Doubt and Probability—in Halakha, in Thought, and in General—Lecture 16
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Statistical majority not before us, majority before us, and the problem of induction
- The presumption created by three occurrences and its appearances in Jewish law
- Mekor Chayim on leavened grain on Passover and a presumption only when there is a causal factor
- Rabbi Chaim on the signs of an imbecile and the simplicity of a unifying explanation
- Yevamot: the dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel over whether two or three times creates a presumption
- The Talmud’s explanation: weak blood in circumcision, “the spring causes it,” and “fortune causes it” in the lethal woman case
- Practical Jewish law: the sign that the ruling follows Rav Ashi and the difficulty this poses for the proof of Mekor Chayim
- The meaning of “fortune” and the possibility of seeing it as an ancient scientific conception
- Our day: medicine, testing, and differences in responsibility and risk
- Kahneman: the law of small numbers and explanations that tempt us into false generalizations
- The two roles of explanation: a condition for generalization versus a source of bias
- Correlation, causation, and self-interest in explanation
- Tradition, “a law given to Moses at Sinai,” and lies “for good purposes”
- Scientific error and the authority of the Talmud regarding fortune
- Practical conclusion: applying the Talmud’s principles with updated scientific thinking
Summary
General Overview
The text presents the difference between a statistical majority not before us, as a majority based on generalization from a sample and exposed to David Hume’s problem of induction, and a majority before us, which rests on facts “in front of us,” and illustrates the discussion through presumptions created by repetition (two or three times) in Jewish law. It presents the position of Mekor Chayim that a presumption is created only when there is a “causal factor” and a unifying logic, as against the passage in Yevamot about a lethal woman, where two explanations are proposed, the spring causes it and fortune causes it, together with the comment that the law is ruled in a way that strengthens “fortune causes it” and weakens the proof of Mekor Chayim. Later, Daniel Kahneman is brought in to illustrate statistical failures in which דווקא a “reasonable explanation” tempts people into false generalizations (small schools and life expectancy), and a double conclusion is built: a possible explanation helps justify a generalization, but also requires suspicion and statistical testing, alongside criticism of the use of “a law given to Moses at Sinai” as a rhetorical tool and the question of the validity of Talmudic determinations that rely on the scientific conceptions of their time.
Statistical majority not before us, majority before us, and the problem of induction
The text states that a statistical majority not before us is a generalization from a sample, and therefore its strength and its weakness lie in the fact that it assumes the sample represents a general law—an assumption that cannot be known with certainty, and that is David Hume’s problem of induction. The text explains that a majority before us, such as nine kosher stores and one non-kosher one, does not require generalization but rests on the facts before us, and therefore appears stronger and is not exposed to Hume’s induction problem. The text adds, however, that on the other hand a majority before us has a different problem: the inability to confirm the ruling by experiment or testing.
The presumption created by three occurrences and its appearances in Jewish law
The text presents the idea that a three-time presumption appears in many halakhic contexts, such as an ox that gored three times and thereby changes from a harmless ox to a forewarned ox, altering the amount of payment. The text gives further examples such as menstrual patterns, a woman whose husbands died, and children who died because of circumcision, where after three times one assumes a general law. The text formulates this as an inductive assumption according to which three examples allow events to be turned into a rule.
Mekor Chayim on leavened grain on Passover and a presumption only when there is a causal factor
The text cites Mekor Chayim in the laws of Passover regarding a case where three split grains of wheat were found in dough and removed, and asks whether one must be concerned that there are more grains in it. The text quotes his language: “Therefore it seems to me that we do not say a three-time presumption except where there is a causal factor, such that it is reasonable it should be so and logic requires it to be so… but in something that happens by chance… there is no presumption regarding coincidences.” The text explains that according to Mekor Chayim, generalization from three cases is made only when there is a logic or principle that explains and connects them, and not when it is merely a coincidence without a plausible causal factor.
Rabbi Chaim on the signs of an imbecile and the simplicity of a unifying explanation
The text cites Rabbi Chaim on the Talmud at the beginning of Chagigah regarding the signs of an imbecile, where according to one opinion, three signs together are decisive. The text explains that each sign on its own can receive a local explanation that does not require concluding the person is an imbecile, but three signs allow all of them to be explained by one unifying explanation. The text states that Rabbi Chaim prefers a shared explanation that explains all three events over a collection of separate explanations, because the unifying explanation is simpler and therefore preferable.
Yevamot: the dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel over whether two or three times creates a presumption
The text presents the Mishnah in Yevamot regarding a woman who lived with her husband for ten years and did not give birth, and the Talmud’s understanding that “a second, yes; a third, no,” from which it identifies the tanna as Rabbi. The text cites the baraita: “She circumcised the first and he died, the second and he died; the third should not be circumcised—these are the words of Rabbi,” versus Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: “The third should be circumcised; the fourth should not be circumcised,” and explains that this is a dispute over whether a presumption is created after two cases or after three. The text also cites the parallel baraita regarding marriage: “She married the first and he died, the second and he died; she should not marry the third… these are the words of Rabbi,” while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits the third and forbids the fourth, and raises the question: on what basis is this line drawn if no studies were conducted?
The Talmud’s explanation: weak blood in circumcision, “the spring causes it,” and “fortune causes it” in the lethal woman case
The text brings the Talmud’s explanation that in circumcision there is a reason to generalize, because “there are families whose blood is weak and there are families whose blood congeals,” meaning one can attribute the deaths to a family characteristic of blood clotting. The text explains that regarding marriage, the Talmud asks, “what is the reason in marriage?” and two explanations are offered: “the spring causes it,” in the name of Avimi of Hagronia in the name of Rav Huna, and “fortune causes it,” according to Rav Ashi. The text explains that the practical difference is in cases of betrothal without marital relations, and in a case of death by accident—“he fell from a palm tree and died”—where according to “the spring causes it” there is no reason for concern, while according to “fortune causes it” there is concern even without a connection to sexual contact or to a specific cause of death.
Practical Jewish law: the sign that the ruling follows Rav Ashi and the difficulty this poses for the proof of Mekor Chayim
The text points out that the sign indicating the practical ruling appears by Rav Ashi, and cites the Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 9: “A woman who married two men and they died should not marry a third,” together with the gloss of the Rema: “or was betrothed,” as proof that the ruling also takes betrothal into account. The text states that this fits the explanation “fortune causes it” and not “the spring causes it,” and therefore the proof of Mekor Chayim from this passage is weakened and even “collapses” within the framework presented. The text sharpens the point: if “fortune causes it” is an explanation always available, then the requirement of an explanation as a condition for generalization is emptied of content, because one can always attribute it to fortune.
The meaning of “fortune” and the possibility of seeing it as an ancient scientific conception
The text raises the question whether “fortune causes it” is a concrete explanation or a “joker” that fills every gap, and suggests that the claim embedded in it is that there are no coincidences in the world, and any threefold repetition is better seen as lawful behavior than as chance. The text states that in the Talmud’s conception, “fortune” means the influence of stars and constellations, not “the hand of God,” though it acknowledges that “Israel is not subject to fortune” raises a difficulty. The text raises the possibility that the term “fortune” may once have had criteria for when to invoke it and when not to, so that not every three random events would generate a practical prohibition that would make life impossible.
Our day: medicine, testing, and differences in responsibility and risk
The text argues that today there are medical tools to investigate causes, and therefore in cases of circumcision one would not necessarily act as they did then; perhaps even after one case with serious medical concern one would refrain. The text compares ordinary risk-taking in life to driving a car and to systems in which people continue operating even without understanding the precise mechanism, and sketches a decision line between one time, two times, and three times. The text emphasizes that in marriage there is no obligation to marry, though Jewish law may prohibit it after enough repetition, whereas in circumcision there is an element of obligation, so the dilemma is sharper.
Kahneman: the law of small numbers and explanations that tempt us into false generalizations
The text brings from Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow an example from a Bill Gates Foundation study that found the most successful schools were small and concluded that schools should be made smaller, but it later turned out that the worst schools were also small. The text explains this through the law of small numbers, according to which small samples tend toward the extremes of the distribution and therefore produce extreme results for better and for worse. The text gives another example of small Midwestern towns supposedly having high life expectancy because of fresh air and calm, until it turned out that the lowest life expectancy also characterized small towns, because statistical extremity is characteristic of small size, not of essential quality.
The two roles of explanation: a condition for generalization versus a source of bias
The text formulates the point that on the one hand, according to Mekor Chayim, the existence of a possible explanation is a condition for generalizing from three cases, while on the other hand, according to Kahneman, the existence of an “obvious” explanation is a dangerous place where people fall into statistical errors because they are captivated by an intuitive solution. The text states that there is no complete contradiction, because the Talmud requires the possibility of an explanation and not necessarily the temptation of a “reasonable” explanation, but the two sides still limit one another. The text concludes that when there is an explanation that sounds right, one must carefully check whether the statistics really support it, because the explanation may simply be begging the question.
Correlation, causation, and self-interest in explanation
The text cites a criticism of an argument by a lecturer from the Technion who claimed that investment in higher education should be increased because countries that invest more have a higher GDP, while pointing out that the causal direction could be the reverse or more complex. The text presents the idea that the explanation most convenient to someone in academia leads him to see the statistics as “proof” of what he had already assumed. The text emphasizes that such biases are common, and that awareness of them can help one be cautious, even without guaranteeing full success.
Tradition, “a law given to Moses at Sinai,” and lies “for good purposes”
The text describes a suspicion toward principles that sound a little too reasonable, such as the World to Come and reincarnation, when they are presented as “a tradition from Moses at Sinai” without a clear source, because the human motivation to “close circles” can produce a mistaken attribution of authority. The text notes that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) wrote that sometimes “a law given to Moses at Sinai” in the Talmud serves to strengthen a point and not necessarily to give an exact historical description, and the speaker objects strongly to a policy of “holy lies,” arguing that it is morally wrong and also tactically unsuccessful because “a lie does not stand.” The text mentions Kant and the categorical imperative against lying, rejects the extremism of forbidding falsehood even to the point of martyrdom, but maintains that as a policy one should not permit lying except perhaps in immediate life-saving situations.
Scientific error and the authority of the Talmud regarding fortune
The text defines “fortune causes it” as an ancient scientific/factual conception about the influence of stars, and argues that scientifically there is no indication that such an influence exists, so there is no reason to assume it does. The text argues that a scientific mistake does not bind Jewish law in the same way, similar to the example of lice on the Sabbath, and presents a dispute with the claim that there is no “proof” here of error. The text distinguishes between a desire for autonomy and a simple disbelief in fortune, and identifies the astrological conception as a widespread ancient worldview rather than as a tradition from Sinai.
Practical conclusion: applying the Talmud’s principles with updated scientific thinking
The text concludes that, in the speaker’s view and by reasoning alone, Mekor Chayim is right that one does not generalize wildly from every three cases, and there must be some idea or logic that justifies the generalization. The text states that applying the Talmud’s principles to today’s reality should be done through modern scientific thinking and not through the science of the ancient period. The text ends by saying that the existence of an explanation can both justify a generalization and mislead one into it, and therefore the lesson is to combine explanatory plausibility with careful statistical testing and not be swept away by an appealing explanation.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, last time I started talking about the presumption created by three occurrences, and the context for the discussion was really the statistical majority not before us. And basically we saw that a statistical majority not before us is a generalization from a sample, and I said that that is both its strength and its weakness. You can interpret it either way. And its weakness—at least for someone who sees a weakness in a statistical majority not before us, which is also the plain meaning of the Talmud in Chullin—comes from the fact that when you generalize from a sample, you are basically assuming that this sample is a representative sample. In other words, that the sample reflects the general law, that it is a particular case of the general law. But that is something you can’t really know. It’s speculation. And that, in fact, is David Hume’s problem of induction. David Hume basically says: the fact that you saw something happen several times does not mean it is a general law, that it will always happen. And your assumption that if it happened several times then that must be the general law—that contains an element of speculation. And therefore people tend to think that a statistical majority not before us is a more problematic kind of majority. It has a speculative dimension. By contrast, a majority before us—all the stores are in front of us, there are nine kosher ones and one non-kosher one—I’m not making any generalization. These are the facts. And there is a piece of meat here that is one of the pieces, meaning it came from one of the stores, so seemingly it is much stronger to say that this piece came from the majority stores and not from the minority stores. There’s no speculation here, no generalization, it isn’t exposed to Hume’s problem of induction and so on. On the other hand, I talked about the fact that there is another problem here, which is that this is not something you can verify by testing; you can’t do an experiment that would confirm it. So we saw considerations both ways. To illustrate Hume’s problem of induction, or the problematic aspect of generalization, I started dealing with the question of the presumption created by three occurrences in Jewish law. And I said that this appears in a number of halakhic contexts. We can talk about a forewarned ox; maybe that’s the place where it appears even in the Torah itself. An ox that gored three times becomes a forewarned ox; until then it is a harmless ox and pays half damages, and once it is forewarned it pays full damages. There are differences between the law of a harmless ox and that of a forewarned ox. What changes its status from harmless to forewarned? The fact that it gored three times. So that is basically a first foundation for this idea of the presumption created by three occurrences. If something happened three times, then it is apparently a general rule. Right, that is basically induction. We see it in other places too: a woman’s menstrual patterns, a woman whose husbands died, or children who died because of circumcision—after it happened three times, I assume that this is a general rule, and so on. There are various more examples; they all appear in the Talmud, all the examples I’ve given up to now, and they are examples of the presumption created by three occurrences. In other words, the assumption that if I saw three examples, I can generalize from them and turn that into a general rule. Then I brought the Mekor Chayim—wait, Mekor Chayim. Mekor Chayim is dealing with the laws of Passover, leavened food on Passover, and he discusses a situation where I found a split grain of wheat inside my dough. I removed it, and then I found another split grain, and then three split grains, and I removed them from the dough. Now the question is whether I need to suspect that there are more grains in this dough. I’ve already found three; the question is whether I need to be concerned there are more. So he says: “Therefore it seems to me”—we already started this last time—“therefore it seems to me that we do not say a three-time presumption except where there is a causal factor, such that it is reasonable that it should be so and logical inference requires it to be so. But in a matter that happens by chance, where there is no plausible causal factor, there is no presumption regarding coincidences.” He says like this: when I saw three cases and I turn them into a general law, I make that generalization if there is some logic that connects the three cases that I saw. But if something just happened three times and there is no principle behind it that could explain why it happened three times, then I will not assume that it is a general law. And I brought the well-known Rabbi Chaim on the Talmud at the beginning of Chagigah, about the signs of an imbecile, where the Talmud says that if he has the three signs, then according to one opinion he is probably an imbecile. It’s a dispute among amora’im. But according to one opinion, one bad sign doesn’t do it, two bad signs don’t do it, three signs mean he is an imbecile. And Rabbi Chaim asks why. After all, each sign by itself is not enough. Why? Because it has an explanation. He goes out at night because—well—he sleeps in a cemetery at night because he wants an impure spirit to rest upon him. He wanders at night because some mental disturbance seized him, some shock or troubling thought or something like that. He tears his clothes because he didn’t notice, or something like that. So we have explanations for each of these signs of madness that tell us: no, he is not necessarily an imbecile; there may be some explanation for why he did this. So if there is one sign, I can’t declare him an imbecile. Two signs also not. Maybe he goes to the cemetery at night because he wants an impure spirit, and he goes out at night because some disturbance seized him. But when there are three signs, then yes. Why? So Rabbi Chaim says: because if I have three signs and one explanation strings all three together—the explanation that he is an imbecile—that explains the three events, then that is preferable to the alternative that offers a separate explanation for each event. The simpler explanation is preferable. But of course that is only where there really is some common explanation that strings together the three cases; otherwise I won’t assume that there is some rule here. Only if we have some idea of what this rule might be. Okay? So that is what Mekor Chayim is basically saying here too. And he says: “And a clear proof of this”—I’m reading here—“and a clear proof of this is from Yevamot 64 regarding a lethal woman, for according to the one who says ‘the spring causes it,’ the law of a lethal woman does not apply to a betrothed woman, and likewise the law of lethalness does not apply where it concerns men. From here we see that wherever there is no plausible causal factor, there is no presumption.” And then he brings further proofs and so on. Where does this idea come from? So let’s look at the Talmud. This is the Talmud in Yevamot. The Talmud discusses presumptions created by three occurrences here; this is basically the foundational Talmudic passage dealing with them. The Talmud says—well, there is the Mishnah there: “If a man married a woman and stayed with her ten years and she did not give birth, he is not permitted to desist from the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying. If he divorced her, she is permitted to marry another, and the second is allowed to stay with her for ten years. And if she miscarried, he counts from the time of the miscarriage.” Fine? Now they begin discussing how many times this can be repeated. So the Talmud says: “Who is our Mishnah according to?” Right? “A second, yes; a third, no.” Meaning, starting from “if he divorced her she is permitted,” and so on—so one more person can try marrying her and waiting ten years. If that also doesn’t work, is a third also allowed? The Mishnah doesn’t say. The Talmud says: “A second, yes; a third, no.” One man can try again, but an additional man, a third, can no longer marry her, because apparently she is barren and will not have children. The Talmud asks: “Who is our Mishnah according to? Who is the tanna who taught this Mishnah?” The Talmud answers: “It is Rabbi.” As it was taught: “She circumcised the first and he died, the second and he died; the third should not be circumcised—these are the words of Rabbi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The third should be circumcised; the fourth should not be circumcised.” What does that mean? A woman gave birth to a child, they circumcised him, and he died from the circumcision. She gave birth to another child, they circumcised him, and he too died from the circumcision. Regarding the third son, Rabbi says he should not be circumcised anymore, because once they circumcise him he too will die. Rabbi holds that a presumption is created after two cases, not three. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says no—the third should be circumcised, and if he too dies, then the fourth should not be. Their dispute, as the Talmud explains here, is whether two cases create a presumption or three cases create a presumption. Or whether one generalizes on the basis of three examples. Because according to Rabbi, the presumption is really a two-time presumption, not a three-time presumption. According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the presumption is created by three occurrences. It brings other examples here, not important. I’m skipping a little in the Talmud. Then the Talmud says: “And furthermore, if they only taught that they disagree regarding circumcision, do they also disagree regarding marriage?” Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree regarding infants who died from circumcision—whether the presumption is created after two times or three times. And the Talmud says that our Mishnah, which speaks about a woman who did not give birth after ten years, follows Rabbi’s view. Because it says explicitly that a second may marry her, but a third may not. So you see that according to the Mishnah, a presumption is created after two times, and that fits Rabbi. The Talmud asks why. Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree in matters of circumcision, but regarding marrying this woman, who says the same dispute applies? The Talmud answers: yes. It is the same dispute. “And as it was taught”—and here, the commentators say, that wording is used gently, meaning we explicitly see it in a baraita: “She married the first and he died, the second and he died; she should not marry the third—these are the words of Rabbi. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She may marry the third; she should not marry the fourth.” So we see in the baraita that the same dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel regarding death from circumcision also exists regarding a woman who did not bear children for ten years. According to Rabbi the presumption is created after two times; according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it is created after three times.
[Speaker C] The Talmud says—Rabbi, where does Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel know this from? Know what? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is willing to risk another child? On what basis does he know that two times yes and three times no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that after two times it’s still not proof; three times is already proof.
[Speaker C] Did he do research? Did he check a million cases and see that this is how it works? To risk the third child? That’s his reasoning, it’s not the result—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —of a study. Nobody there did studies.
[Speaker C] I’m asking: if Rabbi comes along and says that one shouldn’t risk a third child because it’s kind of strange that two children died—if Rabbi hadn’t said that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you wouldn’t have found Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel difficult.
[Speaker C] All the more so. Then Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel comes and says no, I’m convinced, I received from—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why doesn’t Rabbi worry after one time? A child died from circumcision—maybe the circumcision killed him. Why are you taking a risk and circumcising the second?
[Speaker C] Also a good and valid question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So where will you stop? Rabbi stops after two, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel after three. What can you do? That’s… somebody is going to pay that price, right. The Talmud says: Granted, regarding circumcision, there are families with weak blood and families with blood that congeals. “Weak blood” means thin blood. And “blood that congeals”—right—the blood does clot. So once you circumcise, the blood doesn’t clot and therefore the infant dies. And there are families where the blood—yes, sort of genetically, that is the Talmud’s assumption—there are families where the blood clots more readily, its PT is shorter, and therefore the children there do not die from circumcision. So what? So regarding circumcision, says the Talmud, there is logic to making a generalization. And if you see that two or three children died from circumcision, you can assume there is some general law here. What is that general law? Apparently in this family children are born with weak blood, blood that does not clot, and therefore do not circumcise the next child. There is an explanation for this phenomenon, and therefore we generalize. Remember Mekor Chayim? Here is his source, this is his proof. And the Talmud says: where there is an explanation, there we generalize on the basis of the three cases. But “what is the reason in marriage?” says the Talmud. Regarding circumcision I understand Rabbi’s and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s dispute, because regarding circumcision there is logic to generalizing. After two times, after three times—each one according to what he thinks—but there is logic to the generalization. What’s the logic? You can explain why two or three children died from circumcision. Apparently in this family the blood is thin and therefore it doesn’t clot and the children die. So there is an explanation for the phenomenon, and therefore we generalize. Remember Mekor Chayim? Here is his source, this is his proof. And the Talmud says: where there is an explanation, there we generalize on the basis of the three cases. But in marriage—the husband died once, and then another husband died, and then a third one died, so now she should not marry anymore. Why? Is there some logic saying that something is killing all the husbands? There’s no logic here at all. Therefore, says the Talmud, no—that’s not right. It isn’t right to generalize. So the Talmud says: Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi, this is what Avimi of Hagronia said in the name of Rav Huna: “the spring causes it.” And Rav Ashi says: “fortune causes it.” What does that mean? Avimi of Hagronia claims that “the spring causes it.” What is “the spring”? The woman’s source, meaning whoever has marital relations with this woman—there is something in her fluids, the woman’s bodily fluids, that kills the husbands. In other words, the sexual contact is what kills the husbands. So that is the explanation. So we have an explanation for making a generalization even in the case of a woman whose three husbands died. Apparently the sexual contact killed them. In other words, something in the woman’s bodily fluids kills whoever comes into contact with them. So if it happened two or three times, we generalize. So there is logic here too, not only in the blood of the infants in circumcision. And Rav Ashi offers another explanation: “fortune causes it.” The fortune of this woman is that whoever marries her dies. Okay? So that is her fortune. So here too we basically have some kind of proposal for the idea that ties together the three—or the two—cases, and therefore I can generalize. The Talmud asks: “What practical difference is there between them?”
[Speaker D] What does “fortune” mean, Rabbi? What? What does “fortune” mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll come back to that in a moment. Good question. The Talmud asks: what practical difference is there between them? The difference is in a case where she was betrothed and he died, or alternatively he fell from a palm tree and died. What practical difference is there between these two explanations? What happens if the woman was betrothed to a man and he died, betrothed to another man and he died, and betrothed to a third man and he also died? Is it now forbidden to become betrothed to her? If you say that the woman’s “spring” causes it, meaning the explanation is that her bodily fluids kill the husband through sexual relations, then in betrothal there are not yet sexual relations. So the fact that the three husbands died should not create concern regarding the fourth husband or fourth fiancé. Therefore the fourth may marry her. According to the view that fortune causes it, it is forbidden, because you see that the fortune is such that everyone who becomes betrothed to her dies, so there is concern that the fourth will also die, and therefore even without sexual relations the concern remains. Another practical difference: what if one man married the woman and then died not because of intercourse, but because he climbed a tree and died? He had an accident and died, and that happened to three of her husbands. Now if you say that her fortune causes it, then I am concerned—so the fourth husband either shouldn’t marry her, or shouldn’t climb trees. Right? But if you say the woman’s “spring” causes it, then this has nothing to do with her “spring.” They fell from a tree; it’s not that they died because they were affected by the woman’s bodily fluids. Unless those fluids cause dizziness and then if you climb a tree you get dizzy and die. But apparently the Talmud did not consider that. In any case, what do we see here? We see here, says Mekor Chayim—Mekor Chayim is really the Netivot on Orach Chayim—Mekor Chayim basically says that where we have a possible explanation, then if it happened three times I make a generalization and assume that these three cases are a representative sample, and basically there is a general law here. I make an induction, make a generalization. But if I have no explanation behind it—people climbed a tree and died—what, the fact that it happened to three people means it will happen to the fourth? Do you see some causal factor behind the death of the first three husbands? I don’t see any cause here. And since that is so, here I do not generalize. I do not say that therefore the fourth husband who marries her will also climb a tree and die. No. Because there is no logic that I can think of that strings together the three cases I encountered. Mekor Chayim says: you see here in the Talmud that this assumption—if something happened three times we make it into a generalization—applies only where we have some possible explanation for the three cases that occurred. And that explanation is basically some sort of natural law, or some law of some kind, doesn’t matter, some natural explanation. Then you say that if there is an explanation, apparently that explanation is true and it will also happen in future cases. But where no possible explanation appears, then even if it happened three times, I will not assume it will happen a fourth time. This Talmudic passage explicitly says exactly what Mekor Chayim says: that we generalize from three cases only where we have some explanation that strings the three cases together. Okay? That is basically the claim. Now a comment about “fortune causes it.” What you asked earlier. This is an interesting comment, because what does “fortune causes it” mean? Is “fortune causes it” an explanation? Could there ever be a case where you would not find—according to the thesis that fortune is also one of the possible explanations—could there ever be three cases that don’t have an explanation? No. You can always say: fortune causes it. I don’t know, something mystical, something—I don’t know exactly what. Fortune causes it. The moment you accept fortune as an explanation, that basically empties Mekor Chayim of content. Because it basically says no, I don’t need an explanation. Even where I cannot think of any explanation, I’ll say: fortune causes it. And I’ll still be concerned the fourth time. So you have to notice carefully that Mekor Chayim indeed brought a proof from the Talmud here, but the proof from this Talmudic passage works only according to Rabbi Avimi of Hagronia. But according to Rav Ashi, who says that fortune causes it, it seems in the simple sense that there is no need for an explanation—sorry, not that there is no explanation. In every case where it happened three times, I’m not saying there is no explanation. I’m saying that even if I don’t have an explanation, I assume there is an explanation: fortune causes it. It wasn’t a coincidence, and therefore it will happen the fourth time too. Why isn’t that an—
[Speaker B] —explanation?
[Speaker E] Why isn’t that an explanation? She’s a woman with bad fortune like that, that every—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no problem. It can be an explanation. I’m only saying: if you accept such a thing as an explanation, then I can’t think of any case where there would be three cases and you wouldn’t have an explanation. The explanation “fortune causes it” can always be used. So the requirement that there has to be an explanation is emptied of content, because if you didn’t find any other explanation, the explanation of fortune is always there. It’s a joker, right? You can always pull out the joker. So there is no situation of three cases that do not have an explanation.
[Speaker E] It’s a little different because in circumcision we wouldn’t say of every infant that he had that kind of fortune. Here we’re focusing on the same woman, that she has the fortune of a lethal woman.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, also with the infant. I’m saying, what do you mean? This woman has the fortune that her three infants died because of circumcision.
[Speaker E] Circumcision is something external to her.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? The fortune of this woman is such that always… Here too the tree is external to the woman. But the woman’s fortune causes her husbands to die when they fall from a tree. So her children die after circumcision—what’s the difference? Once you accept the explanation of fortune, then this requirement of Mekor Chayim, that there must be an explanation behind the generalization, is emptied of content. In other words, again, it is emptied of content not because there is no explanation. There is an explanation—fortune is the explanation. I’m just saying: but in every situation there is an explanation. In other words, there will never be three cases where you say, no, this has no explanation and therefore I do not generalize. There is always an explanation. And once you accept fortune as an optional explanation, meaning an explanation that is also admissible, that you are also allowed to attribute things to fortune, then there will never be three cases where there is no explanation.
[Speaker E] You’re right, but maybe that itself is the proof of Mekor Chayim, that he says that according to the one who holds that fortune is the cause, then you can always pull out that reason and it strings the events together. Okay, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that means Mekor Chayim wanted to say that there are situations where we do not generalize—where three cases happened and we do not have an explanation that strings them together. There is no such case according to Rav Ashi. After all, the whole point of Mekor Chayim, his entire idea, was to give us this concept in order to say that there are situations where even if something happened three times, we will not generalize, because it is not a representative sample, because these are not particular cases of a natural law, because there is no possible explanation. Now according to Rav Ashi there are no such cases. There is always an explanation. If fortune is an explanation, then everything is an explanation, so everything has an explanation. Right, exactly. So now notice this: you see here the sign of the practical ruling. Look. The sign of the ruling is next to Rav Ashi, did you notice? Look at Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer 9. “A woman who married two men and they died should not marry a third, because she has already been established as one whose husbands die. And if she did marry, she does not have to leave.” Gloss: the Rema says, “A woman who married”—or “who was betrothed.” See? What does “or was betrothed” mean? That’s the fortune. The fortune, right? And that follows the explanation of fortune and not the spring. Because if she was only betrothed, there were no sexual relations. In other words, like whom do we rule? Like Rav Ashi. So Mekor Chayim’s proof, of course, falls apart.
[Speaker D] Fine, but it’s very hard to understand this answer of fortune, because you can use it, like the Rabbi said, as a joker, it’s not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the claim is, the claim is that there is no such thing as coincidence in the world at all. That is really the claim. There are no coincidences in the world. If something happened three times, then it is apparently a general law. That is exactly the claim. And if you don’t find one, then apparently it’s fortune. But there always has to be—there is no coincidence. That is exactly the claim. Right? Or at least the assumption of coincidence is a very implausible assumption. I’m not saying there is no coincidence. But every time something happened three times and I am now deliberating whether to see it as some fixed law or as coincidence, I prefer to see it as a fixed law. Because it is more logical—even if I have no explanation—it is more logical that it is fortune than that it is luck in the modern sense, meaning that it is just coincidence. Okay? That is basically the claim. It doesn’t necessarily mean that such things are always cases of law-like regularity, but it does mean that we will always prefer the explanation that there is some law here over the explanation that it is coincidence. All right?
[Speaker B] Is that a law of nature? I can’t hear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nature? I didn’t hear the question. I didn’t hear.
[Speaker D] He asked whether it’s a law of nature.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What law of nature? Fortune? Yes—again, in the Talmud’s conception, yes, fortune is one of the laws of nature. Fortune is the stars. The influence of the stars, stars and constellations.
[Speaker D] Oh, so it’s not the hand of God?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Fortune is the influence of the stars. For example, “Israel is not subject to fortune”—so how can they attribute this to fortune? I don’t know, that needs analysis. In any case, fortune is a scientific explanation.
[Speaker F] Rabbi, maybe one could explain that this is not a scientific explanation even for the sages, but rather they are saying: we do not always know; there is a concern here, especially since this is danger to life, so when there is concern there is a cause, and we do not always know it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not only with danger to life. The claim would always be true, not specifically with danger to life. It doesn’t look like it’s only here.
[Speaker F] But that’s also difficult. Why don’t you distinguish? There are cases where you would say, true, I still don’t know the explanation, but probably there is some likelihood that there is some explanation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The point, I think, is that if you—this is really the same question you asked before. So maybe I’ll answer it a little differently; I just thought of this now. After all, nobody is forcing you to marry this woman, the fourth person. The whole question is only whether we will forbid it to you, right? You want to marry her—if you don’t want to, then don’t marry her. The question is whether we, as a religious court or the rabbi or whoever, will forbid you from marrying her. And here the claim is that after three times it is already forbidden to you. After one or two times, we could tell you: listen, take note, be careful—but if he decides nevertheless to take the risk, that is his right. After three times, that is already strong enough that we won’t allow it even if he wants to. Okay?
[Speaker F] But the implications for the woman are hard. Even if somehow these men can manage, she won’t be able to live with it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker F] She basically can’t get married anymore.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, of course, yes, that’s the other side of the coin. But if I were sure that she kills her husbands, then what can I do? I wouldn’t allow it. Right, what can you do? Right. Fine, so that’s what I’m saying. So there is some sort of balance here. Regarding circumcision—now I think—but regarding circumcision it is really a bit different, because with circumcision we are deciding whether to circumcise. It’s not that someone wants to circumcise and the question is whether we stop him; we are deciding whether to circumcise. The question is whether to circumcise or not. Here there is actually an obligation to circumcise. It’s not like marriage where it is permitted to marry her. In circumcision it is an obligation to circumcise. There it really is harder.
[Speaker F] Fine, but would it even occur to us today to do this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not at all sure. Let’s say this: I think that in our thinking today, we would still ask ourselves whether this is coincidence or whether there could be some medical explanation here. If there could be some medical explanation, we would be concerned even after one or two times. We would investigate why the child died. With today’s medical tools we have more possibilities for checking. The sages lived in a world where you really had no way to test such things; you made estimates based on constructs like presumptions, generalizations, one conjecture or another. Today we have the ability to test. Therefore, if a doctor came and said, listen, this child died and there is a substantial chance that it was because of the circumcision, I assume they wouldn’t do another circumcision even for the second child.
[Speaker F] They didn’t think of that. What? It’s strange that they didn’t think of it then. Apparently they didn’t think of it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, they didn’t think of it? The doctor has to say that on the basis of some knowledge, not just raise possibilities. I can also raise possibilities; for that you don’t need to be a doctor.
[Speaker F] I didn’t understand. A child definitely died because of the circumcision—that’s what we’re talking about. It’s clear he died because of the circumcision, not because he had a heart infection.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, and is this a screw-up by the mohel?
[Speaker F] It could be that it was a screw-up by the mohel, and let’s say we didn’t examine that. There was no evidence of any screw-up.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, we examined it?
[Speaker F] Again, no—Hazal couldn’t examine it. No, they didn’t know how to examine it. After a few days, say, we won’t be able to know. But apparently there was nothing obvious; he wasn’t clumsy with his hands.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, if we run tests today, with today’s medical tools, and we reach the conclusion that there was no screw-up by the mohel, and we have a reasonable suspicion that he really died because of the circumcision, I assume they also wouldn’t circumcise the second child.
[Speaker F] So then how did they take responsibility for it back then?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because back then they had no tools to examine it. We’re talking here about positive knowledge. But you’re basing it on the circumcision. It’s all conjecture. So he says: based on one case, you don’t make conjectures.
[Speaker E] But the side the Talmud brings to explain the circumcision case—that it’s a family whose blood is weak—that sounds a lot like hemophilia, doesn’t it?
[Speaker F] Obviously.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, hemophilia or—
[Speaker E] Not hemophilia—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thin blood, whatever you want to call it.
[Speaker E] I’m saying that’s equivalent to a test we actually would do today.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the Talmud didn’t test whether their blood was weak. It says, apparently there are families whose blood is thin. That’s not the result of a test. If they had known that their blood was thin, they wouldn’t even have circumcised the first baby. No, it’s all conjecture—that’s exactly the point. You have to understand, the Talmud is dealing with a situation of complete darkness. There is no knowledge.
[Speaker F] So how—so how, I’m asking? A child dies, we have no evidence of any other screw-up or malfunction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t raise those concerns.
[Speaker F] No, what do you mean you can’t? There’s a second child, and they say—they come to an Amora or a Tanna and ask him whether to circumcise him the second time. We have no explanation. Clearly the child died because of the circumcision; the mechanism is unknown in every direction. But it could be a screw-up—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the mohel, it could be weak blood, it could be a lot of things.
[Speaker F] It could be. So they ask the Tanna: do you want to take—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Upon yourself the risk of causing death?
[Speaker F] Rabbi says after two times, no more.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says after three times. I’m asking even about the second time—how do you take that risk? Yes, yes, they take that risk.
[Speaker F] Whereas today no one would—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Would even imagine—
[Speaker F] Doing that. Not true, I don’t agree. People wouldn’t imagine doing that only if a doctor told them, as a medical opinion, that there is a positive concern here that it’s because of the circumcision. The Talmud knows that it’s not a screw-up by the mohel. Again, I’m explaining: it’s connected to the circumcision, it’s connected—there’s no dispute that it’s connected to the circumcision. What’s the mechanism? It could be a screw-up by the mohel, it could be weak blood, it could be a thousand things. Why not? There’s no dispute whether it’s connected—these things—but it’s connected. Let’s say it’s clear to us that something happened there, nonstop bleeding, something like that happened, bleeding in the area, and he died because of it. Now you come to the second time; we have no mechanism, we didn’t identify a mechanism, and we say let’s see. That’s not reasonable. Nobody would take that on himself; it’s not obligatory.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t agree.
[Speaker F] The dispute is whether it’s connected—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only where you have some kind of positive knowledge. No, otherwise there are lots of possibilities; you can’t be concerned about all those possibilities.
[Speaker F] But they all converge on the circumcision.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not just some vague matter of circumcision.
[Speaker F] Right, it happened, but it converges on the circumcision. And if the child dies, then he won’t incur karet, but he also won’t exist.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, what can you do? Most children apparently won’t die. It could be that someone will—what can you do? Yes.
[Speaker F] And what catastrophe would happen if the Jewish law were, let’s say—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the Jewish law—
[Speaker F] Were that if a child dies because of circumcision, then the brothers born after him don’t undergo circumcision. It sounds regrettable, but saving life overrides—that’s the Jewish law, that’s what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants. Would the Rabbi protest against such a Jewish law? Of course not. So how did the Tannaim not take that upon themselves?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not protest? That would mean it’s a necessary Jewish law.
[Speaker F] Not necessary, but logical.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not protesting here either. Fine, somewhere you have to draw the line. After one child they didn’t draw the line; one drew it after two, one drew it after three. Fine.
[Speaker F] Yes, but other people paid the price—not their own children.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either they paid or they didn’t pay; most likely they wouldn’t pay the price. Fine, it could be they would—what can you do? We get into a car and drive; there’s a decent chance we’ll die. Fine, we take risks in order to live properly.
[Speaker F] A driver lost control of the car and, through an unclear mechanism, killed several people. They say: we currently have no explanation for what exactly happened to you at that moment when you were driving; we have no explanation. But come on, drive again and let’s see. If it happens two or three times and there are more deaths, then we’ll act.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you think—every driver who killed someone has his license revoked and never drives again?
[Speaker F] No, in a case where we don’t know the mechanism. Not that he committed an offense, not that he was talking on the phone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t know—in a mechanism we don’t know. Besides, if he wasn’t talking on the phone, then what? So he talked on the phone one time.
[Speaker F] They ask him how it happened, and he says, honestly, I have no idea. We check: he wasn’t talking on the phone and nothing else. So we say, drive again and let’s see what happens. No, no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If we run tests on him and find nothing, we’ll let him keep driving. We take risks all the time—that’s life. Okay, in any case, back to our topic. Notice that I’m a bit puzzled by this proof from Mekor Chayim, because if in practice we rule like Rav Ashi, then what he’s really saying is that it is indeed true that after three times we generalize, whether there is an explanation or whether there isn’t one. Because if there is no explanation, we’ll say that mazal causes it. But bottom line, de facto, you don’t need to find an explanation or think of some optional explanation in order to generalize. Okay, I’m putting that in parentheses, because the logic still says that Mekor Chayim is right. And I don’t know why the Talmud calls it mazal, or when the Talmud is prepared to attribute things to mazal. It could be that in their way of thinking—again, I don’t understand all their stories about astrological influences and exactly how they conceived of the matter—but it could be that for them mazal really was a concrete explanation. Meaning, it could be that there are sets of three cases about which people would say, no, no, that has nothing to do with mazal; here mazal isn’t relevant. I don’t know exactly how they decided that, because I have no idea how they thought in those terms of mazal and non-mazal. And then it could be—because logic says you don’t make a generalization from just any three cases. That doesn’t sound reasonable. Let’s say, I don’t know, on a Tuesday there was a car accident in Lod, okay? A person died. The following Tuesday again someone dies in Lod. According to Rabbi, are we supposed to stop all travel in Lod on Tuesdays from now on?
[Speaker F] There’s no choice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does that sound reasonable to you? Not to me. Nobody is going to stop traveling. Why? Because there’s no logic in thinking that Tuesday carries some special danger. They’ll say, yes, but maybe Lod’s mazal is that on Tuesdays someone always gets into a fatal car accident. I don’t know—I don’t believe in mazal at all, so I… But when people once thought in terms of mazal, it could be that for them it wasn’t some joker explanation, as I said before, that you can always pull out whenever you want—the issue of mazal. Rather, maybe they had some criteria for when you say mazal is operating and when not. Just as a side note, according to Mekor Chayim that is certainly the case, because Mekor Chayim brings proof from this Talmudic passage for his principle, but the proof collapses from within, because the Jewish law follows Rav Ashi, and according to Rav Ashi there is actually proof against him. So you point to this Talmudic passage as proof for your position? He must have understood that even when Rav Ashi says that mazal causes it, Rav Ashi is proposing some kind of concrete explanation here; it’s not just a joker.
[Speaker G] Okay, but clearly—the Talmud in Bava Kamma also talks about an animal and a person, that mazal protects him. The redundancy there—that a person has mazal, has an angel who protects him; an animal doesn’t. The Talmud sees it as something that really exists.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, something real—yes. No, and also as if… But something real that you can also determine when it does apply and when it doesn’t.
[Speaker G] No, you can’t determine that. Even with a person we couldn’t determine it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you can’t determine it, then we’re back to a joker. Not that mazal doesn’t exist—according to the Talmud, mazal certainly exists, that was clear to me from the outset. I just thought that since it exists, every time three cases happen I can attribute them to mazal, because if there’s no other explanation, that’s probably the explanation. And then it means that Mekor Chayim’s requirement that there be some possible explanation is emptied of content, because I can always attribute it to mazal. But if I say no—mazal really exists, but I can also explain when it’s possible to attribute something to mazal and when not—if that’s so, then Rav Ashi saying that mazal causes it isn’t saying something that’s a joker. Rather, there are situations where I’ll attribute it to mazal and situations where I won’t, and then I really won’t generalize based on three cases.
[Speaker G] Right, but even with circumcision, say, blood—they obviously didn’t really know whether it was an issue of blood or how it works. They were just worried and said maybe there’s something in the blood.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, no—but that’s a concrete concern, because they understand that something in the blood could cause it. Again, without—
[Speaker G] Just as they understand that something in mazal could cause it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but mazal is something terribly general. If mazal is something general, then that means okay, so everything is mazal. Then every three things that happen I’ll attribute to mazal.
[Speaker E] So apparently—
[Speaker G] The term mazal, according to Mekor Chayim—what, again? That “there is mazal” means there’s something specific about a person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, it depends on the conceptions. I don’t know what the conceptions were then, but I assume—I think, at least—that when they said mazal they didn’t mean a joker.
[Speaker G] Yes, it’s not like—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What we said, that really from every three things you’d make a generalization. Every three things. Meaning, if someone whose name starts with A got the flu on Sunday, and the next Sunday again someone whose name starts with A got the flu, then the assumption is that every Sunday someone whose name starts with A will get the flu? According to that, there is no set of three cases in the universe from which you wouldn’t make a generalization. That’s not reasonable. It can’t be that we make such wild generalizations. You won’t be able to move. You won’t be able to marry any woman, you won’t be able to circumcise any child. Run statistics on all the days on which children died over the years close to a circumcision. And you can always say, okay, so we can’t circumcise on this day this child. You can always find three cases that will create a rule forbidding me to circumcise on that day. That doesn’t work—you can’t function that way. Therefore Mekor Chayim really is right. Mekor Chayim is right. How to explain this issue of mazal there in Rav Ashi—I don’t know. Apparently they had some conception of when it is relevant to attribute something to mazal and when not. But it is a conception. Meaning, there is an explanatory option here. It’s not just a joker.
[Speaker F] If mazal causes it, then of course there’s nothing to be done. Whatever we do, in the end it will happen.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why we won’t circumcise. What do you mean?
[Speaker F] But if mazal is determined from above—stars, whatever is relevant—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not determined from above that you’ll die. It’s determined from above that if they circumcise you now, you’ll die. Not determined, of course—the stars cause it, I don’t know, something.
[Speaker G] In any case, regarding the practical implications in the Talmud, the Talmud really didn’t bring—it didn’t bring a practical difference saying that in the case of mazal this won’t apply.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. The Talmud brought a practical difference only for one thing. Yes, which implies that the Talmud didn’t—yes, I did suspect it was a joker. But it sounds so unreasonable to me that it’s a joker, because that means from every set of three cases you’d make a generalization. Mekor Chayim certainly didn’t learn that way, because otherwise his proof falls apart. From this Talmudic passage there is proof against him. Not only is there no proof for him, there’s proof against him.
[Speaker D] And it also doesn’t make sense to compare something concrete and medical with something airy like mazal. It’s very hard to compare those things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. Hazal understood that mazal too operates in the world. Never mind—that was the conception. Again, if you ask me whether if three leaves fall from a tree, there’s no problem for the fourth husband to marry her, because I don’t believe in mazal. So even if the Talmud ruled that it’s forbidden to marry the fourth time, I would violate that Jewish law without any problem.
[Speaker D] If the Talmud ruled that way, does that mean that even today you can use that ruling for any three things we see?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary. I want to argue that even though the Talmud ruled that way, it is not binding because it is based on a mistaken method, a mistaken scientific conception.
[Speaker D] It’s not binding? What about its formal authority?
[Speaker G] The Rabbi says the Talmud has formal authority, doesn’t he?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not where it’s a mistake. A factual mistake, a scientific mistake—like lice, killing lice on the Sabbath.
[Speaker G] No, but here there’s no factual mistake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A rabbi can’t know whether mazal exists.
[Speaker G] Nobody can know whether mazal exists or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can know—it doesn’t.
[Speaker G] You can’t know. You can say it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can. What do you mean I can’t? I know it’s mythical, and there is no reason in the world to assume it exists. Stars don’t affect anything. Except in the astrology corner of Yediot Aharonot.
[Speaker D] The Rabbi says that because he understands that mazal equals astrology in the eyes of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud.
[Speaker D] And not mazal as in the Holy One, blessed be He, intervening here and wanting all the husbands to die.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Mazal, I think, in the Talmud’s terminology means the influence of the stars in some way.
[Speaker D] How can one be sure that that’s what it means?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, you’re not sure—you assume. Again, it’s always a comparison between possibilities. And you ask which possibility is less implausible. So what do you say—that three events were coincidence? So no, maybe mazal did it. Then one should be concerned and not do it a fourth time. It’s a concern; it’s not a positive determination.
[Speaker D] I wouldn’t say coincidence. I’d say more that supposedly the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes here. I don’t know if you can claim it that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not the term mazal. That’s the term—“He is being pursued from Heaven,” yes, what the Talmud says. That means it comes upon him from Heaven. But mazal is something else. And again, as much as I haven’t examined it deeply, as far as I know in the language of the sages, mazal means the influence of the stars.
[Speaker E] Rabbi, so—
[Speaker D] They really believed in that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, obviously. True, the Talmud says “Israel is not subject to mazal,” so I don’t know, but okay.
[Speaker E] Is Mekor Chayim bound to Rav Ashi? To think like Rav Ashi?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the Jewish law is ruled like Rav Ashi, then yes.
[Speaker E] No, but the Jewish law is that according to the one who says the spring causes it—that there is a cause—but the Jewish law wasn’t ruled like him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Jewish law was ruled like Rav Ashi.
[Speaker E] Because the Rema brings the “some say”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Shulchan Arukh and the Rema—
[Speaker E] And Maimonides. Fine, he can—the Mekor—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Chayim does not dispute the Shulchan Arukh. What? Mekor Chayim does not dispute the Shulchan Arukh.
[Speaker E] He didn’t dispute it regarding Jewish law, but maybe he belonged to the group of people of little faith, where we also find ourselves, and didn’t believe in mazal at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—he’s talking about strict justice.
[Speaker E] Practically speaking it’s the same thing, but he doesn’t believe in it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely not. He would have had to comment on that; that’s really not it.
[Speaker E] He didn’t dare, Rabbi. He didn’t dare.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then he also wouldn’t have dared say this. What, are you counting on not getting caught? That’s too speculative; it doesn’t seem likely to me.
[Speaker D] Wait, Rabbi, but if the sages really believed in this mazal, what source would they have needed for it, since there was no science?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? There was science—Aristotelian science.
[Speaker D] They relied on science in order to determine that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just as today we don’t rely on the science of the gentiles? Of course we do.
[Speaker D] No, obviously. I’m asking.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That was the science of that time.
[Speaker D] And that was the basis for this thing, for this determination? It wasn’t some tradition from Sinai or something like that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see why it would be a tradition from Sinai. That was the conception prevalent throughout the world in that period. Maimonides talks about it in Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah; yes, it was obvious to everyone. The Raavad talks about the decree of the astrologers. That was the accepted conception. It’s not a tradition from Sinai; it was simply the scientific conception.
[Speaker D] That’s why the Rabbi says it’s a factual mistake, because it’s based on science and not on—yes, a scientific mistake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but—
[Speaker G] Wait, Rabbi—astrologers and all that. Maimonides, for instance, didn’t really believe in astrology, in predicting what will happen, reading the signs.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. We’d have to think about it, check it.
[Speaker G] He writes that he believes the stars have influence, but in a physical way, as Aristotle believed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine—what difference does it make?
[Speaker G] Yes, but you can’t see mazal as fate. He didn’t believe in fate.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is fate? The influence of the stars—that’s mazal.
[Speaker G] Fate is what happens to me specifically, in the literal sense, if—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the stars have influence, then the stars can also cause what happened.
[Speaker G] Yes, but the stars influence in the sense of how the world exists, in the astronomical sense—how it exists at all, how it stands, I don’t know exactly what.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They didn’t mean gravitational influence. They—
[Speaker G] They meant something like that. No. No? No. That could be what it means. What, gravity?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nobody even imagined that there is gravity between us and the stars. That’s not—anyway, the claim is, in short, what I want to say is that in the final analysis, in my opinion, at least logically, Mekor Chayim is right. We do not make a generalization on the basis of just any three cases. That’s not reasonable. There has to be some idea, some logic behind the generalization. And of course that logic is open to criticism. Meaning, if the Talmud thought in the scientific terms of that time, we are supposed to think in the scientific terms we know and understand today. That is perfectly fine. That is how one ought to apply the principles of the Talmud to our reality today. I just want to make an interesting remark now about the other side of the same coin. Notice that what we said here—and this is a very interesting point, and it’s connected to statistical fallacies, which is part of our topic—we are basically saying this: if we have three cases and there is a reasonable hypothesis, a possible explanation that would explain those three cases, then we assume that this is the correct explanation and not just coincidence. And therefore, with all the implications, it will also happen in future cases, and so on. In other words, the existence of an explanation that seems reasonable to us is a condition for generalization, right? If we see no reasonable explanation, we won’t generalize. If we do see a reasonable explanation, we will generalize. Now notice very carefully the other side of the same coin. Daniel Kahneman, in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow, brings several fascinating examples of statistical fallacies. Yes, this is his field—statistical fallacies; that’s what he got the Nobel Prize for. Among other things, he gives, for example, the case of the Gates Foundation, Bill Gates’s foundation, which invests huge sums in all kinds of goals for advancing humanity—really a very noble foundation. And once they conducted a study among schools to examine what characterizes the most successful schools, in order to learn from that and try to invest in that direction. And they found that the schools achieving the best results are small schools. And the conclusion was that we should therefore try to make schools smaller, because evidently that makes students’ achievements more efficient or better. And they invested billions of dollars in making schools smaller—meaning, they took a large school, split it, invested a lot of money, arranged teachers for every small group of students, and poured in huge amounts of money to create small schools.
[Speaker D] Meaning fewer children in a class? Fewer students, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And again, I don’t remember all the details, and I’m not committed that every single detail is accurate; I’m speaking generally.
[Speaker D] They—
[Speaker F] Didn’t they check whether that wasn’t a result rather than a cause? Sorry? Didn’t they check that it wasn’t a result and not a cause? Maybe the fact that small schools are like that wasn’t what caused the success, but some result of the fact that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How a result? First the school was successful and then it became small?
[Speaker F] Richer people, so they could afford it—it’s not something that caused the success.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, we’ll get to explanations in a moment. In any case, they invested billions of dollars. This had financial expression; it wasn’t a theoretical study. At some point, someone suddenly caught on—it probably didn’t work; the achievements didn’t improve, if I remember correctly. At some point someone realized that when you check school performance, you also find that the very worst schools are small schools. Meaning that the size of the school has nothing to do with whether it is successful or unsuccessful. So what does it have to do with? It has to do with what he calls the law of small numbers. What does the law of small numbers mean? Large schools—think of a school with ten thousand students, okay? Its grade distribution or average grade will be more or less the same every year. That’s the law of large numbers, right? In a small school the deviation from the average will be much greater; it will be more at the edges of the Gaussian distribution. In terms of grade distribution, the small schools will be at the edges of the Gaussian; the large schools will be in the middle. Think about an extreme case—a school with a single student. You understand that if that one student is Einstein, then it will be the best school in the world. And if that one student is some total donkey, then it will be the worst school in the world. Why? Because that one student in the school determines whether the school is good or not good. Averages have no meaning here; it’s a school of one student. Now think of a school of three students. You understand that the deviation is still—suppose there are many, many schools with three students—certainly some of them will be excellent; there will be three students with an average of 100. Some of them will be three students with an average of zero. And there will be quite a few schools somewhere in the middle. So when we ask ourselves, among all the schools, which schools reach the most extreme achievements, those will always be small schools. The most extreme—whether for good or for bad. They will always be small schools because small schools are the ones far from the average. Large schools will always be somewhere around the average. Right? Small schools can deviate a lot to one side—or to this side or that side. So if you ask yourself, you take all the good schools and ask what characterizes them, you say: that they are small. If you ask about all the bad schools and ask what characterizes them, again you discover that it’s the small ones. What does that actually mean? That in fact the number doesn’t determine the quality of the schools. Rather, it determines the distance of their achievements from the average. When the number is small, the distance from the average can be large. There can be a very large standard deviation from the average, and a large number of standard deviations from the average. Therefore extreme cases always characterize small samples. Small samples can give you extreme results. Now what happened here—another example, perhaps. They were looking for—I think there was some study there on life expectancy, I think health, life expectancy, and they found that the places leading in life expectancy were small towns in the Midwest, I think, that vote Republican. That’s what they found. Then they had an explanation, because these are peaceful places, farmers, not industrialized, not urban, so the air is better, so there’s better health, there’s serenity, not the neurosis of the city—therefore there’s health, right? We find explanations like that in the newspaper every day. Until, of course, someone came and showed that the places with the lowest life expectancy are also small towns in the Midwest that vote Republican. They vote Republican simply because that’s how people there vote; it has nothing to do with illness and health. What it does have to do with is that they are small towns. So it turned out that the very lowest life expectancy also characterized small towns in the Midwest. What does that mean? That, once again, small towns will reach extreme results. Either very high life expectancy—that will always characterize a small town—or very low. In large cities, life expectancy will generally be around the average, because there are many people there, so on average life expectancy will be the average life expectancy, plus or minus a little. When you look for large deviations, it will always be in small towns. Now he says there—and he’s a psychologist, after all, Kahneman—he explains that where do these mistakes appear in the clearest, most common, most widespread way? When we have an explanation. In small schools, we discover that the good schools are small. Immediately a natural explanation comes to mind, right? What’s the explanation? There are few students; the teacher can invest in each one, there is patience for each one, everyone knows everyone, it’s not a student factory—so it sounds very logical that a small school would be successful, right? It sounds very logical to us. When there is logic, you have to be very careful about the generalizations you make. Because when you have a priori logic, you are captive to it and you’ll make generalizations very easily. And the same thing with health. We had a very logical explanation: these are agricultural places, not urban, peaceful, no industry, no smoke, no air pollution, there’s calm, nobody rushes anywhere, so that’s why they’re very healthy. Except for one thing: the really sick places are also like that. So again, the fact that we had a very tempting, very natural explanation caused us to make the generalization too hastily. In truth, when there is a compelling, logical explanation, we should suspect the generalization. דווקא when there is an explanation. If you want to make a generalization properly, look for situations where you have no prior stance, no explanation, you don’t know why it happens, but statistically it is very clear. That is much better than something that merely seems logical to you. Something that seems logical is prone to errors of generalization. Now why is this remark so nice? Because it stands in direct contrast to our previous conclusion. Because what did we say in Mekor Chayim’s previous conclusion? That if you have a small sample, you don’t generalize from it unless you have an explanation that sounds logical to you. Right? If you have an explanation that sounds logical, then you generalize, and if not, then not. Kahneman tells you: if you have an explanation that sounds logical, be very careful about that generalization. And that is Rav Ashi.
[Speaker E] That’s Rav Ashi—mazal causes it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That may be Rav Ashi. And this is very interesting. It basically means that one has to be very careful with explanations that sound logical to us. Now there is no real contradiction here.
[Speaker G] No, because here too there is an explanation, just a different explanation. Sorry? What we have with small numbers is also an explanation. The small numbers themselves—in the end, the solution is also an explanation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, but that’s a statistical explanation, not a scientific explanation. Statistically, small places will be found far from the average. So I’m saying there is no real contradiction between these two things. It’s just two sides of the coin that one should be aware of. But there is no real contradiction here. Because the Talmud does not require an explanation that sounds logical to me. The Talmud requires that there could be some possible explanation. That’s not the same thing. When I have a logical explanation, it tempts me to make the generalization. The Talmud is not tempted to make a generalization. It only says, on the contrary, that where it is impossible I will not generalize. I will generalize where it is possible—not where it sounds logical to me. It’s where it is possible. Okay? Therefore there is really no contradiction between these two aspects, but one does limit the other. And if it’s possible, fine. If it sounds logical to you, be careful.
[Speaker G] And that also doesn’t mean it isn’t true, if it sounds logical. What? It doesn’t mean it isn’t true. It just means, as the Rabbi said—you have to be careful to do it properly, so that it’s not only, as the Rabbi said, statistics.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, if something sounds logical to you, then examine the generalization very, very carefully on the statistical level. Because it may be that you’ve been seduced by the logic. There isn’t—I think I’ll talk about this more later as well. There isn’t a day that I don’t come across some report in the media, online or elsewhere, about this or that statistical finding—and it’s all nonsense. Meaning, there’s not one thing there that holds water. They all offer various explanations, and you always see that they were captivated by the explanations; the statistics don’t say what they think they say. The explanation took them captive. Yes, I brought some examples; maybe we’ll discuss them later, but—
[Speaker F] Yes, Rabbi, many times it’s not just that the explanation caused it, but their desire to explain it in that way. The rationale—and also that false image we all have, that we’re rational people and that’s what leads us.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, but I’m saying: there are many—there are many fallacies. I’m not claiming I’ve listed all the fallacies that exist. People have many fallacies; thank God we are richly endowed with fallacies in our thinking. And after all there are—yes, the examples I often bring of various correlation fallacies. The article by the lecturer from the Technion that I once saw—poor guy, he attained eternal life thanks to me. He once wrote some letter to Haaretz, and ever since I haven’t forgotten it. I’m not saying his name because that would be slander. But he wrote there that the state needs to increase its investment in higher education because countries that invest more in higher education have a higher GDP. Okay? Now here I ask what Shmuel asked earlier. Right? The question is whether investment in higher education creates the GDP, or whether because they have a high GDP, they have enough money and therefore invest in higher education. Now the lecturer from the Technion didn’t even imagine that there was another possibility. Check which is the dependent variable and which is the independent variable. What is the cause and what is the—what is the reason and what is the result. Why? Because he had a very logical explanation that if you invest in education—he’s a faculty member in academia, yes?—if you invest in higher education, then of course that improves the state of the economy and the state and everything. So of course, after assuming that, the statistics also prove it. But that’s begging the question. If you assume the opposite, then the statistics will prove the opposite. The statistics here neither add nor subtract anything.
[Speaker F] That kind of begging the question always comes from someone to whom, coincidentally, it also suits.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, fine, we’re all human—it’s not… We all probably fall into this, what can you do.
[Speaker F] The question is whether there is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi, the only thing you can do is be aware of it.
[Speaker F] But Rabbi, if this is an assumption that we just fall into this, maybe that’s what we do in all areas. Just this week I happened to read—surely the Rabbi knows Jonathan Haidt’s book, The Righteous Mind. The first half I agree with; the second half I connect with less. But in the first half he proves that we are all tiny rational riders sitting on a very, very emotional elephant—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t think he proved that. He showed that it happens quite a bit. Fine, okay. One has to be careful. Someone who is aware of this can be more careful about it. What we can do—we are all human, we all have psychological biases. What we can do is be aware of it and try to overcome it. Sometimes we’ll succeed and sometimes we won’t. It’s not that nothing can be done. Something can be done. There’s just no guarantee that we’ll always succeed. Yes, so that’s… that’s another example of being taken captive by what sounds reasonable to us. Yes, for example, I once wrote on the site about the World to Come and reincarnation, or various things—I think I wrote about both—that I have a strong suspicion about these principles, these beliefs. Both about the World to Come and about reincarnation. Why? Because they are very logical. Precisely because they are very logical, I suspect them. Why?
[Speaker G] Reincarnation is logical?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] People have a very strong motivation to reach the conclusion that there is reincarnation or that there is a World to Come, because it resolves various injustices for them or closes various circles that remain open—why bad things happen to the righteous, and all sorts of things of that kind. Now, on the one hand, that’s true. Meaning, if I think the Holy One, blessed be He, is good, then if I can find an explanation that closes circles of injustice, that definitely works in His favor. On the other hand, when they explain to me that this is a tradition from Moses at Sinai, I start to get suspicious. If you tell me it’s a logical principle, fine, I also think it’s a logical principle. If you tell me it’s a tradition from Moses at Sinai—a tradition whose source I don’t know and I don’t know who derived it or where one sees that it’s a tradition from Moses at Sinai—in my view there is no such tradition, at least from what I can see. And if you add to that the motivation, whether logical or moral or even self-interested, to reach that conclusion, then I become very suspicious of claims that there is such a tradition. And so too regarding many things. Meaning, the moment something is logical, it is worth suspecting it. Again, that doesn’t mean that if it is logical then it isn’t true—that’s nonsense. But if it is logical, then one should be suspicious, first of all, of the claim. But if it’s logical and there are really no other reasons—fine, if it’s logical then why not assume it’s true? The problem is when they tell you this is a tradition from Moses at Sinai, or this is such-and-such, and they use authority claims. That’s where I begin to get suspicious. Leave it alone—it’s not a tradition from Sinai. If it’s logical, for example the survival of the soul. The survival of the soul seems very logical to me. Logical independent of tradition. Why? Because if I’m a dualist and I think that we have a soul and not only a body, and I ask myself what happens when we die, it’s very plausible—not certain, but very plausible—that the body dies, but the soul may remain in some other form. Therefore if you asked me purely from reason, maybe I would say there is survival of the soul. But now someone comes and says there is survival of the soul—it’s a tradition from Moses at Sinai. I don’t know of such a tradition. And therefore I suspect that someone is loading his own logic onto a tradition from Moses at Sinai so that people will accept it from him. And sometimes he invents it unintentionally, not deliberately; rather, he convinces himself that it is tradition—after all, everyone says so, therefore it must be tradition. No, everyone says so because everyone thinks it is logical. That still doesn’t mean it is tradition. So the existence of an explanation plays two opposite roles. On the one hand, the existence of an explanation encourages generalization. To say: in these cases I have an explanation for them, so apparently they are an expression of some general law, some representative sample of a general law, and then that is indeed a reason to generalize. On the other hand, one must be careful and examine very carefully precisely in those places where I have an explanation that seems logical to me—check very carefully whether it is also statistically convincing. Because many times you will discover that statistically I can justify both this and that, and then it means I chose this direction simply because I am a priori captive to that direction, and not really because the statistics say what they say. So I think this is a very important lesson for dealing with statistical problems, with statistical reasoning.
[Speaker G] Fine, but Rabbi, religious people love to turn everything logical into tradition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly, it’s a serious ill. Because in order for people to accept it from them—that is, it seems reasonable to me, and I know that if I say it’s reasonable, okay, why should they accept it? So they say, no, no, it’s a law given to Moses at Sinai. Notice, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) already write this. Several medieval authorities (Rishonim) in a number of places write this—the Rashba and Tosafot somewhere, and the Rosh—that when the Talmud says about something that it is a law given to Moses at Sinai, about a certain matter, that’s not always literal; usually it is a law given to Moses at Sinai, but sometimes when the Talmud says “a law given to Moses at Sinai,” it just means to say that it’s very firmly established, but it could actually be rabbinic law altogether. It tells you “this is a law given to Moses at Sinai” in order to strengthen the matter. And I explode when I hear things like that.
[Speaker F] But the Talmud itself says: “Whoever wants to hang himself should hang it on a great tree.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Crazy falsehoods, and I can’t understand this policy that allows sacred lies—yes, lies for sanctified purposes, for good purposes. First of all, normatively I don’t accept that at all. Since when do you lie? But tactically I also don’t accept it. Because tactically, in the end, a lie doesn’t stand. In the end they discover your lie, and then you lose your credibility entirely; they won’t accept even your correct arguments. You must not lie. Not for good purposes and not for bad purposes. Again, maybe in extreme cases, fine—if you’re saving lives right now by means of a lie, then lie. But as a policy, if it’s not immediate life-saving, don’t lie. Any general permission to lie is a mistake. Aside from, again, exceptional cases… Here’s Kant—when he talks about the categorical imperative, he says you should do what you would want to become a universal law. We would not want there to be a universal law that it’s permitted to lie. Therefore it’s forbidden to lie. Except that Kant was a Yekke, and like a Yekke he said, well, if it’s forbidden to lie, then even in a life-threatening situation, you should die and not lie. Because it’s forbidden, the categorical imperative. Fine, that’s stupidity. Nobody is supposed to die in order not to lie. I said lying is forbidden; it’s not good to lie. But in cases where I need to lie in order to save myself from pursuers, then I’ll lie—of course I’ll lie. What am I, an idiot?
[Speaker F] So maybe you could judge that Talmudic statement—maybe hang it on a high tree, since it’s such a blatant lie—as an approach that in the end is meant to make us understand that we have to think for ourselves. And all the labor and effort—that’s actually a very great advantage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As you’ve already heard me explain, that’s exactly how I explain the Magen Avraham, exactly like that.
[Speaker F] So it’s already seeped into you so deeply that now…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s it, I agree, it’s obvious. I’m not prepared to accept such a permission in any other way; it just can’t be. Okay, all right, we’ll stop here for now. Any questions or comments?
[Speaker G] I didn’t understand why this is considered—why astrology is considered a factual mistake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I think that scientifically, astrological signs have no influence.
[Speaker G] No, it was a belief in something objective, it’s not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A fact, as far as I’m concerned, is a fact. You can say that a general law in science is not certain; nothing in science is certain. But as far as I’m concerned, the law of gravity is good enough to be called a fact.
[Speaker G] No, because I’m saying that when the Talmud says “mazal,” it’s also talking about laws, as it were, that today we don’t believe in—most of the world doesn’t—but it’s not that science disproved them; science just doesn’t talk about them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no indication whatsoever that they exist.
[Speaker G] True, but also—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Talmud’s time too there were people who believed in them for no reason at all, not from Sinai. So it’s clear to me that the Sages also took it from there.
[Speaker G] Yes, but the Sages believed in it independently of science.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They were mistaken—what can you do?
[Speaker G] Fine, granted, but it’s not… I’m not saying it’s scientifically certain; it’s not proven that they were wrong.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no such thing as “scientifically proven.” “Scientifically proven” is an oxymoron.
[Speaker G] Yes, okay, I mean—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I mean—
[Speaker G] Science just doesn’t talk about it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t talk about it, and it doesn’t recognize its existence, and there is no indication whatsoever that such a thing exists. Right, exactly. So therefore there is no reason to assume that it does.
[Speaker G] Yes, but is that enough to disagree with the Talmud?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Every miracle that appears there—you can always say maybe some demon showed up there and suspended the law of gravity and did who knows what. Do you have proof that there are no demons? No. The crumbling of houses—that’s the work of the demon Shiya, “let him strike the gate,” like the Talmud in Bava Kamma, chapter two. No—the crumbling of houses is the second law of thermodynamics. I have no proof that there are no demons, but in my opinion there aren’t any.
[Speaker F] But the impression is that the position of Maimonides, for example—I agree that he disagreed with the idea that the stars have ontology and influence—it’s also interesting. I think the Rabbi’s position against this is not just that if we come from the UN, as it were, we’re objective and it hasn’t been scientifically proven, but rather that because of that we feel there’s something here that denies human autonomy, deeply harms human dignity, and a person’s obligation to try to repair this world in the sense…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can speak for yourself, not for me. The force of gravity doesn’t harm my autonomy; the influence of the stars also doesn’t harm my autonomy.
[Speaker F] No, but if the stars—if mazal determines things, if there’s fatalism, then it won’t help whatever you do.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What fatalism? The law of gravity is also fatalism. A person can choose not to climb the tree.
[Speaker F] No, but what is fatalism? There are facts now—you can influence the outcomes. If fatalism says it won’t help whatever you do, the result will be… No, but the influence of the stars isn’t necessarily fatalistic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what I’m saying.
[Speaker F] Who says it isn’t? If the stars determine mazal, then seemingly that’s total fatalism.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They determine that if you climb the tree you’ll die—so don’t climb the tree.
[Speaker F] Right, no, that’s a description of what? Why would they determine such a thing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They determine, they have influences, I don’t know. In my opinion they determine neither that nor anything else, but I’m talking about someone who believed they did.
[Speaker F] The point is that they understood that this was… those who speak about mazal…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short, for me this doesn’t come from some desire for autonomy; I simply don’t believe in it.
[Speaker F] For Maimonides it does give an explanation, because how come—there were many other scientists too; Ibn Ezra also was, he wasn’t among the scientists…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look at Ibn Ezra—in their time, science thought that way. Fine. I assume that if I had lived then, I would have thought that way too.
[Speaker F] But he—Maimonides didn’t, Maimonides didn’t. Maimonides managed to break away from that. Very nice. But for Maimonides this is a whole general worldview that revolted against the denial of autonomy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ibn Ezra was a very autonomous Jew. Okay, so we’ll stop here. Sabbath peace.
[Speaker C] Bye, Sabbath peace,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All the best.