This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Exemptions on the Sabbath: exempt but forbidden, and exempt and permitted
- A labor not needed for its own sake: definition, the Tabernacle, and the Tannaitic dispute
- Unintentional action: dragging a bench, ruling like Rabbi Shimon, and the precise language of “forbidden” and “permitted”
- Unintentional action throughout the Torah: a skin lesion and circumcision, and the changed meaning of “forbidden”
- An inevitable result: “Cut off its head and will it not die?” Rabbi Shimon’s admission and its implications
- An inevitable result that one does not want: the Arukh’s innovation and disputes over the definition
- Mita’sek and whether commandments require intention: distinguishing the concepts
- The distinction between a labor not needed for its own sake and unintentional action: Kesef Mishneh and Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides
- A nice thought about Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda: evaluating an act by intention or by result
- Explaining the inevitable result: Rabbi Chaim versus Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman
- Pesachim 117: skinning the Paschal offering, inevitable result, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question
- Tosafot, Shmuel, and practical Jewish law: trapping a snake and lancing an abscess
- Maimonides: liability for a labor not needed for its own sake versus permission in lancing an abscess and trapping harmful creatures
- Conclusion and direction for what comes next: reading Rabbi Chaim
Summary
General Overview
The lecture uses the passage on page 3a to introduce foundational concepts in the laws of Sabbath labor, mainly a labor not needed for its own sake and unintentional action, and to clarify the relationship between them through various sources in the Talmud and the halakhic differences between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. It explains that a labor not needed for its own sake is defined by the purpose for which the labor was done in the Tabernacle and applies specifically to the Sabbath, whereas unintentional action is a broader principle throughout the Torah, with the exception of an inevitable result, where even Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is forbidden. The lecture emphasizes how blurry the practical distinction is between unintentional action and a labor not needed for its own sake, and shows that in the language of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and in the Talmud itself, the categories often get tangled. Finally, it presents an apparent contradiction in Maimonides’ view: on the one hand, he rules like Rabbi Yehuda that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own sake, while on the other hand he rules that lancing an abscess and trapping harmful creatures is permitted. From there, the lecture plans to continue through Rabbi Chaim’s analysis.
Exemptions on the Sabbath: exempt but forbidden, and exempt and permitted
Shmuel states: “All exemptions on the Sabbath mean exempt but forbidden, except for these three, which are exempt and permitted: trapping a deer, trapping a snake, and lancing an abscess.” The Talmud brings this in passing in order to explain that when the Mishnah says “exempt,” it usually means exempt but forbidden, though there are exceptions that are exempt and permitted. The lecture defines trapping a snake and lancing an abscess as cases of a labor not needed for its own sake, while trapping a deer depends on different interpretations in the passage.
A labor not needed for its own sake: definition, the Tabernacle, and the Tannaitic dispute
The Talmud in Sabbath 73 brings: “One who digs a hole on the Sabbath and needs only its dirt is exempt from liability for it,” as the classic example of a labor not needed for its own sake, because the prohibited labor is creating the hole, not removing the dirt. The lecture explains that according to most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), “needed for its own sake” is determined by the purpose the labor served in the Tabernacle, and if the act is done for some other purpose, it is a labor not needed for its own sake. Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable because the prohibited labor was done, while Rabbi Shimon exempts; in the simple sense, “exempt” still means rabbinically forbidden, even though most decisors rule like Rabbi Shimon. Maimonides is presented as the exception, since he rules like Rabbi Yehuda and holds one liable for a labor not needed for its own sake.
Unintentional action: dragging a bench, ruling like Rabbi Shimon, and the precise language of “forbidden” and “permitted”
The Mishnah in Beitzah about a child’s wagon, and the Talmud there, explain that dragging an object along the ground may make a furrow. The Mishnah is explained as following Rabbi Yehuda, because “an unintended act is forbidden.” The baraita brings Rabbi Shimon permitting: “A person may drag a bed, chair, or bench, provided he does not intend to make a furrow,” and the lecture defines this as unintentional action, not as a labor not needed for its own sake. Rabbi Yehuda forbids and Rabbi Shimon permits, and in the context of Sabbath law the Talmud uses the language of “forbidden” versus “permitted,” not “liable” versus “exempt.” The lecture notes that many medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain that according to Rabbi Yehuda, on the Sabbath this is only rabbinically forbidden because “the Torah prohibited only thoughtful labor.” The lecture also points out that the Talmud itself rules like Rabbi Shimon regarding unintentional action, and therefore all decisors rule that way in the laws of Sabbath, with a note about the She’iltot concerning the framework of that ruling.
Unintentional action throughout the Torah: a skin lesion and circumcision, and the changed meaning of “forbidden”
The Talmud in Sabbath 133, regarding circumcision in a place where there is a skin lesion, discusses the prohibition of cutting off a lesion, which has nothing to do with the Sabbath. Rabbi Yoshiyah permits circumcising even though there is a lesion there. Abaye explains that the verse is needed according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an unintended act is forbidden. The lecture emphasizes that here too the language is “forbidden” and not “liable,” but here it means a Torah prohibition, because there would be no reason for a verse to permit something that was only rabbinically forbidden. Maimonides is presented as holding that the rule that “forbidden” means exempt but rabbinically forbidden is a rule stated only at the beginning of the laws of Sabbath, not throughout the Torah.
An inevitable result: “Cut off its head and will it not die?” Rabbi Shimon’s admission and its implications
Rava says, “Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of ‘Cut off its head and will it not die?’” The lecture defines an inevitable result as a case in which the forbidden outcome is certain, and therefore the exemption of unintentional action does not apply. The accompanying example is cutting off a chicken’s head “to give to a child to play with.” Even though it is not done for the purpose of killing it, the chicken will certainly die, and so one cannot say that the outcome is not attributable to the person. The lecture sharpens the point that an inevitable result belongs to the category of unintentional action and not to a labor not needed for its own sake, and raises the question whether on the Sabbath an inevitable result is forbidden by Torah law, while saying that in the straightforward understanding that is the accepted view.
An inevitable result that one does not want: the Arukh’s innovation and disputes over the definition
The author of the Arukh innovates that an inevitable result applies only when the resulting outcome is beneficial to the person. If he does not want the outcome, then it is not considered an inevitable result, and according to most views it is rabbinically forbidden. The lecture distinguishes between the question of intention, which defines unintentional action, and the question of whether the result is desirable, which is asked after the result itself, and stresses that one must not confuse “I didn’t do this for the furrow” with “I don’t want the furrow to be made.” It notes a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot about a case of “I don’t care,” and how that relates to not wanting the result, and adds that some medieval authorities identify an inevitable result that one does not want with a labor not needed for its own sake.
Mita’sek and whether commandments require intention: distinguishing the concepts
The lecture separates intention as “motivation for the result” in Sabbath discussions from intention as “intending to fulfill an obligation” in the dispute over whether commandments require intention. It explains that someone who is not aware of the action at all is considered mita’sek, and that this is required “according to everyone” in order for an act to count as a commandment or a transgression. An example of mita’sek on the Sabbath is someone walking down the street whose sleeve accidentally tears leaves off a bush without his awareness. The lecture notes that according to most views there is not even a rabbinic prohibition in such a case, while mentioning Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s view that there is a rabbinic prohibition.
The distinction between a labor not needed for its own sake and unintentional action: Kesef Mishneh and Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides
Kesef Mishneh, in the name of Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides, defines an inevitable result as a case where one does not intend the labor at all, but it necessarily occurs, such as closing a door while a deer is inside, whereas a labor not needed for its own sake means that one intends the very act of labor, but not its standard purpose. The lecture stresses that the usual formulation is the distinction between “two actions” as opposed to “one action with two results,” but presents this as a vague distinction that is hard to apply. The classroom discussion raises the similarity between digging a hole because one needs the dirt and dragging a bench that makes a furrow, showing that the criterion is not sharp even when one single movement performs one single act.
A nice thought about Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda: evaluating an act by intention or by result
The lecture makes a conceptual connection to the story of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai’s emergence from the cave, where Rabbi Yehuda praises the Romans’ achievements and Rabbi Shimon says, “Everything they did, they did only for their own benefit.” It suggests that Rabbi Shimon’s outlook may be tied to judging on the basis of inner intention, while Rabbi Yehuda tends to judge based on what was actually done, as a possible conceptual basis for their disputes in unintentional action and a labor not needed for its own sake. The lecture notes, however, that Shmuel’s split position between the two disputes shows that this is not necessarily a decisive explanation.
Explaining the inevitable result: Rabbi Chaim versus Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman
The lecture introduces Rabbi Chaim as distinguishing between two interpretations of unintentional action: lack of a conscious goal toward the result, versus lack of awareness that the result will occur. According to the “awareness” interpretation, an inevitable result restores the case to one of certain knowledge, and therefore there is no exemption. According to the “goal” interpretation, a difficulty arises: why should an inevitable result change anything if that still was not the person’s goal? Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman is presented as explaining that intention is required in order to attribute the act to the person, and an inevitable result attributes the forbidden outcome to him because it is a necessary consequence of his act, even without any goal-directed intention toward it.
Pesachim 117: skinning the Paschal offering, inevitable result, and Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question
The Talmud in Pesachim says that when the 14th of Nisan falls on the Sabbath, one may skin the Paschal offering, and the Sages permit skinning all of it. The answer that justifies this permission is “for example, where he does not need the hide,” but the Talmud challenges this: “Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of ‘Cut off its head and will it not die?’” and answers: “where he removes it in strips.” Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks that if he is intentionally skinning it, but simply does not need the hide, then this is a labor not needed for its own sake and not unintentional action, so there should be no room for the question from an inevitable result. He notes that Rashba asks the same thing regarding the lesion case, and concludes, “This requires further analysis.” The lecture uses this to demonstrate just how much the terminology and categories get mixed together in the passages and in their interpretation.
Tosafot, Shmuel, and practical Jewish law: trapping a snake and lancing an abscess
Tosafot on trapping a snake bring the objection of BaHaG from one statement of Shmuel against another, because here Shmuel seems to follow Rabbi Shimon regarding a labor not needed for its own sake, whereas in the chapter Kirah it says that Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon regarding unintentional action and Rabbi Yehuda regarding a labor not needed for its own sake. Rabbeinu Tam answers that on page 3 Shmuel is only explaining Rabbi Shimon’s position, but Shmuel himself does not rule that way. Tosafot conclude that for us the law follows Rabbi Shimon, because the later authority Rava held like him.
Maimonides: liability for a labor not needed for its own sake versus permission in lancing an abscess and trapping harmful creatures
Maimonides rules in the laws of Sabbath: “Anyone who performs labor on the Sabbath, even though he does not need the labor for its own sake, is liable for it,” and Raavad objects that from Rava’s statement in the chapter Notel it appears that one is exempt like Rabbi Shimon. Kesef Mishneh, in the name of the Ramakh, asks that many anonymous sources indicate that the law follows Rabbi Shimon, including “All exemptions on the Sabbath are exempt, except for these three, which are exempt and permitted.” Yet Maimonides himself rules: “If he lanced it in order to remove the pus in it, this is permitted,” and regarding snakes and scorpions, “Even though they do not kill… it is permitted to trap them on the Sabbath… provided he intends to protect himself from their bite.” The lecture explains that the rationale here is bodily suffering, not life-threatening danger, as Maimonides emphasizes: “even though they do not kill.” This sets up a difficulty: how can Maimonides hold one liable for a labor not needed for its own sake like Rabbi Yehuda, and yet in practice permit Shmuel’s cases, which seem to depend on Rabbi Shimon? From there, the lecture intends to continue the analysis through Rabbi Chaim.
Conclusion and direction for what comes next: reading Rabbi Chaim
The lecture concludes by saying that the passages and the medieval authorities show a real difficulty in distinguishing these categories and in reconciling the views of the decisors, and that the main continuation should be direct work on Rabbi Chaim of Brisk and on resolving the difficulties, including Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question, with a note that Rabbi Aharon Kotler follows a similar line and is also hard to read.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, basically I’m taking advantage a bit of the opportunity presented by the passage on page 3a, at the top. Just one second, I’ll close a window here so a fly doesn’t suddenly pop in.
[Speaker B] Taking advantage of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, taking advantage of the passage on page 3a, at the top, to get acquainted with a few basic and important concepts in the labors of the Sabbath. It’s worth devoting at least one session to an initial introduction to them. In principle, a discussion of unintentional action and a labor not needed for its own sake, and all these rules like destructive action and mita’sek and things of that sort—what are called the general rules of Sabbath labor—that’s a topic for many, many lectures, it’s a very broad topic. But still, I think it’s very important that we become familiar with these two concepts and the relationship between them, and that’s what I want to devote today’s session to. The Talmud on page 3a says: “And Shmuel said: All exemptions on the Sabbath mean exempt but forbidden, except for these three, which are exempt and permitted: trapping a deer, trapping a snake, and lancing an abscess.” Now, this appears incidentally—the actual main discussion is on page 107—but it appears here incidentally just to explain that in our Mishnah, when it says “exempt,” it is supposed to mean exempt but forbidden, not exempt and permitted. And then the Talmud explains why nevertheless there can also be cases that are exempt and permitted. But I want to take advantage of this, as I said, because at least trapping a snake and lancing an abscess are cases of a labor not needed for its own sake. Trapping a deer depends on different interpretations there in the passage, but those two exemptions are cases of a labor not needed for its own sake, and so I’ll try to use this to introduce these concepts a bit. So maybe I’ll begin with defining the concepts. I’ll share the file so it’ll be easier to work. I’ll begin with defining the concepts. The Talmud on page 73 in Sabbath—yes, page 73—the Talmud says: Rabbi Abba said: “One who digs a hole on the Sabbath and needs only its dirt is exempt from liability for it.” This is true even according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said that for a labor not needed for its own sake one is liable; that applies when he is repairing, but here he is damaging. That parenthetical comment is less important for us, but the Talmud brings here the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda about a labor not needed for its own sake. The example the Talmud gives is someone who digs a pit—yes, a hole—on the Sabbath, and he does not need the pit itself, he needs the dirt he removes. Now, the Sabbath prohibition is on digging the pit, not on removing dirt. Removing dirt—do whatever you like; maybe there’s some issue of set-aside objects, maybe a rabbinic prohibition—but in terms of Sabbath labor prohibitions, there’s no prohibition on taking dirt; the prohibition is on creating a pit. And creating the pit is not what he wanted, he only needed the dirt. So that is, you could say, the classic example of a labor not needed for its own sake: you perform the prohibited action, but you don’t do it for its own purpose, for the usual purpose for which it was prohibited. Rather, you do it for some other purpose. In this case, I’m digging the pit, but not because I want to have a pit—that’s the purpose, that’s what it means to need it for its own sake—but because I want sand, I need the dirt. What defines the purpose as being the labor’s own purpose? Where does that definition come from? According to most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), the answer is: the Tabernacle. Meaning, this labor was performed in the Tabernacle for a certain purpose, and that is what defines that purpose as the labor’s own purpose. If you do it for a purpose that did not exist in the Tabernacle, that is called a labor done not for its own sake, a labor not needed for its own sake. And about this Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree. Rabbi Yehuda says one is liable. He says there is no such exemption as a labor not needed for its own sake. You dug a pit, a pit was created, you violated a prohibited labor on the Sabbath. Rabbi Shimon says no: a labor not needed for its own sake—since you did it for a purpose that is not the defined purpose of that labor, but rather some other purpose—you are exempt. Okay? That is Rabbi Shimon’s position. And plainly, “exempt” here means rabbinically forbidden. For a labor not needed for its own sake, there is a rabbinic prohibition. Even in practical Jewish law, we rule like Rabbi Shimon, so there is a rabbinic prohibition, but not a Torah prohibition—yes, it is not considered prohibited labor. The exception is Maimonides. Maimonides, as I assume you saw in chapter 1, law 7, rules like Rabbi Yehuda, that for a labor not needed for its own sake one is liable. And regarding unintentional action he rules like Rabbi Shimon, but regarding a labor not needed for its own sake he rules like Rabbi Yehuda. Okay? So that is about a labor not needed for its own sake. Now, there’s a Talmud passage—I chose Beitzah, though of course it appears elsewhere too—the Talmud in Beitzah. The Mishnah there speaks about a child’s wagon, yes, a baby carriage: it can contract midras impurity, may be moved on the Sabbath, and may only be dragged over vessels. Rabbi Yehuda says: all vessels may not be dragged, except for the wagon, because it compresses. When you drag the wagon, you compress the dirt in the ground, and therefore it’s forbidden to do that. Why?
[Speaker B] The opposite—therefore it’s permitted. Since it compresses, it’s permitted, it doesn’t make a furrow.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh? Again, I didn’t understand.
[Speaker B] It doesn’t make a furrow, so it’s permitted, because it compresses and doesn’t cut a groove. It compresses…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What did I say? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker B] You said the wagon is forbidden because it compresses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, permitted, sorry, permitted because it compresses—yes, right. Of course. “All vessels may not be dragged,” meaning they’re forbidden, except for the wagon, which may be dragged because it compresses. Okay.
[Speaker D] So…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says: “and it may only be dragged over vessels.” Yes, I’m skipping the first line, it’s less important for us. “Only over vessels”—over vessels yes, over the ground no. It is forbidden to drag it on the ground. What’s the reason? Because it makes a furrow. It is forbidden to drag the wagon on the ground because that makes a furrow. Whose view is this? Rabbi Yehuda’s, who says that an unintended act is forbidden. For if it were Rabbi Shimon’s view, didn’t he say that an unintended act is permitted? As it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says, “A person may drag a bed, a chair, and a bench, provided he does not intend to make a furrow.” So that is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion: since he does not intend to make a furrow, it’s an intentional act only if he intends it, but if he doesn’t intend it, then he has the exemption of unintentional action and it’s permitted. And by the way, here it’s permitted—not merely rabbinically forbidden, but fully permitted. “Say the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda says, not everything may be dragged on the Sabbath except for the wagon, because it compresses”—that’s less important for our purposes. What do we learn from here? That someone who drags a bench or a bed or a chair and does not intend to make a furrow—he makes a furrow, but he doesn’t intend to make the furrow, he just wants to move the bench from one place to another—that is called unintentional action. And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about that. Rabbi Yehuda says one is liable, and Rabbi Shimon says it is permitted. Sorry—Rabbi Yehuda says it is forbidden, not liable, forbidden. And Rabbi Shimon says permitted. Okay? The Talmud defines this as unintentional action, not as a labor not needed for its own sake. So again, notice: digging a hole and needing only the dirt is a labor not needed for its own sake. Dragging a bench and making a furrow, but intending not the furrow but moving the bench from place to place, is called unintentional action. In both of these cases Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree. In the case of a labor not needed for its own sake, Rabbi Yehuda says liable—Torah prohibition—and Rabbi Shimon says exempt—rabbinic prohibition. In practical Jewish law, most decisors rule like Rabbi Shimon; Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yehuda. In unintentional action, all decisors rule like Rabbi Shimon, because the Talmud itself rules like Rabbi Shimon. Okay? And therefore everyone rules like Rabbi Shimon. The She’iltot says not for that reason, because it says that this is only in the laws of Sabbath. But in the laws of Sabbath certainly everyone rules like Rabbi Shimon. But in the straightforward reading of the Talmud here, it says that even according to Rabbi Yehuda, unintentional action is forbidden—it does not say liable. “Forbidden” here means—and several medieval authorities say this as well—only rabbinically forbidden. Even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that unintentional action on the Sabbath is not a Torah liability; it is only rabbinically forbidden. And Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with him, says it is completely permitted. Notice the wording here: “It is Rabbi Yehuda’s view, who says an unintended act is forbidden”—it doesn’t say liable—and “Rabbi Shimon says an unintended act is permitted”—it doesn’t say exempt. Okay? So in the straightforward sense, the Talmud really seems to support those medieval authorities. There is Tosafot in Yoma and elsewhere that says that the prohibition of unintentional action on the Sabbath, according to Rabbi Yehuda as well, is only rabbinic and not a Torah prohibition, whereas according to Rabbi Shimon it is completely permitted.
[Speaker D] Now…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Besides this, there is also the law of unintentional action throughout the Torah, as I mentioned before. Look—I brought you the example from the Talmud in Sabbath 133. “The Master said: flesh—even though there is a skin lesion there—he should circumcise; these are the words of Rabbi Yoshiyah.” Yes, if there is a lesion—meaning a kind of leprous mark—on the baby’s foreskin and I want to perform circumcision, then it is forbidden to cut off a lesion. That is a halakhic prohibition that has nothing to do with the Sabbath; it is forbidden to remove a lesion from the body even on a weekday. This is not a Sabbath prohibition, it’s part of the laws of leprosy. Okay? Now, if I have a lesion on the baby’s foreskin, on the one hand I have the prohibition of cutting off a lesion, and on the other hand I have the commandment to circumcise the baby. So Rabbi Yoshiyah says: circumcise him. Even though there’s a lesion there, don’t get worked up over the fact that you’re cutting off the lesion. The Talmud asks: why do I need a verse for this? We learn it from a verse. The Talmud asks: why do I need a verse? This is an unintended act, and an unintended act is permitted. Why do we need a verse to teach that circumcision is permitted in such a case? Even without the verse I would know it, because this is an unintended act, and an unintended act is permitted. Abaye said: it is only needed according to Rabbi Yehuda, who says an unintended act is forbidden. Yes, meaning the verse is required only according to Rabbi Yehuda, because Rabbi Yehuda says that unintentional action is forbidden. Specifically in circumcision there is a verse that says that even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that in this case it is permitted to circumcise the baby, even though in a case of unintentional action one would otherwise transgress the prohibition of removing a lesion. So specifically here, and in principle with regard to unintentional action…
[Speaker B] What is the Torah source from which they learn this? Is it “And on the eighth day…”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? “He shall circumcise…”
[Speaker F] “The flesh of his foreskin.” There were two verses there. One is “Take heed regarding the plague of leprosy…”
[Speaker B] No, it says, “Why do I need a verse?” I’m asking what verse he means.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Flesh.” It says “flesh,” even though there is a lesion there. “Flesh” is the wording of the verse. Ah. Okay? So that’s one direction. Abaye says the verse is needed only according to Rabbi Yehuda, because Rabbi Yehuda says an unintended act is forbidden, so you need a verse to say “he should circumcise.” A side note: here too the wording is “forbidden,” it doesn’t say liable. You might think that means it is only rabbinically forbidden. That cannot be, because if it were only rabbinically forbidden, there would be no reason to require a verse to permit it. And it is also clear from the Talmud here that the intent is a Torah prohibition. So why does it say only “forbidden”? Because here we’re not dealing with Sabbath prohibitions. These are other prohibitions. So there is no liability to a sin-offering or to karet or something like that. Therefore, when they say “forbidden” here, they mean a Torah prohibition. Maimonides too—his rule that “forbidden” always means exempt but rabbinically forbidden—that is only a rule in the laws of Sabbath. He does not say that at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah in general; he says it at the beginning of the laws of Sabbath. Rava said—a second answer, that was Abaye—Rava said: even if you say it is according to Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of “Cut off its head and will it not die?” Here another innovation comes up for us: when there is a case where I do not intend the result, like dragging a bench and making a furrow, but I don’t intend the furrow, I want to move the bench elsewhere—according to Rabbi Shimon that is indeed permitted, but only when it is not an inevitable result. In a case of an inevitable result, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that it is forbidden. What is an inevitable result? The phrase is taken from another case, that of a person who cuts off the head of a chicken in order to give it to his child to play football with. That’s their ball, okay? Now if he does that on the Sabbath, he violates the prohibition of taking life on the Sabbath. But he does it as an unintentional act, because really he wants the head for football; he doesn’t need the chicken to die. He’s not slaughtering a chicken because he wants to eat it or use the chicken’s body. Rather, he takes the head because he wants the head. So that is unintentional action. The Talmud says: true, it is unintentional, but in this case even Rabbi Shimon agrees that he is liable. Why? Because “Cut off its head and will it not die?” That is said almost in astonishment. You cut off its head, of course it will die. There is no doubt—it is obvious that it will die. In a situation where there is no doubt that the forbidden outcome will occur, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that there is no exemption of unintentional action. Even in unintentional action.
[Speaker B] And would he say liable—liable to karet or liable to a sin-offering? What would he say?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same as in all the other cases. Whatever would apply in an intentional case would apply here too. It depends what prohibition we’re talking about; whatever it would be in an intentional case, that’s what it will be here too. Can I ask a question for a second? It takes us back to the picture of intentional action. Unintentional action plus an inevitable result becomes intentional action.
[Speaker F] Can I ask a question about intention regarding commandments in general? There’s also the issue of whether commandments require intention at all. Is that not connected here? It’s not connected here at all, because with commandments, like, why not say that if commandments require intention, then transgressions also require intention?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, those are completely different concepts.
[Speaker D] “Commandments require intention” means intention in the sense of fulfilling the commandment through the act. Here the meaning is: what are you trying to achieve by this? But as far as I know, it’s not only intention to fulfill…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An obligation, but…
[Speaker F] It’s also whether I intended at all to do the action. For example, with reciting the Shema, is there also an issue of intention to fulfill the obligation, or even whether I intended to read it properly at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Intending to read is required according to everyone; otherwise it’s mita’sek. The dispute over whether commandments require intention concerns only intention to fulfill one’s obligation. Meaning, if you didn’t intend the action at all, then of course you also didn’t intend to fulfill the obligation, so you did nothing at all. But here, according to everyone, you also did not fulfill the obligation, because this is mita’sek. It doesn’t create a commandment act at all. You’re not even aware that you’re performing the act of the commandment, regardless of the question whether you intend to fulfill your obligation. That’s something much more basic, much more fundamental. Here, even according to the view that commandments do not require intention, you would not fulfill your obligation.
[Speaker F] I understand, because I did see this in tractate Rosh Hashanah too, regarding the shofar. Okay, where when people blow the shofar it does matter what he intended. Whether he intended to blow—let’s leave aside the question of fulfilling the obligation or not—whether he intended at all to blow particular blasts or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What you’re talking about is not the intention discussed in “commandments require intention.” It’s an intention that may indeed be related to our topic, but it’s not about commandments requiring intention. It’s about the law of mita’sek.
[Speaker F] Because the intention in commandments…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …requiring intention is intention to fulfill one’s obligation.
[Speaker F] That’s why I saw that this is also an issue—it exists, meaning, just as there’s the opposite, there’s also the issue of intention in positive commandments, not only in transgressions.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, what do you mean by intention? The concept of intention has two meanings. There is intention in the sense of intending to fulfill one’s obligation—that’s what they dispute when they ask whether commandments require intention or not. And there is intention in the sense of not being mita’sek, which everyone requires. You intended the action. If you were just occupied without awareness…
[Speaker C] Exactly, the action. Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You simply have to be aware that this action is taking place, regardless of whether it’s a commandment or not. For example, someone who is mita’sek on the Sabbath is someone walking down the street and meanwhile, somehow, leaves get torn off a bush at the side by his sleeve. In that case, this has nothing to do with Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda—that’s mita’sek. According to everyone, mita’sek involves no prohibition—or at least no Torah prohibition, because Rabbi Akiva Eiger argues that there is a rabbinic prohibition, but according to most views there isn’t even a rabbinic prohibition. Okay? Because here I am not even aware that I’m plucking. The issue of intention versus lack of intention is where I am aware that I’m plucking, only I’m not plucking because I need the leaf, but in order to do something else—I don’t know exactly what. Okay? That’s intention at a higher level. So in short, what we’ve learned from here is this. Maybe before that I’ll clarify something. The prohibition under discussion here is not connected to prohibited labors on the Sabbath; it’s the prohibition of cutting off a lesion, a prohibition in the laws of leprosy. Right? If there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding an unintended act, what does that accomplish? It means that when it comes to an unintended act, where one is enabled to do it, Rabbi Shimon exempts or permits—not only in Sabbath labor prohibitions, but in all the prohibitions in the Torah. If you did not intend it, Rabbi Shimon says you did not violate a prohibition. And Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with him, again not only on the Sabbath but throughout the Torah. Even if you did not intend it, according to Rabbi Yehuda you violated a prohibition. There is a difference, according to a large group of medieval authorities, that on the Sabbath even according to Rabbi Yehuda, if you didn’t intend it, it is only…
[Speaker C] …rabbinic, because the Torah prohibited only thoughtful labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That’s what Rabbi Chaim explains there, but that’s what most of the medieval authorities say. But in the rest of the Torah, Rabbi Yehuda says that even if you didn’t intend it, you violated a Torah prohibition, a biblical prohibition. Okay? That’s an internal distinction, and we’ll get back to it later. But for our purposes, the dispute about unintentional action is not a dispute in the laws of Sabbath. It is a dispute throughout all of Jewish law. Okay? It is not really connected to specifically Sabbath concepts like thoughtful labor and so on, which we’ll discuss later. So that’s the first point—that’s what we learn from the passage here. We also learn from the passage here that, by the way, elsewhere it says that Abaye and Rava both said: Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of “Cut off its head and will it not die?” Meaning, Abaye too agrees with this principle, which here appears only in the name of Rava, that if this is a case of an inevitable result—where the forbidden result is necessarily achieved, where from the outset it is clear that it will certainly happen—then even Rabbi Shimon agrees that there is a Torah prohibition. Okay? That’s another thing we learned, and this too is a principle that applies both throughout the Torah and on the Sabbath. We’ll get to Rabbi Chaim later. So that is what is written here. Meaning, if I summarize where we currently stand, I’d say this: in a labor not needed for its own sake—maybe I should add this too—a labor not needed for its own sake is a dispute only in the laws of Sabbath. Only in the laws of Sabbath. There is no such thing as a labor not needed for its own sake outside the laws of Sabbath. Okay? That is why it is called a labor not needed for its own sake, because it is talking about prohibited labors on the Sabbath. If you do the labor not for its own purpose, not for the purpose it had in the Tabernacle, but for another purpose, then it is a labor not needed for its own sake. And Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree about that. Rabbi Yehuda says one is liable, and Rabbi Shimon says one is exempt but rabbinically forbidden. Okay? That’s about a labor not needed for its own sake, and it applies only in the laws of Sabbath. Unintentional action applies throughout the Torah, not only in the laws of Sabbath. And Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree. According to Rabbi Yehuda, unintentional action is forbidden throughout the Torah—Torah forbidden—but on the Sabbath probably only rabbinically forbidden, though that is itself disputed; according to at least some views, on the Sabbath it is only rabbinic. And according to Rabbi Shimon, unintentional action is permitted both on the Sabbath and in the rest of the Torah.
[Speaker F] But according to Rabbi Shimon, an inevitable result in Sabbath labors is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now that’s the next stage. If it is an inevitable result—and an inevitable result applies only to unintentional action, not to a labor not needed for its own sake, only to unintentional action—if it is an inevitable result, Rabbi Shimon does not disagree with Rabbi Yehuda. He agrees with Rabbi Yehuda. What does that mean? That when I perform an act unintentionally, but it has an inevitable result, meaning that the forbidden outcome necessarily follows or will necessarily occur, that is like intentional action. What does that mean? It depends. In the rest of the Torah, intentional action is liable, right? Sorry—it is like intentional action. And therefore…
[Speaker F] So then it’s forbidden by Torah law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? So apparently it is forbidden by Torah law. Now here there is room to hesitate, and that is probably what you meant to ask—what happens on the Sabbath? Because on the Sabbath, unintentional action even according to Rabbi Yehuda is only rabbinically forbidden. So the question is: when I’m talking about unintentional action with an inevitable result, and Rabbi Shimon says, here I agree with Rabbi Yehuda—does he mean there is a rabbinic prohibition, or does he mean: no, in unintentional action with an inevitable result, this becomes like intentional action, and intentional action on the Sabbath is forbidden by Torah law? Here there are disputes. Well, in the straightforward sense, it means forbidden by Torah law. That is usually how people understand it—that an inevitable result is forbidden by Torah law. One more important note: I didn’t send you to the source, because that would drag us into more passages and more disputes among the medieval authorities, but Rabbi Chaim directly needs this, and I made a mistake by not writing this introduction on the page—an inevitable result that one does not want. This is an innovation that does not appear in the Talmud. An inevitable result appears in the Talmud—we just saw one example, and it appears elsewhere too. But there is another layer in this chain, and that is desirability: “he does not want it.” What does that mean? The author of the Arukh, Rabbi Natan of Rome, one of the earliest of the early authorities, says—he innovates, and proves it from Talmudic passages, but that doesn’t matter now—he innovates that if there is a labor I do unintentionally, and it is an inevitable result, the forbidden outcome will certainly occur, but I do not want the forbidden outcome, it is not desirable to me, then it is not forbidden. This is not considered an inevitable result. An inevitable result exists only when the outcome is desirable to me, but if the outcome is not desirable to me, that cancels the status of this thing as an inevitable result. Let’s do a little exercise. Someone drags a bench and makes a furrow, but he wants to move the bench from place to place. He does not want the furrow, meaning he is not doing it for the sake of the furrow. Not that he actively dislikes the furrow—he simply isn’t doing it for the furrow. The goal is to move the bench. That is called unintentional action, right? And on that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree. Rabbi Yehuda says it is forbidden by Torah law or forbidden rabbinically—there’s a dispute among the medieval authorities—and Rabbi Shimon says it is permitted. What if we are dealing with soil such that dragging the bench will definitely make a furrow? That is a case of an inevitable result, right? Because the prohibited outcome will certainly happen. In such a case Rabbi Shimon agrees that there is a prohibition—Torah or rabbinic, as I said one could argue, but he at least agrees with Rabbi Yehuda that it is prohibited. The author of the Arukh says: yes, but that is only if he wants the furrow made in the ground—for example, it plows the ground and he wants that, it’s a field he wants plowed. But if it damages his ground, he doesn’t want what happens to the ground, then that is called an inevitable result that one does not want, where the outcome is not desirable to him. In that case, we do not apply the rule of inevitable result. Rabbi Shimon does not concede.
[Speaker G] But can I ask? The example itself, the classic example of an inevitable result—I don’t need the dead chicken, I don’t want it, and still it’s called an inevitable result?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only where I need the dead chicken. If in fact I don’t need the dead chicken, then according to the Arukh, an inevitable result that one does not want is exempt.
[Speaker G] What does it mean if I just don’t care?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot.
[Speaker C] What difference does it make to me whether the chicken is alive or dead? That’s not “I don’t want it,” it’s not harming me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, no—if…
[Speaker G] If I have some use for it—if I’ll use the feathers or something—then maybe I do want it. But theoretically the example there implies I don’t need it at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s nothing to argue about here. You’re arguing about different cases. It depends what case we’re talking about. If he wants the dead chicken, then he wants the result. If he doesn’t want the dead chicken, then he doesn’t want the result. That’s all. There’s nothing to argue about.
[Speaker C] So this isn’t… I want to be precise. I don’t understand what “doesn’t want it” means. What’s the default? If it doesn’t benefit me, is that already called “doesn’t want it,” or does it have to be actual damage, something destructive?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no default. If it’s not good for me, that is called “doesn’t want it”—it’s not good for me. If it is good for me, then I do want it. You can ask what the law is if I just don’t care.
[Speaker C] Right, that’s what I’m asking.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot on page 75.
[Speaker H] I didn’t understand—an inevitable result that one does not want, is that permitted or is it rabbinically forbidden? Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to most views, it is rabbinically forbidden. There are some who identify it completely with a labor not needed for its own sake. It’s the same thing as a labor not needed for its own sake—I’ll still comment on that. Rabbinically forbidden? According to most views, yes.
[Speaker F] An inevitable result that one does not want.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now, take a look for a moment—I want to sharpen the point, to sharpen the foundation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. This is a well-known idea; I don’t know who its source is, but I think there’s something to it. In the Talmud in tractate Shabbat, on page 30 I think, the Talmud brings some aggadic story about Rabbi Shimon—Rabbi Shimon here is Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai who came out of the cave. So there’s the story there of how he got to the cave and so on, yes, what exactly happened there? It starts with a story that several sages were sitting there, and one of them—I think Rabbi Yehuda ben Gerim—one of them said there, look at all the roads, how beautiful are the works of this nation, of the Romans, yes, that they pave roads and build marketplaces, and all kinds of wonderful things they contribute to the world, and therefore they should be appreciated for that. So Rabbi Shimon says: everything they did, they did for their own benefit. Therefore there’s no reason to appreciate them; it’s their own interest, and that’s why they did it. And Rabbi Yehuda says that yes, their deeds should be appreciated. What stands behind these views, this dispute? The question is: when do I value a person’s act? Does that depend on the intention for which he did it, or is the act judged in itself? Rabbi Shimon says: I value it as a function of their intention, and if their intention was for their own benefit, there’s no reason for me to appreciate them. Meaning, Rabbi Shimon follows intentions. True, people also connect this to the fact that he was the author of the Zohar—or I don’t know exactly the author of the Zohar, but he is the basis, the infrastructure on which the Zohar is built—and essentially he speaks about things hidden from the eye, not only about the act that we see, but also about the motivations, the thoughts, the intentions that were at the base of the matter. In contrast, Rabbi Yehuda looks at the act in itself; he doesn’t care about the intentions. In that sense, it may be that there is some underlying principle there on which both of the disputes we saw here are built. Here too, in essence, Rabbi Yehuda looks at the question: what did you intend, what were you trying to achieve—sorry, Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yehuda says: I don’t care what you intended, what you were trying to achieve; the question is what you did. And therefore, in essence, he follows what was actually done, whereas Rabbi Shimon follows the intentions of the person who acted, and from his perspective that’s why the goal and the intention and things like that matter. That’s one remark. Second remark.
[Speaker I] Is an inevitable result that is beneficial to him just an indication for figuring out what my intention was?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that too—another good comment, but we’ll get to it in just a moment. I really do want to point out something here. Look, when I drag a bench and I’m not doing it for the furrow, you have to pay close attention. That does not mean the furrow is not convenient for me. It could be that the furrow is convenient for me. It’s just that I didn’t do this action for the sake of the furrow, but in order to move the bench. In practice a furrow came out—great, maybe that’s very convenient for me. That is still called unintentional. Meaning, don’t mix up unintentional with beneficial. Those are two different things. Intention means what? What?
[Speaker D] He really distinguishes there by whether it’s on ordinary ground or on field soil. Field soil—I may not need it right now, but in my future I do have an interest in it. So that would be beneficial to him, but on other ground…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The difference between a field and a house is only the question of whether that’s building or plowing. Those are two different things…
[Speaker D] Yes, but when I drag a bench across a field—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—
[Speaker D] —I have no interest in the furrow.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not?
[Speaker D] But… but I do need… that’s it, I don’t need it right now, but I will need this furrow, so it’s like…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no difference whatsoever. I need the furrow because I want to plow the field. What difference does “right now” make…
[Speaker D] But not right now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But not right now—
[Speaker D] Right now I want the bench; I don’t care that there should be a furrow there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—the difference is not “right now” or “not right now.” That’s not the difference. The difference is in the question—it’s two different questions. The question of whether it’s unintentional or not touches on the question: what was the motivation for which I set out to do the action? I set out to do the action in order to move the bench from place to place. The question of whether it is beneficial is the question of how I relate to the result, not what my motivation was in acting. The result is a furrow—is that convenient for me or not? That’s the question of benefit. And that can be at the same moment; it doesn’t matter at all whether it’s at the same moment or not. Even in the case of cutting off the head, say from the chicken, it’s at that very moment—the chicken dies right here, at the same moment I cut off the head, not afterward. That is not the distinction between unintentional and beneficial.
[Speaker D] Yes, but I want to say that in a field it is beneficial to him, it will be convenient for me, and in a place that isn’t a field then not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In every situation you have to check whether it is convenient for me or not. That’s not the point. What I’m saying is: in a place where it is convenient for me, then it’s an inevitable result that is beneficial to him; in a place where it is not convenient for me, it’s an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him. What I just want to sharpen here is that the question whether it is convenient for me or not can be asked even after we’ve determined that it is unintentional. Even though, seemingly, if I said it was unintentional, that means I didn’t do it for the sake of the furrow—doesn’t that mean that the furrow is not convenient for me? No, it doesn’t mean that. It means that my motivation for doing the action was not the furrow, but it could still be that the fact a furrow was created is convenient for me. Two different things. Meaning, here we are talking about the motivation—why I set out to do the action; that determines the status, whether it’s unintentional or not. Benefit is a question asked afterward: the result happened; is the result that happened convenient for me or not? Those are two different questions. Clear? Now let’s try to understand a little better the definitions of the concepts. What exactly is the difference between someone who digs a pit and needs only its soil, and someone who drags a bench and doesn’t need the… doesn’t do it for the sake of the furrow? All right? There he doesn’t do it for the sake of the pit, and here he doesn’t do it for the sake of the furrow. By the way, regarding a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, they don’t talk at all about the question whether it is beneficial or not beneficial; they don’t talk about whether it is an inevitable result or not an inevitable result; it’s not relevant. Those concepts belong to the world of unintentional acts, not to the world of a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. Okay? Now the question is what exactly is the definition that distinguishes between these two things. So I referred you to the second passage.
[Speaker B] Can I say something? Yes, yes. In a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, he is interested in the labor, but not in the result for which it is usually done, whereas in an unintentional act he is interested neither in the labor nor in its result.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so let’s get to that in a moment. I’ll get to that in a moment. I agree in principle, but it’s really not simple. Let’s look here at the Kesef Mishneh. He brings something in the name of Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides. You see it says at the end, “from the teaching of Rabbi Avraham the Pious in the name of his father of blessed memory.” That is Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides. So he says as follows: the distinction between a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose and “cut off its head and will it not die?” Notice already in the wording here: he doesn’t say what the difference is between a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose and an unintentional act, but rather between it and an unintentional act with an inevitable result. Why? Because a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, typically, is always with an inevitable result. So the difference between that and an unintentional act without an inevitable result is obvious; the difference is simply the inevitable result. The claim that… what bothers him is that even an unintentional act with an inevitable result is still not a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. And the question is: what is the difference? For example, let’s take the pit. I dig the pit and I need only the dirt, not the hole—but this is an inevitable result: there is a hole formed here, right? And nevertheless, according to Rabbi Shimon, one is exempt because this is a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. Why? After all, it’s an inevitable result, and it also doesn’t matter whether the hole is beneficial to him or not beneficial to him—nobody makes those distinctions, because in a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose we are usually dealing with an inevitable result. The inevitable result doesn’t play there, but typically the situation is one of an inevitable result. Therefore the question that Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides and the Kesef Mishneh ask is: what is the difference between someone who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, and someone who drags a bench and necessarily creates a furrow? Because if you don’t create it necessarily, then that’s the difference between it and the person digging the pit. But I’m talking about when you do create it necessarily—then seemingly it’s the same thing, and so the question is what the difference is. Therefore he says: what distinction is there between a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose and an inevitable result? Meaning, between an unintentional act where there is an inevitable result. And then he says… what is the difference? One second, wait, there’s some… sorry. So he says: the distinction is that regarding an inevitable result, the unintentional person does not intend the labor at all, except that it necessarily occurs. Yes, he does not intend to create a furrow, but it necessarily happens—it does happen. For example, he shut his house door and there was a deer there. Inside the house there was a deer and then he trapped it; this is the labor of trapping, yes? He did not intend to preserve the deer, but the labor necessarily occurs in the case of “cut off its head.” That is called unintentional. But in a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, he intends the body of the labor, except that he does not intend its usual purpose. From what he says here, it isn’t clear what the real difference is. Why not say the same thing regarding a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose? I do not intend the labor of digging the pit, except that it necessarily occurs; I intend the labor of the dirt, the removal of the dirt, not the labor of digging the pit.
[Speaker C] Because that’s not what was done in the Tabernacle, so it’s not in the category of labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, and there too I say: I don’t intend the labor of digging a pit, but rather the dirt. That’s all. So why is that not an unintentional act with an inevitable result? How does that difference explain the difference between the cases?
[Speaker C] Because in an inevitable result I do a permitted act, and on its own an additional prohibited labor also comes along.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also in the pit. I remove the sand, which is permitted, and on its own there comes into being a labor of digging a pit.
[Speaker I] Why? Removing the sand is prohibited. The labor of taking dirt is a prohibited labor in a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, removing the sand—
[Speaker I] —is permitted,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] only digging the pit is prohibited.
[Speaker D] But say when I remove dirt, it’s permitted to remove sand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, one minute.
[Speaker D] But in abstraction, if we give the example of skinning: to skin a hide, I am doing a labor, I know I am doing a prohibited labor, and I skin the hide and I have no interest in it, in the hide itself; rather I skin the hide. But here I want the dirt, and along the way another labor also comes about.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore what? So therefore digging the pit is unintentional? A labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose? Unintentional? In a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose?
[Speaker D] But the Talmud—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says it is a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, digging a pit. That is exactly my question.
[Speaker I] That’s the question—why the person is doing it. If he is doing a prohibited labor and, by the way, he doesn’t need the labor itself but only its result, then that’s what Ruti said, so that is a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. But if he does a permitted act and then another labor gets done—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he drags a bench and creates a furrow, then he is plowing now, only he is not—
[Speaker B] No, but wait, Rabbi, that’s dragging a bench.
[Speaker I] Dragging a bench that in a different reality would have been permitted.
[Speaker D] Dragging a bench is not a labor. From dragging a bench a labor comes into being.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker B] Rabbi, when he digs, only one act can be done here. But when one drags a bench, there are two actions here. He wants to move the bench from one place to another.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The standard formulation really is the formulation Ruti is saying here. I was only trying to demonstrate to you why this formulation is very, very far from being simple. The standard formulation—that this is what Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides means, and the Kesef Mishneh, and the Magen Avraham also brings this—is that the difference is the question whether you are doing one labor or two labors. One labor with two results, or two labors each of which has a result. If you do one labor that has two results, one of them for its own intrinsic purpose as was done in the Tabernacle, and you do it for the second result, that is called a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. If there are two different labors here, where you are involved in one labor that is a permitted labor, only on its own another labor occurs, which is the prohibited labor, and you did not intend it, you are not doing it for that—this is an unintentional act. Now understand that this is a very vague definition. Because why is dragging a bench, where in the course of it I also create a furrow, considered two labors and not one labor with two results? One result is that the bench changed place, and the second result is that a furrow was formed. Why is that not the same thing as digging the dirt from the pit, which is one labor with two results—the pit and the dirt? What’s the difference?
[Speaker I] If I had dragged it on a floor, if I had dragged it on a floor then no furrow would have been made, but because reality itself, the surrounding environment, caused the second labor to be done—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if I had dug a pit in concrete I wouldn’t have had dirt, so what?
[Speaker I] What difference does that make? True, but then the labor was done; here it couldn’t be done—
[Speaker B] Rabbi, dragging the bench—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait—Noa, Noa, one second, Noa.
[Speaker I] In a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, if I can’t dig the pit in the house, then I really won’t dig a pit, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if you do dig a pit in the house because you want the concrete, then what? In any situation, you can do everything without the second thing—think of another situation, you can do anything without the other one.
[Speaker I] Why? How can I dig a pit without making a cavity? How can you take dirt without making a cavity?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Easily—what’s the problem? If there’s a pile of dirt, I take dirt and don’t make any cavity at all.
[Speaker E] You make a cavity in the pile.
[Speaker B] No—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not called a cavity.
[Speaker B] Okay, but I want to ask. Wait. Dragging the bench from one place to another is not a labor in terms of the definition of the Sabbath labors. Right. So it’s not one labor and two results; these are not exactly labors.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again, obviously this is not a prohibited Sabbath labor, because otherwise there would be no unintentional act; I would be liable for that labor itself. We’re talking about a permitted act. But still there is a definition of two acts—they’re not from the list of prohibited labors, but there are two acts, let’s call it that, not two labors: two acts, each of which has one result. And in a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, it is one act that has two results.
[Speaker E] Can we go back to the picture of the deer? Basically I closed the door, which is fine, but I trapped. I trapped a deer, meaning that this is a prohibited act. So here, seemingly, I have no intention, okay? I’m saying seemingly—I have no intention, or I didn’t succeed—the intention to trap the deer, but rather not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I succeeded in trapping the deer, only—
[Speaker E] —that wasn’t the intention for it. That wasn’t the goal. The goal, in the course of closing the door, I don’t know what. Okay. But here it seems to me this is not a labor for its own intrinsic purpose, and there’s also no intention here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re repeating my question—that is exactly the question I’m asking. With the deer too, for example, I would ask the same question: why not define it—
[Speaker I] —as a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m just closing a door. It has two results: the deer is trapped and the door is closed.
[Speaker H] And I’m interested in the result of the door’s being closed and not in the result of the deer’s being trapped. So why is that not called there a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose? No? What? The deer is a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. No, maybe unintentional. No, with closing the door, it appears in the Talmud in both senses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re right—here it appears as a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. It appears in both senses, and they even talk there about an inevitable result. In short, this deer is exactly the same story. There too I can say that it is a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. But maybe in order for a labor to be called a labor, it has to be done in a certain manner or with a certain tool. For example, plowing—there are ways to plow. Moving a bed across dirt is not the way to plow, and automatically that indicates that I did not intend to do that. According to this, if I were to plow by means of the bench and intended to make the furrow, I would also be exempt. And that is not true. The Talmud makes the exemption depend on the fact that I did not intend to make a furrow—implying that if I had intended it, I would be liable.
[Speaker F] I want to note something for a second. First of all, that’s why we really said earlier that if there is an unintentional act with an inevitable result, that means he really did intend. That there is no such thing as an unintentional act with an inevitable result. So one opinion really doesn’t accept that. There is no such thing as unintentional with an inevitable result.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—but it’s still not a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. Therefore, apart from a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose—
[Speaker F] Therefore, if I move the bench and there will definitely be furrows, I won’t say that this is an unintentional act with an inevitable result, because there is no such concept.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course there is such a concept.
[Speaker F] Unintentional, but we said that according to one opinion, unintentional with an inevitable result is called intentional.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, wait—that’s exactly the point. Intentional. It is called intentional. And he asks why that is not a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, so that one would be exempt.
[Speaker F] Now I wanted to say for a second about the issue of the digger, that it is a very different action—that’s how I see it. It’s terribly, terribly hard to be precise here, but I think that when a person wants the dirt, what does he say to himself? He doesn’t say to himself, “Come, now let’s bring ourselves some dirt,” but rather, “How will I get the dirt? I’ll dig this pit here and I’ll take the dirt, but I don’t need the pit itself, only the dirt.” In contrast, when a person moves a cart, he doesn’t say, “How will I move the cart? I’ll make furrows here and then I’ll have the cart, the cart will move.” Rather, he just comes and moves the cart. It’s a bit disingenuous to say that these two things are exactly the same.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not sure I understood that distinction. You basically want to say that when I remove dirt from the ground, I really am involved in the labor of digging a pit, only my goal is not for the sake of the pit but for the sake of the sand. In contrast, when I drag the bench, if my goal is not the furrow but moving the bench, then one cannot say at all that I am engaged here in the labor of plowing; rather, I am engaged here in the act of moving a bench, and the plowing happens automatically. Is that the claim? Yes. Okay.
[Speaker F] Therefore it matters what the goal is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: but the point is that in both cases—no—the goal in both cases is the permitted goal. The question is what the relation is to the prohibited component. Is the prohibited component a prohibited labor that I did not intend, in which case it is unintentional, or is the prohibited component a result of the action that I did do and did intend to do, only not for that result but for some other result? Okay? So again, I’m saying: there is some kind of feeling that there is a difference between the situations. To tell you there is a clear criterion—that would be a lie. Meaning, the criterion is very, very far from unambiguous, and I brought you the example of skinning there so that you could see how the commentators get tangled up with this, with the difference between unintentional and a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. Because defining when I am doing two acts, one of which I want and one of which I do not, and when I am engaged in one act that has two results, one of which I want and one of which I do not—the definition is not simple. Think, for example, about the inevitable result when I cut off the chicken’s head. When I cut off the chicken’s head, that is really a single momentary act. It’s really similar to digging a pit. If we go back to Chani—Chani, what would you say about something like that? I cut off the chicken’s head. So what, I don’t say to myself, “I’m basically going to kill the chicken”? Only I don’t need its body, I need the head. So I do the killing for the sake of the head and not for the sake of the chicken. According to your definition, this ought to have been a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, not an unintentional act with an inevitable result. Right.
[Speaker B] The question is what is the chicken—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the chicken?
[Speaker B] The body or the head?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both. What do you mean, what is the chicken? That’s not—
[Speaker B] Wait, you’re saying we should split it? I don’t need the chicken, I need the head—but the head and the chicken are one and the same.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So according to that, this is really outright intentional. So if that’s the case, then the whole discussion doesn’t even begin. I’m not… clearly that is not the idea here. Now the question still is: why is this classified as unintentional with an inevitable result and not as a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose? The line here is far from sharp; it’s very hard to put your finger on some precise definition. And again, I don’t have anything more to give you than that; I’m just drawing your attention to the fact that the definition here is really not sharp. Okay, that’s…
[Speaker B] But Rabbi, regarding unintentional—this is subjective, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both are subjective. And my not being interested in the result—is that not subjective?
[Speaker B] Yes, but the inevitable result seems to me to be an objective measure; it doesn’t seem to me…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s unrelated. Right now I’m referring to unintentional versus a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. Leave the inevitable result aside for the moment. Both are subjective criteria, and that’s why I said this is the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda: whether we relate to subjective dimensions or whether we relate to the fact that happened, to the action that happened, and that’s it. Both are subjective dimensions. Good, so really here…
[Speaker I] What is the difference between them—between unintentional with an inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose—if in the end it becomes the same thing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I didn’t understand.
[Speaker I] Isn’t unintentional with an inevitable result basically a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose in practice?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can I look at it that way? Absolutely not. Absolutely not. A labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is liable. Sorry—a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, according to Rabbi Shimon, one is exempt.
[Speaker I] Yes, but an inevitable result… if…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An unintentional act with an inevitable result—one is liable.
[Speaker I] Right, and a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Shimon…
[Speaker I] Only according to Maimonides it’s liable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’m talking about Rabbi Shimon; right now I’m talking about the Tannaim. Leave the decisors aside; the decisors are another story. But I want to discuss each view on its own terms. So Rabbi Shimon’s own view—you see that it’s not the same thing. There are those who claim that an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him—about which they say one is exempt—is really a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. What does “not beneficial to him” mean? Not… think about an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him: I drag a bench, I do not intend the furrow, and it is also not convenient for me that a furrow was produced after the fact. That can already be treated as though I basically did one act that has two results, right? A furrow was created and the bench changed place, and I am interested in the permitted result—that the bench moved place—and not in the result that a furrow was created. Tosafot in several places identifies this with a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose.
[Speaker I] But it doesn’t have to be only “not beneficial to him”; it could also be “he doesn’t care,” right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s already a different discussion, a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot, as I said earlier.
[Speaker I] But in a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, I don’t need it to be uncomfortable for me. Right. So why… so why specifically…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At most you can say that this identification is possible only according to the view that “not beneficial to him” also means “he doesn’t care.” Let’s say—I don’t want to get into that discussion right now—but fine, let’s say according to that view. In short, you’re linking the two disputes among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) to one another. I’m not sure you’re right, but in order not to get into it I’ll say it’s not important; I’m still making the same point. All right?
[Speaker I] So what really is Rabbi Shimon’s logic with the inevitable result?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker I] Meaning, why does he concede in the case of an inevitable result?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So here, look—I’ll introduce this briefly, because we won’t have time to get into it today. Rabbi Chaim touches on this a bit; I’ll do it very briefly. In principle, as Rabbi… I’m already getting ahead of myself here—Rabbi Chaim distinguished between two meanings of the concept “unintentional.” Unintentional can mean “I’m not interested in it”—meaning not that I don’t benefit from it, that’s benefit, but rather I didn’t do this for that purpose, okay? And unintentional can mean: I didn’t know at all that this was going to happen. I didn’t intend it, meaning I didn’t think a furrow would come out here; I didn’t think about it at all. That’s another discussion. The first concerns intentionality—what I am aiming at mentally, why I did this action. The second is an issue of information. What did I know when I dragged the bench—did I know that a furrow was going to be made or not? So Rabbi Chaim says that according to these two definitions, the role of an inevitable result changes. If I say that unintentional means I didn’t know beforehand that a furrow would come out, I permit it—but in the case of an inevitable result, you did know, and this was a certain result. Certain, necessary. It was clear that on this kind of ground, when you drag a bench, a furrow is made. There aren’t two possibilities here. It’s not ground where maybe a furrow will come out and maybe it won’t. You knew it. Okay, therefore the inevitable result cancels the lack of intention. Because in an inevitable result, you basically really do intend. By the way, according to that, it comes out that an inevitable result is really fully liable—it’s not a rabbinic prohibition.
[Speaker F] No, no—I didn’t understand the distinction.
[Speaker I] But why? If Rabbi Shimon says that the main thing is intention, then what difference does it make that it’s an inevitable result? I have absolutely no intention to make a furrow.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, Noa, I’ll explain again. What is called intention? One possibility: intention means—no, that’s the first option—no, one possibility is that intention means to know that this is going to happen. That’s called intending. When I drag a bench, I don’t know that a furrow will be made; I’m only moving the bench. So they say, ah—and that is the option—
[Speaker I] —the second one you said earlier.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait. But if it is an inevitable result, then I do know. Therefore the inevitable result turns the unintentional into intentional, and you are liable. That is according to the conception that lack of intention is lack of knowledge. There is another meaning to lack of intention. And that means that I did not intend that; that was not the purpose of my action. In that case, Rabbi Chaim asks: so how does the inevitable result help? Rabbi Chaim himself asks this. How does the inevitable result help? I still didn’t do it for that purpose. So what if dragging the bench will necessarily create a furrow? True, it will necessarily be created, and I also knew beforehand that it would be created, but that was not the purpose for which I dragged the bench. The exemption of unintentional has nothing to do with knowledge but with intention. And I do not intend the furrow even though I knew. So why does it matter that it was an inevitable result? So I’m saying here in parentheses—because Rabbi Chaim doesn’t say this; Rabbi Chaim leaves it as a difficulty, and therefore he says it cannot work with that meaning of intention. But other later authorities (Acharonim) argue that this is not so.
[Speaker F] Wait, sorry, I didn’t understand for a second the issue of why—this issue. If I didn’t know it would happen, then why, if it’s an inevitable result, did I certainly know? No, no—I didn’t manage to understand.
[Speaker C] No, you knew it would happen. In an inevitable result, you knew it would happen even if you didn’t want it.
[Speaker F] So in what situation did I not know it would happen?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When it is not an inevitable result. Say, when it is not an inevitable result, then you don’t know whether a furrow will be created or not. But if it is an inevitable result, then you know. But unintentional and not knowing—that doesn’t sound… no, no, it’s not inadvertent. But that’s already the distinction Maimonides made. Did I not know it was prohibited, or did I not know it would happen? Here I knew there was a chance it would happen, but it wasn’t certain.
[Speaker E] And not intending—like, no?
[Speaker F] But okay, but Maimonides already made the distinction. When it says unintentional, the meaning is that the result might happen and might not happen. Meaning, it’s not an inevitable result. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An unintentional thing—the question is why, nevertheless, in an inevitable result one is liable. Because in an inevitable result I do intend. Unintentional is only when there is no inevitable result. When it is an inevitable result, I simply do intend. Unintentional plus inevitable result, according to this interpretation, is simply intentional. It goes back to being intentional; it is not true that you do not intend—you do intend. Okay, that’s according to the understanding that unintentional means “doesn’t know,” or “doesn’t know for certain.” But according to the understanding that unintentional, as I presented it until now—and that is the accepted understanding—means that this was not my motivation for doing the action: I knew that a furrow might be created here, maybe I even knew for certain that there would be a furrow here, but that is not why I dragged the bench. My motivation was something else. Here the question really arises: why, in the case of an inevitable result, do I become liable again? I still don’t intend it. The exemption is not based on lack of knowledge. So why is it relevant that it was an inevitable result? That’s what Noa asked earlier. So that is exactly the question Rabbi Chaim asks, and therefore he argues that with this kind of unintentionality—intentionality in the sense of purpose—the inevitable result is not relevant at all. Only for the unintentionality of not knowing. Okay? But I’m saying, here in parentheses, there are other later authorities who asked this question and they claim otherwise. For example, Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Shiurim. I didn’t take you into all the corners of the topic, because it’s a broad topic, but still I want us to get a taste of its outlines. Rabbi Elchanan argues that the reason why, when I do not intend, I am exempt—the inevitable result does not turn me into someone who intends; rather, it solves the problem created by the lack of intention. What does that mean? When I do not intend—why am I exempt? So what if I do not intend? Because if I do not intend, it is not considered my action. I dragged a bench; the creation of the furrow is something that happened on its own, not something attributable to me. Since I did not make the furrow, they cannot make me liable for it. Therefore unintentional exempts. Rabbi Elchanan says: yes, but if the making of the furrow is a direct and necessary result of dragging the bench, then you cannot say that you didn’t do it. So that connects the action to you even though you did not intend it. It doesn’t solve the problem of unintentionality; it doesn’t turn you into someone who intends—but why is intention needed at all? Intention itself is not needed for its own sake; it is needed in order to connect the prohibited action to me, because if I don’t intend it, the action is not connected to me, it isn’t considered my action. Rabbi Elchanan says: so if it is an inevitable result, the inevitable result connects the action to you in an alternative way, despite there being no intention here. Therefore in an inevitable result you are liable. Do you understand what I’m saying? Yes. Again: if unintentional means this was not the purpose for which I dragged the bench—not a problem of knowledge but a problem of purpose—okay? Then Rabbi Elchanan asks: so why does the inevitable result solve that problem? Why, in an inevitable result, am I liable, and Rabbi Shimon concedes that I am liable, even though I do not intend it? After all, I still did not drag the bench for the sake of the furrow. That exemption still exists. What difference does it make that the furrow was certainly expected? So he says this: let’s try to think why, if I don’t intend it, I am exempt according to Rabbi Shimon. So I didn’t intend it—so what? Why am I exempt? I am exempt because when I did not intend the action, it is not considered my action. It’s not that intention is required; intention is not needed in itself. What is needed is that the action be considered my action. Intention is the means that connects the action to me. Okay? And therefore when there is intention, the action is connected to me and then I violate the prohibition. What happens when there is no intention? Then the exemption is not “there is no intention”; rather, once there is no intention, the action simply is not connected to me, and therefore I am exempt. Rabbi Elchanan says: yes, but there may be alternative ways to connect the action to me even though I did not intend it. For example, if the action necessarily follows from another action that I did intend. That too is enough to connect the action of the furrow to me, even though I still do not intend it—I did not do the action for its sake. If the requirement of intention is an essential requirement, then an inevitable result does not solve it, because I still do not intend the furrow. But if the requirement for intention is only to connect the action to me—not that one truly has to intend, but rather that the action has to be connected to me in order to make me liable for what I did—then it may be that there are several ways to connect an action to me. One way is that I intend it, but it could be that even if I do not intend it, if it necessarily results from another action that I did intend, that too connects the other action to me, and then I will be liable even though I do not intend it. Meaning, when I say that if… I can’t hear.
[Speaker E] That I gave the chicken’s head to a child to play with—meaning, the fact that I cut, killed the bird, cut off the head, that is an action that is necessary for the sake of giving the toy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, that’s an inevitable result.
[Speaker E] So then here—no, okay—so I’m saying here, this is some very clear kind of connection in…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it isn’t clear. It becomes clear after we gave the explanations here, but otherwise it’s very unclear. I still didn’t do it for the sake of killing the chicken; I did it so my child would have a toy. So they say to me: true, you didn’t do it for the sake of killing the chicken, but it’s obvious that when you cut off the head, the chicken will die. That is a certain result. Once the result is a certain result, then even though you didn’t intend it, you are liable. And that is the question…
[Speaker B] Rabbi, according to Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, then if it was not clear that there would be a furrow through dragging the bench, and he did make a furrow, is that considered indirect causation, sort of?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not indirect causation; it’s unintentional.
[Speaker I] Indirect causation is that I wanted the furrow and I did it in an indirect way. Right, in an indirect way. But earlier there was the idea that, as it were, there’s someone else in the game when it’s not an inevitable result—there are, I don’t know, forces of nature and so on—and when it is an inevitable result…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The action is not considered my action. Therefore the action is not considered my action, because something else caused it to happen. But if it is a necessary result of what I did, then it is still my action. Okay? Even though that does not solve the problem of intention—I still genuinely do not intend in the sense of purpose—but it doesn’t matter; purpose is not needed. All that purpose is needed for is to connect the action to me. If the action is connected to me in an alternative way, then what difference does it make that I did not intend it?
[Speaker I] But according to this explanation, for Rabbi Shimon it doesn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —work out.
[Speaker I] But for Rabbi Shimon it doesn’t work out—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] because if you follow intentions, there is room to hesitate. It still could be that it’s relevant, but let’s leave that; that’s not the main point. Chani, clear? All right? You said before it wasn’t clear.
[Speaker F] Clear, yes, I understood. Thank you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so let’s continue. Once again, I brought you this case of flaying the Passover offering just so you can see that even the medieval authorities (Rishonim), the later authorities (Acharonim), and the Talmud itself hesitate there between an unintentional act and an inevitable result. More than that, there are medieval authorities who want to argue that what they really meant there… the terminology itself is already confusing. In other words, there are sometimes situations where they say “unintentional” but really mean “inevitable result,” or “a labor not needed for its own purpose,” and vice versa. In that context, again, whoever at some point has time—it takes a bit of time—to read Rav Aharon Kotler, it’s a real intellectual experience. First of all, the man was a genius, so in general it’s worth reading his writings. But the way he explains this question of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, and he goes along Rav Chaim’s line… after we explain Rav Chaim, it’ll be easier for you to read what Rav Aharon Kotler says. But again, I won’t have time here to get into that whole story. So I want to move already to Maimonides and Rav Chaim, simply because that’s the heart of the matter. So, here’s the point: these three cases are really cases of a labor not needed for its own purpose. The three cases in the Talmud where it says exempt and permitted are basically—at least two of them—a labor not needed for its own purpose; maybe the third as well, meaning the first one. That already depends on textual variants, but it’s less important for our purposes. So let’s talk about lancing an abscess and trapping a snake, okay? Lancing an abscess means someone opens an opening in some kind of pus-filled wound in order to let out the pus. Not in order to create an opening—making the opening itself is forbidden—but in order to let out the pus, and that’s a labor not needed for its own purpose. In the case of trapping a snake, again, trapping the snake is forbidden—that’s the labor of trapping—but I’m doing it not because I need the snake, but because I want the snake not to bite me. It’s done for another purpose, not for the purpose intrinsic to the labor itself. Trapping in its own proper sense means trapping an animal when I need the animal itself. But here I’m trapping the animal so it won’t roam free and harm me. Okay? So that’s a labor not needed for its own purpose. Tosafot asks about this in our passage as follows: regarding trapping a snake, Tosafot says, the Behag asked. The Ba'al Halakhot Gedolot is one of the Geonim; there’s a dispute among the medieval authorities about who he was, what his name was—whether it was Rav Shimon Kayyara or Rav Hai Gaon. There are debates about this. In any event, the Behag asked: Samuel contradicts Samuel. He challenges one statement of Samuel from another statement of Samuel elsewhere. Because here Samuel holds—here in our passage on page 3—Samuel holds that a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt, like Rabbi Shimon. And because of bodily suffering, it is permitted. What does that mean? We know, after all, that a labor not needed for its own purpose is a rabbinic prohibition, right? So why here does Samuel say that it is exempt and permitted—not a rabbinic prohibition, but fully permitted? Because of suffering—bodily suffering. I want to heal myself, remove the pus from myself, or make sure the snake doesn’t bite me. So in principle this isn’t permitted; it’s an action that involves a rabbinic prohibition, but they permitted that rabbinic prohibition because of alleviating my suffering, to allow me to protect myself from these things. According to Rabbi Yehuda, where the action itself is biblically forbidden, because he holds that a labor not needed for its own purpose is biblically forbidden, then of course according to his view they did not permit it, because this is not a case of danger to life. It’s important to understand: we’re not talking about a situation where the snake threatens one’s life. If that were the case, it wouldn’t be connected to this whole discussion at all. Danger to life overrides everything. We’re talking about a situation meant to prevent suffering or bodily discomfort. In such situations they permitted a rabbinic prohibition. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, for whom a labor not needed for its own purpose is a rabbinic prohibition, they permitted it here, and therefore it is fully permitted. Where there is no bodily suffering, it is a rabbinic prohibition; where there is bodily suffering, they permitted it entirely. According to Rabbi Yehuda, where this is a Torah prohibition, then even in a case of suffering they did not permit it. A Torah prohibition is overridden in a case of danger to life, not where you just want to spare yourself suffering. Okay? So that’s why these cases were established only according to Rabbi Shimon. When it says in our passage exempt and permitted, that goes only according to Rabbi Shimon. Because according to Rabbi Shimon, a labor not needed for its own purpose is basically a rabbinic prohibition. In a case of suffering, they permitted it entirely. According to Rabbi Yehuda, it’s a Torah prohibition and they did not permit it at all. So the whole statement of Samuel here goes according to Rabbi Shimon, okay? That it is exempt and permitted. And in the chapter Kira, I’m continuing to read in Tosafot, and in the chapter Kira you said—
[Speaker C] You’re not sharing. You’re doing it on purpose.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh, I forgot.
[Speaker E] Wait, it’s me—I wanted to ask where we’re reading.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sorry, I sent you approval. You have no faith in the sages. Okay, difficult.
[Speaker C] You have to be like an angel of God. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so again: regarding trapping a snake, the Behag asked that Samuel contradicts Samuel, and he challenges Samuel from Samuel. Because here, Samuel holds—in our passage on page 3—Samuel holds that a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt, like Rabbi Shimon. Exempt means a rabbinic prohibition, and because of bodily suffering it is permitted. Where there is bodily suffering, they permitted it entirely, and therefore it is exempt and permitted. And in the chapter Kira, on 42b, we say: regarding an unintentional act he rules like Rabbi Shimon; regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose he rules like Rabbi Yehuda. The Talmud there distinguishes according to Samuel—it depends. Regarding an unintentional act, he rules like Rabbi Shimon; regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose, he rules like Rabbi Yehuda. All right? By the way, this shows that the basis of the dispute is not the same basis. Because if it were the same basis, there would be no reason to split it this way. If you hold like Rabbi Shimon, then in both cases you hold like Rabbi Shimon; if like Rabbi Yehuda, then in both cases like Rabbi Yehuda. That too goes a bit against the little idea I said earlier, but let’s leave that aside. So Samuel says that regarding an unintentional act he rules like Rabbi Shimon; regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose, he rules like Rabbi Yehuda. So what’s difficult? The difficulty is that if with respect to a labor not needed for its own purpose he rules like Rabbi Yehuda, then lancing an abscess and trapping a snake—which are cases of a labor not needed for its own purpose—are biblically forbidden. In that situation, in a case of bodily suffering, they did not permit it. So why here does this same Samuel himself say that they did permit it—that it is exempt and permitted? After all, according to his own view he rules like Rabbi Yehuda, so this is a Torah prohibition, and here this statement goes according to Rabbi Shimon’s view about a labor not needed for its own purpose. How can that be? That’s the contradiction. And Rabbenu Tam answered that Samuel is saying—that what Samuel said is that according to Rabbi Shimon, who says a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt, in these three cases it is exempt and permitted. As Samuel proves in the chapter HaOreg, where he certainly means exempt and permitted. But he himself does not hold like Rabbi Shimon. He says: he is presenting Rabbi Shimon’s view; he himself does not hold that way. Rabbenu Tam is basically saying that Samuel says here that according to Rabbi Shimon, when Rabbi Shimon said exempt, he meant exempt and permitted. But Samuel himself certainly rules like Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore according to his own view this is biblically forbidden—not exempt and not permitted, but biblically forbidden, liable. Okay? He is only explaining according to the Tanna Rabbi Shimon, whom I myself do not follow, that the exemption written here means exempt and permitted. That’s all. That’s what Tosafot says. In other words, Tosafot basically remains with the conclusion that there really is a contradiction, and we have to say that what Samuel said here was not according to his own view but according to Rabbi Shimon’s. He himself, who rules like Rabbi Yehuda, really does not accept this. Nevertheless, for us, Tosafot says, we rule like Rabbi Shimon, because Rava, who was later, held like him at the beginning of the chapter Notel. Fine? So Rava holds like Rabbi Shimon, and therefore in practice we rule, regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose, like Rabbi Shimon. Okay? Now, do you remember how Maimonides rules? Maimonides rules regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose like Rabbi—
[Speaker B] Yehuda, and regarding an unintentional act like Rabbi Shimon.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or in other words, Maimonides rules like Samuel, right? That’s exactly what the Talmud on page 42 says: regarding an unintentional act he rules like Rabbi Shimon, that it is permitted; and regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose he rules like Rabbi Yehuda, that one is liable. Liable—sorry. Okay? Liable. So that is exactly Maimonides’ ruling. Maimonides follows Samuel. He does not accept this reasoning that Tosafot says here, that because Rava was later—Rava was the fifth or sixth generation of Amoraim, and Samuel was first generation—so there is such a rule that the law follows the later authority. Here Maimonides apparently did not accept that rule for some reason, and he does rule like Samuel. Fine, up to here, okay? This is a dispute among the medieval authorities about how to rule. Maimonides could still say: I rule like Samuel, but accept Tosafot’s answer that Samuel here was not stating his personal view; he was stating what follows according to Rabbi Shimon—that Rabbi Shimon, when he says exempt here, means exempt and permitted. But I myself certainly think it is forbidden, and therefore there is no room to permit it; it is a Torah prohibition. Okay? Except that Maimonides follows Samuel all the way through. Yes, except that in Maimonides’ rulings it is written otherwise. Because Maimonides in law 3 rules that a labor not needed for its own purpose incurs liability. You see? Anyone who performs labor on the Sabbath, even though he does not need the actual purpose of the labor, is liable for it. And then he gives examples, not important right now. In other words, he rules that one is liable, like Rabbi Yehuda, right? Yes, and here the Raavad objected to him. You see? The Raavad’s gloss: “Anyone who performs labor,” etc. Rabbeinu Chananel ruled like Rabbi Shimon, who exempts, because we say in the chapter Notel—that’s what Tosafot brought—that Rava held like Rabbi Shimon, who says a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt. Exactly the same proof Tosafot brought: because Rava holds like Rabbi Shimon, and Rava was later, and the law follows the later authorities more—which is the opposite of what we’re generally used to, where later authorities don’t dispute earlier ones. Within the Talmud, the rule is the opposite: if there is a dispute between an earlier Amora and a later Amora, the law follows the later Amora, except from the generation of Abaye and Rava onward. And so the Raavad says exactly what Tosafot said here. But Maimonides does not accept that. Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yehuda regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose, because he follows Samuel. Now the Kesef Mishneh—the same Kesef Mishneh I brought earlier, where he brought Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides, who made the distinction between a labor not needed for its own purpose and an unintentional act—that same Kesef Mishneh in its first part asks against Maimonides. He says: the Ramakh wrote—Rabbi Moshe HaKohen of Lunel, one of the medieval authorities—even though the Rif also ruled this way, the Rif also ruled that for a labor not needed for its own purpose one is liable, this did not seem correct to the Ramakh. Yes, remember the Raavad, who said that the Ramakh rules like Rabbi Shimon, and that none of my teachers accepted it. These are the sages of Provence, by the way; Lunel is in Provence in France. The Ramakh was from Lunel, and so was the Raavad. “And none of my teachers accepted it because of several anonymous passages”—what does “anonymous passages” mean? The anonymous editorial voice of the Talmud in several places rules like Rabbi Shimon, such as trapping a snake and lancing an abscess, where it says that it is permitted, and that only works according to Rabbi Shimon, and also the case that all harmful creatures may be killed, and the case of one who is protective of the lamp, and so on. He brings many places where it says like Rabbi Shimon. And also in the chapter Notel, what everyone brought: Rava held like Rabbi Shimon, who says a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt. And the Rif himself brought this statement of Rabbi Yohanan, etc., which is like Rabbi Shimon, and he also brought the rule that all Sabbath exemptions—except these three—are exempt but forbidden, whereas these are exempt and permitted, and that follows Rabbi Shimon. Right? The Rif himself brought these exemptions of the Sabbath—that it is exempt and permitted in the cases of lancing an abscess and trapping a snake—and that follows Rabbi Shimon. We saw this. So how does he bring it as law? The same question arises regarding Maimonides. Let’s look at Maimonides. Maimonides—I’m skipping a bit—Maimonides in chapter 10, law 17 writes as follows: One who lances a boil on the Sabbath in order to widen the mouth of the wound, the way physicians do, whose intent in healing is to widen the opening of the wound—such a person is liable because of the final hammer blow, because that is the physician’s labor. But if he lanced it in order to remove the fluid inside it, that is permitted. What is Maimonides’ source? Our Talmud on page 3, right? That lancing an abscess is exempt and permitted if one does it in order to remove the fluid, because it is a labor not needed for its own purpose—it’s a rabbinic prohibition—and if one does it because of bodily suffering, then it is fully permitted. That’s how Maimonides brings it. The same with trapping a snake, chapter 10, law 25, eight laws later. In chapter 10, law 25: Harmful creeping creatures, such as snakes and scorpions and the like—even though they do not kill, notice, this is not danger to life—since they bite, it is permitted to trap them on the Sabbath, provided that one intends to protect oneself from their bite, but not in order to trap them. Because then it would be labor needed for its own purpose. But if he intends only to save himself from their bite—he doesn’t need the snake or scorpion itself—then it is a labor not needed for its own purpose, and it is permitted. Fully permitted to trap them on the Sabbath. What does that mean? Again, in both lancing an abscess and trapping a snake, Maimonides rules like Samuel’s statement on page 3—
[Speaker F] But we said that regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose he rules like Rabbi Yehuda, right? So that’s the contradiction, right? That’s the question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Samuel—not like Tosafot. It’s just the same question that Tosafot asks as a contradiction within Samuel. But Tosafot answers that contradiction by saying: no problem, Samuel wasn’t stating his own opinion on page 3; he was saying what follows according to Rabbi Shimon. According to Samuel’s own view, obviously this is a Torah prohibition, and here it wouldn’t be permitted. Okay, no problem. But Maimonides—not only does he say this in Rabbi Shimon’s name, he brings it as practical law. And in practice he rules like Rabbi Yehuda. But according to Rabbi Yehuda there’s no room for these leniencies, because a labor not needed for its own purpose is a Torah prohibition. In a case of suffering we do not permit a Torah prohibition. What Rabbi Shimon wrote—what Samuel, sorry, wrote—that this is exempt and permitted, is only according to Rabbi Shimon’s opinion. But Samuel himself does not hold that way, as Tosafot says. And Maimonides rules like Samuel—so how can Maimonides bring this as law? The same question that the Ramakh asks about the Rif, and that Tosafot asks about the Behag—that same question we ask about Maimonides. Except that there, Tosafot’s answer won’t help. Tosafot’s answer helps when you say about Samuel that Samuel was speaking according to Rabbi Shimon, not giving his own opinion, but saying what follows according to Rabbi Shimon. But Maimonides here is giving his own opinion; he’s ruling this as law. And according to his own view, a labor not needed for its own purpose is a Torah prohibition.
[Speaker E] Couldn’t he be deriving it here from somewhere else entirely, from the issue of danger to life?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—I said, this is not danger to life. If it were danger to life, nobody would tie it to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. Danger to life overrides all prohibitions in the Torah.
[Speaker C] Maybe the dispute—
[Speaker B] But weren’t we—with Rav Chaim, I think Rav Chaim said that if someone is harmful to the public, it’s considered like danger—that if, for example, a snake can harm the public, then it counts like danger to life?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if it’s danger to life, then why would it depend on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda? The Talmud makes it depend on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, so it can’t be danger to life. That’s why he also explains—Maimonides explicitly explains it. Look at the first line: harmful creeping creatures such as snakes and scorpions and the like, even though they do not kill. It’s not danger to life.
[Speaker B] If it were danger to life—that’s what it means in public.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short, the Maggid Mishneh also holds—never mind—he ties it to disputes, not important right now. I’m not going to get into that here, because what I still want somehow to have time to touch on is Rav Chaim. So let’s start seeing a little of Rav Chaim, as much as we can. First, let me just ask: how much did you manage? Was it okay? Did you finish the page or not finish it, or how far did you get?
[Speaker C] No.
[Speaker G] No, we—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Didn’t see it—
[Speaker C] There were a lot of concepts during the learning itself, so the learning went more slowly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so I’m asking how far you got. No problem, I’m not—
[Speaker C] We got to seven.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which is—remind me?
[Speaker C] The Talmud on 107 about Samuel’s three kinds.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so maybe—do you know what? Let’s do something else. I’ll leave Rav Chaim for you, because I actually want you to go through him a bit yourselves—practice reading later authorities, especially in light of the background I gave today. I hope that will also make it easier for you, because this is a classic passage. A classic passage that’s important to me that you work through on your own.
[Speaker B] Rabbi, maybe Maimonides here isn’t going according to Rabbi Yehuda, and perhaps here we’re dealing with damage? I understand. I’m saying that in these three cases Maimonides isn’t going according to Rabbi Yehuda, even though concerning a labor not needed for its own purpose he usually goes according to Rabbi Yehuda. Maybe here the point is damage. At least in two of them, where they are harmful, even if they don’t involve danger to life, they still cause harm.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Where have we found that one may permit a Torah prohibition because of damage? And fully permit it at that?
[Speaker B] We do see that with medical treatment sometimes it’s permitted even if he’s not ill, not in a state—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only death. Or eye damage—there’s a dispute; maybe eyes count as danger to life—but that’s it. Something that is only suffering, bodily suffering, does not override Torah prohibitions. There is no such opinion here.
[Speaker C] But are we allowed to kill mosquitoes on the Sabbath? I didn’t understand. Do we kill mosquitoes or bees on the Sabbath?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With mosquitoes it’s a bit more delicate, or with killing it’s a bit more delicate. Maimonides there writes: what should one do? He should place a vessel over it.
[Speaker C] So to trap, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So to trap. In short, beyond trapping there is also a prohibition of taking life.
[Speaker C] Okay, so to trap with a cup? To put a cup over it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and that is fully permitted from the outset. That is fully permitted. I want to—
[Speaker B] But here too he said to place a vessel over it? What—I didn’t understand. Here too was he talking about placing a vessel over it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes—the point is not to kill it. To kill is something else. Killing also involves the prohibition of taking life. In any event, what I’m going to do now with the remaining time is just go back to the passage I skipped above.
[Speaker F] But I wanted to ask that at least in the next class we should go through Rav Chaim of Brisk, because we did read him and it was very hard for us to understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, of course. My goal is to read him in the next class. Okay? Fine, that’s exactly what I want to do. So let’s do that. Let’s go back for a moment to the passage I skipped.
[Speaker F] The Maggid Mishneh?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this case on 116, about flaying the offering. Yes, it says as follows: The sages taught: If the fourteenth falls on the Sabbath, they flay the Passover offering up to the chest. Yes, the fourteenth means the eve of Passover. The Passover offering is brought on the eve of Passover. Okay? Now what happens when Passover falls on Sunday? Then the eve of Passover falls on the Sabbath. They flay the Passover offering up to the chest—why? In order to remove the sacrificial fats, the internal organs. These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka. And the sages say: they flay it entirely. Fine? So in principle, to remove the sacrificial fats it’s enough to flay up to the chest; you don’t need more than that. So the Talmud explains as follows: Granted, according to Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, because the need of Heaven has been done. Right? What I needed in order to offer it—to remove the sacrificial fats—it’s enough to flay up to the chest. Why continue flaying? So Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka is understandable.
[Speaker B] But Rabbi, is that because the sacrificial fats would be offered before the Sabbath ends? I didn’t understand. Would the sacrificial fats be offered before the Sabbath ends, so that this isn’t preparation from Sabbath to—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a dispute, there’s a dispute whether this can be done on the Sabbath itself or not. But yes, simply speaking, yes. Why—what difference does it make?
[Speaker B] Then it says it’s for a heavenly need, but it’s for today, for the Sabbath need that has to be done.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, doesn’t matter. Even if it is preparation, it’s still permitted because you need it—it’s part of the sacrificial procedure. Fine? But according to the sages, what is the reason? So why do the sages say it’s permitted also to complete the flaying all the way? Why? After all, you don’t need it in order to remove the sacrificial fats. Rabbah bar bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan that Scripture says, “The Lord made everything for His sake.” And here, what “for His sake” is there? After all, it isn’t needed—it’s for the Holy One, for the sacrifice. But if it isn’t needed for the sacrifice, then why do it? Rav Yosef said: so it should not spoil. Rava said: so that consecrated items of Heaven should not lie there like a carcass. Right? So there are different explanations why there is nonetheless some value in continuing the flaying. Later the Talmud asks: what do the sages answer to Rabbi Yishmael? How do they justify it? They bring proof from the case of a Torah scroll case together with the scroll. The Mishnah there says that if a fire breaks out in a house on the Sabbath, one may save not only the Torah scroll but also the case in which it is contained. So too, we can also remove the hide from the Passover offering beyond the amount of flaying required just for removing the sacrificial fats. And then the Talmud says: are the cases really similar? There, it’s just carrying; here, it’s labor. There you’re telling me they take out the Torah case—that’s just carrying, not a Torah prohibition—but here we’re dealing with actual labor. Then the Talmud—not all the details matter to me, this is just to give background, this section is what matters to me. So the Talmud says: rather, Mar bar Rav Ashi said, actually it remains as we said at first. And as for your question that there it’s carrying and here it’s labor—it’s a case where he does not need the hide. He is removing the hide, but he doesn’t need the hide. And then what? Then the flaying is not a Torah prohibition but only a rabbinic prohibition. Even if he flays the whole thing, not just what’s needed for the sacrificial fats—even the second half—as long as he doesn’t need the hide, apparently that is a labor not needed for its own purpose, right? But look further: Yet didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon agrees in the case of an inevitable result? The Talmud asks: but this is an inevitable result! And it answers: he removes it in strips. Meaning, he does it piece by piece, so it isn’t an inevitable result. The details aren’t important. What matters for us is: why does the Talmud ask that it is an inevitable result? We’re talking about a labor not needed for its own purpose, not about an unintentional act. For a labor not needed for its own purpose, it is irrelevant whether it is an inevitable result or not. If someone digs a pit and needs the earth, the creation of the pit is an inevitable result. A pit will certainly be created here, and still there is the exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose according to Rabbi Shimon. Okay? So what’s the connection? How can they raise an objection from the law of an inevitable result against an exemption that is the exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose and not the exemption of an unintentional act?
[Speaker B] Why not say that this is an unintentional act? He doesn’t intend the hide; he doesn’t need the hide.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he doesn’t need the hide—not that he doesn’t intend the hide. He fully intends the hide. What do you mean, “doesn’t intend”? He is performing the act of flaying.
[Speaker B] He doesn’t intend to use the hide.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Doesn’t intend to use the hide” means he doesn’t need the product, the hide itself. That is exactly a labor not needed for its own purpose. He fully intends the flaying. That’s what Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks there. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says there: “that he does not need the hide,” etc.—I did not merit to understand, says Rabbi Akiva Eiger, I did not merit to understand how this is called an unintentional act. Why is this called an unintentional act? How does he know it’s called an unintentional act? Because otherwise they wouldn’t ask about an inevitable result. Right? An inevitable result is relevant only to an unintentional act. But here he intentionally flays the hide with his own hands. He only does not do so for the sake of the hide. And that is called intentional, except that it is not needed for its own purpose, like extinguishing. Yes? When one extinguishes and does not need the charcoal produced by the extinguishing, that too is called a labor not needed for its own purpose. And if we say that where the hide is beneficial to him, that is considered needed for its own purpose, then automatically it is intentional and there would be no need to raise the issue of an inevitable result. And if the hide is not beneficial to him, then even if it were an inevitable result, it would still be an inevitable result that is of no benefit to him. And so the whole language of an inevitable result does not belong here. Because he is acting intentionally, and it depends only on whether the hide is beneficial to him—in which case it is needed for its own purpose—or not beneficial to him—in which case it is not needed for its own purpose. And so too the Rashba asked below on 133 regarding a bright spot. That same passage we brought earlier about the bright spot—there too he says that when in circumcision you cut the skin and at the same time cut off the bright spot, you do it for the circumcision, not for the bright spot. Therefore it is a labor not needed for its own purpose. Right? So the Rashba… the Rashba says this is not an unintentional act; it’s a labor not needed for its own purpose. So what does it have to do with the issue? Fine. So the Rashba there gives an answer—not important—but the answer he gives there is not relevant here, says Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Therefore he says this requires further analysis. I don’t know what connection there is here to an unintentional act. Here it is a labor not needed for its own purpose. What does this have to do with our matter? So here this is already an example where you can see just how fine the line is that separates a labor not needed for its own purpose from an inevitable result. When you ask yourselves, for example, about cutting off the head—which also relates to an unintentional act—in my view cutting off the head is very similar to flaying the hide. If cutting off the head is an unintentional act, I don’t see why in flaying the hide one couldn’t also say that it’s an unintentional act. Except that apparently, in the case of cutting off the head, Rabbi Akiva Eiger understands that when I cut off the head, I’m actually doing two things. I remove the head and kill the chicken. Of course this is done in one act, but in effect it performs two actions with one motion of the hand. It is not one action with two results, but two actions. Killing the chicken is not a result; it is an action. I kill the chicken and remove its head. That is not called one action with two results. Okay? In the case of flaying, you can’t say that I’m flaying and also—and also—wait. Why not? Why isn’t exposing the sacrificial fats like the flaying? No, because he isn’t removing the sacrificial fats; he is only flaying. So what two actions did he do? Exposing the sacrificial fats is the flaying. What—what two actions are there? It is only one action of flaying, but it has two results, one of which interests me and one of which does not. Therefore Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks: here this is a labor not needed for its own purpose, not an unintentional act. In the case of cutting off the head he doesn’t ask this, because there he can understand that the cutting is two actions. The fact that it is done with one motion of the hand is true, but the same is true when dragging a bench: making the furrow and dragging the bench are done in the same action. That’s always true; otherwise the whole discussion wouldn’t arise. But still, when you look at the act the person is doing, you can understand that it has two aspects. It is as if in the same movement he is doing two actions, not one action that has two results. It’s two actions. In contrast, here he is flaying—and what else? Just flaying. There is no additional action here, only two results. So Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks this quite rightly: what do you want? This is a labor not needed for its own purpose, not an unintentional act—something entirely different. And I also showed you that the Ritva there asks the same question and answers with the answers he gives—not important, we won’t get into that here. Okay. I’ll stop here. For next time, if you haven’t finished this page, go over this page and finish it. Maybe I’ll also send you the Kovetz Shiurim that I mentioned earlier, about how an inevitable result splits the unintentional act, so you can see that too. And of course the main focus will be Rav Chaim. Okay?
[Speaker I] We don’t have a good answer to Rabbi Akiva Eiger?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker I] We don’t have a good answer to Rabbi Akiva Eiger? He saw the Ritva, after all, so there isn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s Rav Aharon Kotler. Rav Aharon Kotler follows the line of Rav Chaim of Brisk and also answers Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question. We’ll see—if we manage to get there next time, maybe I’ll also describe it. If you manage to read Rav Aharon Kotler, blessed are you, but it really isn’t easy. Not easy. But I’m saying: after all the preparation, and if you make it through Rav Chaim, it will make things much easier, because he goes on a very similar track. Okay, so we’ll stop here.
[Speaker E] Thank you very much.
