definitely…

[Speaker C] Tilted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are two versions.

[Speaker C] One…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One of them says that he tilted, one says that he almost tilted. But in the Talmudic text there he says this according to the view that he tilted. That is the source for “tilted.” Ah, okay—the source that says he tilted. There are different sources.

[Speaker D] The fact that he said he would bring a sin-offering—that is written in the Talmudic text. Oh really?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there too the version is that he tilted.

[Speaker D] Ah, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he asks there what the distinction is. I think that in light of what I said earlier, you don’t need to reach that answer. Rather, because the rationale is in a place where the rationale is written in the language of the enactment itself: “one should not read by candlelight lest he tilt it.” There you can say: if I think that I… By the way, also among the later authorities (Acharonim) they make distinctions on this issue. Even though on the one hand it is written—in the Shulchan Arukh it even appears—that if it is at the height of two stories, you still should not read by candlelight, even though there, how exactly are you, with a ladder, going to get there to tilt the candle? They said: no, no distinctions are made. But on the other hand, if you have someone watching you, then you may read. A watcher who pays attention to make sure you don’t tilt it. If you appoint someone to watch you so that you don’t tilt it, then yes, it is possible. I don’t know on what basis they make these distinctions, unless these are distinctions that were already made by the original enacting forum.

[Speaker D] But they came to teach the students, right? He said that where he had students he wanted to teach, then he stands over them and they read. Apparently the need is what brought this about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but still the question is, the need—

[Speaker D] was here, but what is the justification for the distinction? They said, fine, we’ll distinguish it this way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be, if that’s the case, but the distinction still has to hold water. And there are various other distinctions like these that come up among the later authorities (Acharonim), where in the end there are mechanisms, even in rabbinic law, to make changes of this sort that are not really changes. And again, I’m always talking about a situation where the circumstances have changed. To dispute in that way right now is impossible if we don’t have an authorized religious court, which in Torah-level law you do not need. No—sorry—in Torah-level law you do need it; in order to dispute, you do need it.

[Speaker E] A few examples I saw where it’s as though—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, the leniencies, on the plain level, the leniency is only after the Jewish law fell out of practice. Okay.

[Speaker E] And Maimonides wrote in another passage that it’s easier to change such a situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Still, from the standpoint of the law itself, the law is still in force even if it fell out of practice after it had spread.

[Speaker E] It spread and then fell out of practice. In terms of the requirements needed to change it, they’re lighter—from what I remember in Maimonides, where he says that a Jewish law, something that had spread and then it stopped—did they retract it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember there being any leniency regarding changing it; I don’t remember such a thing.

[Speaker E] That there was a custom that had spread and then fell out of practice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says it spread and afterwards fell out of practice. I don’t remember any leniency regarding changing it. And the last point—I just want to mention again the matter of an emergency ruling. That always works, even to dispute the previous religious court, if the times require it, in a place where there is damage, in situations of that sort. A direct change is possible without any requirements of authority. That applies to everything, to rabbinic law and to Torah-level law, so even on the rabbinic plane there are several channels that allow us to operate. Okay, we’ve finished this topic.

Authority and Change in Halakha, Lecture 15

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Changing Torah-level laws and the nullification of the rationale

Midrashic conservatism, plain-reading conservatism, and the naturalistic fallacy

Grounding a midrash: sources, indications, and halakhic implications

Women as witnesses: evidentiary difficulty, exegesis, and doubt about the source of the disqualification

Reasoning as a driver of change when there is no evidence, and the example of the Meiri

The price of error in both directions, and the response to fears of Reform

“We do not expound the rationale of the verse” and the scope of that rule

Rejecting the claim of “hidden reasons” as a defense against change

Rabbinic laws: the requirement of a religious court and the apparent lock-in

Actual changes in rabbinic law and interpretive mechanisms among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)

Concern versus enactment, uncovered water, and when the reason appears in the wording of the decree

The interpretation that the enactment never applied in the first place to a certain reality

The example of Rabbi Yishmael, practical distinctions, and temporary emergency rulings

Conclusion: moving from the topic of Torah-level law to rabbinic law

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Changing Torah-level laws and the nullification of the rationale

Midrashic conservatism, plain-reading conservatism, and the naturalistic fallacy

Grounding a midrash: sources, indications, and halakhic implications

Women as witnesses: evidentiary difficulty, exegesis, and doubt about the source of the disqualification

Reasoning as a driver of change when there is no evidence, and the example of the Meiri

The price of error in both directions, and the response to fears of Reform

“We do not expound the rationale of the verse” and the scope of that rule

Rejecting the claim of “hidden reasons” as a defense against change

Rabbinic laws: the requirement of a religious court and the apparent lock-in

Actual changes in rabbinic law and interpretive mechanisms among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)

Concern versus enactment, uncovered water, and when the reason appears in the wording of the decree

The interpretation that the enactment never applied in the first place to a certain reality

The example of Rabbi Yishmael, practical distinctions, and temporary emergency rulings

Conclusion: moving from the topic of Torah-level law to rabbinic law

Full Transcript

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